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BLUE METROS, RED STATES:
THE FIGHT FOR THE SUBURBS

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. TEIXEIRA: Hello everybody and welcome to a session -- a Brookings session on a brand-new book that's coming out that you all have to buy. It's called “Blue metros, Red States” and it covers the shifting urban rural divide in America's swing states. So you’ve never seen a book like this. It's so great. It covers every swing state that you're concerned about in the southeast, the southwest, the Rust Belt, they're all here. And you might ask, well, you know these are all pretty different states, right? They've got all kinds of different race and ethnic distributions, different growth rates, different areas of the country, political histories, but I'll tell you one thing that all got in common, generally speaking.

They all have million plus large metros in those states. And one thing that's really shaping the political evolution of all the swing states is the conflicts and differences between the large million plus metros like Phoenix and Tucson in Arizona, Charlotte and Raleigh-Durham in North Carolina, and so on, and the outlying areas, the more rural and ex-urban and non-metro parts of the states. There's political voting behavior and trends and by unpacking these differences and documenting, looking at recent voting trends, looking at recent demographic trends, looking at changes in diversity, looking at diversity within diversity because not all diversity’s the same. Sometimes changes driven by the growth in the Hispanic population. Other places, the B lack population is more important, and so on. And the distribution of these -- of this diversity between the large metros and -- and again, the outlying areas is quite different, and of the trends are quite different.

So if you really want to understand what's going to happen in the swing states in these selections, what they really mean, what they're really about, you absolutely have to get this book. It is just an invaluable reference. It will allow you not only to understand what's about to happen very soon, but also, like what it all means when it does happen. So I really commend it to you as the indispensable handbook for understanding the selection, in any serious empirical sense.

So without further ado though I want to hear from the authors of this fabulous -- or the editors of this fabulous volume, who wrote most of the chapters. We've got David Damore, Karen Danielsen, and Rob Lang here.

And first, I want to start with you, David, and maybe you can tell us a little bit about what was the origins of this project? How did you think it up? What led you to do it?

MR. DAMORE: Well, Rob can speak to this as well. But a lot of this was actually informed up on our life in Nevada. We are very much a blue metro in Las Vegas, and we are competing against -- you know we are in a state that was traditionally Republican voting. And once you get outside of Las Vegas it tends to be a Republican state. And we also have -- and Nevada is now a majority minority state but that all is concentrated, essentially, in Las Vegas. Once you get out in the rest of the state is overwhelmingly white.

We were also, obviously, interested in how institutions matter, right. How they affect outcomes. So a lot of the chapters we talk about sort of gerrymandering and that kind of stuff. But we are also interested in things like home rule, the ability of metros to sort of carve out their own place. And again, we are a city that doesn't have much home rule. We have a very, very distant state government that is really sort of -- looks like something out of the 1800s. 1 of 4 states where the legislature meets every two years for 120 days. And a governor staffed with minimal support there. So this tension between sort of these policy demands by big metro working in a state that was essentially rurally oriented and still is sort of institutionally very rural oriented as well.

MR. TEIXERA: Ted, you have anything to add to that?

MR. LANG: Yeah, following up on Dave. In June of 2017 I went to a meeting that was held by the Kinder Institute at Rice University in Texas. And it was a meeting of people who were running metro centers within the Sun Belt so it was everybody from, you know, Southern California to Florida. And a common theme that emerged in the discussions when we were -- we were talking about, you know, maybe we could do some joint projects, is there anything that everybody finds to be similar?

And so I reported out of my centers and gave them the Nevada experience. Charlotte was represented and Georgia was there. You know, Georgia Tech, Denver. So one of the common things that came up was that these big metros, if it was the state capital, like Denver, the rest of the state didn't get it outside the biggest metro. And that they sought to restrain the metros actions in all kinds of,

you know, cultural issues like, you know, who can use a bathroom, like, in North Carolina that just had occurred. And the person from UNC, the University of North Carolina at Charlotte spoke to that, you know, in a compelling way.

And someone was there from Georgia Tech talking about what if a certain candidate wins and passes restrictive legislation on abortion. Netflix is threatening us, and so the theme emerged that these big blue metros -- and all of them were blue voting, and the cores were blue voting, but also through most of the suburbs until you really got to, like, very conventional single-family detached, auto-dependent, large lot exurbs. Most of the places that got rail, or anything else and it fit the sort of descriptions that we've been working on for a bunch of years about density, diversity, you know promoting Democratic voting, or attracting Democratic voters more likely.

So I said, “Look I think we could do a project on this.” And the interesting thing that happened was I running a center where private philanthropy pays for most of the bills. They're in state-led centers doing state contracts. They couldn't afford to alienate the rest of the state. So I said, “Is there interest if I do it alone?” And they said, “We'll all contribute, we'll all put our two cents in. But you -- you go and take that risk.” Because in their view it was controversial to even make that delineation to say that the big metro had a tension with the rest of the state.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Karen, did you have a word to put in here on the project?

MS. DANIELSEN: Well, I wasn't there at the outset with him but I was just mainly interested, and you'll see it in the book that there’s information about, like, how capitals were located and how that actually structured -- and like how that differed around the country to. So one of the things that we were also very interested in is looking not just at, you know, the actual state and federal level, but you know, kind of breaking it down even at lower levels, and seeing relationships between the capital city and the big blue metros, and seeing if there was a relationship at all.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Right. Oh, David?

MR. DAMORE: Let me add -- and Karen found some just great literature on that. On just sort of this notion of the whole country was based on this rural mindset, and that the cities weren't really a

thought at the time when a lot of states were founded and when the federal Constitution gets written. And we never sort of figured out how to govern cities and put them in this sort of state context or in this federal context there. So that was really, really interesting that these, sort of tensions, have gone back, essentially, to the founding. But now, I don't think the founders of even the state or the federal government could imagine you would have such large metropolitan areas in these states.

MR. LANG: Yes. No, I would just interject here that I mean that is really one of the unique features of this book, is that it does cover that political culture and history and even in these geographical decisions and how important they are, and a fair amount of detail in each chapter and that's -- I mean, this is information that I, even though I look at these states carefully, a lot of it I didn't know. So it's really very helpful.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Karen, did you have something else?

MR. LANG: Tallahassee.

