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IRAQ INDEX

Tracking variables of reconstruction
and security in post-Saddam Hussein
Iraq

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AUGUST 2020



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	4
SECURITY INDICATORS	5
Average boots on the ground in Iraq, rounded to hundreds, Fiscal Years 2003-2020	5
Average total number of contractors operating in Iraq, 2007-2018	7
U.S. troop, U.K. troop, and non-military fatalities in Iraq, 2003-2020	8
American military fatalities by category, March 19, 2003-September 10, 2019	9
Total U.S. troops wounded, by year	10
Estimated Iraqi Security Forces strength (2002-2019)	11
Iraqi civilian fatalities since March 2003	12
Civilian deaths by province due to suicide attack, 2003-2017	13
Incidents involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs) resulting in civilian fatalities, 2003-2017	14
Internally displaced Iraqis, 2003-2020.....	15
Number of Iraqi Asylum Application by Year, 2003-2018.....	16
Number of Iraqi returnees per governorate by category of severity, 2014-2020	17
Iraq's rank in Transparency International's annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI)	18
Iraq's rank in Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index, 2003-2020	19
ECONOMIC AND QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS	20
Iraqi population, 2002-2019	20
Iraqi GDP estimates, 2002-2018	21
Iraqi trade balance by year in current U.S. billions of dollars, 2005-2018	22
Total Iraqi crude oil production and export by year, 2003-2018	23
Total Iraqi crude oil revenues by year, 2002-2018	24
Iraqi unemployment rate, 2002-2019	25
Estimated Iraqi labor force and percentage of female workers, 2002-2019	26
Estimated access to safely administered essential services, 2002-2017	27
Iraqi electricity production versus distribution losses, 2003-2017	28
Estimated number of maternal deaths in Iraq, 2002-2017	29
Estimated Iraqi life expectancy (total and by gender), 2002-2019	30
Estimated number of physicians per 1,000 Iraqis	31
Estimated Iraqi literacy rate (total and by gender)	32

Estimated Iraqi internet usage	32
Estimated telephone subscribers, 2002-2018	34
POLLING/POLITICS	35
IIACSS Report (Al Mustakilla Research Groups): Iraq 16 Years Later	35
Brookings Institution Iraq Index 2003-2011	43
REFERENCES	45

INTRODUCTION

The Brookings Iraq Index presents numerical information on a range of security, economic, and political indicators of pertinence to the future of that country as well as the U.S. role within it. The Index was originally created in the early years of the 2000s, after a U.S.-led coalition overthrew Saddam Hussein, and sought to help Iraqis build a state that could avoid dictatorship and extremism going forward. Our goal, then and now, is to present a wide enough array of information to gauge many aspects of the effort, without swamping a reader in so much detail or arcana as to obscure attention to the big-picture policy questions facing the United States and its allies and partners there.

No compilation of statistics can ever convey whether a counterinsurgency campaign is being won or lost, and whether a country is managing to stabilize itself or not. This lesson was learned in Vietnam and must never be forgotten. But careful compilation and study of metrics, recognizing the uncertainties and complexities of the data going into them, can nonetheless provide grist for policy debates — and keep those policy debates grounded in empirical reality. As the data show, Iraq remains a troubled land — but is far improved by most indicators, at least for the moment, relative to many times in its past. It is gradually becoming a middle-income country, with notable improvements in the quality of life in recent times — even as corruption remains endemic, jobs for many youth remain scarce, and sectarian pressures (often inflamed by Iran) always threaten to boil over yet again.

SECURITY INDICATORS

Average boots on the ground in Iraq, rounded to hundreds, Fiscal Years 2003-2020ⁱ

Fiscal year	U.S. troop strength	U.K. troop strength	Total international coalition strength in Iraq (including U.S.)
2003	141,800	21,900	164,500 ¹
2004	130,600	8,800	155,300
2005	143,800	9,900	165,800
2006	141,100	9,400	160,200
2007	148,300	7,000	161,700
2008	157,800 ²	4,100	164,600
2009	135,600	500 ³	140,900
2010	88,300	N/A	88,300
2011	42,800	N/A	42,800
2012	4,100	N/A	4,100
2013	760	N/A	N/A
2014	1,129	N/A	N/A
2015	3,300 ⁴	400	N/A
2016	3,800	400	N/A
2017	5,262	400	N/A
2018	5,200	400	N/A
2019	5,200	400	7,500
2020	5,000	400	7,500


¹ From 2003 to 2011, the next two countries to deploy the most military personnel after the U.S. and Britain were Spain and Poland. Spain contributed 1,300 troops at the invasion but withdrew by April of 2004. Poland contributed 200 troops at the invasion and had a peak of 2,500 before withdrawing in October of 2008.

