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Tracking variables of reconstruction
and security in post-9/11 Afghanistan

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AUGUST 2020



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INTRODUCTION

The Brookings Afghanistan Index presents numerical information on a range of security, economic, and political indicators of pertinence to the future of that country as well as the U.S. role within it. The Index was originally created in the early years of the 2000s, after a U.S.-led coalition overthrew the Taliban, pursued al-Qaida in the region, and sought to help Afghans build a state that could keep such extremist groups from regaining major footholds in the future. Our goal, then and now, is to present a wide enough array of information to gauge many aspects of the effort, without swamping a reader in so much detail or arcana as to obscure attention to the big-picture policy questions facing the United States and its allies and partners there.

No compilation of statistics can ever convey whether a counterinsurgency campaign is being won or lost, and whether a country is managing to stabilize itself or not. This lesson was learned in Vietnam and must never be forgotten. But careful compilation and study of metrics, recognizing the uncertainties and complexities of the data going into them, can nonetheless provide grist for policy debates — and keep those policy debates grounded in empirical reality. As the data show, Afghanistan remains a violent, impoverished, and unsettled place — but nonetheless a country considerably better off by most measures than it was in 2001, and hosting a far smaller U.S. and NATO troop presence than was present at most times over the past two decades.

SECURITY INDICATORS

U.S. and international troop levels in Afghanistan, 2001-2019¹ i

Year	U.S. troops	Other troops ²	Year	U.S. troops	Other troops
2001	2,500	N/A	2011	90,000	41,300
2002	9,700	4,800	2012	68,000	37,900
2003	13,100	5,000	2013	60,000	27,100
2004	16,700	7,700	2014	29,000	15,500
2005	17,800	8,900	2015	6,900	6,700
2006 ³	22,100	16,200	2016	7,000	5,900
2007	24,700	24,500	2017	14,000	6,400
2008	31,800	29,700	2018	14,000	7,600
2009 ⁴	68,000	33,800	2019	8,500	8,100
2010	90,000	40,500			


¹ For both U.S. and international troop levels, the above data is in terms of annual averages.

² The data for other troops includes all nations who sent military personnel to Afghanistan, including those under the NATO mission at the time, originally the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) now the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), as well as International assistance of the U.S.-directed counterterrorism mission.

³ Although troop levels remained steady in 2006 and 2007, the United States' attention was shifted at the time largely to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

⁴ As the fighting in Afghanistan became more intense, in December of 2009 President Barack Obama deployed more U.S. troops to Afghanistan while at the same time announcing his plan for withdrawal. In 2011, Osama Bin Laden was killed in neighboring Pakistan and troops began to incrementally return home.

U.S. and international troop levels in Afghanistan (2001-2019)



Troops committed to NATO's Resolute Support Mission (RSM) by countryⁱⁱ



Resolute Support Mission

Troop Contributing Nations



	Albania	99		Germany	1,300		Poland	360
	Armenia	121		Greece	11		Portugal	188
	Australia	200		Hungary	89		Romania	738
	Austria	11		Italy	895		Slovakia	20
	Azerbaijan	120		Latvia	40		Slovenia	6
	Belgium	92		Lithuania	25		Spain	36
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	66		Luxembourg	2		Sweden	13
	Bulgaria	160		Mongolia	233		Turkey	600
	Croatia	76		Montenegro	32		Ukraine	13
	Czech Republic	91		Netherlands	160		United Kingdom	950
	Denmark	108		New Zealand	9		United States	8,000
	Estonia	45		North Macedonia	42			
	Finland	65		Norway	61			
	Georgia	860						
							Total	15,937

See links to media backgrounder on ["NATO-Afghanistan relations \(June 2020\)"](#) and to media backgrounder on the [ANA Trust Fund](#).

June 2020

Size of Afghan security forces on duty, 2003-2019ⁱⁱⁱ


Year	Ministry of Defense forces ⁵	Ministry of Interior forces ⁶	Total
2003	6,000	0	6,000
2004	24,000	33,000	57,000
2005	26,000	40,000	66,000
2006	36,000	49,700	85,700
2007	50,000	75,000	125,000
2008	68,000	79,900	147,900
2009	100,100	94,900	195,000
2010	149,500	116,800	266,300
2011	179,600	143,800	323,400
2012	178,500	148,500	327,000
2013	185,800	152,300	338,100
2014	178,600	152,600	332,100
2015	170,300	148,200	318,500
2016	175,000	147,600	322,600
2017	180,000	156,000	336,000
2018	174,300	148,700	323,000
2019 ⁷	180,900	112,400	272,500

⁵ Includes the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan Air Force (AAF).

