THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

TRANS-ATLANTIC COOPERATION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER AFTER THE U.S. ELECTION

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Welcoming Remarks:

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Panel Discussion:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. MALONEY: Good morning. My name is Suzanne Maloney and I am vice president and director of the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. It's a real pleasure to welcome you to our discussion today which will focus on the implications of the U.S. election for trans-Atlantic cooperation under the next administration and more broadly, for the international order. A set of norms and rules that govern international affairs.

Over the past four years, the United States has often shirked its traditional leadership role, leaving allies across the Atlantic to fend for themselves. This combined with COVID-19 and an economic recession has weakened the international order. As American's and Europeans alike, process the results of the results of the U.S. election, questions remain about the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship and the global order.

President-elect Joe Biden, a self-proclaimed liberal internationalist and committed trans-Atlanticist has made clear that he intends to restore the United States former role as leader of the international order. The former vice president has also reaffirmed his commitment to U.S. European allies. Making personal phone calls over the course of the past week to French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin.

Although the Biden administration will certainly be more friendly to trans-Atlantic relations in multilateralism, will this shift be lasting or merely a lapse amidst an increasingly nationalist era of American foreign policy. How willing will Europeans be to trust the United States and which areas will the United States under the Biden administration seek to prioritize if the Senate remains under Republican control after the January runoff elections in the state of Georgia.

Our discussion today will examine these and other questions about the future of trans-Atlantic cooperation and the shifting international order. I count myself extremely fortunate to welcome such a distinguished group to discuss these issues.

First, we'll be joined by a panel of experts form the U.S. and Europe to discuss prospects for trans-Atlantic cooperation on global issues under the Biden administration. Then the Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali Nathalie Tocci, will give a keynote address on what the U.S. election means for our

European allies.

In putting this event together, we are thankful for the support of the Robert Bosch Foundation. This event is part of the Brookings Bosch Trans-Atlantic initiative or BBTI which aims to expand our networks and work on how best to further trans-Atlantic cooperation to address global challenges. As always, Brookings retains a rigorous commitment to independence and the views of the speakers are solely their own.

Before I turn it over to my colleague, Constanze Stelzenmüller, to moderate the panel discussion, I'd like to hand the virtual mic to Henry Alt-Haaker, senior vice president for Strategic Partnerships at the Robert Bosch Foundation and the Robert Bosch Academy at the Bosch Foundation. Over to you, Henry.

MR. ALT-HAAKER: Thank you very much, Suzanne, for this great introduction. And I apologize to all of you, first of all, that we are not sitting in Berlin in the Office of the Foundation downstairs and we not can meet afterwards for a glass of wine. Because here it's actually afternoon so sorry, I didn't mean to kind of convince the American friends of the call to drink wine in the morning but here it would be appropriate after the event.

But unfortunately, it is not possible this year and so we are resorting to this virtual gathering which I am very fortunate to open and welcome you all. And I guess one of the few advantages of the pandemic situation is that these virtual meetings, many are possible that we can have interlocutors and speakers from different countries and continents to come together and discuss which normally would have been much more difficult.

This year was dominated by very few events that kind of competed with the COVID-19 situation. But one of those events were certainly the American presidential election and I'm actually that we now have an American president because for a while, I wasn't sure whether we were going to have this conversation today still being uncertain about who won.

But now we are certain and it is certainly one of those events that's not only going to shape the politics in the United States but also global affairs. Which is why I'm sometimes joking that the American president is far too important to only be elected by the American populous. Maybe we should widen the circle of constituents but only half talking.

And we are very much looking forward to, you know, here today our first thoughts and

predictions on what the impact of Joe Biden and his administration are going to be. I mean, he does have a lot on his plate domestically. Certainly, kind of healing this country after the polarized last couple of years. Healing it also from the healthcare perspective when we look at the situation of COVID in the United States.

And so, I'm wondering how much of energy and tension he can still focus on international affairs and foreign policy at which obviously as a European foundation we are looking with particular attention and care. And it is indeed, very encouraging that, you know, some of the first statements that he has made are going in the direction of stronger emphasis on multilateralism and trans-Atlantic relations and cooperation which we very much welcome.

The BBTI initiative that this event is part of does tackle the reinvigoration of the trans-Atlantic relations. It is a core topic of the discussions within the initiative and so I'm very much looking forward to now hearing to our distinguished speakers on different possible developments over the next four years.

On the European side, we have this narrative for a long time that once Biden gets elected, we go back to the good old normal how we all felt it was before. And I do have the suspicion that the awareness became more and more apparent among European decision makers that this is probably not going to happen but there is still going to be much more care that we have to invest ourselves in our neighborhood and our own affairs. And I'm curious to see what our speakers have to say about this.

But without further ado, I just want to say thank you for joining us one more time. I will hand it to Constanze Stelzenmüller. Very close friend and partner for both Brookings but also the Bosch Foundation for a long time. You all know her so I'm not going to introduce you. Constanze, over to you. Thank you.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Thank you so much. Good morning, everybody. Yes, my name is Constanze Stelzenmüller and it's my honor to moderate a very distinguished panel this morning. I'm a senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings and I was indeed the inaugural Robert Bosch senior fellow from 2014 to 2019. So really, Robert Bosch and the Foundation is the reason that I'm here. I seem to have hung around.

I have five distinguished panelists who are going to join me and I'm going to introduce

them in the order that I will ask them to speak. The first is Jim Goldgeier, the current Robert Bosch senior visiting fellow at the Center on the U.S. and Europe and professor of international relations at the School of International Service at American University. He is also, as you will have noticed, the only man on our panel. In a time of manels, we're very grateful that Jim has agreed to be the token male on what I think is called a wanel. Thank you, Jim.

Second, I'd like to introduce Marietje Schaake who is the international policy director at Stanford's policy center, international policy fellow at Stanford's Institute for Human Centered Artificial Intelligence and president of the Cyber Peace Institute and a Dutch national.

Third, my colleague Fiona Hill, senior fellow at the Center on the U.S. and Europe and the Foreign Policy at Brookings and former Russia and Europe director at the NSC. Author of a by now, quite legendary biography of Vladimir Putin.

My fourth speaker is Stormy Mildner, the head of Department for External Economic Policy at the Federation of German Industry known in Germany as the BDI. And in January, she'll become the executive director of the Aspen Institute Germany, one of the trans-Atlantic institutions in Berlin. Congratulations, Stormy, for this.

And finally, we have Rachel Rizzo who is the head of programs at the Truman National Security Project and an adjunct fellow in the trans-Atlantic fellow program at the Center for New American Security. And who just has come back from a year as a Bosch fellow in Berlin.

So, welcome to all of you. It's great to have you hear. We have a fairly sporty program ahead of us. We have an hour and we want to reserve the last 15 minutes of that for questions from the audience which I'll be getting from colleagues and in the chat function. So, we've got 45 minutes and I think with that in mind, I want us to be quite focused.

We're looking right now at a situation where the Biden administration has had an ultimately really respectable win of 306 votes in the electoral college. But still faces really significant hurdles in articulating and implementing foreign policy and that, of course, in the middle of a truly historic crisis. You've all seen the numbers of the pandemic here. We have similar ones tragically in Europe. We have a global economic recession and we are seeing social race relations, political and constitutional crises throughout the western world.

To look again briefly at the American side of this, we still don't know whether the Republicans will keep the House. There are run-off elections in Georgia in January. My guess is that probably they're going to keep the majority and it's thinkable knowing how Americans like divided government that the Republicans could regain a majority in the House in 2022 in the midterms.

We also don't know whether 2024 Trumpism might prevail again in the next presidential elections. And for that matter, we're also looking at wide open elections and possible political transitions in Germany in 2021 and in France in 2022. And I think none of us Europeans on this call think that the populous, while some of them have gotten a damper in some of our political spaces, we don't think they have disappeared and we certainly think they are prepared to challenge establishment politics again.

So, with all that in mind, I want us to talk about how to make the trans-Atlantic relationship resilient in against future shocks and disruptions which we all know are going to come and to help it overcome the current crisis that we're living through. Which, I think, for all of us, we would say are exceptional for our lifetimes.

And so, at the same time, none of think we can turn back the clock. They're going to have to be changes, hard changes even and we all know that in our own political cultures, we have hard red lines. The Dutch have that, the Germans have them, the Americans have them presumably as well. And we know from our neighboring political cultures in Europe that they exist there too. We've seen the debates between the Germans and the French about strategic autonomy and whether it's useful to discuss that.

So, what I want to do in going through these 45 minutes with you all is to look at your specific policy fields and find out from you how you think it is possible to drive out the changes that are necessary and at the same time, make those changes resilient against shocks. And the last thing I'm going to ask you to consider which is something that we've all had to learn in the last four years is that we ignore the domestic politics of policy making and are peril. And so, tell us what you think the domestic political implications in your political spaces for the policy changes that you want to see are going to be, all right?

With that, I'm going to shut up and move over to my first speaker, our first speaker, Jim Goldgeier. Jim, you're a specialist on the Atlantic Alliance. You've written many books about it. What would you like

to see Washington do, the Biden administration to do to engender new trust in the Europeans and make them believe that we can work together and achieve changes together in the Alliance to make it functional again?

MR. GOLDGEIER: Well thanks, Constanze for the nice introduction. It's such an honor to be on this panel and thanks to Bosch for all their support enabling me to be at Brookings first and foremost from my standpoint.

So, since your remarks, Constanze, were a little -- reminded us of all the negatives, let me just start with the positives which is for trans-Atlantic relations, a Biden victory. A committed trans-Atlanticist as president, a team that will be committed to the trans-Atlantic relationship. And so, at least you have the instincts at the top that are going to be very different than what we've had over these past four years.

