Global governance after COVID-19
Survey report

Kemal Derviş is a senior fellow in the Global Economy & Development program at the Brookings Institution

Sebastián Strauss was a project manager and senior research analyst in the Global Economy & Development program at the Brookings Institution and is now a senior analyst at the Eurasia Group

Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Geoffrey Gertz for his many contributions to the project and thank Jose Antonio Ocampo, Amrita Narlikar, Dennis Snower, Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Vera Songwe, Nathalie Tocci, Wonhyuk Lim, Homi Kharas, Amar Bhattacharya, and Brahim Coulibaly for helpful comments and suggestions.

The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars.

Brookings recognizes that the value it provides is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are not determined or influenced by any donation. A full list of contributors to the Brookings Institution can be found in the Annual Report at www.brookings.edu/about-us/annual-report/.

About Global Economy & Development
Founded in 2006, the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution aims to play its part to ensure that the future of globalization is one of inclusive growth and shared prosperity. With an interdisciplinary team of experts, Global provides thought-leadership, cutting edge research, and innovative policy solutions to achieve a more equitable global economic system for sustainable prosperity, drawing on the core strengths of Brookings—authoritativeness, independence, depth of practical expertise, and unparalleled convening power. For more, visit www.brookings.edu/global
Background

The Global Economy and Development Program at Brookings conducted a survey on multilateralism in the Spring of 2021 as part of a project on the future of global governance. This report summarizes and analyzes the results. It comes at a time when the new Biden administration has re-committed the United States to multilateral cooperation and multiple initiatives—notably on international taxation, the issuance of $650 billion of new Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and ramped up efforts to cut emissions to combat climate change—are underway. At the same time, the rivalry between the United States and China is growing, threatening a new form of Cold War, and new technologies are emerging, promising enhanced human welfare while introducing the risk of misuse. The COVID-19 pandemic is still far from under control in most developing countries due to a lag in vaccination rates and the uneven recovery from the pandemic-induced economic recession.

However, multilateralism has been in crisis long before the pandemic. Growing political discontent with globalization has been associated with the failure of the multilateral system to stem the tide of rising inequality, social fragmentation, and job insecurity heightened by technological change. Moreover, calls to reform global governance to better reflect the shift in economic, demographic, and political weight of developing countries have gone largely unheeded. Political rigidities in multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, United Nations (U.N.), and World Trade Organization (WTO) have prevented adequate reform.

Disillusionment with the existing multilateral system has prompted various alternative visions, such as replacing multilateral agreements and rules with bilateral deals or groupings of like-minded or geographically proximate countries. We believe that these alternative approaches cannot adequately replace true multilateralism since a world facing inherently global challenges—as evidenced by the COVID-19 pandemic—requires globally concerted actions and responses. For the Global South, the consequences of weak multilateralism—on climate change, trade, conflict prevention, and countless other issues—are particularly high.

COVID-19 has laid bare key vulnerabilities of an economic system designed to maximize short-term efficiency at the expense of robustness and resilience. As governments struggled to procure vital medical goods and mount an effective response to COVID-19, international cooperation broke down, sparking export bans and political
recriminations. This followed recent trends of nationalist leaders calling for inward-looking policies. The irony, of course, is that just as the world was turning away from multilateralism, COVID-19 underlined its necessity: given that the virus spreads seamlessly across borders, the threat of further spikes in infections will persist unless countries collaborate on expanding access to vaccines and ending the pandemic. And epidemiologists warn that an even worse pandemic could hit the world at any time, further highlighting the need for global cooperation.

Looking ahead, new technologies introduce great opportunities but also grave dangers, particularly in domains such as cyberspace, artificial intelligence, or biotechnology, where global rules are urgently needed. There is also the urgent climate change problem, which demands immediate and coordinated global action.

Against this backdrop, the great powers face the risk of moving towards confrontation, as opposed to a multilateral approach, that would fragment the world into rival blocs. A world in which rival great powers, particularly the United States and China, seek to protect their own spheres of influence through its own rules and standards, could strip smaller and poorer countries from having agency or space to maneuver. This would fail to provide the type of solutions needed for today’s global problems. Furthermore, the direction the rivalrous relationship between the U.S. and China takes will have implications for all nations.

As the world begins to pivot from reacting to the pandemic to planning for recovery, many policymakers have embraced the mantra, “build back better.” A multilateral architecture fit for the 21st century ought to prioritize the wellbeing of the worst-off and build a more robust and inclusive global system while respecting the legitimate demands for policy autonomy. It should help prevent beggar-thy-neighbor policies, facilitate the provision of global public goods, and help manage the global commons. And where appropriate, it should draw on the skills and resources of a broad range of actors beyond the nation-state, including cities, scientists, civil society organizations, businesses, and labor, all of whom have important roles in global problem solving.
Survey design

The survey seeks to understand how to chart a more effective and legitimate multilateral system amid heightened geopolitical tensions, with a particular focus on the often overlooked concerns, interests, and perspectives of the Global South. The hope is to determine whether fundamental agreements can be reached on some basic principles to govern international cooperation in the coming decades toward equitable and sustainable economic, environmental, and social outcomes.

The first thing to emphasize is that the survey responses can in no way be viewed as “representative” of citizens around the world. In fact, there was no intent or effort to sample a statistically representative population. It is by design a survey aimed at experts who are—at least in their work—engaged in some way on multilateralism. Therefore, the responses reflect the views of those who have a strong interest in and knowledge of the multilateral system. However, the questions do not presuppose any particular views on the type, effectiveness, or legitimacy of specific forms of multilateralism. The questions do reflect our concern about these issues, but the survey allows for diverging and varying perspectives to be expressed.

The survey is divided into four sections:

- **Section 1**: Asks respondents to assess the current multilateral system as it is and consists of positive questions.
- **Section 2**: Asks respondents to express their predictions for the future of multilateralism.
- **Section 3**: Asks respondents to consider and rate possible guiding principles for multilateralism and consists of normative questions.
- **Section 4**: Consists of demographic questions.

The majority of questions are closed-ended rating scale questions, in keeping with the primary goal of eliciting respondents’ attitudes and beliefs about multilateralism—past, present, and future. Multiple-choice questions were used in limited instances, as were open-ended questions and write-in boxes. Responses to the latter two types of questions were helpful in interpreting the results of the survey but are omitted from the analysis below for tractability.
Summary statistics

The survey garnered 250 responses. About 68 percent of respondents identified themselves as male and 29 percent as female. The median age group of respondents is 51-65, and the mode is 36-50. A majority of respondents are employed by or affiliated with either a think tank (40 percent) or a university (29 percent); about 17 percent are policy practitioners either in government (5 percent) or at an international organization (12 percent), and 8 percent are in the private sector. Finally, about 56 percent of respondents are from the Global North and 44 percent are from the Global South.

The full set of summary statistics can be found in Appendix A.
Analysis

The first message that comes through is a strong belief in the importance of multilateralism for peace, prosperity, and resilience (with an average rating of 8.9 out of 10) and consensus that the need for effective multilateralism has increased over the last two decades (81 percent of respondents). At the same time, most respondents rated the effectiveness of the current system as only moderate at best (4.7/10), and a large majority believes it has worsened (69 percent) over the last two decades, while over 80% thought that the need for effective multilateralism has increased. No significant differences can be gleaned between Global North and Global South respondents on these questions.

Aggregating the very ineffective and somewhat ineffective as well as the very effective and somewhat effective ratings, respondents believe that multilateral effectiveness is lowest in the realm of “democracy, human rights, and gender equity” followed by “climate and environment.” The percentages are not quite as low in “international economics (trade, finance, taxation)” and “global poverty and development.” However, in no domain did a majority of respondents believe that the multilateral system is currently working somewhat or very effectively.