⁶ Includes Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Police Special Forces (GDPSU), and Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP).

⁷ In 2019 the Ministry of Interior Affairs began the planning phases of transitioning its forces from a semi-paramilitary security force to a more traditional police force focused on community policing. Plans to lower the high numbers of headquarters personnel as well as the ANP's high attrition rate due to ongoing violence led to the downturn in force numbers in 2019.

Percentage of Afghan territorial districts by control, 2015-2018⁸ iv




⁸ There are 407 districts in Afghanistan. However, the government controls the most populous districts, so although in late 2018 it only controlled 54% of the districts, it controlled 63% of the population. This is still a marked decline from 2015, when the government controlled 70% of the population. For the last quarter of 2018, Afghan government control or influence of its districts reached the lowest level (54%) since the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) began tracking district control in November 2015. Conversely, the amount of contested districts is noticeably higher than the 21% in 2015. Since early 2019, territorial control has ceased being reported by Operation Resolute Support because the command no longer believes the data has decisionmaking value.


U.S. and coalition troop fatalities since October 2001^v

Year	U.S. troop fatalities	Coalition troop fatalities	Contractors
2001	12	N/A	N/A
2002	49	21	N/A
2003	48	10	N/A
2004	52	8	N/A
2005	99	32	40
2006	98	91	20
2007	117	114	49
2008	155	140	51
2009	312	203	104
2010	499	211	357
2011	418	148	374
2012	310	92	247
2013	128	34	180
2014	55	20	103
2015	22	4	56
2016	14	2	47
2017	11	2	40
2018	14	5	27
2019	24	2	38
2020	8	N/A	N/A
Totals	2,445	1,139	1,788

US and coalition troop fatalities since October 2011



Contractor fatalities in Afghanistan (2005-2019)



American military fatalities by category, October 7, 2001 – September 10, 2019^{9 10 vi}

Category	Total fatalities as of September 10, 2019: 2,428
Gender	Male: 2,372 Female: 55
Age	Younger than 22: 519 22-24: 549 25-30: 752 31-35: 282 Older than 35: 325
Component	Active: 2,096 Reserve: 107 National Guard: 225
Military service	Army: 1,719 Marines: 463 Navy: 129 Air Force: 117
Officers/enlisted	Officer: 308 E5-E9: 979 E1-E4: 1,141
Race/ethnicity	American Indian or Alaska Native: 30 Asian: 63 Black or African American: 202 Hispanic or Latino: 174 Multiple races, pending or unknown: 66 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander: 7 White: 2,060

⁹ It is important to note that the U.S. private contractor deaths does not delineate nationally. The number reflects the total number of cases filed by year in the U.S. Office of Workers' Compensation. The majority of contractor fatalities in Afghanistan were Afghan citizens.

¹⁰ Represented are the totals by category for U.S. military fatalities in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom's Sentinel.