I would also say on the plus side that despite, I mean, if the Republicans maintain control of the Senate and with the narrow Democratic majority in the House, domestic legislation is going to be very difficult for President Biden to pursue, certainly any kind of ambitious legislation. And as you noted, he has a lot to focus on domestically with COVID, with the economy, addressing the issues of systemic racism that we saw so prominently this year and other issues.

He will have more flexibility, I think, well presidents typically have more flexibility on foreign policy. He has a lot of experience on foreign policy and there is bipartisan support for NATO which is very important. Trump was the outlier when it came to NATO. But the Congress made very clear during the Trump presidency that there is still strong support on Capitol Hill for NATO. The resolutions passed in the summer of 2018 with some small opposition from some Republicans in Congress. The reception for Secretary General Stoltenberg in April of 2019 in his speech before the Congress.

And so, you know, for Joe Biden to pursue a revival of the trans-Atlantic relationship and support for NATO, that should draw bipartisan support from Capitol Hill. And there's bipartisan support among the U.S. public based on the public opinion polls. There was some concern during the Trump presidency as we saw his continual attacks on NATO that we saw in public opinion polling, some decline in Republican support among the broader public among Republicans for NATO with a concernment rise in support from Democrats giving the bashing that he was engaging in. But by enlarge, you have strong

bipartisan support.

So, I just mention two issues in, you know, in terms of sort of making things stick which is really the big question. And certainly, the question I'll look forward to hearing from our European colleagues, sort of how they see, you know, the wariness of, you know, can they rely on a United States that as you point out, Constanze, could go back to some version of this Trumpism. Either because of the mid-term results in 2022 or the presidential election in 2024.

How do you get American policy to be more even keeled as opposed to swinging widely back and forth due to different presidents? And I think a lot of that has to do with the ability to re-empower a responsible Congress that works with the president. I mean, I just don't know whether we can pull that off given the polarization.

But I think having the unconstrained presidency that we do that's built up over the last few decades and has enabled so much strength in the president to chart a course even if it's contrary to the wishes of the Congress. But the Congress has just become such a weak actor that I think that's going to be something that President Biden is going to have to sort of think about.

And then the other is the staffing of the bureaucracies, you know. Trump took a sledge hammer to the bureaucracies, just eviscerated them. Lots of people leaving, career people, places like the State Department. All right, so it's a long-term thing to re-staff but what happens if somebody comes in in January 2025 and takes a sledge hammer again. It just can't afford it.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Jim, I think those are all -- those points are all very well taken. And I think they -- it is important to think about the sort of long term structural changes that need to be made, improvements that need to be made to make the process, the legislative element and the bureaucracies more resilient.

But surely if we're looking at something that might only be a two-year timeframe for the administration to make real progress in relations with Europe, let me just pitch this to you as a question. Is it if you want to bring the Republican side of Congress on your side and perhaps some of the younger Democrats, wouldn't it be extremely important to show that Biden was committed to reducing American exposure and American troops in the world? In other words, to end what is being called, The Endless Wars here, at least partially.

MR. GOLDGEIER: Well, I think we may see Donald Trump try to get American troops fully out of Afghanistan, for example, before Biden even becomes president. So, that's a strong possibility. But I would say this gives an opportunity for both sides of the Atlantic to think about ways where Europe can pursue strategic capability of its own and I think the United States needs finally to be fully on board in effort by Europe.

If Europe wants to build that and to stop talking about how that undermines NATO, it's just the United States really needs to go all in in supporting Europe's efforts to do more for itself and stop being opposed to it.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Sure, fair enough. I think that's a really key point and it seems to me that some of the things we've already heard from European leaders, not only in my own country but particularly their signals that that message has been heard loud and clear. Not least because there is an assumption that there will be -- that American voters will want this as well.

Fiona, I'm going to move to you now. As a former, and you're going to have to unmute yourself, please. As a former administration official, I know that you have to be a little bit reticent about some of the fields that you were working on. But perhaps you can try and help us understand how the Biden administration will have to recalibrate its relationships with non-western great powers.

Particularly, obviously Russia and China but perhaps you can also sort of weave in Iran and perhaps even Turkey, a NATO member that seems to be behaving increasingly like a non-western great power. And tell us what you think the Europeans would be wise to offer from their side as a way of showing that they have understood that they are going to have to be a more of the burden for their own backyard.

MS. HILL: Thanks, Constanze. I was expecting you to go to Marietje next so I was, you know, kind of just, you know, --

MS. STELZENMULLER: You know, what you're right. And I've mixed up my own sequencing. Marietje, if you don't mind because I've just -- I will come to you next, forgive me, my bad. Thank you.

MS. HILL: It's okay because I'll make a segue to this which I'm sure then that Marietje will be able to wrap it all into a nice bow as we go forward.

MS. STELZENMULLER: I trust you.

MS. HILL: On the Russia front, what we need to do here is to get Russia out of U.S. domestic politics. And, you know, part of the problem I think in terms of seeing Trump still refuse to concede unless he's actually made some kind of concession speech while we've all been online here, is because he's been saying for so long that he needed a redo.

You know, one of his justifications for staying on potentially in office and being given extra time irrespective of the elections was his assertion that he had been cheated out of the first couple of years of his presidency by the Mueller investigation. So, the Russia hoax.

The idea that he was deemed an illegitimate president because he was elected in 2016 according to, and it has to be said, very many Democratic politicians and pundits by Vladimir Putin and the Russian intelligence services. And I think that this is really at the core of some of the problems that we're now having with Republicans refusing to acknowledge, as some Republicans refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of Biden's election.

And I think we do have to have an honest acknowledgement of the fact that whether, you know, people liked it or not, Trump was elected by Americans in 2016. It's certainly the case that the Russian interfered, they meddled on a large scale. In the aggregate, they probably did have some impact. But when we now see the results of 2020 and the breakdown of the votes and the fact that Trump got millions more votes than he did in 2016 which were not manufactured by Russia and the intelligence services.

And when our own people who have been watching this, Chris Krebs, one of my former colleagues in DHS have said that this was the most secure election we've ever had really because of mail voting and they're, of course, also refuting the president's accusations of fraud. But because of the large turnout, we have to accept that the electoral outcome in 2016 was not a fluke.

So, there has to be some kind of level setting here of the system and the acknowledgement that the system in the United States, the electoral system has its quirks which often put forward these very narrow margins and these very tight races because of the electoral college. So, that's the first thing to say here that Russia has to be taken out of being a domestic political issue. And we have to sort of accept that what happened in 2016 and what happened in 2020 are part of the reflection

as we've already been talking about, about a very divided nation. Many America's not just one.

So, putting Russia out of our domestic politics and inspecting it like a national security issue, I think it's also really going to be incumbent on Europe to come forward in a proactive way to work with us and figuring out how to deal with Russia. Because what we also see, particularly from the point of view of Germany, Constanze, the hack of the (inaudible) and the chancellor's accounts, email accounts in 2015. It took a long time for Germany to do all the forensics and come up with attribution.

We've seen recent hacks of Norwegian email systems. For Marietje and the Dutch, I mean, we've seen constantly not just MH17 and all the lies about the shooting down of the Malaysian airlines with all of the Dutch passengers but also the hacking of the OPCW in The Hague. We've seen the hacking of the Swiss laboratories looking at the doping scandal from the Olympics. I mean, I could go on and on about all of the things that we've seen. But it's unmistakable that this is no longer directed at one country.

So, first to really be able to deter Russia from taking these kinds of steps, it has to be a collective joint action. Not just in NATO, not between the United States and a small collection of countries but of full-fledged EU NATO European U.S. trans-Atlantic effort to push back against Russia.

But then to also decide among ourselves the parameters of engagement, be it on arms control, climate change or what's going to be really essential is going to be a global vaccination program for COVID-19. We should also at least, you know, have the wherewithal to inspect the reality of Russia's vaccine.

It is possible that there is, you know, this is also an effective vaccine. They've just jumped forward beyond the normal testing procedures. But a world in which we have more vaccines produced by more actors, more pharmaceutical companies is a better world than when we just have one. So, this is another, you know, area which I hope and I think a Biden administration is amply placed to do this.

But also, in the interim between now and January, it would probably be a great idea for us to set up some kind of taskforce with the incoming administration in a way that doesn't violate the hat chart to running other prohibitions on actee's if you're the government ahead of time. But I'm sure that European public health experts will be able to come up with something.

The same goes for China. The Trump administration or rather Trump himself was

somewhat viscerally opposed. This is a very personal thing with him and a handful of his advisors like Peter Navarro and others in cooperating on China. They didn't want to do any heavy lifting on rolling back against China's predatory trade and investment practices and then have Europe, as he put it, take advantage of this. Because Trump persisted in seeing Europe as a competitor in the international trade and economic space on the same level as China.

And this is why he was always saying that Europe was worse than China because his point was that Europe was supposed to be allies and that the United States was protecting Europe with its security umbrella through NATO or through the nuclear arsenal. And that there's a result Europe ought to give the United States preferential trade positions.

So, now barriers whatsoever to U.S. trade which, of course, is antithetical to the European Union. But this is kind of one of the issues, I think, that we can work out in a much more rational discussion with a Biden administration. So, how do we work together on China, particularly on the trade investment practice, I think, is a key area.

But we also do need to have a discussion with Europe about China's behavior otherwise in the defense and security space. And I'm thinking not just South China Seas and Taiwan but also other destabilizing actions that we've seen China taking on the human security front with the (inaudible) and, you know, obviously the appalling abuse of human rights which I think we should look at in a security context.

