

ADVANCING MULTILATERALISM IN A POPULIST AGE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper looks at how multilateralists in the United States and Europe are thinking about strengthening a cooperative international order at a time when populism and nationalism are strong forces in many of the major powers. The paper distinguishes between three pathways that multilateralism might take, particularly in Europe: the hitherto dominant *incrementalist* approach which involves trying to gradually integrate China and other non-Western powers into the order; an “*alone in the jungle*” approach whereby Europe would operate as a third pole between the United States and China; and a “*reinvigorating the free world*” approach, with Europe working with the United States to strengthen free and open democracies against authoritarian challenges.

The *incrementalist* approach is the path of least resistance, but it also seems like the least sustainable if the political trends we are experiencing — nationalist populism as a force within democracies and great power rivalry between the United States and China — persist. The *alone in the jungle* strategy would be a disaster for the liberal international order, as it would split two of its greatest champions, the United States and the European Union. However, if Trumpism makes a comeback in the United States, a significant number of Europeans will feel that there is an equivalency between America and China and may be drawn to this approach. The strategy of *reinvigorating the free world* is best suited to deepening and modernizing cooperation amongst liberal democracies, but for many Europeans the continued strength of Trumpism in the Republican Party, as well as fears of rivalry with China, gives them pause about pursuing this option.

INTRODUCTION

In 2002 and 2003, when Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) emerged in southern China, the Chinese government covered it up and withheld cooperation with the international community. SARS spread throughout Asia and claimed the lives of 774 people before disappearing. Despite its low death toll, SARS put the world on notice about the threat of a global pandemic. In the decade and a half that followed, the Chinese government put in place a series of reforms to ensure a transparent, cooperative, and rapid response to a future

outbreak. Western governments invested significant resources in developing scientific capacity in China, particularly among medical experts and in the safety of laboratories. In the summer of 2019, when the Chinese government conducted a major pandemic response exercise, it took place within this new framework: information was rapidly transmitted to the central authorities and to the international community.¹

Unfortunately, however, when COVID-19 hit in December 2019, the SARS reforms melted away, leaving the Chinese government to default to the

worst practices of 2003. Beijing refused to allow the World Health Organization (WHO) and other foreign experts full access to Wuhan, the outbreak's epicenter, and did not share samples of the virus. The government cracked down on doctors, nurses, and journalists who told the world about the outbreak and spread disinformation about the origins of the virus. When COVID-19 finally comes under control and the world turns its attention to preventing a future pandemic, it will have to answer a troubling question: why did the international community's earlier efforts to encourage China to be a responsible stakeholder on global public health fail and how can that outcome be averted next time, whether in China or another country?

Meanwhile, in the United States, Donald Trump failed to win a second term as president, but performed well enough to make it likely that Trumpism will remain the dominant force inside the Republican Party. While receiving seven million votes fewer than Joe Biden, Trump increased his popular vote from roughly 63 million to roughly 74 million and only lost the three swing states of Wisconsin, Georgia, and Arizona by a combined 43,000 votes. Republicans gained seats in the House and lost control of the Senate by the narrowest of margins after the January runoffs in Georgia — a 50-50 split with Vice President Kamala Harris casting the tiebreaking vote. The failed insurrection on January 6 shows how authoritarian impulses are embedded within the Trumpian project. The Republican Party has always been skeptical of multilateral organizations and treaties, but prior to Trump, they had nonetheless been broadly supportive of a U.S.-led international order. A Trumpian Republican Party means the United States will likely oscillate between the liberal internationalism of the Democrats and illiberal "America First"-ism for the foreseeable future. The consequences for the multilateral order are profound. Even if a Democratic administration enters into an international agreement, whether that is one the Trump administration withdrew from or a new one without strong bipartisan support, it is very likely that the next Republican administration will withdraw from it.