Cause of death for U.S. troops, by year^{vii}


Year	Improvised explosive device	Suicide bombs	Mortars/ RPGs/ rockets	Landmine	Helicopter losses*	Aircraft losses*	Other hostile fire	Non-hostile causes*	Total
2001	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (16.7%)	0 (0%)	4 (33.3%)	6 (50.0%)	12
2002	5 (10.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (2.0%)	1 (2.0%)	4 (8.2%)	18 (37%)	12 (24.5%)	8 (16.3%)	49
2003	1 (2.1%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	19 (39.6%)	0 (0%)	12 (25.0%)	16 (33.3%)	48
2004	12 (23.1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.9%)	1 (1.9%)	2 (3.8%)	3 (5.8%)	10 (19.2%)	23 (44.2%)	52
2005	18 (18.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (2.0%)	5 (5.1%)	36 (36.4%)	1 (1.0%)	20 (20.2%)	17 (17.2%)	99
2006	27 (27.6%)	3 (3.1%)	1 (1.0%)	1 (1.0%)	21 (21.4%)	0 (0%)	33 (33.7%)	12 (12.2%)	98
2007	33 (28.2%)	1 (0.9%)	9 (7.7%)	1 (0.9%)	13 (11.1%)	0 (0%)	35 (29.9%)	25 (21.4%)	117
2008	84 (54.2%)	4 (2.6%)	7 (4.5%)	2 (1.3%)	2 (1.3%)	0 (0%)	36 (23.2%)	20 (12.9%)	155
2009	142 (45.5%)	8 (2.6%)	21 (6.7%)	0 (0%)	13 (4.2%)	2 (0.6%)	91 (29.1%)	35 (11.2%)	312*
2010	257 (51.5%)	8 (1.6%)	16 (3.2%)	0 (0%)	20 (4.0%)	0 (0%)	164 (32.9%)	34 (6.8%)	499
2011	183 (43.8%)	9 (2.2%)	12 (2.9%)	0 (0%)	35 (8.4%)	0 (0%)	132 (31.6%)	47 (11.2%)	418
2012	104 (33.5%)	12 (3.9%)	5 (1.6%)	0 (0%)	21 (6.8%)	1 (0.3%)	116 (37.4%)	51 (16.5%)	310
2013	40 (31.3%)	6 (4.7%)	12 (9.4%)	0 (0%)	20 (15.6%)	4 (3.1%)	28 (21.9%)	18 (14.1%)	128
2014	11 (20.0%)	2 (3.6%)	2 (3.6%)	0 (0%)	3 (5.5%)	0 (0%)	25 (45.5%)	12 (21.8%)	55
2015	0 (0%)	6 (27.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (9.1%)	6 (27.3%)	5 (22.7%)	3 (3.6%)	22
2016	1 (7.1%)	2 (14.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	7 (50.0%)	4 (28.6%)	14
2017	3 (27.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	7 (63.6%)	1 (9.1%)	11
2018	5 (35.7%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	7 (50.0%)	2 (14.2%)	14
2019	0 (0%)	4 (16.7%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (8.3%)	0 (0%)	14 (58.3%)	4 (16.7%)	24
2020	2 (25.0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (25.0%)	0 (0%)	2 (25.0%)	2 (25.0%)	8
Total	928 (37.9%)	65 (2.6%)	89 (3.6%)	11 (0.4%)	217 (8.9%)	35 (1.4%)	760 (31.1%)	340 (13.9%)	2445

Non-US coalition fatalities by country (2001-2020)

Non-US coalition fatalities by country (2001-2020)

Non-US coalition fatalities by country (2001-2020)

Non-US coalition fatalities by country (2001-2020) ^{viii}



Non-military fatalities, 2001-2020^{ix}

Year	Journalists	Humanitarian Workers ¹¹
2001	9	2
2002	0	3
2003	0	13
2004	0	26
2005	0	20
2006	3	29
2007	2	20
2008	2	34
2009	2	24
2010	2	33
2011	2	31
2012	0	11
2013	0	43
2014	3	45
2015	0	41
2016	4	14
2017	4	15
2018	13	14
2019	0	18
2020	0	0

¹¹ The death toll includes both national and international aid workers who have died in Afghanistan.

Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) Personnel Fatalities, January 2007-2020^x

Annual Estimated Totals

Year	Afghan Security Force fatalities
2007	1,000
2008	1,100
2009	900
2010	1,500
2011	2,000
2012	3,400
2013	4,700
2014	4,400
2015	7,000
2016 ¹²	8,000
2017	7,000-9,000
2018	7,000-9,000
2019	10,900
2020	10,900 ¹³

Total ANSF killed (2001-February 2014): 14,000

Total ANSF killed (2014-2020): 45,000

¹² In 2016, the American and Afghan governments decided to classify exact battlefield death tolls. The years following are estimates based on statements made by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani on total troop fatalities during those years.

¹³ U.S. military officials estimate that 2020 will have a similar death rate to 2019, around 30-40 ANDSF personnel killed per day.

