DEEPENING
GOOD GOVERNANCE
Inclusion, democracy, and security
Good and inclusive governance is imperative for Africa’s future

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Among the seven key aspirations listed in Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want—the African Union’s (AU) shared 50-year development and transformation program for realizing the full potential of the continent—one stands out in its interconnectedness: “[a]n Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law” [emphasis added]. The key to Africa’s political and economic transformation in the next decade is found in this aspiration. Indeed, as former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, “Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.”

Since then, many African countries have undertaken institutional reforms that have significantly changed their governance architectures and put in place a new set of leaders. Since the early 1990s, for example, Ghana has diligently undertaken governance reforms, including the design and adoption of a new democratic constitution, which places emphasis on the separation of powers with checks and balances to transform its political system. Ghana subsequently became a role model in the institutionalization of democratic rule, as illustrated by the quick acceptance of defeat by incumbent President John D. Mahama during the 2016 elections.

More broadly, over the past decade, Kenya, Morocco, and Côte d’Ivoire have led the way. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance indicates that between 2008 and 2017, these countries experienced significant improvements, particularly in overall governance. Specifically, Côte d’Ivoire registered the greatest improvement in overall governance during the period 2008–2017 (+12.7 points), followed by Morocco (+7.3 points) and Kenya (+6.1 points).

But Africa has a long way to go: Too many countries have not yet achieved the type of reforms that can prevent dictatorship, corruption, and economic decline. Due to
continued sectarian violence, weak and ineffective leadership, and lack of political will, countries like the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan remain saddled by poor-functioning governance structures. The absence of good governance in many African countries has been extremely damaging to the government’s corrective intervention role, particularly in the maintenance of peace and security, as well as the promotion of economic growth and the creation of the wealth needed to confront poverty and improve human development. Without good and inclusive governance, Africa will not achieve its social and economic targets

It is imperative that countries entrench mechanisms that promote constitutionalism, accountability, democracy, and good governance if Africa is to achieve its development goals. For example, although there has been a substantial decline in the share or proportion of Africans living in extreme poverty—from 54 percent in 1990 to 41 percent in 2015—the number of Africans living in poverty has actually increased from 278 million in 1990 to 413 million in 2015. Unless effective anti-poverty and pro-poor policies are implemented in African countries, global poverty will become increasingly African. Indeed, the least developed countries in the world (as determined by the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index) are also countries with relatively weak, dysfunctional, or ineffective governance structures (as determined by the Ibrahim Index of African Governance). These include the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan.

Fighting poverty and improving human development in Africa must begin with the creation of wealth, a process that requires the existence of a robust entrepreneurial class. In order to achieve these goals, there must be peace and security—especially the peaceful coexistence of the various ethnocultural groups that inhabit each African country. Unfortunately, weak and dysfunctional governance structures continue to prevent many African countries from creating and sustaining the necessary enabling environment for peaceful coexistence, entrepreneurship, and wealth creation. In fact, in countries such as Cameroon, the DRC, and South Sudan, the absence of governance structures undergirded by the rule of law has failed to halt ethnic-induced violence. That violence stunts entrepreneurship and economic growth in these countries. Peace and security, which are a sine qua non for entrepreneurial activities and the creation of wealth, are unlikely to return to these countries without the provision of participatory and inclusive governance structures.

Fighting poverty and improving human development in Africa must begin with the creation of wealth, a process that requires the existence of a robust entrepreneurial class.

6 Ibid., p. 16.
7 “Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Africa: In Five Charts,” World Bank, October 9, 2019
8 See United Nations Development Program, Human Development Index 2018 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018) and Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2018 Ibrahim Index.
Deepening good governance

Spread of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa has stagnated since the mid-2000s

Sub-Saharan Africa has seen significant democratic progress since the 1980s with 19 democracies in 2018 compared to 5 in 1980. However, democratic progress has stagnated since the mid-2000s. There has been an even greater decline in autocratic regimes as some countries have moved from autocracies to anocracies - a hybrid form of government that exhibits both democratic and autocratic tendencies.

Progress on female representation in government

Sub-Saharan Africa has made significant progress on improving women’s representation in government. The share of women in parliament has doubled since 2000. In fact, the region is close to the global average for women in parliament and local government as well as female ministers.

