

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION  
BROOKINGS CAFETERIA PODCAST  
HOW CHINA SHAPES U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS

Washington, D.C.

Friday, February 21, 2020

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## PROCEEDINGS

DEWS: Welcome to the Brookings Cafeteria. The podcast about ideas and the experts who have them. I'm Fred Dews. In the new book, *Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War*, published this month by the Brookings Institution Press, author Tanvi Madan shows how U.S.-India relations have been shaped in the past and present by China.

On this episode, Madan, a senior fellow in foreign policy and director of the India Project at Brookings, is interviewed by Brookings Press Director Bill Finan about her new book. Also, on the program, senior fellow David Wessel offers his economic update with a focus on the strong U.S. economy and the risks facing the global economy.

You can follow the Brookings Podcast Network on Twitter @policypodcasts to get information about and links to all of our shows. Including *Dollar and Sense: The Brookings Trade Podcast*, *The Current*, and our events podcast. And now, here's Bill Finan with Tanvi Madan.

FINAN: Thanks, Fred, and welcome, Tanvi.

MADAN: Thanks for having me on the podcast, Bill.

FINAN: Glad to have you. So, China and India and the United States. Your book brings these three countries together that in the popular mind are usually dyads, not a triad or a triangle, U.S.-China, U.S.-India, China and India. It also comes at an opportune time—the Trump administration appears to be making a very clear attempt to bring India into a relationship with the U.S. that is more overt than in the

past and with China as the central reason.

Early on the book, you note that Washington's China policy shaped its India policy and Delhi's perception of China affected how it dealt with the U.S. Is that still true today?

MADAN: Absolutely. The points that the book makes is we actually, it's almost kind of as Jay Nostra says, it's a truth universally acknowledged today that China shapes and influences U.S.-India relations. That over the last few administrations, since the Bush administration really, that for U.S. policymakers, they have seen India as a potential balance, geopolitical balance but also a democratic contrast to China. And also, an alternative market for American companies, for example.

So, they've seen India from a China lens. That was the case in the Obama administration as well. We've even seen the Trump administration though in some ways so different from the previous two administrations. Also follow that same strategic framework that India should be seen as an Asian, large Asian country that can show as a democracy. The democracy and development aren't mutually exclusive. And that because of its growing economic and military power, it could be a geopolitical balance as people become more concerned about China's, not its rise per se but its behavior.

And the book makes the case that this is not a recent phenomenon. It's indeed, how American and Indian policymakers saw each other even as early as the late '40s when India became independent. Both American and Indian policymakers'

perception of China and their policies towards that country affected how U.S.-India relations developed during that period and they definitely do so today as well.

FINAN: I want to go to what I think is the core of the book which is, as you write, does not argue that China has not been the only factor that mattered in the U.S.-India relationship. But it demonstrates that China's role in the U.S.-India script was a leading actor and not in the form of a cameo or a guest appearance.

Your book does that by examining a number of stages in that relationship. The first, from 1949 to 1956 shows that the United States and India had different perceptions of China as you point out. Can you describe what the predominant perceptions of each were then?

MADAN: So, I'll tell you that true story to start with. In 1949, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, just two years after India had become independent came to the United States and he also visited Washington. And he was the first Indian Prime Minister to visit the United States.

President Truman went to the airport to receive him. He took along three cabinet members and a guard of honor. Also, the U.S. Congress hosted Nehru for a speech to the joint session of Congress. This was not the kind of welcome that was given to some country that was considered peripheral as has been traditionally understood when we think about U.S.-India relations during the Cold War.

It was because just a few days before Nehru had arrived in the U.S., the U.S. had felt that it had lost China to communism because the People's Republic of China had been established on October 1, 1949. And they wanted India just like the Bush,

Obama and Trump administrations today. The Truman administration also thought that since China had gone communist and was allying with the Soviet Union, they too could find a new partner in Asia, this time a democratic India, that could play a role in their strategic framework in Asia and could serve as a contrast and a counter balance.

But what they found very quickly, during that visit as Prime Minister Nehru and President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson had these conversations about what they actually thought about China. They found that while Prime Minister Nehru had some concerns about China, India had and still has a long boundary with China. That he had some concerns about what China might do in the future.