The stifling of democracy in Hong Kong which is going to affect everyone more broadly, given all of the close links that Europe has with Hong Kong, not just the United Kingdom. But also, what China has done more recently in clashing with India on the disputed border in the Himalayas. That should give everyone a pause for thought that, you know, China, you know, has the potential to act in way that would be deeply destabilizing in a global scale at some point. So, this could also be something of concern to Europe for discussions about how everyone would react together in that case.

And then quickly on Iran. Before there was the decision to pull out completely out of the JCP, there was actually a lot of work was done when General McMaster will still the national security advisor on reaching some agreements with Europeans behind the scenes. The EU, Germany, other interlocutors fronts and the UK.

On how to tackle the sunset clause, in other words, pushing off the possibility of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon for several more years, Trump wanted it to be indefinitely which, you know, I think we would all aspire to but it may be more difficult to achieve this. But also, to tackle Iran's ballistic missile arsenal that it was building up.

So, I think if we get to a stage where we have an administration that is not quite so keen on regime change and frankly, Trump was less keen on regime change than some of the others in his entourage, we may be able to actually find somewhere forward on a renewal of the JCP on dealing with Iran. But also, addresses these issues that was already in negotiations about ballistic missile technology development and also on the sunset clause. And something about Iran's behavior in the larger Middle East. So, there was a lot of work that was already done that we could revert back to that might be helpful for moving forward.

And then on Turkey, absolutely. Turkey, I think, is a major dilemma and it has to be really tied into Middle East policy and policy with Russia. What we've just seen recently in (inaudible) illustrates that now Turkey is really thinking of the world less as a European player and more as a near eastern, Middle Eastern power. In which it's sort of reverting back to the legacy of the unfinished business in its mind of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. And what we're seeing in the caucuses is really a spillover from Syria where Turkey and Russia and essentially sizing each other up and reverting back to a world of patterns.

MS. STELZENMULLER: You mean the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

MS. HILL: Absolutely. It really does have its roots in Syria to many respects as well, partly because Armenia was settling (inaudible) and other Armenian speakers from Aleppo and elsewhere who would come under siege in Syria from ISIS. And some cases in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and some of the occupied territories. And Azerbaijan as we saw was drawing very heavily on Turkey's experience of fighting counter insurgency in Syria as well as in Afghanistan as well. The drone warfare, the smaller kind of groups of special forces.

But also, it seems was drawing upon fighters that the Turks had recruited in Syria. So, you can see even more so, we need to remember that parts of the south caucuses are part of that larger geopolitical area. And we're going to have to think very carefully about how as Europe and the United

States, we deal with this in the future.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Fiona, thank you very much. That was a tour de force and (inaudible) which I think rammed home one really important point. Which is that we need to get a way from a politics that focuses on maximalist goals with regard to a single actor and tries to build coalitions around that.

We need to have a much broader and much more sophisticated sense of strategic regional policy as American's and Europeans together. And there is a hell of lot of homework to do there, I think, on both sides. But as you also say, there was work going on behind the scenes to make this possible.

I'm going to leave that there for the moment. Obviously, you've raised a ton of questions but move to Marietje who was my designated second speaker, apologies again, Marietje. Marietje, you're our technical expert on this panel. And I think all of us foreign policy and security buffs who know very little about the digital realm, have come to understand with painful clarity just how important the digital space is to private, commercial and security life.

That we are far behind in both defending our spaces against hostile action and against regulating them in a way that, and ordering them in a way that allows for peaceful use. Can you help us understand what the trans-Atlantic Alliance could and should do to tackle these issues? I realize this is a question that we could talk about for a whole day.

But if you could try and break it down for us into perhaps and focus on sort of big ticket items that the Alliance should tackle quickly and very publicly in order to make it clear. Both the salience of these issues and that is possible to constructively engage within the next 48 months on something that helps change the framing and perhaps the policy on these issues.

MS. SCHAAKE: Well thank you very much. I will try to be brief and then hope we can engage in more interaction. Because all of your interventions have mentioned the fact that democracy is at stake both domestically and globally. And the technological component is unmistakable. I'm not talking so much about what Fiona, I think, has correctly placed in a perspective, you know, the ongoing pointing towards Russia in relation to 2016.

But I'm talking also about disinformation about the erosion of agency of democratic governments because the outsized power of corporations in the digital world is simply not met with checks, balances,

independent oversight and accountability. And this is where I believe the democracies of this world have a lot to lose. Essentially being squeezed between a privatized governance model and an authoritarian governance model but without a strong agenda marrying geopolitics and technology into a vision for a democratic governance model of the digital world.

Which we can't talk really about technology anymore as a sector because technology is now an element of all other sectors. So, it is essentially a layer that touches anything from health to security to the economy to, you know, the well-being of people, education, human rights et cetera. And so, let me try to be optimistic.

I am hopeful about the fact that one, I think Americans have been confronted with the lack of safeguarding, core democratic principles so far. So, you know, the tone vis a vie Europeans was one that, you know, we were allegedly hysterical, overly emotional, hypersensitive about such quaint issues like privacy and data protection. But now I believe and unfortunately in a harsh way, some of the issues have hit home in the United States and have revealed that more connectivity also means more vulnerability. And I think that this is where an opening for better collaboration is possible.

One, in the global context, you know, there is an acknowledgement that authoritarian regimes and others are seeking to instrumentalize technology to strengthen their geopolitical position and that the democracies of this world have to catch up. Now I'm hopeful about a trans-Atlantic leadership in this space but I think it should clearly not be a western traditional kind of alliance. But we need countries like India, Japan, Australia and others who can come on board and be part of this joint democratic effort.

And I think the momentum is there. Joe Biden has spoken about the need to organize a democracy summit and has placed technology as one of the agenda items. Ursula von der Leyen has said that she hopes to reinvigorate the trans-Atlantic relation also around rules for the democratic world around technology. So, I'm hoping this opens up space.

And then that's one spotlight on Europeans to be more realistic about national security aspects. I think the focus on fundamental rights has been important but it's too narrow in terms of what all is at stake. Whereas, in the United States, national security tends to trump many agendas and so maybe the balance between them is helpful.

Another aspect where I see convergence is anti-trust. You know, economic rules of

fairness vis a vie the big players. And if it's not an intrinsically motivated goal then the fact that China is now beginning to lay out rules for anti-trust should also be a wakeup call that the world is not waiting until Europeans and Americans work it out between themselves.

And so, hopefully placing all of this in the global context with the high stakes that we can observe and the high speed with which things are changing, this will hopefully put issues like privacy protection, data protection in the proper perspective. Which, in my opinion, should be that they can be overcome between Europeans and Americans. I'll leave it there for my introduction because I think we're running out of time but happy to answer any more questions.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Marietje, I would actually like to come back at you with one question. I thought that was all very useful and particularly, your sort of overarching suggestion that the American's need to move towards the Europeans and privacy and human rights considerations and the Europeans need to add national security considerations to their technological policies.

But what about the rather tricky question of national sovereignty over critical technology and industrial policy to support it? And the most salient example here, of course, is one and Stormy may want to weigh in on this in a moment as well.

But the most salient example here is, of course, the fact that we have a Chinese state owned company offering us 5G technology. Which neither the Americans nor the European companies in the field are in a position to compete with on market terms. Because we have essentially, for whatever reason, failed to provide viable western owned alternatives. What's the remedy for that?

MS. SCHAAKE: Well, what we see in the example of Huawei and other 5G and network technology is what happens when you don't proactively spell out what an enabling environment for trade looks like. There has been, you know, market entry. There has been investment and development by a number of Chinese companies in Europe and you can see every day how hard it is to roll back.

And the fact that there was so little trust in the intentions, the tone and the engagement of the Trump administration I don't think has helped to convince Europeans that this was in a shared interest between Americans and Europeans to come up with enabling criteria would look like. So, I don't believe it helps to point a finger to one producer, one company, one country or origin because the problem may well multiply itself, you know, within considerable amount of time.

It's much more important for Europeans and hopefully together with Americans to say whoever wants to do business with us has to meet these and these and these criteria. Which is the same that we do with food, with pharma, with toys, with chemicals and what not. And it's for good reason because essentially, this is not about a digital trade war for one reason or another. It's about protecting those core principles of our open societies and open democracies.

And the challenge again, with technology is that economic aspects, security aspects and rights aspects integrate. So, it's really hard to divorce what concern when it comes to dealing with a network provider, is strictly speaking economic. What is strictly speaking national security or a right's based concern. And that's why such an integral vision and strategy between the U.S. and Europe but ideally for the democratic world would be so helpful because it would actually connect the dots between those different aspects.

And so, I would hope that lessons learned also by Europeans who are, you know, still struggling to come to a common position because of their 27 different national security concerns and one single market, this is a tension that needs to be overcome. And similarly, I think between the democracies of this world, there is simply more critical mass if countries work together. And so, that would be what I hope are the contours of a path forward.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Sure. I mean, just a footnote to that which is the fact that we're also, you know, we've had a fair amount of democratic backsliding within Europe. We have at least two European governments where a liberal authoritarianism is in power with consequences for national security and for civil rights. But I think what I'm not hearing you say is that you're a fan of the sort of national sovereign industrial policy to encourage sort of national ownership of certain critical infrastructure and the corresponding production capabilities. Am I right?

MS. SCHAAKE: Well, I think it can be the consequence of what an enabling environment to focus on national champions per se I believe has perverse effects. It sends the wrong signal at the moment where there is trade wars going on already. I think Europe should show that it's open for business but (inaudible dropped audio) it believes are just and necessary to protect the rights of people. And I think GDPR should be seen in that context as well.