² U.S. troop strength reached an all-time peak in 2008 as an effect of the troop surge.


³ U.K. combat forces left Iraq in July of 2009, they had supplied the bulk of coalition forces outside of the U.S.

⁴ In late 2014, both the United States and the U.K. recommitted troops to Iraq in order to fight ISIS.

Average U.S., British, and coalition troop strength (2003-2012)



Average U.S. and British troop strength (2013-2020)



Average total number of contractors operating in Iraq, 2007-2018⁵ ii

Year	U.S. national contractors	Foreign and host country national contractors	Total contractors ⁶
2007 ⁷	26,900	127,900	154,800
2008	29,600	130,100	159,700
2009	34,200	94,300	128,500
2010	24,000	63,200	87,200
2011	18,300	44,400	62,700
2012	4,800	8,000	12,800
2013	2,000	5,700	7,700
2014	800	2,400	3,200
2015	1,100	300	1,400
2016	1,600	900	2,500
2017	2,300	1,700	4,000
2018	2,800	2,200	5,000

⁵ The numbers in this chart are approximations, as counting contractor personnel in theater is a difficult task. The contracting effort in Iraq is extensive, with layers of subcontractors making the tallying effort challenging.

⁶ Total contractors include both private military contractors as well contractors hired for infrastructure-based work. The chart attempts to characterize all recipients of funding from the Department of Defense (DoD).

⁷ The years 2003-2006 are missing from the table because it wasn't until legislation in 2007 under the National Defense Authorization Act that the DoD became responsible for issuing reports detailing the use of contractors in the field.

U.S. troop, U.K. troop, and non-military fatalities in Iraq, 2003-2020ⁱⁱⁱ

Year	U.S. troop fatalities	U.K. troop fatalities	Journalist/media worker fatalities	Humanitarian/ NGO worker fatalities
2003	486	53	14	48
2004	849	22	24	30
2005	846	23	23	9
2006	823	29	32	18
2007	904	47	32	6
2008	314	4	11	0
2009	148	1	4	1
2010	62	0	5	9
2011	58	0	5	0
2012	2	0	0	0
2013	0	0	10	1
2014	4	0	5	0
2015	8	0	6	0
2016	20	0	6	1
2017	22	1	8	3
2018	17	1	0	3
2019	12	0	2	1
2020	7	1	2	4
Totals	4582	182	189	134

American military fatalities by category, March 19, 2003-September 10, 2019⁸ iv


Category	Total fatalities as of September 10, 2019: 4,579
Gender	Male: 4,460 Female: 118
Age	Younger than 22: 1,310 22-24: 2,004 25-30: 1,173 31-35: 446 Older than 35: 545
Component	Active: 3,633 Reserve: 430 National Guard: 516
Military service	Army: 3,344 Marines: 1,027 Navy: 127 Air Force: 76
Officers/enlisted	Officer: 459 E5-E9: 1,516 E1-E4: 2,604
Race/ethnicity	American Indian or Alaska Native: 44 Asian: 78 Black or African American: 462 Hispanic or Latino: 487 Multiple races, pending or unknown: 199 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander: 19 White: 3,777

⁸ Represented are the totals by category for U.S. military fatalities in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation New Dawn, and Operation Inherent Resolve.

Total U.S. troops wounded, by year

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
WIA	2,423	8,004	5,945	6,415	6,121	2,052	680	392	221	
Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	
WIA	0	0	0	5	25	32	13	11	116 ⁹	32,455

U.S. troops wounded in action (WIA) since March 2003^v



⁹ The spike in U.S. troops wounded in action in 2020 is the result of heightened tensions with Iran. In retaliation for the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in January, Iran launched missiles at Ain al-Assad Air Base. Following the attack, it was originally reported that 11 U.S. Service Members received brain injuries, but further reports have indicated the number to be closer to 100. More missile strikes came in March on Joint Operations Base Camp Taji, adding to the U.S. service member casualties in 2020. The attacks are thought to have been conducted by Iranian-backed militia Kataib Hezbollah.