MS. DANIELSEN: Oh yeah. What I wanted to also mention is, like, it's very strange how capitals got located. Like, for instance in Florida. Tallahassee doesn't' really look like the right place because it's not even in the middle of the state, because one of the reasons why they locate capitals the way they did is that it was supposed to be the geographical center so that it was easy for people to get to and transportation was very difficult at the time.

So -- but if you think about it, the bottom part of Florida was uninhabitable at the beginning. So actually, Tallahassee was half-way between the two biggest cities at the time of Jacksonville and St. Augustine?

MR. LANG: St. Augustine and Pensacola?

Ms. DANIELSEN: Pensacola, I'm sorry.

MR. LANG: Yeah. And now that Tallahassee's up there they've considered moving the capital to Orlando at one point, but there was just too much cost. Tallahassee is further from Key West than it is from Chicago. And so, you know, if you're in South Florida and you're really part of the Caribbean essentially, and you're focused on trade with Latin America and you have a large Latino

population, Tallahassee is this old Magnolia tree, southern capital, quite remote in its mindset, just like Carson City is to us.

I mean we live in this vibrant, sprawling, Sun Belt city and then this tiny little, antique capital with a workforce that often hasn't even traveled to Las Vegas, remarkably, is in command of the bureaucratic structure that determines our lots.

MR. TEIXERIA: Rob, you want to talk a little bit about Nevada then, since you bring it up? It seems almost like a poster child for the conflict between a thriving million-plus metro and the rest of the state that isn't quite the same way.

MR. LANG: Dave and I have been working a decade-long project of systematically attempting to decompose the advantage that the older, ancestral part of the state holds, politically, over the South. And it's a really weird dynamic in the case of Nevada, in that, for a century from its founding, from the 1860s to the 1960s, Reno was the largest city. And, you know, it was then thoroughly usurped by the emergence of this new city in the South that was really part of the growth of the Sun Belt. You don't really see that often, so Denver is the original location of the big population in Colorado, and it continues to grow. And Phoenix likewise.

This is a case where an original population was completely displaced by an emergent city, and the older city was built basically by and for insiders who can trace their ancestry back to Kit Carson, as a point of pride in the North. The southern part of the state is all by outsiders. All the people around the casinos, all the money that flowed, all the immigrants and the rest of the world. So Las Vegas is the sort of new space. It's a voluntary region, according to the geographer Wilbur Zelinski. People sort of come to it because they wanted a certain lifestyle, came to it for an opportunity that's a very different structure of opportunity than in the North which is, you know, began in ag and mining and, you know, those kinds of industries.

And so the South had an industry, as well, that was stigmatized in that it was only located in this state and really couldn't threaten to leave. Like, GM could always go to the state, you know. Or anyone that's a major industry can go to a state capital and say, don't jerk us around, or we'll take off.

Even the pharmaceutical industry in New Jersey could move to Raleigh, for example. Here, there was no other state that could manage the industry in that it was outlawed everywhere else except Nevada. And that wasn't going to go well.

So what it did is it created a situation where the leading industry in the state didn't have the political power that you would typically have that's requisite with such an industry to push for its priorities. And it was just lucky to -- you know that the state allowed the sector to exist. So I'd like to say to wrap this up, that you know, originally, famously Kansas City used to skim Las Vegas.

You know, Kansas City, if you look at a film like “Casino” you know, the mob funded the Teamsters Union, paid for the hotels when they couldn’t go to Wall Street. And now, Carson City has the skim, which is the state capital. And they've got a better skim because it's the skim that's ongoing. And trucks of cash, metaphorically, leave every day from Las Vegas and head to that state capital and we produce a tax share that in no way can we trace to a single category that we've looked at over a decade where our share of contribution is ever returned in proportion.

And so there is an actual diminishment of economic opportunity, the capacity, the infrastructure of this region vis-à-vis the state capital. And we're not alone, Charlotte can tell a similar story. That's one of the things that came up around the country, almost nobody was getting their money back. Metro -- big blue metros are covering red parts of the state that are hostile to the entire project of the big blue metros.

And that's where the identity with the sort of moderate Republican, and a moderate Republican leadership and the Chamber of Commerce in these regions begins to identify with more moderate elements of the Democratic Party in that their project is similar and that they're stewards of these large metropolitan areas.

MR. DAMORE: Just to take --

MR. TEIXEIRA: Dave, you want to jump in here?

MR. DAMORE: I was just going to say, this was a -- you know, one of the things -- one of the ways that we were able to sort of tease some of this information out, was each chapter we had one or

multiple state experts we interviewed. We had a graduate assistant come along and they ended up locating state experts and we sort of gave them the same battery of questions for these open interviews. It was really, really insightful to sort of get beyond the data and sort of get at some of these issues that Rob's talking about.

And one of the examples that just stuck out to me was in Texas. During the hurricane Texas had, like, a $12 billion literal rainy day fund. And the Republican government would not tap it for Houston. They had six feet of water, a huge rainy day and they're "No, that's not going to happen." And then at the federal level you have this fight between the Houston delegations -- well, between Democrats and Republicans and they couldn't get their act together there either.

So it just sort of was a stunning thing, like Texas, huge driver of the state's population, huge economic driver and they can't even get relief when they're under six feet of water.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Wow. David, you want to talk a little bit since we're on Texas about how you see these political conflicts manifesting themselves in the trends in this coming election?

MR. DAMORE: Yeah. We actually got a piece out today that's on the urban edge put out by Kinder. And we sort of look at those dynamics there between the Texas triangle verses the rest of the state there. And you clearly saw this in '18 with the pickups in some of the House districts, Dallas and Houston. Obviously, the O'Rourke/Cruz race. You know, was -- caught a lot of people by surprise and now the polling here we're seeing there. And it's a very, very big split. You know the rural urban split there. And it's really about how far out in the suburbs the Democrats can push in Dallas and Fort Worth and obviously Austin, San Antonio in those areas. And how much they're able to pick up along the border there.

And what I think makes the Texas story unique is something we saw in a lot of the states we're looking at; is you see in these sort of op-eds in a lot of these states about the Californication of these states. Like, all these people moving in from California and this is going to change our politics. And sure enough, here we are, you know, a couple of weeks -- a week and a half before the election and we're seeing tied polls in California -- actually, I mean Texas, largely because of these changing politics in

the metros.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Care to make a prediction?

