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JORDAN AND AMERICA’S DECADES-LONG FRIENDSHIP

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1
DEWS: Welcome to the Brookings Cafeteria, the podcast about ideas and the experts who have them. I’m Fred Dews.

For over 70 years, Jordan has been an important ally in the Middle East for the United States, a connection built largely on the relationships between two Jordanian monarchs of the Hashemite family—King Hussein and King Abdullah—and American presidents from Eisenhower to Biden. In his new book published by the Brookings Institution Press, “Jordan and America: An Enduring Friendship,” Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel tells the story of this critical relationship. On this episode, Riedel is interviewed by Brookings Press Director Bill Finan about the book, one in a series Riedel has authored about important people and events in the Middle East.

Also on this episode, Joseph Kane, a fellow in the Metropolitan Policy Program, explains how, with a $1.2 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill pending in Congress, regional leaders and institutions can prepare future infrastructure workers now.

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First up, here’s Joseph Kane.

KANE: Hello this is Joseph Kane, a fellow at the Brookings Metropolitan Policy program.

Washington is on the verge of advancing two historic pieces of legislation: a $1.2 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill and a $3.5 trillion reconciliation package. While the ultimate fate of both is up in the air, one point is clear: policymakers are focused on creating more jobs and supporting more workers following the COVID-19 recession.

And the potential for infrastructure to deliver a needed jolt to the labor market continues to attract bipartisan interest, which makes sense given the competitive wages, lower
formal educational barriers to entry, and looming hiring needs in this sector. But simply spending more money on infrastructure is no guarantee that all people in all places will benefit, including the unemployed and out of work. Many prospective infrastructure workers may lack the training, experience, or supportive services to quickly fill open positions in the skilled trades and related fields.

In other words, the politics of the federal infrastructure debate will quickly transition to implementation challenges at the federal, state, and local level—challenges around engaging, hiring, and training the next generation of infrastructure workers.

Now is the time to start developing and testing new approaches to strengthen a long-term talent pipeline and not just scramble to fill short term jobs. Educational institutions, workforce development boards, labor groups, community organizations, and infrastructure employers are among the regional leaders that play a central role coordinating all this outreach and activity.

The problem is that many of them operate in silos, still rely on rigid hiring strategies, and struggle to address a widening talent gap amid a rapid rise in retirements. Whatever happens in Washington, regional leaders need to be ready to hit the ground running in advance of any additional federal funding.

That starts with rethinking what an infrastructure even means. If additional federal funding comes through, many regional leaders will be inclined to throw more money toward a backlog of existing projects and rely on existing workers. If the last recession offers any indication, leaders tend to focus on shovel-ready projects and jobs.

However, the COVID-19 recession is different. Many unemployed workers today are concentrated in retail, hospitality, and other service industries. Put another way, filling infrastructure jobs goes far beyond construction. Leaders must focus on the multiple branching career pathways involved in infrastructure operation and maintenance. There are
17 million jobs involved in managing ports, delivering electricity, fixing broadband, and more. Many of these workers are also involved in finance, administration, and human resources. Not everyone can or wants to wear a hard hat. Many unemployed workers have customer service skills or other experience that could translate well into a variety of infrastructure jobs.

Second, we need to emphasize high growth jobs and jobs with enormous replacement needs. Infrastructure hiring needs are not just about new positions emerging in years to come, but also about filling existing positions that have lost or will lose workers. For instance, new jobs in clean energy and green infrastructure are among the fastest growing nationally and are vital for addressing a changing climate. However, across the entire infrastructure sector, nearly 1.5 million workers, or about 10 percent, are projected to permanently leave their jobs on average each year over the next decade. We need to focus on both new and existing positions as a result.

Third, we need to strengthen regional coordination around planning and training. Infrastructure jobs share many of the same skills and training needs, yet employers routinely struggle to build or pull from a larger common pool of labor. Rather than collaborating to create common curricula and more flexible pathways, many educational institutions and workforce development organizations focus on a narrow range of credentials while employers compete against each other and hoard scarce talent. Regional leaders need to bridge planning and communication gaps. The emergence of infrastructure academies and other sector strategies hold promise in coordinating and accelerating action.

