THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

WEBINAR

THE FUTURE OF U.S. ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC:
A CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR TAMMY DUCKWORTH

Washington, D.C.

Thursday, December 3, 2020

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FORD: Hello everyone. My name is Lindsey Ford, and I want to welcome you to today’s conversation on the Indo-Pacific and the future of U.S. alliances in the region. I am a David M. Rubenstein fellow, here, in the Foreign Policy Program, at Brookings, and I have the pleasure of introducing today’s keynote speaker, who we are so honored to have with us, Senator Tammy Duckworth.

Senator Duckworth probably needs no introduction, to most of you watching. She is an Iraq War veteran, a Purple Heart recipient, former assistant secretary of the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, and now a U.S. Senator for the state of Illinois, and I think for those of us working in national security, certainly those of us who are women in national security, when you think about people who are breaking down barriers ahead of you, Senator Duckworth is at the top of the list. One of the first handful of women in the Army to fight combat missions during Operation Iraqi Freedom, first U.S. Senator to give birth while in office, and particularly relevant to today’s event, the first member of Congress who was born in Thailand, and the first Asian-American who was elected to Congress from the state of Illinois.

So, in addition to the work that she’s done on defense and veteran affairs, Senator Duckworth has spent a lot of time thinking about the military challenges that we face in the Pacific, and she’s really been an advocate for the alliances and partnerships that we have in the region, especially in a part of the world that she knows very well, from time spent living in Southeast Asia, when she was growing up, and from the time that she spent serving in the U.S. military, she understands, firsthand, why it is so important to have our friends and partners working and fighting alongside of us.

So, I’m thrilled that we’re going to have this conversation. Senator Duckworth is going to offer a few words at the top, and then we’re going to talk a bit, for about 30 minutes. When that’s done, I’m going to turn the floor over to my colleague, Rush Doshi, who’s going to moderate a really excellent panel, talking about regional perspectives on the Indo-Pacific. So, with that, Senator Duckworth, welcome. We are thrilled to have you, and I want to turn the floor over to you.

SEN. DUCKWORTH: Thank you so much, Lindsey. I, first off, want to apologize to
everyone. This whole thing is late because of me. We had votes called right at 2 p.m., and I had to go vote. So, I do apologize to everyone. Thank you for waiting on me to go cast my vote, in order to start this event. Lindsey, thank you so much for that very kind introduction, and thank you for inviting me to speak today. I’m really looking forward to our discussion. So, I’m just going to say just a few words to kick things off.

As you said, I’m American, but I was born in Southeast Asia, to an American dad and a Thai mother. You know, I think, my Thai heritage makes me a living example of the friendship between the two Nations. For centuries now, the United States and Thailand have learned from and leaned on each other, militarily, diplomatically, economically, culturally. Whether it’s law enforcement, or education, national security, or our respective economies, the two nations have helped one another to grow and evolve, adapting to a world that is ever more connected, and adapting to era in technology, that allows allies half a world away to be there for each other in an instant.

That kind of friendship, that kind of bond, with other nations and the United States, doesn’t just hold true between the U.S. and Thailand. It’s the same for the many other countries, that we are fortunate enough to call our allies throughout the Indo-Pacific Region, countries whom we’ve worked together with over the years, and even decades, and, in some, even centuries, as is the case of Thailand, in the name of common sense and for the sake of common good. And now, we have even more geopolitical threats, rising by the day overseas, and then after four years under an administration that viewed the term alliance as a dirty word, here at home, the strength of these bonds are more important than ever, and you know, as well as I do, that the Indo-Pacific plays host to or borders some of the greatest security challenges of our time.

In the West, tensions with Iran continues to roil, in the -- to the North, Russia is determined to find its way back to dominance, ignoring international norms, and bulldozing forward at -- no matter what the cost is. And to the Northeast, North Korea remains dangerously erratic, leaving the world with little sense of what tomorrow will bring, and our alliance provides some sense of stability in that -- amid that chaos, some sense of security amidst the unpredictability between us and our friends.
From the economy, to cyber warfare, to maritime security, the United States counts on nations, big and small, throughout the Indo-Pacific Region, to be our partners, our friends, working together to ensure the region’s safety and prosperity, to ensure that all the countries are free to trade and travel on the high seas, and to ensure that all parties adhere to the rule of international law, and as the United States said at the most recent Shangri-La dialogue, and I’m going to quote, “Perhaps the greatest long-term threat to the interest of states across this region comes from actors who seek to undermine, rather than uphold the rules-based order…trying to exploit others, economically and diplomatically, and coerce them militarily. They destabilize the region…towards their exclusive advantage.”

We the United States, on the other hand, must stay vigilant against such threats, refusing to ignore any erosions of rights because we’ve seen what happens when we close our eyes to the wrongs before us. When the United States commitment to international rule is anything but resolute, economies around the globe falter. When norms and principles are breached, alliances fissure, prosperity and security are threatened, instability reigns, and there is no easy fix, no simple way to backtrack. Those are just some of the reasons why I’m so grateful to be speaking with everybody here today, and why I’m so grateful that you all have taken an interest, not only in what are explicitly America’s interests, but in our allies’ interests, as well, because, at the end of the day, they’re are often one in the same, and so, with that, I’m going to turn it over, and look forward to the discussion.

MS. FORD: Great, thank you so much for those remarks, Senator. So, to kick us off, you know, we have had a couple of administrations now, and I think this will be consistent with an incoming Biden administration, who have really tried to emphasize focusing on our interest in the Pacific Region, but I think a common complaint that I have heard, I imagine you have as well, from U.S. allies and partners in the region, over the last several years, is that we, in the United States, may not always have put our money where our mouth is, when it comes to Asia, that we’ve, at times, talked a really good game about the Pacific, but they’ve been frustrated sometimes that it looks like resources continue to flow to other parts of the world, like the Middle East. Congress, I think, has really been out in front on this issue, in the last few years, and we’ve seen some efforts, through things like the Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act, on the diplomatic side, more recently, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, that tries to deal with budgetary resources for the Pacific, on the defense side. From your view, diplomatically, as well as on the defense side, what are some of the key investments that the U.S. needs to be focusing on, over the next several years, to really demonstrate to our allies and partners in the region that we’re walking the walk?

SEN. DUCKWORTH: Well, one of things we could do is to renegotiate a trade agreement, a multilateral trade agreement in the region. Now, I did not vote for the TPP, and that, in part, was for -- at the time, I was a Congresswoman, I had very specific issues with country of origin rules, as well as rules that had to do with environmental damage that had not -- the language was should, not shall, in the agreement. I ended up voting against it, but I do think we need a TPP type agreement, in the Asia-Pacific Region.