But he argued that the best way to deal with the China that had emerged, a communist China, was not to isolate it or kind of essentially give it up to the Soviets but to engage it. To encourage it, to become part of the international community and to be a responsible stakeholder. The Truman administration disagreed.

Now, this could have been an academic difference that the two sides just didn't have the same view of China. Why did it actually matter for U.S.-India relations? It's because these two countries actually engaged with each other quite a bit on the subject of China. And so, for example, the U.S. actively tried to discourage or at least delay Indian recognition of the People's Republic of China. But India did recognize communist China fairly quickly.

The U.S. and India also had differences on the question of the Chinese takeover of Tibet and how much to do to first prevent it and then subsequently how

to respond to it. The U.S. wanted India to take a more active stance to resist that takeover. India could not afford to do so in Nehru's opinion.

And then finally where you really saw the differences play out between the U.S. and India on China that caused real problems for the U.S.-India relationship was during the Korean War. When India acted as a mediator between the U.S. and China and even, in fact, warned the U.S. that General MacArthur shouldn't cross the Yalu because the messages they were getting from the Chinese was that they would then enter the war. The U.S. did not listen. But India didn't win any friends from that case for telling the truth, it actually caused more problems.

And especially advocates of the China lobby on Capitol Hill which favored Chiang Kai-shek in a strong opposition by the Truman administration to communist China. They, in fact, advocated against aid to India on the basis that it had been too pro-Chinese during the Korean War. So, as I said, these differences weren't just academic. It had a very real impact on the U.S.-India relationship as well.

FINAN: One thing that jumped out at me in reading this because I hadn't seen it before is that United States seemed to be concerned that India would be a domino that would topple too after China had become communist, a very large domino. How valid were the concerns of some Americans that if China fell to communism India would too?

MADAN: Well, it's quite interesting because you're right, the domino theory is usually thought to be about Vietnam. But you always, if you actually read and you see this in the documents that I've gone through in various archives. And through

various administrations, you see presidents and their officials when they're laying out the domino theory. Always the way it goes is China fell, then southeast Asia would fall and then the big one, India would fall.

Now, it's hard to judge in hindsight about whether counterfactual in terms of would this have actually happened. But I can tell you the thing I found through the Indian archives which have only recently opened up in the last decade or so. Is that Indian officials too were worried about the potential spread of communism. Sometimes people think of Nehru as a communist sympathizer. But actually, especially in terms of domestic communist groups, Nehru and first his Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel but then others as well.

They were actually very anti-communist, in fact, went after communist groups in India and communist synthesizers. But Nehru wasn't just concerned about communism in terms of homegrown problem. He was very concerned that the Soviet Union was actively encouraging these groups. But he was also concerned that if communist China, which had just been established in 1949, could grow faster, could deliver the goods, as he put it, to its people faster, then democratic India which had also been established around the same time. If democratic India could not keep up with Chinese economic growth, could not deliver the good, then Indians would question whether communism was actually a better way of life.

So, this idea that only the U.S. was concerned about communism which sometimes it's people in India who say that. It was something that concerned Indian officials too. And again, this concern about the race with China as it got called, the

economist Barbara Ward came up with the term “the fateful race” between China and India. It wasn't just the U.S. that thought it was important for India to win that race but the Nehru government as well.

FINAN: I wanted to ask you about the relationship with the Soviet Union at this time too between India. You note that Stalin believed that Nehru was a stooge of the U.S. and Great Britain. Where did that view come from, the Soviet view?

MADAN: The Soviet initial view and it starts changing during the Korean War. But initially, there really was this view on the part of the Soviet Union that these leaders were kind of bourgeoisie leaders who were just going to do what London and Washington would say. Part of the reason was that India was very close to Britain even though it had had this kind over charged colonial experience with it.

But I think there was this impression in Moscow that, particularly with Stalin, that India was going to just do the U.S.-U.K. bidding. Some of this, I think, was because he saw smaller countries as not having too much, what we call agency. That they couldn't make their own decisions. Some of it was because Indian leaders, it is true, did go after communist groups. And I think some of it was just a lack of knowledge about India, per se. There hadn't been that much interaction with the kind of leaders and policymakers of independent India.

So, there was this kind of view but it starts to change when Soviet officials start to see that India's willing to play an independent role during the Korean War. And even after that, when India was in charge of the neutral nation's repatriation committee in charge of repatriating thousands of prisoners of war that both sides



held. The Soviet Union thought that India was playing a non-allying role and so, was willing to change its mind about India.