At the same time, there is heterogeneity within sub-Saharan Africa. Notably, at 61.3 percent, Rwanda has the highest share of female parliamentarians in the world. In fact, East and Southern Africa have a higher share of women in parliament compared to Central and West Africa. The presence of a quota system also affects female representation in sub-Saharan Africa. In 33 countries with some form of quota system (legislated candidate quota, reserved seats, or voluntary party quotas), female representation in parliament is at 25 percent compared to 13 percent for those without.

Women in governments worldwide

Note: Candidate quotas imply that a rule (legal or voluntary) is installed according to which for instance 30%, 40% or even 50% of the candidates must be women. At the third stage, those elected, we find quotas as reserved seats. Here it is decided that a certain percentage or number among those elected must be women. Voluntary party quotas refer to individual political parties setting minimum participation rates for women at any level of participation.

Weak governance manifests itself in other ways as well: Too often dysfunctional governance processes persist, creating environments where civil servants and political elites act with impunity, embezzling scarce public resources that could be used for education, health care, infrastructure, water treatment plants, electricity, farm-to-market roads, or technology. Elites are usually not incentivized to implement pro-poor economic programs that enhance the ability of the poor to participate productively and gainfully in economic growth, such as public investments in primary and secondary education, clean water, basic health care, and child nutrition.

The type of governance structure that each African country should strive for over the next decade is one that should address peaceful coexistence and economic development, inequality, the effects of climate change, health pandemics, and enhanced regional cooperation.

**Bolstering good and inclusive governance through 2030 and beyond**

The type of governance structure that each African country should strive for over the next decade is one that should address peaceful coexistence and economic development, inequality, the effects of climate change, health pandemics, and enhanced regional cooperation, as well as ensure the full and effective participation in both the economic and political systems of groups that have historically been marginalized (e.g., women, youth, and ethnic and religious minorities). Each country must reflect upon its own governance challenges and engage in robust national dialogue on institutional reforms to enable an effective and inclusive governance system.

First, countries in or recovering from crises must engage in process-driven constitution-making to produce an agreed-upon governing process characterized by the separation of powers, with effective checks and balances, including a robust and politically active civil society; an independent judiciary; and a viable, free, and independent press. The process through which the constitution is designed and adopted must be participatory and inclusive enough to allow for all relevant stakeholder groups to participate—from the development of constitutional principles to the actual design and ratification of the constitution. It is especially important that historically marginalized groups be empowered to participate fully and effectively in the constitution-making process. Each country must also produce a set of constitutional principles to inform, guide, and constrain the drafters. Such principles should ensure that the constitution safeguards against abuses of power. Importantly, each constitution should have a robust amendment process, one that can effectively prevent the manipulation of the constitution by opportunistic executives to remain in power indefinitely, as we are currently experiencing in several countries.

Second, the countries that have progressive and inclusive constitutions undergirded by the separation of powers, including Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa, should engage in national dialogues to help their citizens understand and better appreciate the importance of the constitution to governance generally and the protection of human rights in particular. Through this process, citizens can determine how to strengthen their national constitutions (e.g., add a Bill of Rights).
Third, all African countries, with the aid of civil society, should develop and implement education programs to help citizens understand and appreciate the constitution and its provisions, and recognize the law as a tool that they can use to organize their private lives and resolve their conflicts, including those arising from trade and other forms of exchange. Programs for empowering youth and women could be particularly fruitful.

Fourth, each African country should engage in regular dialogue, where necessary, to revisit such important governance issues as the centrality of human rights in the structure of the country’s constitution, as well as a strong and independent judiciary. Countries should also ensure that governance is inclusive of women and youth, who have historically been marginalized, as well as cultivate transformative leadership at all levels of government.

Finally, each country’s citizens, especially its legal and constitutional scholars, including those in the diaspora, should play an important role in shaping the institutional and legal environment for the transformation of Africa’s governance architecture during the next decade.

It is unlikely that the continent will be able to successfully and effectively implement and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals in 2030 or Agenda 2063 unless institutions are reformed to enforce good governance undergirded by the rule of law. The policies outlined will help the region accelerate good governance and support its economic transformation.

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**Viewpoint**

**Closing the gender gap in African labor markets is good economics**

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Differing levels of economic advancement, social stigma, and religion all govern norms on whether a woman should be in the labor market, her occupation, and compensation. While progress had been made in gender equality in global labor markets thanks to economic and social advancement, progress is more limited in Africa due to high poverty and gender discrimination.

