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Calling All Issuers: The Market for Debt Monitoring

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Incidence of Delayed Calls

Anticipated findings

- Smaller and lower rated issuers, infrequent issuance
- One or more prior rating downgrade events
- Municipal issuers delay more often than Corporate issuers

Unanticipated findings

- GO credits experience more delays than revenue credits
- Very sticky issuer-underwriter relationships may result in longer call delays
- Large number of issues which call dates occur within a specified time frame
- Type of underwriter dominance; regional general practice vs national dominance and sector specialized
- Majority of market access by competitive sale versus negotiated

Possible explanations for some delayed call situations

- Anticipation of a possible adverse rating event; availability of more current disclosure/audit
- Bundling with next new money issuance or current call
- Economy of scale on issuance expenses and working group administrative time
- Bundling constructive federal tax characteristics (common plan of finance)

Calculating Economic Losses

Results

• \$1.74 Billion annual cost; \$31 billion over 18-year test period

Computational Complexities

- Fluid credit and sector spreads; credit spreads also have their own tenor slope
- Locating and testing bull market yield conditions within each annual testing frame
- Replacement optionality (choice of refunding coupon and call date impact on PV)
- Overarching market liquidity climates (external headwinds such as the 2008 financial crisis)
- Exclude for intentional call delays related to external circumstances
- Subdivide analysis into groups of refunded coupons

Simple "par ratio" placeholders backing into annual loss = \$1.74 billion; up to 7.6% of \$3.8tn market

Un-Called Par at Coupon:	5.00%	4.00%	3.00%	
Gross Coupon in post call "Overtime"	34,800,000,000	43,500,000,000	58,000,000,000	
Refunding D/S = 80% of Refunded DS	174,000,000,000	217,500,000,000	290,000,000,000	

Cost of Funds by coupon and call feature from an Original Issue Perspective (AAA Rated issuers)





20-year maturity costs **<u>1.31%</u>** if the call is exercised If not exercised, a **10-year** call costs **<u>2.75%</u>** If not exercised, a **7-year** call costs **<u>3.31%</u>** **20-year** maturity costs <u>**1.66%</u>** if the call is exercised If not exercised, a **10-year** call costs <u>**2.23%**</u> If not exercised, a **7-year** call costs <u>**2.44%**</u></u>

Example Call Date Tests 2000-2018 for \$100m 30-year Level Debt Structure Issued in 1990

Prior Issue Coupon 5.00		5.00%		PV Decision %	3.00%						
			-						Forgone	Current	Value After
Test	Call	MMD	Credit	Refunding	PV %	Bonds	Annual D/S	Refunding	Annual	Refunding	Prior Forgone
Year	Date	Curve Date	Spread	PV Savings	Refunded	Called	Svgs / (Cost)	тіс	Savings (A)	PV (B)	Savings (B-A)
2000	01/01/00	12/31/99	20	(5,216,417)	-6.43%	81,075,000	(450,100)	5.797		-	-
2001	01/01/01	12/29/00	20	(393,050)	-0.50%	78,625,000	(35,011)	5.061	-	-	-
2002	01/01/02	12/31/01	20	(39,972)	-0.05%	76,050,000	(7,246)	5.007	-	-	-
2003	01/01/03	12/31/02	20	4,782,919	6.52%	73,345,000	395,959	4.167	-	4,782,919	4,782,919
2004	01/01/04	12/31/03	20	5,415,750	7.68%	70,505,000	461,647	3.980	(395,959)	5,415,750	5,019,791
2005	01/01/05	12/31/04	20	4,814,981	7.13%	67,525,000	429,705	3.999	(461,647)	4,814,981	3,957,374
2006	01/01/06	12/30/05	20	3,372,513	5.24%	64,395,000	320,077	4.213	(461,647)	3,372,513	2,053,258
2007	01/01/07	12/29/06	20	3,237,815	5.30%	61,110,000	325,110	4.153	(461,647)	3,237,815	1,456,913
2008	01/01/08	12/31/07	20	3,528,115	6.12%	57,660,000	372,079	3.964	(461,647)	3,528,115	1,285,566
2009	01/01/09	12/31/08	20	4,472,146	8.28%	54,040,000	494,660	3.515	(461,647)	4,472,146	1,767,949
2010	01/01/10	12/31/09	20	6,043,603	12.03%	50,235,000	695,736	2.727	(494,660)	6,043,603	2,844,746
2011	01/01/11	12/31/10	20	5,392,249	11.66%	46,240,000	676,850	2.593	(695,736)	5,392,249	1,497,657
2012	01/01/12	12/30/11	20	6,634,085	15.78%	42,045,000	884,397	1.510	(695,736)	6,634,085	2,043,756
2013	01/01/13	12/31/12	20	5,547,137	14.74%	37,640,000	832,531	1.342	(884,397)	5,547,137	72,411
2014	01/01/14	12/31/13	20	3,846,307	11.65%	33,015,000	677,057	1.655	(884,397)	3,846,307	(2,512,816)
2015	01/01/15	12/31/14	20	2,833,753	10.06%	28,160,000	591,191	1.629	(884,397)	2,833,753	(4,409,766)
2016	01/01/16	12/31/15	20	1,870,672	8.11%	23,065,000	485,590	1.717	(884,397)	1,870,672	(6,257,243)
2017	01/01/17	12/30/16	20	964,951	5.45%	17,715,000	333,176	2.214	(884,397)	964,951	(8,047,361)
2018	01/01/18	12/29/17	20	413,524	3.42%	12,095,000	210,870	2.684	(884,397)	413,524	(9,483,184)