Estimated Iraqi Security Forces strength (2002-2019)^{10 vi}

Year ¹¹	Iraqi armed forces				Paramilitary	
	Army (includes National Guard)	Navy	Air Force	Total	Iraqi Police Service	Total Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) Forces ¹²
2002	350,000	2,000	37,000	389,000	N/A	42,000-44,000
2003 ¹³	47,500	410	500	48,500	86,900	18,200
2004	79,000	700	200	79,900	67,000	32,900
2005	105,700	800	500	107,000	82,000	38,000
2006	105,700	800	800	107,300	82,000	38,000
2007	163,500	1,100	1,200	165,800	135,000	33,000
2008	187,000	1,900	1,900	190,800	305,700	386,300 ¹⁴
2009	187,000	2,000	3,000	192,000	305,700	386,300
2010	238,000	2,600	5,200	245,800	298,500	413,600
2011	193,400	3,600	5,100	202,100	302,000	531,000
2012	193,400	3,600	5,100	202,100	302,000	531,000
2013	193,400	3,600	5,100	202,100	302,000	531,000
2014 ¹⁵	100,000	3,600	5,000	108,600	N/A	N/A
2015	54,000	3,000	4,000	61,000	36,000	145,000
2016	54,000	3,000	4,000	61,000	36,000	145,000

¹⁰*The Military Balance* is the International Institute of Strategic Studies' (IISS) annual assessment of the military capabilities and defence economics of 171 countries worldwide. Iraq's Security Force on duty consists of the Iraqi Armed Forces and the Iraqi Paramilitary Forces. This list does not take into account the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or the Kurdish Peshmerga.

¹¹ In the years following 2006, the IISS annual report was based on the data collected up to November of the previous year. Due to this in the above graphic data about military capabilities in Iraq in 2007 was taken from the 2008 released report for the years after 2006.

¹² The Ministry of Interior's Forces includes Iraq's Civil Intervention Force, Emergency Response Unit, Border Enforcement, and Dignitary Protection.

¹³ Following the invasion of Iraq by the United States, the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded much of the Iraqi Army.

¹⁴ In the years following 2007, IISS began including the Iraqi Police Service in the total MOI Forces.


¹⁵ The Iraqi Armed Forces as well as its paramilitary forces took heavy losses in personnel and equipment due to the fight against ISIS.

2017	54,000	3,000	4,000	61,000	36,000	145,000
2018	54,000	3,000	4,000	61,000	36,000	145,000
2019	180,000	3,000	5,000	188,000	36,000	145,000

Iraqi civilian fatalities since March 2003^{vii}

Year	Iraqi civilian fatalities due to violence	Year	Iraqi civilian fatalities due to violence
2003	12,133	2012	4,622
2004	11,373	2013	9,852
2005	16,583	2014	20,218
2006	29,526	2015	17,578
2007	26,112	2016	16,393
2008	10,286	2017	13,183
2009	5,382	2018	3,319
2010	4,167	2019	2,392
2011	4,162	2020	384

Iraqi civilian fatalities due to violence per year (2003-2020)




Civilian deaths by province due to suicide attack, 2003-2017¹⁶ viii

Year	Baghdad	Anbar	Salah ad Din	Diyala	Ninawa	Tamim	Babylon
2003	48	25	0	18	0	4	0
2004	361	37	35	101	30	53	8
2005	858	45	160	251	352	110	440
2006	717	234	83	92	218	81	37
2007	998	575	468	492	712	142	281
2008	429	234	121	385	221	104	102
2009	458	160	13	129	188	91	83
2010	444	96	15	78	32	0	55
2011	104	67	232	71	15	12	38
2012	149	37	31	34	36	14	2
2013	331	225	326	182	184	96	122
2014	632	173	268	167	44	95	119
2015	295	117	135	284	0	7	15
2016	962	58	172	138	105	25	246
2017	78	4	7	6	64	0	0

¹⁶ The seven provinces depicted account for roughly 95% of the recorded attacks nationwide over the entire period.

Iraqi civilians killed by suicide attack by province (2003-2017)



Incidents involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs) resulting in civilian fatalities, 2003-2017^{17 ix}


Year	IED incidents	Year	IED incidents
2003	56	2011	287
2004	271	2012	339
2005	548	2013	414
2006	647	2014	365
2007	645	2015	374
2008	528	2016	385
2009	274	2017	104
2010	237		

¹⁷ This chart only takes into account IED incidents that involved one or more civilian fatalities. It does not include IED incidents that did not result in a fatality or incidents involving exclusively non-Iraqi fatalities.