Notably, the relationship between female labor force participation (FLFP) rate and economic development is “u-shaped” (Figure 2.3). At an extremely low level of income, where most African countries fall, women must work at the family farm or in household enterprises. As the economy advances and family income increases, the family “buys” back women’s (wives’) time for home production, such as care for children and the elderly. The exclusion of women from manual

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jobs, such as manufacturing and agriculture, due to social stigma as well as discrimination also contribute to the decline in the FLFP. It is only at a higher level of income and women's education that we start to see closing gender gaps in labor markets.

Empowering women in the informal sector

In developing countries, including in Africa, 75 to 90 percent of non-agricultural employment is informal and low-paid work in which women are three times more likely to be employed as contributing family workers than their male counterparts—meaning women are often unpaid and vulnerable for exploitation. In this case, the policy priority should concentrate on gender equality in pay and protecting women from exploitation in the short term and on enabling women to become independent and successful entrepreneurs in the long term.

Given that nine out of 10 employed women in sub-Saharan Africa are in the informal sector, policies should encourage more women to enter the formal sector, targeting constraints more acutely felt by women, including low skill and education levels as well as lack of access to finance. Additionally, facilitating forward linkages of women-owned informal enterprises with the formal sector, reducing costs of formalization through tax incentives and the elimination of registration fees, improving access to finance through microfinance, and lowering collateral requirements could empower female entrepreneurs.

**Escaping the “middle dip” in female labor force participation**

In countries on the decline and in the “middle dip” portion of the FLFP curve, the priority should be to achieve full and equitable participation of women in the labor market. Lack of affordable care for children and the elderly are key factors, as these constraints decrease FLFP rates in developing countries by 4.8 percentage points. Policies that increase access to affordable care could thereby increase female labor force participation rates.

**Gender equality in the labor market is not just a fairness issue. It is good economics.**

The stigma against women in manual work is also stronger at this stage in the curve, destigmatizing women’s work in factories, construction, and mining is thus an important policy consideration. Notably, a lack of safe transportation for women to and from work is also associated with a 15.5 percentage point lower rate of FLFP in developing countries. Policymakers should improve gender-sensitive transportation systems, institute and enforce strong anti-discrimination labor laws, and work closely with religious leaders and male partners to relax restrictive gender roles.

Policies and business reforms should also address challenges faced by female entrepreneurs in the formal sector, including limited access to finance, poor governance, and lack of infrastructure. In addition, skill and financial knowledge training that targets female entrepreneurs could increase both financial success and managerial confidence. In the long term, increasing girls’ access to quality education, particularly secondary and tertiary education, could increase their relative wages, as well as heighten their chances of finding white-collar jobs or becoming successful entrepreneurs.

Had African countries with lower relative female-to-male participation rates in 2018 had the same rates as advanced countries, the continent would have gained an additional 44 million women actively participating in its labor markets.

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4 Ibid.
Potential gains from full and equitable participation of women in the labor market are substantial

Gender equality in the labor market is not just a fairness issue. It is good economics. Countries that improve gender equality in labor markets through 2030 could see large gains in economic growth. After all, women constitute more than half the productive population.

Had African countries with lower relative female-to-male participation rates in 2018 had the same rates as advanced countries, the continent would have gained an additional 44 million women actively participating in its labor markets. By increasing gender equality in the labor market, the gain in GDP ranges from 1 percent in Senegal to 50 percent in Niger (Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4

Potential gains in GDP from women’s labor market participation

Full and equitable participation of women in the labor market can create substantial economic gains in the entire economy. By increasing gender equality in the labor market, African countries can increase their GDP anywhere between 1 percent (Senegal) to almost 50 percent (Niger).

Source: Author’s calculations using “World Development Indicators,” World Bank and ILOSTAT, International Labor Organization.

Viewpoint

Unpacking the implications of future trends for security in Africa

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Imminent changes in climate, demography, and urbanization will reshape Africa’s security landscape by the middle of this century. By 2050, parts of the African continent will be much hotter and arid, while others will be prone to flooding and rising sea levels. One in four people on the planet will be African, the continent’s demographic structure will still have a stubbornly broad base with a high dependency ratio, and new entrants into the job market will find it difficult to find employment. The majority of Africans will be living in cities and, notably, the number of urban dwellers living in slums is expected to double.