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The Chinese and American examples are just the most dramatic manifestation of a broader trend — the rise of nationalism and unilateralism around the world. Countries like Brazil and India, both previously regarded as swing states that could play a vital role in reforming the international order, have become more illiberal. Meanwhile, the advent of social media has transformed political discourse by facilitating a torrent of disinformation that can create severe barriers for governments seeking to pursue a cooperative and multilateral foreign policy. Just consider the intense opposition, including in Europe, to the Global Compact for Migration. William Burke-White, a University of Pennsylvania law professor and Brookings nonresident senior fellow, has shown how incidents of democracies exiting treaties and agreements (which he calls institutional exit) have increased dramatically over the past decade.²

As Bruce Jones and Susana Malcorra have noted, the pressures on multilateralism have been building for a long time. Even as the world cooperated to address the financial crisis, they wrote,

“the dynamics of conflict were changing, the politics of globalization and trade were changing, the provision of global public goods was stalled, and great-power tensions were rising. All of this was seriously eroding the prospects for multilateral order long before David Cameron launched his referendum on Brexit and Donald Trump launched his election campaign.”³

Most European nations are committed to protecting and strengthening the multilateral order in an increasingly nationalist world, but the headwinds are strong. To understand the challenge, it is first necessary to distinguish between two forms of international cooperation. The first is on security,

where the United States is an indispensable power given Europe's participation in and reliance on U.S. alliances and the U.S. military more broadly. The second is on global public goods, like cooperation on climate change, public health, and development, where the U.S. is still influential, but where institutions and other powers have a greater relative importance. To give just one example, if the U.S. pulls out of NATO, the alliance will collapse. If it pulls out of the WHO, on the other hand, the institution will be weakened but still capable of surviving and functioning.

Europeans often note that the second category of global public goods can only be provided through deep and structured cooperation involving inclusive institutions, rules, and formal intergovernmental networks. However, while the case for multilateralism is well established, much less is known about the pathway to an effective multilateral order. To that end, this paper explores how multilateralists are thinking about how to secure an American and Chinese commitment to international cooperation and how to design the order in a way that is politically viable in a more populist and nationalist world. It distinguishes between three different pathways that multilateralism might take, particularly in Europe: the hitherto dominant *incrementalist* approach which involves trying to gradually integrate China and other non-Western powers into the order; an *“alone in the jungle”* approach whereby Europe would operate as a third pole between the United States and China; and a *“reinvigorating the free world”* approach, with Europe working with the United States to strengthen free and open democracies against an authoritarian challenge.⁴

EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM

The modern multilateral rules-based order has its origins in the early Cold War period, when the United States and its allies created new institutions both to cooperate with each other in pursuit of an affirmative vision of international order and to contain the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, there were instances of American cooperation with

Moscow — notably the nuclear nonproliferation treaty — but the multilateral order was, in effect, a Western order.

The end of the Cold War and the globalization of the 1990s, however, offered a strategic opportunity to extend multilateralism to include countries outside of the Western block — Russia, China, India, and many others. These countries appeared to share the same basic interests as the United States and its allies — global economic growth, nuclear nonproliferation, environmental protection, deterring rogue regimes, and stabilizing fragile states.

Rapid economic growth in the non-Western world — not only in China, but also in Brazil and India — provided an added impetus. In fall 2001, Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs would coin the term “BRICS.”⁵ In a then-seminal speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick argued that “while not yet democratic,” China “does not see itself in a twilight conflict against democracy around the globe,” and “does not believe that its future depends on overturning the fundamental order of the international system.” Zoellick expressed the hope that China would become “a responsible stakeholder” in the international order.⁶ Successive U.S. administrations understood that problems would persist, but the United States and China would work together on common challenges, while old geopolitical rivalries would diminish in importance. Over time, gradual political reform might even occur in autocratic countries.⁷

The literature around multilateralism in this period was predicated on the assumption that non-Western states must be coopted into the international order. They offered several ways to accomplish this. The first was to reform multilateralism to reflect the rise of new powers like China, India, and Brazil. This included revising voting weights at the International Monetary Fund (which gave Belgium as much influence as China), reforming the United Nations Security Council to provide greater representation to the non-Western world, and expanding the G-7 into what would become the G-20.

The second proposal tried to address the risk that expansion of representation could lead to gridlock. Therefore, to be effective, multilateralism must be flexible: multilateralists must assemble different coalitions of states and non-state actors on an issue-by-issue basis. Each of these coalitions would have a coherent rationale and logic to avoid being a mere *ad hoc* coalition of the willing. There had to be a formal process and set of principles – whether it was regional, by governance type, or pertaining to the countries affected by the problem the coalition was designed to address.