MS. STELZENMULLER: All right, great. Thank you very much for that clarification, I

think that was important. And by the way, you are breaking up a little bit, Marietje. I don't know whether that's your Wi-Fi but there is an occasional sort of echo. But I'm going to move on to Stormy.

Stormy, thank you for joining us. You're obviously the perfect speaker to help us understand what after the, you know, disaster area that T-TIP was for years. And then trade relations in general and the weaponization of economic interdependence was in the four years of the Trump administration.

What can the trans-Atlantic Alliance do to maximize the benefit of its enormous trade areas. And I think that that question has been given additional impact by this morning's news of this new Asian China led trade alliance. Over to you, Stormy.

MS. MILDNER: Yeah, thank you so much. First of all, thank you for having me, it's great to be here. And it's a big question you are asking and it needs to be seen in the new context, in the new geopolitical context. I had the opportunity to talk to the UST, former UST on my phone last week. And he said that it will be shown that the decision of the United States to leave the TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, would be seen as one of the big strategic mistakes the United States has made.

And I would like to add to this. And the second very big mistake, strategic mistake of both of us, on both sides of the trans-Atlantic was to put the T-TIP negotiations on ice and to decide not to integrate further. Of course, it is not just in terms of economic welfare and growth and jobs. Something of a really missed opportunity but also a missed opportunity with regard to strategy, foreign policy, power and not just economic power but really also geopolitical power.

And don't take me wrong, I mean, I do remember how hard these times were, the T-TIP negotiations. I was right in the middle of it. And there was also very little appetite by our civil society but maybe the right way back then would have been to downscale the project a little bit instead of putting it completely on ice.

I also wanted to pick up on one thing which you, Constanze mentioned in your opening remarks. The question you posed, how can we make the trans-Atlantic relationship more resilient. And that made me thinking about what we mean by resilience. That the capacity to recover quickly from a crisis, the adaptability and I don't even know if it's a word, transformability. But the ability to transform and I do think that we do have to do a lot on both sides of the Atlantic.

Because it's not just a question of what we can do with the United States with regard to

trade and economic issues it's really also a big, huge question of what the United States can do with us on trade and economic issues. Because on a lot of topics we don't have a unified European opinion right now.

For example, with regard to an industrial trade policy deal, industrial goods deal with the United States, there's the big question if agricultural products should be in there or not from the U.S. side. Yes, certainly they should be from the EU side, no they can't. Of course, of not just French opposition but of course agriculture is a really sensitive issue for us and has even become more sensitive, I would say, then the T-TIP negotiations.

So, it's a big, big question what we can put on the table. And for us to really work together, I think, we on the European side really have to make our homework and in terms of what is our position, what can we put on the table and what are willing to put on the table. And we have to make this discussion very, very quick because our window of opportunity for a restart is very small and we don't want to lead to any disappointment.

So, I think we have to look at two things. The first thing is we need to look at our joint agenda. What are the positive issues we can put on the agenda so that we don't start with the most conflictive issues. So, not start with Air Bus and not start with the tariffs on aluminum. Not start with the really tricky of the industrial goods tariff agreement because that might set us up for failure. But identify the issues where we also can deliver and we have a really aligned interest.

And the second thing is, I think we need to reestablish our old institutions. No, no, let me rephrase this. Not our old, we have to create trans-Atlantic institutions again. Doesn't necessarily have to be the old ones, probably should get a different name. But once upon a time, we had good working dialogues, legislator dialogue, trans-Atlantic economic dialogues, city dialogues and so on. And definitely, we need to reestablish those dialogues to rebuild trust.

So, let me just pick out a few issues where I think we could really work or we could put on the top of a positive agenda. And I think the first point is definitely health, health, health and Corona crisis, working on research and development. But also, the distribution of vaccines, talking about how we can make our supply chains more resilient.

And also, working together on a reform of the WHO. But also working together on a WTO, World

Trade Organization health initiative and a farmer agreement, zero tariffs for farmer products and medical products. I think this offers such a big potential for cooperation. We should put that at the forefront.

Then the second one and you mentioned it already as well is digital issues. The standards for digitalization for how we would deal with data, data transfer but also the whole the question of ecommerce and how we want to regulate ecommerce. And we can also do this bilateral, another WTO if there are negotiations so that's another issue where we can work on.

Climate issues, I think it's a given. Education, another one. Trade issues, as I said, I would focus on the multilateral level first before I get to the tricky bilateral issues. And then also China which you mentioned before which was mentioned before as well, working on subsidies and so on. And some would also throw the issue of space in there. So, we started development for space issues so lots to do.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Stormy, because you just said that you were in favor of creating new trans-Atlantic institutions, you haven't mentioned the WTO and its dispute resolution mechanism. Which to a number of people working in this space is top of the list for things to reestablish. What's your take on that, very succinctly if you would so that Rachel has enough time.

MS. MILDNER: No, absolutely. I actually did mention it when I said we have to work on the WTO together. I just didn't specify that I think it's definitely trade dispute. But also, that's a really tricky conflictual issue so I would align it with plurilateral negotiations on issues where the U.S. also has an interest. So, plurilateral on ecommerce, on investments and some others and rules. Rules, rules, rules on subsidies.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Right, okay great, thank you. Over now to our fifth and last speaker, Rachel. Rachel, I'm going to sort of plunk down on you a question that I think we haven't raised at all yet. But I think you are better than any of us to speak to, better place than any of us to speak to and it's this.

That we are in the midst of a generational shift from the post-World War II and the post 1989 generation to a millennial generation that has grown up with American wars of choice. And with, I think, a much more sort of an attenuate to take on both the relationship with Europe and America's role as a steward or even policeman of global order. And we have been talking until now about trans-Atlantic

reordering, rebuilding of bridges as though this generational shift wasn't happening.

And the other part of that generational shift, of course, is that this new generation on both sides of the Atlantic is much more diverse than it used to be. Has completely different backgrounds, socially, culturally, ethnically and is also less male, just have to look at this panel.

Can you, and I know that the Truman project also is concerned with this. Can you give us a take, if you would, what this means for the priorities that in a short and sharp window of time, American's and Europeans ought to be setting? What have we got wrong, what did we leave out?

MS. RIZZO: Sure Constanze, thanks for the question. And I think that you hit the nail right on the head when you say that we're in the middle of a generational shift. Because with that generational shift comes a shift of priorities. You know, I was looking at some poll numbers over the last couple days and I was seeing the numbers come out the Pugh organization.

Where they said that, you know, 48 percent of adults under the age of 30 say it's -- this is in the U.S. 48 percent of adults under the age of 30 in the U.S. say it's acceptable for another country to become as militarily powerful as the United States. For people over the age of 65, it's only 27 percent that say it's acceptable for another country to become as militarily powerful.

So, I think we're seeing a generational shift in terms of a less militaristic and a less defense oriented view of the world. And I think when that comes to the trans-Atlantic relationship it means a few things. The first is that the de facto foundation of the U.S. European relationship for so long has been the NATO alliance. And I think it has caused a situation where the United States and Europe view one another through sort of a very narrow lens of security and defense.

And so, I think that if that is the lens through which we continue to view the relationship, then we risk sort of losing this next generation of national security practitioners. Which are focusing on other issues that might not be specifically in the realm of what we would consider security and defense but none the less, are as equally as important.

So, I would think that one of the priorities and, you know, this is not going to be easy. But refocusing the U.S. European relationship through the lens of U.S. EU relations. And obviously, the NATO alliance is extremely important and the U.S., I think, with Biden as the new president will obviously recommit to, you know, Article V and show our European partners that the United States is recommitted

and not going anywhere.

But I think a much stronger focus on the U.S. EU relationship would be well served. And with that, I think, comes a focus on new issues that are much more important to next generation foreign policy thinkers. The first is climate change. Without U.S. top down leadership over the past four years on climate, a lot of the progress we've made has been at the state level, at the city level.

I mean, we've seen relationships between U.S. states like California and the EU pop up. And so, I think being able to sort of take those issues that have been left to state and local governors and marrying those up with national policies is going to be really important.

I also think that a refocus on human rights is going to be important too. And with that comes talking about structural inequality, structural racism on both sides of the Atlantic and speaking out when we see those things happen beyond our borders. You know, I would have liked to see a high-level statement from Pompeo and Burrell a year and a half ago about the atrocities going on in Shenzhen province against the weaker populations. We didn't see that.

Thinking about where we export our surveillance technologies and when they go to authoritarian countries and how those leaders use them to quell democratic movements. And jail their citizens and, you know, jail journalists which go against everything that we believe in as western ideals.

And also, a focus on how we approach China. You know, the U.S. and Europe have, you know, both talked about a strategic rivalry with China. But there's no secret that we have to figure out ways to cooperate. And I think a next generation of foreign policy leaders will be much more apt and, you know, wanting to do that.

So, I think, you know, a refocus on diplomacy when it comes to the U.S. European relationship as opposed to security will be important. Another number that I thought was really interesting is this sort of Democratic and Republican divide. You know, 90 percent of Democrats prefer diplomacy as a way to ensure peace rather than military. And only 53 percent of Republicans preferred diplomacy over security.

So, not only are we dealing with, you know, interparty divides but also generational as well. And so, those three things, climate change, human rights and an approach to China, I think will be very important over the next four years.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Fair enough. Those are all really, really important points Rachel. I would perhaps add that, you know, we keep talking about the necessity of speaking to civil societies in countries such as Russia. But for some reason, and while we're willing to talk about the Uyghurs and Hong Kong and I think we probably should also mention Taiwan here, we're less inclined to talk about Chinese civil society which I am told exists.

And none of us have mentioned Belarus so far which is, you know, the strongest most enduring and I find most inspiring example of a civil society sort of asserting its freedoms against now significant pressure. And zero public support from the U.S. administration and a lot of sympathy in Europe but also from what I can see, not a lot of diplomatic support. So, I mean, your points are all very well taken.