MR. DAMORE: No, it was funny when we were working on the final -- we had done the interviews right after the '18 election for Texas and they were like, oh, you know, this is just a Trump thing. You know, it will happen someday, but we don't think it's going to be there. And then we started finishing the book and the data was starting to look and the recruiting was looking good. And all of a sudden now, it's -- you know, still my gut sense is the Democrats will come up short there in the state-wide elections, but they may end up picking up because of that, a couple of the house seats there.

And more importantly, for Texas Democrats is what happens in the state legislature. Texas is a heavily gerrymandered state because the Republicans have controlled the process there. The Democrats can get a majority in the lower chamber that will at least allow them to have some say in how the redistricting happens for the next 10 years.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Karen, you know, we did touch on Florida earlier and that's another state where the Democrats may possibly come up a little short. But at any rate, it's super competitive. How do you see the dynamics you touched on in your chapter playing out in this election?

MS. DANIELSON: Well, every time you see things written about Florida everything just comes down to like one or two percentage points. So it seems to be a toss-up always. Although, it seems to be going more in Biden's direction. I'm not going to make that prediction, but I mean, at least now. But the one thing that's really changed since I wrote the chapter is that I think the Democrats were counting on a large Puerto Rican sort of turn out for voting. But we're seeing some of those people who came after Hurricane Maria returning back to Puerto Rico so some of that stuff may be -- the balance may be tipped a little bit. So what was probably like even a bigger strength for the Democrats in 2018 may not be quite -- that part won't be there necessarily.

And I mean, other things would probably be more relevant, particularly something like Jacksonville, which is becoming a very -- and you'll see, if you read the book, that Jacksonville's becoming a very interesting case in the state, particularly since it has a lot of people from the North and it

still has retained some of the Southern flavor that it gets from people that migrate there from Georgia.

And what's actually happening there is that there's still people that are traditionally, and I think one of the people that we interviewed said, “They still have their gods and guns, but they don't really care that much about having marijuana,” and –

And what?

MR. LANG: Gay marriage.

MS. DANIELSEN: Oh, and gay marriage there. So it seems to be that if you're going to predict anything if that's -- if Jacksonville is the future of Florida, you know, again, its going to be close but it looks like in the future that it's going to go a little bit more blue than it has in the past.

MR. LANG: And one of the things that Karen does in the Florida chapter is she separates Jacksonville from the Panhandle, which a lot of people definitely don't, but it's a different world.

MS. DANIELSEN: Yeah, there's a lot of different worlds in Florida.

MR. TEIXEIRA: David, you want to talk a little bit about what's happening in Arizona because that's another state that's on people’s minds in these days, and it certainly exemplifies that blue metro rest of the state split, right?

MR. DAMORE: Arizona is an interesting one because you actually have two big metros there. A lot of people forget about Tucson, which is a million-plus metro there. And Tucson is very, very Democratic leaning. Huge margins for Democrats out of there. And it's much smaller, obviously than Phoenix, but what we saw in the '18 Senate election there was Maricopa swung towards the Democrats. And Maricopa is where Phoenix is, and if the Democrats can carry Maricopa, and they’re carrying Tucson there's just simply not enough of Arizona left there.

And the dynamics in Arizona are very similar to Nevada in the sense you have a lot of transplants from California moving there, a lot of retirees from elsewhere. But what's changed sort of the typical view of Arizona is just generational replacement, right. The older, white retirees who might've come, you know, 10, 15 years ago are now being replaced by younger Latinos. And then you have the Californians coming in, so the population's shifting quite a bit there.

Arizona is also interesting because they, even though the Republicans have been the stronger party there, particularly in state races, they have independent redistricting, which has allowed the Democrats to sort of maintain a foothold in there, in both the statehouse and in the U.S. House delegation there.

A lot of -- we get a lot of questions, like how's Arizona different from Nevada. The main difference is there's no unions in Arizona, which has made it more difficult to organize. The secrets of that -- not so secret reasons for the Democrats whose success in Nevada is you have a really robust organized labor here. We don't have that when there so they're kind of starting from scratch in there. But you know, we expect it, and we did the new swing region about 10 years ago right, that was sort of the projection.

MR. LANG: Classic.

MR. DAMORE: Yeah. Yeah. That, you know, Arizona would soon be blue. I don't know if we've got to be blue in 2020 but it certainly looking there. The other element that I think Arizona is a little bit different is the LDS culture there. You know, there is a real sort of pushback against Trump among LDS voters there. Led obviously, by Jeff Blake who opted not to run for reelection and has been sort of an outspoken Trump critic there. So that's a little bit of a wildcard I think in Arizona is if the LDS vote either doesn't come out or ends up voting for Biden, that may further hurt the Republican chances there.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Now, it's easy to see in your mind's eye sort of what's going on in Arizona with a heavy diversification that's affecting the voting in the state, particularly these blue metros. But there's a lot of the key states, arguably the key states in this election really aren't that much about changing diversity, at least, in the race ethnic sense. I mean Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and what have you. Does anyone want to speak to that? How the blue metro kind of trend is still pretty relevant in those places?

Rob, you or Karen?

MS. DANIELSEN: Well, I can speak about Ohio and Michigan since I was involved in

those chapters. But Ohio's interesting. I mean it's been traditionally called a bellwether state but what's been really interesting in the past is that the three big blue metros in the state. But there's not enough population, surprisingly, in all those cities to overwhelm the vote in the outer parts of Ohio. But apparently, the suburban vote is probably going to turn out -- there's been trends showing that, you know, it's getting closer than it has in the past although I think it still trending red at this point.

And Michigan's interesting to because it has, I don't know, if you think about there's two parts of Michigan. There's like the Detroit area, and then there's also the Grand Rapids area. Grand Rapids area is the most Republican part of the state while obviously, Detroit is the most liberal part of the state. And all the rest of it is red obviously. And so again, Detroit has not been able to overcome, in terms of its vote, the rest of the state even though Grand Rapids is, you know, still a large city. It still has a bigger say with the rest of the -- the rest of Michigan in terms of how the state goes. Although, that's trending a little blue too.

MR. LANG: I can speak to Pennsylvania. We've, controversially, let me say this, put Pennsylvania in the mid-Atlantic along with Virginia. I think it's not controversial to have Pennsylvania in the mid-Atlantic, it was, or Virginia. But the reason is that Northern Virginia and Pennsylvania -- Eastern Pennsylvania are along the Acela corridor. They're part of the northeast. And because those are the most vibrant parts of the states in terms of population growth, population weight, liberalism, that the reason those two states, that is Virginia and Pennsylvania are light blue now because I don't consider Virginia anymore, really, a swing state. I think it had one of the shortest resting points as a swing state of any state I can think of. It went red, red, red, kind of blue, blue. Blue now.