There are differences in how respondents from the Global North and Global South rated the effectiveness of multilateralism across domains. In the realm of international economics, 48 percent of Global North respondents rated the multilateral system somewhat or very effective compared to 35 percent of Global South respondents, and 37 percent of Global North respondents rated it somewhat or very ineffective compared to 53 percent of Global South respondents.

In the realm of democracy, human rights and gender equity, 24 percent of Global North respondents rated the multilateral system somewhat or very effective compared to 39 percent of Global South respondents, and 57 percent of Global North respondents rated it somewhat or very ineffective compared to 48 percent of Global South respondents.

On the topic of global poverty and development, 43 percent of Global North respondents rated the multilateral system somewhat or very effective compared to 32 percent of Global South respondents, and 32 percent of Global North respondents rated it somewhat or very ineffective compared to 53 percent of Global South respondents.

It seems that vis-à-vis Global South experts, Global North experts overestimate the effectiveness of the multilateral system on international economics and global poverty.
and development, while they underestimate its effectiveness in the domain of democracy, human rights, and gender equity. An alternative explanation is that some of the answers from the South reflect a greater reluctance to emit “political” judgements.

Respondents were asked whether there exists a tradeoff between *effectiveness and legitimacy* with respect to international organizations and multilateral forums. Responses were almost evenly spread across the choice set, with no consensus emerging. A plurality (26 percent) responded that “It most often depends on the purpose of the organization in question,” followed by 21 percent who said, “No, the two features are mutually reinforcing,” 19 percent who said, “No, the two features are compatible,” 18 percent who said, “Yes, but it’s avoidable,” and 16 percent who said, “Yes, and it’s unavoidable.” It is only this latter group of respondents that believes there is an inescapable tradeoff between effectiveness and legitimacy, whereby enhancing one diminishes the other, but there seems to be no marked preference for effectiveness over legitimacy or vice versa. To varying extents, the rest of respondents believe that low effectiveness and legitimacy (to the extent that they are indeed low) are—at least partially—either circumstantial or a policy choice. Global South respondents are much more likely to believe there is a tradeoff (42 percent) than Global North respondents (29 percent).

When asked about concrete institutions, pluralities believe that the U.N. system is more legitimate (74 percent) but no more effective (44 percent) than the G-20. Global South respondents are more likely than Global North respondents to believe that the U.N. system is both more legitimate and more effective than the G-20, although Global South respondents think largely that in general there is a trade-off between legitimacy and effectiveness. Opinion is evenly divided on whether any existing forum or organization is fit to lead the multilateral system, but a plurality (48 percent) believes that “The current multilateral system cannot be redeemed through tweaks to the rules and governance structures of existing institutions; the multilateral order needs to be fundamentally reimagined.” This sentiment is much stronger among Global South respondents, 21 percent of which strongly agree with the statement compared to only 8 percent of Global North respondents. An absolute majority (56 percent) of Global South respondents agree or strongly agree with the statement, as opposed to 42 percent of Global North respondents.

When asked to select the three *biggest challenges facing multilateralism* today, respondents thought that among the options listed, the biggest deficiencies are: (1) Failure to “effectively constrain countries’ ability to make policy decisions that have significant negative spillover effects on other countries” (57 percent of all respondents, 60 percent of Global North, and 54 percent of Global South respondents); (2) Governments’ refusal to “provide adequate funding to support multilateralism and global public goods” (49 percent of all respondents, 52 percent of Global North and 43%
of Global South respondents); and (3) Failure to “keep pace with rapidly evolving new technologies, in areas such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology” (47 percent of all respondents, 51 percent of Global North and 49 percent of Global South respondents). Global South respondents are almost twice as likely as Global North respondents to believe that it is a problem that “The multilateral system fails to reflect the views and interests of ordinary citizens around the world,” highlighting an important contrast.

What does the future hold for multilateralism? Respondents (from the Global North and the Global South alike) are only very moderately optimistic that a “governments are likely to recommit to supporting multilateralism” after COVID-19 (5.7/10). In fact, respondents don’t have strong views about whether the multilateral system is likely to function more effectively a decade from now than today (average 5/10), although pessimism is more common than optimism. Respondents believe that geopolitics and security concerns will “make it more difficult to sustain an open global economic order” (7/10) and that “Greater fragmentation in the multilateral system, across both regions and issue areas, is a fundamental threat to effective international cooperation” (average 6.9/10), but are divided on whether heightened geopolitical competition will impede cooperation on key areas of global concern such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, pandemic prevention, among others (5.5/10). Global South respondents are significantly more worried than Global North respondents about the impact of geopolitics and fragmentation on international cooperation. Respondents are ambivalent, if slightly optimistic, about the prospects for a more multi-channel and multi-level multilateralism with greater roles for local authorities and civil society (including businesses) (average 6.3/10). Expert opinion is divided on questions about the changing balance of power and the likelihood of strong bipolarity (5.4/10) or multipolarity (6.3/10) emerging, with less-than-sanguine forecasts about the EU’s ability to bolster its standing significantly (4.8/10). Global South respondents are more likely than Global North respondents to believe in the possibility of emerging bipolarity within the next decade (p=.007).

What do respondents believe the multilateral system should look like? On plausible guiding principles for multilateralism, the survey shows strong support across geographies for the “leave no one behind” principle driving the SDGs (7.9/10), reflecting a high priority given to poverty reduction in all its forms. Two other strong messages ratified by Global North and Global South respondents alike concern the importance for the multilateral system to better provide global public goods (8.3/10), facilitate policy coordination (8.1/10), and constrain the use of beggar-thy-neighbor policies (7.7/10). These results tend to justify a recent judgement by Jean Pisani-Ferry that the need for nations to manage the global commons together has become indisputable and that “global governance has won the battle of ideas,” albeit not the battle for political support.
There is strong cross-geographical support for the idea that "The multilateral system should be designed with greater attention on robustness and resiliency, even if this comes at the cost of economic efficiency" (7.0/10). There is also consensus that "Regional organizations should play a greater role in the international system" (7.0/10), the multilateral system should be multi-level and multi-channel (7.2/10), and it "should seek greater coherence across different levels of governance, including through more formal and regular cooperation between the G-20, U.N., Bretton Woods institutions, and regional institutions" (7.7/10).

On some of the other major questions about potential guiding principles, opinions are more divided. For instance, while constraining the use of beggar-thy-neighbor policies is viewed as a core purpose of the multilateral system, there is no agreement that the system should only address such issues. Carbon emissions or very low corporate tax rates are examples of policies that have important spillover effects. Neglect of poverty reduction or some of the other SDGs by a country has less obvious spillover effects, and wanting the multilateral system to deal with these issues to a considerable degree reflects the endorsement of universal “values”, although neglect of the SDGs by one country can convincingly be argued to have some negative consequences for others, for example allowing the spread of disease. The same could be said for neglect of human rights. The cost of such neglect is felt by citizens of the country abusing human rights, but can lead to conflict and violence and affect other countries. The answers to the question expressing mixed views on strict subsidiarity (5.8/10) are consistent with the belief that some universal values should guide multilateralism in addition to the utilitarian objectives of providing global public goods and constraining beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Global South respondents are on average more supportive of strict subsidiarity than Global North respondents (p=.001).