Afghan civilian fatalities by perpetrator, 2007-2020^{xi}

Year	Anti-governmental elements ¹⁴	Pro-government forces ¹⁵	Other ¹⁶	Total
2007	700	629	194	1523
2008	1160	828	130	2118
2009	1630	596	186	2412
2010	2080	440	257	2777
2011	2332	410	279	3021
2012	2,179	316	259	2754
2013	2,311	341	307	2959
2014	2,643	622	434	3699
2015	2,315	621	493	3429
2016	2,131	903	464	3498
2017	2,303	745	390	3,438
2018	2,243	1,185	376	3,804
2019	1,668	1,473	262	3,403


¹⁴ The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) describes anti-governmental forces as “encompassing all individuals and groups currently involved in armed conflict against the Government of Afghanistan and/or IMF. They include those who identify as ‘Taliban’ as well as individuals and groups motivated by a range of objectives and assuming a variety of labels.”

¹⁵ UNAMA describes pro-governmental forces as “ISAF, OEF, ANSF (including the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police and the National Security Directorate) and the official close protection details of officials of the IRoA. Government Forces rarely cause civilian fatalities on purpose, usually it is the result of an accident. The use of the term perpetrator in this indicator is not meant to imply malevolent intent but end result.”


¹⁶ UNAMA describes other forces as “unverified perpetrators, unexploded ordnances and other accounts related to the conflict (including border clashes).”

Data found using the UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan)

Estimated percentage of Afghan civilian fatalities by group which caused (2007-2020)




Estimated number of Afghanistan civilian fatalities by group which caused (2007-2019)



Internally displaced people (IDPs) in Afghanistan, 2002-2019^{xii}

Year	IDP	Year	IDP
2002 ¹⁷	724,000	2011	450,000
2003	184,000	2012	492,000
2004	167,000	2013	631,000
2005	153,400	2014	805,000
2006	132,000	2015	1,174,000
¹⁸ 2007	161,000	2016	1,533,000
2008	235,000	2017	1,286,000
2009	297,000	2018	2,598,000
2010	352,000	2019	2,993,000

Internally displaced people in Afghanistan (2002-2019)



¹⁷ With the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and the relative stability that ensued, Afghanistan saw massive returns of Afghan refugees and a decrease in internal displacement.

¹⁸ The increasing conflict and worsening security situation following 2006 made voluntary repatriation less common and triggered a new refugee exodus, putting internal displacement on the rise once again.


Estimated Afghan refugees and asylum applications, 2001-2019^{xiii}

Year	Asylum seekers ¹⁹	Refugees (millions) ²⁰
2001	52,500	3.81
2002	25,400	2.51
2003	14,200	2.14
2004	8,800	2.08
2005	14,000	1.91
2006	14,300	2.11
2007	10,000	3.10
2008	18,400	2.80
2009	38,900	2.89
2010	33,500	3.05
2011	37,800	2.66
2012	48,900	2.58
2013	49,100	2.56
2014	73,500	2.59
2015	239,600	2.66
2016	237,800	2.49
2017	124,900	2.62
2018	107,500	2.68
2019	105,600	2.72


¹⁹ The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) describes an asylum seeker as “an individual seeking international protection and whose refugee status is yet to be determined. Individual applications for asylum or refugee status were submitted to States or UNHCR in 174 countries or territories. In countries where national asylum systems are not in place or where States are unable or unwilling to assess asylum claims in a fair or efficient manner, UNHCR may conduct refugee status determination under its mandate.”

²⁰ The UNHCR describes refugees as “persons recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; its 1967 Protocol; the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; persons granted complementary forms of protection; or, those enjoying ‘temporary protection’. UNHCR has a mandated responsibility to extend protection to all refugees wherever they may be, unless this role is otherwise specifically accepted.”

Afghan asylum applications (2001-2019)



Estimated Afghan refugees (2001-2019)



Estimated Afghan refugee returns, 2003-2019^{xiv}

Year	Refugee Returns ²¹
2003	646,000
2004	940,000
2005	752,100
2006	388,000
2007	374,000
2008	278,500
2009	57,600
2010	118,000
2011	71,100
2012	98,600
2013	39,700
2014	17,800
2015	61,400
2016	383,900
2017	60,500
2018	16,200
2019	8,400

Estimated refugee returns (2003-2019)


Estimated refugee returns (2003-2019)

Estimated refugee returns (2003-2019)

Estimated refugee returns (2003-2019)

²¹ Returned refugees (returnees) refer to refugees who have returned voluntarily to their country of origin or place of habitual residence.