Pennsylvania is interesting in that in the past it was seen that there was a very strong union side to the state in Pittsburgh because of the nature of the heavy industry there. And in the aast, it was liberal because Philadelphia was a part of this northeast corridor and everything that goes between Boston and Washington is liberal.

And famously, James Carville said, you know, between Pittsburgh and Pennsylvania is like Kentucky. You know, it's like Alabama in between. It has high gun registration; they shot a deer

hunter there. What's changing is this. Pittsburgh is sort of shifting red rather. And it is now one of the largest metros across the entire metro with a slight R lean, like, a slight Republican lean. And at the same time, the eastern part of the state of Pennsylvania, and not just Philadelphia, but Bucks County, places that commute back into New Jersey, the Lehigh Valley, which has a large Latino population that decamped from New York City, are changing the state into an east/west split. There's kind of a New Jersey part to Pennsylvania and the Ohio, especially Southeast Ohio, which is conservative, part to Pennsylvania.

That's the shifting dynamic, and that's why you see Trump in a place like Erie. He's got to get what we call the lakefront region, and squeeze out -- and he even said, “Hey, I don't even want to be here. I shouldn't be here, woe is me. If I wasn't losing this election because of the plague I wouldn't be here.”

And you know, as kind of crazy as that was to say politically, and it was, he had a point. In that, you know, he had Erie at hello, and he was going to count on just grinding out the whole western part of the state. And from, you know, small towns like Latrobe, Johnstown, and places like that, and he felt pretty secure in being able to sort of just pick up Pennsylvania again.

He is now facing a revolt of those collar counties in southeast Pennsylvania around Philly. Delaware County, places like that, where the suburban women in those counties, those numbers are plus 40 -- they're impossible, plus 40. Do you know how many rural counties it takes to make up for a bunch of women who like red wine and shop at Trader Joe's and sit around southeast Pennsylvania and just hate on this guy?

MR. TEIXEIRA: A lot.

MR. LANG: Pennsylvania is looking pretty good for the Democrats.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Well, let's talk a little bit more about that suburban dynamic. Just a second, Dave, and I'll get to you.

It seems to me like a lot of what the blue trending metros -- and their effects are all about is this, you know, the surrounding counties, the suburban counties becoming more like the urban areas,

and sort of that whole agglomeration then of the, you know, the huge million plus metros and their sort of linked areas becoming bluish.

So what's in the dynamic behind that? Why are the suburbs becoming so Democratic? Maybe Dave --

MR. DAMORE: I'll take that one. So I think if you look at sort of Bill Frey's data from Brookings, he's done a really nice job on that and he basically shows the suburbs are no longer lily white, right. They're rapidly diversifying. Initially, in the core, and then when you get farther out you're starting to see that as well. So you're starting just to see that the suburbs themselves are looking more like cities as Rob's research looks at there. There's also more (inaudible) going in there, more dense building, so they're looking more like cities as well.

So that's a big dynamic. And I think there's also, we can't downplay the COVID-19 here, right. That that hasn't been interesting to watch. We finished writing the book right as sort of lockdown started. But even back in April you can see these dynamics emerging with these red states and these blue metros fighting it out over what the policy was going to be. And the red state governors were sort of following the lead of the Trump administration. The blue metros were like this isn't going to work for us, we can't work with this. You have -- like, we focus in the book, we talk about what happened in Dallas where you have the suburban Dallas mayors, including some Republican ones, essentially going after the Republican governor and saying what are you doing here? This isn't going to work for us. We need to have much more consistent protocols and much stricter protocols there.

And so you can sort of see the suburbs that might have traditionally been Republican are now sort of, this is -- they're looking at the urban cores and saying yeah, those are the policies that we want to follow. And I mean, you saw crazy stuff like, lawsuits in Florida between metros and the governor, same thing in Atlanta. So I think that, you know, you have the changing demographics there. We certainly saw in '18 virtually all of the Democratic pickups were in the suburban districts. And not just in blue states. I mean, they're winning, you know, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Kansas, the suburbs there, as well.

So it's not something that's just happening in the swing states. It's important to remember that this is happening across the country. And I think COVID may strengthen those lines, sort of reinforce those blue metro, red state dynamics.

MR. TEIXEIRA: So is it then a lot about these voters that live there sort of changing their politics? It's not a matter of in-migrants?

MR. DAMORE: I think there's some of that as well. Because we certainly have that, as we touched on earlier there. You certainly have that a lot in the Sun Belt states where a lot of it's in-migration. And Karen can speak to that because she wrote that part of the concluding chapters. I'll let her chime in on that.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Karen.

MS. DANIELSEN: Well, I was just going to say something more about what you are saying about suburbs. I don't think you can underestimate, and we're seeing this more and more, how much women are changing their mind in the suburbs. And related to COVID I think that, you know, women are even more upset about this because they have -- they're deciding whether to send their kids to school, whether it's safe, or they have -- they're forced to stay home because they don't have babysitters. So I think one of the battle lines is also drawn just because of how women have to interact in those environments under this COVID, you know, lockdown environment that we're having as well.

MR. LANG: Remember the Bush security moms from 2004?

MR. TEIXEIRA: Who could forget.

MR. LANG: So they targeted -- suburban women, the Bush campaign smartly did this. Karl Rove did this, spoke about, you know, national security issues as related to 9/11 at that point which was still omnipresent because it was so recent in history.

Also, Ruy, I want to remind you, you did a book in 2008, “Beyond Red, Blue, Purple America” if you recall.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Right, I do.

MR. LANG: Another Brookings Press page turner. And in that book Tom Sanchez, who I

was at Virginia Tech with at that point and Alan Berube who's in Metro did a typology on the suburbs and on the counties. And the book starts with that chapter, and so we developed the kind of, you know, hypothetical statement where density plus a diversity equal Democrats, was the line. So we made a clean axiomatic statement, and you know, we could operationalize that. I won't bore the listeners with that but the upshot comes to something like this.