ASEAN has just recently -- the ASEAN nations recently inked a new one and left the United States out. If we don’t engage economically in a very real way, we can’t -- we can’t show the commitment to the region. So, I do think a multilateral trade agreement is critically important on the agenda of things to follow through on. The NDS, the DOD’s National Defense Strategy, that came out just a couple of years ago, specifically talks about national security, in the Indo-Pacific Region, as critical to our national security, and we need to go back to that, and really reengage with friends and partners, and basically restore the U.S. presence in the region.

That doesn’t mean that we have to be there in a purely defense posture, but we can be there in a humanitarian posture. We can be there -- we don’t need giant bases, you know, we don’t need to recreate a Subic Bay, for example, but certainly having a presence, when it comes to cybersecurity based out of Singapore is important. Some of the work that we’re doing -- I actually have an initiative, right now, that’s in the current NDAA, that would establish a cybersecurity partnership between the United States, Thailand, and Indonesia, that looks like it’s going to stay in, hopefully, so, that gets signed into law, and that was -- create a new initiative, and that’s not just a defense cybersecurity, but economics, as well, but I think, first and foremost, it’s going to be that economic reengagement has to happen in a very
real way, in addition to what’s happening already on the defense side.

MS. FORD: Thanks so much, Senator. The issue raised about cybersecurity, I think, is an important one, because another issue that certainly the Trump administration has talked a lot about, but I think President Obama did, too, and I would imagine this conversation will probably continue, maybe in a different form under President-elect Biden, is this issue of burden sharing. And President Trump has probably taken what’s a very narrow slice at this conversation, that’s focused mainly on host nation support costs, in places like Japan and Korea, but there is a broader conversation to be had, when we think about burden sharing, about how we modernize our alliance and partner relationships, where the areas are, where maybe partners have more to contribute, and where we may be looking for partners to invest more, so that they can do things alongside us. Where do you think are some of the opportunities that we can think about burden sharing, in our respective goals and missions, in our alliances, maybe in a little bit of a strategic way in the coming years?

SEN. DUCKWORTH: Well, I think the burden sharing portion -- we should have that discussion, where it’s burden sharing, not necessarily purely on monetary terms. I mean, you can have that discussion more perhaps with NATO, where our alliances and our allies are wealthier, and have greater financial capability, but in the Indo-Pacific Region, in particular, I think, if you talk about burden sharing, we have to recognize some of the burdens that can only be shouldered by our allies, or even those who are not our allies, but just are friends in the region.

And we have to recognize that that is a portion of burden sharing that is just as important and encourage other nations to step up. So, you look at what Vietnam has been doing, in terms of resisting the Chinese expansion into the region, and, you know, incursions into Vietnamese territorial waters, whether it is territorial waters on the oceans, or even through the riverine forces, you see Indonesia doing the same thing, really, you know, standing up to incursions into international water -- into their waters, and so, some of that is not necessarily on a monetary base, but it’s more a commitment based type of burden sharing to continuing to grow partnerships and understanding that we have the same shared priorities, that is, freedom of navigation, in the region, and adherence to the International
Law of the Seas Treaty, and international regimes, and so, I think that's where we can have our start with talking about burden sharing, which is roles-based, as opposed to strict dollars-based.

MS. FORD: Really excellent point. On the Law of the Sea Treaty, what would you say in terms of a prospect for the United States to actually ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, in the near term?

SEN. DUCKWORTH: You know, I don't know. I certainly am very interested in moving in that direction, but, again, we don't even have a named nominee to be defense secretary yet, so, it's certainly something that I will be having in my conversations with whoever the nominee is, as we move forward.

MS. FORD: So, let me follow up on some of the points that you made about Vietnam and Indonesia. You talked about Thailand, obviously, in your opening, and, in the last several years, the United States has obviously focused a lot on our partnerships in Southeast Asia, not only because these are longstanding relationships we've had, economically important countries with young, you know, vibrant economies, but there's a lot of shared interest that we have on the security front, and a lot of areas where we want to help partners in Southeast Asia, as you said, defend their own sovereignty. I think, perhaps, a challenge for the incoming administration to address will be the fact that, while President-elect Biden has certainly talked a lot about the importance of strengthening our alliances and partnerships, he's also discussed how we need to be bringing the importance of democratic values and discussions about human rights back into U.S. foreign policy, and there are some difficult conversations to be had there, with Southeast Asian partners. So, I'm wondering, from your perspective, how we balance those two goals, in the alliance conversations that we have, especially in places like Southeast Asia?

SEN. DUCKWORTH: I think we have to be consistent. First and foremost, I think we have to be consistent in our approach. We, the United States, have to consistently stand up for democratic values and for, you know, those who are championing true democracy, representative democracy, and to be opposed to authoritarianism. I think, that is -- that is who we are, as a nation. Those are the values, those -- that's we are founded on, and those are the values we must adhere to.

Whenever we've strayed away from those values, and, you know, try to prop up juntas
and the like, it’s never worked out well for us. So, even though there might be an instinct to do that, it’s not -- that’s not the way to go, and, frankly, it’s a different world now, than it was in the ‘50s or the ‘60s, or, you know, or -- and we have to recognize to move for these democracy movements because they’re only going to grow.

We need to support movements for democracy. We need to oppose, you know, those who -- whether it is insurgence, in terms of terrorist groups, just as much as we need to talk to those who may be in power, who are trying to oppress popular demonstrations and people who are just asking for an ability to participate in their own political process.

I think we can do both. I think we can have a very blunt, upfront conversation, especially with our allies and with our friends, but say, listen, you know, we stand for democracy, and we want to work with you, but it can’t come at the expense of our support for democratic movements.

MS. FORD: You talked a lot about norms and values, and one of the more notable things, I think, about the past year, has been that we’ve seen a lot of allies and partners, in Asia, speaking up on issues, like the problems in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and pushing back against Chinese actions, in some of those areas, and, in return, some of them have paid a pretty steep price, and, in particular, I would point most recently to what’s been an escalating trade dispute between Australia and China, over China’s frustration with stances that Australia has taken on COVID, or on Hong Kong, or in the South China Sea, that now are impacting something like $20 billion of Australian exports.

And I think a lot of U.S. allies and partners, what they want to see in this situation, because it’s -- Australia is not the first partner that this has happened to, they won’t be the last, is that the U.S. has their back. So, what kind of steps would you like to see the U.S. actually taking to be more proactive about backing up partners, like Australia, when they get into these kinds of situations, where they’re suffering some really direct economic coercion from Beijing?