Internally displaced Iraqis, 2003-2020^x

Year	Internally displaced people	Year	Internally displaced people
2003	400,000	2012	2,100,000
2004	800,000	2013	2,100,000
2005	1,200,000	2014	3,276,000
2006	2,000,000	2015	3,290,000
2007	2,740,000	2016	3,035,000
2008	2,770,000	2017	2,648,000
2009	2,764,000	2018	1,962,000
2010	2,700,000	2019	1,555,000
2011	2,600,000	2020	1,400,000


Internally displaced Iraqis (2003-2020)



Number of Iraqi Asylum Application by Year, 2003-2018^{xi}

Year	Asylum applications	Year	Asylum applications
2003	25,500	2011	23,500
2004	9,850	2012	19,600
2005	12,498	2013	38,200
2006	22,761	2014	68,700
2007	45,514	2015	209,200 ¹⁸
2008	40,400	2016	185,100
2009	24,319	2017	113,500
2010	20,100	2018	72,600

Iraqi asylum applications (2003-2018)



¹⁸ The spike in asylum applications coming from Iraq in 2015 can be attributed to the rise of ISIS. At its peak, in 2015 ISIS controlled 282,485 kilometers of territory in northwestern Syria and northern Iraq.

Number of Iraqi returnees per governorate by category of severity, 2014-2020¹⁹ xii

Governorate	High ²⁰	Medium	Low	Total
Baghdad	103,620	536,652	715,662	1,355,934
Anbar	1,932	30,372	57,114	89,418
Diyala	41,634	141,798	44,754	228,186
Erbil	2,424	6,750	35,784	44,958
Kirkuk	306	80,700	255,546	336,552
Ninewa	173,724	560,496	1,016,676	1,750,896
Salh al-Din	198,450	393,672	80,226	672,348
Total	522,090	1,750,440	2,206,542	4,479,072

¹⁹ The Return Index is a tool designed to measure the severity of conditions in locations of return for Iraqis. Collection began in 2014, with the most recent update being in February of 2020, and was meant to track population movements due to the conflict with ISIS. The numbers represent a gross figure of internally displaced people who have returned to their homes since 2014. Since it is a gross figure the numbers do not represent those returnees who were displaced again due to conflict after returning.

²⁰ The Return Index is based on 16 indicators divided into two scales: Scale 1, on livelihoods and basic services, and Scale 2, centered around social cohesion and safety perceptions. Of the 1,724 locations studied, 12% of Iraqi returnees have arrived in high severity locations, 39% in medium severity locations, and 49% in low severity locations.

Iraq's rank in Transparency International's annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI)²¹ xiii

Year	Rank	Number of countries surveyed
2003	113	133
2004	129	146
2005	137	159
2006	160	163
2007	178	180
2008	178	180
2009	176	180
2010	175	178
2011	175	183
2012	169	198
2013	171	198
2014	170	198
2015	161	198
2016	166	198
2017	169	198
2018	168	198
2019	162	198

²¹ Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index uses 13 different indicators to measure a country's level of corruption in the public sector. Rankings are then based on this CPI score, with the country ranked first being the least corrupt country.

Iraq's rank in Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index, 2003-2020²² xiv

Year	Score	Rank	Number of countries surveyed
2003	37.5	124	166
2004	58.5	148	167
2005	67.0	157	167
2006	66.8	154	168
2007	67.8	157	169
2008	59.4	158	173
2009	53.3	145	175
2010	45.6	130	178
2011	75.4	152	179
2012	75.4	152	179
2013	44.7	150	180
2014	45.4	153	180
2015	47.8	156	180
2016	54.4	158	180
2017	54.0	158	180
2018	56.6	160	180
2019	52.6	156	180
2020	55.37	162	180


²² Reporters Without Borders (RSF) determines the degree of freedom for journalists in 180 countries “by pooling the responses of experts to a questionnaire devised by RSF. This qualitative analysis is combined with quantitative data on abuses and acts of violence against journalists during the period evaluated. The criteria evaluated in the questionnaire are pluralism, media independence, media environment and self-censorship, legislative framework, transparency, and the quality of the infrastructure that supports the production of news and information.” Countries are ranked based off of their score with the country with the most press freedom being ranked first.

ECONOMIC AND QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS

Iraqi population, 2002-2019^{23 xv}

Year	Population	Year	Population
2002	24,931,900	2011	30,725,300
2003	25,644,500	2012	31,890,000
2004	26,313,800	2013	33,157,000
2005	26,922,300	2014	34,412,000
2006	27,448,100	2015	35,572,300
2007	27,911,200	2016	36,610,600
2008	28,385,700	2017	37,552,800
2009	28,973,200	2018	38,433,600
2010	29,742,000	2019	39,309,800

Iraqi population (2002-2019)



²³ Data found using the World Bank's online database.