I have to say that we've got 12 more minutes and I have questions from the audience. And, in fact, some of them which I found really impressive have been so diligent as to send us questions over the weekend. And some of them have been emailing them to us now. I'll start with the first two, one which is for Jim and one is for Fiona.

For Jim, this is from Jason Davidson of the University of Mary Washington. How should the Biden administration deal with the diversity of threat perceptions within NATO with some members very concerned when the threat from Russia and others focused entirely on the Mediterranean.

I think this is a really key question, particularly since there are NATO members that do not want NATO engaged formally in the Mediterranean and would much prefer this be either bilaterally done through the EU or in a form of some sort of EU based coalition of the (inaudible). That's I think a key question for NATO to answer, particularly since its NATO members that are up, you know, nose to nose now in the Eastern Med.

And the question for Fiona comes from Phillip Stevens of the *Financial Times*. Who says, these have not been the best of times for Vladimir Putin in terms of the economy, COVID, (inaudible) caucuses, U.S. elections, true that. Is this a moment for U.S. and Europe to test whether Mr. Putin is ready to change course? Over to you, Jim, first and then Fiona.

MR. GOLDGEIER: Well thanks to Jason for the question. I'd be very eager to hear Rachel's thoughts on this. I mean, we have an alliance of 30 so you're going to have a divergence or a diversity of threat perception when you're talking about, you know, Estonia down to Turkey, western

Balkans, western Europe, U.S., Canada. I just think it's inevitable that you're going to have a diversity of threat perception.

And I think key will be movement on a new strategic concept for NATO. I mean, this is something that's been talked about for a while. An incoming Biden administration is a perfect opportunity to get the U.S. Canada and the Europeans into that kind of a conversation. And I think with a new strategic concept, you'll see a range of different threats outlined but at least that would help focus countries on what the range is.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Rachel, do you want to come in on that?

MS. RIZZO: Sure. I would just add, I completely agree with Jim that a new strategic concept is something that I think NATO should try to tackle over the next few years. It's not going to be easy. It's going to bring up to the surface many fishers and issues with alliance cohesion that have been bubbling under the surface for a long time. But have started to, you know, become like very outward in public and everyone can see them.

But I think it will also give us a good sense of how different countries view their own security and how, you know, NATO as an organization might be, you know, better served in the 360-degree approach 30 for 30, 29 for 29 has been sort of the rallying cry for a long time. And I wonder if it's time to sort of step away from that and rethink how the alliance deals with different threat perceptions around its regions.

MS. STELZENMULLER: All right, thank you very much, that was very helpful. Fiona, do you want to speak to the question of Putin?

MS. HILL: Yeah, that actually provides a really good segue because, you know, if we were to have a new approach towards Russia which, you know, I actually do think that there's some room for that. Precisely because of what Phil has said, we'd have to think very carefully about how we did it.

And, you know, kind of going back to the Russia NATO council is probably not the best idea for one thing. So, how would you structure, you know, kind of any kind of engagement with Russia, let alone the ability to push back. NATO is essential in the deterrent side of things, absolutely and, you know, maintaining forward deployment and the investments that we already have to make sure that there is no, you know, risk of say a Russian military intervention of Belarus. Which, you know, getting back to

your point before remains a distinct possibility in some form.

But we have seen, you know, Russia itself pulling back somewhat from other major military interventions using more paramilitary forces. And, you know, also being caught on the back foot to some degree in somewhere like Nagorno-Karabakh and even in Syria where it hasn't been able to, you know, prevail in the way that it anticipated.

You know, I think that Russia is somewhat overextended right now. You know, as Phillip suggests, maybe Vladimir Putin is overextended. I mean, unlike many other leaders, he has squirreled himself away in Novo-Ogaryovo. He's not going out there taking any chances of catching COVID. He's basically applying mask mandates. He is being guarded by science and, you know, he is being very serious about the vaccine.

You know, so which also gives us, you know, some sense here that we could work with Russia on some of these issues. The main thing like I said before, is that we have to find coalitions in which we band together to push back. And I think there is some obvious ways in which some of the countries that have been really targeted, you know, most directly by Russia which is actually quite a long list.

But is not, you know, kind of universal within Europe, could find ways of setting up taskforces and beefing up the hybrid centers of excellence, for example, in Prague and in Riga and Helsinki and elsewhere to push back in the digital spaces. Marietje said that's not just one space it's now everywhere, you know, so how do we work on those. How do we get the Dutch, the Swiss, you know, and all the Scandinavian countries, Germany, you know, and others to really ban together to push Russia back out of our digital affairs and to, you know, try to restrain them.

And how do we really work on our sanctions policy, our collective sanctions policy to tie this to direct messaging to Russia. To basically saying look, if you're going to continue down this path, then this is what will happen. But, you know, in the realm of other possibilities, if you pull back or, you know, certain things are possible, then we'll reconsider.

But it takes a much more concerted diplomatic effort and a joint effort. No one is going to be able to do this alone but I think there is indeed every sign that Putin has, you know, basically started to over stretch. And that then is a moment for us to get ourselves organized. But we're not going to be able

to do it by, you know, the old mechanisms as Rachel and others are suggesting here.

MS. STELZENMULLER: It's also, I think, we know a moment of risk for Europe because that's the kind of situation in which Putin likes to distract by doing things that are beyond his borders, right.

MS. HILL: Absolutely which is why we have to be agile. So, I mean, basically clunky institutional arrangements are not going to work.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Exactly.

MS. HILL: If you have more coalitions of those who are most affected, that could be useful.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Darlings, we have five more minutes and I want to squeeze in two more questions. One from the people who wrote over the weekend. This is from Viola Gienger of Just Security and I'm going to pass this to our German on the panel, Stormy. How will the jockeying for Chancellor Merkel's position and her departure at the end of her term in 2021 affect relations with the U.S.?

And for Marietje, there is a question from Bret Sweeney of NDU. How do the U.S. and Europe coordinate on mitigating China's influence? Is there a concern that more strident U.S. efforts will open a wedge with Europe? So, over to you Stormy and then Marietje, you get the last you get the last word.

MS. MILDNER: I'll make it very short. I mean, the answer really depends on who is going to make the way for the chancellery and who is going to be in the next leadership. But having said that, I think the structural factors in our relationship are so strong and so determining that the question of the chancellor will not play such a big role.

If I'm looking at the chancellor candidates, I really don't see such a big difference. Not like last time on the other side of the Atlantic with the shift from Biden to Trump which obviously made a huge difference. I don't see that coming for us. So, take a look at the structure factors more than the actual personal factors.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Right. But the, I mean, Stormy if I may, I mean, we're seeing right now a sort of an unusual moment of German national unity and sky high polling for the CDU. Which, if we look closely, is due mostly to Merkel. And below that is a great deal of CDU infighting and a sort of

tallow of candidates that I think none of whom are sort of supremely persuasive to a majority of voters at this point.

With a result that we might be looking at in 2021 at a political outcome that allows only for a three-way coalition. And we saw in 2017 what that's like. I mean, we saw three months of negotiations that then the smallest party walked out of and another grand coalition after five months which Germany was unprecedented and was a nail bitter for everybody else in Europe. But anyway, I'm just putting that out there as one of the potential risks for 2021 that affects not just us but all of our neighbors.

MS. HILL: Oh no, I do agree. I mean, first of all, Merkel was always a stability anchor internationally. I mean, she is wherever you go, you get compliments for her, I mean, for her leadership also on the crisis for her capabilities and so on. I do agree with you, Constanze that we might run the risk of also having a period of non-extrability, a very restricted ability to act internationally. But also, we'll have to reestablish -- yeah.

MS. STELZENMULLER: Yeah, that was my point. Marietje, you get the right of the last response and we've got two minutes and then I will hand over to our next speakers.

MS. SCHAAKE: Yes, and I certainly don't want to eat any time of Nathalie Tocci, so I'll be very brief. I think it would be most helpful if American's appreciated how much trust has been lost between the Europeans and themselves around the issue of China during the Trump administration. And similarly, that the Europeans acknowledge that they are late to catch up.

Now, you know, if there could be some sort of more level discussion about the actual challenges that China poses, then there's still enormous differences in how the challenges are perceived. Not in the least place because Europe has a land connection to China and it really puts everything from the Belt and Road initiative to, for example, development and the role of China and Africa or the role of Europe and Africa in a different perspective.

So one, I think sort of stepping up and acknowledging past mistakes on both sides and then two, looking challenges in the eye but being much more strategic and deliberate in how each side, the U.S. and Europe respectively deals with China. And then hopefully making that part of that bigger democratic governance effort over not only technology but in the interest of preserving democracy whether it's challenged (inaudible dropped audio).

MS. STELZENMULLER: Sure, thank you, Marietje. I'm going to squeeze in a tiny final point because Rachel didn't get a question so I'm going to ask you one. Rachel, I'm going to assume that having spent a year in Germany recently that you would think that the issue of diversity is also is one that not only the Biden administration looks set to give a major space to in the composition and the content. In the composition of its personnel and the content of its policies. Am I right in assuming that you would advise Europeans to think about the same thing?

MS. RIZZO: Absolutely. It was really striking to me after the murder of George Floyd in the United States earlier this year. The Black Lives Matter protests which sprung up around Europe as well which I think points to the fact that these issues are structural in Europe as well and talking about them and addressing them in a very, you know, pointed and public way I think would do European nations well.

