GLOBAL CHINA'S GROWING ROLE IN THE WORLD

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P R O C E E D I N G S

DEWS: Welcome to the Brookings Cafeteria, the podcast about ideas and the experts who have them. I’m Fred Dews.


Also on this episode, Metropolitan Policy Program Fellow Joseph Parilla offers a metro lens on how the 1.9 trillion-dollar American Rescue Plan provides significant and flexible funding to local and state governments to help catalyze economic recovery through small business relief, creation, and expansion.

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First up, here’s Joe Parilla on relief and recovery for America’s small businesses.

PARILLA: Hi, this is Joseph Parrilla, a fellow here at the Brookings Metropolitan Policy program.

The COVID-19 crisis has really been a small business crisis over the past 15 months, the federal government has deployed nearly $1 trillion to help small businesses weather the storm. And even as the pandemic retreats and the economy begins to recover, 60% of small business
owners report it will take at least four months to return to normal operating levels—if ever—a share that rises to 75% for owners running small businesses in food, accommodation, and arts and entertainment—the sectors that have been hardest.

Meanwhile, even as America's existing small business owners express continued concern about the fate of their businesses, a new cohort of entrepreneurs is launching startups at a historic clip—a rarity during a recession. New business starts grew by 24% in 2020, driven mainly by new startups selling goods and services online.

So, the policy response right now must both deliver relief to small businesses still at risk of closure, and catalyze a recovery fueled by small business creation and expansion. The $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan provides significant, flexible funding to local and state governments to do just that. But it's important to note that this will not occur automatically. It is going to require smart, federalist approaches organized locally to invest Washington's resources in comprehensive small business relief and recovery strategies.

In a new brief I co-authored with Sifan Liu, we provide a framework for these planning efforts focused on two key stages. Stage one is relief, which is going to involve capital access and technical assistance strategies that help small businesses stay afloat until public health restrictions loosen, which they are beginning to; consumer demand returns—that is beginning to happen as well; and existing federal small business relief programs expire. The objective for the release relief stage is to avert small business destruction.

The evidence suggests that micro businesses, Main Street businesses, and businesses located in majority-minority neighborhoods have experienced the most challenges during COVID and thus local and state government relief efforts should be targeted to those segments using their flexible fiscal recovery funds which were provided in the American Rescue Plan Act.
Stage two is recovery. This stage will involve new platform investments in the local ecosystems of support for small businesses. The objective for this stage is to recover better by catalyzing higher quality, more racially inclusive local economies. And we recommend that local recovery strategies take advantage of two leverage points: one around state policy and one around corporate commitment.

First, state policy. A lesser known provision in ARP, called the State Small Business Credit Initiative, provides states with $10 billion to dispense capital to small businesses. Local communities should be organizing themselves to use that money to build capacity in community development finance and venture capital investment—two types of lending and equity investment that are eligible under SSBCI.

Second, local communities should leverage the estimated $80 billion in corporate commitments, especially to advance racial equity in small business ownership. They could do this by investing in local intermediaries that help build and support a pipeline of minority- and women-owned businesses that can benefit from these shifts toward more diverse supplier and procurement policies in corporate America.

The point is that Washington has supplied the resources. Now, local leaders must act through collaboration with a network of entrepreneurship support organizations, economic development groups, Chambers of Commerce, community-based groups, major corporations, anchor institutions, and state government partners. A big tent is required here. But with those coalitions, local communities can make transformative investments that yield a more dynamic and equitable economic recovery.

I'm Joseph Parilla. You can find this report at our website at brookings.edu/metro.
DEWS: And now, here’s Bill Finan’s interview with Ryan Hass and Emilie Kimball on the new book, “Global China.”

FINAN: And as always, thanks, Fred, for the introduction. Ryan and Emily, thank you for being here today to talk about the new book you coedited along with Tarun Chhabra and Rush Doshi, who weren’t able to join us. Appreciate that you two could.

HASS: Thank you, Bill, it’s wonderful to be with you.

KIMBALL: Thank you, Bill. We're thrilled to be here.

FINAN: In your new book, "Global China, Assessing China's Growing Role in the World," you write that China has emerged as a truly global actor, impacting every region and every major issue. I want to ask, what are some of the major themes, the research uncovered, or lessons learned with respect to U.S. China relations?

HASS: Well, Bill, I'll start out and I'm sure Emily will have thoughts to add as well, but at the outset, let me just say that I'm glad that you recognize Tarun Chhabra and Rush Doshi as coeditors of this project, they were intimately involved in every detail before they left the Brookings Institution. And we thank them for their many contributions to the project.