If you're in suburban Denver now, you're in Aurora, or you're in Lakewood, and you've got light rail running through, and you've got mixed income, higher density, mixed tenure housing, renters, owners, you've got, you know, a kind of urban environment and a millennial feels comfortable in because it's walkable. If you have that kind of space, that space around this country, whether it's in Plano, Texas, which is deeply conservative in the sort of traditional parts of Plano, but around the station stops in the downtown is transformed.

That part of metro America has expanded immensely, deep into Mecklenburg County. Deep into all these places you don't expect it. Deep into Phoenix. Deep into Mesa, into Mesa's downtown. A city that's larger than Atlanta in population, Mesa is so big. So when you look at these urbanized suburbs, they're gone for the Republicans. They're not quite as blue as cities. They don't have the 80/20 split or the 70/30 splits, but they've got 60/40 splits, and they're big enough, and expansive enough and in a coalition with the cities, as Dave mentioned, they have that identification. They are enough to be, in the states that are dominated by the large metro, like in Arizona, like Georgia, they may be enough to just push it over and to substitute for the intense rural turn out and this loyalty that rural areas have to the Republican Party.

MR. TEIXEIRA: I mean it seems like it might have been a bit of mistake, you could argue, for the Republicans to not be more cognizant of these trends and what was happening in these urbanizing suburbs and, you know, sort of the more dynamic areas of the country, almost like ceding them without really directly doing it, or saying they're going to do it.

But why is it? Why would they be less aware of what -- and in some sense, it's pretty obvious trends, which if you do the political arithmetic seems to put them in a medium to long-term hole.

So what's the dynamic there? Why did they miss this, if they did miss it?

MR. DAMORE: Yeah, I think 2018 should have been a wake-up call, right. In that when you're losing these suburban districts there. I think there's a couple of dynamics at work. The first is there's sort of this rationalization oh, the Democrats are motivated to vote against Trump. Trump voters stayed home because they don't care about if Trump's on the ballot right. So there was sort of that argument there, it was just a function of turnout.

But the reality is they all have to get in and win primaries. And the primary electorates in all these states, you know, more liberal on the Democratic side obviously, and much more conservative on the Republican side than the voters. Like, we saw that in Nevada right, 2018 all the polling had Dean Heller up here to maintain his U.S. Senate seat there. He tried to position himself as a moderate, and actually came out against President Trump in 2016. Goes back to Washington after the election and gets the cold shoulder, right. Becomes ineffective there. So then he has to cozy up to Trump and that ends up hurting him there, right.

He ends up sort of -- he had to do that to fend off the potential challenger in that race that you know, might have actually beat him in the primary there. So there's that dynamic, is that primary electorates, the Republican is still calling the shots. So in swing states like Nevada it's harder to get these sort of moderate candidates to emerge out of the Republican Party who might be receptive to those arguments, who might be more appealing to those types of candidates.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Other thoughts on that?

MS. DANIELSEN: Going back to Florida, one of the things I found that was really interesting is that a lot of Republicans in order to survive, they've had to give at least some lip service to some liberal ideas, particularly like climate change. So one of the things that helped people get elected, even if they were pretty staunchly Republicans is even Marco Rubio, starts to sound pretty liberal when it comes to climate change. At least within the state.

So there actually, you know, within the state they're coming off that way. Whether or not that translates to the federal level is a whole other issue. But you can see in some places that they are

recognizing it. They're not going whole hog with those issues all the way but they are recognizing that they need to, at least, talk about some of those issues that are important to liberals.

MR. LANG: But you raised an interesting question, Ruy, is like how could you miss this? I mean it's as common as just getting in an automobile. That's just a great line that, you know, Biden used on Trump. It's like this guy's never even been in a suburb. Trump sounds, when he describes the suburbs like, you know, June Cleaver is there in heels vacuuming the house; talks about housewives, you know worries about the degree of integration in the suburbs. Says, "I've saved you from this integration," when the suburbs already have a kind of quasi-urban feel and a diversity that in some cases, and I did this in another Brookings Press Bloomberg's, has a diversity that exceeds the core city.

So this train's left the station, literally, as it applies to light rail in the case of the suburbs. And the Republicans that are smart about this, and there are many, understand this dynamic and have applied it to win local races. Winning, even in statehouses, understanding these places. The national level, you know, the presidential campaign in this particular iteration of it, is probably the last time I suspect that the Republicans will, depending on the outcome, if they win maybe they'll feel, you know, verified that they understood the suburbs in a way the Democrats didn't get. But if they lose, and it's a pretty sound loss I suspect there'll be that re-examination that they were attempting to do after Romney lost.

You know, remember, go back. Romney lost in '12 and they did a sort of autopsy on the election and they said well, we really are just not appealing to the emerging America. Trump came along with a different political model and said no, you need to turn out the base and he turned out the base successfully. And what that did for a short amount of time is extend the idea that you can ignore all the change and the demographics and the characteristics of the United States.

If there is a reckoning now in 2020, I'm sure there'll be a 2021 retreat to a place like Williamsburg where a bunch of demographers and urban folks come in and lay this all out again. Now, whether or not they act on it is up to the Republicans. But I suspect at some point there will be a Republican leadership that says we can't keep getting slaughtered on this. We have to start pushing

back into the core of these cities. We've got to hold the blue line in these kinds of suburbs and then create public policy that appeals back into the interior.

And what that would look like is this. Why are you upsetting the Republican of Arlington, Texas who is a Republican and a natural ally to you by not agreeing to a universal use of masks on the basis of science? There is where you're losing them. There -- Arlington's got several hundred thousand people, it's bigger than Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. It can't afford to be casual about the larger urban population there not practicing contemporary public health techniques.

And when they did that in the Texas leadership in the governor's mansion, it's like throwing those cities away.

MR. TEIXEIRA: But how does a Trumpist Republican Party make that turn if they do lose in 2020?

MS. DANIELSEN: I just wanted to --

MR. TEIXEIRA: Trump is -- go ahead, Karen.

MS. DANIELSEN: Oh, I was just going to say I wanted to add to this, I think rather than doing the hard work of reconfiguring their party and their platform and going the whole Trump way is that they are treating the symptoms. Like they're losing voters, they're not, you know, getting them excited about this. So instead of doing this they've been gerrymandering. They been doing voter suppression rather than actually doing the reconfiguring that's necessary in order to actually get people to vote.

So rather than try to really meet the people's needs they're just trying to cheat their way around this thing, if you want.

MR. DAMORE: If I can add --

MR. TEIXEIRA: (inaudible) politics?