MS. FORD: Well, I think this is -- this goes back to my first, you know, answer, which was talking about economic engagement. We’ve sort of dealt with this part of the world as sort of a -- sort of an afterthought, almost, and when the -- President Trump pulled out of the TPP, that really negatively
affected our economic engagement in the region. I think that we certainly should look at increasing our engagement, in the Indo-Pacific Region, and especially working towards maybe perhaps in addition to a multilateral trade agreement, but having a stronger bilateral agreement, with specific partners, like Australia for example, or New Zealand also, in order to support them and show them that we do have their back.

Unfortunately, for the last four years, we've had a president, who has not wanted to engage internationally, whether it is national security wise, or whether it is economically, and I think you'll see the Biden administration, especially if you look at the nominees that he's already announced, become -- you know, let the world know, we are going to be much more engaged, that we are going to recommit, both economically and security wise. But I certainly would support -- I sit both on Armed Services and on Commerce Committees. So, I'm uniquely positioned to talk to both sides of this, whether it's economic or security wise, and I do think that more trade agreements are necessary, and looking at what we can do, perhaps in a bilateral basis, with particular nations that have really bore the brunt of negative, you know, push back from the Chinese.

MS. FORD: Thank you. You know, when we look at what's happened in places, like, say, Hong Kong, over the last year or two, I think something that's been a concern, for a lot of people, is that perhaps Taiwan could be next, and that we could see that China ratchet up some of the military, and political, and economic pressure, that it has been deploying against Taipei, over the past few years.

How concerned are you, about that problem, and what steps do you think, I mean, in addition to the obvious issue of arms sales, could the U.S. and other like-minded partners, as well, be taking to help preserve international space for Taiwan?

SEN. DUCKWORTH: Well, I think, this actually one thing that I've been pleasantly surprised by the Trump administration. I think they have been engaging significantly with Taiwan, both economically and on measures related to COVID-19. Currently, the administration has taken a number of steps that signals investment in the relationship, including sending various senior officials to visit the island, earlier this year, you know, secretary -- the HHS secretary was there, the undersecretary for
Economic Growth, Energy, and Environment, within the State Department was there. These are the highest-ranking members of the U.S. Government to visit Taiwan, in literally decades.

You know, I think, that -- while they’ve been unprecedented, those visits, you know, are in line with established U.S. Policy, and I think we need to continue those type of visits, and to perhaps, you know, raise up the level of engagement, with more secretary or Cabinet-level visits, as well, and I think the administration has continued to build on this agreement, these engagements. Last month, the State Department did host a delegation from Taiwan, for the inaugural US-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue. I think we can push that a little bit more. It’s basically just continuing to engage, even more frequently, and even at a higher level, and if we can bring some of our own friends and allies, from around the world, to participate in those, that’s even better.

MS. FORD: I’m glad to hear you say that, because I think this is an area, when think about Taiwan Policy, where bipartisanship is really important, and, so, I think, it’s a really important message of continuity that you’re making. Last question that I have for you. You mention allies and Partners from elsewhere in the world, and something that’s been really interesting, over the last few years, is the degree to which some of our European allies and partners, have become more interested in engaging in Asia as well.

So, I’m curious where you think, maybe, there are particular opportunities to think about ways that our European partners, could be more engaged in the Indo-Pacific, and providing more support for our Asian allies?

SEN. DUCKWORTH: You know, I think, that the Indo-Pacific Region is a region that is, growing economically, it’s got a growing middle class, and that’s whole big market place for everyone, include -- you know, European allies, and the United States, and, so, I think, that economic engagement is just as critical, to national security, and really having a much more of a presence in the region, and having much more, in terms of formal economical agreements, is critically important.

And, I think, it’s actually beneficial to our European allies, because this is a whole new market that, you know, I just seen over the last 10 years. The growth of disposable income, in the
middle-class, that is growing in places like, Indonesia, and Malaysia, for example, you know, we were long, you know -- I thought about Singapore as being really a developed nation, but when you look at places like Indonesia and Malaysia, you see this exponential growth, in the middle-class, and Thailand too, in a market place that is hungry for goods and services, coming out of the United States, and out of Europe, and we have to engage that. Cause if we don't fill that void, the PRC -- well, and they've been moving in, and providing some of those goods and services, and I think, that we just need to reengage in -- and that is a way to pull our allies from Europe back into the region, into the security discussion, is through the economic discussion first.

MS. FORD: It's an excellent point, you know, everything you've said today, I think, really emphasizes how much, when we talk about the Indo-Pacific, it's not simply a conversation about the military challenges, that we may face in the region, but we really have to think about the region from -- from a whole of government context, that sounds cliché, but it is so true. Because we have economic interests there, but if you don't also think about the conversation about norms and values, as being connected to those economic insecurity's interests, you know, you're not looking at the full puzzle.

So, Senator Duckworth, I want to thank you so much again, for taking the time to join us today. It's been an absolute pleasure to have you with us. And with that, Rush, I'm going to turn it over to you, and our panelist for the rest of the conversation. Senator, thank you.

SEN. DUCKWORTH: Thank you, everyone.

MR. DOSHI: Thank you, so much, Lindsey, and thanks to all the members of our audience for joining us, today. My name is Rush Doshi, I am the director of the Brookings China Strategy Initiative and a fellow here at the Brookings Institution and at Yale’s China Center. I’m glad to be joined by three stellar colleagues, from the Brookings Institution, who are going to help us think through the future, of U.S. alliance in the Indo-Pacific.

In many ways, these individuals represent precisely the people you want on stage, for discussions of allies and partners, and their experience spands, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia, and Europe. So, let me tell you a little bit about our panelists.
We have with us, Tanvi Madan, senior fellow here at The Brookings Institution, and director of our India Project. I’m also joined by Jonathan Stromseth, the Lee Kuan Yew chair in Southeast Asian Studies at Brookings, and senior fellow. And, we’re also joined by Constanze Stelzemüller, senior fellow, here at the Center on U.S. and Europe.

So, to get it started, I’d like to turn, I think, first, to how U.S. Allies and Partners are thinking about the Indo-Pacific and the incoming Biden administration. And, by the way, for all our audience members, we’re going to be continuing this panel discussion until about 3:30 p.m., so please do stick with us, right until then.