In some ways, the international financial crisis of 2008-2009 underscored the need for these reforms while also raising real doubts about it. Prior to 2008, China was perceived to be pursuing a multilateral, low-key, and modest foreign policy. Beijing behaved responsibly during the crisis, helping pull the world back from the brink of a great depression. However, it also became more geopolitically assertive and willing to throw its weight around, including at the 2010 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum, where it reacted angrily to multilateral discussions of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

After 2010, a split emerged amongst supporters of multilateralism in the expert community. One group continued to believe that the United States must integrate China and other non-Western powers into the international order.⁸ They argued that while China might have regional ambitions, it was not revisionist at the global level and its interests broadly aligned with those of the United States. Moreover, they continued, China had a crucial role to play in the provision of public goods that necessitated a non-confrontational security relationship. To take one example, on this view, the United States must be more tolerant of China taking the lead and building its own institutions, like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

The second group that emerged after 2010 believed that China, Russia, and several other states sought to replace the existing regional orders in Asia and Europe, organized around a U.S. alliance system, with

a spheres-of-influence arrangement allowing for a sharing of power.⁹ This group wanted to amend global rules and norms to protect the world from autocracy and argued that while transactional cooperation with China and other authoritarian states is necessary, there is no prospect of integrating them into the international order as responsible stakeholders. The relationship would be inherently competitive.

This debate accelerated over the past decade as several other world leaders became more nationalist, authoritarian, and less multilateral. Brazil has gravitated in a nationalist populist direction, as has India. President Trump clearly displayed autocratic characteristics, even as he was constrained by American institutions. And the cast of characters that make up the G-7, G-20, or even the United Nations is more difficult and pricklier than ever before. Europe is not exempt. The era of the “strongman” will have a detrimental impact on multilateralism.

Just consider the case of far-right Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. Prior to his coming to power, Brazil was playing a generally constructive role in multilateral institutions despite its reservations about a U.S.-dominated order. For instance, after the Edward Snowden revelations of U.S. surveillance led China and Russia to try to undermine the integrity of the internet, Brazil’s NETmundial Initiative took a middle course, embracing a path that preserved a free and open internet while also questioning U.S. leadership.¹⁰ A very different story, however, has emerged recently.

There is broad agreement in Europe on the general principle that Brazil must participate in climate change efforts. But after European governments harshly criticized Bolsonaro over the Amazon fires in 2019 – to which he responded by insulting French President Emmanuel Macron’s wife – the G-7 offered only paltry assistance, which Brazil then rejected. This bears far closer resemblance to the new normal than general bromides about pragmatically working with new powers. Would it have been possible to work with Bolsonaro? If so, what concessions would have been required? And if not, what were the alternatives?

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Meanwhile, it became more difficult for leaders who favored multilateralism to mobilize support at home for multilateral solutions. The positive case for inclusive multilateralism to tackle global challenges appears to have limited appeal politically. In the United States, politicians avoid the term and similar concepts like the liberal international order. In France, Macron now speaks of “a Europe that protects.” Populists on the right target multilateral institutions and amorphous “global governance.” Agreements like the Global Compact for Migration have unexpectedly become political flashpoints in domestic politics. Moreover, politicians of all stripes increasingly criticize other countries for their own problems. We still have not found the language or rationale to convince our publics of the benefits of multilateralism.

ALTERNATIVE PATHWAYS

Any strategy to strengthen multilateralism must take domestic and international political constraints seriously. These constraints are likely to remain a feature of the international order, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic, which has exacerbated fears about the Chinese regime’s secrecy and assertiveness, and about American disengagement from multilateral institutions. There are at least three distinct strategies that European nations could potentially follow to strengthen multilateralism on the provision of public goods.

Incrementalism

The first pathway is deliberate, cautious, and incremental. The European Union would continue to push for multilateral solutions to international problems within the context of its existing strategic framework of partnership with the United States,

while also holding out hope of greater cooperation with China and other non-Western powers. It would push for a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), cooperative action on climate change, reforms to the WHO and World Trade Organization, and a cooperative approach to managing the global economy. In the long run, this strategy assumes that non-Western powers can play a more influential role in the international order in a manner consistent with upholding the order’s founding principles and values.