The takeaways that I have, just looking back on the past two years of this endeavor are one, that it was helpful, I think, to have papers written by people who are not China experts per se. They are deep experts in their field, whether it's technology of the Middle East or the Pacific Islands or Russia, and having them explain and curate what China looks like from their vantage, I think provides the unique insight into how China's actions are being interpreted around the world.

And some of the lessons that I think that at a 30,000-foot level this book has uncovered are that China is truly a global actor. It's no longer a regional actor. There's no longer disputes
over whether or not China is going to consolidate its foothold in Asia and then use that as a springboard to project itself onto the world. It is pushing itself outwards into every region and every issue in the world at the same time as it seeks to consolidate its position in Asia.

At the same time, I think that China is focusing heavily on use of economic incentives and disincentives to try to consolidate its position and to use these economic tools as tools of first resort. This is a pattern that we see everywhere, whether we're looking at the Pacific Islands or the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, Latin America, China recognizes that other countries want to grow their economies and they want to create opportunities for their people. And the Chinese seem pretty determined to try to present themselves as the partner of choice for enabling that type of progress. And so, they're relying heavily on their economic statecraft to advance their ambitions.

And then the third lesson I take away from looking at the sweep of pieces that comprise the book is that it's not a foregone conclusion that China's strategy is going to work. Viewed collectively, I don't think that the papers in the book fall uniformly on one side or the other. They really expose a question mark. China's power is growing—that's evident throughout the book. But so too are some of the resistances to China's exercise of its influence and power, whether it's on elite capture, environmental issues, stress on local labor conditions. So, this is part of what we were hoping the book would do, which is to set out a clear, unfiltered view of what China is doing and how it impacts are being felt around the world.

KIMBALL: Thank you, Ryan, you made a lot of great points there, and thank you, Bill, for hosting us on the Brookings Cafeteria podcast. I'd like to first introduce myself a bit and then answer your question, if I may. I'm a former National Security Council staffer who served in the executive secretariat from 2015 to 2018 managing the foreign policy process. And I mostly spent
my time there reading policy memos from regional and functional directorates, then for the president and assisting him on foreign travel. While U.S. China policy has evolved since then, it's through that lens that I provide my perspective on the China challenge. Now I serve as a product manager for the Global China workstream at Brookings.

I spent considerable time working on China issues, but my background allows me to approach the China challenge from a global perspective. This perspective has helped situate the way we have thought about and approach the research questions for this Global China project. So, back to your question. Over the course of study, an overriding theme, as I noted previously, is that China has relied foremost on economic tools to expand its influence abroad. Beijing has leaned most heavily on economic incentives and disincentives to advance its global agenda, even as it also relies on malicious uses of cyber and other emerging technologies to advance its ambitions. Beijing leverages other countries' growing dependency on China as the world's most significant economic engine to gain international acceptance of its leadership position, as well as of its domestic governance and economic systems. For example, through the Belt and Road Initiative, which is China's flagship international development project, China will supply capital to spur economic growth in other countries. China has also expanded its presence in international financial institutions, launching a new multilateral development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. So, China is advancing a determined strategy to burnish its international image, expand its influence, take a leading role in rule setting, and gain acceptance of its leadership on the world stage.

FINAN: I want you to move back a little bit to that 30,000 feet level, and we'll come at this again at a more lower level, too. But what is the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy toward the region?
HASS: Well, Bill, the American policy—it's a cliche, but it has merits—that a good China strategy is a good Asia strategy. And right now, American foreign policy in Asia is pretty focused on China. There has been moves to build out from that. The Quad leaders have met. This is the leaders of India, Japan, Australia and the United States. And when they met, they really didn't talk, at least outwardly, about China, but they talked about providing solutions to the problems that people in the region face: providing COVID vaccine to people in the region, helping to deal with climate mitigation and adaptation, and also helping to spur technological innovation.

So, this is, I think, an onramp to building a more affirmative agenda for the region than other countries in the region can buy into and build into. And hopefully with that, we can begin to see progress, because I think if American policy is animated by what it is against, it's going to have very little purchase in the region. Countries in the region simply can't afford to choose to be against China. It's too risky and too costly for them. But they can afford to be part of something that is building towards a shared vision for the future of the region. And I think that's where I see American policy heading.

