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WEBINAR

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LAUNCH OF THE FRITZ STERN CHAIR

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Panel Discussion:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

GENERAL ALLEN: Well good morning, to our dear friends coming to us from across the Atlantic in Germany, good afternoon. For those of you who I have not met, I'm John Allen and I'm the president of The Brookings Institution. And on behalf of The Brookings Institution it is my sincere pleasure to welcome you to this inaugural event for Brookings, the first event of the Fritz Stern Chair on Germany and trans-Atlantic relations. It's also my honor to introduce German foreign minister -- Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas, who in a few minutes we'll give the floor for a keynote address launching the Fritz Stern Chair.

I'm so proud that it is one of Brookings very own Constanze Stelzenmüller who will be the inaugural holder of the new chair. At a time when trans-Atlantic relations are fraught, Constanze's work has shown a bright light illuminating the flaws in the challenges in the trans-Atlantic relationship and how we might repair them. Before we begin I'd also like to think that many donors on both sides of the Atlantic without whom today's event would not be possible including American and German businesses, individuals, and a generous grant from the German government. This chair represents the determination of both Germany and the United States to maintaining and improving this vital alliance.

In particular, we would like to thank this morning, Airbus Corporation, the C.H. Beck Stiftung, the von Braun family, the Daimler Fonds, the Hertie Stiftung, Anna-Maria and Stephen Kellen Foundation, Stefan Quandt, Fay and William Shutzer, the VolkswagenStiftung, and finally, we'd like to thank the federal government of Germany for a very generous contribution and for its steadfast support of the project. We're privileged at Brookings to receive funding from a diverse group of foundations and individuals. From nongovernmental organizations, corporations, governments, and others who share our commitment to independent research that leads to innovative ideas for addressing global challenges. We're grateful for that support. But were also more grateful for their abiding respect for the value we place on our independence. In today's event, as always, reflects only the views of the speakers involved.

We'd like to further thing can extend our heartfelt welcome to the family of Fritz Stern for their support and encouragement of this initiative all along. It's truly an honor to have several of our contributors and members of the extended Stern family joining us online today. For those who might not

have known him, Prof. Stern was a brilliant historian of modern Germany and trans-Atlantic relations whose work provided new clarity about the challenges facing democracy.

Named in Prof. Stern's honor, the chair that will carry out vital work for analyzing the trans-Atlantic relationship so that we can better address the challenges of the 21st-century. We're launching this new initiative at a time of peril and promising trans-Atlantic relations. The past four years have done untold damage, frankly, to this relationship between the United States and Germany. And though President Biden has said that America is back and has signaled a welcome commitment to the NATO alliance and democratic values that are the foundation of the trans-Atlantic relationship. The loss of trust that that has occurred between the United States and our European partners and I was, that loss of trust is palpable. Because so many of the challenges that the United States and Europe face are shared it's an imperative that we find a way to address them together; from combating COVID-19 which is now taken the lives of over 525,000 Americans and roughly 2.6 million around the world to meeting the challenge posed by authoritarian competitors, like China and Russia, and protecting our own democracies from threats at home there is much work to do as friends and partners.

So ladies and gentlemen, let us begin that important work of which today's event is a part; an important part. I'm heartened to know that experts that you will hear from today will play an important role in preparing the trans-Atlantic relationship for a new and a better future. One that addresses not only today's challenges but also those of the 21st century more broadly. And now, it's my great honor to introduce the German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas. Minister Maas became the foreign minister in 2018 after serving previously as his country’s justice minister. And through both of these roles Minister Maas' steadfast commitment to trans-Atlantic relations and the need to protect democracy have been exemplary and have shown through. In the aftermath of the horrors of January 6 and that insurrection on our nation's Capitol, Minister Maas called for the United States and Europe to work together to protect democracy because he knows, as I do, and as we all know, that only together can we truly confront the ongoing threats of radicalization and extremism in society.

But briefly, a reminder that we're very much live and on the record today and we're streaming. So please send your question to us via email at events@brookings.edu, or at Twitter using

#USEurope. With that, it is my great pleasure and my great honor to welcome Foreign Minister Heiko Maas. Mr. Minister, the floor is yours, sir.

MINISTER MAAS: Thank you very much, John for these kind words of welcome and thank you for inviting me today. Members of The Brookings institution, dear trans-Atlantic friends, it is an honor for me to inaugurate Brookings' new chair on Germany and trans-Atlantic relations especially as I deeply respect and admire the man whose name it will bear, Fritz Stern. It was Fritz Stern who, despite the suffering inflicted on him and his family by Germans, encouraged the world to place its trust in the re-unified Germany. Our country could not have wished for a better friend, a more clear eyed analyst, or a more generous companion. So let me thank you -- thank all of you and, of course, the generous donors for supporting the Fritz Stern Chair. None of this would have been possible without you, Constanze. I know how many days you spent talking to donors, reaching out to politicians and parliamentarians on both sides of the Atlantic. Today we are harvesting the fruits of your labor. So thank you very much for all that you did and the German Parliament and the Federal Foreign Office are proud to support you.

For me, this broad alliance of supporters is also a reminder of how vibrant our trans-Atlantic partnership is, and of what we can achieve when we work together. Ladies and gentlemen, next week marks the 30th anniversary of the Two Plus Four Agreement, which handed back full sovereignty to Germany. Fritz Stern famously called that historic moment Germany's second chance. A chance to build a strong, lasting European Union and an even stronger, more resilient democracy at home. We know to whom we owe this chance; to our friends and allies and especially to the United States. But Fritz Stern also reminded us about what the second chance depended on. In praising what he called the policy of reliability and reason; that is what we should keep in mind when we talk about Germany's global responsibility today. Reason, reliability, and responsibility must go hand in hand because only together do they make German foreign policy possible. And let me begin with the most inspirational element, reason. Reason in politics, ladies and gentlemen is threatened today in all of our liberal democracies. We are all experiencing how alternative effects are eroding trust in our institutions. The attack on the U.S. Capitol might have been a shocking culmination, but it was not the first time that the forces of conspiracy and the preachers of hatred have attempted to divide us. Only last summer, protesters tried

to enter the Reichstag in Berlin. We must not let happen -- we must not let this happen, dear friends.

Summoning the power of reason is essential for the survival of democracy in the digital age. I say this as a German foreign minister because President Biden is right; there is no longer a pride alignment between foreign and domestic policy. Indeed, our credibility and strength abroad are measured by our unity at home. We should have paid more attention to this in the economic and financial crisis the last decade. We rushed to help banks and corporations that we deemed too big to fail. Wall Street, and not mainstream. That left a bitter taste among many in our populations. The populace exploited that. But we have learned our lesson today we are putting our people, workers, business owners, families, at the heart of our response. We are supporting those companies that don't lay off their employees. And for the first time, we have created a common European program to mitigate unemployment risks. This is a way to narrow the divides at home.