I thought I was really striking to me, you know, Biden's speech last Saturday November 7th when he -- when the AP and CNN finally called the presidency for him and he actually mentioned the issue of structural racism in his, you know, first speeches as president-elect. And so, I think this is going to be a huge focus for him and hopefully will open up this dialogue on both sides of the Atlantic as well.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Yeah. I think that that's a really important point to end on. Almost all Europeans have post-war and post-colonial heritage issues and immigration issues that will increasingly factor into our foreign and security policy. And that we need to address if we are not to alienate significant parts of our electorate.

Thank you very much to all of you. I thought this was a fabulous panel and we could have gone on for hours. You've been extremely disciplined. I'm sorry for mixing up the sequencing in the beginning and apologies to all those whose questions I didn't ask. I tried to squeeze in as many as possible.

Again, thanks for taking the time from your busy days wherever you are and with that, I'm going to ask you to unmute and un-video yourselves. And I'm going to introduce my colleague, Thomas Wright, the Director of the Center of the U.S. and Europe who will now hand over to our next distinguished guest. Thank you very much from me, bye bye.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Constanze. That was a truly terrific panel and an

extraordinarily rich conversation to start us off. I'd like to say thank you, also, to Rachel, Stormy, Marietje, Jim, and Fiona, for taking part and for their insight, this morning. I'd also like to say a personal word of thanks to the Robert Bosch Stiftung, for their continued support and partnership. This is my fourth year as Director of the Center of the US at Brookings, and we've really enjoyed our convenings each year and very much regret that we couldn't make it to Berlin, this month, because of the pandemic, but we look forward to returning next year.

So, it is my great sort of privilege today to introduce Nathalie Tocci, as our keynote speaker. Nathalie, thank you so much for joining us. Nathalie is the director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali and honorary professor at the University of Tubingen. Since 2015, she has served as a special advisor to the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and vice president of the Commission, firstly, to Federica Margini, and, since 2019, to Josep Borrell. Previously, she held research positions at the Center for European Policy Studies at Brookings, The Trans-Atlantic Academy, in Washington, The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, in Florence, and she received her PhD in international relations from the London School of Economics. Nathalie is one of Europe's leading and most brilliant strategic thinkers. She's an expert on European foreign policy, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, but I think what has struck me most about Nathalie's work and what I've valued the most over the last few years is her insight and support and rationale for Europe's strategic autonomy and for the European Union playing a larger role in international affairs. We very much look forward to hearing her thoughts, today, on the Trans-Atlantic relationship after the US election. I would just say that you can submit questions, still, via email, to events@brookings.edu, or on Twitter, using #BBTI, and we'll get to those questions after Nathalie's remarks. So, Nathalie, thank you, again, for joining us, and over to you.

MS. TOCCI: Well, thank you, Tom, for those kind, kind words. I'm really glad to be with you, albeit virtually, this afternoon, for me, morning, for you. So, indeed, I have obviously, as many of us, been thinking a lot about the Trans-Atlantic relationship, over the last couple of weeks, but, for obvious reasons, and, you know, sort of one first question that I've been asking myself is, you know, what is it that has made such a huge difference over the last four years, compared to the past?

And, indeed, I think, you know, when one does look at the past, meaning, you know, in -- over the decades, it is true, that one has the tendency of kind of looking at the past through rose tinted

lenses, and, you know, imagining, you know, the sort of a period, in which the United States and Europe always tended to sort of work hand in glove, and get on, and agree on pretty much everything, and of course that isn't the case, and, you know, one only needs to think about, you know, Banana Wars of the past or divisions over the war in Iraq, to realize how deep in the past those divisions have been.

But I think that over the last couple, you know, sort of four years, there have been some things that have been sort of not quantitatively, but qualitatively different, about the relationship, and it is the fact that, over the last four years, for the first time, I think in the history of the Trans-Atlantic relationship, since the Second World War, and certainly since European integration began, that Europeans had the sort of quite distinct feeling of essentially being viewed as enemies, being viewed as adversaries, and so, those differences and those disagreements were no longer differences and disagreements that took place within the family, but, all of a sudden, they -- and we were, and have been viewed as being something other than family, and I think this is the ultimate reason why the last four years have been probably the sort of hardest period in the history of the Trans-Atlantic relationship.

So, yes, you know, obviously there have been policy differences and disagreements over the last four years. The Europeans have been appalled about, you know, the Trump Administration's withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the sanctioning of the International Criminal Court, the withdrawal from the WHO, not quite happened yet, thankfully, but kind of, you know, on course to happening, you know, tariffs on steel and aluminum, automotive industry. I mean, obviously, the list is there, and it's a long list, but, as I was saying earlier, I mean, I do see it as, you know, those differences have not been as acute as other policy differences in the past, and perhaps this is largely to do, you know, with two main reasons.

I mean, you know, the Trump Administration did not start new wars, which have tended to be the kind of issue, with which Europeans sort of take issue with, and the -- in general, the Trump Administration on foreign policy has not achieved very much, so, and being that they, you know, not achieving very much has obviously made, you know, reduced the scope of disagreement, but, as I said, it has been that being treated as enemies, being treated as adversaries, you know, on a par where then, at times, worse than the likes of Putin and Xi Jinping.

I mean, it was -- it was clear, also, from the sort of personal chemistry, that this has a

been a president more at ease with leaders like Xi and Putin, than leaders like Merkel, or Juncker, or Ursula von der Leyen, that has really sort of struck Europeans so much, alongside, in a sense, the sort of psychodrama, that we lived, with its peak, obviously, during the election, itself, of US democracy ultimately being under theat.

So, there's been these two elements, both of which are very much value related, you know, sort of the internal threat to US democracy and the external sort of perception of being viewed as adversaries, and, therefore, not having that sort of, you know, yeah, I mean, you know, not having that shared ideational, that shared value, in a sense, background, to the relationship which has been the ultimate shock of the last four years, which is why, coming to today, the election result is so important, huh?

So, and I think this is a sort of fundamental point, that I really want to highlight, because we can then get to, and I will get to, reasons why, you know, so many things will, perhaps, not change, and why there will still be disagreements, and why there will still be differences, but, ultimately, it's that value piece to the equation, that will come, again, into being, and that has been, you know, such, you know, which had been the ultimate cause of the crisis, over the last four years.

So, beginning with what I think will change, and then perhaps I'll end with what will not change, and then what the implications for Europe may be. So, firstly, I would say, well, obviously, tone, messaging, communication will change, and beginning, obviously, with a commitment and a recommitment to Europe, to European security, the fact the first calls that were made by President-Elect Biden have been to European leaders, or, you know, the United Kingdom, or founding members of the European Union, and beyond that, and there will very clearly be a sort of public diplomacy recommitment, to European security, to NATO, to Article V, et cetera, and given that all these things ultimately hinge on the magic word, which is trust, even simply speaking out, and speaking out very clearly on these matters, is going to be not simply a question of form but, indeed, a question of substance.

Now, I think, alongside the, you know, the speech acts, I think there will also be some substantial sort of concrete measures. So, I expect that things like true presence in Europe is going to be reconsidered and possibly reversed, as well, but, as I said, I think, you know, even if it simply stays with tone, with tone communication, and public diplomacy, I think this, in and of itself, will already have sort of

impact, in terms of content, not only in Europe and a reassurance to Europe, but also of messaging, vis-à-vis those countries that have represented a threat to Europe, obviously beginning with Russia.

The second aspect, in which I think there will be a fundamental change, is approach, and in particular approach to multilateralism to partnership, which, of course, as we know, is the ultimate sort of -- it's really the -- a fundamental element of the European DNA. This is the way in which Europeans think, it's the way in which Europeans act, it's the way in which Europeans are internally organized. So, it's only natural that this is the sort of instinctive way in which the Europeans relate to the rest of the world, and, obviously, given that the first partner of choice for Europeans is the United States of America, having, on the other side of the Atlantic, someone with an Administration that does not look at multilateralism and partnership as sort of unnecessary shackles that constrain American power means that, on a set of issues, Europeans will, once again, feel that when it comes to the multilateral agenda, when it comes to global governance, Americans and Europeans will be playing in the same team, once again.

Now, obviously, this will begin with the first priority that we both (inaudible), which is the response to COVID-19. So, I would expect that the United States will enter COVAC, it will commit to the global pledge, and, and I think this is going to be a key aspect for 2021, it will work alongside Europeans in three key multilateral formats, the G7, the G20, and COP26, that will all be Chaired by Europeans, in 2021, and that will ultimately, I think, be important venues to ensure not only a recovery from COVID, for a start, but that that recovery from COVID is going to be a green recovery. So, having Europeans and the United States playing on the same team, in those three multilateral formats, is going to be key, and I think it's going to be well within reach.

The second aspect concerning approach, which will change, is everything that falls under the domain of nonproliferation, and in particular, Europeans and Americans working hand in glove to ease the US's way back in to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This is another element which is very urgent, indeed, and it's very urgent because there's not a lot of time available. As we know, essentially, given the timing of the Iranian presidential election, in the summer of next year, if there is progress to be made, it really has to be made over the course of the next nine months, which also means making the best use of the time available between now and January, in terms of mapping and scoping where the two

parties are because, clearly, a sort of compliance for compliance way back in to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for the United States is, in a sense, easier said than done. So, on this front, I am, perhaps, slightly less optimistic than I am on the COVID response front, but I am fully confident that both the United States and Europeans are going to give it the best possible shot.

Then, when it comes to EU and US acting with one another in the sort of troubled neighborhood, in the surrounding regions of the European Union, I think, here, it would be fair to assume that there will not be a massive recommitment of the United States, in regions like the Balkans, the caucuses, North Africa, slightly, honestly, when it comes to the Middle East, as such, but I think that even if there is not that massive recommitment to our surrounding regions, by the way for reasons that I think are perfectly understandable, which shows the fact that the United States will probably and rightly so continue to consider this part of the world to be the part of the world where Europeans ought to do the heavy lifting.