Iraqi GDP estimates, 2002-2018²⁴ xvi

Year ²⁵	GDP (constant 2010 U.S. dollars, billions)	Real GDP growth (%)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 U.S. dollars, billions)	Real GDP per capita growth (%)
2002	96.8	-6.9	3,881	-9.6
2003	64.7	-33.1	2,524	-34.9
2004	99.8	54.2	3,792	50.2
2005	104.2	4.4	3,869	2.0
2006	114.8	10.2	4,181	8.0
2007	116.4	1.4	4,169	-0.3
2008	125.9	8.2	4,436	6.4
2009	130.2	3.4	4,493	1.3
2010	138.5	6.4	4,657	3.6
2011	148.9	7.5	4,848	4.1
2012	169.7	13.9	5,322	9.8
2013	182.6	7.6	5,508	3.5
2014	183.9	0.7	5,344	-2.9
2015	188.5	2.5	5,298	-0.9
2016	217.1	15.2	5,931	11.9
2017	211.7	-2.5	5,638	-4.9
2018	210.5	-0.6	5,477	-2.8


²⁴ These numbers are estimates provided by the World Bank, as there is some discrepancy between sources over the exact GDP value for certain years. Both GDP and GDP growth rate, as well as per capita, are adjusted for inflation and demonstrate the real GDP values for the given year.

²⁵ In 2002, the Iraqi population was 24,931,919; by 2019, the population had grown to 39,309,800.

Iraqi trade balance by year in current U.S. billions of dollars, 2005-2018²⁶ xvii

Year	Imports	Exports	Year	Imports	Exports
2005	26.1	24.1	2012	63.4	97.0
2006	24.1	30.9	2013	71.4	93.4
2007	21.5	40.5	2014	68.6	88.9
2008	37.3	65.2	2015	58.2	56.4
2009	43.8	41.6	2016	44.1	46.8
2010	47.2	54.6	2017	48.5	63.6
2011	51.8	82.5	2018	56.9	91.9

Iraqi trade balance (2005-2018)



²⁶ Data for this chart was found using the World Bank's online database.

Total Iraqi crude oil production and export by year, 2003-2018^{xviii}


Year	Crude oil production (millions of barrels/day) ²⁷	Crude oil export (millions of barrels/day)
Estimated pre-war level	2.5	1.7
2003	1.5	0.9
2004	1.9	1.4
2005	1.8	1.3
2006	1.9	1.4
2007	2.0	1.6
2008	2.1	1.7
2009	2.3	1.8
2010	2.3	1.8
2011	2.5	2.1
2012	2.8	2.3
2013	2.9	2.3
2014	3.0	2.4
2015	3.4	2.9
2016	4.3	3.7
2017	4.4	3.7
2018	4.4	3.9

²⁷ To get millions of barrels of oil equivalent per day, the data had to be converted from thousand tonnes of oil equivalent per year. This was done through the use of a converter, and then divided by 365 to find the value per day.

Total Iraqi crude oil revenues by year, 2002-2018^{xix}

Year	Crude oil export revenues (U.S. dollars, billions)	Year	Crude oil export revenues (U.S. dollars, billions)
2002	15	2011	82.9
2003	0.6	2012 ²⁸	94
2004	9.5	2013	89.2
2005	12.7	2014	84.1
2006	18.6	2015	49
2007	18.8	2016	43.6
2008	42.5	2017	60.4
2009	41.2	2018	68.1
2010	52.2		

Iraqi crude oil export revenues (2003-2018)




²⁸ Although total production has increased since 2015, revenues peaked in 2012 and only started to recover in 2017, due to internal conflict, lack of investment in infrastructure, and lower international oil prices.

Iraqi unemployment rate, 2002-2019²⁹ xx

Year	Unemployment rate (percent)	Year	Unemployment rate (percent)
2002	9.1	2011	8.2
2003	9.1	2012	8.0
2004	9.0	2013	9.3
2005	8.90	2014	10.6
2006	8.8	2015	10.7
2007	8.7	2016	10.8
2008	8.4	2017	13.0
2009	8.5	2018	12.9
2010	8.4	2019	12.8

Unemployment rate % (2002-2019)



²⁹ The Global Economy Online Database describes the unemployment rate as “a percentage of the total labor force in Iraq. The labor force includes the people who are either employed or unemployed, i.e. who don’t have a job but are actively looking for one. The labor force does not include people who are not looking for work, children, and the retired.”