So, Tanvi, perhaps, we could begin with you. How is India thinking about the U.S. role in the region, and if you could, in answering that question, maybe you could address a question that we got from our audience, from Mark Bucknam, at the National War College. He’s wondering what changes you foresee in U.S. India relations under a Biden administration? And Tanvi, if you could just -- I think, you might be muted.

MS. MADAN: There we go.

MR. DOSHI: Thanks a lot.

MS. MADAN: I think, I’m unmuted, then. Thanks Rush. It’s -- I’m gonna try to address that as in succinct way, a big question. I think, in terms of the Indo-Pacific, I think, India and the U.S. were actually, kind of later, adopters to the idea. It was really a Japanese idea that, first the Australians, and then the U.S. and India kind of adopted. Over the last few years, you’ve seen India embrace the concept, in mostly because of changes due to -- the changes due to the realities on the ground, including something that the U.S. is also concerned about, which is China increasing forays into the Indian Ocean.

I think, there is a recognition in Delhi, that what happens in the Pacific, doesn’t stay in the Pacific, or as the Indian Foreign Minister said, just today, you cannot deal with the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, as watertight theaters. The region itself, is crucial for India, but, and, in some ways, it see the challenges in the region. Particularly to the rules bases order, in the region is fairly similar. There’s a lot of overlap between the challenges that the U.S. and India see, and prime amongst them, in some
ways is a rising China’s behavior. Including things like, you know, actually changes to the status quo, whether that’s in the South China Sea, or even in the Continental Domain, at the Bhutan-China Boundary, in 2017, or the ongoing boundary crisis, between China and India this year, and for India the U.S. is part of the response that it sees is necessary in the region to these challenges.

India's response has tended to be in part to try to kind of up its own game in the region, including through, an adjusted approach to -- to its neighbors, as it’s extended neighbors, so I would include Southeast Asia as well. But there is a real recognition, that because, largely because of capacity constraints, capability constrains, that India cannot deal with these challenges alone. And, so, what it has done, is made India more willing to, kind of, deepen cooperation with U.S., including in ways that it would have been hesitant to do otherwise.

So, for example, India, which has had kind of informal Monroe Doctrine, in the region, about its South Asia, as a neighborhood, recently welcome the U.S. Maldives Defense Agreement. You wouldn't have seen this reaction from India in the past. Reviving and upgrading the quadrilateral, with Australia, Japan, and the U.S. Signing a range of agreements, enabling agreements that make it -- make the U.S. and India -- Indian militaries more able to operate together, in the future.

And, so, you see, kind of, India broadly welcome the, kind of, free and open Indo-Pacific, that’s come out of the Trump administration, and the role that has assigned -- India it’s like the administration more competitive view of China, even though it has some problems with some parts of the approach, including the heated rhetoric. I think, as it looks at the Biden administration, the U.S. for India, remains the most crucial partner, of its various partners in the region, and it's not just the U.S. that's deep in ties with Australia, France, Japan.

The good thing for the U.S., is these are all American allies, as well, but even amongst these, I think, the U.S. is -- as Prime Minister Modi, has called the U.S., and indispensable partner, and so, they will be looking for opportunities to move the ball forward, in a number of areas, including Maritime Security, Regional Connectivity, building resilience in the regional, fairly broadly, and then cooperation in regional and international institutions, and third countries. So, I think, they will watch the Biden approach,
to the region, very carefully. They will particularly watch the Biden administration approach to China. Have questions, will the U.S. continue with strategic competition, and even the nuances of that competition.

Will it limit competition with China, because of domestic global priorities, or desire to kind of, get China’s cooperation? I think, these questions will shape, let’s answer, kind of the view of question, what the U.S. and India might be willing to do together. I think, though, broadly and briefly, they kind of --- that India will be quite pleased with a set of people that’s quite familiar with. They will probably look for some rebalancing in the relationship. It’s not a relationship that needs repair, and like some others, and on --- even on the China approach, I think, they’ll be pleased with a Biden administration emphasis on working with allies and partners, and not imposing unilateral tariffs on allies and partners.

Biden administration, has pledged to reengage in international institutions, where India has been very concerned about growing Chinese influence. So, I think, to kind of round that up, I think, what we would like to see, what Delhi, would like to see, with the Biden administration, is the continuation of the trend that we’ve seen, between the Bush, Obama, Trump administrations, which was, that the U.S. has seen India, as played an important role in the region, the Obama administration, called it the linchpin of the rebalance. Trump administration has called it a key democratic anchor, and I think, either that --- the U.S., is essentially seen India, very --- maybe not explicitly, but as a strategic counterbalance and economical alternative, and a democratic contrast to China, and on that basis, has supported India’s rise, and is invested in India’s rise.

So, I think, well Delhi would except some kind of adjustments, it will hope that the administration will continue that, and also will not throw the baby out with the bath water, in terms of some of the things that the Trump administration has done, that they’ve actually liked.

MR. DOSHI: Thanks so much, Tanvi, and I want to turn now to Jonathan. You’ve written, Jonathan, about how Southeast Asia is at the front lines, of the U.S.-China rivalry, it doesn’t really want to choose between Washington, and Beijing. So, you know, we see on the India side, close to --- you know, basically ties that are increasingly close between the U.S. and India. What do we see in
Southeast Asia? What is the picture -- what is the picture there?

MR. STROMSETH: Well it -- it’s a complex and diverse picture. One of the first things I always say about Southeast Asia, is that it is very diverse. There is 11 countries, 10 that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. But broadly speaking, if you’re kind of asking about the Indo-Pacific, for instance, and that strategy, coming out of Washington, but also, Japan, Australia, and so on. Their generally, I would say, uncomfortable with it, and I would say they have some specific issues with the Trump administration’s approach to that concept, in particular.

On general terms, you know they are concerned that it is kind of an anti-China coalition, that’s dismissive of ASEAN, and they say that or they feel that way, I think, because, in an ideal world, they want to have constructive relations with both the United States and China, and given the geography of the region and China’s growing economic strength and their integration with China, in some ways, they can’t afford to choose, and that’s where you get the problem with the Trump policy over the last, you know, three or four years. Basically, it’s had very hard-edged rhetoric. It basically talks about a choice between free and repressive visions of the region.