And, of course, that view changes very much when Khrushchev and Bulganin come into office. And they actually go on what people called a Soviet economic offensive to try to win over not just India but other non-allying countries as well.

FINAN: There are two major events during this early time period that you've mentioned. The war in Korea and China's annexation of Tibet and how India responded to those. But there was also Indo-China at the beginning of that during the Eisenhower administration and that, by my reading of your book, seemed to sour the U.S. relationship with India because of India's stance towards what happened in the early years as the French abandoned.

MADAN: It was one more reason in that early period till about the mid '50s. It was another subject of difference between the U.S. and India. And again, it involved China. India saw what was happening in Indo-China from its own lens and its own prism. Both colonial countries saw these, and Ho Chi Minh in particular, as basically nationalists who were conducting an independent struggle for independence. Ho Chi Minh even cited the U.S. example as an independent democratic country.

But the U.S. obviously saw it through a Cold War, anti-communist lens. And so, saw it very much in the context of the spread of communism and the influence of the Soviet's and the Chinese in that country. And so, this was a subject of difference

where India actually said that Vietnam could take independent decisions. And the U.S. saw it essentially as coming under very much and making decisions under the influence of the Soviet Union and China.

And so, once again, kind of China which the U.S. resisted Chinese participation in the Geneva conference. India actively encouraged it and again, mediated to some extent or at least got itself involved, in passing messages between the U.S. and China. Again, that did not win it any favors.

So, at least till the mid '50s, China was kind of basically the source of divergence. That's why the first section of the book is called divergence because it is these various instances from about 1949 through 1956. Where you do see the U.S. and India basically very much disagreeing on the subject of China. But they still kind of felt that they needed each other enough that they continue to engage but not exactly in a very positive or optimistic way.

FINAN: It's interesting to me that in two of the major land wars that the U.S. fought in Asia, India made the right call. First in Korea with MacArthur and then second seeing Ho Chi Minh for what he really was at that time at least as a nationalist leader and the U.S. didn't want to listen at that time.

MADAN: I think that's definitely what the Indian policymakers would say in hindsight. But I think one of the things the book tries to do is not pass judgement on the decisions that either side says. Because especially doing archival work, it gives people like me who have not served in government a certain amount of inside into the constraints that policymakers are operating under.

So, things that seem obvious in hindsight, policy options that seem kind of no-brainers today, sometimes yes, they got it wrong, they should have known better. But at other times, it's something that it's easier to say in hindsight than it was at the time. And even though there are times that, you know, I kind of look back and say wow, why did they do that.

One of the things I have become more humble about is saying that I could have done it better had I been in their shoes. But yes, I think the other thing that the book does show is there's been this traditional view that sometimes the U.S. and India didn't get along because they didn't understand each other's views of say China. My book shows that sometimes they very much understood what the other side thought about China. They just thought the other side was wrong.

FINAN: So, we have divergence and then we move to what in the late 1950s and early 1960s led to what you called the convergence of U.S. and Indian views. What happened during that time?

MADAN: So, the key thing that happens during 1956 and 1957, my book makes the argument in the section called convergence. And there are two chapter sections called convergence. That what happens to cause the change is that the U.S. and Indian views of China as a challenge start converging.

And part of the Eisenhower administration in its second term starts to see the Cold War as not just a geopolitical battle. But also, an economic battle and an ideological battle. And from this lens, it was important that democratic India win the race, the fateful race as they called it, against Soviet ally China which was

developing at the time.

And so, the Eisenhower administration started to see China not just as a geopolitical threat as it had but also as an ideological one in Asia. And on the Indian side, you start to see Nehru who had had some concerns about China. But his administration, his government had essentially said either they had time to deal with those concerns or that China would also be very busy growing and developing economically and wouldn't be concerned about external problems.

They find in the Nehru government that in 1956, around 1956-57, that their view of China needed to be different. And they start to take a more concerned view of China and start seeing it as more assertive. They start having concern about Chinese behavior and they start seeing it not just as an ideological challenge as they had in the early '50s but a geopolitical one.

This is when you start to see China raise questions about the Sino-Indian boundary and said that it wasn't a settled question. You start to see China getting much more involved in India's neighborhood, particularly in Nepal which causes deep concern in India. And you see China harden its position on things like Tibet.