In this framework, Europeans see the international order as objectively in the best interests of the entire world, not just the Western world. They privately understand it as liberal, but are reluctant to emphasize this publicly, as that might play into a narrative from China, Russia, and other nations that the order lacks legitimacy. Although some Europeans harbor hopes of becoming much stronger and more autonomous, European incrementalists believe that this is a pipedream: geopolitically, Europe will remain a middle-sized power, and so has no other option but to try to uphold the existing multilateral order.

This has essentially been the approach for the past two decades. Yet, it has evolved a bit over the past five years. European views of China have shifted in a more skeptical direction since 2015 because of Beijing’s refusal to countenance serious structural economic reform, and because of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s undeniable authoritarianism. But Europeans remain wary of any approach that would exclude China on principle.

The problem is that this strategy requires good faith and good will from both the United States and China simultaneously. Without these, Europe is left on its own, unprotected, vulnerable, and without much ability to influence the course of events.

“Alone in the jungle”

With the second strategy, multilateralists would recognize that the European Union is almost alone in its commitment to multilateral solutions. Though

the United States elected Biden over Trump, ratification of international treaties or domestic legislation on climate change remain extremely difficult. Trumpism will continue to be the dominant force inside the Republican Party and will have significant influence over national politics, with or without Trump himself at the helm. The United States has profoundly changed, and Europe must adjust accordingly, or so the argument goes.

This, of course, necessitates a real effort to make the EU more strategically autonomous and less dependent on the United States. It will need its own military capability, an intelligence apparatus, and a shared strategic culture. Macron has been vocal in explaining the rationale for this course of action. This, he said, referring to European strategic autonomy, “is the only way to impress our values, our common voice, to prevent the Chinese-American duopoly, the dislocation, [and] the return of hostile regional powers.”¹¹ However, this is just a precondition for other actions, not an end in itself; it does not tell us what a stronger Europe would be used for.

In this scenario, the European Union would engage with all the nationalist powers – the United States, China, India, Russia, Brazil, and others – to advance multilateral solutions to shared problems. It would deliberately avoid aligning with the U.S. against China since it believes that Beijing is an indispensable partner in tackling global problems. Under this approach, the EU would be more geopolitically adept and flexible than it is at present by being less bound to Washington.

The EU would also take steps to reduce its dependency on the U.S. as well as its dependency on China. In a seminal report released just before the U.S. election, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) noted that while China is putting pressure on Europe:

“America, too, is increasingly politicising things we once thought of as global public goods: the US financial system, SWIFT, the World Trade Organization, the internet, and the International

Monetary Fund. Rather than being a barrier to conflict, interdependence will increasingly be weaponised. There is a real danger that Europeans will be squeezed in the middle of the Sino-American competition. Europeans are likely to increasingly face extraterritorial sanctions, forced sensitive data transfers, and extraterritorial export controls that distort the European market and global competition.”¹²

The ECFR report proceeded to outline 10 steps the EU could take to enhance European sovereignty in the geoeconomics sphere, including creating an EU office of resiliency, building a European export bank, and reciprocally using travel bans and asset freezes on countries that impose them on Europe.

With this capacity, Europe would seek to preserve its values at home while stepping into the role of *realpolitik* actor abroad. It would focus on agreements in its immediate vital interest, like climate change, arms control, and pandemic response. It would be less interested in trying to shape the global order in line with classical liberal values because that would put it at loggerheads with non-democracies.

This is still a remote prospect. There are no strategic thinkers advocating such a policy at the present time. It runs afoul of European values and the long-standing alliance with the United States. And yet, it carries a distinctive logic and rationale. Some evidence for it can be found in the EU’s successful negotiations with China on a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) in December 2020. This was interpreted by some as a deliberate effort by Germany in particular to avoid being pressured into joining a U.S.-led coalition to contain China. It is important to note that Europeans were at pains to say that the CAI would not preclude cooperation with the Biden administration on China.¹³ Nevertheless, if the United States returns to a Trumpian “America First” policy, this *alone in the jungle* strategy will certainly gain adherents.