Abroad we must strengthen international cooperation with other democracies. President Biden's proposed settlement for democracy can revitalize our bonds. Hate speech, manipulation, and disinformation are eroding the face we have in each other. We need a better regulation, also internationally. And we clearly can't leave that task to big tech alone. In the past four years we Europeans often stood alone in holding this view. In fact, we stood along quite a bit.

So I joined with my French colleague and friend Jean-Yves Le Drian to create an alliance for multilateralists. A group of dozens of partners and like-minded countries from around the globe to protect the rules-based international order. Together, we looked at how to make our societies more resilient, and how to protect human rights online as much as offline. My hope is that we can build on this work in the coming months with the United States back at the table. And that we can use the force of reason to revitalize our democracy at home and bring back stability to international affairs.

This brings me to the second element, reliability. But Germany, with its history marked by terrible failures, reliability means of knowing where we stand and with whom. In a speech 30 years ago Fritz Stern described what this should mean for us. Germany, he said, must use its power, its worth, it's pursuit of peace and reason, not just to invoke Europe rhetorically, but to help turn it into a reality. That benchmark is as valid today as it was 30 years ago.

This is why we agreed, in the midst of the pandemic to set up a €750 billion rescue package together as the European Union. And this is why we decided to jointly purchase COVID vaccines. Mistakes have been made during that process, but we were right to act as one Europe. The alternative would have been a continent divided; with the bigger states outbidding smaller ones. Instead, the European Union has so far vaccinated twice as many people per capita as Russia or China.

Ladies and gentlemen, European solidarity is the basis for keeping Europe together. And European serenity is a precondition for making our voice heard in the world. The goal is a Europe that is capable of bringing stability to its neighborhood. And only a strong open and united Europe will remain as a relevant partner for the United States. Investing in European sovereignty means investing in the trans-Atlantic partnership. Some argue that this partnership lost its purpose when the Cold War ended because our common enemy had disappeared. This is profoundly wrong. Our partnership was never built on fear, but on freedom and shared values, and these persist. The Soviet Union has disappeared, and we are facing new common challenges together. The COVID pandemic and climate change are the most extensional ones. They require trans-Atlantic leadership and unity.

We know that we can only defeat the pandemic by working together. However, masks and vaccine diplomacy have turned this fight into a systemic competition. That is why the U.S. commitment to COVAX was so important. Germany and the United States are now it's two biggest supporters. And a multilateral solutions must succeed if we don't want to lose our crown to those who argue that our authoritarian regimes are better at dealing with a crisis like this.

Ahead of COP26 in Glasgow the European Union has committed to cut its carbon emissions by 55% by 2030. And we welcome the recent new commitments from Washington. We are already discussing with John Kerry's team how to reactivate the trans-Atlantic climate bridge and bring our decision makers, civil societies and the best scientists together. And why don't we start discussing now how to design and harmonize carbon border adjustment before the European union proposes its plan, later this year?

Speaking of trade, ladies and gentlemen, we should also break the cycle of tariff and punitive measures. This is not how partners treat each other. The suspension of the Airbus and Boeing

dispute tariffs announced last week was a crucial step to build on. Europe and the United States can join hands to build an economic model that puts people at the center, protecting jobs and the middle class is a shared task for us. And Tony Blinken just explained this last week. But that should not keep us from discussing fair sectoral trade agreement. In fact, such agreements could raise social standards and increase our global leverage.

Ladies and gentlemen, how do we create a level playing field with an ever more challenging confrontational China? And how do we deal with an ever more aggressive and repressive Russia? Answering these questions will be central to the future of our alliance. Strengthening NATO's political role will be an important step. And what is even more important is it that we commit to a joint approach. To me, that means pushing back where ever Russia, China, or others are threatening our security, our prosperity, democracy, human rights and international law.

Over the last two years we have massively invested in European defense and security. Our defense spending has risen by 50% since 2014, and we will stick to that part. We have strengthened our laws to protect our digital infrastructure against foreign influence, especially our 5G networks. We have responded to Moscow's and Beijing's crackdowns on civil society and their violations of international law. And I hope that we can return to a joint trans-Atlantic approach on targeted sanctions, after that approach fell apart in the last four years. And as a trading nation, we are committed to upholding free seaways. Only a few days ago we decided in the German government to send a naval unit to the Indo Pacific for the first time. Ladies and gentlemen, when our interests and values are at stake must stand up for them. President Biden was also right when he pointed out in Munich that pitting East against West is not in our interest. We told the previous administration many times that the coupling doesn't work in an interconnected world since we all face the same global challenges. Diplomacy means engaging with difficult actors. Especially where this is in our interests.

Arms control and the extension of the new start treaty is one example. Trade policy, climate change and clean energy are others. Of course, European and American interests won't always overlap. Geography alone is part of the reason. But we should never again allow those differences to call our partnership into question. Ladies and gentlemen, this brings me to my third and last point,

Germany's responsibility. A few days ago a major American newspaper wrote, “America is back, but Europe has moved.” Yes, Europe is on the move but that only means that Europe is taking on greater responsibility; that we are doing our part to share the burden. We are doing more to stabilize our neighborhood in the Western Balkans.

The EU integration is the key driver for reforms and reconciliation and it remains on the table. With the Berlin process we have invested in diplomacy to end the war in Libya. Lasting peace is still far away. But the new transitional government and the plans for national elections later this year are encouraging results. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom went out of their way to keep the JCPOA with Iran afloat. And we are glad that President Biden and Tony Blinken have expressed their readiness to return to diplomacy, the full JCPOA provided that Iran is prepared to do the same. The agreement is key, not only to keeping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, it would also provide a basis to address other pressing issues such as Iran missiles program for its and destabilizing regional behavior. And finally, for 20 years now German soldiers have been standing shoulder to shoulder with their American partners in Afghanistan. In together, out together. That was always our guiding principle. And I agree with Tony Blinken that certain conditions need to be met before we leave. Because we did make all these great sacrifice over the years just to see Afghanistan descend into chaos once more. Ladies and gentlemen, America is back was President Biden's message two weeks ago in Munich. And Germany is by your side is our answer today. In his book on the five Germany's he had come to know in his lifetime, Fritz Stern concludes that German American understanding was a dictate of history, politics, and my own life. And let me just add that this Germany is looking to conclude a trans-Atlantic new deal with you. As a voice of reason in our joint fight for democracy, as a reliable partner in Europe and the world, and as a reasonable ally and friend working with you to make this world a better place. Thank you very much, and thank you once again for having me today. And all the best to the new Fritz Stern Chair and to all of you.

MS. MALONEY: Good morning. Those were wonderful keynote remarks from German Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas. He is given a great deal for us to consider. It's an honor to have him with us this morning to launch the Fritz Stern Chair at Brookings and to commence this discussion on

the future of trans-Atlantic relations.

