

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
WEBINAR
GLOBAL CHINA: ASSESSING CHINA'S GROWING
ROLE IN THE WORLD
Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, June 22, 2021

PARTICIPANTS:

Keynote Address:

THE HONORABLE GERGORY MEEKS (D-N.Y.)
Member, United States Congress
Chair, House Foreign Affairs Committee

Panel Discussion:

RYAN HESS, Moderator
Michal H. Armacost Chair and Senior Fellow,
John L. Thornton China Center,
The Brookings Institution

TANVI MADAN
Senior Fellow and Director, The India Project
The Brookings Institution

PAVNEET SINGH
Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L.
Thornton, China Center
The Brookings Institution

CAITLIN TALMADGE
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for Security,
Strategy and Technology,
The Brookings Institution

* * * * *

P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. MALONEY: Good morning and good afternoon and good evening to those of you outside the Washington area. My name is Suzanne Maloney and I'm the vice president and director of the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. It is my great privilege to welcome Representative Gregory Meeks, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, back to the Brookings stage for this special event.

Our discussion today will examine key issues at the heart of the U.S.-China relationship and also celebrate the publication of an important new book, "Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in the World," edited by Tarun Chhabra, Rush Doshi, Ryan Hass and Emilie Kimball.

This book which is being released today is the product of a truly monumental project led by the co-editors that aim to provide a current empirical baseline for understanding the implications of China's rise for the United States and the rest of the world. The Global China project and the book that will launch today are designed both to examine China's ambitions and to explore the implications for the United States and the rest of the world if China succeeds and if it does not.

We are so grateful to have Chairman Meeks with us today to help make sense of some of these questions which constitute the foremost strategic challenge for Washington and the world. After the Chairman's keynote address and moderated discussion, we will invite a panel of Brookings expert to the virtual stage to explore these questions further in their areas of expertise.

I'm delighted once again to have the opportunity to engage with Chairman Meeks as we have in the past around a range of foreign policy issues, including most recently on the Middle East and, of course, now around Asia and China. Congressman Meeks represents New York's 5th District and is now in his 13th term. As you know, he serves as the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and was the first Black member of Congress to serve in this role.

Prior to representing the 5th District of New York, Chairman Meeks served in the New York State Assembly and he has worked as Queens County Assistant District Attorney, a prosecutor for a special anti-narcotics task force and a chief administrative judge for the New York State's worker

compensation system. Chairman Meeks holds a J.D. from Howard University Law School. Earlier this year, Chairman Meeks introduced the Ensuring Global Leadership and Engagement Act or EGLE Act. The legislation is intended to increase U.S. economic competitiveness and hold China accountable on human rights.

A final reminder that we are on the record today and streaming live. So please send us your questions to events@brookings.edu or on Twitter using the #GlobalChina. Before I hand over the virtual stage, I'd like to thank the Ford Foundation for their generous support of this initiative. We are very grateful for their partnership throughout this project. As always, Brookings' commitment to scholarly independence is sacrosanct and the views of our speakers today are solely their own. And now, I'm delighted to pass the mic over to Chairman Meeks for his keynote address. Excuse me, Chairman, I believe you may be muted.

MR. MEEKS: Okay, gotta hit that button. Let me thank you, Suzanne, for all that you do with Brookings. And I want to give my sincere thanks also to Brookings for hosting me today for the launch of what is this timely new book, "Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in the World."

You know, we took a glance in taking a look at the book's table of contents and my first thought was that America is indeed in good hands. And that is in part because the far-ranging analysis included in this volume reveals that we are at least we are aware of the China challenge. But what I was particularly struck by was the diversity of views in people that contributed to this volume, some of whom I understand are now part of the Biden administration.

The diversity in our marketplace of ideas and our communities and in the United States government is something China cannot match. That is strife that we must not relinquish. This book lays out the challenge ahead of us. A globally oriented China that wants to change the rules of the international order and alter the existing economic governance and security systems around the world in ways that undermine U.S. interest and those also of our close allies.

Our collective task is to navigate this grey new reality. Yes, the China challenge is considerable. Your volume surveys, China's growing military, economic and technological lift. We are

locked in a strategic competition across a spectrum of issues across the world. And relations between our two countries have not been this dire in decades.

We indeed have a difficult road ahead of us. But I believe in this competition, I will always bet on America. We need to be clear that today's competition is different than that which we faced with the Soviet Union. Yet many in Washington are eager to bring out the same toolkit America used during the Cold War. We're not here to contain China and we have no interest in keeping prosperity from 1.4 billion people.

Remember, the United States and the international community facilitated China's economic rise by welcoming it into the international trading system and investing in its economy. Our competition is with the government of the People's Republic of China which has chosen regression instead of reform.

Over the past eight years, Xi Jinping has taken the problematic trajectory and supercharged it. Under Xi, we have seen the PRC tighten its grip domestically and throw its weight around internationally. These two challenges are linked. Enhanced party control domestically by cracking down on economic and political freedom on the one hand, and enhanced PRC's influence and dominance internationally on the other.

They then explicitly connect the party with China's rejuvenation. And we must reject Xi's narrative that the CCP is China. China isn't the problem, the Xi administration is the problem. And as Secretary General, as General Secretary rather, Chairman and President, Xi Jinping may as well be the judge, jury and executioner in China today. And he's likely to be at the helm for some time.

So this gives China a great deal of continuity in how it advances its global ambitions. But nevertheless, we need to understand that China isn't as invincible as some make it out to be. Xi's consolidation of power doesn't mean he faces no challenges. In fact, in my opinion there are many.

Xi Jinping has stated his desire to elude the middle-income trap but COVID-19 has delayed that goal. And even before the pandemic, the Chinese economy was experiencing declines in its growth rate and productivity rate. In the face of an aging population and ethnic divisions, the PRC still

has to deliver for its people economically and it will need to do so with an increasingly top-down governance system and a shrinking inner circle around Xi and Beijing.

And then, of course, we have the growing pushback internationally against the PRC's foreign policy and it's not just from the United States and not just because of COVID. But because of a long litany of China's belligerence. Over the past year, the PRC has demonstrated to the world the dangers it possesses. As a result of the degradation of Hong Kongese autonomy, the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang, the violence at the Indian border, the maritime bullying on the Scarborough Shoal and the economic corrosion around the world, there is growing alarm about China on the world stage.

