THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
WEBINAR
THE FUTURE OF PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA
Washington, D.C.
Thursday, February 11, 2021

PARTICIPANTS:

MICHAEL O’HANLON, Moderator
Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

LISE HOWARD
Professor of Government
Georgetown University

GRACE KPOHAZOUNDE
Peace and Development Advisor
U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
MR. O’HANLON: Good morning everyone and welcome to Brookings. I’m Michael O’Hanlon with the Foreign Policy program and the Africa Security Initiative there. And I’m just delighted today, benefiting from the wonders of Zoom, to be joined by good friends and colleagues in Ivory Coast and in Paris, France. I have my -- on the screen to my side is -- but I don't know where relative to you, is Dr. Lise Howard who is a professor at Georgetown University where she has been teaching remotely 3,000 miles away all fall and winter and doing her outstanding research on U.N. peacekeeping in Africa, having just published two years ago a tremendous book, “Power in Peacekeeping” that has just won a major award and that will be some of the bases, at least from my point of view come up with the conversation today, although she has new, updated results and findings to share with us as well. And we will turn to her at the beginning of our conversation for some PowerPoint slides and presentation on recent U.N. peacekeeping in Africa. More on that in a second.

We are also joined today by Dr. Grace Kpohazounde, who is a long-standing expert on peacekeeping currently based with the Country team in Ivory Coast where a major U.N. peacekeeping effort has recently concluded, but there are ongoing associated activities. And she’s been in the past, also involved in U.N. peacekeeping in central location in New York, if you will, but also in the field in the Central African Republic, South Sudan. She hails from the great country of Benin.

I should say that Dr. Lise Howard is also a field researcher who has been to some of those same countries as well as the Democratic Republic of Congo, my former Peace Corps location, and many other places on the continent as well. So let me just say one more word by way of framing the topic for today's conversation and then we will go first to Dr. Howard and then to Dr. Kpohazounde, have a couple of rounds of conversation amongst ourselves and then invite your questions which you can still send to events@Brookings.edu.

I think many of you who are following this know, but others may not, that the history of human peacekeeping is actually pretty impressive. And I say that fully aware, as I’m sure our panelists are, and all of you, of the problems of the limits of times when peace has not held, of the times when
peacekeepers have done terrible things or have not been up to professional standards that we would like. But if we look at the research, for example, of Dr. Howard and her book that I just showed on power in peacekeeping, we looked at complex missions since the Cold War and concluded that roughly two-thirds have fulfilled the majority of their mandate. Or we look at other work by people like Page Fortna at Columbia who had done statistical analyses on simpler as well as complex peacekeeping and concluded that peacekeeping has made a positive difference in at least 60% of the cases. And she has various statistical methods, as do other researchers in the field, who have generally come to this conclusion that the batting average for peacekeeping is better than 50% relative to a norm if we didn't do anything.

And that's pretty good when you're talking about a combined global enterprise that's been costing the world $7 or $8 billion a year in recent times, about 1% of the U.S. defense budget. And yet that kind of a track record -- and roughly a dozen to 15 countries at any given moment in the modern era. And so there is a long way to go. This lot of conflicts that aren't result. This lot of ongoing missions, some of which are struggling and there are certainly places where the task is so daunting, as in my former Peace Corps country of DRC and elsewhere, that we are a long ways from any finish line.

But having said all of that, this is an area of international security policy that shows considerable success, achievement, and promise. And that's what we are here to discuss today With as much emphasis on the future challenges as on the past record. So no one is here is to spike the football in the end zone Tom Brady style, but we are here to give a balanced assessment of the utility of this tool and a discussion of how it can be applied even more effectively in the future. But thanks for indulging me on the introduction. And now we will hear from the real experts starting with Dr. Howard. Over to you, my friend.

DR. HOWARD: Thank you so much, Mike. And it's a genuine pleasure to be with you today. Thanks for inviting me to Brookings and to all of your staff who helped make this possible. And it's lovely to see Grace again. Grace and I were actually traveling together in DRC, Michael; I forgot to tell you about this; in 2015 with the under-secretary general.

So yes, how you move around in DRC is by plane and I was fortunate enough that Grace
and her team allowed me to join them to witness and how they were doing what they were doing. And a lot of that didn't make it into that but that you very graciously just plugged. Thank you very much for that.

Okay. I want to talk today that I know the title of this event is the “Future of Peacekeeping,” but I'm going to look retrospectively for a moment because you did ask me to talk about it in this case. And it's really worth spending a moment thinking about this because the -- the view of peacekeeping from the statistical studies is really not what it looks like on the ground. When you on the ground in a mission it generally feels, just as Michael said, like things are not working well. I mean, it seems like it must be how -- or not all the time, but very frequently there are crises large and small and it's hard to get a big picture of what's -- of what it would look like were peacekeepers not there.

And so I'm drawing on two recent pieces. This one I wrote with Barb Walter and Page Fortna in the British Journal of Political Science that just came out. And most of what I'm talking about is from that. And then I'm also referencing a course a book that Michael very graciously plugged, but I was doing the research for with Grace -- thanks to Grace in part, a good six years ago.

Okay. So I wanted to say six things basically; to look at the relationship between peacekeeping and civilian deaths, talk for a moment about sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual and gender-based violence, talk about a few other findings. Mike, you already noted that we are looking at about a two-thirds success rate for the completed missions. I will say two things about peacekeeping in Africa. And then you asked us to say a little bit about that's maybe a word of advice for the new administration. And I have two -- I am a -- I'm an academic. So I am slightly uncomfortable with the concept of telling other people what to do because that has never been my job. But I will venture into that terrain when asked.