MR. DAMORE: If I can add to that, right. And think about a lot of the Republican success in the early half of this decade in the statehouses and the U.S. House was because they did so well in the 2010 mid-term. They picked up so many statehouses, so many governorships that they're able to control so many redistricting processes and sort of built these dynamics in for themselves.

Now, we saw in 2018 a wave comes along and sweeps away some of these seats. Now, you're thinking what's important about the 2018 election is how many Democratic governors got elected that weren't there in 2010. You know, the only thing that can happen in 2020 is a good day for Democrats, they've got more statehouses and they're getting more control over redistricting. So some of this is going to be imposed upon the Republicans just by the redrawing of the maps and the changing dynamics that are being brought on by the demographic changes.

Look, all the states that are going to pick up U.S. House seats are in the Sun Belt. They are all of these key states that are now coming in and getting on the radar, the Georgias, obviously Florida has been there for a while, but the Texases, the Arizonas, right, that's where it's going to be important in the next decade because that's where the countries moving.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Yeah, I guess you could make the argument that this election, at least, has the potential to be picking up on the theme of your book, kind of the blue metroization of American politics where blue metros will finally punch their weight. And in the process, maybe change the political terrain quite a bit.

MR. DAMORE: We'll see. I mean it’s also to remember -- an important thing we find out is you know, there's a lot of internal division in the metros. Right, they're not necessarily unified on local policy or state policy as well. That sort of one of the things the literature tells us. Well, that's nothing new, right. They've always been divided here. And what I thought was interesting was when we were sort of talking to the experts there, one of the things that they focused on in some of the states was the degree to which you have the sort of institutions emerge to sort of aggregate metro opinion and policy priorities for state and local governments here. And we certainly see that in Arizona, in Maricopa, for example the associate governor. You see that in Denver as well, and Colorado.

But in places like Texas you have clear divisions within the metros. And then when you go to the Northeast, it's even more difficult because there's so many little governments there. So you have all these indifferent elected officials in the “blue metro” but they're all responding in different electoral timetables and different constituencies. So yeah, you may see this in the voting, but in terms of

transferring into policy, it's a little more difficult.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Any words on -- final words on the future of the blue metroization of politics before we turn to some audience questions?

MR. LANG: What you had mentioned, you know, post Trump, what's the Republican path back in? I think what Bush was doing in '04 the last time the Democrats lost the popular vote and the Republicans won was '04. And so it's only one -- since 1988, as you know, the Republicans have only won the popular vote once. So they've relied on the electoral college, gerrymandering, as Dave and Karen noted, and so on.

But if you just went back to sort of Bush's approach from '04 you wouldn't get wiped out in these places. You'd remain competitive. So if you recall, Bush had heavily outreach to Latinos. There's no reason in the world that you can't embrace the country as it is. If you choose not to use those folks as a political battering ram to stoke a white base. If you think you've run out of white voters and that political model no longer is operative, then it's time to probably consider, what is the conservative set of ideas that would animate a diverse electorate?

And that would be the big challenge in this next decade coming up for Republicans, if they lose. And if the Democrats secure a bunch of governorships and state legislatures, and you don't have the gerrymandering and some of the chicanery you had because of the Tea Party wave of 2010, which was extremely fortunate to Republicans, and it was unfortunate in another way. They were able to avoid, for the better part of a decade until '18 until finally they were just swept out of office. Until all those little barriers that they put up were kicked over, and all those little sand castles wiped out.

Before that, they were just cruising along. Yeah, you can just be a party that ignores all this and just appeals to basically a rural voter. While all of the economy to -- as you know, famously, Brookings determined that almost two-thirds of the economy lie in the counties that Clinton won. And how long is it going to take for people that are responsible for two-thirds of the U.S. economy for their politics to be recognized as more important, sort of component, of American politics, and not be swept aside or some rural fetishes that the Republican Party has pursued?

MR. TEIXEIRA: Right, well maybe that's -- oh, David, you have something to add?

MR. DAMORE: I was just going to say, just to put an exclamation point on what Rob said. Clinton's counties that she carried were two-thirds of the economy, that's only 16% of the counties.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Whoa.

MR. DAMORE: So you think how concentrated that is.

MR. TEIXEIRA: So I think we're going to turn now to questions at this point. I would advise the, you know, people following us online that you can submit questions through your app there, and we'll try to get to some of them.

I do have a question here from Anna O'Connell on something we were just touching on really about the issue of redistricting and how that may possibly redress the balance between blue metros and the rest of the state. And I think that there's two questions there. One, is how likely is it that this will happen? And second, if they did it, what's the fair way to do it? What's the mechanism?

MR. DAMORE: I think that you're seen increasing use of redistricting commissions, right. They're on the ballot in a couple of states, Michigan for example. You know, the Michigan chapter is a fascinating story of how that reached the ballot. So that's just taking out the hand of self-interest that legislatures might have.

The other thing is sort of how this is done and how it hurts the metro regions is you can think a lot of districts are sort of pizza slices, that is they pick up parts of the metro region and then just extend far, far, far out into rural spaces there, essentially to minimize the impact of the metro voters. They are lumped in with rural voters, and ex-urban voters as opposed to drawing sort of core urban districts there.

So some of it's going to be taken care of by the demography and the growth is in the urban parts of the country there. Some of this could be done where states simply change the rules and take it away from the self-interest of legislatures there. But it's one of those things that sort of falls under the radar. The average voter doesn't really think much about that so there's an education component to it as well. So I'm optimistic that you've got more states where the legislatures aren't drawing the map

should help a little bit. And then, just sort of public input saying, “No, this isn't how representation should work here.”:

I'll just give a quick antidote in Nevada, and then we can move on. In 2011 in our state a Republican governor, a Democratic legislature, they could not come to agreement. And the governor kept vetoing the map so they let a nonpartisan set of judges draw it -- or a judge pick nonpartisan map drawers to draw it. And they drew maps and essentially the maps that I would have drawn, and guess what, Democrats won under them. Republicans won under them. When you put out good candidates you had a good message. So there's something to be said for that.

MS. DANIELSEN: Can I just add to that a little bit. The only thing I'm concerned about with the redistricting is that Trump has been monkeying around with the census. So we're not even sure if we counted everybody. So whether the maps are drawn well or not we may not even know the total number of people that should be counted, particularly people that make up the diversity in metropolitan areas. Those are the people that usually are undercounted which, you know, that doesn't bode well for us, actually.