In 2018, even before some of China's most glaring policy decisions and despite the counterproductive policies of the last administration, Pugh found that most countries preferred the United States as the world's leading power. And according to the Morning Consult Political Intelligence, there has been a sizeable improvement to American brand since the inauguration as Joe Biden as President. Globally, America remains far more popular.

But in my conversation with our allies and our partners, I've also heard worries that American institutions and our policies are not up to the task. After the tenure of the previous administration and the insurrection in Washington on January 6th, there is concern that a future administration could undo the commitments made by the Biden administration. And that is why Congress must act to set a longer term of course. Congress must ensure that we remain steadfast in our focus to renew American institutions and competitiveness at home, at American engagement and leadership abroad.

You have seen that in the passage this month of the United States Innovation and Competition Act in the Senate, a comprehensive legislation to tackle the China challenge. And you see it in the House also where multiple committees are considering and moving legislation on China as I plan to do with the EGLE Act in the Foreign Affairs Committee.

See I believe America will be best positioned to compete with China if it leads and engages the world again. And the EGLE Act returns America to the world stage. I sincerely believe that

the United States fell behind not by supporting China's rise but by becoming complacent and short sighted about bolstering an international order and our alliance system.

The last administration forgot that if we don't lead the world, someone else will take on the mantle. And the PRC in many ways saw a vacuum and filled it. America will come out ahead as long as we lead with confidence and leverage our strengths. The first of these are our alliances with partnerships. Our system of alliances is a superpower that China simply does not have. We are not alone in our competition with China. We need to be creative about how we leverage this constellation of relations. Bilaterally, multilaterally and through groupings like the Quad.

You know, the Quad's cooperation on vaccine diplomacy is the kind of activity we need to see more of. Groupings of like-minded nations acting collectively for the global good. And that's why the EGLE Act calls for greater funding for vaccine diplomacy and to boost cooperation with the Quad.

It also bolsters our diplomacy through an increase in Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific. And we need to present a positive vision for the international system based on the rule of law. The EGLE Act shines a light on countries that started to get overlooked by American foreign policy. Such as the Pacific Islands and the Pacific Island states. And states from the Caribbean and in African.

These nations are often at the frontline of international and transnational threats and are especially vulnerable to China's influence because of the lack of international standards. America also needs to lead in international organizations again. This is true both at the UN where China has made a huge push for influence as well as in regional organizations around the world.

You know, America used to be the driver of economic integration and standards in the Indo-Pacific. Now being on the outside of the CP TPP and the RECP, it is barely a part of the conversation. So the EGLE Act calls on the United States to upgrade its economic diplomacy in leadership in the Indo-Pacific by looking at sectorial trade agreements and embracing a leadership role that organizations like APEC where it is a member.

America must demonstrate that it will lead on climate change and hold China accountable

when it comes to the most pressing challenges facing the world today. The EGLE Act does this by making climate a critical component of our diplomacy and authorizes the Biden administration to provide supplemental foreign assistance for clean energy, reduce the negative impacts of black carbon, support the green climate fund promote responsible alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative.

The EGLE Act also ensures that the United States walks the talk when it comes to human rights on our values. It imposes concrete costs of the PRC for its use of Uyghur forced labor and designate survivors as priority II refugees of special humanitarian concern. It authorizes appropriations for the promotion of democracy in Hong Kong and provides temporary protected and refugee status for qualified Hongkongers.

And last but not least, as Ryan Hass has written in his book, we need to find an equilibrium to the relationship to allow for co-existence in the midst of strenuous competition. To do that, we need to decelerate the downward spiral in the relationship. We need to find discrete issues we can cooperate and reduce mistrust. And we need to use diplomacy to prevent an avoidable war with China. We've gone through two of the longest wars in American history.

And while the American people may be waking up to the idea of great power competition, we all aspire to avoid a great power war. Therefore, we must keep open lines of communication and dialogue and strengthen mechanisms to avoid managed crises because we need to manage these crises and reduce the risk of accidents that can escalate into conflict.

And, of course, much of this will depend on China itself. The easiest way to avoid confrontation will be if the PRC changes course. Whether it is the safety of our good friends in Taiwan or the plight of the Uyghur's or the maritime and border claims of our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. China must adhere to its commitments and to international rules and law if it wants a productive relationship with the United States and the rest of the world.

So in the meantime, what America must do and America's task is to lead again. It's to lead again. I've said it before and I'll say it again. America first means America alone. We want to be America forward leading our friends and our allies with our values and our collective interest. So again,

thank you for having me, I look forward to addressing a few questions.

MR. HASS: Congressman, thank you so much for your comments, your time and your insights. I think that you've provided a really positive, affirmative case for America's way forward. I particularly appreciate your emphasis on diversity and alliances, its unique strengths that the United States has that provide competitive advantages with respect to China.

If I could, I'd like to pick up where you left off talking about the EGLE Act. Could you share with us what you envision as the timeline for completion of this bill and where do you see deficiencies or gaps in the Senate bill that you hope the EGLE act will address?

MR. MEEKS: Well, we're in negotiations now to finalize the bill. I delayed it. I was going to mark it up earlier but I delayed and my plan now is to mark it up this month, the month of June. Which would mean that it would be or could be considered on the floor perhaps as early as next month. My ultimate goal is to work with the Senate so that we can get a bill on the President's desk.

I've been talking back and forth with my Senate counterparts, and I think that the Senate is in line with that. So I look forward to move in that regard in my conversation with some of the Senate and I applaud my Senate colleagues are moving their bill, The U.S. Innovation and Competition Act through their chamber.

Let me note something that the Senate passed or the bill that the Senate passed was a package of several bills that moved through different committees in the Senate. And we're trying to do the same thing in the House with multiple committees in the House working to get legislation in their jurisdiction to the floor. So, of course, we've incorporated many provisions from the Senate's bill into the EGLE Act.

And there are a number of areas where we have added provisions. So for instance, the EGLE Act includes important provisions on climate change and global vaccine distribution that are missing in the Senate Act. And the EGLE Act also goes further in holding the PRC government accountable for its grave human rights violations and helping those it oppresses.