It has labeled China an economic predator that practices debt trap diplomacy, for instance, and this is in a context where Southeast Asian countries are desperate for infrastructure, if they want to meet their economic needs, and there are some debt problems, say, with Laos, to some extent, perhaps with Cambodia, but, broadly speaking, ASEAN countries have basically been learning how to manage and negotiate with China, and it’s not so much about opposing China, but managing China’s rise, and I think they would like to do that in concert with the United States, in general, but I think they also recognize that the Indo-Pacific policy, or, you know, program strategy, whatever you want to call it, concept, is here to stay, and so they have tried, in fact, to issue their own kind of language on the Indo-Pacific. Last year, they issued a document called the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” and not surprisingly it was a more ASEAN-centered approach trying to bring back this concept of ASEAN centrality, which tries to, you know, make ASEAN be the anchor or the kind of foundation for regional institutions, and the main emphasis is inclusiveness, in other words, this isn’t or shouldn’t be about
excluding China, and then it -- there’s a lot more emphasis, to pick on -- up on some of the themes of Senator Duckworth, on economic development, for instance.

Now, turning to the Biden administration, as it’s coming in in January, you know, I think there is a sense of relief, a sense that experienced diplomats, a sure pair of hands, you hear this in some of the op-eds, and so on, that are coming up in the region, and in the hope that they will reengage with Southeast Asia more, rebuild ties, and I think one of the most important things is that they’ll show up for Regional Summit at a high level, and for ASEAN and Southeast Asian countries that’s really important.

But I think just as important as that, they want Biden administration to know that the region has changed. I think the incoming diplomats know this, but they really want to make the point that China has gotten stronger, and in particular, China has gotten stronger on the -- in the economic realm and is practicing economic statecraft in a way that has really expanded not just its economic power, but its overall power and helping to achieve its strategic goals along the way, and I think even before the pandemic, there was a regional survey that showed that policy elites in Southeast Asia felt that among, you know, when they were asked, what -- who -- what country or institution is the most strong in Asia -- or in Southeast Asia, China was rated at 79%. The U.S. was only 8%. Japan was at about 4%. And, obviously, I think there are strategic gains that flow from these economic realities, and I could tell that Senator Duckworth also was pointing this out. I think it’s a very interesting point to consider for the incoming administration.

MR. DOSHI: Thanks, Jonathan. Constanze, I want to turn to you and sort of the picture from Europe. I think one of our audience members noted that Germany had this Indo-Pacific policy document that received a lot of attention. The U.K. is thinking about a greater military presence in Asia. So, what does all of this mean for Trans-Atlantic cooperation on the Indo-Pacific, and what do you think the, you know, European allies and partners, specifically, would want to see from a Biden administration within that region?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Sure, thank you very much, first of all, for inviting me to speak with these great colleagues, and I also thought that listening to Senator Duckworth was fascinating.
There is a great deal to discuss and to work on here, and I want to bounce off a really excellent paper that Lindsey Ford, the moderator with Senator Duckworth, wrote in Sep -- in late September, called “Sustaining the Future of Indo-Pacific Defense Strategy,” where she -- which is essentially a critique of American Indo-Pacific Defense Strategy, but makes some points that, in fact, argue, that make the case why there’s a role for European allies here, and the key point that she makes is that there is a -- that the U.S. and the incoming Biden administration needs to find the appropriate balance between deterring high-end conflict and countering the coercion of allies, in other words, what its role should be in hybrid and gray zone conflict.

Now, her emphasis, obviously, was on the allies in the Pacific, in the Indo-Pacific theater, and on the role for the American diplomatic and economic agencies to play here, but you can extend that argument to the Europeans, but that is, in my view, not where it ends. So, what would be the role for Europeans here? And I see four things: one, military, second, dip -- political signaling, thirdly, diplomatic leverage, and fourthly, and probably it’s the key point, is its economic heft.

We Europeans have traditionally thought of ourselves as essentially trade partners of China, and it’s really only the U.K. and France that have had a traditional, you know, decades old military presence with the Pacific, that they think of as essential to their global role as nuclear powers, but -- and whereas the Germans were extremely reluctant to think of their alliances in the Indo-Pacific Region, including with China, which was called a strategic relationship, as in any way security related. That has completely changed, particularly in Germany, but it has changed across Europe, I would say, and there is now a recognition that a -- what the Chinese aggressiveness, assertiveness, in its region, is -- has an impact on our trade, in other words, that as the German defense minister said recently, freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific is an issue for Germany’s trade relationship with China.

But there is also increasingly in Europe, of course, a recognition that the Chinese strategy is very -- is strategic and is global and is highly active in the European theater, in essentially acquiring physical and digital real estate, which not just serves immediate Chinese strategic purposes, but also is then deployed in a secondary way to split the Europeans when that’s necessary, in case they
are developing -- you know, when they threaten to develop the kind of cohesion that would undercut Chinese strategic purposes.

And so, the Europeans are now in the very, very difficult situation of looking at a Biden administration whose capability to act, they think, will be significantly constrained by domestic conflicts, and a China which they increasingly see as a strategic rival, and as a security threat to them, and they are trying to figure out -- they’re both traumatized by four years of Trump and want to embrace the Biden administration, but they also fear it’s an American strategy of containment or decoupling that would make them -- that would force them to choose, you know? This is what the Europeans are having to navigate.

Now, interestingly, there’s two papers that came out this week that tell you a little bit about where the Europeans are going. One is this, the NATO Reflection Group, “NATO 2030,” which has an extended chapter on China, which NATO has just been wrapping its mind around, but does not mention the Indo-Pacific at all, literally zero. It’s all about NATO and China, whereas the -- this week’s paper, by the European Commission, or the “Joint Communication: A New EU-U.S. Agenda for Global Change,” interestingly, does embed the trans-Atlantic policy on China in a larger Indo-Pacific context, and it’s, as has already been pointed out by people who have read it, it’s ambiguous, it both recognizes the American analysis that the -- that China is -- I’ll quote it to you. “We agree on the strategic challenge presented by Chinese growing international assertiveness, even if we do not always agree on the best way to address this.” So, there you go. This is, in other words, and they’re proposing a new EU-U.S. dialogue on China to address these issues.

What’s interesting, and I’ll end on this, is that a number of these new European policy papers, including the German guidelines that you’ve mentioned, do focus on the military aspect of this, and it’s -- it is particularly interesting that the Germans have moved in this direction. I won’t go into the details here, but the German Defense Minister has been particularly forthright on this and has, among other things, said what we suggested, a bilateral Navy relationship, operations with the Australians, first with German Naval Officers on Australian ships and FONOPs operations, but also next year deploying a German frigate to Australia, to deploy with them in operations.
That's an enormous change in German thinking, and obviously, you know, the Pentagon is going to -- DOD is going to smile at the thought of a German frigate, and maybe the Australians are smiling as well, but from a country that is the economic anchor power of Europe, it's a huge political signal. The question that remains open, though, is whether the Europeans and the Germans are willing to put their economic heft behind a comprehensive trans-Atlantic strategy because that's the biggest leverage that they have to bring, and that raises a huge amount of tricky questions, which we can discuss later.

