THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
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“THE DEMOCRACY PLAYBOOK”:
A STRATEGIC PLAN TO FIGHT DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

A BROOKINGS INSTITUTION AND TRANS-ATLANTIC DEMOCRACY WORKING GROUP
REPORT AND PANEL DISCUSSION

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Welcome and moderator:

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The Brookings Institution

Keynote:

SENATOR BEN CARDIN (D-MD)
United States Senate

Panel:

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MR. EISEN: I'll ask everyone to turn off their ringers. And I'll do the same. Good morning everyone. And welcome to Brookings. I'm Norman Eisen, and I'm a senior fellow in Governance Studies here.

Today’s event is a discussion of The Democracy Playbook project; a collaboration between Governance Studies and Foreign Policy here at the Brookings Institution, and the Transatlantic Democracy Working Group, which I co-chair. We are a bipartisan coalition of former government officials, scholars, and experts, and we are headquartered at GMF.

I want to thank the president of Brookings, John Allen; and the vice president and director of Governance Studies, Darryl West, for their support of this program.

My co-chair of the Bipartisan TDWG representing the conservative side of the aisle, Jeff Gedmin; and the president of GMF, Karen Donfried; all my colleagues here, Leti Davalos who helped put this event together.

And my wonderful co-authors who you'll be hearing from today, Torrey Taussig, Alina Polyakova, and Susan Corke, you'll meet them a little later; as well as our other co-author Andrew Kenealy, who couldn't be with us today, but is joining us over the Internet. Good morning, Andrew.

Speaking of the Internet, #DemocracyPlaybook to tag this on Twitter or other social media, and we welcome our audience of hundreds of folks who have logged in online to be with us virtually.

We have a special guest to kick off today's conversation, and that is Senator Ben Cardin of Maryland who will deliver keynote remarks. We are thrilled to have you with us, senator.

You are a champion of democracy, working for years in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The senator is deeply committed to working across the aisle, in the spirit of all the institutions who are involved in putting together today's event. Putting principles and people first.

He is the ranking Senate commissioner on the bipartisan U.S. Helsinki Commission, needed today more than ever. Since 2015 he served as the special representative on anti-semitism, racism and intolerance for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The senator is an outspoken champion of human rights, and throughout his career in public service has advocated for accountability and
transparency measures, two things very near and dear to me, to promote good governance and to combat corruption.

Some of his recent work includes introducing bipartisan legislation, to track, analyze and report corruption in foreign lands. The Sergei Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act that imposes sanctions on Russian individuals and entities who commit gross violations of human rights against rights of defenders, and the Global Magnitsky Act, a law that the senator co-authored with Senator John McCain, that gives pro-democracy actors a powerful tool to push back on authoritarian, kleptocratic governments.

The Magnitsky Act, and the Global Magnitsky Act, as the many experts I see gathered around the room here today know, are two of the most signature pieces of legislation in the United States and around the world for defending these values that we hold so dear.

With all of these demonstrated commitments to bolstering democracy and human rights across the planet, the rest of which are too numerous to list, we are deeply honored to have Senator Cardin as our keynote speaker here today. Senator? (Applause)

SENATOR CARDIN: Ambassador Eisen, thank you very much for that very generous introduction. It really is a pleasure to be here. I would accept any invitation to get off Capitol Hill these days. So thank you very much. (Laughter)

I got “The Democracy Playbook” about two minutes ago, I have not read the full report, in fact I have not read any of the report yet, but I’m looking forward to it. So thank you very much for your contribution here to democracy.

I’m going to be very serious this morning, because I am extremely concerned about the status of democracy globally. And I thank Brookings for sponsoring this event, and I thank you for the team that put together this Playbook, because we need you. Democratic states desperately need a game plan to counter what’s happening globally and here in the United States.

Let me just start, if I might, by a trip that I took with the majority leader of the House of Representatives, Congressman Hoyer, under the auspices of the Helsinki Commission, we went to Europe in July for the Parliamentary Assembly Meeting in Luxembourg. But before doing that we decided that we wanted to go to Budapest, to Hungary, to see first-hand what was happening in that country.
We knew that there were troubles in the country, but we wanted to see firsthand what was happening in that state. And as I was talking a little bit earlier to the panelists, as I was listening, I met with half-a-dozen government officials from all different agencies, and as I was listening to their response to our concerns about the freedom of the press, about imprisoning opposition, about removing democratic principles of one-party state, and revising history, I thought I was in China.

And I say that because when I was in China every official I met with gave me the same response to every question they answered. It was talking points given to them by their government that they were required to respond to whatever we said. And that's what I found in Budapest, every one of the government officials gave us information that was factually wrong about the control of the press by the Oligarchs, that Mr. Orbán has been able to control the message going out, gave us misinformation about the revisionists of history as what they've done in Hungary's involvement in World War II.

They gave us revisionist history on the protection of civil societies, and every one of these issues was just frightening to hear. Hungary which is a NATO ally, a NATO ally, is no longer a democratic state according to the principles of the founding of the NATO alliance. The NATO alliance states very clearly, founded in 1949, on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law.