MR. TEIXEIRA: I've got a question here from Ross Duvall about Republican and Democratic voter registration patterns in this election. I don't know if you guys have been keeping track of it with your geographic template, but do you have any insights on that? And what's happening and what it means?

MR. LANG: So yeah. The Republicans are saying just to sort of offset the idea that they’re down in the polls, that they're reporting registration numbers that have bumped up. And the question there is, you often don't know if a person was an Independent that leaned R prior to that. And then with Trump's election felt so energized that they finally went ahead and registered, as opposed to somebody coming into the voting rolls, moving to a state, turning 18, it's a little hard to disentangle that.

It's something that's probably a net plus but less than what the Republicans think it is. You know, it's always good to have people in your party when you look at the loyalty that people will show parties, even in kind of an off year it's plus 80%. So you're looking at a fairly -- you know, you're looking

at an indication that there's a fairly reliable vote out there. And they've closed gaps -- the gap with Democrats around the country, and in pretty critical states. The Republicans have been very aggressive at doing registration now. You know there's a difference between a registrant and a voter so these people may have just not going to vote. You know, you don't know the turnout. You don't know all the variables associated with it. So it will be one of the good things post-election to look at.

MR. DAMORE: And also, remember a lot of growth -- I mean the fastest growing group is nonpartisans. Which, I guess, is sort of a fascinating thing. Obviously**,** a lot of them are not really nonpartisan because they lean predominately one way. But you're starting to see, particularly a lot of young voters, are less likely to sort of identify there. So I think that's an interesting dynamic, particularly in the western states you're seeing almost a three-way split in voter registration between nonpartisans, Democrats, and Republicans.

That's with existing --

MR. LANG: Yeah, so just looking at the difference between Democratic and Republican registration is only part of the story if you don’t take into account people who register as Independents or whatever who may, in fact, lean fairly strongly in one direction or another. Probably Democratic, I would suspect.

MR. DAMORE: Yeah, and remember in '16 the Libertarian candidates got a lot of votes, and the Green Party got a lot of votes. And you're not seeing that this time around. Most people are going to -- you know I've made up my mind one way or the other on this and I'm not going to do something strange in our state. We have our weird, none of the above voting. And that actually got a bigger chunk of the vote than the difference between Clinton and Trump in '16. You're not going to probably see that again this time.

MR. TEIXEIRA: We have a question coming in from Anusar Farooqui. I may not have pronounced his name correctly. I would also add he has a great (inaudible) I can recommend. But he wants to know what accounts for the gender gap that we're seeing in the suburbs? What's really driving it, and, you know, I guess sort of related to that, we know there's a gender gap that's really growing a lot

in this election. Are both women and men in the suburbs moving toward Biden? What's going on there? What's your take on all this?

MS. DANIELSEN: I guess I have to answer that one. But I think I mentioned some of what I thought was some of the drivers of that before. Although this has been going back even, if you think about how many people were elected that were women in 2018, so this is not something that's new to 2020. I think it's been building. I think people have been getting angrier, particularly women, and I don't think COVID-19 actually helped Trump in this regard. I think women just are not happy with how he's responding to their needs in terms of -- they can't go to work necessarily. They may have to stay home again. They're worried about their kids going to school. And again, they're probably losing income if they are not able to go to work for many of those reasons beyond just losing their job because businesses are going under.

So I think it's growing in the sense that women are taking more of an interest in elections. I don't know if necessarily men are changed that much in the suburbs from where they were before, all the they probably don't like Trump as much as they did, necessarily.

I think it also has to do in terms of men, in terms of their education level. So obviously, Trump likes the non-educated, the uneducated. He doesn't particularly like the college educated males. So I think the divide between gender, at least in the male sense is educational level. I just think the women's dimension of that is a little bit more complicated, partly by education, but also partly by their family situation.

MR. LANG: Women have more BAs. Women are better educated if you look at education and its relationship to Republican voting now, women would be by sort of a risk for being a Democrat higher just on education attainment alone. So part of it's independent variables, external to gender.

MR. DAMORE: And also, it's important to remember that pre-Trump when we talked about the gender gap it was largely driven by minority women overwhelmingly voting Democrat. And white women were essentially 50/50. Now, you're seeing this more of a 60/40 split, and you're seeing the

shift -- minority women are still overwhelmingly Democratic. And of course, more and more are running for office as well. But you're seeing the movement again among white women, particularly in the suburbs, higher educated, that's where you're seeing the shift.

MR. TEIXEIRA: So we have a question from Caroline Corona about state legislatures. How do you see that working out in this election? I mean state legislatures are famously sort of stacked against Democrats in the blue metros. Are we going to see a breakthrough in that sense in this election? How much progress and change could we really see in this area, which is pretty important.

MR. DAMORE: Yeah. Particularly when they're drawing the maps. You know, legislatures, as you said, they tend to be stacked against there. But you can see what happens when they do flip. So Virginia and Nevada, two states that have flipped, gone Republican leaning to Democratic leaning, and now you have unified Democratic control there. And you see the policies have changed quite a bit on a lot of those sort of salient hot button issues there.

Other states, it's going to be a little bit more difficult for that to happen. Where, you know, the metros aren't quite as big, people aren't quite as dominant there. And then the other part of it is we found in some of the fascinating stuff that Karen uncovered in the Michigan story was just how sort of wired in some of these older states to more sophisticated party organizations have in preserving their interests. We saw that in Ohio a little bit, I think in Michigan too. And that's something that goes beyond just sort of the lines there, is just having that sort of network of donors, having that network of lobbyists, having that network of candidates there.

In a lot of those states that's where the Democrats are really behind is just sort of building that infrastructure that gives life to the policies that you want to see.

MS. DANIELSEN: I just want to respond to that. One of the things that, even going back to the history that that party structure like that has not changed probably fundamentally in the last couple of hundred years since the country started. One of the things that people have found, typical voting culture or political culture has not really changed on a sectional basis in states for very long. So you know that whole big sword idea where people moved to where their political affiliation suits them, still

persists. And that feeds into those networks and the state legislative voting patterns that you're talking about too.