And finally, you see Indians start to question whether some of the commitments China had made in some of the agreements that China and India had signed whether China was really living up to its promises that it had made. And there was a broader concern that the Chinese were, in fact, taking a more hostile view of global issues as well than even the Soviet Union.

And so, you saw India now actually and India and the U.S. both seeing China

very much as a geopolitical and economic and ideological challenge. And you also see them starting to agree that what is needed to tackle that challenge was a partnership with each other.

And so, that really causes convergence not just on threat perception, it causes convergence in terms of how to deal with the threat. And for India, the benefit was part of what the U.S. thought was needed was for the U.S. to aid India, to help its rise and help its development. And so, that started to mean from the second Eisenhower administration through to the Kennedy administration, billions of dollars of economic and food aid to India.

FINAN: And you talk about that, the development aid, the Food for Peace Program, the PL-480, which continued for a long time. Is it still?

MADAN: The program itself did end. India no longer is now a food exporter. And the U.S. helped it in the '60s as part of this effort to build India up. A lot of scientific collaboration between Indian and American scientists. Even the strange American Indian program called the GROMET which I kept reading as “grommet” in the archives. GROMET which was essentially a plan to help seed of grain in India to ensure kind of more consistent rainfall.

All this essentially to help agricultural production, economic growth in India. And so, you do see the PL-480 program eventually wind down because India has a green revolution and that helps. But you see one of the benefits of the PL-480 program around the country here in the U.S. to this day. Because one of the ways India paid for that grain that went to India from the U.S. was through books.

And so, these PL-480 libraries were established in many key universities in the country including where I did my PhD at the University of Texas which became a depository for a lot of south Asia books.

FINAN: So, it was quid pro quo of a different sort back then.

MADAN: Absolutely.

FINAN: How important was this Sino-Indian War of 1962 to a deepened Indian-U.S. relationship?

MADAN: Many people still think in some ways, at least during the Cold War period, it was the zenith of the relationship. What you had is the Kennedy administration come to India's assistance with very quick delivery. And mind you, these are two countries that did not have an alliance. So, the U.S. was not obliged to come to India's assistance.

But because it could not see India fall to China, and India was in desperate straits at that time because of shortages in military equipment and there were some real setbacks during the war itself which took place in October and November 1962. There was also a certain problem that neither the U.S. nor India had expected the war. Even though there had been kind of border incidents between China and India.

So, the U.S. very speedily had to deliver large amounts of military equipment. And they were also as the war continued, there was an Indian request by Prime Minister Nehru, quite controversial to this day. For the U.S. to even help it with air defense and potentially even for the U.S. to have its own pilots help defend Indian skies had the war continued. It didn't but what the '62 war really did is this is

this very clear example of the U.S. without an alliance because of a Cold War framing coming to India's assistance in this war against Soviet ally China.

The other important part about the 1962 war for the U.S.-India relationship is that there had been some discussion even before it about military equipment sales to India, even military assistance to India. But you really see after 1962 is when you see the next few years, in fact, almost to the late '60s and even to the early '70s to some extent, a military relationship, an intelligence sharing relationship. That we are only finding out about some aspects of it thanks to the newly released papers.

This included India allowing American U-2s to take off from its base or to fly over India as the case was from Thailand. You saw the U.S. supply equipment, military equipment to India over the '60s. And not as much as the Soviet Union did but nonetheless, it did supply.

And in the very crucial agreement, at least a largely forgotten one, an air defense agreement that was signed in 1963 where the U.S. and India agreed that if China attacked India again, the two countries would get into mutual consultations to talk about the U.S. coming in to help defend India in the case of another Sino-Indian War. Now, that's not quite an alliance but as Kennedy put it, it has the substance of alignment even if not the reality of it.

FINAN: The Johnson and Nixon administration years in the U.S. saw what you term the era of disengagement, the unraveling of U.S. and Indian convergence on China. What were the central issues that led to that unraveling?

MADAN: In the Johnson administration, you still see he's a true believer in

terms of this idea that you couldn't have India fall in the face of a communist China. That the U.S. might not be able to build India up, India having lost the Sino-Indian War and also having had some economic setbacks because of some drought conditions in India.

The U.S. had moved from trying to build India up to just ensuring that it didn't fall. In language we would use today, India was too big to fail. But you still saw Johnson as a true believer in this idea that he had to support India until it was able to support itself against China and not just militarily but economically as well.