When it comes to legitimacy and representation, opinion is fragmented but generally skeptical – especially in the Global North that “The rise of China as a power capable of challenging the U.S. could lead to a more legitimate global order” (4.6/10), although there is some hope that coalitions of less powerful countries could effectively counter the influence of great powers (6.5/10). Just as respondents doubt China’s potential to improve the legitimacy of the multilateral system, they are also ambivalent about technical panaceas to the problem of underrepresentation such as weighted voting rules (5.9/10). Global South respondents are more skeptical of weighted decision-making rules than Global North respondents (p=.02). At the end of the day, most experts agree that ultimately, ”The multilateral system can only be legitimated if rulemaking and standard-setting processes become fully representative and inclusive of Global South nations, even if this makes it more difficult to quickly reach and implement decisions" (7.2/10). Not surprisingly, this sentiment is significantly stronger among Global South experts.
One particularly important and perhaps novel result can be found in the answers to questions related to **universal values**. About 75 percent of respondents believe it is possible to define core universal values and the multilateral system should advance these, against 17 percent who believe that values are essentially different across cultures and geographies and attempts to universalize them are doomed to failure, such that the multilateral system should not seek to represent them. This message is reinforced by the fairly strong rejection of the statement that “The multilateral system should avoid value judgements on countries’ political regimes” (4.1/10). Here we do find significant differences across geographies, although the general picture remains unchanged. Whereas 81 percent of Global North respondents believe universal values exist and the multilateral system should promote them, 68 percent of Global South respondents subscribe to that view—a significatively lower proportion, albeit still a clear majority. Only 24 percent of Global South respondents take on a more relativistic view and believe the multilateral system should not advance any set of values, compared to an even lower 10 percent of Global North respondents who believe that. Global South respondents are more likely to believe that the multilateral system should not issue value judgements on countries’ political regimes (p=.002). One write-in box comment was that there is “need to work toward some basic values but also” need “to be cautious in using force to impose them.” This points to the crucial difference between promoting values by example or viewpoint versus threats to use force.

Differences notwithstanding, majority support a view of multilateralism that stands for values that include not only the ethical imperative to fight poverty and most of the other SDGs—on which there is broad consensus in the literature and governments have all nominally endorsed—but also human rights and related “political” issues, which are generally believed to be much more controversial. While the questions did not explicitly ask whether the multilateral system should actively promote democracy and some of the comments make it clear that respondents do not support “regime change” attempts, majority of respondents favor a multilateral system that not only supports the economic and social “enabling freedoms” contained in the SDGs, but also promotes human rights and democratic freedoms. This is consistent with the new U.S. administration’s **approach to international affairs**. These aspirations are also in line with the two concepts of liberty proposed by Isaiah Berlin and, incidentally, with Amartya Sen’s “capability” approach. It is therefore worth remembering that the notion of human rights and freedoms were a cornerstone of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at a time when the foundations of what was hoped to become the post-World War II multilateral order were laid. It will be important to follow up on these questions, which are at the heart of the debate on future global governance.
Conclusion

The answers to the survey reflect a broad desire for a renewed and strong global multilateralism as well as strong dissatisfaction with how the system has operated in the recent past. The objective of the Survey was to see whether there were basic principles that had broad support as well as what visions there were for the future, both predictive and normative. We did not ask questions on specific policies such as global minimum corporate taxes or ways to implement carbon taxes. The aim was rather to better understand the general “traffic rules”, as Dani Rodrik called them, that had support across domains. Rodrik proposed seven specific principles to guide multilateral cooperation. Our survey, while not asking about his specific proposals, is inspired by his approach of looking for general principles on which cooperation in various domains could be built.

Some of the findings described above deserve particular attention. While the principle of subsidiarity has support, the vision of multilateralism that emerged was one that is not strictly limited by a narrow interpretation of subsidiarity. Multilateral actions can complement national policies and make them more effective.

The support for universal values and aspirations is remarkable. It was expressed both by respondents from the Global North and the Global South, although a little less strongly by the latter. The difference is most likely due to memories in the South about Global North countries trying to impose their values, or present them as universal when they in fact reflected economic or political interests. But these memories did not imply a belief in the absence of universal values, which majorities agree the multilateral system should promote. This is a crucial area of discussion as the new U.S. administration is announcing a more values-driven approach to international affairs.

On big-power rivalry and the form the international system is likely to take, the answers did not reflect a strong prediction that the world will simply divide into an American and a Chinese sphere of influence. There was substantial predictive and normative support for much greater multi-polarity. This issue is also at the heart of the current debate about the future direction of the international order.

While we believe that the findings outlined in this report are particularly noteworthy, the full answers to the survey (attached as Appendices) reflect richer insights and nuances. Overall, what the survey results have shown is some hope in reaching a widely shared agreement on basic guidelines and rules for a renewed multilateral system that will help meet the global challenges that lie ahead.
Appendix A: Summary statistics

Part I. Assessing the current multilateral system

Q1. How important is multilateralism for advancing peace, prosperity, and resilience today? (0-10)

Mean: 8.9
St Dev: 1.5

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.
Q2. How effective is the current multilateral system? (0-10)

![Histogram showing the distribution of responses to Q2.](image)

Mean: 4.7
St Dev: 1.4

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.

Q3. Over approximately the last two decades, has societies’ need for effective multilateralism increased or decreased?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Global North</th>
<th>Global South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasn't changed</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q4. Over approximately the last two decades, has the effectiveness of the multilateral system generally improved or worsened?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Global North</th>
<th>Global South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worsened</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasn't changed</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q5. When it comes to international organizations and multilateral forums, is there a tradeoff between effectiveness and legitimacy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinions</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Global North</th>
<th>Global South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, and it’s unavoidable</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, but it’s avoidable</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, the two features are compatible</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, the two features are mutually reinforcing</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It most often depends on the purpose of the organization in question</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q6. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations system is more effective than the G20.</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations system is more legitimate than the G20.</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No existing forum or organization is fit to lead the multilateral system.</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current multilateral system cannot be redeemed through tweaks to the rules and governance structures of existing institutions; the multilateral order needs to be fundamentally reimagined.</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q7. Please select the 3 biggest challenges facing multilateralism today:*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Global North</th>
<th>Global South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The multilateral system does not effectively constrain countries’ ability to make policy decisions that have significant negative spillover effects on other countries.</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Governments have failed to provide adequate funding to support multilateralism and global public goods.

The multilateral system has been unable to keep pace with rapidly evolving new technologies, in areas such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology.

The multilateral system is ill-equipped to function effectively amidst rising geopolitical tensions between the United States and China.

The multilateral system reflects the views and interests of rich and powerful countries over those of poorer and smaller countries.

The multilateral system fails to reflect the views and interests of ordinary citizens around the world.

Multilateral rules and standards are too restrictive, limiting countries’ policy space and scope for policy experimentation.

* Percentages indicate the proportion of responses each challenge was selected in.

Q8. How effectively do you think that the multilateral system is currently working in the following domains?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Very ineffectively</th>
<th>Somewhat ineffectively</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Somewhat effectively</th>
<th>Very effectively</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International economics (trade, finance, taxation)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International peace and security</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate and environment</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy, human rights and gender equity</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global poverty and development</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q9. Which of the following statements better represents your view?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Global North</th>
<th>Global South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is possible to define core universal values, standards, and aspirations that reflect our common humanity, drawing from all cultures, histories and geographies; the multilateral system should support and advance such principles.</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values, standards and aspirations are essentially different across cultures and geographies; attempts to universalize them are doomed to fail, and the multilateral system should not seek to represent them.</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part II. The future of multilateralism

Q11. In the aftermath of the global coronavirus pandemic, governments are likely to recommit to supporting multilateralism in order to more effectively address shared global challenges. (0-10)

Mean: 5.7
St Dev: 2.0

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AFTER COVID-19

Q12. Collapsing distinctions between economic and security policymaking spheres, and governments’ increasing resort to national security exceptions to block trade and investment flows, will make it more difficult to sustain an open global economic order. (0-10)

Mean: 7.0
St Dev: 1.8

On average, Global North respondents scored lower (M=6.8, SD=1.7) than Global South respondents (M=7.3, SD=1.7), t(219)=2.0, p=.04.
Q13. Greater fragmentation in the multilateral system, across both regions and issue areas, is a fundamental threat to effective international cooperation. (0-10)

Mean: 6.9  
St Dev: 2.1

On average, Global North respondents scored lower (M=6.7, SD=2.1) than Global South respondents (M=7.5, SD=2.0), t(220)=2.9, p=.004.
Q14. Heightened geopolitical competition will not necessarily impede multilateral cooperation on areas of global concern, including climate change, avoiding nuclear war, global poverty, pandemic prevention, etc. (0-10)

Mean: 5.5  
St Dev: 2.3  

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.
Q15. Approximately a decade from now, the power and importance of non-state and sub-national actors (relative to national governments) in advancing global cooperation will be significantly greater than it is today. (0-10)

Mean: 6.3  
St Dev: 2.1  

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.