MR. DOSHI: Well, thank you. That is an exceptionally thorough set of answers that we have from the first round. I want to turn now to one theme, of course, that was in all of your answers, which is changing perceptions of China. So, that is clearly one of the key takeaways from this year, particularly post-COVID, particularly post-Chinese greater assertiveness around the world. So, I'm kind of hoping we can zoom in a little bit on how that changing perception is affecting the strategies of each country and also the politics within each country, so, you know, and in -- and within each region. So, Tanvi, you know, there's been a lot written about Sino-Indian border clash, the casualties there, as well as, you know, China's wolf warrior diplomacy and sort of bullying of India on social media, with some sort of mixed degrees of success there. Could you tell us a little bit about how all that is shaping not only Indian strategic thinking, but also Indian public opinion, and whether that could even lock in some strategic shifts in the period ahead?

MS. MADAN: Thanks, Rush, and I just want to say, I mean, to Constanze's point on kind of various countries and China, that I think we're going to see a lot more of this kind of interaction between European and Indo-Pacific countries, not just because they're of shared interest, but I think because everybody has been a little -- kind of has -- the uncertainty factor about the U.S. has increased, and so there'll always be this at the back of the various partners', allies and partners, minds, is what happens if this happens again in four years?

I think for India, which has had kind of seen China as a challenge for, you know, almost since they're going to -- late -- I would say mid to late '50s, it's the -- I think the one-two punch for the
China-India relationship, less the wolf warrior, which I think has focused in recent months much more on Europe, but it’s been the Chinese handling of COVID-19 and the Boundary Crisis, that’s been the one-two punch, and I think among the public, and you saw this even before the Boundary Crisis began in May, in the first few months COVID, you saw, among the Indian public, anti-China sentiment go mainstream in a way that we -- is usually reserved for India’s other kind of adversary, Pakistan, and if you think about the strategic community, which was kind of, you know, the particularly former India diplomats or China hands, the dominant view amongst them seems to be that this is an inflection point in the China-India relationship, that the already low levels of trust have fallen even further, if they exist at all, and almost all of them have called for China -- India’s ties with China to be reassessed.

And you’ve had people, like Vijay Gokhale, who, till earlier this year, was a foreign secretary in India, say that China’s actions, the PLA is kind of unilateral, what India sees as the PLA is unilateral attempts to change the status quo at the boundaries has left the agreements that the two countries had signed to try to manage their boundary dispute, that those lie in a heap of rubble, as he put it, and so I think what that -- what’s that -- that’s resulted also in is that the government, as Foreign Minister Jaishankar reiterated again just this week, sees it very similarly, that those agreements between the two countries were violated, and those were the basis for all the cooperation and the expansion of the broader China and India relationship, including economic ties, and he essentially said you cannot expect to violate those agreements and have the relationship remain undisturbed.

I think that these just, kind of the COVID Boundary Crisis has also weakened the arguments of those in government who are calling for India to do more with China and to do less with the U.S., or of those arguing that, you know, as we saw in the U.S. a few years ago, the deeper economic ties and broader connectivity with China would alleviate political strain.

So, I think, you know, broadly these two things have brought to the floor existing concerns about China’s lack of transparency, its uncertain -- certain commitment to the rules-based order, and its growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and in international institution, and it is particularly of concern, I think a new concern that India has seen, is China actually pointing to democracies and saying,
look, we do better than them, and so, this idea of the ideological competition, I think you’re just starting to hear that discussion in India.

I’ll just end with saying kind of, you know, this would be all very well, if there weren’t kind of specific policy results, and I think some concerns -- there have been intense -- an intensification of particular concerns in India, that have resulted in specific policy actions, and I don’t mean at the boundary, but economically, in particular, and the concerns have been about overdependence on China, about inroads that Chinese companies have made into certain sensitive sectors and avenues of Chinese influence in the country, and in some cases using them for propaganda or disinformation, and so, you’ve seen a slew of Indian policy measures, not just the app ban that got a lot of attention, that will restrict or increase scrutiny of Chinese activities in a number of spheres, economic, technology, telecom, public diplomacy, educational exchanges, and so that’s been a kind of a big move, a second, I think, area, where there’s been a lot of focuses on building resilience, military resilience, economic resilience, either by bringing production home or diversifying kind of suppliers, and then, finally, I would say working, and I’d circle this back to kind of where we started, which is India has decided that it needs to work with like-minded partners far more than it has, and -- in ways that it was reluctant to in the past.

MR. DOSHI: Thanks. So, Jonathan, I’m curious if you could talk a little bit about Southeast Asia’s relationship with China. Of course, it’s a diverse collection of states in that region, so, if, you know, you can maybe go by -- go through as many of them as you’re able, but in particular, you know, what about, you know, the South China Sea sort of heating up over the last year? Has that affected the way that Southeast Asia looks at China, and of course, on the other side of the ledger, there’s RCEP, and the fact that that was recently signed, what does that tell us about how the region is thinking about China, as well?

MR. STROMSETH: Well, again, you’re right to point to the diversity factor in Southeast Asia, you know, 10 states individually trying to hedge and balance, you know, as China rises and they cope with U.S.-China rivalry, depending on geography, a sense of economic opportunity, threat perceptions, history, and other factors, and this includes our allies in Thailand and the Philippines, and
importantly, I think, just as importantly, emerging partners, like Vietnam and Indonesia.

The Philippines, over the last three or four years, has, you know, tried to, under President Duterte, get more economic largess through the Belt and Road Initiative, not too successfully, actually, compared to other countries in the region, but, you know, they’ve maintained and kept an eye on the security partnership, a relationship with the United States. Meanwhile, Vietnam, in some ways, has been more assertive in pushing back against China on the South China Sea, but they’re also perhaps the most vulnerable, and so they know there’s a line they can’t cross as basically having a long border and being, you know, right on China’s doorstep.

And I think this gets to a key point that we all need to remember, that, broadly speaking, the region does remain very distrustful of China. The same survey that I mentioned earlier made that very clear, that policy elites throughout Southeast Asia are distrustful of China’s, you know, long-term strategic intentions. This provides, I should say, you know, a real opportunity for the US. Security concerns will continue to resonate, and there’s an opening as China continues be more assertive or has been plenty assertive in the South China Sea during the pandemic, as you’ve mentioned, Rush, and China has also been occasionally ham-handed in ways that maybe we saw a few years ago, not so much recently. There was this music video, for instance, in the Philippines, that the Chinese Embassy released, called One Sea, where they seem to try to showcase their COVID relief aid on the one hand, but legitimize their claims to waters that Manila sees as their own territory on the other end. There obviously was quite a social media reaction in the Philippines.

