




1930
2020

Promoting monetary
and financial stability




Discussion of "A congruence principle for financial regulation"
by Andrew Metrick and Daniel Tarullo
Brookings Panel Spring meeting, 25 March 2021

Hyun Song Shin*

*The views expressed here are mine and not necessarily those of the Bank for International Settlements


“Domino model” of cascading defaults gives an incomplete picture of systemic risk




- Defaults need not figure in the propagation mechanism; deleveraging due to spike in margins / haircuts can be potent mechanism for stress propagation

Of three ways to increase leverage, the third is the relevant one for market intermediaries ...


Mode 1: Increased leverage due to equity buyback



Mode 2: Increased leverage due to fall in asset value




Mode 3: Increase borrowing to fund asset growth



Equity buyback through a debt issue (mode 1); dividend financed by asset sale (mode 2); asset expansion due to reduced haircut. Shaded area is balance sheet component held fixed.


... as illustrated by the US broker-dealer sector



- Change in assets matched dollar for dollar by change in debt, not equity

Source: Adrian and Shin (RFS, 2014), data from Federal Reserve, *Flow of Funds*


Spillovers through pricing channels (“pecuniary externalities”) and margining may propagate stress, even when the underlying asset is default-free




- Chart shows the price difference between the futures-implied price of US treasury securities and the cheapest-to-deliver treasury, adjusted for carry

Broker-dealer balance sheets have smaller heft in the financial system post-crisis, as market-based intermediation has migrated elsewhere

Total assets (1990Q1 = 100)



Leverage (=assets/equity)



Source: Federal Reserve, *Flow of Funds*