Q16. Over the next decade or so, the world is likely to splinter into two rival “poles” around the U.S. and China, with each having their own rules and standards. (0-10)
Mean: 5.4
St Dev: 2.3

On average, Global North respondents scored lower (M=5.0, SD=2.2) than Global South respondents (M=5.9, SD=2.4), t(220)=2.7, p=.007.

Q17. Over the next decade or so, the European Union is likely to develop sufficient geopolitical weight and internal cohesion to form a third "pole" or sphere of influence alongside the U.S. and China. (0-10)
Mean: 4.8
St Dev: 2.0

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.

Q18. Over the next decade or so, the world is likely to become more multipolar, with a wider distribution of power and influence among countries, and with regional powers playing more important roles. (0-10)

Mean: 6.3
St Dev: 2.0

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.
Q19. Approximately a decade from now, the multilateral system is likely to function more effectively than it does today. (0-10)

Mean: 5.0  
St Dev: 1.8

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.

**Part III. Toward consensus principles of multilateralism?**

**To what extent do you agree with the following statements?**

Q21. The multilateral system should avoid value judgments on countries’ political regimes. (0-10)
Mean: 4.1  
St Dev: 2.8  

On average, Global North respondents scored lower (M=3.6, SD=2.6) than Global South respondents (M=4.8, SD=3.1), t(220)=3.1, p=.002.

Q22. Multilateral agreements and institutions should be shown to enhance the wellbeing of the worst-off, consistent with the principle of “leave no one behind”. (0-10)
Mean: 7.9  
St Dev: 1.8

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.

Q23. The multilateral system must be reformed to better facilitate the provision of global public goods. (0-10)

Mean: 8.3  
St Dev: 1.7

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.
Q24. The multilateral system should be designed with greater attention on robustness and resiliency, even if this comes at the cost of economic efficiency. (0-10)

Mean: 7.0  
St Dev: 2.1  
No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.

Q25. The multilateral system can only be legitimated if rulemaking and standard-setting processes become fully representative and inclusive of Global South nations, even if this makes it more difficult to quickly reach and implement decisions. (0-10)
Mean: 7.2
St Dev: 2.1

On average, Global North respondents scored lower (M=6.9, SD=2.2) than Global South respondents (M=7.7, SD=1.8), t(220)=2.9, p=.004.

Q26. In a fair and legitimate multilateral system, the influence of great power countries can effectively be countered by coalitions of less powerful countries. (0-10)
Mean: 6.5  
St Dev: 2.2  

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.

Q27. The rise of China as a power capable of challenging the US could lead to a more legitimate global order, as it means no single country can dominate multilateral forums. (0-10)

![Bar chart](image)

Mean: 4.6  
St Dev: 2.5  

On average, Global North respondents scored lower (M=4.3, SD=2.4) than Global South respondents (M=5.3, SD=2.6), t(219)=2.9, p=.004.
Q28. Weighted voting decision making rules are, in general, preferable to either unanimity or one-country-one-vote decision making rules, although appropriate weights should reflect the specific purposes of particular international organizations. (0-10)

Mean: 5.9
St Dev: 2.4

On average, Global North respondents scored higher (M=6.4, SD=2.2) than Global South respondents (M=5.6, SD=2.6), t(218)=2.4, p=.02.
Q29. A core purpose of the multilateral system should be constraining the use of beggar-thy-neighbor policies, through which countries aim to benefit at the expense of other countries. (0-10)

Mean: 7.7  
St Dev: 1.9

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.
Q30. A core purpose of the multilateral system should be facilitating new opportunities for governments to coordinate policies and reducing transaction costs that inhibit coordination. (0-10)

Mean: 8.1
St Dev: 1.5

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.

Q31. The multilateral system should serve a subsidiary function, dealing only with issues that have significant cross-border spillover effects that cannot be tackled at the national or sub-national level. (0-10)
On average, Global North respondents scored lower (M=5.2, SD=2.8) than Global South respondents (M=6.4, SD=2.6), t(220)=3.2, p=.001.

Q32. Regional organizations should play a greater role in the international system. (0-10)

Mean: 7.0
St Dev: 1.9
No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.

Q33. The multilateral system should be multi-level (involving sub-national governments) and multi-channel (involving non-state actors such as civil society and businesses) reflecting the complexity and diversity of global governance challenges. (0-10)

Mean: 7.2
St Dev: 2.3

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.
Q34. The multilateral system should seek greater coherence across different levels of governance, including through more formal and regular cooperation between the G-20, UN, Bretton Woods institutions, and regional institutions. (0-10)

Mean: 7.7  
St Dev: 1.9

On average, Global North respondents scored lower (M=7.5, SD=1.9) than Global South respondents (M=8.0, SD=1.6), t(220)=2.2, p=.03.
Q35. Insofar as there’s a tradeoff between effectiveness and legitimacy, it’s preferable to have a more effective multilateral system than a more representative and legitimate one. (0-10)

Mean: 5.4
St Dev: 2.4

No statistically significant difference of means between Global North and Global South responses.
Appendix B: Survey comments

Q9: On the existence of universal values

- Setting multilateral goals around a core set of values becomes more difficult the bigger the “tent” is
- Attempts at “top-down” values-building, especially from rich nations onto poor nations, Western nations onto the developing world, etc., can alienate poorer countries from multilateral projects
- A middle ground will eventually be necessary as global values converge
- Multilateralism has the best chance of working when participants have clear benefits from the exchanges occurring in the organization

Q10: Additional commentary on multilateralism today

- The functionality of multilateral organizations depends strongly on which organization is under discussion
- Determining what methods and patterns are beneficial and which are disastrous for multilateral organizations is the first step to organizing them more effectively
- While major powers must be constrained in multilateral organizations, strong leadership, especially from the United States, is a major benefit
- Multilateralism is seen as ineffective because it cannot capably handle major crises, but in fact these organizations have never been properly enabled, and so they are ineffective. Changing this in the future, especially with regard to climate change, will be key.
- Persistent skepticism of the capacity of a few developed nations to perpetually lead these organizations.
- Crises of legitimacy exist in both input (representation of less powerful interests) and output (work toward outcome equality in Africa and other developing regions, etc.).

Q20: Additional commentary on the future of multilateralism in 2031

- More solidarity is likely, but financial globalization has proven insufficient to the cause of economic and political integration, or even the building of common cause.
- Trade wars, especially as further deindustrialization occurs, will only become more frequent.
Multilateralism will become much less effective if global bodies are treated as a venue for team sport by the U.S. and China.
Covid has demonstrated the necessity of a welfare-based global policy, but the proper (or at least more efficient) venue for this is likely at the national level.

Q36: Additional commentary on principles for building consensus

- Effectiveness will be the best and most attractive principle.
- National policy coherence will be key to developing multilateral cooperation.
- Building on principles which engage directly with the public will be key (and the SDGs are a good place to start).
- Regional cooperation has its pitfalls but also has substantial promise for building larger multilateral settlements.

Q37: Additional commentary (unprompted)

- Reforming or starting a new multilateral system is politically unfeasible with politicians engaging in an election-driven mindset.
- Regionalism can promote a more positive globalism.
- Chinese-American conflict will write the story of the next 10-20 years in multilateral growth and commitments.