So, even if there isn't going to be that massive recommitment, the fact that in these regions we will at least not be working across purposes with the United States is, in and of itself, going to be consequential. You know, one only needs to think about the Western Balkans, over the last couple of years, and how much damage is done, when the EU and the US do not work in a coordinated fashion to realize why only by reestablishing that coordination, even if the United States is in the support function to what Europeans ought to be doing in these regions. I think, as I said, in and of itself, it's going to be extremely important, and extremely important, I think, is going to be the US's role in nudging Europeans to assume greater responsibility in these regions, and also developing, together with the United States, a strategy to hold and reverse a trend, which is currently going on, and we've been seeing it in Syria, we've been seeing it in Libya, we've, now, been seeing it in (inaudible), which is the way in which we have, knowingly or unknowingly, been pushing Turkey in Moscow's lap, in a manner which has obviously been working against the interests, both, of the European Union and of the United States.

So, a fourth set of points that I wanted to touch on is really what is it that is not going to change? And I think, first and foremost, an aspect, here, is that the US insistence on European risk and responsibility taking is going to, perhaps, change in term, but it's not going to change the substance. The two percent debate did not start with the Trump Administration, it obviously started with the Obama

Administration, that will continue, obviously with greater awareness of the fact that we are in a far more difficult predicament now, than we were early last year. It is clear that most sort of public funding is inevitably going to be channeled towards the social and economic recovery from the pandemic, but that debate about burden sharing, obviously, will remain. It will remain, it will be articulated through the lens of making NATO more resilient, strengthening European deterrence, strengthening European defense. It will not be articulated, I think, anymore in mercantilist terms, so, basically, defense being another way to address the trade imbalance between the two sides. So, it's going to be a defense debate for the sake of defense, itself, rather than sort of, you know, trade, in a sense, through the back door, but that debate will remain there.

A second aspect, which I think will not fundamentally change, is everything that falls into the box of protectionism. Again, obviously, the mold and the methods are going to change, so, yes, I expect, as I was hinting at earlier, that steel and aluminum tariffs are going to be removed. I expect that a solution will be possible, over the dispute, the subsidy dispute, concerning Airbus and Boeing, but there will not be a return to T-TIP-like negotiations.

I mean, you know, that is -- we're -- you know, what has happened over the last years, I would say, first in Europe, and then in the United States, is a deeper trend, which outlives an administration, which, in a sense, is -- I mean, as someone who has been in -- a believer in this, I think it's a terrible shame, of course, and I think it's a terrible shame, also, because if it is true that the nature of globalization post-pandemic is going to change, and we are going to be seeing a shortening of supply chains and the debate of the critical supplies, I mean, you know, much of the discussions that we've been having over recent months, in many respects, the rationale for something like T-TIP is far higher today, than it was, you know, five or six years ago, but I think, politically, we are simply not there. We're not there in Europe, and we're not there -- and I think we will not be there in the United States, as well.

Third aspect, third and final aspect, which I think is not going to fundamentally change, or, in fact, it may well change, but in, you know, in the direction of getting worse, is the US-China confrontation, and I think this is something, also, that Europeans should be cognizant about. I think, in many respects, it may well deepen. We will not be seeing, from a Biden administration, the temptation or the tendency to want to strike deals with authoritarian deepens, and we will see, I think, a far more

genuine commitment to human rights issues and rule of law issues, and, therefore, sort of taking issue in a far more genuine and, therefore, forceful way, concerning questions, like Hong Kong, like Taiwan, the domestic (audio skips) situation in China, the South China Sea, et cetera.

And, now, it is true that this is not just the United States. I think it's also fair to say that the European position towards China has hardened quite significantly, over recent years. I think there has been an Intra-European Convergence over oppositions on China, which has gone in the direction of certainly hardening, and not softening, of attitudes towards China, and I think we've already been seeing enough IG debate in the, well, initial opening and then deep skepticism towards China's mass diplomacy. All of a sudden, China has now been -- it is now being conceptualized in not a dissimilar way from Russia, in the way it uses information and disinformation in fake news, on many issues.

There's been, clearly, a sort of hardening of attitudes on investment screening. So, there is this hardening of attitudes, but, having said this, I think it's also important to note that there will always be differences between Europe and the United States, when it comes to China, because, ultimately, the starting point in the analysis, that will rather -- more than the starting point, the goals, that we're trying to achieve are not perfectly convergent. I think, when it comes to the United States, there is and there will continue to be a question of rivalry. It is China's quest for hegemony, and the way in which that challenges the role and the leadership of the United States, that the United States will take issue with. For Europeans, it -- there is obviously no -- why do we conceptualize in the same way, which is really at stake here?

So, it is more a question of, on the one hand, protection, not wanting the Chinese to interfere in our liberal democratic systems, in the same way as we would take issue with Russia in different ways, and then, obviously, there is the global governance element to it, so, trying to sort of safeguard and protect the liberal elements within the international order, and even if we are moving away from the liberal international order, as it once was.

Now, the fact that we do start from different vantage points, I think, means that we will, I would say, mostly overlap because, ultimately, in order to pursue one set of goals, as opposed to another, we will mostly be doing the same things, but I think it will be important to recognize that there are these differences there, and having that, those channels of communication open, and that coordination

open, and understanding and respecting one another, and in terms of where we are respectively coming from is going to be key.

Now, a final point that I wanted to make, which really sort of sums it all up, is in order -- not only to fully -- to fully achieve what we can achieve, together with a Biden administration, as well as to fully manage or effectively manage the differences and perhaps even the disagreements that will continue to be there. The question that, Tom, you hinted at the beginning, I -- that of European autonomy, in my view, will continue to be key, and I think it will be important to have a healthy debate about this across the Atlantic because, ultimately, I mean, the way I can see that is really not in an either-or terms.

I mean, to me, a rebound Trans-Atlantic relationship in the 21st century hinges upon greater European responsibility and risk-taking, which is, ultimately, my understanding of what European autonomy is all about, and let us not forget that autonomy, I mean, if we go back to the etymology of the word, itself, it doesn't mean independence, it does not mean autarky, it means the ability of the self, Europeans, in their domestic and their European sort of incarnations, to live by their laws, those laws being domestic, being European, and being international. It does not mean a willingness to act alone, that the European DNA is and will continue to remain one in which the preference will be that of acting together with others, and obviously the first course of call will always be the United States.

So, there's essentially about a greater capability to act and a greater willingness to take action, which is ultimately, I think, what the United States wants and needs, in a 21st century, in which, inevitably, the role of the US, itself, in the international system is and will inevitably change. So, simply, to sort of end up on that note, of saying that European autonomy and a revamped trans-Atlantic relationship, I think, really, ought to be looked at, the two sides of the same coin, and I'll stop there, Tom.

MR. WRIGHT: Nathalie, thank you so much. That's a real terror of the horizon, and a terrific insight, I think, into Trans-Atlantic relations and where we're headed. I guess my first question is, you know, many people on the Biden administration, in the Biden administration, will have served, of course, in the Obama administration. They have come to this with a great depth of experience, but as you noted, over the last four years, you know, Europe has changed, the world has changed. Usually, when people come back into government, you know, they can be a little bit surprised, sometimes, how much it's altered from where they were before, and that's not just now, it's always been the case with the

U.S. System.

So, I guess you may have already answered this, implicitly, in your remarks, but if you could offer one piece of advice, to the incoming Biden Team, about, you know, a way -- I guess misconceptions that they may have, that you would like them not to have, or something you would like this administration to do differently than the Obama administration did, you know, what would that -- what would that be?

MS. TOCCI: Well, I mean, I think, you know, sort of my one piece of advice would be to actually be quite strict, in the messaging to Europeans, and basically send, loud and clear, the message, that, yes, you know, we're, you know, we're friends and partners once again, but that friendship and partnership really requires and is premised upon, you know, you not lowering your guards because that tendency, I mean, I already feel it, that tendency will be there, and it will be there amongst some in, particularly, if we think about, you know, Central and Eastern Europe, that continue to see these two things as being in opposition to one another, and, therefore, inevitably the priority is that of saying, well, now, we have to invest in the Trans-Atlantic relationship, rather than on Europeans doing kind of thing and becoming more capable, and that, I think, as I was hinting at -- more than anything, earlier, that should not be viewed in opposition to one another.

So, I think that is the message that has to be sent, loud and clear. Yeah, I mean, you know, it would be -- it would be a terrible shame if what we need, as Europeans, is a slap in the face, that the Trump administration has given us, and we just need to make sure that that doesn't happen, and, particularly, you know, in the pandemic world, in which we are all far more focused on the inside, and we're far more focused on the social and the economic, and away from the security and defense, it is already difficult to maintain that momentum, and we just need to make sure that the election results, in the United States, is an unambiguous positive, for Europe, rather than having this, sort of, you know, negative unintended consequence.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you. If I could switch to T-TIP, for a second, because you mentioned, you know, that T-TIP is unlikely to restart, I think, that's right. Basically, you said with a tinge of regret, that it was, you know, it will be -- it good agreement, that should be pursued, but I guess the argument against T-TIP, in sort of Biden Land, is not so much that, you know, free trade is a bad thing,

it's more that these free trade agreements focus, almost exclusively, on regulatory alignment in particular sectors, a bit on tariff reduction, although tariffs have relatively low, by historic and world standards, and that they're extremely technical and difficult, and then the ratification process is, you know, horrific, in all of these countries, and then the official projections on GDP, bump growth -- bump in GDP growth are very, very marginal, and so, their point is that, you know, let's leave that to one side, and actually have an economic dialog, that does pertain to, you know, international tax, and climate economics, and data, and cyber issues.