The bill includes a temporary protected and refugee status for Hongkongers and

refugee protection for the Uyghur's. And strong measures imposing cost of China for the use of forced labor. And one other area of differences in the emphasis on showing of our economic diplomacy and engagement. That's really important to me.

The EGLE Act takes steps to enhance U.S. trade and investment in the Indo-Pacific. It bolsters American leadership and participation in regional economic organizations, like I said, during my opening remarks like the form of APEC. And it drives the formation of adoption of high standards and rules for the region to counter China's unfair trade and economic practices. So that's just some of the differences between the bill EGLE Act that we're working on and the bill that was put forth by the Senate. And I hope that we can work it out in a conference once we get there.

MR. HASS: Well wonderful, thank you for sharing those insights. I know that one of the responsibilities that you have is to oversee America's entire foreign policy not just its China policy. So I wanted to ask you a question about how you see our challenges with China fitting in the overall hierarchy of American foreign policy priorities and how do you think the Biden administration is doing thus far in fitting in China within the overall hierarchy?

MR. MEEKS: Well, thank you that question. Clearly, I do think that China is probably the greatest state driven challenge that we face. And it's going to be something that we're going to be grappling with probably for years. I don't want to pretend that this is, you know, we have an immediate and easy solution. The only way to make it a little easier is, of course, is if the PRC changes its tune and starts to act in a more responsible -- as a stakeholder in the international system. So that's yet to see. That can make it less painful as we move forward.

You know, the challenges that we face, climate change, the ongoing pandemic, they are just pressing if not more. And I think that looking at what the opinion of the American people, they agree with that assessment. For instance, a recent poll by The Center for American Progress indicated that combating climate change is a higher priority for Americans than taking on China.

So what we're going to have to do is walk and chew gum at the same time. We just need to be careful that our focus on China does not lead to blind spots in our strategy on the other challenges

that we have such as Russia. We also have to acknowledge that on some of the toughest issues we face like North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs, a real solution will have to include China at the table. And we need China to play a constructive role there.

So I don't want to let China dictate our strategy but we have to base our strategy on our interest always keeping our values out front and working with our partners and allies. Now as to President Biden, I really believe that he's adopted a pragmatic framework that meets these challenges and has adopted a whole of government approach that effectively buttresses American power to face the China challenge.

Diplomacy is extremely important and this administration has elevated diplomacy as a premiere tool of our global engagement. Making sure that we're joining with our partners and our allies so that if there are sanctions, we do them together. It's not just America by itself. I think that the President has worked, you know, when I think about restoring our -- and I also think he's reimagining our partnerships abroad.

You know, this is by his participation in the first leaders level Quad meeting, for example, which reaffirmed our commitment to some of our most important partners and has led to tangible cooperation so that we can ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific that's anchored by. And that's what I keep going back there, anchored by our values and unconstrained by coercion.

MR. HASS: Yeah, that's very helpful. One of the things that I hear you working through is this tension between policy and politics. And I wanted to ask you, you're very uniquely positioned to offer insight to our audience about this. Presumptive Republican candidates for 2022 and 2024 have been advertising and promoting their hawkishness on China as key advantages that they have. How do you see China factoring into the national political debate over the coming years? And do you see the issue potentially benefitting one party over the other?

MR. MEEKS: First of all, I hate, I've got to tell you, I hate to speculate about future presidential races. We're just barely into the Biden administration, just six months into his term. And my concern is, you know, it's easy to bolster or bully or anything of that nature. It's effective policymaking

which is hard and I think that's what we've got to try to do.

So despite many of the potential candidate's tough talk on China which I think the previous administration tried to do, actually what it did it utterly botched our response to COVID-19 pandemic which, by the way, came from China. And I don't think the American people are naïve. I don't think they want to be embroiled in an avoidable conflict with China which I think many of their response is just that.

I think the American people are tired of America acting alone. They saw how the previous administration alienated all of our allies just as we were ramping up competition with China. And it was the American people that footed the bill for the previous administration's trade war with China.

So what I'm hearing, don't know what it's going to be but if it's what it is that I'm hearing from many of the campaigns of potential candidates that may be running, they're utilizing the prior administration's strategy that clearly in my estimation made us worse off and not better off. I think that what President Biden is doing, bringing back our friends at the table so that we can take on China together, is the way to do that.

So I'll take that debate any time whether it's how to take on China in that regard. Whether you want to get into another avoidable war or whether you want to work with our friends and allies to make sure that we have a more effective and efficient strategy on China. I'll take that debate any time.

MR. HASS: Well Chairman, thank you for your insights. I may be old fashioned, but I share your view that good policy creates good results and good results create good politics. So I think that's a wise way of thinking about things.

One of the, I know that our time is limited but I did want to take this opportunity to ask you a question. Many of our Asian American friends living in the United States are feeling pressure, facing racism and xenophobia. And how do you yourself or how do you advise other leaders to think about and talk about these issues in the context of rising racism and xenophobia?

Because we've seen throughout American history whether it was the German's, the Russian's the

Japanese, the Muslims after September 11th that there is a pattern when great power competition and nationalism surge, racism often follows. So how are you sort of thinking about this for yourself?

MR. MEEKS: Well here is where I think that the uniqueness of me being the Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and being as indicated, the first African American to sit in that role, I play and bring to the table a big perspective. Racism in America has been with America almost from its inception, even before its inception.

I understand the significance of standing up and making sure that we have a loud and clear voice against anti-Asian hate, anti-Semitism, racism, sexism, you know. Also, you know, against people who happen to have a different sexual orientation. That's not who we should be as a people. I know the pain and the hurt that that puts on various individuals. And it should do all of us because the one thing that we all have in common, we're all part of a human race.

I've seen it with my own eyes here in New York. I've seen it in my lifetime. I've seen anti-Semitism. Whether it was from the death of individuals in a synagogue in West Chester, New York, swath stickers in graveyards. I've seen in the history of America with reference to the ugly history of putting in camps people of Japanese descent. I've seen the bigotry and the hatred of racism.

We as the United States need to stand up and make sure that we voice against it. We must also make sure that we recognize our past, not going to tell others that we are perfect and you are bad. We've got to recognize. That's why I think that the bill that passed and signed by the President just last week making Juneteenth a national holiday is substantial because it talks about recognizes and makes all Americans recognize our past faults.