Open-ended write-in responses (anonymized)

Q9. On the existence of universal values and desirability of their promotion, respondents had the option to write in their view if it didn’t fit into either of the two provided statements:

**Culturally determined**

Multilateral Systems should recognize the ‘interdependency’ between values and standards and aspiration between cultures. One cannot universalize values, standards, aspirations within binaries as its ever-evolving which would be simply impossible. Universalize the link and not the core and cultures will automatically find common grounds.

the multilateral system should be able to enable convergence between different cultures and perspectives to tackle key global challenges

It is possible to define core universal values and aspirations that reflect our common humanity, drawing from all cultures, histories and geographies though likely not politically
attainable. Nevertheless, a multilateral system should aspire to achieve this and support and advance the effort at defining and implementing such principles.

Values, standards and aspirations are essentially different across cultures and geographies. Attempts to universalize them are doomed to follow the path of the more powerful actors. Multilateralism in the XXI Century should be less on creating consensus that on opening ways to work even in dissensus

Aspiration to define core universal values should not be abandoned because of the difficulties introduced by cultural and geographical difference

**Difficulties of reconciling different standards across nations**

while is it possible to define core universal values, standards etc. (ex. environment, life); judgements about political structures and systems of governance may remain different

NEED TO WORK TOWARD SOME BASIC VALUES, BUT ALSO BE CAUTIOUS IN USING FORCE AND PRESSURE IN TRYING TO IMPOSE THEM.

The root problem of the ineffectiveness of the multilateral system is that there are no universally agreed upon values; however without a common basis of values and principles, a multilateral system is doomed to fail.

This is a fundamental challenge of the multilateral system. In my view, it is possible to define core universal aspirations but not at the very detailed practical (easily measurable) level that we often try to define them.

It is possible to define core universal values but these must be understood as context specific and the focus of effort being on creating equal platforms for those values to be expressed in context specific ways, not defined only by powerful countries.

I believe that that there are universal values around human dignity and the rights of every human being to not be oppressed, to live with dignity, etc. irrespective of belief, race, sexual preference etc. But that is not the way some leaders and some people see that, and so a multilateral system that tries to universalise these especially under the current growing tensions between the west and China/Russia will be rendered more ineffective.

It may be possible to define core universal values, standards and aspirations that reflect our common humanity, but the multilateral system is fundamentally inter-governmental and attempts to define these in a way acceptable to all governments will either fail or render them meaningless, and thus the multilateral system should seek to support and advance goals that can be agreed upon, rather than universal principles.

**Need for middle ground**

Neither x or y above. z in between.

There should be a middle ground
The current system has been built on the universality of Human Rights. This should be an inalienable fundament to build on and to make sure that all states adhere to in between: universalization is necessary but so painful that it has to be limited to some carefully selected commons.

**Convergence of universal values**

Values, standards and aspirations will ultimately converge in the long term and multilateralism has to pave the way to achieve this very long term goal.

Support for pluralistic universalism (Amitav Acharya's point)

**Ways to make multilateralism work**

Multilateralism "works" when addressing clearly defined externalities or the provision of essential public goods. It is best thought of in terms of self-enforcing contracts: member states adhere to global rules when the benefits (internalizing externalities or public goods) exceed the perceived costs (restrictions on national sovereignty/freedom of action).

The core values of the value of human life, the protection of innocents and the right to opportunities for education and work can be a shared platform. The current multilateral system aims too high, in my view.

Q10. Are there additional comments you would like to add on the current multilateral system?

**Evaluating existing structures**

We need to include also the G7, which is even less representative than the G20

The evaluation depends very much on the actors of the multilateral system: the UN, IFIs, WTO, G7, G20, etc. do not have the same functioning, roles, positions, efficiency, impact, governance, etc. Therefore, I'd suggest to follow up with an assessment which would specifically identify which institution we are talking about

The World Health Organisation needs to be financed predominantly by fair government contributions, not conditional donations.

I think the way this survey is set up is not ideal. It talks about the global multilateral system as if it is one single framework working together, and it is failing or succeeding writ large. I think the challenge more generally is that it isn't a single system, but a nested system of different bodies and frameworks (UN, G8, G20, organizations like the IMF and WB, etc.) and while in some cases there is a lot of coherence, often they work at cross purposes. I also think every mechanism has some big successes and also big failures. The research question I ask is, "are there any common characteristics of successful agreements and programs, or of failed ones, and what can we learn from that to make the overall system more effective?"
Based on my experience, I think it is a mistake to look at UN type institutions as decision making bodies where binding commitments. They are rather places where countries with very diverse perspectives and interests can together to vent their grievances and make what they are doing and saying more transparent. This actually not a bad way to build trust that can then carry forward to more operational and serious smaller coalition agreements that can push our common interests forward without requiring a global consensus which leads to the “veto State” syndrome.

The multilateral system is made up of at least 200 organization. The U.S. is a member of about 110. these organizations run best when the US takes a leading role in them. Neither China nor Russia can lead these. The multilateral system was largely an American invention -- they are a good thing. Some fights we are going to sometimes lose but at the same time if we do a better job of working with our partners we can more effectively lead these institutions. Many problems require collective action but should not "fetishize" the multilateral system either where we need a permission slip for everything do either.

The Organization of UN must be strengthened to be the representation of multilateralism at a global level, this implies, unrestricted respect for the decisions of the majority of its members and not those that are currently taken unilaterally.

With regard to human rights, it is essential that multilateral systems are based on the idea of defending these rights, in order to guarantee effective actions with a global social impact.

There must be ways/sanctions to force the big and powerful to respect - for their own sake - international norms.

Multilateral systems need to be interdependent on each other. These systems cannot exist independently.

The weakness of multilateralism when it is most needed fuels the self-fulfilled prophecy of authoritarian antiglobalizers. Between the early 1900s and 1945 the same problem arose. Global interconnectedness through markets and military force with no global democratic or at least rule based governance. Two world wars, fascism, the crash of 29...hope we learned the lesson. more and stronger multilateralism is urgently needed.

El multilateralismo debe fomentarse como medio de eliminar las fronteras nacionales a fin de fortificar la paz, sin por ello perder las raíces culturales de cada lugar. Promover la cooperación libre y espontánea de las personas sin imponer criterios arbitrarios bajo ningún punto de vista. (T: Multilateralism should develop itself as a method of eliminating national borders with the aim of strengthening peace, without losing the cultural roots of each nation. Promoting the free and spontaneous cooperation of persons without imposing arbitrary criteria under no fixed point of view)

I believe it is an illusion to think we can design a new system. There won’t be any agreement. We have to make the existing one work. And work on effectiveness without using too easily legitimacy as an excuse.
The system needs leaders with a broader view than just the votes of constituents in each country. It should be a priority for national leaders.

What is the credible alternative to multilateralism? Unilateralism? Good luck with that.

Avoid dominance of the agenda by developed countries. G20 is not the solution since it does not represent all countries.

Major stakeholders should come to an understanding on how a sustainable stability will be formulated in future. The balance should be strike among or between them. Should the race for supremacy goes on unchecked tension will be on the rise and the multilateralism will be first casualty.

We should focus more on the attitude and inclination behind multilateralism than on particular institutional formations.

Even if of not efficient and effective in dealing with global issues, always stands for the right causes. Cannot go further of what governments decide in its respective governing bodies.

Today’s core universal values are Planet, People, Peace, Prosperity, and Partnership (5Ps) that SDGs are pursuing.

Multilateralism demands leadership rather than structures.

For starters, fewer IOs should require unanimity to reach decisions with vote weighting schemes that should give more importance to population relative to economic outcome indicators like GDP, trade shares, etc...

Part of the problem is also the de-coupling between macro-level trends (such as overall economic growth, developments in healthcare etc.) and the experience of individual citizens (stagnating or falling real wages, less access to healthcare).

The existence of multiple independent nation-states is unsustainable in the long-term, as it inevitably leads to conflicts. To ensure long-term survival of our species as a coherent technological civilization, capable of providing public goods globally, the multilateral system has to promote gradual but steady integration.

They are more the playground of the Big power players than effective problem solvers of human challenges.