“Reinvigorating the free world”

With the third strategy, the United States, Europe, and other free and democratic societies would deepen their cooperation in the face of an authoritarian challenge from China, Russia, and other nations. These efforts would focus on the rules governing new technologies like artificial intelligence and the big data consequences of facial recognition, maintaining a level economic playing field with an increasingly mercantilist China, protecting democratic institutions from external interference, and standing up for human rights around the world. The free world would then negotiate with non-democracies from a position of collective strength.

The concept of the free world is one with a lineage dating back to just before World War II. According to the Swarthmore College political scientist Dominic Tierney, internationalist Americans began to use the term in 1941 to press for entry into the war against the Nazis.¹⁴ It took off in the early Cold War period but fell into disrepair during the Vietnam War and was discarded after the fall of the Soviet Union. Its weakness was always that the world was more of a shaded grey than black and white.

Today, there is little doubt that free societies are in trouble, from without and within. As Freedom House has documented, the world has become less free over the past four years, due in large part to illiberal forces within democracies.¹⁵ The rise of Trumpism in America, Britain’s exit from the European Union, democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland, the near-total collapse of democracy in Turkey, and the rise of the “strongman” in Brazil and India has left the democratic world in a very different place than was the case a mere decade ago.

The root causes of the rise of populist nationalism are disputed. For some, it is primarily economic in nature – the decline in middle class income and the manufacturing sector. For others, it is a question of identity, particularly those voters who feel left behind by and insecure in the modern world, or race, including a backlash against America’s first Black president. A related element of the identity

question is immigration, which the political scientist Francis Fukuyama has argued is particularly salient for those worried about the erosion of the nation-state.¹⁶ Others argue that changes in how we disseminate and receive information, particularly with regard to social media, have created siloed communities with their own realities that reinforce their visceral instincts and political beliefs.

Meanwhile, democracies also face external challenges. States like Russia use disinformation and political warfare to pull on the threads of fraying societies, heightening fears of the other and creating the sense that society is under siege with no shared objective truth. Russia, along with other authoritarian states – including China through its Belt and Road Initiative – contributes to a global network of corruption that benefits authoritarian forces within democracies. Autocrats use the lure of their economic markets to coerce and pressure democracies whenever they act in ways unhelpful to their regimes, and increasingly cooperate to erode liberal norms in international institutions.

In this new context, a *free world* strategy would focus primarily on strengthening and protecting free societies in a world that is becoming unsafe for democracy. It would return to the post-World War II model of promoting multilateral cooperation among a group of like-minded countries. In today’s world, it would contain three core elements: resilience, solidarity, and shaping the international order.

Resilience

Resilience means ensuring that free societies are strong enough to withstand threats from within and from without. At a most basic level, this means investing in critical infrastructure, including public health, education, and research and development. However, it also means tackling corruption and oligarchy, protecting democratic institutions and the rule of law against erosion at the hands of populist nationalists, and reforming international tax and financial regulations. Resilience means doing this with like-minded free societies and exerting joint pressure on democracies sliding backwards.

Resilience also includes a strategic review about the extent and nature of engagement with authoritarian countries — economically, culturally, politically, and technologically — to ensure inoculation from negative externalities of the authoritarian system. Vanderbilt University professor Ganesh Sitaraman, who has written extensively on resilience, outlines three strategic steps: selective disentanglement to uncouple “the American economy from Chinese corporations, investments, and the Chinese economy in sectors that are of critical importance to national security,” diversification of economic partners, and “a coherent development policy — an internal policy to support and strengthen innovation and industry.”¹⁷

Solidarity

Authoritarian countries have become bolder in seeking to intimidate democratic countries, particularly small and middle powers. China uses its asymmetric economic power to make political demands on smaller countries and the private sector. And it is not just China. Saudi Arabia cut off economic ties to Canada and reduced its investment in Germany after those countries’ foreign ministers criticized Riyadh for arresting women’s rights activists and the war in Yemen, respectively.

Authoritarian states can do this because the free world does not stand as one. Each nation must fend for itself. In a *free world* framework, the United States would begin to put together a political equivalent of NATO’s Article V — when an authoritarian power seeks to illegitimately coerce a free society, there will be a collective response. Free societies would also work proactively to counter disinformation, corruption, intelligence operations, and to protect technological infrastructure.