Fourth, focusing on equity and inclusion. Infrastructure jobs offer more competitive and equitable wages, including up to 30 percent higher pay for lower income workers and those just starting their careers. But ensuring prospective workers can actually reach the beginning rungs of the infrastructure career ladder remains a challenge. Federal agencies,
including DOT, DOL, and EPA have increasingly emphasized equity and inclusion in their plans and programs, and regional leaders should do the same.

Last, experimenting with new projects and procurement strategies. As it stands, the infrastructure bill does not contain much direct workforce development funding. It mostly focuses on getting more funding to infrastructure projects. The ultimate labor market impacts and realities individual workers will face will hinge on the types of projects pursued. Experimenting with new types of projects and rethinking the objectives of these projects, including workforce development, have the potential to involve more and different types of people.

There is still widespread uncertainty of what will happen to the infrastructure bill and reconciliation package, but regional leaders should not sit idle if they want to maximize the reach of any federal infrastructure funding that comes their way. That’s especially true when it comes to seizing an infrastructure workforce opportunity that may not come for another generation.

Again, this is Joseph Kane. You can read more about this infrastructure workforce content at brookings.edu.

DEWS: You can listen to more in the Metro Lens series on our SoundCloud channel, soundcloud.com/brookings-institution. And now, here’s Brookings Press Director Bill Finan interviewing Bruce Riedel on his new book, “Jordan and America: An Enduring Friendship.”

FINAN: Thanks, Fred. And Bruce, thanks for joining us today to talk about your new book, “Jordan and America: An Enduring Friendship.” The last time we spoke, you had published your book on the Eisenhower intervention in Lebanon in 1948, which the Press also published. That was about a year ago or so. This new book is also about a U.S. relationship with a Middle Eastern country, Jordan in this case, and Jordan’s political history, too. Before we get to that, I wanted to ask you about Jordan itself. It’s a relatively recent
creation as the modern nation state, formed as you write in the book by Churchill in 1921? Can you give us a quick, brief history of the beginnings of Jordan?

RIEDEL: Certainly. Jordan is a success story. When Winston Churchill found that he had one Arab prince more than he had countries for, he had to carve out a new country, and literally he took the territory east of the River Jordan and made that into the country of what was then called Transjordan.

The British at the time also referred to it as a vacant lot because there was nothing there. There were very, very few people. There were no cities. Amman—ancient Philadelphia of the Roman Empire—was little more than a town with few streets. Most of the people who lived in Jordan were Bedouins who migrated in search of water and fodder for their animals. There were a few farmers in the Jordan Valley, but it really was an almost empty place.

The new king—first he was an emir—Abdullah, was very ambitious, however. He dreamed of Jordan being the seed by which he and the Hashemite family would take over all of Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon someday. And he schemed endlessly trying to make these things come true. In the end, in 1948, he did succeed in getting a hold of the West Bank of the Jordan River, what we’ll call the West Bank, and East Jerusalem as a result of the first Israel-Arab war, the Israeli war of independence as it’s often called, in 1948.

So, from almost nothing already within 30 years, Jordan had begun to be more than a vacant lot and to assume a place as a small but significant player in the politics of the Arab world in the Middle East.

Last thing I would say about this is just look at the map. Jordan sits in the center. It has Israel to the west, Syria to the north, Iraq to the east, Saudi Arabia to the south, and Egypt just a little bit across the water of the Gulf of Aqaba. It is in many ways the linchpin of the entire region.
FINAN: It’s as if a case of international relations were coming out. Location, location, location. Your book is an amazing tour through the history of Jordan and America and the 20th century and early 21st century. And you yourself have had a long relationship with Jordan itself, moving to the kingdom at age 2, you mentioned in the book, which is right before you were in Beirut as a child?

RIEDEL: That’s right. My father was with the United Nations, in the U.S. Army in World War II, and after the end of World War II, he joined the then very new United Nations. And his first posting overseas was East Jerusalem. It was then part of Jordan. And we lived there for a couple of years. We were evacuated once during the 1956 crisis. Looking back, he was relocated to Beirut, Lebanon, which in those days was widely called the Paris of the Middle East. We were evacuated again, my mother and I and my brother, from Beirut during the 1958 civil war, which I wrote about in “Beirut 1958,” this time to Naples in Italy, which was then home and still is home of the United States Fifth Fleet. So, we were welcomed by the United States Navy and we came back to the United States in 1960, just after the election of John F. Kennedy.