FINAN: There's an incredible depth and diversity of scholars who authored the chapters in this book. What framework did you use to look at the China challenge?

KIMBALL: In this project, we aimed to provide an empirical baseline for understanding China's global role across a wide ranging geographical and functional areas, China has now emerged as a truly global actor and impacts every region and every major issue area. So, to break this down and provide a framework for understanding China's regional and global ambitions, we structured chapters across seven broad categories, including: one, domestic politics, looking at how Xi Jinping's rise has shaped China's foreign policy. Two, the region of East Asia, taking a
look at how China is trying to revise the regional order and how states are responding. Three, great powers and how the world's great powers are maneuvering amid this intensified U.S.-China rivalry. Four, technology competition. Five, regional influence and strategy—so how is China impacting areas like South Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and elsewhere. Sixth, the global economy. And seven, global governance, how is China influencing human rights norms and other international institutions. So, we consulted a range of Brookings scholars as well as experts not affiliated with Brookings, to look at the China challenge from their own area of expertise.

FINAN: Do you see a particular issue area at the center of the competition between the U.S. and China?

KIMBALL: So, I'll jump in here first and then Ryan come in after since I'd like to get his perspective on this question, too. So, I believe that technology and innovation are at the center of U.S.-China competition. China recently has made enormous investments and accelerated its progress in the technology domain. Advances in technology significantly contribute to a country's economic growth, military capabilities, and influence at home and abroad. Some of the new advances in technology, like artificial intelligence, have the capacity to reshape industries as well. Often, those who lead the race then set the standards for the military and commercial sectors regarding the use of these new technologies.

So, Pavneet Singh, Michael Brown, and Eric Chewning wrote a really great chapter in the book on how the U.S. is in a superpower marathon with China on the technology race. We recently hosted Pav for our panel to launch the Global China book, where he explained how critical it is for the U.S. to leverage its strengths on the technology front, whether it is the private sector or public sector funding for research and development, and how the government should
set the conditions for these technologies to prosper, whether that's setting the conditions for America to continue attracting talent or etc.

FINAN: How confident are you in America's capacity to compete with China on this issue?

KIMBALL: I am fairly confident in the U.S. to lead and to continue to compete with China on this issue. We have amazing private sector companies focused on technology such as Google or other folks in Silicon Valley. But one thing we can do is continue setting the right conditions for America to continue to lead on the technology front. At the moment, China is laser focused on leading and surpassing the U.S. on the technology front, and the U.S. government can set some conditions to attract talent, whether that's improving folks who would like to come work here or go to schools here, etc.

HASS: You know, Bill, I'm reminded by your question of a statement that the former leader of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew made a while back when he was asked, would China like to surpass the United States? He said, of course, China would like the United States. Who wouldn't want to be number one? The challenge that China has is that they only can rely upon the talents of their own people, whereas the United States is able to be a magnet for the best ideas and brightest minds around the world. And that is an advantage that the United States has that we need to nurture. Human capital is going to be decisive to questions about innovation and technological advancement. And the more that the United States is able to continue attracting these best ideas and brightest minds, the better position we're going to be for this long-term competition with China. Emily was talking a moment ago about Google. Google was founded by a Soviet emigre. Zoom is founded by a Chinese American, and the list can go on and on. The point is that we have an advantage that China doesn’t, and we need to find ways to nurture it.
FINAN: I'm worried: in the past we've had "bomber gaps," "missile gaps" that politicians are going to be fingering a tech gap between us and China, but it sounds like that's very far in the distant future. And also if positions harden each side, too, that China is seen as an enemy and not as a global power that we should be working with in some ways.

HASS: Yeah, I think it's going to be hard, as much as some politicians like to create black and white dividing lines, the fact that knowledge production takes place on a daily basis on both sides of the Pacific—the West Coast of the United States and east coast of China—there's a flourishing ecosystem of activity there. Nature magazine recently identified the U.S.-China relationship as the most fertile relationship in the world for scientific collaboration. That's counterintuitive to a lot of people who would assume that because our relations are so fraught that scientific collaboration has ceased. It's just simply not the case. So, I don't discount the possibility that you describe, but I would hasten to suggest that I don't think that we're pointed in that trajectory yet.

FINAN: Good, good. What are some of the tools China is using to advance its interests and ambitions across the globe, as the book has defined China as a global power? And how might the U.S. respond to those tools?