I'm Suzanne Maloney, a vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program at The Brookings Institution. It's my great pleasure to welcome you to this morning's panel discussion. As Brookings President John Allen noted in his opening remarks, all of us at Brookings are deeply gratified to inaugurate this exceptional new platform for rigorous research and civil debate on how to respond to the critical set of policy issues facing the United States and its European allies. The Fritz Stern Chair will serve as an enduring testament to Prof. Stern's remarkable capacity to apply the lessons of history to policy determinations.

Made possible through the generous support of a diverse group of U.S. and European donors the chair reflects a renewed commitment to the legacy of strengthening cooperation and linkages across the Atlantic. We are both especially grateful, and deeply honored, to have many of our contributors joining us on line today, as well as several members of the Stern family joining this event. Our only regret is that we are not able to thank you in person for your tremendous collaboration and support. We are delighted to have her excellent see, Emily Haber, German ambassador to the United States with us here today to join our panel. She has been serving in this role since June 2018, a career foreign service officer, Ambassador Haber has held many positions throughout the German government. Immediately prior to serving as a German ambassador to the United States she was state secretary of the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

Joining Ambassador Haber, we have two Brookings senior fellows; Fiona Hill and Constanze Stelzenmüller. Dr. Hill serves as the Robert Bosch senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at The Brookings Institution. She has held several roles in the U.S. government, most recently serving as deputy assistant to the president and senior director for European and Russian affairs on the National Security Council from 2017 to 2019. She is the author of two books: “The Siberian Curse” and “Mr. Putin.” Constanze Stelzenmüller held the Kissinger chair on Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress from October 2019 to March 2020. Prior to joining Brookings, and she was a senior trans-Atlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. As you know, we’re gathered here today to celebrate the launch of the Fritz Stern Chair on Germany and trans-Atlantic

Relations, of which Constanze is the inaugural holder. Constanze, congratulations on this honor.

Fritz Stern has been described as the guardian angel for the new Germany. And we at Brookings are grateful not only for this important new position but also that we have such a stellar colleague with a passion historically informed sharp-witted voice who will steward his legacy at another critical juncture for the trans-Atlantic relationship and the international community. Now, to leave plenty of time for the discussion and audience questions, I'll offer a quick reminder that we are on the record today and were streaming live. Please send us your questions by email to events@Brookings.edu or on Twitter using #USandEurope. Excuse me, #USEurope, all one phrase.

Now, let's get to the discussion and to our panelists. I'd like to invite Ambassador Haber to start us off but joined by both Constanze and Fiona just to speak to the legacy of Fritz Stern and what it means for this current moment that we're facing.

AMBASSADOR HABER:. What Fritz has done committed much of his work to analyzing the threats to democracy and analyzing the phenomenon of cultural despair. And much of it remains important today. Although conditions have changed, we are much more connected today by (inaudible) and mobility and instant communication, which means that grievances, and groupthink, and resentment, and outrages and conspiracy theories travel much faster than they used to. And this does not only mean that it really enforces the yearning for the security of a lost past or halcyon days, in our day and time it also produces a new phenomenon that probably Fritz Stern wouldn't have acknowledged in his day, and that is the emergence of groups with no national allegiances and that cannot be pinpointed geographically.

So look at the recruitment phenomenon of IS. And I think we'll see this phenomenon with causes that we cannot foresee today in a much larger scale. The second phenomenon is different than it was in the day of Fritz Stern is technology because technologies or different in democracies and in autocratic societies. In democratic societies algorithms are usually economically defined and defined by attention spans. And they tend to not only consolidate positions within bubbles but also facilitate a trending to more extreme fringes. Something actually we've seen in the run-up of the January 6 where extreme positions -- or where positions radicalize themselves in incredible speed.

So my point is that the same technology has different effects in in autocratic and in democratic societies. It has a fragmented effect in democratic society and it has consolidating effect and societies where algorithms aren't defined by economic deliberations but by the interests in consolidating and stabilizing a regime. So fragmentation in itself I would say is not necessarily a threat to democracy if it empowers groups previously ignored or marginalized. But it may challenge it if it undermines the sense of overarching -- we have a word in German for that, Solidargemeinschaft, of commonality and perhaps you could call it the social capital of a society. Which means the sense of responsibility for the entirety of the society and consequently respect of allocation of resources to segments of societies to which you don't belong.

And if this phrase it can apply back on the sense of shared purpose of democracy. And this is -- all of this is not only a threat from within because it obviously opens space for foreign actors with an interest to undermine a democratic societies to pit groups against each other; to attack democracy, something that is also -- something that is -- that has been observed by Fritz Stern in his day and time as well, obviously. But it happens now under the conditions of hyper connectedness and globalization entirely intrusive technologies. And we've seen the effects not only attacks on democratic processes but also more importantly attacks on opinion making processes. Attacks on conversations we are having with the express intent of a foreign agenda to manipulate the internal discussions we are having; democracies are having. And to exploit the fissures in western societies. So Fritz Stern has -- can tell us a lot from his experiences and his analysis but we'll have to look at the changed environment which poses more threats, or different threats than he could have possibly predicted.

MS. MALONEY: Thank you Ambassador.

Over to you Constanze.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Well, let me say first off that I'm still pinching myself that we're all sitting here doing this. I think most of us who accompanied this labor of many, many people over the past four years are -- for much of the time weren't quite sure this was going to happen. I think that were many, many reasons why it might not have. And in some ways we were really very lucky.

And in other ways I have to say this was -- the foreign minister very kindly mentioned me,

but this was not just the -- I think the decision of nearly a dozen generous funders for whom this was not an obvious choice to make. But also, of -- about 150 people. I have a list. About 150 people who over the course of time sort of gave generously of their time and opinions, advice, said you'll never do this, but here's what you can do. And who were encouraging in one way or the other. And I want to thank all of them. And actually quite a lot of them have gotten emails from me in the past week. The other thing I want to say is that this -- I have to say is the honor of my life. Not just being the inaugural holder of this position, but for it to be named after Fritz Stern, a man whom I, unfortunately, never managed to meet although it seems that I know a lot of his friends. But who is a titanic figure in German post-war -- West German post-war conversations. And as Emily and the foreign minister said was an instrumental voice, an extraordinarily voice around the time of reunification to put in a good word for German reunification. And to urge and to urge the western nations who then came together in the Two Plus Four Treaty to agree to return Germany to full sovereignty. To trust a unified Germany with being a responsible, reasonable, reliable, actor in Europe.

Fritz Stern famously said that Germany had gotten a second chance. Something that is rare in lives and in the lives of individuals and of nations. And I think the past 30 years of German reunified history would have been unthinkable without that chance and without people urging the rest of the world to trust us as Fritz Stern did at the time. So these are enormous shoes to fill. And the thing that I am most happy about frankly, is that this is a Chair in perpetuity. In other words, it will outlast me. And hopefully, it will -- it will be an enduring testament to the importance of this person, but also of the relationship.

MS. MALONEY: That's wonderful Constanze.

Fiona, let me bring you into the conversation. Can you speak to the legacy of Fritz Stern and what it means for this moment?