Estimated refugee returns (2003-2019)



Afghanistan's rank in Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index, 2002-2020^{xv}

Year	Score	Rank	Number of countries surveyed
2002	35.5	104	139
2003	40.2	134	166
2004	28.3	97	167
2005	39.2	125	167
2006	44.3	130	168
2007	56.5	142	169
2008	59.3	156	173
2009	54.2	149	175
2010	51.7	147	178
2011-2012	74.0	150	179
2013	37.4	128	179
2014	37.1	128	180
2015	37.4	122	180
2016	37.8	120	180
2017	39.5	120	180
2018	37.3	118	180
2019	36.6	121	180

Afghanistan's rank in Transparency International's annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)^{xvi}

Year	Rank	Number of countries surveyed
2005	117	159
2006	NO DATA	163
2007	172	180
2008	176	180
2009	179	180
2010	176	178
2011	180	182
2012	174	176
2013	175	177
2014	172	175
2015	166	168
2016	169	198
2017	177	198
2018	172	198
2019	173	198


ECONOMIC AND QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS

Real GDP and real GDP per capita²² xvii


Year	Real GDP (constant 2010 U.S. dollars, billions)	Real GDP growth	Real GDP per capita (constant 2010 U.S. dollars)	Real GDP per capita growth
2002	7.5	N/A	330	N/A
2003	8.1	8.8%	343	3.9%
2004	8.2	1.4%	333	-2.9%
2005	9.2	11.2%	357	7.2%
2006	9.6	5.3%	365	2.3%
2007	11.0	13.8%	406	11.0%
2008	11.4	3.9%	412	1.6%
2009	13.9	21.4%	488	18.5%
2010	15.8	14.4%	543	11.3%
2011	15.9	0.4%	529	-2.7%
2012	17.9	12.7%	576	9.0%
2013	18.9	5.6%	588	2.0%
2014	19.5	2.7%	584	-0.7%
2015	19.7	1.4%	574	-1.6%
2016	20.2	2.3%	571	-0.5%
2017	20.7	2.6%	572	0.1%
2018	21.1	1.8%	568	-0.6%
2019	21.7	2.9%	571	0.6%

²² These numbers are estimates provided by the World Bank, as there is some discrepancy between sources over the exact GDP value for certain years. Both GDP and GDP growth rate, as well as per capita, are adjusted for inflation and demonstrate the real GDP values for the given year.

Real GDP growth and real GDP per capita growth



Afghan trade balance (2003-2019)²³ xviii




²³ Since 2006, Afghanistan's trade deficit has been growing bigger as imports have gone up due to the reconstruction effort. Afghanistan's main exports are carpets and rugs, dried fruits, and medicinal plants. Its main imports are petroleum, machinery and equipment, and food items. Afghanistan's main trading partners are Pakistan (48% of total exports and 14% of imports) and Russia (9% of exports and 13% of imports). Others include Iran, China, India, Japan, and Turkey.

Afghanistan poverty rate²⁴ xix

Year	National	Rural	Urban
2007-2008	0.34	0.36	0.26
2011-2012	0.38	0.42	0.25
2016-2017	0.55	0.59	0.42

Afghan poverty rate



²⁴ The Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS), a joint study by the European Union and Afghanistan's Central Statistics Organisation, showed the national poverty rate rising to 55% in 2016-2017 from 38% in 2011-2012. The poverty rate has worsened sharply as the economy and GDP per capita stalled and the Taliban insurgency spread, with more than half the population living on less than a dollar a day by 2018.

Electricity production and consumption, 1999-2019^{xx}

Year	Production (GWh) ²⁵	Import (GWh)	Consumption (GWh)
1999	420	90	480
2000	370	100	450
2001	330	200	510
2002	540	150	650
2003	900	200	1,040
2004	N/A	N/A	N/A
2005	750	100	800
2006	N/A	N/A	N/A
2007	840	230	1,090
2008	830	N/A	N/A
2009	910	1,380	2,230
2010	990	1,570	2,490
2011	830	2,250	3,020
2012	880	N/A	N/A
2013	1,020	N/A	N/A
2014	1,050	3,700	4,700
2015	1,030	3,780	4,740
2016	1,210	4,400	5,530
2017	1,100	N/A	N/A
2018	980	N/A	N/A
2019	1280	N/A	N/A

²⁵ Electricity is quantified using gigawatt hours.