We need to make sure that we're speaking up and talking about the past incarcerations and camps of Japanese Americans, the genocide of Native Americans, the anti-Semitism and the truth about us even being late to the holocaust at the time but we got it right finally. Because the one thing I do believe when we do that, America does correct itself and we can get it right and we will get it right.

That's why we're always stressing and trying to be a more perfect union. And we can tell folks yes, follow our example of making mistakes, understanding that we made mistakes and change

directions so that we can make the planet a better place.

That's our struggle with China right now. That's why we put certain things with regards to the Uyghurs. We can't let history look back and say we just sat by and let the genocide of individuals die because they did not directly live in our neighborhoods. We've got to stand for it by understanding what took place in the past.

And I believe that that is squarely and important in the jurisdiction of all the committees but especially the House Foreign Affairs Committee when we talk about the historical context of genocides and racism and sexism, anti-Semitism and Asian hate. We've got to make sure our voices are loud and clear and I intend to do just that as chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

MR. HASS: Chairman, I have many more questions that have come in from our audience and many more questions of my own but I promised your staff that we would not cause you to miss your flight. So I will bid adieu to you now. Thank you very much for your time and your insights and I hope that we can continue this conversation in the future.

MR. MEEKS: Thank you. It's always good to be with you, Ryan.

MR. HASS: Thank you, Chairman. I would now like to invite our panel of experts to join us. They are three friends that I'm delighted to share the Brookings virtual stage with to help us dive deeper on a few of the implications of China's rise. They are leading experts on technology issues, nuclear issues and major power relations. And they are all contributors to the Global China book which has come out today.

The book was made possible by the efforts of many people but I do want to take one moment to recognize the co-editors. Former colleagues Tarun Chhabra and Rush Doshi as well as the irreplaceable Emilie Kimball who orchestrated the entire enterprise. But in order to get straight into this discussion and maximize the time that we have available, I'm going to be ungenerously brief in my introduction of my three friends.

Tanvi Madan is a senior fellow and director of the India Project at the Brookings Institution. Her research focuses on India's role in the world and its foreign policy as well as relations in

Asia among major powers.

Pavneet Singh is a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution dialing in from the West Coast very early in the day. We thank you for that. He's currently examining how machine learning software in advanced analytics can solve complex problems in critical industries in the United States. He previously worked on China policy at the White House where I was proud to serve alongside him.

Caitlin Talmadge is an associate professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Her research focuses deterrents and escalation, nuclear strategy, civil military relations, emerging technologies, defense policy and U.S. military operations and strategy.

In terms of our run of show today, we've split our discussion into three parts. In the first segment, I'm going to ask our panelists to define the challenges that China's rise is posing to the United States and their areas of expertise. In the second segment, I'm going to ask them to share their recommendations for policy improvements that could be made to deal with those challenges. And in the third segment, we will grapple with the questions that our audience poses to these experts. And if anyone has questions, please continue to send them in via email to events@brookings.edu or via Twitter at #GlobalChina.

So with that housekeeping out of the way, Caitlin I'd love to turn first to you. As I think you saw, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Milley recently stated in congressional testimony that he is confident in America's nuclear deterrent vis a vie China even if China doubles its nuclear capability. And I wanted to ask sort of two questions. First off, do you agree with that assessment and then if you could help us non-nuclear experts sort of understand and contextualize the significance of that statement and how it relates to America's thinking around risk tolerance in the relationship with China.

MS. TALMADGE: Sure, great. Well, first of all, thanks for the opportunity to be here and thanks for all your leadership on this project. Great question, I think, about Milley. I do generally share the confidence that he expressed in the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

I think both qualitatively and quantitatively the U.S. has an incredible robust arsenal compared to any

other country including China. And even if China's arsenal doubled or more than doubled it would remain a small fraction of the U.S. arsenal just in terms of sheer numbers. China's foreheads are in the low hundreds, the U.S. has thousands. And it's not just, you know, in a numerical comparison where the U.S. is ahead as I think a number of the chapters in this volume that we've put out today indicate.

The U.S. also has a number of non-nuclear capabilities that are very relevant to the nuclear balance. So the United States, I think, has important advantages in areas like intelligence and surveillance and reconnaissance and long range precision strike and missile defenses. All of which I think contribute to what remains a pretty real sense of Chinese nuclear vulnerability.

So, you know, do we need to suddenly be worried about Chinese, you know, bolt from the blue attack on Los Angeles with a nuclear weapon, no, I don't think so and I don't think that was, you know, even in the background of the conversation with Milley. But I think what was in the background and what's also discussed in my chapter in the book is that China's arsenal is improving both qualitatively and quantitatively in ways that might affect peacetime dynamics and crisis dynamics because it's moving the two countries into a deeper state of mutual vulnerability.

A situation where neither side can avoid suffering unacceptable damage in a nuclear war no matter who goes first. And I think there is concern in the U.S. that if the U.S. enters an undisputed state of mutual nuclear vulnerability with China, meaning that China can inflict unacceptable damage on U.S. cities even in the aftermath of a U.S. first strike, the U.S. may be less able to deter China even at the conventional level. And if the nuclear level stalemated the conventional balance, you know, potentially becomes more important and the conventional balance is not moving in a very favorable direction either.

And, you know, the last thing I'll say is just that Milley himself kind of pointed back to that point in his comments. He said, you know, it's important for the U.S. to actually maintain what he referenced as overmatch relative to China. Because I think he's indicating that the U.S. relies on its nuclear advantages, not just to deter nuclear conflict but possibly also to deter conventional and sub-conventional aggression and that's why it's monitoring these changes and China's nuclear forces so closely.

MR. HASS: Thank you, that's fascinating. Pav, I'd like to turn to you. You and your

authors and your contributions to the book talked about the United States and China being in a superpower marathon with technology issues and innovations sort of at the core of this competition. But your authors and you also said that the Cold War playbook is an ill-advised playbook for navigating this marathon. So my two questions to you, why is technology and innovation at the crux of this competition and why is the Cold War analogy or playbook improper for the current moment?