So where I'm going --

MR. O'HANLON: Please do.

DR. HOWARD: What was that?

MR. O'HANLON: Please do. Yes, you're invited.

DR. HOWARD: Okay. I'm going to summarize several dozen, mainly statistical studies
that sound breathtakingly boring. And I promise you I will not show any regression tables or any actual results. Is going to summarize and things, some of the main findings. And most of these are from studies in the last three years, really.

And so the first priority of most of all complex peacekeeping missions today, is the protection of civilians. And so we want to ask this question; are peacekeepers protecting civilian lives? Are they fulfilling this most basic part of the mandate? And I will tell you that there is an avalanche of evidence that peacekeepers are protecting civilians. So they are protecting civilians during conflict. These are -- I'm summarizing 14 peer reviewed quantitative studies. These have been published in the top journals of political science and international relations. These are produced by different research teams on different continents using different data sets, measuring peacekeeping in different ways, using controls, many different controls, every control you can imagine.

They're not all necessarily about peacekeeping, but they are all reproducing, in different ways, the same general result, which is that all else equal, peacekeepers are protecting civilians from dying. Civilians die less often when there are due in blue helmets deployed. That's 10 studies.

And there's also this interesting finding that it's not only more peacekeepers, but it's also something to do with the diversity of peacekeepers that helps produce less death. So when we think of the war fighting forces, unity does the unity of command and homogenous training is very important. But in contrast with war fighting, for peacekeeping it's helpful to have many different skill sets, so people from different countries bring different skill sets and diversity is actually helpful for protecting civilians.

We also have an important finding that peacekeepers correlate with fewer military deaths. And that's in the top journal and all of political science from a few years ago. Now when it comes to sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual and gender-based violence, I think many of us know that there is a sexual abuse problem in peacekeeping that peacekeepers have had to grapple with. And that is not resolved. And so this is a part of our reality.

And at the same time, when we look across sexual violence and gender-based violence during conflict, we have less sexual and gender-based violence when there are U.N. peacekeepers
deployed. So in other words, peacekeepers are not only protecting civilians from dying, they're also preventing sexual violence during conflict. These are two studies, two very recent studies that showed this in different ways.

We also have very good evidence that with more U.N. peacekeepers we see a greater risk of transactional sex. In other words, we see more prostitution and more trafficking. And that problem, the problem of trafficking associated with peacekeeping, is one that the U.S. and everyone else has to address because you can't -- this cannot be happening. This has to stop. You can't have sex trafficking around peacekeeping missions unless some very big things change maybe. No, not unless -- rewind that.

We also know that with more women with the less sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers themselves. And the problem is the pool of women in national militaries and in police forces is not huge. And so there is a limited possibility of adding more women to peacekeeping forces. And so what really needs to change is the culture of peacekeeping. It is not simply question in my mind of adding more women and stirring, because that supply is not there, unless we create the supply, unless there is a really concerted effort to train more women military and police to participate in peacekeeping.

So those are some big findings, some others, a few others. Being mindful of the time -- peacekeepers prevent the spread of violence. So they prevent the spread of violence both within countries and we know that civil wars tend to spread across borders. And when there are U.N. peacekeepers deployed, there is less spread of violence across borders.

They also help to keep the peace once it's ended. We know that civil wars recur. That is a phenomenon that is a problem of civil wars is that they start and stop and start and stop. We have less recurrence of civil war and shorter civil wars when peacekeepers are deployed. And those studies are a little bit old. So I'd be interested to see whether these findings still hold.

We also have a slew of research really in the last year or two. Oh, and that book is 2021, the top one. That peacekeepers produce better post-conflict institutions. So if you look at civil wars
without peacekeepers as opposed to with them, we see better results in the rule of law. So in legal structures and police forces and reform of the military and civilian control over the military, civil, military relations, and legal systems. The jury is out about whether peacekeepers have a beneficial effect on democracy, but what we do know because studies have found that it can go both ways. I mean, it's just inconclusive.

But what we do know is that there is a correlation between the presence of U.N. peacekeepers and more robust civil society. And since civil society is the building block of democracy, civil society -- and for most folks who study democracy, civil society is far more important than elections. If you have a civil society, the chances of a country transitioning to democracy rise significantly and peacekeepers correlate with a more robust civil society.

As Grace and I can see with their own eyes. If we look at the countries like DRC, like (inaudible) that have really robust civil societies where they did not and only in recent years. So I'm talking a little bit about this power in peacekeeping. Now turning just to the results that Michael was just talking about. So most of those findings are about ongoing conflict. This -- my study is looking at the completed missions and of the roughly completed -- 16 completed missions, I'm arguing that the U.N. has implemented its mandate, most components of the mandate in 11. So we are looking at about a two thirds success rate. So in five cases, the U.N. reported the countries before it had completed the mandates.

And I will just note my little dig at counterinsurgency which is that counterinsurgency as had declining success rates. It's not just Afghanistan and Iraq. Counterinsurgency as a method of intervention has been declining in success for the last 100 years. It's not something that's recent. This is something that military historians have noted for a very long time, that counterinsurgency as a mode of intervention is really not particularly effective.