It is essential for the promotion of development, peace and welfare based on rules and justice.

In order to enhance the effectiveness in the area of peace and security, definitely the Security Council would need and overhaul. However, one has to be realistic about the feasibility of any reform.

Multilateral system cannot work properly when geopolitical aspirations prevail over perceptions of common destiny of nations inhabiting the Globe.
need to diversify and offer much more space for non-state actors; post Westphalian "polylateralism"

Multilateralism work much better than people usually think. It works pretty good in a technical level. The problem is that it is failing in provide answers to the biggest current policy issues.

Multilateral organizations need to be improved and supported especially in the fields of trade, health, governance of digitalisation issues, climate change.

The multilateral system should be the base of international cooperation, not the best one.

All the multilateral organization, projects and ideas need more financial support from developed countries and should direct their activities to help the underdeveloped ones.

The multilateral system and its multilateral institutions are in charge and rightfully set up for this function to address all issues with international spillovers (international externalities) and to provide and protect global public goods. However, no institution can live up to this aspiration single-handedly. The multilateral system and all multilateral institutions will only succeed if they collaborate closely with governments, bilateral implementing organizations, private corporations, civil society organizations. Additionally, the provision of global public goods calls for enabling frameworks like pricing of externalities, and for best practices of contributing to GPG provision for replication and scaling-up. Without such enabling frameworks and innovations the acting multilateral institutions in charge cannot fulfill their function.

We need to change the UN Security Council rules in order to enable its effective responses toward important security matters.

THE INTEGRATION OF THE INFORMATION THE DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONS MANAGE (UN, FAO, WB, and others) ARE KEY TO IMPROVE THE SYSTEM

Thank you for taking up this issue - in the context of declining population in the Global North and increases in the Global South the mechanisms of multilateralism will be changing - it would be good to guide those changes.

We must move the HQs of the UN out of the global north. We must create more equitable and representative leadership within the UN, to avoid the narrow pursuit of values and standards that are shaped by a minority in the global north. We must shift the power and resources to the global south.

El multilateralismo debe ser mucho más eficaz y eficiente ante los impactos del cambio climático (T: Multilateralism must be much more effective and efficient to deal with the impacts of climate change)

The covid 19 pandemic has shown that countries - even though they send their own experts to cooperate in international organizations - still do not listen to recommendations and the best practices provided by institutions like WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF.....
Extremely broad-based multilateral institutions like the UN or the WTO have become ineffective because of their need for very broad consensus. It’s time to think more about “clubs” of cooperators on specific issues, how to entice nations to join such clubs, and to specify the conditions for eviction from such clubs.

It is difficult to talk about multilateral system and not to connect its successes or failures with the failures of the liberal casino capitalism.

el sistema multilateral es lo mejor que hemos encontrado, pero tenemos que mejorararlo, menos burocracia, más aliento a los valores permanentes como la paz, la educación, la cultura, los derechos personalísimos de las personas, la defensa sostenida del clima planetario. (T: The multilateral system is the best we have found, but we have to improve it: less bureaucracy, more allegiance to the permanent values of peace, education, culture, personal rights, and sustained defense of the climate).

The right to veto at the UNSC owned by two authoritarian states (China, Russia), which enhance their cooperation more and more, is a major challenge to achieving global peace and security.

Today the international order is more fragmented, characterised by intensifying competition between states over interests, norms and values. A defence of the status quo is no longer sufficient for the decade ahead. We therefore recognise the need for a sharper and more dynamic focus in order to: adapt to a more competitive and fluid international environment; do more to reinforce parts of the international architecture that are under threat; and shape the international order of the future by working with others.

Countries whose sovereignty strongly depends on religion are currently and historically the most problematic to subsume under the ambit of multilateralism and common values.

The crisis of the multilateral system is a mix of both philosophical and geopolitical crises, laid bare by the hubris of the liberal international order inherited from the era of conquest and imperialism. As the global order has evolved in the context of shared fates and interdependence, the structural deficiencies and lingering issues of legitimacy has also fed into the maelstrom of crisis, ineffectiveness and at worse irrelevancy.

We need to find a way to reform the current system in order to make it future-proof and retain its relevance; we need to come up with ways to solve pressing issues that seem irreconcilable.

I have worked in the UN, the World Bank and the EU, so you can think of me as an insider. My over two decades of experience working with these multilateral institutions thought me about their inherent limits (including defending internal interests and survival, not necessarily the interested of the populations they claim to represent). This said, they can and do perform remarkable tasks, but they are necessarily flawed, like all human creations, and therefore need controlling/opposing institutions to check abuses and mission creep.

In practical terms we should recognise that input legitimacy is but one factor to consider (an important one but not the sine qua non). Representation alone does not guarantee inclusive outcomes. If we take African involvement in the forums on tax, the fact that they
are present has not meant that they have been able (to date) to significantly alter the agenda to address some of their concerns about current proposals. So influence for more inclusive outcomes and better cooperation may come in other forms, not just whether you have a seat at the table. This is specifically in context of question 5.

Countries not infrequently advance inconsistent positions in different multilateral fora (for example in WTO, where remaining in-development confers benefits, versus IMF, where big developing countries seek governance responsibilities commensurate with their actual global economic status). Strengthening or overhauling the multilateral system will necessitate whatever means - including well considered tradeoffs - to make the system more consistent (and effective) as well as transparent (and more legitimate).

Bureaucracy of multilateral system is the main problem to solve the worlds needs

A reformed/revolutionised multilateral system that is inclusive - as opposed to the current exclusive one- is sine qua non to socio-economic and political transformation and peace.

I think that multilateralism need to take in consideration civil society from a transnational approach

The current status of the multilateral system is a classic case of form following function as the purpose of the multilateral system as it is currently constructed is largely to protect and advance the interests of a fairly self contained elite, while those that actually exceed in numbers (the representation question) are unable to launch a powerful, coherent and convincing set of counter-proposals that translate into or galvanize positive and constructive action. That is the tragedy of the current multilateral system - its most optimal functioning is blocked by the absence of a higher, normative framework that values cooperation on longer-term existential resilience and sustainability questions over state-driven short-termism.

There needs to be a fundamental re-think of the UN system. Reforms are always to merge, to add, but never to abolish - outdated structures need to be dismantled. There needs to be more political courage to change fossilized institutions.

it is imperative that we restore confidence in the efficacy of multilateralism and of the values it is based on - not only out of idealism but rather out of self-preservation

Q20. Are there additional comments you would like to add on the future of the multilateral system?

Some of my answers are more wishes than view. 10 years ago, no one could have imagined the impact of the previous US government on multilateralism, nor Covid one, but the lessons learned should inform the way multilateralism is approached. Definitely more solidarity is needed, and globalisation is more than ever needed. Financial globalisation has not brought the expected positive changes and has further exacerbated inequalities, while covid shows that health risks, like climate ones, are -more than ever - to be addressed more collegially
About 25 years ago I was in a meeting with George Schultz about major international security risks—nuclear war, oil security, war and revolution maybe pandemics (not sure), and he shocked us all by opining that a global trade war really ought to be on that list. I think he was right!

The governments cannot recommit to supporting multilateral systems more effectively after the Covid aftermath simply because they are unequally distributed in terms of power, wealth and wellbeing. Many will be left too behind and many will spring too forward.

That I wouldn’t equate multilateralism and economic liberalism/trade and openness to trade. International value chains play a positive role; however, trends will see a repatriation of economic activity. This is also necessary for fundamental resource and environmental reasons. Current levels of trade are not sustainable. Dematerialisation and new techs (for instance 3D printing) will make production more circular and resource efficient...