Estimated Iraqi labor force and percentage of female workers, 2002-2019^{xxi}

Year	Total labor force ³⁰ (millions)	Female workers (percentage of total labor force)
2002	6.6	12.3
2003	6.3	12.8
2004	6.4	13.2
2005	6.6	13.7
2006	6.7	14.2
2007	6.8	14.7
2008	7.0	14.5
2009	7.0	14.4
2010	7.3	14.3
2011	7.6	14.2
2012	8.0	14.0
2013	8.5	14.8
2014	9.0	15.5
2015	9.5	16.0
2016	9.8	16.6
2017	9.8	13.2
2018	10.1	13.3
2019	10.5	13.4

³⁰ The World Bank Online Database describes the Labor Force as comprising “people ages 15 and older who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. It includes people who are currently employed and people who are unemployed but seeking work as well as first-time job-seekers. Not everyone who works is included, however. Unpaid workers, family workers, and students are omitted. Members of the armed forces are not counted as well.”

Estimated access to safely administered essential services, 2002-2017^{xxii}

Year	Drinking water (percent of population) ³¹		Sanitation services (percent of population) ³²	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
2002	29.4	61.0	33.0	31.9
2003	30.5	61.2	33.9	32.0
2004	31.6	61.4	34.7	32.0
2005	32.8	61.6	35.4	32.5
2006	33.9	61.8	36.2	32.9
2007	35.1	62.0	36.9	33.4
2008	36.2	62.2	37.7	33.8
2009	37.3	62.4	38.4	34.5
2010	38.5	62.6	39.2	35.1
2011	39.6	62.8	40.0	35.7
2012	40.8	63.0	40.8	36.3
2013	41.9	63.2	41.6	36.9
2014	43.0	63.5	42.4	37.5
2015	44.2	63.7	43.3	38.2
2016	45.3	63.9	44.1	38.8
2017	46.5	64.1	45.0	39.4

³¹ The World Bank Online Database describes this data as “the percentage of people using drinking water from an improved source that is accessible on premises, available when needed and free from faecal and priority chemical contamination. Improved water sources include piped water, boreholes or tubewells, protected dug wells, protected springs, and packaged or delivered water.”

³² The World Bank Online Database describes this data as “the percentage of people using improved sanitation facilities that are not shared with other households and where excreta are safely disposed of in situ or transported and treated offsite. Improved sanitation facilities include flush/pour flush to piped sewer systems, septic tanks or pit latrines: ventilated improved pit latrines, composting toilets or pit latrines with slabs.”

Iraqi electricity production versus distribution losses, 2003-2017^{xxiii}

Year	Total electricity produced (GWh)	Total electricity imported (GWh)	Total domestic supply (GWh)	Distribution losses (GWh) ³³
2002	33,863	0	33,863	2,326
2003	28,340	0	28,340	1,667
2004	32,295	1,318	33,613	1,977
2005	30,400	1,241	31,641	9,120
2006	33,823	2,688	36,511	9,561
2007	33,273	2,196	35,433	13,605
2008	36,888	2,973	39,861	18,022
2009	37,847	5,585	43,432	18,425
2010	48,908	5,422	54,350	17,558
2011	53,903	7,233	61,136	20,756
2012	46,018	10,170	56,188	19,797
2013	58,422	12,202	70,624	23,285
2014	67,768	12,251	80,019	34,312
2015	68,688	13,104	81,792	37,484
2016	80,030	11,965	91,955	48,958
2017	87,365	11,787	99,152	52,767

³³ Although net electricity generation has increased gradually since the 2003 start of the Iraq war, distribution losses have also increased. From 2006 to 2016, distribution losses averaged 42% of total electricity supply. Distribution lines are outdated and unreliable, metering and billing are inaccurate, electricity theft through illegal connections is rampant, and often electricity supplies are unmetered. Large scale power shortages led to protests in 2018. According to the World Bank, the Iraqi electricity distribution system “is the most problematic with adverse effects on the entire electricity sector in terms of financial sustainability, compromising the economic sustainability of the upstream generation and transmission business.”


Estimated number of maternal deaths in Iraq, 2002-2017³⁴ xxiv

Year	Number of deaths	Year	Number of deaths
2002	640	2010	710
2003	1,200	2011	700
2004	1,100	2012	700
2005	1,200	2013	800
2006	1,500	2014	1,000 ³⁵
2007	1,300	2015	910
2008	860	2016	860
2009	740	2017	870

³⁴ The World Bank Online Database describes maternal death as referring “to the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy or its management but not from accidental or incidental causes.”

³⁵ For comparison the United States had 640 maternal deaths in 2014 with a population of 318 million whereas Iraq had 1,000 maternal deaths with a population of 34 million. The resulting estimated ratio is that per 100,000 live births in Iraq, 92 women would die due to maternal complications, whereas only 16 would die in the United States per 100,000 live births.