KIMBALL: For the moment, we are seeing China rely on economic statecraft as a primary tool for expanding outside of its immediate periphery, but this doesn't necessarily mean that a military presence won't follow. For example, Mara Karlin and Leah Dreyfuss, in their chapter on China's military basing and force projection strategy, explain that China will likely seek security partnerships entwined with Belt and Road Initiative projects that will allow China access and recipient countries. Mara and Leah further explain the partnerships rooted in economic relations or trying to establish footholds which they can then later leverage. So,
Chinese facilities are cheaper to establish and maintain than U.S. bases and can be easily operational if needed.

HASS: I would also draw our audience's attention to a report that Josh White wrote about China's efforts to employ its military to strengthen its position in the Indian Ocean region. But to Emily's points, I think it really is an open question whether China will seek to secure a military footprint in areas of the world where it already has built a strong economic presence. On one hand, China has established a military base in Djibouti, so there is precedence here and a pattern that could be followed. On the other hand, China remains, at least rhetorically, very committed to its non-alignment policy and hasn't really shown much interest in putting skin in the game to protect other countries with whom it has close relations. So, I think this is an open question that the book has surfaced and it's going to be a space that we're going to have to continue to watch closely.

FINAN: Ryan, you note in the book that with remarkable speed, the U.S.-China relationship has fallen to perhaps its lowest ebb since 1979. For listeners not well versed in U.S. China relations, what was the situation in 1979 in terms of the U.S.-China relationship?

HASS: Well, 1979 is an important date in the U.S.-China relationship because it's the date at which both countries established formal diplomatic relations. And it's worth recalling that at that moment we were just a few years removed from Mao Zedong's death. China was still climbing out of one of the most fatal social experiments in modern history, the Cultural Revolution, which resulted in the deaths of millions of Chinese people. The country hadn't yet launched its reform and opening to the outside world policy under Deng Xiaoping. The United States and China were basically brought together by a shared antipathy towards the Soviet Union and the shared judgment that the world would be a better place if China and its 1.3 billion people
representing one fifth of humanity joined the community of nations rather than stood outside of it in angry isolation.

So, that was where we were. There was hardly any two-way investment, very little academic or cultural exchange. Only the most intrepid travelers were traveling to China in 1979. And China really wasn't considered a threat to the United States. In fact, it took a fair bit of imagination for most people at that time to conceive of the idea that China could become the colossus that is today.

FINAN: Can you sketch out what generally are the major issues that are defining this dark period in relations now? I know you touched on some of them already.

HASS: I think that part of the transition that's underway in the relationship is a shift towards the United States uncomfortably confronting a near peer who it can't dominate and who does not share America's vision for the future of Asia or really, frankly, for the future of international order.

But to lower the altitude a bit, to put it in a more tangible level, I think that Beijing has made some pretty significant shifts in recent years that have also put a lot of stress on the relationship. If you think back just five years ago to where we were, there were still term limits for China's president. Hong Kong was autonomous. Xinjiang did not have the detentions that it does now and concerns about forced labor. Taiwan was not experiencing the same level of stress. There were not daily air incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone. There was not blood spilled at the China-India border. Reform and opening was still the talk of the economic town. We had not yet moved into a phase of what's called dual circulation and self-reliance, where China is deciding that it's going to rely more on itself for technological innovation and distance itself from global production chains. And there wasn't what's now called wolf warrior
diplomacy back then, like there is now. Wolf warrior diplomacy is this idea that China needs to stand up firmly and push back strongly against challengers to the dignity of the Chinese people.

So, many of my Chinese colleagues often counter that that's unfair, that the United States is also changed pretty considerably in the last five years. And I'm willing to acknowledge that the United States has contributed to the downturn of relations in recent years. But I don't think that the current impasse can be explained solely by American behavior, because when you look at the situation right now, the reality is that China has a tense relationship with the United Kingdom, with Canada, with India, with Australia, and to a lesser extent with Japan and the European Union. And the simultaneity of these increasingly fraught relationships suggests that there's something more than the United States at work here. And it is that China's approach to the world and its tolerance for friction with the world has certainly grown.

FINAN: Are there any areas where U.S. and China can find common ground or cooperate with each other at this time?

HASS: Well, it's an important question and it's a topic of debate, so I'll share my perspective on this question, but just recognize at the outset that there are different people who have different views. But my view is that there is going to be a lot of tension in the relationship. It's going to be a competitive relationship because there are aspects of the relationship that will purely be zero-sum. In other words, there is no compromise available. We just have irreconcilable differences, whether it's on the balance between the individual and social stability, the role of the state society and the distribution of power in the international system, Taiwan, Xinjiang, Hong Kong—these are going to be very hard issues to manage.