MR. SINGH: Great, thanks Ryan and it's great to see you and I'm delighted to be here at the launch of this volume. I think it's been a long time coming and I think it's safe to say that U.S. China policy has traveled a long way since our time together in the Obama administration.

Quickly, I'd like to acknowledge the work of my co-authors, Mike Brown, the Director of the Defense Innovation Unit and Eric Chewning, the Former Chief of Staff to Secretary of Defense Esper and current partner McKenzie. I say this because the ability for the three of us to come together and writing this paper I think is illustrative of a little bit of what Chairman Meeks was saying. But that there is a bipartisan consensus emerging on many aspects of U.S. China policy.

To your very important questions, the role of technology and innovation, look at a high level, the argument that we make is that technology advantage and leadership really underwrites economic capacity, economic prosperity and it's ultimately critical to national security. This has been born out for the U.S. and other global powers throughout history.

For the U.S., the advances in technology powered our economy through the Cold War and several decades since. And you know this well and our other panelists know this well, the advances in technology conferred strategic military advantage to the U.S. in the form of technology offsets. Caitlin talked about over match but if you think about it, we were first with nuclear weapons in the first offset and then we had things like night vision, laser guided bombs, stealth and jamming technologies and space-based military communications in the second offset.

For the better part of the last half century, the U.S. and to a certain extent, our allies, led the world in R&D, the application of foundational technologies such as semi-conductors, biotech, drug development and advanced computing. But the key point here is that the U.S. really set the standards

both technically and normatively for how these technologies were used both in the military and in the commercial sector.

Today we're living in a very unique moment. And I know a lot of people kind of point to their era as a unique time. But I will say that the advances in technology, for example, with computational capacity and speed, the innovations in data storage. You know, we think about Amazon web service as an afterthought but really is empowering a whole new generation of technologies.

We've got discoveries of new materials and the continual improvements in power generation and storage that are basically enabling technological disruption across every sector of society. We've seen this kind of up front from the development of vaccines very rapidly. The rise of CRISPR and gene editing to the next generation of communications. And I'm not even mentioning, you know, what's to come in terms of smart cities and self-driving cars and trucks and what's going on in the world of crypto currency financial payment systems, et cetera.

The upshot is that horizontal technologies like artificial intelligence, machine learning, they're really poised to restructure existing industries and completely transform others. And there is still the potential of over the horizon technologies such as quantum.

So the fundamental point that I think the audience should take away is that these are largely almost all exclusively aside from nuclear and hypersonics, they're dual use. They're being developed in the commercial sector and the people who will benefit from this are, you know, the governments and militaries will benefit if they are able to adopt what's happening in the commercial sector and be fast followers.

And so, if you put that in context and you look at where and how the Chinese have approached this effort, I mean, they're laser focused on technology development. If you read the statements of President Xi, if you read the industrial policies made in China 2025, every five year plan after that science and technology are core to everything they're doing. And that's led to intense merges and acquisitions, investment funds like the semi-conductor fund. They have a range of illicit activities including cyber theft and industrial espionage and of course they're training thousands and thousands of

students to study STEM.

So in the language of the U.S. how we think about it in the government framework, China is employing a whole of government and a whole of society strategy to attain technology leadership. And they're using the tools that the U.S. either doesn't have, doesn't want or we're currently not properly equipped to address.

You know what's at stake, I've mentioned economic prosperity. We've seen how leadership and technology has given us industries, high paying jobs and so on and so forth. There's the national security aspect from AI to cyber to what's happening in space. You know, the advances in technology will allow whoever is the leaders in these technologies to dominate the national security space as well.

And finally, sort of the normative standards, right, we've had this long ongoing discussion about facial recognition, what's happening in Shenyang. Even in the U.S., we have conversations around it in the city of Baltimore, for example, they passed legislation on what are the ethics and norms underlying those technologies.

The key point is that the winner of these technologies will be setting those standards. So whether it's in 5G or gene editing or in facial recognition, we need to think very critically about who owns the future of those. So technology and innovation is quite critical.

A few words on why the cold war is not a good playbook before I wrap here. Look, first and foremost, China is not the Soviet Union. They are globally integrated in a way that the Soviet Union never was. The sheer size of their economy, I mean, by purchasing power parity, they already exceeded the United States and in real terms, they're projected to exceed the United States in the next decade or so.

The Soviet Union never approached that size. I mean, I think at the max, they were 40 percent of U.S. GDP, maybe 50 percent U.S. GDP. China has more than a million of its citizens working overseas. 140 million Chinese traveling abroad ever year. Some 40,000 enterprises around the globe and investments in excess of \$7 trillion.

And another key difference is they have embraced the multilateral system in terms of influencing the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, establishing new multilateral institutions like the AIIB and the New Development Bank. So the playbook that they're employing is utilizing all the tools that are on the table but shaping them in a way that they want to. And to disentangle or try to dismember that will cause ripples throughout the global economy and more specifically within the U.S.

So I think our view is essentially that, you know, there are areas that we need to compete but there are areas where we need to do as you say in your book is basically orient ourselves and double down on our strengths. I'll stop there and we can go.

MR. HASS: Well thank you, Pav. That provides us a lot to work with. Tanvi, I want to turn to you next. I welcome you to pick up any of the threats that Caitlin or Pav put on the table but I also want to ask you a question.

Because in your chapter of the book, it starts out with, you know, this image of Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi holding hands in the fall of 2019 bowing to strength and cooperation. And traces the evolution of the relationship between China and India from there to now and the current degree of heightened tensions that exist between those two countries.

So recognizing, you know, New Delhi's tradition of preserving its autonomy, strategic autonomy, how confident are you in the durability of the current trajectory that India's foreign policy is on? And it moving continually closer to the United States as it seeks to hedge against uncertainties about China.

MS. MADAN: Thanks Ryan and thanks to Emilie and you in particular for not just getting this book over the finish line but also for all your work you've done in putting together this event. And thanks to Tarun and Rush for their contributions as well.

I think, you know, and I'll bring in something Pav said at the end as I answer your question. I think there are two trends related to kind of India's relations with China and the U.S. that have intensified over the last couple of years. But they both precede this period and therefore I actually think absent major changes or as Chairman Meeks said, you know, absent a very different China, I think these

trends are likely to be durable.