MS. HILL: Well, I think in addition to what Constanze obviously said about the great privilege and honor it is for Brookings to be able to host a chair in Fritz Stern's honor and we're obviously delighted that Constanze is the inaugural chair holder. I think Ambassador Haber really set us out on the right path in thinking about the legacy of Fritz Stern because it also is in many respects, one that doesn't

just speak to the past but also speaks to the present and the future about the fragility of democracy and the fight that democracy is always a work in progress. And Fritz Stern said Germany got a second chance, but everybody needs a second, maybe a third, and even fourth chance because in a way we're never anywhere near to perfection. And Fritz Stern in many respects was ahead of his time writing because we have so many other scholars who were looking into investigating the ways in which democracies fall apart or democracies die.

We have Daniel Ziblatt who is at the Center of European Studies at Harvard who obviously, you know, is also working in an environment that Fritz Stern knew very well. He knew many of the people who helped to set up that community of thinkers there on European and German studies. He's written a book “How Democracies Die.” And this is in a way -- in the path of Fritz Stern coming out of that kind of the legacy of thinking about democracy. Fritz Stern was a trailblazer by channeling his own experiences, his personal experiences of growing up against the backdrop of stress on democracy, war, all of the fissures that have pulled not just Germany but most of Europe apart in his lifetime. And I think there's a couple of things that I would like to point us towards in addition to what Ambassador Haber said which was spot on and so many respects. You know, Europe and the United States were all going through a period of rather dramatic generational and demographic change, that was, of course, the. So that Fritz Stern was talking about two. He grew up as a German in Poland. A part of a population that was very rooted in Central Europe, but he was a German speaker but growing up in a multi-ethnic, multicultural multi-linguistic environment.

And all of us now are trying to deal with these tensions of kind of rapid change as our demography is in our populations change, not just in terms of age cohorts but in terms of our backgrounds. And that inevitably brings stressors as people have to adapt and rethink their identities. You know, many people think of identity formation as a being fairly rigid. But, in fact, it's very fluid and this is actually kind of something that Fritz Stern talks about people having to constantly adapt themselves and kind of rethink about their own place in a changing society. So we have, you know as I was saying, a period of generational change. I mean we, in the United States think in cohorts but perhaps Europeans don't do quite the same. We are coming to the end of the cohort of the baby

boomers which is, you know, the generation born around World War II, the generation that Fritz Stern would have known, but he would have been more a part of our silent generation as a kind of before that. And, you know, obviously our current President Biden is in that older generation and that older cohort which is followed by the generation that some of us, a part of generation X. You know those born in the 1960s. And I mean were kind of on our way out. I know we all want to kind of fill ourselves still very young and youthful. I'm getting kind of a side eye hear from Constanze and Ambassador Haber.

But we are in that process of changing. We've already come far long in our careers. And it's the same, you know, across Europe when Constanze and I, Ambassador Haber in many of our discussions we have a commonality, a view, a vision of experience even growing up in different parts of either Europe or the United States. We share a perspective. That's not the case in the generations that are coming after us who haven't experienced or read about our kind of thought about some of the issues that Fritz Stern was talking about in the previous period of rapid change. So there generations coming in now the millennial's, who are very much who are very much scarred and shaped by the events of 9/11 who have had to go through the major crisis, the financial crisis of 2008-2009, the Great Recession and who have now had to suffer from a pandemic. I mean in many respects, you know, they're described as the most unlucky generation in recent history. Although I think Fritz Stern might argue about -- from his own perspective. But they have been scarred over and over again by war and conflict, the rise of Isis and other groups, and really having their viewpoints shaped by this.

And then the new generation coming in in the United States, generation Z is the most diverse in U.S. history as well as the best educated because of the expansion of education. But they have not kind of, started to come into power yet. And Europe is going through its own changes because of the development of the European Union, free mobility, people moving around in the mobility that Emily Haber talked about is not just internet and technology because we've got massive technological change, but also people moving; people on the move. And that changes perspectives. Ironically, Europe has become more mobile, people moving to different parts of Europe, living in different places which would have been part of Fritz Stern's early experience before the war, but not obviously during the war. It was through a rather horrific reasons that people were on the move as refugees, etc. We now have in Europe

the pursuit of work and different experiences, but the United States has become less mobile since 2008, 2009. We have less mobility, as our colleague William Wilson has noted, since 1947.

So we're kind of you getting stuck in place, and in many respects our mobility and our way of connecting to people is coming through the internet, as Emily described which has got many of its own dangers. And it said that lack of that face-to-face contact, that lack of physical mobility of people coming into contact with each other at this time of change that makes things somewhat dangerous. I mean I would, you know, personally myself love to hear what Fritz Stern would say about this moment. You know given the rapid technological change, climate change on top of the back of all of this which might actually be familiar to him and producing massive refugee flows. You know, how will our democracy deal with climate change as people have to move in from the coast or move in from zones that are beset all the time by hurricanes, for example. Rising sea waters, aridity, desertification, parts of the Mediterranean region and Europe becoming kind of barely livable because of rising temperatures, etc.

I mean I think Fritz Stern's work is so much more current than people perhaps give credence and I would love to see the new Fritz Sterns picking up from where he left off. And thinking about how to adapt his views which were, again, in many respects ahead of his time. But of his time to the present. And it's a great honor, I think, for Brookings to be able to have this opportunity to have a Fritz Stern Chair housed within it.

MS. MALONEY: Absolutely, Fiona. And it is, I think, very emblematic of the legacy of Fritz Stern that you have all opened us up with such a kind of wide ranging and brilliant set of issues already on the table. I want to come back to one reference that I think each of you mentioned, which is the idea of a kind of second chance. A second chance and that Fritz Stern described for Germany. We are now, I think, at something of an inflection point when it comes to trans-Atlantic relations. We have had a certain amount of damage done over the course of the past four years in particular, but we have a new administration that some see as an opportunity for the United States and its European allies to really reimagine or rethink the trans-Atlantic relationship. I wondered if you could think about this moment. Is it a second chance, are we really at a time when we can rethink how we engage with one another in a positive direction and how might the new administration and Germany, as well as its partners, embrace

that opportunity? Ambassador, I would love to put you on the spot and start with you, but of course we want to make this a free-flowing conversation.

AMBASSADOR HABER: I wouldn't call it a second chance. But I would call it the time to a shared agreement that we are not lone fighters in an arena of international relations where everyone tries to fend off on its own. And where in all relationships asymmetric power plays a role. I see this administration drawing the conclusion from the changed balance of international geopolitics and of the international landscape which includes the rise of China and the rise of authoritarian regimes and actually the decline of numbers -- of sheer numbers of democratic governments across the world. And that means that democracies in the arena of the great power tech competition of our time because that's what it is, democracies -- tech democracies should work hand in glove as closely as they possibly can. Because that's centerstage. We agree on values and on principles. And we agree on the role of technologies which will have a huge impact on our societies. We agree on -- basically on constraints and space and the limits that come with it. And if we agree on that that surely is the most important vantage point. And I see, at this administration and coming into office and using that as the point of departure for rethinking and resetting the trans-Atlantic relationship.