Estimated number of maternal deaths in Iraq (2002-2017)



Estimated Iraqi life expectancy (total and by gender), 2002-2019^{36 xxv}

Year	Male	Female	Total
2002	66.3	68.5	67.4
2003	66.7	69.0	67.8
2004	67.1	69.50	68.3
2005	67.5	70.0	68.7
2006	67.8	70.3	69.0
2007	68.0	70.7	69.3
2008	68.3	80.0	69.6
2009	68.6	71.3	69.9
2010	68.9	71.70	70.3
2011	69.2	72.0	70.6
2012	69.4	72.4	70.8

³⁶ This data was found using the yearly CIA World Factbook publications, accessed online.

2013	69.7	72.7	71.1
2014	69.9	73.0	71.4
2015	72.6	77.2	74.9
2016	72.6	77.2	74.9
2017	72.6	77.2	74.9
2018	72.6	77.2	74.9
2019	70.7	74.6	72.6

Estimated number of physicians per 1,000 Iraqis³⁷ xxvi

Year	Physicians per 1,000 Iraqis ³⁸
2001	0.54
2004	0.66
2005	0.66
2007	0.52
2010	0.67
2014	1.0
2017	0.84
2018	0.71

³⁷ Data found using the World Bank's online database.

³⁸ Physicians include generalists and specialist medical practitioners.

Estimated Iraqi literacy rate (total and by gender) ^{xxvii}

Year	Male	Female	Total ³⁹
1995⁴⁰	70.7	45	58.0
2000	84.1	64.2	74.1
2010	86.0	70.6	78.2
2011	86.0	71.2	78.5
2012 ⁴¹	85.9	69.0	77.2
2013	81.4	63.4	72.7
2014	90.0	74.6	82.2
2015	85.7	73.7	79.7
2016	90.0	76.8	83.3
2017	91.2	79.9	85.6

Estimated Iraqi internet usage ^{xxviii}

Year	Internet users ⁴²
2001 ⁴³	12,500
2002	25,000
2005	36,000
2007	54,000
2008	300,000

³⁹ Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can both read and write with understanding a short simple statement about their everyday life.

⁴⁰ The data from the years in bold was found using the CIA World Factbook publications.

⁴¹ The data from the years not in bold was found using the CIA World Bank's online database.

⁴² The CIA World Factbook describes this entry as giving "the total number of individuals within a country who can access the Internet at home, via any device type (computer or mobile) and connection. Statistics include users who access the Internet at least several times a week to those who access it only once within a period of several months."

⁴³ The estimated pre-war fixed broadband subscribers was 4,500 individuals as indicated by the November 2011 Brookings Index. This number climbed to 4,492,300 individuals by 2018. Exact numbers for the years in between were not recorded by the International Telecommunications Union.

2009	325,900
2014	2.8 million
2015	6.4 million
2016	8.1 million

Estimated telephone subscribers, 2002-2018 ^{xxix}

Year	Fixed telephone subscriptions ⁴⁴	Mobile cellular subscriptions ⁴⁵
2002	1,128,300	20,000 ⁴⁶
2003	1,183,300	80,000
2004	1,034,200	574,000
2005	1,115,000	1,533,000
2006	1,247,500	9,345,400
2007	1,364,500	14,021,200
2008	1,082,300	17,529,000
2009	1,650,100	20,116,900
2010	1,720,600	23,264,400
2011	1,794,000	25,519,000
2012	1,871,000	26,756,000
2013	1,900,000	32,450,000
2014	1,947,700	33,000,000
2015	1,997,000	33,559,000
2016	2,031,000	33,447,000
2017	3,237,900	33,415,700
2018	2,705,000	36,527,400

⁴⁴ The World Bank Online Database describes fixed telephone subscriptions as referring “to the sum of active number of analogue fixed telephone lines, voice-over-IP (VoIP) subscriptions, fixed wireless local loop (WLL) subscriptions, ISDN voice-channel equivalents and fixed public payphones.”


⁴⁵ The World Bank Online Database describes Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions as “subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service that provide access to the PSTN using cellular technology. The indicator includes (and is split into) the number of postpaid subscriptions, and the number of active prepaid accounts (i.e. that have been used during the last three months). The indicator applies to all mobile cellular subscriptions that offer voice communications. It excludes subscriptions via data cards or USB modems, subscriptions to public mobile data services, private trunked mobile radio, telepoint, radio paging and telemetry services.”