FINAN: You also had a long relationship with King Hussein himself, who ruled Jordan from 1952 ‘til his death from cancer in 1999. The story of the U.S. relationship is the story of Hussein’s rule for much of Jordan’s modern history, it seems, from reading your book. Tell us about the young Hussein in his first years as king and his relationship with the Truman administration.

RIEDEL: The king acceded to the throne at the young age of 17. His grandfather, King Abdullah, that I mentioned earlier, had been assassinated in front of his aunts, the assassin tried to kill King Hussein as well. And the future king only survived because a bullet ricocheted off of a medal he was wearing that day at the insistence of his grandfather. A remarkable story. His own father, King Talal, had mental difficulties. And soon after he came
to the throne, the Jordanian government and the family agreed that he was not fit for the job. So, the only one left was young King Hussein, who was in many ways very much a teenager at this point in life.

And he ascended to the throne and was immediately faced with one crisis after another. He also, not surprisingly, got married. After all, one of the requirements of being a king is that you have an heir apparent and you could only do that with a queen. He married an older lady, also a member of the Hashemite family, but one from the Egyptian wing of the family who was much more of an intellectual than he was, much less interested in driving around in fast cars and flying airplanes and things like that. It proved to be a poor marriage. It shows that he was, like most of us, not really ready for the big decisions of life in your late teenage years. But he had no choice. He was propelled forward both in politics and into being a family.

FINAN: The book tells the story of Hussein’s growth, his maturation both as a ruler and as a person, too, and also maturation of the Jordanian state, and you entwine that with the relationships with American presidents, beginning with Truman all the way up to Biden today. So, there’s a lot of rich history there, a lot of rich anecdote, a lot of rich character development. It’s an engrossing story that you tell in each chapter of that relationship and of the people who are part of it. I wanted to touch on only a few points of what I think are some of the pivotal moments, as you’ve highlighted it, when Jordan’s political development and also its relationship with the United States. And one of the first I wanted to ask about it was the 1967 war, which you say is the greatest calamity ever to have hit King Hussein? Why?

RIEDEL: The king made a truly catastrophic decision as the crisis in May 1967 developed between Israel and Egypt. The king decided to throw in his lot with the Egyptians. Now it was in many ways strange as over the previous 10 years, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser had tried on more than one occasion not just to overthrow King Hussein, but to
have him assassinated. But in the spirit of the crisis of 1967, all this attention being focused, the king decided that he had no choice, he flew to Cairo and he gave command of the Jordanian army to the Egyptians and he followed through. The war started on the 6th of June 1967 with a devastating Israeli air strike on the Egyptian air force. The Jordanians joined in.

The results were the Jordanians were completely defeated in about 48 hours. And by the time the six-day war was over, Jordan had lost the West Bank, which it had gotten only 19 years before, and lost the city of East Jerusalem. And literally hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank fled across the Jordan to the east bank, creating an enormous refugee crisis. Army was in tatters. Its air force did not exist. It was a truly catastrophic decision by the king, again showing that he was still, at this stage, a fairly young man who could be swayed by emotions. And in this case, he was swayed by the emotions that war was coming between Israel and the Arabs. He couldn’t stand on the sidelines and wait it out. He had advisers, including his prime minister, who told him this was a very foolish thing to do. But he went ahead with.

It is, as you say, a process of watching the king mature over the decades. He was still quite young in 1967 and in this case, swept along by the emotions aroused by all the chants of this is our chance to finally show the Israelis, to liberate all of Palestine. The king should have listened to his CIA chief of station. The CIA chief of station in those days, a man he knew quite well, would have told him that the CIA’s judgment was Israel could defeat any alliance of Arab states in less than one week.