The UN system should increase its capacity to act in a binding way with countries and multinational corporations and players with the goal of creating the embryo of three forms of global citizenship: civil, political and social

En la próxima década el multilateralismo perderá importancia dado que hasta la fecha ha sido altamente ineficaz en lograr sus objetivos. Transformándose en un gigantesco aparato burocrático muy alejado de las verdaderas necesidades e inquietudes de la gente. (T: In the next decade, multilateralism will lose importance given that, to date, it has been highly ineffective in reaching its goals. Transforming itself into a giant, distant bureaucratic apparatus betrays the real needs and unrest of the people).

It is more important to work on the present than predict the future.

There is need for a new world order. Revamping of institutions and rethinking the priorities.

I think the EU will play a much stronger role, but that does not make it a separate "pole". Disagree with the whole notion of a multipolar order (as opposed to a complex and interwoven world order that does include strong regional powers and two superpowers), so find it difficult to answer the questions framed that way.

Multilateralism will be more effective should the USA and China become more accommodating towards each other interests and of course to achievements. EU in future will become more of a normative power with limited impact on major global issues.

If, as I fear, the above scenario materializes it might be suicidal for humanity on earth

The questions adopt an old language that builds in assumptions that I question. I do think it is likely that power and influence will be more distributed but do not think that will result in "poles". And I think the system will function more effectively because I think it will change.

The recent trend of entrusting social and environmental welfare considerations to the private sector, shifting these responsibilities away from government, has been highly problematic and did not lead to positive overall welfare outcomes. The Covid crisis with its major public programs seems to be turning that trend a bit.
A truly fundamental threat is not the fragmentation of multilateral system (which is just a logical consequence of the established international system), but the continued existence of independent international actors, possessing capabilities of institutionalized violence against each other. Such system without a clearly stated end-goal or end-state is unstable at its core.

Keeping an eye on the US climate summit and China's commitments to it will allow us to see if the geopolitical tensions don't affect the work towards humanity's greatest challenges.

If medium powers do not strongly push for multilateralism instead of just falling into spheres of influence of the most powerful, a strengthening of the multilateral system will not happen.

The prospects of the multilateral system will significantly depend on the ability of multilateral institutions to prevent new divisions arising from differing innovation potential of nations in the unfolding Fourth Industrial Revolution.

improve the state driven system when possible (a lot doable in terms of efficiency), bypass it or combine it (depending on issues) with engagement of non-state actors (purpose led coalitions)

Multilateralism means medium and long-term thinking. To make it stronger a mindset change is needed. Incentives to do it are strong in hypothetical terms, but short-terms decisions rules.

The cost of moving away from multilateral solutions need to be assessed by the governments, especially in areas with negative externalities like climate change, pandemics so on.

International spillovers will become increasingly important for prosperity and peace globally, and so will collective action within the multilateral system. Even if individual powers will counter such collective action, multilateralism and "democracy can be periodically delayed, it can never be permanently defeated". (Amanda Gorman, The Hill We Climb)

AGREEMENTS AMONG THE DIFFERENT ACTORS IS KEY TO AVOID COLLAPSES IN THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Great power competition with china is going to force the U.S to play a more involved game in the multilateral system. Either we will lead or China will continue to fill the vacuum. Cities matter, super-empowered billionaires matter and the nation state is the preeminent power in the multi system and will remain so. I think that Chinas bad behavior globally and untrustworthiness creates enormous opportunities for the US in the global system. I'd rather be us than them.

After the financial and economic crisis of 2007, mankind had the opportunity to curb the animal spirits (Adam Smith) and the Global Minotaur (Yannis Varoufakis), i.e., the intercontinental business interests of the military-industrial complex (Dwight Eisenhower) supported by the banking sector embedded in the casino capitalism (J. M. Keynes and
Susan Strange). But instead of the expected structural reforms and the spillover of money produced in the kitchen of quantitative easing (a beautiful intellectual expression for money printing) to those who are most in need – the people (the most vulnerable) – that freshly created liquidity was shared among those who produced the 2007 financial and economic crisis. Thus, the unresolved issues of tectonic conflictuality, now reinforced by the COVID-19 risks (regardless of the controversy over whether it was artificially created to satisfy the interests of global actors), led to the birth of a new global post-globalization paradigm that will essentially contradict globalization and will make countries re-examine, introspect and strengthen their national interests (already announced by President Donald Trump’s rhetoric, decisions, policies). In such circumstances, the European idea will be particularly at risk. This idea of the EU will be jeopardized as the EU has proven to function only in nominal circumstances, free of crisis. When a crisis arises, it lacks proper leaders, instruments, solutions and capacities to handle it (the Yugoslav crisis, the Greek financial crisis, the COVID-19 crisis).

sin duda el sistema multilateral es congruente con la búsqueda de mejorar la vida de los países (T: Without doubt the multilateral system is congruent with the search to better the lives of the nations).

It depends on how Africa as a continent develops. If they can develop with minimal influence from China, France, and other nations, manage to reign in corruption, then other countries will be looking to Africa for resources and trade.

More attention should be given to the growing significance of regions and regionalism in analysis of multilateralism, global governance and international society. Regions should be thought of as diversity managers in a polycentric global order, presenting opportunities for enhancing multilateral utility in the broader context of global-regional nexus with interlinked interactions of complex interdependence.

The “future” of multilateralism is conditional on the perceived costs and benefits of concerted action. If the costs of inaction are sufficiently large, cooperation will increase. The key question is whether we are sufficiently forward looking to act before those costs rise.

In explaining my choices: the multilateral system over the next decade will become one of the arenas of contestation of ideas, rules and standards between the US and China, and will thus be increasingly paralysed on issues where either of these superpowers see strategic eco or security imperatives. The second tier of regional powers will operate at some levels autonomously from the US and China, but will also be closer to one or the other. The EU in its current configuration with the growing dissonance between the ‘old’ EU and the new ‘EU’ (but also the ‘north-south’ divides) is unlikely to emerge as a third pole.

On question 15: It is arguably the case already that non-state (Corporates even Foundations) and sub-national actors (cities) are more influential in shaping multilateral cooperation, but in articulating that power they still work through state structures. I do not foresee states becoming more willing to forego national sovereignty, indeed there seems to be an extensive effort underway to strengthen the exercise of national sovereignty. On question 17: In an ideal world the European union should function as a bridge builder with
other regions rather than as a third block, because positioning the EU as the third block after the US and China leaves out a massive chunk of the rest of the world.

Q36. Are there any additional comments you would like to add on plausible consensus principles for reforming multilateralism?

The survey assumes legitimacy has to do with participation and effectiveness with the achievement of certain goals. But goals (eg avoiding climate change) can also be legitimacy conferring.

The multilateral system should focus on effective alliances in the face of new global challenges.

That questions about legitimacy/effectiveness and votes systems should be addressed case by case.

Q35: my answer is conditioned by idea that “being effective“ reflects principles like leave no one behind

The last question is wrongly stated. In order to really be effective in a certain direction (rule based order, improvement of those worst off, adequate production and protection of global public goods) and effective combat of public bads, the multilateral system must be representative and perceived as legitimate

The purpose of participating in multilateral organizations should be to improve the wellbeing of the world as a whole, not trying to improve the specific political and economic position of each country at the expense of the others.

The multilateral system should embrace regional institutions and NGO’s.

More than cooperation between G20, UN, Bretton Wood and regional institutions is policy coherence. G20 is a closed club dominated by European countries including the current Presidency that influences through their "compatriots" at the UN, regional organizations, and Bretton Woods institutions. Consensus principles is to avoid that certain organizations write the speeches for the developing countries? Is that a real representation? An example the UN Compact on Migration. Or that UN agencies have an office in a Ministry of a developing country. Where is the independence of thinking? It would be good to assess those organizations

Multilateralism could only be effective to the degree that the sovereign countries are willing to undertake and implement binding commitments. Otherwise the interaction among countries will be just exchanging of thoughts requiring no action. The need to reforming multilateralism should not be construed to a simple decision-making process.

Awareness and conversation among different levels of governance is beneficial but striving for coherence can inhibit "productive incoherence". Avoiding beggar thy neighbor practices
and encouraging interactions among many governance forms are the most important principles, in my view.