Here is the list of successful cases. We know in Côte d'Ivoire, which is where Grace is right now, and the failed cases where the peacekeepers let before they implemented their mandates for a variety of reasons, Haiti being the most recently when peacekeepers brought cholera to Haiti resulting in
close to 10,000 deaths from cholera right now. So as not to say that everything is hunky-dory. This is -- that was -- well, tragedy does not -- is not adequate to describe what happened in Haiti or what is continuing to happen in Haiti.

Okay. So turning to the picture in Africa, very, very briefly. Of the 12 current peacekeeping missions in the world, five of them are complex and for those are in Africa. So we have large stabilization missions in Mali, in Congo, in the Central African Republic, and in South Sudan, the mission in Darfur, the hybrid mission with the AU closed down at the end of last year.

I also want to know -- so the fifth complex mission is of course in Lebanon. So the most complex peacekeeping that we have right now is in Africa. And I also want to highlight that it is Africans increasingly who are U.N. peacekeepers. I'm not going to go through that list, but I will just -- and this chart is a little bit complicated. But I just want to note that in mid-2000 that's between 2014, 2013, and 2014, if we look at this dark blue line, the dark blue line are two contributors from South Asia. We think of peacekeepers -- a modal peacekeeper I think for people who have been working peacekeeping -- on peacekeeping for long time, I have in my mind, and I think many others do also, that most peace keepers come from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. That shifted in 2013 and the continent became the main supplier of peacekeepers by the end of 2014 so that now most U.N. peacekeepers come from African countries. So Africa is the continent that supplies the most U.N. peacekeepers. So that has shifted from South Asia to Africa.

MR. O'HANLON: Lise, can I just interject and ask that and that doesn't even include the forces in Somalia, right? Which would be --

DR. HOWARD: No, no. No.

MR. O'HANLON: Supplied by -- it's mandated by the U.N., but is run by the African Union, right?

DR. HOWARD: Right.

MR. O'HANLON: Somalia.

DR. HOWARD: It's not -- it's mandated by the AU, yeah in Somalia. That is an entirely
AU mission. Their son -- there are a few small U.N. support missions that assist UNISOM, no, no. It's not UNISOM, it's AMISOM. It's the one AU peacekeeping mission right now.

Final point; we have this U.S. administration, a Biden administration that wants to show how for -- that wants to make sure that U.S. foreign policy moves and benefits Americans. And the question is, why is it important to invest in peacekeeping. As Michael noted, peacekeeping is inexpensive. It cost somewhere between 8 and 100 times less to send U.N. peacekeepers to a conflict than it does to send U.S. forces.

Peacekeepers reduce armed conflict. When we have less armed conflict, we have less refugees, we have less migration. And since those are problems that affect everyone, most notably the refugees themselves, they are the ones who suffer most from these -- this -- from displacement, it makes sense to invest in peacekeeping. So peacekeeping reduces the need for people to flee.

And if we think, especially here in Europe, there is a lot of -- we hear a lot of conversations about how to help people stay home. This is one way to think about it. So to summarize, U.N. peacekeeping has been effective. Africans are U.N. peacekeepers and increasingly U.N. peacekeepers are Africans. And peacekeeping is a worthy investment considering how robust the results are and how little it costs. That's all I have to say. Thanks.

MR. O'HANLON: Lise, that's fantastic. I'm going to come back in the second round ask you a little bit about the mechanisms by which peacekeeping is effective, because I think your book is so good and clear at explaining that persuasion, inducement, compellants, short of the use of military force just to key those up.

But I did want to have one tiny follow-up before we go to Grace, which would be, in your first point about how U.N. peacekeepers do generally a good job of reducing civilian death, is there a rough number that you have in mind about the magnitude of that effect? Do they typically, on average, cut death rates by half or by 10% or by 90%? Is there any rough number? Because maybe I just think this way given my background. But I love being able to hold onto that number of two-thirds, a two-thirds success rate of complex missions or Page Fortna's earlier work sort of 60% typical effectiveness across
all cases. But do you have any kind of a number on the likely reduction in civilian death rates?

DR. HOWARD: I do not have that off the top of my head because every study has a different number and there are 14 of them.

MR. O’HANLON: Right.

DR. HOWARD: But I can get you some -- I can find you the answer.

MR. O’HANLON: Well, I didn't --

DR. HOWARD: So we are kind of at a range. We are at a range. And I don't even want to tell -- I don't want to venture a guess as to what the range is.

MR. O’HANLON: Yeah, okay.

DR. HOWARD: Yeah.

MR. O’HANLON: Thank you, very much. Fantastic presentation.

DR. HOWARD: Yeah, you're welcome.

MR. O’HANLON: A lot of great information. And now Dr. Grace, Dr. Kpohazounde, we would love to hear your perspective from the field, from Côte d'Ivoire, from your best experiences in New York at that peacekeeping headquarters. Thank you for joining us and over to you, my friend.

DR. KPOHAZOUNDE: Thanks a lot Michael and Lise. It's lovely to see you here as well.

I think I mean, looking at Lise's presentation, I have to say I'm always happy when I hear academics provide useful criticism and useful contributions when analyzing peacekeeping operations. It hasn't always been the case. So for that I want to thank Lise for her work in “Power in Peacekeeping.”

Just a few thoughts about the effectiveness of peacekeeping as a whole. And then I want to touch a bit about the framework on the scope of peacekeeping, most specifically the things that make or help make peacekeeping effective. Such -- all the challenges and then a few words about the Biden administration and if they can -- are going to be more involved.

So yes, I agree with Lise. Peacekeeping has been effective overall. And when you look at Africa, from the 1960s to today, we have had periods where we had about 25 peacekeeping operations deployed over the continent. Today we have about seven. So it means that there has been stability on
the continent. And I like to think that somehow peacekeeping operations have contributed to the stability.