Access to improved drinking water²⁶ xxi

Year	2005-2006	2007-2008	2011-2012	2013-2014	2016-2017
Urban	64%	58%	70%	91%	N/A
Rural	26%	20%	39%	58%	N/A
Kuchi ²⁷	16%	16%	21%	29%	N/A
Total	31%	27%	45%	64%	61%

Afghan health care centers, 2005-2018^{xxii}

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Number of basic health centers ²⁸	764	747	766	917	928	910	930	920	943	932	932	923	970	1012
Number of health sub-centers ²⁹	726	412	382	345	423	542	679	698	765	854	874	833	1020	960
Number of comprehensive health centers ³⁰	376	376	390	371	442	392	383	391	398	411	410	417	434	436

²⁶ Improved drinking water sources as described by the Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey are “those that have the potential to deliver safe water by nature of their design and construction. These include piped supplies and non-piped supplies (such as boreholes, protected wells and springs, rainwater and packaged or delivered water, e.g. by tanker trucks).”

²⁷ Kuchi means “nomad” in the Dari (Persian) language. Kuchis are Pashtuns from southern and eastern Afghanistan who are primarily nomadic and non-sedentary.

²⁸ Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Health describes Basic Health Centers as “a small facility offering primary outpatient care, immunizations and midwifery care. Services offered include antenatal, delivery, and postpartum care; non permanent contraceptive methods; routine immunizations; integrated management of childhood diseases; treatment of malaria and tuberculosis, including DOTS; and identification, referral, and follow-up care for mental health patients and persons with disabilities including awareness raising. The services of the BHC will cover a population of 15,000–30,000, depending on the local geographic conditions and the population density.”

²⁹ The overall objective of Health Sub Centers as described by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Health “is to increase access to health services for underserved populations residing in remote areas. The HSC is established to cover a population from 3,000–7,000. The HSC will provide most of the services available in Basic Health Centers including health education, immunization, Antenatal Care, family planning, TB case detection, TB suspected case referral and follow up of TB cases and basic curative care, including treatment of Diarrhea and Pneumonia.”

³⁰ Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Health says the CHCs “cover a larger catchment area of 30,000–60,000 people and offer a wider range of services than does the BHC. In addition to assisting normal deliveries, the CHC can handle some complications, grave cases of childhood illness, treatment of complicated cases of malaria, and outpatient care for mental health patients.”

Infant mortality rate³¹ xxiii

Year	Ratio (per 1,000 deaths)
2002	145
2003	142
2004	166
2005	163
2006	160
2007	157
2008	155
2009	152
2010	152
2011	149
2012	122
2013	119
2014	117
2015	115
2016	112
2017	110
2018	108
2019	104

³¹ Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. This rate is often used as an indicator of the level of health in a country.

Life expectancy³² xxiv

Year	Male	Female	Total
2001	46.9	45.5	46.2
2002	46.6	45.8	47.3
2003	47.6	46.2	47.0
2004	42.2	42.6	42.4
2005	42.7	43.1	42.9
2006	43.1	43.5	43.3
2007	43.6	43.9	43.7
2008	44.0	44.3	44.2
2009	44.4	44.8	44.6
2010	44.4	44.8	44.6
2011	44.8	45.2	45.0
2012	48.4	51.0	49.7
2013	48.8	51.4	50.1
2014	49.1	51.8	50.4
2015	49.5	52.2	50.8
2016	49.9	52.7	51.3
2017	50.3	53.2	51.7
2018	50.6	53.6	52.1
2019	51.4	54.4	52.8

³² The CIA World Factbook describes these data points as containing “the average number of years to be lived by a group of people born in the same year, if mortality at each age remains constant in the future. Life expectancy at birth is also a measure of overall quality of life in a country and summarizes the mortality at all ages. It can also be thought of as indicating the potential return on investment in human capital and is necessary for the calculation of various actuarial measures.”

Literacy rate^{33 xxv}

Year	Male	Female	Total
2000	43%	13%	28%
2015	52%	24%	38%
2018	55%	30%	43%

Average years in school (primary to tertiary education)^{34 xxvi}

Year	Male	Female	Total
2004	11	4	8
2009	10	6	8
2011	11	7	9
2014	13	8	11

³³ The CIA World Factbook describes these data points as containing “a *definition* of literacy and UNESCO’s percentage estimates for populations aged 15 years and over, including *total population*, *males*, and *females*. There are no universal definitions and standards of literacy. Unless otherwise specified, all rates are based on the most common definition: the ability to read and write at a specified age. Information on literacy, while not a perfect measure of educational results, is probably the most easily available and valid for international comparisons. Low levels of literacy, and education in general, can impede the economic development of a country in the current rapidly changing, technology-driven world.”