Key: First Year at/above PV% Decision Best Year w/ forgone Prior Svgs Highest PV % Year Comments: Refundings are all-or-none; \$15/Bond Expenses; 5% coupon scale with 10-year call. Once Refunded Bonds meet a minimum PV Criteria, the PV of later exercise dates are progressivly handicapped by ongoing previously foregone annual savings.

Example Call Date Tests 2000-2018 for \$100m 30-year Level Debt Structure Issued in 1990

	AAA Rated "+20"				BBB Rated "+100"			
Refunded Coupon	First Year	Best Year	Highest PV%		First Year	Best Year	Highest PV%	
5.000	2003 6.5%	2004 7.7%	2012 15.8%		2009 3.7%	2012 11.8%	2012 11.8%	
4.000	2010 6.6%	2012 11.1%	2012 11.1%	L	2012 7.3%	2012 7.3%	2012 7.3%	
3.000	2012 6.6%	2012 6.6%	2012 6.6%		2013 3.3%	2013 3.3%	2013 3.3%	

Historical lookback suggests that lower refunded coupons and lower ratings groups may be at their optimum execution when and as they first reach their "Minimum PV" policy threshold.

Significantly simplified assumptions may distort impact observation

- General practice is to make refunding decisions by refunded maturity date vs. whole series
- Lower refunding coupons produce higher immediate Refunding PV, but at cost of future option value
- Annual call date testing may not recognize intra-year bull interest rate markets

Policy Implications and Market Environment Comments

Market preferences around callable coupons

- Premium coupons avoid taxable income in secondary market trading
- Deep discount coupons windfall to bondholder; outside example "inverse numeric"
- Taxable buyers indifferent to couponing; new issues priced at par

Issuer Attributes

- Governments generate taxes & user fees practical necessity for restructuring of serialized amortization
- Corporations use debt markets for operating liquidity roll bullet structures to yield curve sweet spots
- Treasury Regulations Federal tax-exempt remediation for change of use

Related subjects

- Lower couponing with Competitive Sale method (Award based on TIC-to-Maturity)
- Financial efficacy of short calls (shorter than 7 years) on very long maturities (longer than 25 years)
- Ceded insurance premium when the refunded bond is credit enhanced (taxable vs tax-exempt may differ)
- Structuring call dates with an eye for "slope aging" of the yield curve
- Non-call is itself an issuance strategy; taxable refunding with make-whole calls already do this.