Now in some cases, before we (audio skip) the success, we need to have similar iterations of a peacekeeping operation including, well for instance where I am currently based. The peacekeeping operation left in 2017, it was (inaudible). But before (inaudible) we had another mission. And in the DRC which is the case that may be the most known to everyone. In the 1960s we had (inaudible) and then we had a different form, now we have MINUSCO. Liberia it is the same case. Different iteration with peacekeeping operations, but ultimately when I look at the continent as a whole and when I look at the contribution of peacekeeping with Lise, and I have it with you, it is a positive it is a positive contribution.

Now in terms of the framework and the things that really help (audio skip) peacekeeping effective, and I think it's important for us, and for (audio skip) that if you want to continue (audio skip) getting it right. The one thing (audio skip).

MR. O'HANLON: Grace, we are losing you a little. I wonder maybe for the time of your presentation, you might want to turn off your video just to make sure we hear your voice loud and clear. That's a good idea.

DR. KPOHAZOUNDE: That's good. Let me turn the video often. All right. Can you hear me?

MR. O'HANLON: Yes, very good.

DR. KPOHAZOUNDE: Okay. So when we think about U.N. peacekeeping, the most visible sign are the blue helmets, the military, the police, the uniformed personnel. But I want to stress that peacekeeping is first and foremost a political tool. It is a political tool that really needs to have the buy-in of all of the constituencies from the get-go. And that means the Security Council. It means (inaudible) countries, and as Lise has said more and more we have seen the demographic of DCC's involved from Asian contributors to African contributors. And of course we also need to have the buy-in of those who are going to foot the bill, who are going to pay the money for peacekeeping.

Now the reason why over the past decades peacekeeping seems to have been more
successful I would say than today, is, in my view, because we had that consensus much more easily than we have today, I would say. Those global dynamics tended to affect the decision-making processes of establishment of peacekeeping operation, of the mandate the peacekeeping operation will be given be given and the resources it will be given to actually implement that mandate. But regardless of that, I think the conditions that we have today where these particular operations are being deployed are changing conditions and peacekeepers continue to do their best to protect civilians, contribute to institution building, and rule of law.

So in terms of the framework of peacekeeping, I think that's the first thing I wanted to stress. Peacekeeping is a political tool and it really requires the consensus of its key constituencies to ensure success. Now a few challenges of course. Peacekeeping is a tool. It evolves and it evolves in an environment. And when that environment changes, of course it impacts the way we think about peacekeeping. It impacts how we conceive our peacekeeping. And also impacts how our colleagues work on the ground.

We have seen peacekeeping missions deployed more and more in countries where there were practically no peace to keep. Normally the ideal scenario for peacekeeping, and when Lise points out in her books is that we need to have the consent of the host country. Those are the three principles of peacekeeping, consent of the host country, the impartiality, and the nonuse of force except in self-defense or in the defense of the mandate.

Now it's a lot easier when we deploy in countries where we have a peace to keep where there is a peace agreement to support. Where the country doesn't present us with (inaudible) which is something peacekeepers are not equipped to tackle with. More and more we have been moving to unknown territory, I would say for peacekeeping. And that adaptation is still ongoing. So it is a work in process. But I would like to say that even there when we look at Mali for instance, and Mali has gone under of a lot of criticism recently, in terms of the fatalities, in terms of the difficulty to implement the AGI agreement.

When you are in the mission and you're looking at today, like Lise said, we tend to think
that everything is wrong. But just take one second. If MINUSMA was not and Mali, I think we would be
telling a different story. So for me, peacekeeping has been effective. It continues to be effective despite
its challenges. And moving forward, and particularly for the Biden administration, what I will call for is that
most constituencies will commit to peacekeeping, it is one of the best multilateral tools we have in
managing conflicts and in dealing with conflicts. And I think it is an opportunity that we have now with this
new administration to really get more involved, all of us in the United Nation peacekeeping. Support U.N.
peacekeeping both financially, but also in terms of troops on the ground in terms of being a beautiful
advocate for peacekeeping.

So I will stop my comments here for now and of course I will work on any observations
and suggestions from you or other colleagues. Thanks Michael.

MR. O’HANLON: Dr. Grace, thank you. You can to very loud and clear with a very
compelling message. I wanted to ask you one quick follow up and then we will go to sort of around two
and I’ll go back to Lise with some thoughts on her book, I hope, in trying to tease out some of the
mechanisms that she described.

But you mentioned that peacekeepers are restricted in their use of force. And we all
know that's crucial because we're sending relatively modest numbers of people into places where
governments do invite them in, but the desire of those governments or other groups to see somebody
else essentially impose order on the country is not necessarily very high. And so the whole notion of
restriction on the use of force is crucial.

However, those of us who are getting old and grisly like myself and remember the
experiences of the 1990s, especially in Rwanda, and Srebrenica, Bosnia, know that there is a risk on the
other side which is that if peacekeepers are precluded from using any force, and I know you mentioned
the two conditions in which they are allowed to use force. And I want to ask you to expand on that little.
But if they are prevented from using force, you can have massacres or even the peacekeepers
themselves could be held hostage or even killed.

And so I just wondered if you could give us some perspective on how United Nations
thinks about that challenge and what kind of steps can be used. We know that these keepers are brave. Many of them, or at least a substantial number, do lose their lives, whether from disease or accident or sometimes the use of force. But we also know it's important to minimize that and make sure the mission doesn't fall apart when a spoiler challenges a deployment. So could you speak to that please, briefly?