³⁴ The CIA World Factbook describes school life expectancy (SLE) as “the total number of years of schooling (primary to tertiary) that a child can expect to receive, assuming that the probability of his or her being enrolled in school at any particular future age is equal to the current enrollment ratio at that age. Caution must be maintained when utilizing this indicator in international comparisons. For example, a year or grade completed in one country is not necessarily the same in terms of educational content or quality as a year or grade completed in another country. SLE represents the expected number of years of schooling that will be completed, including years spent repeating one or more grades.”

Number of university students, 2003-2019 ^{xxvii}

Year	Male	Female	Total
2003-2004	23,600	7,200	30,800
2004-2005	31,200	8,300	39,500
2005-2006	30,500	8,800	39,300
2006-2007	34,100	7,700	41,800
2007-2008	40,700	8,600	49,300
2008-2009	46,400	10,000	56,400
2009-2010	49,200	12,200	61,300
2010-2011	51,400	12,500	63,800
2011-2012	62,800	14,800	77,600
2012-2013	82,100	19,200	101,300
2013-2014	100,700	24,000	124,700
2014-2015	118,100	29,700	147,300
2015-2016	135,200	36,400	171,600
2016-2017	141,300	41,000	182,300
2017-2018	140,000	44,700	184,700
2018-2019	136,900	49,000	186,000

Internet users³⁵ xxviii

Year	2002	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2014	2015	2016
Internet Users	1,000	30,000	535,000	580,000	500,000	1,000,000	1,900,000	2,690,000	3,531,000

Percentage of population using the internet³⁶ xxix

Year	Internet usage (% of population)
2002	0.01
2003	0.09
2004	0.11
2005	1.22
2006	2.11
2007	1.90
2008	1.84
2009	3.55
2010	4.00
2011	5.00
2012	5.46
2013	5.90
2014	7.00
2015	8.26
2016	11.20
2017	13.50

³⁵ The CIA World Factbook describes these data points as containing “the *total* number of individuals within a country who can access the Internet at home, via any device type (computer or mobile) and connection. The *percent of population* with Internet access (i.e., the penetration rate) helps gauge how widespread Internet use is within a country. Statistics vary from country to country and may include users who access the Internet at least several times a week to those who access it only once within a period of several months.”

³⁶ The World Bank Online Database describes these data points as containing “the percentages of individuals who have used the Internet (from any location) in the last 3 months. The Internet can be used via a computer, mobile phone, personal digital assistant, games machine, digital TV etc.”

Afghan fixed and mobile telephone subscriptions, 2002-2018^{xxx}

Year	Fixed telephone subscribers ³⁷	Mobile cellular subscriptions ³⁸
2002	33,100	25,000
2003	N/A	200,000
2004	N/A	600,000
2005	100,000	1,200,000
2006	280,000	2,520,000
2007	N/A	4,668,000
2008	460,000	7,898,000
2009	129,000	10,500,000
2010	140,000	10,215,000
2011	13,000	13,798,000
2012	13,000	15,340,000
2013	N/A	16,807,000
2014	100,000	18,407,000
2015	110,000	19,709,000
2016	114,000	21,602,000
2017	119,000	23,929,000
2018	128,000	21,976,000

³⁷ This chart gives the *total* number of fixed telephone lines in use.

³⁸ The World Bank Online Database describes these data points as containing “subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service that provide access to the PSTN using cellular technology. The indicator includes (and is split into) the number of postpaid subscriptions, and the number of active prepaid accounts (i.e. that have been used during the last three months). The indicator applies to all mobile cellular subscriptions that offer voice communications. It excludes subscriptions via data cards or USB modems, subscriptions to public mobile data services, private trunked mobile radio, telepoint, radio paging and telemetry services. Data accessed via the World Bank’s online database.”