By resetting, I don't mean a return to what was before because the world has changed. The environment has changed. Threats or challenges have changed. Bu the point of departure will be we can prevail and secure and safeguard our societies and safeguard democracies if we work hand in glove. So second chance, in a way it's a new chance, not a second one.

MS. HILL: And I'd like to just jump in there and say I think that that's certainly the case as well. That's, in a way, what I was trying to say about second, third, and -- you know the chances. Because we are constantly having to think about renewal. And reflecting on Fritz Stern's life, you know the maps change as well. In effect, he was born in Poland but it was Germany when he was born there. We see so many times about how maps change as a result of war, but often the erosion of borders because of other agreements that we've tried to see with the EU was kind of an erosion of the internal space, the borders of people's thinking change all of the time. The Internet changes this. So there's a kind of a constant renewal, nothing ever stays the same.

And I think that was another points that Fritz Stern was kind of making that we don't have a status quo for very long. By the time that we realize it, it's gone. It's like happiness, which you know, sometimes it's fleeting. As soon as you come to think you're happy things have moved on. This is a kind of a constant refrain in literature and poetry, but the same in history. And I think what Fritz Sterns was trying to tell us is sort of this constant movement. You know, this kind of constant sense of a democracy under challenge and a democracy that was going to have to be addressed and renewed at all times. So none of us can afford to be complacent. I mean obviously, Germany is going through a period of political change as well. You know perhaps Ambassador Haber and Constanze could talk about this too.

I mentioned the generational changes happening here in the United States. You know, we spend a lot of time looking at our demography. You know Germany and the European countries have changed a great deal from mobility from refugee flows, but also as the current members of government start to move on this is the period in which Chancellor Merkel's great period -- extensive period of being the head of the German political system is starting to wind down and to think about succession. And I think we're really in a period of dramatic, but also evolutionary change. And it's grappling with that which is some of the biggest challenge at the moment. I don't know if Constanze wanted to come in on this. I might have cut her off there.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: No, no. You haven't at all. No, I think I can come in right on the back of that. Yes, I mean it's important to remind ourselves that indeed, we in Germany are facing the end of a 16-year-long year, with our own national elections on September 26th. And what I see from here, I mean technology, thankfully, is very helpful these days and actually getting a better impression of debates than one used to have. When I was going to graduate school 30 years ago in America you wandered to some news store and got a one-week old copy of Der Spiegel at the library, and that was the best you had. And that is, indeed, how I witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall. That I did see on TV in the live. But it just all seemed very far away. And as Emily said, all these debates are now much more immediate and close to home.

On the generational point, which I think is a very astute one, I think it's actually very important for the current German debate. Germans haven't, I think, spent as much time on slicing and

dicing the generations. But there are three that we would think of. The silent generation exists in Germany as well; these are the children of war, those of -- the generation of my parents. The 68'ers, and then my generation which was, quote, for better or worse, than the 89'ers because the formative events in our lives were the fall of the Berlin wall, the reunification of Germany and the second chance. The -- if you will, one of the rare moments of amazing grace in history. And one that fell into the laps of my generation without us having expected it. Most of us -- and without, I think, initially, really knowing what this was going to mean for us, except that we knew that our lives had changed completely in that moment. As I understood standing in front of a TV in Somerville, Massachusetts.

But the -- I think the -- the current sort of poly-crisis of the pandemic, of democratic resilience, of European unity, of trans-Atlantic unity, authoritarian challenges is really testing all of our systems at every which point. And testing not just our systems but our solidarity and our humanity. And I think we've seen several points in the pandemic where we -- I think, if we looked at ourselves in the mirror what we saw was really quite unpleasant. And I think one of the low points obviously was vaccine nationalism, the closing of borders. But the truth is that we have seen for the past half decade or more with the rise of populism, and culture wars on both sides of the Atlantic, the renewal of exactly the kind of politics, of cultural despair, that Fritz Stern was writing about.

What I find so terrifying about Fritz Stern, and this is the book. This is his doctoral thesis from 1953 that was -- then appeared as "The Politics of Cultural Despair" in 1961 and has been translated into German. Is he writes about three figures from the 19th century who are the precursors of the horrors of the 1920s and '30. And if you read the likes of Stephen Bannon, or the other sort of prophets of ethno-nationalism, xenophobia, and very often anti-Semitism the lines of continuity are appallingly clear. Emily is quite right, and you are quite right, Fiona, when you say that there are differences, but the differences, if any -- if anything magnify the impact and the transferability of these ideas. And they allow for a degree of international networking of the people who are perpetrating these -- peddling these thoughts that did not exist in the 1920s and '30s. And it raises the question of how we can make our representative democracies more resilient. And I think the other thing that it raises is -- or it highlights, is the urgency of these issues. I don't know about you, but my feeling is that we are currently in a little moment of trans-

Atlantic and European reprieve because we have found some political strength as societies, as nations, as democracies to affirm our values to each other. But these forces of darkness are still very much there. And the fear is still there, and I think unless democracies can provide an optimistic, positive answer to those fears they are in very great, and very imminent danger.

AMBASSADOR HABER: And I react to two points that Fiona and that Constanze have made. The first one is I do wonder if you point out that the change that we witnessed in our day and time is unprecedented. Fritz Stern with his five Germanies and the epoch he has gone through, he has seen unprecedented change in his time. But there is a specific element where part of the American and German experiences have been different. And that is until 1990 -- until German reunification we were not -- we are today, one of the most globalized countries in the world. To some extent as a trade nation we were until 1992. But of course, it was a Western globalized world and we lived within borders, let's face it, the eastern border was probably one of the most insurmountable borders of its time. So we realized in Germany the effects of globalization only with a certain delay after reunification. I contend with a delay of 15 -- no, not -- with a significant delay linked to the early immigration in the 1990s in the context of the Bosnian War. But not comparable to the huge migration flows that we saw in 1950 and 1960.

This entirely changed our perspective on globalization. And I think it gave rise, as a response to the sense of security of the lost age and imagined halcyon days. That's a trigger you've not seen, or at least not to that extent in the United States. My second point to you, Constanze, is you are right to say, or to point to the continuity of threats, nationalist ones or retreating into tribal and ethnic thinking or identity thinking. All of that poses challenges to a democracy. But I would also make the argument that the success of democracies actually depend on the capacity -- their capacity to deliver on their promises and to deliver on what they're citizens expect. And that's something autocratic societies, at least, as a rule, are not able to do to the same extent because they're not subject to internal control or transparency or to corrective processes. And that, in turn, facilitates red tape and corruption and huge mismanagement. So my argument would be that democracies as a rule are better in delivering which gives them huge advantages. I'm not saying that is always the case, but if it is the case it's key for our resilient and self-power and economic clout. And actually, you mentioned COVID. COVID will be an

important case in point. And we've seen that if we get it right in the longer run it would strengthen democracy at home. And it will strengthen the soft power of democracy in the race between democracies and the autocracies.