DR. KPOHAZOUNDE: Yes, Michael. Thanks. I think you've touched on the -- one of the most essential aspects of peacekeeping that has been under review and continues to be under review in past years.

The nonuse of force or the use of force in self-defense or only in the defense of mandate is one of the key principles of peacekeeping. I think it's also one of the principles that make that tool appear -- how do I put it? More accepted by the parties involved. I mean, when we are engaging governments, or rebel groups, or warring parties on a conflict situation. And of course, this different operation represents a third force; nobody wants a third force coming into their territory and being allowed to shoot left and right and to use the force of law. But I think it reassuring for parties to know that this force will come, it will deploy, it will have very clear principles and it will not be allowed to use force but only in certain circumstances.

So for us, that principal is key and it is important. Unfortunately the country where we have been deployed and we sent the -- as you said, and situations in the past as in Rwanda have called into question, or have, you know, raised criticism about that. But I want to say, we have different tools to address different types of situations. And if I want to take the example of Mali, for instance, peacekeepers are deployed there, but we also a French force. Why? Because the nature of the threat in Mali is not within the purview of peacekeepers. That MISCA force that operates in the same operating area as MINUSMA has a very specific mandate to address as a MISCA force. Now of course, there needs to be cooperation, there has to be cooperation and that is what we call for.

I will also discuss CAR. We had a similar situation in CAR where a French (inaudible) led force deployed alongside the peacekeeping operation and ultimately left once the nature of the threats became something that was more in the realm of peacekeeping operations.
So I think when we are discussing peacekeeping and for us to continue ensuring that peacekeeping is effective we need to manage expectations and we need to keep in mind that peacekeeping will not do anything and everything. Peacekeeping is a very specific tool and it needs certain conditions to function. Now, peacekeeping should adapt because the world is changing. And that adaptation is going along. I think in the DRC we had the force intervention, we were given FIB. We are experimenting because that tool needs to continue to be relevant in light of the evolving nature of the conflicts.

So in a nutshell, that use of force principle is essential to peacekeeping. The failures that we have had and the perception that the implementation of that principal may have contributed to our failure. I think we need to be candid on peacekeeping and simply understand that the tool is designed for certain types of conflict and not for every conflict, and other actors are basically still intervening.

MR. O’HANLON: Thank you. Thank you, Grace. That's fantastic. So now, I want to go back to Lise and ask her about the mechanisms by which U.N. peacekeeping can be so effective because, you know, it's almost counterintuitive that such minimally equipped and resourced deployments can have such a positive effect. And as Grace, as you've just said, this is not through the physical imposition of an outcome on the country in question.

I mean, there is occasionally or historically at least, a possibility of a deployment with a mandate to go impose a peace; but that's rarely what happens today. Maybe it's not happening anywhere today, in fact, by my knowledge. And yet, somehow, peacekeeping works. And so how? How could that be? Even when there isn't a French contingent as in Mali or a brigade deployed as in Congo briefly, as you mentioned, Lise, in your book where there was an active mandate to use force in a particular situation for a particular limited amount of time.

Those are the exception. In general, peacekeeping works without that kind of help and it still is successful 60% to 70% of the time, so how? Can you explain a little bit of the mechanisms and then, Grace, I want to come back to you for any comments before we go to audience questions.

So Lise, please let us know how this works.
DR. HOWARD: Sure. Yeah. I want to repeat some words that Grace just said which is that we have different tools for different situations, right. And peacekeeping is not a tool that will solve all problems. I will say that since the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the genocide in Srebrenica in 1995, if we think back to that it's been more than 15 years when peacekeepers -- no, no -- more than 25 years when U.N. peacekeepers have been deployed and there's been a genocide under their watch, right. So that was -- it has been a long time. We've had many, many years of peacekeepers without them witnessing genocide.

There would have been a genocide in the Central African Republic without the African Union, the French Legionnaires and then the U.N. peacekeepers. Last week there would have been a coup in the Central African Republic had the U.N. peacekeepers not held the line. So they are being asked to do things that are beyond the scope of peacekeeping right now. The mission in the Central African Republic has four quick reactions forces and those act more as military forces as opposed to peacekeepers.

What do -- how do -- so how do peacekeepers change behavior? There are different ways in which one can change behavior in general, right. One -- we can persuade using words. So I think power falls into three categories. So power is the ability to change someone's behavior. We can engage in soft power using words, that's what we're doing today, is we're engaging in the soft power, trying to change minds to change behavior.

Peacekeepers also engage in inducement, right. So they're building institutions that channel behavior, or they provide carrots or take things away that changes behavior so they provide things that people need, especially in schools, buildings, you know, institutions, roads, but they can also curb illicit networks. And I think that that is one area that we really need to think about improving in our multilateral response in general in all of these big missions is how to curb illicit networks. How to stem the weapons -- the flow of weapons and people and natural resources.

And the third way in which -- so we have persuasion which is nonmaterial and then two material forms of the exercise of power. Institutions, so inducement. You can induce people to change
their behavior and then you can also hit them with a stick. Or use compellent force. And that is what
national militaries do; that's what they train to do. They train to fight and win wars using military means.
That's changing -- granted that's changing in the contact (inaudible): warfare and gray war and
information war. But that is the primary idea of what a military is, right; it's to use compellents to get
somebody to change behavior.