MR. DAMORE: And the real fundamental problem I just wanted to point out is the Democrats have too concentrated their voters, it's too concentrated. That's been the problem is they win their districts really, really easily even if they're not gerrymandered. But they're just not -- the Republicans are just more efficiently distributed across the country and within the states.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Yeah, Mark Nadel had a question that's a bit of follow-up to what you just said, Karen, about you mentioned some of the big sword kind of stuff, people moving where they're comfortable. What about, are people changed when they move to a given area? I mean, so it's not just different people move there but by the very process of living in these metro areas they become somewhat different? They have -- they develop a different set of preferences? Do we have a way to unpack that?

MS. DANIELSEN: Well, one of the things we found in the book is that people bring a lot of their politics with them. So as communal, urban areas get bigger and they're usually pretty liberal anyway, but we're seeing still liberal people from other states migrate to other places. Like California, like Dave was talking about Californication, a lot of Californians have moved here to Las Vegas. A lot of Californians have moved to Arizona, and even in Texas. So people do bring their politics with them and they do mix in cities.

And just because you're -- and one of the things that that the American (inaudible) in terms of how you have interactions with people, the more you are familiar with diversity, the more you have interactions with diversity, and that includes politics, it does get influenced when you do move to cities. I mean, obviously there are still conservative parts to big cities too, but it does change as you do move into cities.

MR. LANG: Think about a kid, say from small-town Georgia that goes to Georgia Tech in the heart of Atlanta, and gets an engineering degree and goes to work in the tech belt that's around Atlanta. The world they see, the global perspective they gain by those work forces and by being in Atlanta, being in a city like that has to have some influence. It's got to be transformative.

So when Trump starts talking about the other, you might be married to the other. And maybe you wouldn't have been married to the other if you had stayed in small-town Georgia and didn't get good grades in high school and go to Georgia Tech. You know, so there's something about living in a larger metro, it may not transform all your politics. It might not penetrate your views on pro-life, for example.

But certainly on tolerance, on things that are manifestly true for it to function as a large metro, that you just live and let live, and you recognize that there is -- or there is a remarkably diverse world even beyond the United States, and that you are globally connected. And just the exposure to that alone, in sociological terms over the decades must have some effect. And I think you're seeing that in the suburbs. And I think the fact that the suburbs are so interconnected with their cores and that the business and all that is urban has spilled into them, and that they're functioning as cities that are somewhat more horizontal rather than vertical, that have a little more privacy and that they've got a greater preponderance of single family detached dwellings than the city does, almost becomes irrelevant at some point.

You know, even that couple in St. Louis, that famous couple, they live in the city of St. Louis, and one block that's cut off that was given permission to sort of vacate a street. And they live by Washington University. You know, you walk a few blocks from their house and you're in this unbelievably beautiful part of the west side of St. Louis, near Brookings Hall over at Washington University, I'll put a plug in there.

You would think that the way these people were depicted they were in some far-flung excerpt. They are just one of the rare people that wasn't transformed by it. I suppose some individual reactions to it may be that you hunker down in the giant mansion and by automatic weapons. But I suspect the vast share of people in their position wouldn't hold that view.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Well, I think we're running out of time here. But let me ask just one last question that came in from Eliza Astra that I think quite a good one, and quite relevant; is we've talked a lot about the conflicts between the blue metros and their surrounding suburbs and the rest of the state.

But is it the case that these things always have to be in conflict? What are ways in which the metros can work together with the rural areas too, you know, on things of common interest that might bring them together? Or does it just have to be wall-to-wall conflict?

MR. DAMORE: I think that's where the agenda matters. One of the things that we picked up in our state chapters when we were interviewing the experts was how much the sort of gerrymandering reinforced this sort of social Conservatism in statehouses. That that was something, and this was creating tensions as Rob mentioned between sort of business Republican oriented -- they don't want to talk about those things. And they don't want a bathroom bill, right. And they don't want those types of things there.

So I think some of it is structural, the structural reinforces the attitudes on that. But a lot of it is just who's controlling the agenda, right. So as I mentioned a moment ago the switch in the legislative priorities in Virginia and Nevada. That's a perfect example of that.

So you know, who's controlling the agenda matters a whole lot and who they're responding to in the statehouses.

MR. LANG: And remember when we did our book we chose a cut off at a million plus metro. There are plenty of metros of half million, or 250,000 that have -- that are not rural, that have a different relationship with the larger metro than say a rural area. And so there are states where you have dozens of these midsized, Fayetteville-sized metros in North Carolina. And so it's not as stark a split as the rural/urban. What it is, is that we thought that it was something unique to the character of million plus metros.

For example, just one little weird statistic. There is no county in the United States where a plane flies over an ocean that isn't blue. So there's something about the biggest metros and their global connectivity and their diversity that makes them even apart from a smaller metro. And yet, they could be in a coalition with a smaller metro.

So it's not all million-plus and then everything else is Mayberry. It's a million-plus and then the other city might be Asheville, North Carolina. And we don't see that necessarily as having to be

intention. It's more that these states with a million-plus metros that need to have all of their infrastructure and all their capabilities nurtured so that they can have this global reach and compete in a world economy, are being somewhat restrained in both the sociocultural dimensions of their character, and by the way of being starved of the share of the infrastructure that would be invested because they are so necessary to the state's budget, to smooth over deficits in the rest of the states where they're being depopulated in rural areas.

That's the basis of the tension. A more equitable understanding of these -- if states come to understand that they are really -- they have a lot of value in these big metros. Nevada should recognize it's lucky to have a metro of over 2 million. It's lucky to have a metro big enough to get an NFL franchise. It's lucky to have a metro with an airport that reaches over two oceans, and understand what that asset is. Then, perhaps, we can move forward and sort of build out these places to compete against China and Europe and we don't have to constantly turn back on ourselves and get into these rather destructive fights.

MS. DANIELSEN: Can I just end on one thing? I saw a political ad which somebody said can only happen in Utah. And I don't remember what they were running for, but they had both the Republican and a Democrat that were actually talking to one another. Maybe we can learn the fine art of compromise again. But I thought it was really interesting that they were actually on the same thing and smiling, and not arguing. So I don't know, maybe we need more of that.

MR. LANG: On a hopeful note.

MR. TEIXEIRA: Okay. Well, I think we're going to wrap it up. I'm Ruy Teixeira. We've had three authors of this great volume here that you must pick up. You know, it's totally worth the money. David Damore, Karen Danielsen, and Robert Lang, and I want to thank everybody for tuning in, and you know, we're going to see what's going to happen in this election very soon.

But remember, you can't understand what happened unless you get the book.

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