MS. HILL: I think Ambassador Haber is right. We have to get rid of that hackneyed old think tank phrase of unprecedented change. Because it's just a different kind of change, right? The technological or the climate, you know there have been periods like this throughout history of course. I think it's just kind of, you know, tired old think tankers that we start saying unprecedented change, it happens every 10 years that we have some kind of major tipping point. I think that's a -- that was really a very good point and I think it's just the nature of this kind of change that Fritz Stern would just have to sort of adapt his writing two.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: May I?

MS. MALONEY: Please.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: I think before we all become too optimistic, I'm sorry to be the voice of pessimism here and may I just say that one of -- I think why Fritz Stern was so much liked as a person and his enormous circle of friends in America and in Germany is and that he was fundamentally somebody who believed in the possibility of individuals and countries as it were, redeeming themselves. That was a message of hope and in which particularly appealed to a Germany that was still sort of mired in the sense of guilt and despair at the depths to which it had fallen in the 1920s to 1945.

But you know -- and Emily is certainly right when she says that the representative democracy is only system that promises a decent use of power and protects decent societies. But it's also true, and that is where I sort of would like to veer off into a little bit of pessimism again is that I think we have, over the last 30 years after German reunification, which for Germany we're happier, more prosperous, with more secure than for many others in the world. And for some of our neighbors. I have become complacent about the validity and the effectiveness of our systems, and their legitimacy. And I think if you look at the rise of the hard right in Germany and elsewhere, that you can ask with some justice whether we did not overlook a lot of things over the past 30 years. Democracy is not self-repairing and the consent of the government -- of the governed is not self-evident. It needs to be earned.

And what -- I think what bothers me most, and here I have to think of my -- as I said, I didn't -- I never met Fritz Stern but I'm a student of Goldman's at Harvard who died this past year. I'm a student of Jonas Clark at Harvard, and finally of Tony Judd who taught at NYU and who was a close friend of the Stern family. And I think that the conviction that they shared with Stern and it comes through and what they told us and what they wrote was that the reason that we have a representative democracy is to prevent societies from reverting to cruelty. The kind of excesses that we saw in the 20th century and the kind of excesses that appear to appeal to the to the hard right that we are seeing surging which has not gone away in this country, or in my own. And I think the lesson from this is very clear. This is not -- you know, the second chance isn't the last time we're going to have to exercise that choice of making things right. You have to make things right all the time. Otherwise, this will come back. And we saw that on January 6. We saw it play out in gory detail, and we saw it when -- last fall when a smaller group, less well organized and a less violent group tried to storm the German legislature in Berlin and was stopped just in time. But all that's still out there. I'd say that's the challenge of our generation.

MS. MALONEY: Thank you Constanze. I'd love to stay on this point for just another moment. And it was something that came in even in the questions that preceded this discussion including one from our dear colleague, Marvin Kalb who talked about not just the challenge of right-wing extremism in the United States and in Germany, but of course elsewhere around the world. And I'd love to press each of you perhaps this not of it's not pessimism, it leads hard-nosed realism about the challenges that we are facing individually and collectively for any ideas you may have on how beyond just the expectation and ambition for democratic resilience how each of our governments may confront and address these challenges, or how we can work collectively as a democratic states to try to contend with what is not just a unique American or a unique German challenger but that is confronting a number of states and societies around the world.

MS. HILL: I think there are several aspects to this and I'll just kind of lay out a couple and then obviously, I think, Ambassador Haber and Constanze would like to add to this. I mean, we need to renew our democratic institutions and refresh them. We've seen in the United States, for example, and recent polling by Pew and many other organizations and incredible lack of trust in our federal government

in particular. Less so for state and local government, and you know, a lot of support from many of the functions that governments carry out but again, a complete lack of trust in the federal government; down in the teens in the United States for example.

And part of this is that people don't see that the federal government any longer represents this changing population. And especially in the United States when we've got demographic change in addition to generational change. And as Emily, I think, you know so eloquently laid out there when you have a rapid pace of change people feel anxiety. And they are also very fixed in their identities and don't feel that they're getting something that's being delivered to them from the system. Start to the hark backers Emily said to a Halcyon time, a different time when they felt more in control of things. And demographic change happening very quickly, technological change, economic change with a shift in jobs in the future work which we're all contending with. The pandemic has really brought all of that to the fore. Many of the jobs that have been lost during the pandemic will not come back again.

And you know, we had that in the '70s and '80s as well with massive deindustrialization across Europe in particular, and the United States. But it's kind of a question of how do people feel that somebody is voicing that anxiety and having them not turn into grievances? And that's kind of what populism does. Populism short circuits the representative elements of this and the populist leader immediately says they are speaking in the name of the "the people" as they are defined. And so we have to find a way of refreshing our government institutions to have people who are a part of them this being Congress and the Senate in the United States but also in the federal government and you know whereas people see people are visible to reflect them. This is actually why the Biden administration is grappling so much with cabinet choices. But this can't be just at the top level. It has to be all the way down, and we have to do a much better job of explaining who our government are and how they represent people and what they're doing for them. I've actually thought sometimes that we need an ambassador to America, meaning internally. We have Ambassador Haber who is an ambassador to America and perhaps she could give us some tips here. But our own government needs an ambassador to the rest of America or a whole team. A team America to go out to all the various places and explain kind of what the government is doing. And especially as Americans are less mobile now than they were, you know, going back to

1947.

This is a problem. Because you can't reach everyone through zoom and the Internet. You've got to physically go out there and as COVID becomes manageable, you know, fingers crossed. Perhaps we can get people out on the road to town halls not just rely on members of Congress but for others to go out there. And then, I think the point that Emily and Constanze both made about democracy delivering. The system has to deliver, and that's economic goods. Jobs. It has to deliver people a feature. It has to deliver people a sense of opportunity. So there's socio-economic elements of that and I think that's where the trans-Atlantic discussion could come in. I think we can learn from each other about how to refresh our democratic institutions and I think, you know, our European colleagues have a lot of perspective on what's happening in America because you have a consulate across the country. But I think we also should look at some of the experience of post-World War II Europe about development. We have a development challenge. And you know we do a lot of foreign aid, foreign development. Perhaps, we actually need our own development organization. Sort of thinking about domestic development, and also some trans-Atlantic development because we all have areas of concentrated regional, geographic poverty. And you know, we've seen China -- China just recently announced that it had taken everybody out of absolute poverty. I mean, I'm a little skeptical. But they have done an enormous amount of poverty alleviation. We need to do that too.