That part of coercion is not what peacekeepers are very good at. Peacekeepers come
from dozens of different countries; they don't train together before they deploy. They don't always speak
each other's languages. The command and control doesn't work like a national military command and
control, so you can ask them do to -- you can ask peacekeepers to do some things. Like right now,
protecting Bhanghe (phonetic) and holding the line; they can defend. They are able to defend but they
are not able to exercise compellent force to defeat the armed groups. That is not something that
peacekeepers are capable of doing.

They can undermine rebel groups' capacity to engage in warfare, but they are not going
to defeat any rebel groups by the use of force. So that is the question now in the Central African Republic
is -- which is the most desperate of all missions right now. Right, they're at a breaking point right now.
Peacekeepers are holding the line, there are more elections coming up this weekend and 200,000 people
were just displaced in the last two weeks. So the question now is what can peacekeepers do? The
mission is asking for more troops. That is the main thing they're asking for. They need help very much
so right now.

Rwanda and Russia are coming to the aid of the mission and if we think about the future
of peacekeeping we want to be thinking about who will be the main actors on the horizon? Rwanda is
already proving itself. China is moving through and I think we know that if China becomes the main actor
in U.N. peacekeeping which it's slated to do right now, peacekeepers are no longer going to be as
concerned with democracy, human rights, gender provisions; those types of exercises. So looking on the
horizon of the future of U.N. peacekeeping, unless the U.S. and other decide to recommit to
peacekeeping the future of peacekeeping is Chinese in my view of U.N. peacekeeping will be Chinese.
MR. O’HANLON: That’s not all a good thing even if we can partially commend the Chinese for wanting to be somewhat engaged. We probably want to watch it, if I hear you correctly.

Grace, any comments you’d like to offer at this juncture? And then, I’ve got about a half dozen audience questions that I’d like to see if we can fit most in in our remaining 15 minutes.

DR. KPOHAZOUNDE: Yeah. Just a few things about the peacekeeping. And I find it interesting that Lise says that the future of peacekeeping is Chinese. Yes, it is. I mean, they are being more involved but we’ll see.

The other two things that come to mind when I think about the future of peacekeeping is I believe we will see there will be the need for more partnerships and at two levels. More and more we are seeing regional organizations in Africa getting involved in peacekeeping operations on the continent. I think the future of peacekeeping in Africa, first of all, will depend on partnerships. Partnerships between international organizations like the United Nations and regional organizations, with a clear division of mandate and the compartmentalization of course.

The other type of partnership that we will see in terms of the future of peacekeeping in Africa will depend on the nature of the threat. I mean, peacekeeping will have to partner with other tools, sometimes on the same operating area and in the country in Africa to be able to succeed. So those are the two things I want us to keep in mind in terms of the future of the peacekeeping. It will require more partnerships; partnerships at two levels, regional organizations but also with other tools in the same country to be effective.

MR. O’HANLON: Excellent. So I’m going to break the questions from the audience into two batches and I’m going to give you each about three at a time, but I’m not asking each of you to respond to all of them. So feel free to cherry pick those where you have the most that you want to say, and we’ll see if we have time for two rounds of that.

So in round one, one question which you may or may not want to comment on, but its’ -- I’ll leave that to you. Do you believe the Biden administration should or will expand U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping in Africa? So that’s a question that sitting in Ivory Coast and France you may or may
not wish to comment on but you're certainly invited to.

And then another question concerns the dynamics in New York among and between the five permanent members of the security council; you both just mentioned Russia and China. And would you say that differing views among the permanent five, also of course, France and Britain, do these effect the effectiveness? Do these weaken the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping in Africa in any way or is -- you know, do we largely see synergies or cooperation for the most part? Obviously, there can be high profile disagreements over mandates but I think the question gets more to the mechanics of peacekeeping.

And then finally, there's a question about whether either of you has a suggestion for the U.N. And I realize Dr. Kpohazounde, you work for the U.N. so you may or may not wish to comment, but about how the U.N. can tell its story a little better. If there is so much encouraging news; maybe I don't want to say it's all good news, but there's certainly enough to build on and to make us hopeful about the future. Is there a way for the U.N. as an organization to do a more active and better job of that so that around the world parliaments, and congresses, and others who are skeptical about this enterprise and dubious about whether their taxpayer should be asked to support these missions will be a little bit more forthcoming and obviously we can start with the U.S. Congress in terms of a dubious group historically.

So let me begin, if I could, Lise, with you and then go to Grace.

You're still muted, Lise.

DR. HOWARD: I feel like I tell people that all day long. I'll try to answer them briefly because I don't want to take all the time. So will, or should the Biden administration participate, ramp up, expand participation in peacekeeping. I think the Biden administration will. I hope that they will to the extent that the U.S. is over a billion dollars in arrears now to U.N. peacekeeping and it is jeopardizing peacekeepers all over the place.

So until the U.S. pays its arrears we can expect that there will increasing problems in peacekeeping which is just bad for everyone. So I hope that the Biden administration and Congress will pay -- will pay up and make good on our obligations to the rest of the world because it is just something
that has to happen for so many reasons. And it helps us at home, it helps everyone everywhere else.

So expand financial participation. In terms of actually sending U.S. troops the U.S. is not -- doesn't -- U.S. -- our military forces don't train to engage in peacekeeping. We train others to keep the peace, but I don't think that we would want to see, at any moment an increase in either U.S. or French or any P5, honestly, in participation in peacekeeping because of the impartially requirement, which gets to the third question about the U.N. -- peacekeeping only works because when peacekeepers behave legitimately; and legitimacy is based on inherent to those three things that everyone can agree to that Grace was talking about, right.