POLLING INDICATORS

Afghanistan population and demographic information^{xxxix}

Population (millions)	Total 36.6	Male 18.6 (51%)	Female 18.0 (49%)
Ethnicity			
Pashtun	42%		
Tajik	27%		
Hazara	9%		
Uzbek	9%		
Aimak	4%		
Turkmen	3%		
Baloch	2%		
Other	4%		


Afghanistan governance structures: Wolesi Jirga (House of the People)³⁹ xxxii

Election year	Ethnic Group Share of Seats				
	Pashtun	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Other
2005	47%	23%	15%	9%	5%
2010	39%	27%	17%	8%	10%
2018	45%	26%	12%	8%	9%

³⁹ The Wolesi Jirga consists of directly elected provincial representatives. The number of representatives each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces receives is calculated according to population. The Wolesi Jirga constitutes the first step in passing legislation, with all bills passing with two-thirds majority being forwarded to the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders) and then the president. The Wolesi Jirga also has final say on the appointment of government ministers and other high-ranking officials.

Afghanistan in 2019: A survey of the Afghan people

Afghan opinions towards the direction of the country (2006-2019)




Asia Foundation, December 2019


(15,012 Afghans above 18 from throughout the country were interviewed)^{40 xxxiii}

⁴⁰ Optimism about the nation's direction peaked in 2013, before declining to an all-time low in 2016 due to fears about the economy, difficult elections, and the effects of sharp reductions in foreign troops. In 2019, 36.1% of respondents say the country is going in the right direction while 58.2% say the country is going in the wrong direction.


Question: What is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (2006-2018)




Question: How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? (Percent who say “always,” “often,” or “sometimes.”)



Perceptions of Afghan National Police, % who strongly agree (2007-2019)⁴¹



Perceptions of household health and well-being (2007-2019)⁴²



⁴¹ The number of respondents who strongly agree that the ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan is at its lowest recorded level, 36.4%, down from 39.3% in 2018 and approximately 25% lower than 2007, when the question was first asked.


⁴² Afghanistan has worked to improve healthcare delivery and access over the past 18 years, and these efforts have resulted in improvements in maternal and child health and mortality. However, the resurgence of insecurity and political instability over the past decade has slowed progress.

Satisfaction with government performance, percent who say “very good job” or “somewhat good job” (2007-2019)⁴³


Year	National Unity Government	Provincial Government	Municipal Authorities (Urban)	Municipal Authorities (Rural)
2007	80%	79%	58%	N/A
2008	68%	74%	50%	67%
2009	71%	75%	58%	69%
2010	73%	78%	53%	61%
2011	73%	80%	63%	68%
2012	75%	80%	65%	66%
2013	74%	68%	57%	63%
2014	75%	68%	57%	58%
2015	58%	57%	47%	53%
2016	49%	53%	42%	51%
2017	56%	57%	47%	56%
2018	59%	61%	52%	54%
2019	66%	64%	60%	59%

⁴³ Satisfaction with the performance of different levels of the Afghan government has increased continuously over the last five years after reaching an all-time low point in 2015-2016.

Satisfaction with government performance (2007-2019)




Fear while voting in a national/provincial election, percent who say “some fear” or “a lot of fear” (2006-2019)⁴⁴




⁴⁴ The number of people who responded with some or a lot of fear while voting is at its highest recorded level (63%), 22 percentage points higher than 2006, when the question was first asked. Likewise, the number of people who report no fear while voting is at an all-time low (36.4%), 21 percentage points below 2006.

Afghan sympathy for armed opposition groups (2009-2019)⁴⁵



Afghan belief in the possibility of reconciliation with the Taliban⁴⁶



⁴⁵ Independent of their views on the prospects for reconciliation, Afghans have been losing sympathy for the struggle of armed opposition groups against the government. When asked about this last year, 85% of Afghans professed “no” sympathy, almost 50 percentage points more than in 2009. However, despite nationally low levels of support, sympathy for the Taliban has remained in their traditional South West stronghold.

⁴⁶ Due to the increased media coverage of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks, public awareness of the negotiation efforts was raised. This is reflected in the fact that 77.4% of respondents overall were aware of efforts to negotiate with the Taliban. A new question in 2019 gauged Afghan support for efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. The question showed that 88.7% of Afghans strongly support or somewhat support efforts to negotiate a peace agreement. This is not to be construed as sympathy for the Taliban, rather the desire to end the bloodshed.

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