So, China is facing tripwires. It knows, I think, it has a trust deficit in the region, but what’s interesting and kind of getting to the pandemic is, in Southeast Asia, leaders, I think, have been particularly hesitant to criticize China over the pandemic. We haven’t seen, you know, what maybe we’ve seen out of Australia or coming out of Europe, for instance, and I think that’s because they see China’s economic recovery as the potential engine for their own way out, economically, from, you know, the real stressful situation they’re seeing, economically, in their own countries, and here, I think, one thing I’m concerned about is how the sequencing of economic recovery could have potentially long-lasting effects.
So, as China comes out of the gate first, the region is looking, obviously, at this moment, much more to them than to the United States. The vaccine diplomacy is going to be very interesting because they’ve also been much more assertive on that front, and yet at least the news I’ve been seeing about, you know, the tests in China for their vaccine development, at least so far, hasn’t been quite as positive as what we’ve been hearing from Pfizer and Moderna, for instance, here.

Getting to RCEP, that you mentioned, you know, I think this is seen as a real triumph of ASEAN’s middle power diplomacy in the region. A lot of it -- a lot of people see it as a China agreement, but, in fact, ASEAN, I think, pushed it along, but China is a key signatory, as is Japan, and I think what we’re going to see is greater intra-Asia integration between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, but that will mean also more integration between China and Southeast Asia, which I think will continue these trends that I’m discussing, and I think, for Southeast Asians, getting back to your kind of core question on perceptions, while they have a distrust of China, kind of long-term, I think, you know, they’re realists and I think they look to the future. They try to estimate China’s footprint 20-30 years from now, figure out what their interdependencies and potential economic opportunities are going to be, and I think, even though they have concerns about the South China Sea, which they’ll continue to voice, somehow that sort of tempers things going forward, and I think that’s a dynamic we’re going to see for years to come.

MR. DOSHI: Thanks, Jonathan. And, Constanze, some -- something that Tanvi said, I wanted to ask you about. She mentioned that, you know, within -- that wolf warrior diplomacy may have had less of an effect in India, but it may have had more of an effect in Europe, and for the audience, by wolf warrior diplomacy, referring to some of the more assertive and nationalistic public diplomacy engaged in by China’s diplomats and propaganda organs. So, you know, have you seen that affect public opinion at all, in Europe? I mean, there was a Pew Poll that showed public opinion had changed, but does that actually -- does that shape European strategy at all, or are the factors driving the readjustment you mentioned earlier in European perspectives much deeper than sort of this public element?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Yeah, thank you, that’s an excellent question, and as you lay
out, it’s a very complex one, and there is different level of this. I would say there is a distinct sense that the Chinese wolf warrior diplomacy has generated enormous blowback against China in European public opinion. It’s amazing. I was just sneaking a peak at Twitter, and there is a conversation going on about the comments of one of the senior editors at the Global Times, in response to remarks by Senator Marsha Blackburn. You know, Twitter is a vehicle for spreading that kind of stuff, and I do think that it is quite influential in shaping how public opinion changes.

Certainly, one of the more notable developments in recent months was the -- what seemed to be like a good will tour by the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, to European capitals, where the German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, made a point of standing next to him in public and rebuking him for the mass incarceration of the Uighurs, for the crackdown on Hong Kong. German politicians have made it very clear that they're -- that they share American concern about Taiwan. There is -- none of this can make folks in Beijing very happy. I mean, I don’t think this is where they thought this was going to go, and, frankly, they have only themselves to blame for it, as this has been an astoundingly -- if this was supposed to put the fear of God in European publics and politicians, I would say it's had the reverse effect.

Then, there is the business level, which in some ways mirrors what happened to European-Russian trade relations, a decade earlier, which is the recognition that the benefits come with high costs, and there is a distinct lack of reciprocity, and that the ultimate purpose of the -- of what was thought to be a hugely profitable trade relationship is at least as much political as economic, in ways that seem to be directed at subordinating European purposes to Chinese purposes, including in Europe. That has really moved the needle in Europe, but again, the, you know, the -- Europeans think, mostly, that interdependence is their destiny, and that openness is their destiny. So, actors that exploit that, and that seek to weaponize it against Europe, as the Russians have done, as the Trump administration has done, but has -- as the Chinese government is also doing, you know, create huge concerns, and I think they have all been drivers of this debate in Europe about how we can -- about how to achieve some measure of autonomy and strategic sovereignty, without closing European borders or decoupling, which, for
Europeans, would be suicidal.

MR. DOSHI: Thanks, Constanze. I want to turn to an audience question quickly, and it’s a question that we’ve sort of addressed already, to some degree, but not as specifically, and that’s on multilateralism. So, I have a question here from Leslie Vinjamuri, from Chatham House, and the question is basically about what might a U.S. strategy look like, or what should it look like for multilateral engagement, particularly in key issues, you know, whether it’s economics, finance, technology, different coalitional approaches in different functional domains. How should we think about it? I mean, what does that look like? Will it have -- will it be -- should be, you know, separate in Asia and Europe, should it be combined? Should we look at different arrangements and constellations for different issues? We often talk about multilateralism, but we don’t often specify what it should look like. So, if we could maybe help folks think a little bit more concretely about what that could look like, it’d be a contribution. So, maybe we’ll start with Tanvi again, and then work to you, Jonathan, and Constanze, after that.

MS. MADAN: That’s a great question, and I think it’s something we’ll be talking about a lot because I think, you know, the Biden team has made clear that they’d like to get back to thinking about multilateralism, without necessarily only doing that in multilateral organizations, and I think that is partly speaking from the experience of their own experience. A lot of them served in the Obama administration.

In some ways, the TPP stemmed out of that frustration with the WTO not kind of moving forward, and so I think what you’ll see, I suspect, and our colleague, Tom Wright, called it flexible multilateralism, which is kind of, you know, different, I think, different issues you will -- that you’ll see a recommitment in some sense, from the U.S. in international organizations, coordination, better coordination, in those organizations, perhaps with like-minded partners, to ensure that certain principles and standards are maintained and followed, certain rules are enforced, and that those institutions aren’t undermined for a certain country’s interests, but I think you’ll also see kind of, on different issues, different groups of, you know, whether it’s coalitions of democratic countries, but I think, you know, on some issues, you’ll see, yes, it’ll make sense to have a certain group of democratic partners, Asians, Europeans, and the U.S., come in, but you could -- I suspect the U.S. will also have to find ways to bring
in countries that are like-minded, but not necessarily democracies.