FINAN: One of the aftereffects of the war, as you point out in the book, was the rise of the PLO, the Palestine Liberation Organization and Yasser Arafat. And the PLO moved its operations to Jordan, and it became, as you write, a state within a state there. Why was Hussein unable to control Arafat once he moved his operations into Jordan?
RIEDEL: One was the weakness of the Jordanian military. The Jordanian military had come close to complete collapse in 1967. And by 1968, when the PLO—fedayeen as they called themselves, those who sacrifice themselves—had arrived in force in Jordan, the balance of power was not clearly on the side of the Jordanian military. It was only after the United States and the United Kingdom provided Hussein with new tanks, new airplanes, during the course of 1968, 1969 that the balance of power began to shift towards the Jordanian military.

The other reason, of course, was that the Palestinian Liberation Organization was very, very popular with the majority of Jordanians who were either Palestinians, first generation or second generation. The majority of the population of Jordan then and now are Palestinians who trace their origins back to the western side of the Jordan River. And the king knew that as well.

But as time went on, this state within a state, which had a very radical element within it, became increasingly a threat, literally, to the king’s life and to the survival of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. And in September 1970, the king decided that he couldn’t wait any longer. He launched Black September, or the decisive civil war of the Jordanian military.

FINAN: One of the things that makes this an important book, an important addition to the literature on the Middle East, is you provide interpretations of historical events that offer new information. And one of those is dealing with Black September. I wanted to ask you about that. You have a different interpretation of what happened there, that it wasn’t the U.S. and Israel that saved Hussein from being swallowed up by the PLO rebellion at that time.

RIEDEL: The narrative, which Americans at least read, is that it was Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon who skillfully maneuvered through this crisis and kept the king in power. Well, that’s just not true. The biggest threat the king faced was not really the PLO at all, it
was the Iraqi army. Iraqis in the 1967 war sent a division of Iraqi troops into Jordan, and they were still there. Twenty-thousand Iraqi troops armed with state-of-the-art Soviet tanks backed up by one of the largest militaries in the region back in Iraq, with a huge air force. If they had come to the side of the PLO, it would have been no conquest. It would have been over very, very quickly.

But the United States, indeed Kissinger and Nixon’s memoirs never mentioned the Iraqis because they had nothing to do with anything the Iraqis ____. In fact, the king did a very clever con job on the Iraqis. He convinced them that the Americans were coming and we’re going to be on the ground and the entire NATO alliance was coming. Which persuaded the Iraqis it was too dangerous, and they kept out of the fight. That was the decisive moment when the king then defeated the PLO in Amman and started driving them out of the country. The Syrians briefly intervened. But again, the reason the Syrians’ intervention was so grief was because the power behind the throne, literally, in Damascus, was the minister of defense, Hafez al-Assad. He didn’t like the PLO at all, who over time we would find drove the PLO not only out of Syria but out of Lebanon. That was no friend of Arafat. They might have tactical accommodations over the years, but Assad was fundamentally against the idea of an independent Palestinian entity. He wanted to control the Palestinian movement.

So, in the end, a combination of circumstances, including brave fighting by the Jordanian army and the Jordanian air force, a successful con job with Baghdad, Hussein secured his throne and Black September became the pivot point which the modern Hashemite Kingdom ____ really emerges with the king solidly in charge and with the army providing the key stabilizing forces. And really since 1970, leaving aside occasional terrorists, Jordan has known pretty much peace and prosperity ever since.

FINAN: Another interesting insight that you bring to the history is, and I didn’t know the story either, is that Hussein warned Israelis diplomatically and discreetly that Israel faced
a surprise attack from Egypt and Syria in 1973 in what became the October War, and that he was just basically rebuffed. No, he doesn’t really know what’s happening was the response.

RIEDEL: Right. The king had been somewhat ostracized in the Arab world after Black September. But as Anwar Sadat and Hafez al-Assad planned the October War, Yom Kippur War, they wanted to bring the king into their confidences. So, the king was invited to several of the crucial meetings between Assad and Sadat. Now he wasn’t always in the most important meeting. He was in enough to know something was going on, that a plan was underway. He also had his sources in the Syrian military who told him what was going on. And as a consequence, he had a pretty good idea of what was going on. The king desperately wanted to avoid another war. He knew that another war, his hold on power on the East Bank might ____ or by definition could lead to the further military ____.