But you do see him starting to become really frustrated about Indian performance. So, this is the period where yes, India and the U.S. agree that China is a major threat. But they start disagreeing on what is necessary to do to tackle that threat. The U.S. wants to see India spend far more resources on development, its development needs not so much on defense saying the U.S. can take care of that. Whereas India wanted to spend more on defense having been caught out by surprise in the 1962 war.

The U.S. wanted India to reach an agreement with Pakistan to then together for India and Pakistan to tackle China. So, they saw Pakistan as part of India's-China solution. India saw Pakistan as parts of the China problem because there was a budding China-Pakistan relationship and an alliance starting in the '60s.

And then finally, the U.S. and India disagreed on whether the Soviet Union, what kind of role it could play against China. The U.S. thought that India should essentially ally largely with the U.S. and its allies and partners. India actually



thought it should have not an alliance but a diversified portfolio of partners that included the Soviet Union. And so, you do see these real divergences come up in this period of the Johnson administration.

The Nixon administration, there's a real kind of break and you see this real kind of change from that '62 war period to the 1971 war which takes place after two years of the Nixon administration. And it is between India and Pakistan.

At that point, the U.S. actually was range with Pakistan and China against India or at least that's how it was seen in India which had then signed an alignment or treaty with the Soviet Union. And so, there's this odd jut to position where during the 1962 war the U.S. had come to India's assistance in a war against China and had told Pakistan to back off and not aid China as China was fighting India.

And now in 1971, the Indians having learned that the air defense agreement and other commitments the U.S. had made to it were no longer valid. They found that the U.S. was actually encouraging China to come in on behalf of Pakistan to help them fight India.

FINAN: I'm going to jump forward now to the end of the Cold War into the current era. How would you describe the triangle today?

MADAN: In some ways, the triangle is perhaps where it was in what I call that section convergence. We are in many ways in a period of convergence between the U.S. and India. That they both share a view of China, not its rise per se but particularly its behavior as a cause for concern. So, they do see it as a challenge. I think maybe to different degrees. The Trump administration has been far more vocal

than the Modi government in India has.

But both the Modi government and the Trump administration, and frankly their predecessors, for since about the mid-2000s, have seen China as a challenge. And they have seen that one way to deal with that challenge is for the U.S.-India strategic partnership to be built up. And that building up has taken place over the last 15 or 20 years. An Indian former policymaker, a Brookings Press author as well, Shivshankar Menon and former national security advisor has called convergence in China the strategic glue in the U.S.-India relationship.

Having said that, and this is the other part of the triangle, is that both the U.S. and India maintain a relationship with China. And India, at least, actually uses its partnership with the U.S. to try to get some concessions or some stabilizing of the relationship with China. And you do see China on its part actually trying to shape the U.S.-India relationship, often trying to create a wedge between the U.S. and India. And India on its part becoming concerned anytime there's a sign that there will be a U.S.-China deal or partnership, what India thinks of as G-2.

So, the triangle is, if anything, more fateful today. Because these are going to be the three largest economies in the world, three largest countries definitely in the future. And what happens between them will not just have implications for these three countries but arguably all of Asia and globally as well.

FINAN: President Trump is on his way to India. What does the book tell us about the relationship with China and the U.S. and India at this time as Trump is on his way?

MADAN: So, I started this conversation with talking about one trip that involves U.S. and Indian leaders, that of Prime Minister Nehru in 1949 to the United States to meet President Trump [sic]. China was very much looming in the shadow there even though in public speeches, it wasn't often mentioned. And arguably, this is the same thing that we're going to see with President's Trump trip in India.

This trip would not be taking place if the two countries did not share a view of China and that the idea that that China challenge required a U.S.-India strategic partnership. Afterall, there are many differences in the U.S.-India relationship, many disappointments. But it is still the strategic glue that's keeping the U.S. and India together in a very crucial way. It's not the only reason the U.S. and India have a partnership but it is a fairly significant one.

And so, while you might not see either side in speeches mention China, but perhaps President Trump will since he doesn't usually follow the protocols of democracy. But he might not mention it, he might mention it. But what we will see is things like talk about a rules-based order in Asia or the Indo-Pacific as it's being called these days. You will see highlighting defense equipment or defense deals that India has bought from the United States. Which is often either for its maritime concerns as China becomes more involved in the Indian Ocean or at its land boundary.