So, you know, how do you fit in a country like a Vietnam, which, on many things, has kind of shared views with the U.S., but doesn’t quite fit that, necessarily -- that metric? And I think then you’re going to have a set of thinking about multilateralism on issues where, even if a Biden administration says that, you know, we are going to treat China like a strategic competitor, there are some issues that cannot be solved without China on the table, and so the question of, you know, how do you then cooperate, bring them in, or, you know, work with them in those formats?

But, you know, and I think the way to do it is to ensure that you don’t link -- you don’t let China link their cooperation because it’s in their interest on these global issues, public health, climate change, to basically throwing your allies and partners under the bus, and so, you know, I think, along with resilience, I think the other word we hopefully will hear a lot about is solidarity. This is something I think Lindsey brought up, Lindsey Ford brought up, with Senator Duckworth, as well, vis-à-vis the Australians. So, I think, you know, these -- I think you’ll see different formats. I think it’ll be a lot more flexible and I think, you know, we really are moving into that era of kind of coalitions. Sometimes, it'll be in institutions. Sometimes, it -- they'll be outside.

MR. STROMSETH: Would you like me to chime in, Rush, on this?

MR. DOSHI: Jonathan, as we move into this -- yes, sorry, I don’t know if you heard me, I may have just cut out for a moment, but I’ll -- I’d love you to jump in, and I guess my question for you is what is the dawn of coalitional approaches organized maybe around democracies mean for a region as diverse as Southeast Asia, where some states might find themselves able to participate freely and others might be more concerned?

MR. STROMSETH: Yeah, I’ll touch on that, and then if I could also respond to the audience question a little bit, in a different way, but, you know, I think it’s true, it will be interesting to see how the coalition of democracies approach or how perhaps a summit of democracies in the first year of the Biden administration will be perceived in the region because there are some, you know, political challenges on that front.
Tanvi already mentioned Vietnam. Here, you have a country that has a lot of strategic overlap, in some ways, with the United States. It may be the fastest growing economy this year, in the world, not just the region, because it's been so successful in the way through governance and economic reform it has managed to respond, but obviously to COVID, but obviously, it is not a democracy, and other countries are challenged, whether it's the Philippines or Thailand, at the current time. So, typically, in the past, in the Clinton administration or other times, when the U.S. has had a strong democracy promotion approach, at least at the leadership level, it has not been well-received. So, I think that could be quite challenging. The perception could be quite different, of course, at a civil society level of the region.

And if I could just address the other sort of broader multilateral question, as well, and also kind of picking up on the point that Senator Duckworth mentioned. I was quite pleased to see her mention about something like a TPP, some kind of multilateral reengagement with the region, and I think that is so critical. The Trump administration has talked for three or four years about reciprocal free bilateral agreements, but, really, there hasn't been a lot of interest, as the region, itself, has went -- has gone forward with TPP, or the CPTPP, and now RCEP.

So, I think one thing that will be very interesting to see and what the region most wants is whether or not the U.S. can somehow come back to a multilateral engaged trade agreement with the region, and then how do we get there? Do there have to be Congressional hearings, some kind of national discussion about how we can make foreign policy work, you know, for the American workers and the middle class, and reconnect both the domestic and the foreign policy approaches of this country? I think that'll be a real challenge, but it's really what the region is hoping to see.

MR. DOSHI: Thanks, Jonathan, and, Constanze, if you could give U.S. the perspective from Europe, I mean, what is the perspective on a D10 or a Tech 10? Are these sort of ad hoc coalitional approaches or flexible multilateral approaches?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Right, the -- obviously, the Europeans think this is where they're the world champions, and this is where they can rope in powers that are larger than they are and
make them behave, but I do think, and I’m caricaturing slightly here, I do think that there has been, in recent years, a somewhat sobering recognition that there’s only so much here that’s possible. So, I think I want to pick up both what Tanvi and Jonathan said and say, look, the perception in Europe is not just what if this all flips again in four years, but the perception is, well, wait, what if the House flips in two years, and this administration will be even more constrained than it already looks now?

So, the -- I think the emphasis is very much on doing things on not, you know, taking the usual European decade-long, you know, let’s have a decade of dialogue and then maybe start exchanging papers approach, but a very quickly harvesting low-hanging fruit and of sort of, I’m sorry, this is a horribly mixed metaphor, but sort of hammering in sort of two by fours that will help make the whole -- that will salvage pragmatic flexible multilateralism for a future of additional shocks and crisis, and I think one of those focuses has to be the WTO and its adjudicating mechanism. That is absolutely crucial.

I think that rather than have an overall sort of comprehensive trade approach, you’re going to look at sectoral approaches, you know, or mini-lateral approaches, fine tune, whatever works, and on the point about UNCLOS, which Lindsey asked Senator Duckworth about, as somebody who once studied international law and, in fact, had to write my exam thesis on UNCLOS, I’m uncomfortable aware of how old UNCLOS is now. It’s -- it was -- you know, it codified existing customary international maritime law, at the time, but, in many areas, things have really moved on, particularly in exploitation of scarce resources on the seabed and also, frankly, in cables and listening devices on the seabed. There is real work to be done here, that is not covered at all by UNCLOS, and where it’s worth having conversations, where I think Europeans, you know, with their new, more comprehensive, and more security-minded approach, I think would be much more minded to engage than they were more than 30 years ago, when UNCLOS was finally tabled at the U.N.

MR. DOSHI: Well, thanks, Constanze, and thanks to all of you. I think we’re approaching our 3:30 endpoint, here. So, I’d like to take a moment to thank our audience for joining us today, and for those who stuck with us till 3:30, thank you for that, as well, and for those who submitted questions, we’re glad that we could get to them. Hopefully, you found the answers interesting and
worthwhile. Thanks again to Tanvi, Constanze, and Jonathan for joining, to Lindsey for moderating the early panel, and, of course, to Senator Duckworth for taking some time out of her busy day to speak with us today about an important issue. And with that, I wish you all a good afternoon and a good evening.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Can I just say it's 1:30 in the morning for Tanvi, in Delhi?

MR. DOSHI: Well, thank you, Tanvi, espec -- double thanks to you for staying up so late, and hopefully now you can get some rest. Thanks to all.

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