⁴⁶ Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, mobile phones were hardly seen in Iraq, but quickly took off in the subsequent years. In 2018 the total population was 38,433,600 with the total mobile cellular subscriptions being 36,527,400. However, one limitation to this data is that it does not account for people holding more than one cellular subscription.

POLLING/POLITICS

IIACSS Report (Al Mustakilla Research Groups): Iraq 16 Years Later

Question: Do you think things in Iraq are going in the right direction or the wrong direction?




(IIACSS Group CEO Dr. Munqith Dagher Presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) headquarters, April 8, 2019^{47 xxx})

Note on graph: The years chosen for this data all represent landmark events in Iraq since the invasion of 2003. The years 2005-2006 represent the first Iraqi parliamentary election, 2009-2010 represent the partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, 2014-2015 represent the occupation of Iraq by ISIS, 2016-2017 represent the defeat of ISIS, and 2018-2019 represent the current situation.


⁴⁷ IIACSS is the first and largest private research group in Iraq, established in 2003. It is a member of Gallup International. The report details nationwide representative surveys conducted since 2003, with samples being drawn using proportional probability random samples and up-to-date population statistics. Interviews were carried out in the main governorates of the different regions of Iraq. Data was collected face to face with interviewers recruited and trained locally. IIACSS employs rigorous quality controls with these data sets having a margin of error of 2.8% and a confidence rate of 95%.

Question: Do you think Iran is a reliable partner to Iraq?




Note on graph: During the years 2014-2015, Iran assisted with the fighting of ISIS which is a potential cause for the uptick in public opinion. However, due to recent meddling in Iraqi politics and the belief that Iran is pulling strings from afar, this number has dropped once again. Most startling is the drop in Shia support for Iran since 2014.

Question: Do you think the United States of America is a reliable partner to Iraq?



Note on graph: Although Kurdish support has remained strongly in favor of the United States, the total Iraqi population has become more and more favorable towards the United States since the partial troop withdrawal in 2009-2010.


Question: Do you feel safe in your neighborhood?



Year	Shia (%)	Sunni (%)
2004	50%	54%
2006	78%	30%
2009	97%	90%
2014	77%	10%
2018	88%	88%


Note on graph: As a result of the 2007 U.S. troop surge and new policy regarding winning the “hearts and minds,” of the Iraqi citizens, large gains were made in making the Sunni population of Iraq feel more secure. Following the departure of U.S. troops, many of these gains were lost. In 2014, the Sunni population felt the least safe which had a strong link to the rise of ISIS in predominantly Sunni areas.

Question: Do you believe that the government should base its laws entirely from Islamic laws (*shariaa*)?




Note on graph: The sharp decline in 2018 could be attributed to the role ISIS played in highlighting the problems of strict adherence to *shariah* during its occupation from 2014-2017.

Main concerns for Iraqi people




Note on graph: In 2019, the main concern for Iraqis is corruption in the government and its bureaucracy, a sharp change from the security concerns in 2004.

Question: Do you have confidence in the Iraqi central government to improve the situation in Iraq?



Note on graph: A marked decline in Iraqi confidence in their government was seen between the years 2014 and 2016 which corresponds to the occupation of northern Iraq by Isis. However, confidence has been building since the successful ousting of ISIS. Kurdish confidence levels remain low in contrast.


Question: Do you have confidence in the Iraqi police to improve the situation in Iraq?



Note on graph: It is important to note that Shia groups are at a decade low in terms of the percentage who have confidence in the Iraqi police.

Brookings Institution Iraq Index 2003-2011^{xxxix}

Question: Do you think things in Iraq are going in the right direction or the wrong direction?



Note on graph: Yearly estimates were made by taking the average of the monthly polling data collected in the previous Indices. Similar to the IIACSS report, the percentage of Iraqis who thought the country was headed in the right direction was lower in 2010 than in 2005 and the percentage of Iraqis who thought the country was headed in the wrong direction was higher. However, this graph displays the change in optimism during the years in between. A clear decline in optimism was seen in the early months of 2007 prior to the effects of the troop surge taking place. Optimism then levels out towards the end of 2008 as progress was made in regaining the confidence of Iraq's Sunni citizens.

Question: Do you feel safe in your neighborhood?

Year	Shia (%)	Sunni (%)
2007	29%	3%
2009	67%	33%

Main concerns for Iraqi people

Year	Security	Unemployment/ Economy	Infrastructure	Other
2004	59%	16%	15%	10%
2005	31%	18%	26%	25%
2009	35%	20%	0%	17%

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