So, he went to the Israelis in secret. Flew by helicopter to a Mossad safe house just north of Tel Aviv, and he met with the prime minister, Golda Meir, and told her, war is coming, you need to do something now dramatic, get a peace process going to avert the war. Mrs. Meir who was quite shaken by this, called the Israeli minister of defense, Moshe Dayan, who said, there’s nothing to worry about. We have nothing to worry about. We are so much stronger than the Arabs. If they start anything, we’ll be victorious within hours. Based on Dayan’s assurance, Meir did nothing. In fact, she went off to Austria on a long-planned visit to several European countries. And war started and as we all know, the 1973 war began with the Egyptians successfully crossing the Suez Canal and set in train the process that would ultimately lead to the 1978 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

FINAN: I’m going to jump forward by about 20 years or so to talk a bit about you and the U.S. and Jordan. You had a personal role in bringing relations between the U.S. and Jordan back to ally status during the administration of George H.W. Bush. And you played a
role in the 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty under Bill Clinton. What was it like to engage in that kind of diplomacy?

RIEDEL: Oh, it was fascinating. In 1990, at the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, King Hussein made another... he was neutral at best. He tilted towards the Iraqis. This just absolutely drove President George H.W. Bush and his team bonkers. This was a naked example of aggression, and the Jordanians were fighting more or less with the aggressor. But the entire world, including most of the Arab world—Syria, Saudi Arabia, Gulf states—all arrayed solidly against Iraq.

Well, there was a case of the king trusting someone who he had worked with in Saddam Hussein. And, it was an error of judgment. Again, key advisers, including the crown prince, his brother, advised him that this was a mistake.

When Iraq was liberated and the Iraqis were defeated, George H.W. Bush and his national security adviser, Brant Scowcroft, knew that they didn’t want to leave Jordan in the doghouse forever, and that Jordan would be very important to any effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. So, they began to tentatively reach out to the Jordanians. And just before the 1992 election, Brent Scowcroft chose me to go to Amman with an oral message to the king—

FINAN: —and Brent Scowcroft was George H.W. Bush’s national security adviser?

RIEDEL: Brent was the national security adviser, the two were very, very close, very close, probably the closest president and national security adviser in American history. And my oral message was simple. We wanted to bury the hatchet, get over this, stop arguing about the past and look forward to a new relationship between the United States and Jordan. Jordan would have to do a few things; it needed to tighten up control of material flowing across the Jordanian-Iraqi border in accordance with UN sanctions. But our expectations were realistic. We knew that Jordan made a lot of money off of that trade and we couldn’t ask them to give it up.
Anyway, not surprisingly, I was very well received. I had a private lunch with the king in his palace. I was accompanied by the CIA chief of station. He was accompanied by the head of the royal court, just the four of us. The next day, the king made available his own personal helicopter for me to fly to Petra. I’ve been to it before never in a helicopter. Needless to say, a lot of the American embassy wanted to come with me, and I took several people, including their kids. We all had a great time. H.W. lost the election in November 1992. The Democrats came in. Tony Lake asked me to stay on the National Security Council, which I was happy to do—

FINAN: —and Lake was Bill Clinton’s national security adviser?

RIEDEL: Yeah, Tony Lake was Bill Clinton’s first national security adviser. And surprise, surprise, a month or so later, Tony Lake calls me in and says, I’d like to send you to Amman to tell the king that we want to have a good relationship with Jordan. Definitely felt like a case of déjà vu, but okay, absolutely. And did it all over again.

And Bill Clinton in the end, not only restored the relationship with Jordan, but it was on his watch that Israel and Jordan secured the peace treaty in 1994 and Jordan really at long last achieved King Hussein’s goal of being at peace with its neighborhood and able to focus on its own development. And Clinton was for eight years a strong and stalwart supporter of the king, basically giving him everything that the king asked for, including a free trade agreement, military equipment at an affordable price, and diplomatic support as he engaged dealing with ____.