So impartiality means that the great powers do not participate in peacekeeping, they don't take sides. It's very hard for them not to take sides. Consent of the warring parties and the limited use of force, adhering to those rules of peacekeeping are what has enhanced the legitimacy which plays into the effectiveness of peacekeeping.

And how can the U.N. tell its story better? I don't know. I think when folks in the U.N. say the types of things that I just said, it sounds like propaganda. I don't know why. It's like if you -- I -- it's just -- what can I say? It is what it is. And I will also say that for all of those studies for researchers it doesn't matter what the finding is; it just matters that you have a significant finding. So that the finding is that U.N. peacekeepers save civilian lives is publishable and that's what furthers our careers. But nobody is like to led to peacekeeping as a thing, it just happens to be a finding that you can get published to further your career. And so the -- in that sense it might be helpful to have scholars talk about peacekeeping a little bit more.

MR. O'HANLON: Excellent, as we're doing today. So I'm again, grateful to both of you.

DR. HOWARD: Right. Yeah.

MR. O'HANLON: And Dr. Grace, over to you my friend, for any responses to those three questions before we go to the final round.

DR. KPOHAZOUNDE: Yeah. So very quickly. About the U.S. administration, yeah. I will say yes. Peacekeeping is most effective when all member states are committed to it as a tool. And of
course, the United States is a member state of the U.N. It is not just any member state, it is also a permanent member in the security council. So I think yes, the U.S. should come into peacekeeping. I mean, I think like Lise, I'm a low on confidence and I'm not sure that the U.S. would want to send troops on the ground but in any case it should recommit politically, but also financially; also, in terms of training that's quite possible as well. But that is a big yes for me.

Do using the council affect the (inaudible) operation? Like Lise said, we do have this first of all, and I like to sit here in front of all of you and say that it don't affect, but there is a reality that it's out there. And the truth is that peacekeeping operations are more effective when we have a consensus, unanimity among council members. Those who decide on when, where peacekeeping will deploy and how much money will be allocated to that mission. So of course, when they all get together it's easier for the mission to operate. And when they don't get along as mentioned in particular topic, it again, hurts the work of the mission.

Yeah. If I started talking about how good U.N. peacekeeping was; of course everybody would look at me and say, well you won't say the opposite. And even sitting here taking a (inaudible) on how good it is. I feel a bit uncomfortable, but yeah, we're not very good at telling our own story. I agree. But I think Lise's suggestion is the -- we need others to come and see peacekeeping for themselves and study peacekeeping for what it is objectively and, you know, tell it like it is.

We have challenges but overall, if peacekeeping did not exist someone would have to invent it.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Okay. Final round. And this one has five questions. So I hope you have a piece of paper and a pen and again I'll invite each of you to respond to maybe a couple, as you prefer.

But one question -- and some of these are a little bit more pointed and a little bit more specific too. So one question is how can peacekeeping missions be successful when the host nations often don't even issue timely visas for necessary rotations and deployments? So for example, Sudan, I think has sometimes slowed things down in this regard. That's question one.
Question two is about DRC and a critique of the mission there and with -- I think now, 15,000 U.N. soldiers, I think it used to be 20,000, and roughly a billion dollar a year budget, why has progress been so difficult and why do we still see civilians threatened and even hurt within meters of U.N. bases at times? Is the mandate there too weak or is the force to incapable?

Grace, you've already touched on collaboration with other organizations and so have you Lise, but there's a question about private sector capabilities and whether there's more collaboration possible there on that specific dimension of working with other groups?

And then, there is a question about regional peacekeeping, or regionally led operations or AU led operations. Should there be more of that, or does the union model sort of strike the right balance involving Africans, as you both said, in peacekeeping in Africa, but also having a certain dispassionate quality because there are people from all over the world who have varying interests. And as you pointed out, Lise, in your original presentation, diversification of peacekeepers is often correlated with success. But nonetheless, is there a case for more regional or AU-led operations?

And then finally, this gets into a little bit of the details, and maybe the statistical leads on various studies. But do unarmed civilian monitoring missions differ from armed peacekeeping missions in their effectiveness? And again, we all know that even the peacekeeping missions with armed soldiers have very limited mandates for the use of force as we've been discussing. But nonetheless, they do have weapons by contrast with pure monitoring missions. And do you have any general observations about whether one of those is more effective than the other?

So that's a lot to throw at you, but please be selective and we'll start again, Lise, if we could.

DR. HOWARD: Yes. I will manage to unmute myself before I start speaking. Yeah, great. Thanks so much for your questions, everyone. I'm sorry we can't interact face to face. I hope that we will be able to interact face to face before too long. I really appreciate the interest in the questions.

On visas, there's been, just -- it's not just in the Sudan, it's everywhere that there has been difficulty in rotating troops because of COVID. I mean things are just rough, COVID makes things
very difficult. And more so for peacekeepers, and I will say that peacekeepers are engaged in helping with COVID prevention; restriction and prevention and so in that sense they’re providing a very necessary and useful assistance to many governments.

For DRC what I can tell you is, it's not beautiful. The U.N. peacekeeping in DRC in general has not been beautiful. But it’s also really quite evident to me that if U.N. peacekeepers were to be withdrawn which the government, I think, wants a lot of people would die. A lot of people would die. And so, it is a Band-Aid on a wound and they're not able to protect everyone everywhere. But if they were to leave the situation would be much worse.