The first trend is kind of India's view of China as a challenge. This actually goes back to the late 1950s and early '60s. But in recent times, Delhi has really kind of seen China as being more assertive since the global financial crisis as others have and it's experienced it itself.

And since 2012 in particular, after a 25 year lull, we've seen the boundary dispute between China and India flare up significantly, at least four times, and then there have been minor kind of altercations as well. So you've seen kind of this challenge preceding this period.

The second trend for India has been the kind of deepening the relationship with the U.S. across domains over the last two decades. Now there have been a number of drivers of that relationship but it is true that shared concerns about a rising China's behavior have been a key factor.

And what you've seen, I think, over the last year particularly with the one-two punch of the boundary crisis that is still continuing between India and China and China's handling of COVID is you've seen both these trends intensify. So for India, it's seen the acuteness of its China problem become far more evident. Both in terms of the assessment for instance or, you know, it's kind of brought home to them that they have less time and this goes to something Pav said.

The Indian policymakers thought that they had more time to do the second set of things that Pav said. You know, strengthen India's own abilities, work, cooperate in China by time, mitigate some differences. And I think they've come to the conclusion that they can't do one after the other. That they do have to kind of compete in ways and simultaneously in ways that they didn't have to before.

So I think, you know, their approach, they think, has fallen short in some ways. And in this context as their predecessors did, I think the government has seen kind of the U.S. and other likeminded partners as part of the solution to the China problem. I think both in terms of what we call internal balancing, strengthening Indian capabilities but also external balancing.

And I think, you know, to help ensure a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and broadly including competing or working to blunt Chinese influence in certain international institutions. But I think this has particularly become important in the context partnerships including with the U.S.

because of the growing capabilities gap between India and China over the last 30 years. So the U.S. has become more important or as Prime Minister Modi calls it an indispensable partner. And I think that's been reinforced by the fact that the U.S. was helpful during this crisis.

So I'll end by saying kind of, you know, this is not to say that Delhi and Washington don't have or have this kind of consensus on China, they don't. Or that there isn't a debate in India about how far and fast to go with the U.S. or to align with the U.S. And there's a constant tug of war between the desire for autonomy in India and kind of the need for alignment thanks to the China challenge.

But I do think it is important keeping in mind that while India doesn't ally, it does align when it is in its interest. And I think you will see it continue to align with the issues with the U.S. Maybe not on, you know, as a block but I think you will see it align on a number of key issues that the U.S. finds useful.

MR. HASS: Well, thank you for that insight. If I could just follow up with one quick question for you, Tanvi and that is Russia, how does Russia fit into this dynamic that you're describing. And how does India think about the democracy versus autocracy framing that has been gaining steam in discussions in Washington, D.C.?

MS. MADAN: So I think Russia is actually, it's quite complex in terms of for India, it's traditionally seen Russia as part of its balancing strategy against China or vis a vie China if you don't want to say against China. Both in terms of strength, helping strengthen India's military capabilities.

I mean this why in the second half of the Cold War, India aligned with the Soviet Union. It was because of the China challenge and the Soviet Union was helpful and that continued including for legacy reasons which the U.S. is having to grapple with today. India's legacy systems are still kind of largely Russian.

And so, for India, it sees Russia as having been useful in building its military capabilities providing certain kind of technology that only the Russians will to this day. And they find they have seen in just in terms of the balance of power in the region whenever Russia and China are close, that has been problematic for India and it has constrained India's options.

Russia has also been useful because India likes to diversify its partnerships. Because it's uncertain about any one country being there and being reliable. And so, the fact that Russia and China have been pursuing a pretty close relationship including insensitive sectors has been a source of concern for India. And you see this in the sense of Russia not having sided with India during this China India crisis but taken a more mutual stance whereas the U.S. has been helpful.

But for India, this only kind of conveys the point that what India and this is not just a view India has, Japan and France have said it as well which is to kind of try to not push Russia further into Chinese arms. So, you know, the west should give it an option.

And so, they would have looked at the Biden Putin meeting as a positive sign and this makes the U.S. India relationship complex Russia factor because of India's procurement platforms like the S-400 missile defense system which just create potential complications. Particularly, forget sanctions, short term interoperability down the line.

Just very quickly on the democracy and authoritarianism. I think India sees it in pros and cons. On one hand, if you are saying that there is this kind of democracy and authoritarianism, you know, kind of competition, India then uses that to portray itself and says look, we are the largest democracy in the world and, you know, we highlight itself. So it makes India useful and important as a democratic contrast to China along with being a geo political balance.

Having said that, India has tended kind of historically not want to emphasize the ideological aspects of competition. And I think there would be concern about how do you include, for example, if you say you have a concert of democracies, where does a like-minded country like Vietnam fit in which has concerns about China but is not a democracy.

So that's why when you hear India say free and open Indo-Pacific, to them they see the free as freedom for countries to choose, to make choices. Not kind of they're not, it's not a Coventry on governments within. And then there are kind of sovereignty's issues involved where India actually shares some views like Beijing and Moscow on governments as they exist within countries.

So I think it's a very mixed picture as long as the U.S. doesn't push India to make similar

statements, they will be fine with it. But I think if the U.S. starts pushing India to also be kind of frame things in that way, they will resist that.

MR. HASS: Well thank you. Caitlin, if I could return to you, we've now had a few minutes to let your comments about over match and, you know, nuclear annihilation marinate. How concerned should we be, what should policymakers be doing that they aren't now to manage the emergence of nuclear rivalry. And if you're up for it, how important is it that the United States and China enter into arms control talks in the near term and is there anything that we can be doing to encourage that outcome?

MS. TALMADGE: Great. Well, I think that's a really important set of questions. We don't want to just admire the problem, we want to think about what can actually be done. I do think it is a really hard problem set and the question of arms control or even maybe arms control lite, some form of unofficial or official strategic stability dialogue I think is, you know, it is really hard.

I think China has a lot of reticence as you know regarding being more transparent with its arsenal. I think the U.S. attitude has always kind of been transparency is good for deterrence, we'll show you what we have and then you'll know. And I think that's not China's view, right, that it's better to make you wonder about what we have.