FINAN: A very different Jordan when Hussein died in 1999 from the Jordan that he inherited as king in 1952, both in status in the region and also with the United States. When Hussein died in 1999, his son Abdullah II became king then. You’ve also worked with him since he ascended to the throne?
RIEDEL: I actually met him before he ascended to the throne. He thought his career was going to be as a military officer, he thought that his uncle, Prince Hassan, who had been crown prince for 30 years, was going to ascend the throne. So, in the mid ‘90s, he had come to the United States on more than one occasion, usually to go to the Pentagon. I served two years in the Pentagon as deputy assistant of defense and I was his host when he came to the Pentagon. We had lunch together more than once. And I found him to be a very sharp, very articulate, very bright young man who spoke English with a classic British accent, because after all he’d been educated in the United Kingdom and was actually quite more comfortable speaking English than he is speaking Arabic. His mother, Princess Muna, King Hussein’s second wife, was British who grew up to be a Jordanian lady—they amicably divorced, and she continues to live in Amman to this day with her son, who is now king of Jordan.

The king did over the years make sure that Abdullah had the experience to be ready, that he was more experienced than Hussein had been when he was thrust into the position. The king also had confidence of the support of Bill Clinton, who wanted to make sure that this was a success story and sent as much aid and assistance as he could to help Abdullah consolidate his position and be the success father had been.

FINAN: What is your sense of him as a leader compared to Hussein and we have 20 years to look back at this point, I now realize beginning basically from September 11, 2001 until now?

RIEDEL: Abdullah learned some lessons from his father. For example, 2002 and 2003, when President George W. Bush began planning another war with Iraq. Abdullah thought this was a terrible idea, that it would set in train chaos in the region. He turned out to be absolutely right, but instead of criticizing the Americans, as his father had back in 1990, he kept his criticism largely to himself. He let it be known privately what his views were, but
he didn’t quarrel with the Americans. And therefore, there was no crisis like there had been back in 1990, ‘91.

He learned and benefited from looking back at his father’s career, but King Abdullah lacks the warmth and he doesn’t have that deep clarity that King Hussein had developed over almost 50 years on the throne. He’s seen as somewhat more remote, difficult to engage with, and like a lot of leaders in the Middle East there’s all kinds of charges and innuendos of corruption, most of which don’t involve the king personally, but involve people in the king’s administration. These have tainted him over time.

And we saw that in spring of this year when a conspiracy developed, calling for an end to corruption and calling in some cases for the removal of King Abdullah and his replacement by Prince Hamzah, who had formerly been the crown prince, who was King Hussein’s fourth wife’s favorite, Queen Noor. Jordanians caught that conspiracy in the bud, it never really had a serious chance of overthrowing him. It had no support whatsoever in the military. But it did demonstrate some problems beneath the surface of Jordan, which the king now needs to address and deal with, including these charges of corruption.

FINAN: I want to end with a simple but complex, I know, question: why is Jordan important to the United States?

RIEDEL: It is a simple question. Geography, a big part of it. We discussed earlier that Jordan is in the center of the Middle East. A stable Jordan helps to bring stability to the neighborhood. An unstable Jordan, let’s say a country that descended into civil war, that would bleed out into its neighborhood, including ultimately probably into two American allies, which the United States has long recognized as more important: Israel to the west, Saudi Arabia to the south.

If you have profound instability in Jordan, it’s going to lead to, next, the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and possibly also in Saudi Arabia. So, a stable Jordan, hopefully a
reasonably prosperous Jordan, helps to build regional stability. And as we all know, that’s a difficult objective in the Middle East. And if you compare Jordan which, as I said, has largely been free of instability since 1970 to its neighbors—Israel’s had two intifadas, Syria is now in the 10th year of the civil war, Iraq has had one war after another and continues to have civil war, Saudi Arabia is bogged down in a quagmire in Yemen—when Jordanians look around and they may say, okay, at least we’ve got peace and stability in our own country, and that’s something to be prized.

FINAN: Bruce, thank you again for coming by to talk about your new book, “Jordan and America: An Enduring Friendship.”

RIEDEL: My pleasure.

DEWS: You can get “Jordan and America” wherever you like to buy books, and may I suggest your local bookstore.

A team of amazing colleagues makes the Brookings Cafeteria possible. My thanks go out to audio engineer Gaston Reboredo; our audio intern this semester, Nicolette Kelly; Bill Finan, director of the Brookings Institution Press, who does the book interviews; my communications colleagues Marie Wilkin, Adrianna Pita, and Chris McKenna for their collaboration. And finally, to Ian McAllister, Soren Messner-Zidell and Andrea Risotto for their guidance and support.

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Until next time, I’m Fred Dews.