Even though the percentages of our population are relatively small who live in poverty it's not the case actually with the United States with Black Americans and other minority groups where sometimes a third, almost a third of the population is living in poverty are living on the edge. But in terms of absolute numbers of the poor in the United States and across Europe, these are very large numbers. And so we have to do some poverty alleviation to because the future is our human capital so I think we have to put a development lens on it, you know, as we did after World War II. We're looking at the same kind of idea of World War II, post-World War II recovery when the Marshall Plan and other organizational innovations were made as a bet on the future and to protect democracy because at that time we were worrying about the way that communist parties were increasing their appeal after World War II. And all the way across Europe. We were worried about left-wing extremism then but we were also worried about

the return of the right. And so this is the same period in my view, where we have to have the same kind of thinking.

AMBASSADOR HABER: Well, as Constanze charged me with Pollyanna-ish thinking I'd like to make a point. Actually, I do know that the attacks on democracy and on democratic institutions are increasing worldwide in democracies. And I do know that this has an effect on the legitimacy that is actually grew to birth with democratic institutions and democratic positions and that's a problem. So I realize that completely. Now, turning to representative democracy and the spread of populism, but not only of populism, actually, of extremism, of Islamist terrorism; it's all directed against a representative democracy. So how -- what are the key features of these attacks and why do they happen? And I know it's over simplistic but I would make the argument that it happens if there is a segment of the population that believes that what it thinks is a problem is not being considered by the government.

The second is if there is a topic that actually fuels that we've seen that in the context of migration and the United States has actually also seen it in the context of migration but also the effects of globalization, the loss of jobs, etc. So there was a topic and there was a population that did not feel that it's concerns and grievances were being addressed. And populism usually is getting fueled if there are actually two figures who take up that the issues and pledge to speak for the population. That's the threat for representative democracy. I remember when I was on my previous post that time and again people told me why don't you (inaudible) but the government (inaudible) too. Why don't you explain better what you're doing? Why don't you communicate. And obviously, communication, and explaining and educating people on the complexities of issues is important. But if the issue -- if it's about something that actually people don't want to unfold or to happen in the first place and then explanation then explanation will marginally be helpful. Which brings me back to the previous point and that is democracies need to deliver. And that's not Pollyanna-ish, Constanze, it's a necessary, and I contend that the COVID recovery stimulus plan, or the recovery plan in Europe they are about actually delivering to what people feel is a problem. And just -- I was just trying to make the point that let's not whine and be victims as democracy and see that there's something we actually have to do, and it's hugely important that we get it right and that we do it. That was the point I tried to make.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Suzanne, you mentioned questions.

MS. MALONEY: I have just an absolute torrent of questions from our audience and so let me try to get to a few of them. I'm going to try to combine one broad issue that was raised but Noah Barkin from the German Marshall fund in a question to us but with another question that has come in from multiple viewers and audience members from essentially all across Europe as well as here in Washington. So I welcome each of you to speak to the kind of dichotomy of views that may be emerging between -- within the trans-Atlantic relationship, that there has been, I think, some receptivity to the idea of a summit for democracy as Minister Maas suggested. But in many capitals in Europe including in Berlin there is less enthusiasm for the idea of a kind of broader systemic competition between democracies and authoritarian states. And so I wonder if you could speak to that general issue and I want to make it a little bit more specific and talk about one of the areas where this comes up in a very specific way. You won't be surprised that we've had many questions about the differing views on Nord Stream 2. And how the United States and Germany can coordinate in a way but also on issues like this I have some significant differences. So let me turn to you first, Constanze on this issue.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Okay. Well, I'm probably the least interesting person to ask this, but I'm happy to. And some of those who asked the question note that I've written about this. I think that this systemic competition between democracies and autocracies is real and one of the most significant frameworks -- elements of the great power competition and the interdependent framework that we are now having to grapple with. But I don't think that that's something that's been in any way denied by German policymakers. I think we are having systemic competition rubbed under our noses by the Russians, by the Chinese, but also by the hard right in Europe. And in parts of Europe, as we know, it is in government. The populists have -- Hungary has a populist government that is basically change the constitution into a one-party state arrangement. Representative democracy is somewhat under threat in Poland. With apologies to my Polish friends, but I think half of them will know exactly what I'm saying.

And it is as if you need only read the party program of the alternative for Germany to see that they would very much like to do similar things in Germany, or you follow the writings of their publications, or their Twitter feeds for that matter. But one thing that we haven't mentioned and that --

actually Fritz Stern was again, somebody who pointed this out early is it's not just about the -- as it were, the operating systems, the architecture of democracy. The battle here is also one about modernity. It is -- this is about fundamental hostility to the values of liberal modernity. And which again, to quote Jonas Clark boils down to preventing the cruelty of the majority against the minorities. Of which Fritz Stern coming from an assimilated Jewish family and what is now Wroclaw and Stern and, and Judd and Peter Goldman could speak a great deal if they were still with us.

Now, Nord Stream 2. I think it is generally known that I don't much like the pipeline. Not a fan. But I also am distressed at seeing the -- help maximalist positions on both sides seem to me to be obstructing the path to a rational, reasonable, workable compromise solution. And which is -- you know, protections for Eastern Europe, protections for Ukraine, modernizing the Ukrainian pipeline, security guarantees and European-izing the ownership and management of pipelines. In other words, the full application of the European Energy Package. That would do a great deal to defang this damned project.

MS. HILL: If I could just come in on that point that Constanze made on Nord Stream 2. You know, I think that what she just said is very important because we've made this totemic and under the previous administration it was actually more about the struggle between the U.S. and Germany than it really was -- and this is over NATO and defense spending to be frank. You know, rather than it was about thinking very seriously about (inaudible). This also has to however, put in the context of the fact that the United States has never been a big fan of a gas and energy pipelines from Russia or the Soviet Union to Europe, and it was a big issue back in the 1980s and many people, including many of my colleagues, wrote dissertations and books about it, you know, back in the day. So we are nothing if consistent on this issue in the United States. It's a been a bone of contention for decades. But there's also another point here which is really about the future of the Ukraine and thinking as Constanze has suggested about how we enhance Ukraine's sovereignty and its ties with Europe. And fighting over Nord Stream 2 is not going to be the only way of going about this. In fact -- most of the discussion about this in fact, and Constanze and I and many others have talked about this, cements Ukraine's dependency on Russia.

Because the refurbishment of the pipeline system just means that Ukraine continues as a

transit for Russian energy into Europe, and not just to Ukraine itself. And although all those billions of dollars in transit fees are important right now for Ukraine's economy, this kind of dependency is not good for Ukraine over the longer term. And all of the discussions that we tried to have about how to change this have gotten bogged down in fights over Nord Stream 2, which has become, as I said, a totem, a kind of a stand in, a symbol for Ukraine's dependency and difficult relationship with Russia, and Ukraine being stuck between a rock and a hard place in terms of Germany's energy needs. And we should be thinking more about how Ukraine becomes a fully-fledged member of a kind of a broad European energy space, and economic space. You know building upon the Association Agreement that Ukraine fought so hard for and ended up losing territory because of to an annexation of Crimea, etc.