So I think that's an obstacle and I think also just the asymmetries and the arsenals is a big obstacle. You know, the U.S. has a much larger arsenal of long range intercontinental strategic weapons whereas the bulk of China's nuclear forces are in, you know, the intermediate range forces. So, you know, it's a different problem set from what we faced with the Soviet Union. And as I mentioned earlier, China also has a set of suspicions about non-nuclear capabilities that the U.S. has that may need to be part of a conversation missile defense, long range precision strike, space, cyber.

And, you know, from China's perspective, it's suspicious of the U.S. refusal to acknowledge mutual vulnerability like mentioned a bit earlier. That's a real stumbling point for China. I think China would say, you know, we are a leader in arms control, we have a no first use pledge whereas you won't even acknowledge mutual vulnerability. And I think that that's an issue that the U.S. should at least study to think about the pros and cons of maybe acknowledging that as an entry way to dialogue.

I think there are definitely pros and cons but, you know, one question I think the U.S. should be asking is is that an area where we're willing to give a little to get the dialogue going. But at the same time as your question I think indicated, I think the U.S. can make the case to China that it has some interest in pursuing arms control too at least, you know, in a more traditional arms control definition.

I mean right now, the prevailing arms control framework for managing large strategic arsenals is the start framework with the U.S. and the Russians which received a boost in the recent Putin Biden statement coming out the summit. And yes, that's a U.S. Russian agreement but I think it's important for everyone to recognize, especially Beijing, that if this framework didn't exist, China would actually have a lot less information about the size and composition and posture of the two largest nuclear arsenals in the world which are the U.S. and the Russian arsenals.

And this is also the framework that caps the size of those arsenals at a relatively low level not compared to China's forces but compared to where they were in the Cold War. And so, if that framework collapses because politically it's not sustainable without some sort of Chinese participation, China is going to be facing an unconstrained three-way arms race that it's entering behind and as a latecomer.

And so, you know, if I'm sitting in Beijing, I'm not sure that that's in my interest either and I think that that's something that the U.S. may want to communicate that China has an interest here and maybe the U.S. is willing to give some. But China also should not want to see that framework collapse.

As far as specific steps that I think that the two sides could take, one broad comment I would make is just that I think it's important to think actually in a broad about what constitutes arms control. I think we tend to have this idea from the Cold War that, you know, arms control is when two countries, you know, it's bilateral for instance it's not multiplayer, that's one big difference. But, you know, it's when two countries with big arsenals that look very similar come together and make bilateral symmetrical reductions and, you know, that's what arms control is.

And I think arms control can actually be a lot broader than that. Arms control is anything that you do that reduces the likelihood of a war, how bad the war is going to be if it happens and the cost

of being prepared for a war. And so, from that perspective sure, big reductions in forces that counts but there is a lot of other things that you could do too.

I think one area in this and I think Pav mentioned this briefly as well in a different context is, you know, things you could do just to improve high level political and military communications channels between Beijing and Washington. So that is you do get into a crisis, you actually might have some off ramps or some opportunities to clarify strategic intentions.

That's a very immediate thing but I think the administration is already working on. There are some signs in this direction but, you know, we had a lot more progress on that with the Soviet Union then we've had with China so far and I think that's something we should be pushing on. I think we also should think about expanding the strategic stability talks that we're initiating with Russia to include China. We should offer bilateral strategic stability dialogue with China officially or unofficially. I think we should keep that door open.

And I think there are ways to, you know, take baby steps toward bringing China into the strategic arms control framework even things like encouraging China, you know, inviting China to observe a new start inspection. You know, establishing a link between the U.S. nuclear risk reduction center and a Chinese counterpart. Developing a prelaunch missile notification regime with China.

Things that, you know, not by themselves are going to radically change the equation but are going to, you know, maybe build some trust, establish, you know, some mutual interest and keep that dialogue going. Both kind of in a long-term way where you can maybe move toward an agreement but also in a shorter term way where you can at least just have channels open.

Because I do think and I've written about this a bunch in other work that there is real escalatory danger in the event of a crisis over something like Taiwan and it would be good to have some off ramps there. So really tough nut to crack but I think both sides do have interest in doing so.

MR. HASS: Well, I think you've provided a framework for us to think through this. I really appreciate it. Tanvi, there seems to be a pretty broad consensus in Washington that it is in America's interest for India to play a more active, energetic role in the Indo-Pacific. Where would it be profitable for

us to encourage India to take on, you know, greater leadership and where would it be counterproductive for us to push the Indians?

MS. MADAN: Thanks, Ryan. You know, I think one way to think about this is dos and don'ts. And I think kind of the first do's so to speak is for the U.S. to kind of encourage and facilitate the strengthening of India's own capabilities.

I mean, part of the theory of the case has been if you are thinking about it in a balance of power sense which is, and administrations now for the last 20 years have had this. Which is it's not only about what India does even just a strong India that can show resolve and, for example, hold its ground at the boundary. That in and of itself can actually shape the balance of power in the region and give and make China think twice in some ways.

So I think it's very important to encourage that strengthening of Indian capabilities. Also because then it has these kind of it's a false multiplier for everything else that the U.S. would like India to do. And I think those things are providing alternatives and particularly its own immediate neighborhood in South Asia. I think also working with the U.S. and other likeminded partners in the extended neighborhood in the broader Indian Ocean region in particular.

I think this idea of kind of building resilience across a range of issues where India does bring kind of strength and it can kind of add to and it has complimentary strengths to other kind of likeminded partners in the region. And then, you know, when China does put pressure on partners to show solid, you know, encourage India to also show solidarity and resolve.

I'll give you a quick example. I mean this is even something that's not usually that India is very forward leaning on. But it did it in a cautious way. When China was pressuring or reportedly pressuring Paraguay or inducing it saying we'll give you vaccines if you drop your recognition of Taiwan, India sent vaccines to Paraguay. Now nobody acknowledged that there was any connection but if you actually trace it, there's clearly India finding a way to kind of be part of the solution to this.

I'd say also kind of encourage for the U.S., encourage relationships between India and American allies and partners even if the U.S. is not in the room. So there's a lot of kind of trilaterals,

bilaterals, sometimes opportunistic kind of exercises et cetera that India is doing with European partners or the Indo-Pacific allies and partners of the U.S. And I think that should be encouraged and it's a good way to kind of encourage burden sharing of the region as well.