Delivering Regional Public Goods (RPGs), outside EU, has largely failed because of the national sovereignty hurdle. Uncertainty is high and rising, contributing to further reluctance at delegation of authority to supra-national bodies. Look at the travails of the Africa Union...

The consensus principle needs to be seen from a feasibility point of view - realistically, certain states will not adhere to any decision by any multilateral body if they didn't agree to it in the first place.

The first step is to ensure consensus, that the only plausible end-state of the global multilateral system is political unification. Otherwise the system is bound to perpetually be in some sort of crisis.

A true multilateral system should include that the most powerful respect the rights of the weaker. The notion of sovereign equality of States is not an outdated one, but the essence of a multilateral system that is fair and thus legitimate. Some essential rights common to all (human rights for instance), should be paramount.

Value judgments on countries’ political regimes is to be restricted and limited to cases associated with clear violation of international law proven in accordance with international procedural rules. The growing role of regional organizations should not go at the expense of multilateral approaches when the latter are vital.

build on SDG-like processes that plug cooperation more directly with the general public

Multilateralism should be clearly shown as the only way to overcome global reaching problems and challenges. While it will not be crystal clear on this starting point, it will be difficult to build a strengthened multilateral system. In that sense, global goods production is crucial to reinforce multilateralism

Consensus did not work well in multilateral trade regime. May be countries can try plurilateral but open and inclusive agreements in some areas while exclusive plurilateral regimes can be preferred when free-riding is too costly.

effectiveness enhances output legitimacy, so the E and L (e.g. in Q35) should not be assumed to be in trade-off

Personnel is policy. Who else needs to engage in leadership early and ensure that 30 organizations of about 200 are the commanding heights of the multilateral system. Of those 30 organizations we need to work hard that the top leaders and a couple levels below are populated with competent people that democracies can work with. They do not need to work mainly with the U.S. For example, the newish leader of WIPO is someone that can attract a broad consensus. The current leader of the WHO has gotten more mixed review how the WHO has handled the source of the Covid-19 outbreak.
There will always be a temptation to prioritize immediate effects of a global organization, and not to worry much about future legitimacy. But unless you think that today's problems are the only problems, future legitimacy matters a lot.

The birth of the new global mainstream socio-economic format and frame is likely to rest on the relapses of globalization dominated by frictions of global externalities, such as climate change, environmental pollution, natural and man-made disasters, terrorism, corruption and tax havens, health risks and pandemics, the slowing of international trade and protectionism, technological development with digitalization and automation, and challenges associated with automation (and its taxation) by further reducing the share of the labor force in the distribution of profits, information management and the regulation of social networks.

I slightly disagree with the approach and framing of these questions. It suggests that there is only one multilateral system to deal with all issues. As opposed to recognising that the multilateral system is built up of multiple orders, actors, and initiatives which allows for flexibility of approach rather than trying to force all elements through a single system. We need to be able to accept multilateral multiculturalism. Consensus is therefore available in specific areas without overly effecting other elements. Generating progress on issues at different speeds and reflecting different power dynamics in different areas / subjects.

Deep pluralism should also be a key consideration in understanding decentred globalism at the core of an evolving global international society, this means greater attention to prominent cultural and political differentiations and greater degree of tolerance and respect for variations of practice. A plurally conceived international order suggests diversity and multicultural understandings of modernity, order-making and identity.

Effectiveness and legitimacy can frequently clash (albeit this do depend on how you define both). For instance, reducing unanimity makes reaching decision in the EU easier, but can lead to rather uncomfortable decisions for some EU members (and the occasional Brexit). My experience leads me to conclude is that subsidiarity should be the rule (the EU, the WB, the UN, do what countries cannot do) as there is no global polis to legitimatize them. As a side remark, as someone born in the South Hemisphere, I always felt that “Global South” is one of those condescending expressions that only US academics can come up with.

Questions 21 through 35 (with the exception of Q25) are problematic: the multilateral system is comprised of many different organizations. Responses to the questions depend on specific organizations; not the “system.”

It is extremely difficult for a multilateral system to be entirely ‘value’ neutral. For example, one may find that even in the definition of human well-being there may be many perspectives (is income the determinant? a clean environment? Political freedom? Happiness...? to highlight some examples). What is clear is that value judgements on political regimes will continue to make international cooperation very difficult, if that is the
focus. It makes for tit-for-tat 'cooperation'. On the importance of global public goods, there should be a recognition that focusing on those alone may sometimes take away from focusing on the specific needs of LICs and vulnerable. GPGs and addressing poverty/development may not be synonymous.

You have not defined "the multilateral system". The statements imply it should be a single system, rather than say, a set of overlapping spheres. So, for example, "The multilateral system should avoid value judgments on countries’ political regimes." Parts of the multilateral system that deal with climate change, global health and so on should clearly avoid this in case it could impede global cooperation on these issues. But is there a role for part of the multilateral system such as a ‘club of democracies’ to focus on this issue, then I think the answer is also clearly yes.

Reduce multilateral bureaucracy

We must resurrect the UN Charter as the primary instrument of international relations

Q37. Any other comments or questions?

Politicians everywhere should notice that the future of the world is at stake, and that short sighted views, such as winning elections at whichever cost, will growingly put us all in danger.

I think it is politically impossible to "reform" the multilateral system. It is really not a system, but a conglomeration of many different types of organizations with wildly different objectives. Better to focus on improving the components of the system, individual organizations, specific divisions and subdivisions of organizations, and only once in while a group of interacting agencies with similar purposes (i.e, multilateral banks).

The multilateral system should not only serve a subsidiary function, dealing with issues that have significant cross-border spillover effects that cannot be tackled at the national or sub-national level, but also consider those issues that are common to several countries.

Regarding questions 25-27. A system, where conflict (or distinction) between its elements is regarded as a force to keep it from failing, is bound to fail. The core goal is to eliminate the possibility for conflict between large and effectively unaccountable actors (e.g. nation states).

Several of the above questions in this section would require some caveats. For instance, in 35, in some bodies like the UN Security Council, effectiveness could be more important than on other UN bodies or international organizations.

Your examples of a second pole are all about China. What about India, which at least is a democracy?

Multilateralism greatly depends on the will and perceptions of the biggest nations, and their mental readiness to treat fundamental global issues as their real (not declarative) priorities.
This should have been split into separate questions: "The multilateral system should be multi-level (involving sub-national governments) and multi-channel (involving non-state actors such as civil society and businesses) reflecting the complexity and diversity of global governance challenges."

Populists in nation states will use the tangible expenses of global externalities to strengthen their positions and build their narratives around external enemies, the discontents of globalization, and increasingly obvious tribalism. The gullible masses will accept their sweet rhetoric as defense from "enemies" of all colors. In the economic sphere, this will mean that populists will win support in return for their promises to restore jobs, but those jobs will have already been taken by machines and automatics / robots. The share of capital in the economy will continue to increase, and the share of workers / wages will decrease. Personal indebtedness and insolvency will continue to grow. And now when the global debt is higher than ever, to whom does the World owe? Who is the debtor and who is the creditor of the World as a habitat for sustainable development?

Regionalism can also promote positive globalism by pressing for greater representation, participation and accountability as part of accommodating a plurality of views and values.

One should not be too misty eyed about multilateral institutions (or about national governments, as a matter of fact).

The rise of China in power to rival the US will mean greater stasis in multilateral organisations. On question 31 - there is a case to be made for cooperation on helping LICs and other vulnerable states on their development trajectory - so not just on transnational issues.

On question 27: The rise of China will elicit a response from the US, and my sense is that in the current context the US would seek to block Chinese influence. The effectiveness of multilateral institutions in this context will revolve around whether there are enough countries in the room that can focus on the core issues that needs addressing - like climate change - instead of only responding to US or Chinese efforts at block formation or alliance-building.