So what we need to do is really think about how Ukraine can be integrated. And there has been a lot of discussion with the Germany, Austria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, many other countries here to try to kind of figure out how to refurbish different sets of infrastructure, bring energy into the Ukraine and really kind of build Ukraine up. Now, Ukraine's having a lot of problems at the moment but I think we should be trying to focus. Instead of a symbolic fight here, on how we really work with Ukraine. And so that's all I wanted to add on here that we need to take a deep breath and not become obsessed about Nord Stream 2 and try to find out how we really work with Ukraine on bringing it into the European energy and economic space.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Precisely.

AMBASSADOR HABER: I'd like to come in on that too. I think you made very astute observations, Fiona. First of all, this is an old dispute. We had it in the 1980s. Second, both the United States, both this administration and Germany are committed to possibly fossil free fuels by 2050. So -- and with significantly reducing the segment of fossil fuels by that date. So obviously, this is -- and Nord Stream is a problem, but it will be a problem for a transition time. So from my point of view, if we've actually (inaudible) and completely overblown the importance which it would not have in the long-run. But it helps, certainly the Russian intention to pit Europeans and (inaudible) against each other. So I do agree actually with the legitimacy of some of the concerns that have been raised with regard to Nord Stream on -- as an European energy security and so forth. But what I said in debate that we have led so

far is that it was focusing in a very (inaudible) mode only on one aspect. It did not -- it never had it in the debate here. Never had it in what we actually did, what Germany did in order to allay concerns that relate to the pipeline like, reverse flow, or the trilateral negotiations with Ukraine or the energy director.

Each time the -- although these were steps that had been called for by the U.S. each time there were any issue consumed and we were back at square one. Also, I must say I heard so often the -- you are feeding the beast and you are feeding -- Germany is -- feeding Russian disruptive policies in the Ukraine. But the fact is if that's the argument then we should also factor in the oil imports from Russia that come to the United States which are very much on the same scale as our gas imports. So my plea is, there are -- there's a whole array of concerns, aspect of vantage points. Let's talk about them. And let's not focus on just one item in the conversation because that's not fair and it doesn't reflect the complexity of the dispute.

MS. MALONEY: Thank you Ambassador Haber. We are very close to our conclusion here, but I wanted to give each of you a very brief opportunity to wrap up and address one final question that came to us from Dr. Catherine Stern Brennan who is the daughter of Fritz Stern. It should not escape meeting that we are meeting today, only a day after International Woman's Day. And Dr. Brennan has asked that in memory of her father that each of you might take a moment to address the significance of March 8 for today's trans-Atlantic relationship.

MS. HILL: I think the Ambassador needs to go first.

AMBASSADOR HABER: No. No, no.

MS. HILL: While we think.

AMBASSADOR HABER: I admit the relevance of March 8 for the trans-Atlantic relationship.

MS. HILL: We are an all-female panel.

AMBASSADOR HABER: Well, I'd say this. When I started to work in the Foreign Office which was back in 1982, I think no one could have imagined a panel featuring only for women discussing the trans-Atlantic relationship. So the argument being progress is possible.

MS. HILL: Yes, I was thinking the same thing. But I as was technologically challenged I

couldn't unmute myself. So you -- apologies. I'm muted because the next generation of women is having a Spanish recovery test behind me and was yelling into me -- into the computer and I was worried that everyone was wondering why I had somebody yelling Spanish manically behind a door behind me. But you know, I think that what Emily said here and I made the solution to generational change, when all of us -- all four of us started out in our careers -- Suzanne and I were actually both at Brookings, you know, together in 2000, 21 years ago. And I was a junior fellow and Suzanne I think, was sort of finishing off your Ph.D. And there were virtually no women in senior positions in the Foreign Policy Studies Program. Today, Susanna is the vice president and director of our Foreign Policy Studies Program; it just took 21 years to get to this place, the first position holder. We have Constanze as our Fritz Stern Chair. And I know that Constanze will tell very similar stories particularly in Germany and Europe about women moving up. We've had the iron chancellor of Germany, who has been a woman for the last 16 years, position that most of us think immediately of Bismarck, and instead we have had Angela Merkel. And there are so many women in positions of authority around Europe. Prime ministers, presidents, senior officials, many of them of a much younger generation as well as the millennials versus like Finland, you know, for example. And I think that what we've seen here is a major change in trans-Atlantic relationships.

For me when I was growing up in the 1980s Margaret Thatcher was the person who had broken the ceiling but it didn't feel like lots of other women were going to come behind her. And I think that the importance of role models is a key one. And we now have the first woman vice president in the United States and Kamala Harris, our generation but blazing a trail for the next generation's to follow. So I think the significance of this and Fritz Stern and as someone who talked about the importance of rule of our democracy when we bring everyone in to our democracy, not just based on gender but across all kind of racial, and minority and socioeconomic, and every other line; that's when we really do have hope for the future when people can see representatives of themselves in the faces in the stories of the people who are in prominent positions. And that I think is the relevance. And obviously Fritz Stern had the good sense to have a daughter as well who is playing a key role. And I want to say thank you for asking that question.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: All right. Well, I hope no Republican senators are listening because I'm going to quote a famous Chinese communist Mao Zedong as saying that women prop up half the heavens. But honestly, we've been talking about representation. And of course, the consent of the government, is as Fiona just said, is also gained by people seeing themselves represented and that requires diversity. And not just more women in politics but members of other groups as well. I think that is one of the significant achievements of liberal modernity is to honor that, acknowledge it, and try to facilitate their voices being heard. But -- and this is where I swerve into Germanic darkness again. Let's not forget that the horrors of national socialism and the Holocaust were not just perpetrated by men. There were women camp guards as well. And I think I would like to end, if I may, with a quote from Fritz Stern, from the very last page of his Politics as Cultural Despair, which matters to me because while I wouldn't dream of accusing Ambassador Haber of Pollyanna-ism I think that we all sort of need to heed these warnings. And it's this sentence: "Can one abjure reason, glorify force, prophecy the age of the imperial dictator; can one condemn all existing institutions without preparing the triumph of irresponsibility?" I think that rings very current, doesn't it. And I'd say there is a lot of work for us to do. And I want to, again, think everybody who's been a part of this insane project of creating the Chair. And the one person that I didn't mention with whom it all started was Fiona. Because Fiona was the one who traipsed around Germany and ended up creating the Robert Bosch positions and without that there would never have been a Stern Chari, so thank you Fiona. And thank you to all of Brookings and to Emily. This is amazing. I think I'm going to have to have a glass of red wine tonight.

MS. MALONEY: Well, thank you to you, Constanze and your inaugural role as the first Stern Chair. Thank you so much to Fiona and especially to Ambassador Haber for joining us today. This has been just a truly phenomenal discussion, thought providing and I look forward to many more. Thank you all for joining us and we look forward to welcoming you to the next Brookings event. Have a wonderful day. Thank you.

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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