And then I think both for India and the U.S., one of the key questions is going to be something Chairman Meeks mentioned which is what is the trade solution they're offering to the region? Now, you know, in this kind of -- so if you think about Australia and Japan, they've been forward leaning on this. Whereas India and the U.S. have actually been, and I think COVID has strengthened the kind of, you know, protectionist impulses or at least the reshoring impulses in both countries.

And so if both countries rather than take that route and think about it more in terms of offering kind of a positive solution and diversifying to kind of create a more resilient economy rather than kind of reshoring, I think you'll have different things. But this will get complex because it gets into domestic politics, it gets into some kind of standards issues, et cetera.

Very quickly on the don'ts, I would say the U.S. shouldn't preemptively assume that India will not do X, Y or Z because it didn't do it in the Cold War. Test the propositions. Put things on the table. India might not say yes today but I think down the line, you could see changes and I think that's what we've seen in the last few years.

I'd also say don't expect or push India to act in the western Pacific in ways that will distract them from their primary AOR which is going to be the Indian Ocean region. Everyone doesn't have to do everything everywhere together. Divisions of labor should be something we should be thinking about.

Also, kind of don't yoyo between very low expectations of India and very high expectations. There's a tendency to do that. I like to say that the U.S. should show in both countries, pragmatic ambition which is don't just say India is not going to do this, put stuff on the table. But also don't imagine India is going to be an India that everybody would like it to be. Don't focus on the potential India, focus on kind of the India today.

And then finally, don't assume, as I said earlier, don't assume consensus on China or the Indo-

Pacific but find ways to kind of manage differences that India has. And then, you know, find ways to encourage India to be the best of itself. The India that everybody, a number of countries are investing in as an idea but also as a country.

MR. HASS: Thank you, Tanvi. Pav, from your perch in Silicon Valley, how confident are you in America's competitive posture on technology vis a vie China and where would you like to see the United States invest more or advance reforms to strengthen our position?

MR. SINGH: That's a great question, Ryan and one that I'm quite focused on every day. You know, I remain supremely confident in the United States capacity to compete on technology, to compete on innovation for all the reasons that Chairman Meeks identified. We have one of the most robust scientific enterprises in the world. Whether it's federally funded in the national labs in the service labs in our military manufacturing institutes and so on and so forth.

We have one of the most vibrant private sectors and we remain a magnet for immigrants to come to the U.S. and work in technology across a range of fields. Where I worry and what I'll do and bear with me on this analogy is essentially we have the NBA playoffs going on and there's been a range of seven game series. And the coaches identify what their stars can do and they win a game, they lose a game and then they make adjustments, right. But they stick with their stars and their core capabilities.

And I think what we need to do in the U.S. is really think in those terms. We have the best players. We have the best facilities. We just need to make adjustments because our competitor is pursuing a strategy that we haven't seen before. And so, if we're going to win over the long term, we need to double down on the things that we're good at.

So we're very good at allocating capital in this country. We have the most efficient markets. Now there is some question around how do we set guardrails around how our businesses think in terms of short term earnings. And what we're actually investing in in our high-risk investors such as venture capitalists and private equity.

So think about that. The Biden administration has been out front with their focus on investing in R&D. You know, at the height of the Cold War, we were about 2 percent of GDP investing in

R&D. That fell to nearly .7 percent, half of which went to health. Of course that's great, you know, as we develop a vaccine and work through the current issues. But think about you know, where is the remainder of that and how do we increase that.

And Congress I quite attuned to it as well. You've seen bills, as Chairman Meeks talked about, USICA, the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act. The Trump administration pushed for the National Quantum Communications Act. But what we need to figure out in this respect is how do we pursue a strategic focus on some of this funding, right.

We're having a hard time thinking about whether USICA is going to get passed. Included in USICA is \$50 billion for semi-conductors. And right now, there is a bunch of lobbying and jockeying about how it's going to be spent, whether it's going to be spent and whether the appropriators are actually going to give money towards this end.

So, you know, if this is a strategic priority for the country, no one is saying pick winners. But identify the technologies that we believe will be game changing in the future. Leverage the strengths that the U.S. has whether it's in the private sector or in the public sector funding long term R&D. And really set the conditions for these for our industry to prosper, for our government to adopt and procure and be able to take advantage of those things.

From the government perspective and Ryan, you know this as well as I do because we sat at opposite sides of the table on a lot of these things. You know, what's become quite clear is that national security and economic security are tied, right.

The Biden administration has acknowledged that and they frame it as sort of, you know, foreign policy for the middle class which essentially is how do we think about the economic stability and livelihood of the people in the United States. Before we think about, well not before but simultaneously as we think about what's going on around the world.

What that really means essentially is how are we thinking about trade policy, national security policy, economic policy, environmental policy. How are we thinking about that in totality? And, you know, previously the U.S. government often you had the economic side on one hand, you had the

national security side on the other and the environmental side maybe out here and never should they meet.

And so, in order to get our house right, we basically have to make sure that these folks are talking to each other understanding what incentives they're solving for, what problems they are trying to optimize for and how then do they create policy that reflects that. And I think the Biden administration is quite keen on doing that, the question is will they be able to execute over the long run. And I think if they can get the early wins in terms of the infrastructure bill, in terms of USICA, you will start to see a lot more collaboration across these disciplines.

And then, you know, the last thing I'll say is, you know I mentioned that we remain a magnet for talent in the United States. We do have to figure out our immigration policy and that has to be part of this broader conversation. Because we continue to develop technologies based on the unique learnings from people bringing their knowledge from overseas. There's a great amount of information sharing and collaboration that happens in academia.

And so, while we do that, we need to get the structures right so that we feel confident that the risk is limited but that we benefit from all that the citizens from around the world can bring to the table. So the upshot is I remain supremely confident, we just need to get our structures right.

MR. HASS: Well, I think that's a very powerful note for us to end on today. I've benefitted tremendously from listening to you. I'm sure our audience has as well. Thank you for sharing your time, your insights, your expertise and have a good day. We look forward to continuing our conversation going forward. By for now.

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2024

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 600
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190