Shaping the international order

China and other authoritarian states have made great inroads into the international order, shaping organizations like the WHO and diluting international norms. Under the Trump administration, the United States largely disengaged from these institutions.

In a *free world* strategy, the United States would work with other free societies to strengthen liberal norms and to set up new structures where existing ones fall short. This coalition should also cooperate to reform and shape the global economic order — reducing corporate tax loopholes, tackling inequality, and regulating international finance. This is a form of competitive multilateralism whereby democracies actively contest illiberal values rather than cede the field to countries like China.

ASSESSING THE THREE APPROACHES

The *incrementalist* approach is the path of least resistance, but it also seems like the least sustainable if the political trends we are experiencing — nationalist populism as a force within democracies and great power rivalry between the United States and China — persist. It is for this reason that Europeans are likely to consider and develop autonomous capabilities now, even if they do not intend to avail themselves of them for some years to come (possibly if Trumpism makes a comeback in the United States).

The *alone in the jungle* strategy would be a disaster for the liberal international order, as it would split two of its greatest champions, the United States and the European Union. However, if Trumpism makes a comeback in the United States, a significant number of Europeans will feel that there is an equivalency between America and China. If a new Trumpist government wages an economic war against the European Union and pulls out of NATO, the odds would shorten further. And, if nationalist populists come to power in France or other major European countries, the European Union would likely take additional steps away from promoting liberalism globally.

The strategy of *reinvigorating the free world* is a way of deepening and modernizing cooperation among liberal democracies in a way that is consistent with strategic competition with China. As Bruce Jones and Susana Malcorra noted when arguing for what they called competitive multilateralism, democracies “need to eschew romantic conceptions

of multilateral institutions as somehow absent from the dynamics of interstate power competition [and] move away from consensus mechanisms in the effort to forge and protect global public goods.”¹⁸

Europeans are wary of the *free world* strategy because it appears ideological, but the case for it is not that a cold war with China is inevitable and worth pursuing — far from it. Rather, the *free world* strategy assumes that European nations can make the greatest progress multilaterally with like-minded nations, and that the contrast with alternative systems of governance can provide added impetus to that effort. This strategy is primarily focused inward — dealing with inequality, corruption, new technologies, and the erosion of competitiveness with China. It is about democracy protection rather than democracy promotion.

Working with like-minded partners would also enable Europeans to negotiate collectively and from a position of strength with China and other non-democracies. For instance, Europe and the United States could agree on a set of measures they would take collectively in the event of another global pandemic where the country in which the virus originated refused to fully cooperate with the WHO. Europe and the United States could work together to reform the global economy, including by agreeing on the changes China would need to make to ensure reciprocity on global trade. And they could pool their resources to develop a democratic alternative on 5G and other new technologies.

It should not be forgotten that cooperation with allies to compete with China is the only way to persuade a Trumpian Republican Party of the benefits of international cooperation.

It should not be forgotten that cooperation with allies to compete with China is the only way to persuade a Trumpian Republican Party of the benefits of international cooperation — whether through alliances providing a counterweight to Chinese power, vying with China for influence inside

international institutions, or relying on international law to prevent Chinese revisionism in the South China Sea.¹⁹ Without the China component, there is no chance of persuading today’s conservative Americans of the benefits of a cooperative international order. This is unfortunate and regrettable, but it does not make it any less true.

It may be possible to mix elements of the *alone in the jungle* strategy with the *free world* strategy. For instance, Europe could take steps to protect its sovereignty and interests against U.S. and Chinese actions and then use this capacity to support a liberal international order instead of treating the United States and China as equivalent. These are the types of strategic questions that will arise as Europeans come to terms with a more nationalist and competitive world.

These choices cannot be avoided for much longer. The COVID-19 pandemic may be the closest to a reordering moment that we will have for several decades, short of major war or the collapse of a great power. Billions of people have seen their lives upended and are both newly conscious of transnational threats and rightly skeptical that the present international order is well equipped to handle them. Democracies will have to demonstrate to their citizens that an internationalist and cooperative foreign policy delivers concrete results on issues that matter directly to their day-to-day lives.

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