But even in spite of that, I would argue that it would constitute self-harm for the United States only to view the relationship in zero-sum terms. The truth is, I think that there are
significant aspects of the relationship that will be either positive-sum or negative-sum, meaning that either the United States and China will benefit together or will both be harmed together depending upon how they deal with the issues. And I would put climate change in that basket. I think that our efforts to tackle COVID-19 would fit in that basket. Our efforts to build global public health infrastructures so that we can quickly detect and respond to future epidemics would go in that basket. Food security, energy security, Afghanistan, potentially Iran's nuclear program.

And even if you don't accept those, the fact that the United States and China have the two largest health care systems in the world, we both have a bulge of an aging population that is going to grow older and require more social services. And if we both are able to pool our resources to discover cures to diseases, that would benefit both countries and both societies. If we're both able to find the most effective care models for treating uncurable diseases, we could save resources and hopefully save lives.

But even taking it a step further, as we were talking about a moment ago when we're talking about security issues, we both have pretty significant capacity to blow each other up if we want to. And with our emerging technologies, existing capabilities, nuclear capacity, one of the lessons of the Cold War that I take away is that it took the Cuban missile crisis to sober the United States and Soviet Union up to the need for crisis communications, risk management, and arms control. My hope is that the United States and China in this present moment will not require a similar crisis in order to move down that path.

I mentioned these things just to underscore the intellectual limits of viewing the relationship as solely friend or foe, black or white. The real world doesn't fit itself as neatly into those categories. I think the real world has lots of shades of gray. So, whether we like each other or not, whether we view each other as rivals or not, whether we have an ideological view of the
other or not, the simple reality is that we both confront shared challenges. And as long as we're both stuck on the same planet together, I think as the world's two most capable powers, we're going to have to figure out ways to deal with these problems. And if we don't, I think that people in both countries are going to suffer as a consequence.

FINAN: I like that enumeration of focal points for cooperation, and I haven't really heard that from others before, so that's good to know. The book also discusses what China's rise signifies for great power relations. There's an intriguing insight from Brookings scholar Bruce Jones that captures the issue in a way that I hadn't seen it before. And I'll just quote it. "China's rise marks the first time since the creation of a global system that an illiberal power has the reach, capacity, and ambition to reshape the rules of the international order." What exactly does that mean? And what should policymakers do to manage U.S.-China competition with that understanding in mind?

KIMBALL: Thanks for this question, Bill. This is a significant point Bruce Jones makes in his chapter. So, as Bruce goes on to sort of explain, it effectively means that China can claim a seat at the table, given its economic and technological strength, and Washington will need to learn how to navigate this reality that a system that is not democratic has more agency in international affairs. Now, there is another dynamic unfolding as well. With the U.S. and China's economic and military strength, as well as its leadership and new technologies, there's a growing gap between the U.S. and China and the rest of the great powers and overall national power. The U.S. and China are separating from the rest of the pack and the intensifying U.S.-China competition forms the backdrop against which the other powers now maneuver. U.S. policymakers will have to be careful not to push Russia closer to China, as Russia expert Angela Stent notes in her chapter. And other powers will have to play a careful balancing act, one that
seeks engagement with Beijing where possible and one aimed at limiting or competing with China on the other, all the while maintaining positive relations with the U.S.

HASS: Bill, if I could just add definition to the great points that Emily was making. If I recall correctly, I think it was PricewaterhouseCoopers that had an estimate that the AI technology in the world will generate a windfall of, I think, 16 trillion dollars between now and 2030. Of that 16 trillion dollars, 70 percent of the windfall will be spread across the United States and China. And this just underscores the point that Emily is making, that there is a separation taking place between the United States and China, racing ahead of the rest of the pack because of this clustering effect around innovation and around the most talented engineers working in the United States and China.

And so, it's going to provide the context through which major powers are going to have to navigate. And as much as the United States and China say that they don't want countries to choose sides, in reality, both countries do want other countries to choose their side, whether it's on what 5G technology to install for their national systems, what technology standards to adopt, who to support for UN leadership positions. There are these proxy battles taking place over and over again, and it's becoming harder, frankly, for countries stuck in the middle to navigate. But if either the United States or China puts the screws to other countries and forces them to choose an across the board alignment and demonstration of loyalty, I suspect that they will be disappointed and frustrated with the responses they receive. Because the reality is that for other countries, they want to have good relations with both countries. They don't want to pick one or the other and alienate the other in the process. It's too risky and too costly to pick one and to become estranged from the other.
FINAN: I want to end by asking you both questions about the Biden administration's foreign policy toward China, what it's getting right, where it can improve. And there are two areas that I was hoping that you could comment on specifically, too, Hong Kong and Xinjiang and the persecution of the Uighur there, too.