Could it get better? Absolutely. How could it get better? It's about curbing illicit networks. It's about -- in my mind, it really is about reining in the political economy of conflict, which is not what peacekeepers do. It is up to other actors, partners, as Grace was talking about, to reign in the political economy of conflict. Once we rein in those political economies, those networks those illicit networks, bring things aboveboard I think that's when things maybe that's where the role of the private sector would come in and making sure that actors behave -- you know, that they engage economically and above board.

Should there be more regional peacekeeping? The AU in Somalia there right now is not engaging in peacekeeping. That is war fighting in Somalia. So there are two different things about observers. There's a finding that many studies -- many studies have found that unarmed observers, or lightly armed observer missions do not fare well. But there are so few of them -- they are so few in number that the finding is not very robust. It's just something we haven't tried very much.

I will say that -- and so it's inconclusive and sometimes it seems like it's a negative correlation. So what I will say is that for elections we know that unarmed election observers have positive effects on elections, even in conflict zones, which suggests to me that it might be possible to engage in peacekeeping without being armed. And I'll leave it at that.

But thank you so much for your questions and for the session today.

MR. O’HANLON: And for those excellent answers. And so Dr. Grace, over to you for
your final thoughts, please, my friend.

DR. KPOHAZOUNDE: Yeah, thanks. The question about the visas, and I think maybe the person who is asking the question was maybe talking more about the issue we often have in peacekeeping operations, which is the consent of the host country. Sometimes that consent tends to erode over time and the agreement that the host country has signed to facilitate certain processes to a U.N. operation, when things get a little difficult, when the mission becomes a bit vocal, for instance, on issues where it's human rights, the host country can use those as a tool to sort of try to impress upon the peacekeeping operation.

So it is a reality that we face in a lot of countries. The host -- I mean the consent of the host country can erode. But I think overall most of our peacekeeping operations do stand their ground, as we should. And I know that Sudan hasn't been a notorious case about this, and I also know that our colleagues on the ground are doing the best that they can.

In terms of the DRC, yeah, I mean I've heard and read so much about the DRC, I've been to the DRC and I want to disagree with you a bit on this, Lise. I actually think that our missions in the DRC have had very positive effects. It hasn't been that bad because if you look at the size of the country, if you look at the issues, that affect that country I'm not even sure if DRC would still have its -- the frontiers that it has today, its territorial integrity if we didn't have the peacekeeping operation deployed there.

So yes, I agree it has been there forever. It has taken different shades and different sizes and, you know, some even joke about it that someone born in the '60s in the DRC today has never known in his or her country without a peacekeeping -- and it is unfortunate. But I say it takes the time that we need to really get it right. And it may be, you know, it is taking quite a while in the DRC, I agree; but I am convinced that the effort is worthwhile. A few things that can be adjusted here are there, yes, I agree. And as Lise says, the dynamics and the issues are such that we may also want to consider involving the private sector at some point.

So I would say yeah, the DRC is a complicated case but we shouldn't see things
completely as the glass half empty. I want to see it as half-full on the DRC.

The regional peacekeeping, it will be on a case-by-case basis, I think. I do think that we will be seeing more of those because the AU echo us. And other regional organizations are getting more involved in managing and dealing with conflict situations on the continent, as they should. And it is true that the U.N. has an advantage in terms of the diversity it brings, in terms of the technicalities of the work, of this broad experience. But I think that regional peacekeeping is a reality that we just have to accept and the U.N. will continue working and partnering with regional peacekeeping operations on a case-by-case basis.

As for the last question, on armed observers as opposed to armed soldiers their effectiveness. Again, I think this is on a case-by-case basis. And some situations unarmed civilians would do much better than countries where you already have parties that are at each other throats, where the country is already pretty been and if you bring in someone who is armed, you may create a sort of a -- a sort of a reaction, I would say. But I think unarmed versus armed it depends on the country. But both are effective.

MR. O'HANLON: In closing, let me add one brief personal note to back you both up on DRC because I heard you both support the mission even while acknowledging it's mistakes. And let me just say because I don't have anything like the expertise the two of you do, but I do have a memory of what Congo was like when it was Zaire in the '80s and then, of course, followed it into the '90s.

I know how much worse things can be in Congo than they are today. And that's not because of the Congolese people who are some of the most wonderful people I've ever met and I'm sure you both agree with me. It's because of the history of horrible colonial rule and fractious politics and Mobutu's strong arm autocracy that prevented institutions from forming, and then the sheer size of the country and the difficulty of controlling that space in any meaningful way. And all these things plagued the Congolese people. And therefore, the benchmark against which we're measuring the effectiveness of this mission has to be realistic for what can and has happened in the absence of any kind of effort to try to prevent even worse things from transpiring.
So thank you for both saying such good things about Congo specifically, even as you’ve also acknowledged and underscored the importance of improvement and thank you both in general, Dr. Kpohazounde and Dr. Howard for your work and for being with us today. It’s really been a fantastic conversation. We’ve very grateful at Brookings and I know many others are as well. So we’ll sign off now and wish you all the very best. Thank you.

DR. KPOHAZOUNDE: Thank you, Michael. It’s been a pleasure.

DR. HOWARD: Thank you so much, really appreciate the opportunity.

MR. O’HANLON: By everybody.

DR. KPOHAZOUNDE: By Lise.

DR. HOWARD: Bye-bye Grace.

* * * * *
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III
(Signature and Seal on File)
Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia
Commission No. 351998
Expires: November 30, 2024