I guess I'd like to get your response to that, I mean, do you think, there's sort of a scope for, in a way, a much broader economic negotiation focused on those macro issues, and is that sort of a way, you know, forward, that is not protectionist, but is actually addressing the real concerns, that Europeans and Americans have about unfettered globalization?

MS. TOCCI: Yeah, I mean, and I think that's right, I mean, I think one should learn from the past, and, in the past, it is true that we tried the T-TIP approach, and it didn't work out. So, I think, it's healthy to basically say, well, what can be an alternative route, to perhaps get to the same -- to the same thing, and what can be, in a sense, a more effective route, but also a shorter route?

And, I think, you know, splitting this up, in its various components, and, you know seeing, you know, where is it, that one can actually achieve some sectoral agreements. Where is it that -- we're still a very long way away, and, therefore, we just to start with simply understanding one another a little bit more. So, you know, I think, that one -- once one breaks it, in those various components, there won't be, you know, a few, not many, but a few relatively low hanging fruits, which can be reached, straight away, you know, perhaps even over the course of the first year, you know, 18 months.

And, then there will be other, obviously, far harder things to achieve, on which, inevitably, at the same time, a dialogue is going to be necessary. And all of this, obviously, is going to be happening, and I come back to the point that I was making about -- about globalization, at a time in which it's not as if it's just us and, you know, Europeans and the United States. I mean, you know, there is a broader reshuffling of the way in which things are done and will be done, you know? We will both be watching at, for instance, the way in which China interprets its dual circulation approach, which, in a sense, could end up being far more protectionist, than any, you know, of any of the debates that we're

having. So, I think, it's going to be a question about, you know, of sort of, you know, talking to one another, exchanging notes with one another, but, again, and I come back to this point about family, realizing that with all our differences and all our disagreements, we are playing on the same team.

MR. WRIGHT: Absolutely. So, let me turn to another sort of tricky issue, and you talked about it in your remarks, which is the JCPOA, and, you know, Biden, I think, is on record, for some time, as arguing for a return, you know, compliance for -- compliance exchange with Iran. If Iran comes back into compliance, the US will, too. But there's a very vibrant debate here, I would say, both within, you know, Democratic circles and, particularly, in Republican circles, on how to approach this, and some argue, as you know, that the Trump administration has bequeathed a lot of leverage to the incoming administration, in the form of new sanctions, unilateral measures, that have put a lot of pressure on Iran, and what Biden should is be sort of patient, maybe have an interim deal but, you know, a freeze for freeze sort of arrangement, but actually have a longer-term negotiation, in which he puts pressure and uses leverage with Iran. What is -- the way you described it though, you know, it was a much tighter time frame, you know, with the first few months, because of the upcoming Irian elections.

What is your view on that, and this sort of dovetails with a question we have from one our audience members, Melanie Nelkin, of the American Jewish Committee, who asked about USU Diplomatic Renewal, on a broader JCPOA?

MS. TOCCI: Okay, so, I mean, I think, as I said, you know, we need to do what we can between now and the Iranian presidential election, and we need to make sure that what is done, between then and now, achieves, I think, two things. The first is sort of, you know, set nothing into reverse (inaudible) but kind of concrete steps, that actually reverse the direction of travel over the last few years, in terms of Iran's non-compliance with -- with the agreement.

And then, the second, in a sense, more political goal is just to try and sort of act in the manner that does not continue strengthening those in Iran, that will make achieving anything, after the summer, even more difficult, if not outright impossible. So, time is not much, which is why, I think, what would be -- well, not only there is -- there are not a lot of time available, but there is also hardly any contact between the Biden Team and Iran, itself, which is why I think that European, and in particular, I would say more then E3, when it comes to this, EU facilitation, particularly in the next couple of months, is

going to be key.

I think the first thing that we need to really get a sort of clear sense of is, you know, beginning with the Iranians, themselves, what is it that they think is important to achieve, in terms of US, you know, steps, between now and the summer? Is this -- you know, are they more interested in some quick wins, that give, you know, concrete economic results, but perhaps not that significant, in terms of, you know, overall measures, or would they rather go with the latter?

So, just under -- you know, understanding, you know, having sort of first few weeks of really scoping, you know, what is it, you know, what are the (inaudible) on both sides, you know, what are the Iranian steps of noncompliance, which the United States would like to see reversed, first?

I mean, Iraq -- Iran has done a lot, you know, over the last couple of years, you know, so, what are the priorities, so as to ensure that, you know, as of the 21st of January, the actual negotiations can begin and really making best use of -- of that time. So, ideally, we would have a situation in which they would be, as you said, Tom, beginning with a sort of freeze for freeze, but then a compliance for compliance, you know, process, between now and the summer, and using that time available, and here I come, also, to the question that was being asked, to set the basis for what comes next. And what comes next has, obviously, a nuclear and then a non-nuclear component.

So, obviously, on the nuclear component, the question is going to be largely revolving around the sunset clauses. So, that was, basically, a question of updating the existing agreement, and then there is this sort of more complex question, but just as important. I mean, I would, perhaps, set aside the missiles questions, where I don't think there is going any appetite on the Iranian fight, to do anything about this, but I think on the regional question, the set of regional questions, so, as long as this is not framed as a everyone against Iran format, but it is rather framed as, you know, let us have this conversation about regional issues, in which it is not just Iran, but is obviously the Gulf countries, which are also brought in, and picking up on some of, you know, not only the Iranian Hope Proposal, but also the overtures by other countries, in the region, Kuwait, (inaudible), to an extent, UAE to an extent, too, and so, it's taking back to the starting point, to start discussing these regional questions, but really continuing to separate, I mean, become part-mentalization, that took place in Obama day, made sense, and it still makes sense today. We do not want to conflate things that are already difficult enough, taken

in their various components, we don't want to bunch them all into the same set of negotiations.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you. On another tricky issue, which you also spoke about, China, you know, you mentioned that a Biden administration will largely keep intact some of the competitive approaches to China, and also that Europe's perspectives on China have evolved, considerably, over the last four years, particularly over the last 12 months.

You know, there is this dialog, that hopefully will start, you know, that's just started, I guess, between EU and the US, about China, President Trump was sort of very resistant to that, for some time. Could you talk to us a little bit about maybe what you see the potential for cooperation being there, and what some of the limits of that might be, as well, over the next couple of years?

MS. TOCCI: Yeah, I mean, I think -- I think it's going to be -- you know, having that conversation going is going to be key, and I think it's important, in my view, to realize what has basically changed over the last, you know, six months, particularly over the course of the pandemic.

I think, up until this pandemic, it was clear that there were a set of disputes, not so much there was a trade issue, there was a digital issue, I mean, you know, there was a South China Sea question. I think, over the course of this pandemic, what has become clearer is that this is a confrontation, which has acquired a political and ideological overlay to it, which is why, you know, sort of, you know, I'm not fund of Cold War analogies, but there is something reminiscent about that, you know, this is about different systems of government, at the end of the day, and, unlike the Cold War, where arguably there was never a real disagreement, as to, you know, as to which was the more desirable or effective system of the government.

With China, we both, I mean, Americans, Europeans, and other liberal democracies, have a much harder challenge to face, you know, we have been, you know, sort of talking about, in preaching, you know, the fact that economic prosperity and political freedoms can only go hand in hand. Well, China has proved that wrong, and we can keep on saying that, sooner or later, the unsustainability is going, you know, is going to surface, but, so far, we've been proven wrong, and so, I think we need to sort of factor that in, in the same way as we need to factor in the fact that, so far, China can make, unfortunately, a good case, as to why it's been more effective at handling this pandemic.

So, I say all this simply to highlight the fact that, I think, that, as US and Europe, we're in

a much more complex predicament than we were during the Cold War, which is why the need for that coordination and that dialogue is so -- is perhaps even more fundamental now than it was then. I think, inevitably, we will be living in not necessarily an Illiberal international order, but a non-liberal international order, in which liberal and Illiberal elements are going to co-exist, they're going to, at times, clash, but that they will, you know, they will both be there, and so, I think that that dialog and that coordination between us has, on the one hand, to sort of start from the premise of kind of understanding and respective, where we respectively stand in this, and, as I said, you know, I think there is a rivalry element, which is present in the United States, which is not present in Europe, and, perhaps, they say an existential element, which is present in Europe and perhaps is not present in the United States, you know?

So, in some respects, it may well be that Europeans are going to be even hard aligned from the United States, when it comes to China, precisely because, you know, the Chinese challenge and perhaps the Chinese threat to those liberal democratic components of our own society is, at the moment, felt in a much stronger way, I think, in Europe, than it is in the United States.

So, I think, you know, recognizing that we come from, you know, from a different place, but that, ultimately, I would say, you know, a good 90 percent of our goals will be convergent, it is going to be important, but also recognizing that 10 percent, that will not, is going to be equally important.

MR. WRIGHT: Nathalie, thank you so much. That was a really wonderful conversation. We've come to the end our time, but I know we will be discussing these matters, in the weeks and months, and even years to come, and we very much look forward to welcoming you back to Brookings, once we are allowed to convene in person, again, after the pandemic, but thank you so much for joining us today.

MS. TOCCI: Thank you, Tom, for having me.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, and I'd like to thank, again, the Robert Bosch Stiftung, for their partnership, to Constanze, and the other panelists, on the first panel, and also to Agneska and Suzanne -- Agneska Block and Suzanne Schaefer, who did amazing work in putting all of this together. So, thank you very much, to both of you. So, with that, we are adjourned, thank you very much.

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