HASS: Well, Bill, I'm happy to take a swing at this, and I'm sure Emily will have smart ideas to add. But on Hong Kong, you know, I think that China has smashed the notion of Hong Kong enjoying significant autonomy. It has broken the pledge that it made to guarantee 50 years of autonomy in one country, two systems to Hong Kong after the retrocession of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China. And I think that what we're watching is just a day by day absorption of Hong Kong into the mainland, where the distinctions are being blurred between how Hong Kong operates and how the mainland operates. It's sad. It's disappointing. And I think that undergirding this is an assumption by Beijing that over time the international community will give in and give up and just accept the reality on the ground. And I think that Beijing also calculates that for foreign financial firms that operate in Hong Kong that it will be too costly for them to leave Hong Kong because they would lose access to the mainland market and lose access to the lucrative returns that they are earning in Hong Kong at the moment.

So, what do we do? There are no easy answers, but I think that the United States and its partners are going to need to find ways to exceed Beijing's expectations about the seriousness of their concern and the steadiness of their response. The G-7 announced that there will be a monitoring group on Hong Kong. I think that's a step in the right direction. And the goal really is to impress upon Beijing that we are not going to turn a blind eye. We're going to continue to push to preserve an independent judiciary, the ability of international NGOs to operate in Hong Kong, etc. And I think that the United States and other like-minded partners also have a moral
imperative to find ways to welcome those in Hong Kong who are fearing persecution from being there.

And if I could just turn from one happy subject to the next, Xinjiang is a heartbreaking case to follow. I previously was the Xinjiang reporting officer when I served in our embassy in Beijing. So, I had an opportunity to travel around the region and meet with lots of people. It's a beautiful place with proud cultural traditions. There are a few things that I think would be better than others to do for the United States. The first is to keep an unblinking eye on developments there, to raise our concerns in very concrete ways, very tangible ways at every level from the embassy officers such as myself, all the way up to the president and everyone in between. If our top leaders don't raise Xinjiang as an issue of concern, I think that the Chinese will significantly discount the strength of our concerns. But it's also important to let the people of Xinjiang see that we understand the situation that they're enduring, that we support their rights to live without fear of repression or discrimination on the basis of their ethnic or religious identity. Overall, I think that it's important for the United States to work with its partners around the world to ensure that Xinjiang is an issue that China must explain to the world and does not become cabined as a U.S.-China issue. And hopefully the cumulative weight of these efforts over time will push China to move from overreach to recalibration. The sooner the better. And I know this is unsatisfying, but I think it's important that we continue down this path.

KIMBALL: I'm happy to come in on this question as well, and I'll maybe take a step back to the top part of your question about what steps the Biden administration can take on China policy. I'll go back to the technology front. So, we've seen Chinese tech companies quietly shape the global regulatory environment around some of the new technologies and platforms that we've been talking about. And so one area where I think the U.S. can be strong is in sort of setting
standards around technology and especially around the surveillance technologies to align more with our values. So, around privacy and human rights. So, there's a really critical chapter in the book by Sheena Chestnut Greitens, which focuses on the export of China's public security and surveillance technology platforms. And I think I'd just like to stress the point and the importance of standing up for U.S. values when some of these technologies then get implemented.

FINAN: Emilie and Ryan, thank you for taking the time today to talk to us about your new book, "Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in the World." It's a book that's essential reading to understand China now and how we should deal with it.

KIMBALL: Thank you so much for having us.

HASS: Thank you, Bill.

DEWS: You can find the book, Global China: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World,” wherever you like to get books, and may I suggest your local bookstore.

A team of amazing colleagues helps make the Brookings Cafeteria possible. My thanks go out to audio engineer Gaston Reboredo; Bill Finan, director of the Brookings Institution Press, who does the book interviews; my communications colleagues Marie Wilkin, Adrianna Pita, and Chris McKenna for their collaboration. And finally, to Soren Messner-Zidell and Andrea Risotto for their guidance and support.

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Until next time, I'm Fred Dews.