And so, you'll see China kind of lurking in the shadow of this Trump trip to India very much so. But you wouldn't have seen, as I said, this trip without a China shadow lurking in the background. Though we might even see it in the forefront

today depending on how the trip goes.

FINAN: Tanvi, thank you for coming by today to talk about your new book, *Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War*.

MADAN: Thank you, Bill, it was a pleasure.

DEWS: You can get *Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War* from our website or wherever you like to get books. And now, here's David Wessel with another Wessel's economic update.

WESSEL: I'm David Wessel and this is my economic update. The U.S. economy is doing pretty darn well these days. Unemployment is a 50-year low. Wages, particularly at the bottom, are finally climbing. The share of Americans who are working part time but who'd prefer full time jobs is lower than it was back in 2007 before the great recession. The stock market is storing.

To be sure the fruits of these good times are not evenly shared, plenty of places are left behind and lots of middle-class people are struggling. But the widespread fears last year that the U.S. might be sliding into a recession about now have dissipated. The U.S. is doing markedly better than much of the rest of the world which raises a big question. To paraphrase something Alan Greenspan, the Fed Chairman, said 20 years ago. Can the U.S. remain an oasis of prosperity if everyone else is doing poorly?

There's plenty to worry about overseas. Europe is barely growing. The European central bank doesn't have much room to maneuver and Germany remains reluctant to increase spending and cut taxes. Britain is coping with Brexit. Several

Latin American economies are in turmoil. Japan is sliding into a recession. And trade tensions persist despite the phase one China-U.S. trade deal which still leaves the U.S. with much higher tariffs in place than BT, Before Trump.

And then there is the coronavirus, a human tragedy with significant economic implications. It has brought parts of the Chinese economy to a halt and disrupted economically important cross border tourism and disrupted global supply chains. It's quite difficult to estimate the economic effect of the virus because no one will be sure how soon it will be contained.

But one thing we do know, China is a lot bigger factor in the global economy than it was back in 2003 at the time of the SARS outbreak. Back then, China accounted for less than 5 percent of world GDP, today it accounts for more than 16 percent. It's the world's second largest economy.

Now China's economy will obviously be hit pretty hard by the virus and so will surrounding economies that are closely linked to China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan. Economists and financial markets though seem to anticipate that most of the damage to global growth will occur in the first quarter and then things will start to get better. Keep your fingers crossed.

As the International Monetary Fund put it recently, global growth appears to be bottoming out but the projected recovery is fragile and risks remain skewed to the downside. In other words, the IMF is saying look, we're giving you our best guess for the world economy and it looks okay. But if we're wrong, things are far more likely to be worse than we are projecting than better.

Even before the Coronavirus, the world economy was suffering disappointingly slow growth and productivity, widening inequality, an erosion of public trust and institutions and populous fervor. So, the big question is whether the Coronavirus will spread and tip the global economy into a recession and whether that will pull the U.S. economy down with it.

The U.S. is less vulnerable to other economies than many other countries. We still make most of what we consume and we consume most of what we produce. But if the coronavirus spreads significantly beyond China and if the disruptions to global commerce extend well beyond the middle of this year, even the U.S. economy is vulnerable.

DEWS: The Brookings Cafeteria podcast is the product of an amazing team of colleagues starting with audio engineer, Gaston Reboredo, and producer Chris McKenna. Bill Finan, director of the Brookings Institution Press does the book interviews and Lisette Baylor and Eric Abalahin provide design and web support. Our intern this semester is Amelia Haymes. Finally, my thanks to Camilo Ramirez and Emily Horne for their guidance and support. The Brookings Cafeteria is brought to you by the Brookings Podcast Network which also produces Dollar and Sense, The Current, and our events podcast. Email your questions and comments to me at [BCP@Brookings.edu](mailto:BCP@Brookings.edu). If you have a question for a scholar, include an audio file and I'll play it and the answer on the air. Follow us Twitter [@policypodcasts](https://twitter.com/policypodcasts). You can listen to The Brookings Cafeteria in all the usual places. Visit us online at [Brookings.edu](http://Brookings.edu). Until next time, I'm Fred Dews.

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Carleton J. Anderson, III

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Expires: November 30, 2020