Consequently, security outcomes across the continent will be impacted in various ways. First, these future trends will be collectively reinforcing. Climate trends will influence migration, and urbanization will be driven by population dynamics. Thus, unraveling inter-linkages will become even more important than searching for “root causes” of insecurity. Second, the impacts of these trends will vary over time and space. Clearly, broad initiatives and linear solutions will be unhelpful. Instead, granular, location-specific programs (national, sub-national, and community) will become even more necessary. Third, these trends will affect different types of insecurity differently (see Table 2.1).

The inexorable evolution of Africa’s security landscape will clearly change the nature, incidence, and location of violent conflict across Africa. For example, the combined effect of growing population pressures and desertification in the Sahel will heighten land and resource tensions in already fragile communities, making them more susceptible to militia violence and violent extremism. On the other hand, megacities (like Lagos, Cairo, and Johannesburg) with expanding slums are likely to experience an increase in violent protests that could be either social, political, or both.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Conflict</th>
<th>Climate</th>
<th>Demography</th>
<th>Urbanization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-state battles</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state battles (militia)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent extremism/terrorism</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent protests and riots</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-sided violence (e.g., genocide)</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s analysis.
The diverse pathways and potential impacts of this evolution could inform the design and implementation of relevant policies, as well as the establishment of resilient institutions. More than ever before, the policy response will need to go beyond reacting to the symptoms and instead focus on the drivers and sustainers that reinforce persistent conflict.

Policymakers also face the added challenge of untangling the complicated, and often transnational, milieu of future trends. Furthermore, the almost binary core vs. periphery approach to politics, economics, and insecurity will be a thing of the past, as urban areas become the epicenter and climate variability becomes an even more important determinant of where Africans live, how they earn their livelihoods, and the degree to which groups peacefully coexist.

Addressing the complexities of Africa’s emerging security landscape requires careful consideration of the following:

1. **Build capable institutions.** This does not imply training and equipping existing security institutions to address today’s problems more efficiently. Instead, it requires targeted investments and strategic partnerships to resolve the multi-dimensional challenges of tomorrow. Also, capacity-building initiatives in Africa’s security sector must be matched by efforts to improve institutional capability and diminish politicization.

2. **Leverage technology.** This must go beyond broad conversations about mobile phone ownership and internet access. It should explore ways in which technology (particularly infotech, biotech, and fintech) could address some of the enduring structural challenges that lie at the heart of Africa’s emerging and dynamic security landscape.

3. **Strengthen state-society relationships.** Repairing and redefining the social contract between governments and the governed in Africa must be prioritized. Perversions of the social contract, including pseudo-democracy, account for the upsurge of governance-related violence in recent decades. Ensuring critical investments, developing effective partnerships, and countering endemic corruption are essential in this regard.

4. **Enhance domestic resource mobilization.** True ownership and effective accountability are only possible if African countries reduce their dependence on external assistance, in all its forms. Central to this goal is the sound governance of the continent’s abundant natural resources in order to maximize fiscal benefits. Governments would then be in a better position to invest, strategically, in activities and institutions that address the drivers and sustainers of insecurity. External partners, for their part, would find it easier to align their assistance with programs and activities that are truly country owned.

Future challenges in Africa’s security sector are daunting, but not insurmountable. Resolving them is central to the attainment of socio-economic development goals like the 2030 SDGs and the African Union’s Agenda 2063. This must start with tangible, collective, and concerted efforts to address the continent’s persistent market, governance, and institutional failures.
Progress on service delivery in Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa’s attempts to address poor service delivery are showing results, as access to electricity, basic sanitation services, and clean drinking water has gone up overall. Then again, performance has varied wildly from country to country, with countries like South Africa and the Seychelles continuing to excel from a relatively higher starting point, Mozambique and Tanzania making remarkable progress, and Chad, the DRC, Mali, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe still struggling, and, in some cases, regressing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Electricity</th>
<th>Basic sanitation services</th>
<th>Clean drinking water</th>
<th>Doctors (per 10,000 population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0.28 → 0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.28 → 0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.5 → 13.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.9 → 1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.46 → 1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>7.2 → 9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.2 → 0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.76 → 1.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All service delivery numbers except for doctors are in percent of population. Due to data availability, the year range for doctors varies across countries and shows the earliest date since 2000 as the starting number and the most recent date since 2017 as the latest number. For more details, see the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

Source: World Development Indicators