Hungary doesn't meet those standards today under President Orbán. And what makes matters even more frightening is that we visited the Aurora Center. The Auróra Center is a non-profit, the protection for civil society, is a place where the NGOs can come, and meet, and share information, and talk about events, and try to organize to protect democratic principles.

And we met there at their request, and they told us that because this meeting was taking place, there were certainly going to be repercussions to the Center itself. They had lost their license at times by the government officials because of their protests, they've been harassed, that their funding had been cut off, a lot of things.

And sure enough, just about a month ago, a couple weeks ago, a group of criminal types broke into their offices, harassed their -- physically arrest the people there, and the government made no response at all to these attacks. That's what's happening. Hungary, of course has adopted, just recently, the Foreign Agents Law 2017, very similar to the Russian Foreign Agent Law that puts a very chilling effect on civil society's ability to operate.
Hungary is moving further and further away from the principles of democracy. They're moving in the wrong way. So it gave us the stark reality that of the popular misconception that democracy arcs upwards forever. It's not inevitable. We don't necessarily are able to protect democratic states just because it's the right form of government.

Now Turkey is not -- Hungary is not alone, another NATO partner is even worse, Turkey. Every day you're reading more and more things that are happening in Turkey. It is a country that, again, we reformed NATO to protect us from the threats of the spread of the Soviet Union, of their of their national security threat against us.

And what does Turkey do? They buy the S-400 from Russia, compromising our national security, and the security of NATO, and sharing military information with our adversary, and make no mistake about it, Russia is our adversary. They attacked our country in 2016, and they continue to compromise American's national security interests.

And Turkey now has a military relationship with Russia which is prohibited under the NATO Alliance, and by the way, also triggers sanctions under the CATSO Statute. But Turkey has done a lot more, they invaded Syria, we all know that. How tragic this is, it compromises our ability to fight counterterrorism -- to have counterterrorism in that region, our ground forces are the Kurdish fighters, and the Kurdish fighters now have been very much compromised because of the Turkey intervention into Syria.

It is the world leader in jailing journalists, Turkey, 180 media outlets have been closed, 220,000 websites have been blocked in Turkey. Under Erdogan we've seen the use of emergency powers, rewriting the Constitution, imprisoning those who challenge the power, undermining judicial independence, violating the rule of law on civil liberties, and the list goes on, and on, and on, and on.

It was Brookings that sponsored, and the German Marshall Fund that sponsored: How do the liberal leaders who gain power operate to keep power? What is the game plan here? And we've seen this over and over again, and you can just take a look at what's happened in Hungary and Turkey to see this play.

Once they gain power they end the Independent Judicial Review. That has happened in both of those countries. They create a one-party state, both for now one-party states. They attack the
independent media and civil society, controlling the message to the population to gain support, and they cast those who oppose the ruling government as out-of-touch elites, as globalist, or bureaucrats, and increasingly identifying them as enemies of the state.

And we've seen this happen now with two of our NATO allies, and the list goes on, and on, and on. If these practices sound familiar and too close to home, they are too close to home. We see a growing presence in our own country, supporting these types of practices, promoting nationalism, and anti-migrant sentiments in order to get popular support, giving legitimacy to those who promote hate, the misuse of executive power here in the United States.

Please look at how the Trump administration is using the power, and abusing the Constitution of the United States. We could talk about the Emolument Clause, but that that'll be for another day.

Congress specifically took action in regards to our southern border, and the President used the power of his office to negate the actions of Congress. To me it's clearly unconstitutional and illegal. But it's not the first time. The President's trying to take over the powers of the Judicial Branch. Look at his appointments, and the Senate, we are not standing up to those appointments. We're not giving independent review. He's trying to take over the courts.

Look how he criticizes judicial decisions, and the media and which he calls the enemy of the state, trying to compromise independent media. And then we see the President intentionally misstating the facts in order to try to control public opinion through his tweets and social media. These are signs that we see in societies that are moving away from democracy, and justifying control by one party.

We do need a Democratic Playbook, so thank you, we need this. And you're going to hear from the panelists a lot of the principles, and I have not had a chance yet to review this report, but we do need to have this game plan.

Let me just give you a few of my lists of things that we need to do in order to protect democracy. We have to be able and use sanctions against those who violate basic human rights.

I thank Norm for mentioning the Magnitsky Statutes that I worked with Senator -- the late Senator McCain on. Believe me, these sanctions work, when you deny human rights violators access to
our banking system, or to this country it hits them where it hurts, because they don't want their money in their local currency, and they certainly like to visit and have family here in the United States.

And now with Global Magnitsky, and also the first Magnitsky Statute, we're getting cooperation of other states around the country -- around the world. So Europe is following suit, Canada has followed suit, so we are getting a more global response to human rights violators. It needs to be used.

Senator Wicker and I have introduced legislation that would impose these types of sanctions in regards to Turkey, in their most recent violations of basic human rights. We also have the CATSO Statute that I mentioned earlier, that is mandatory sanctions against Turkey in regards to their purchase of the S-400.

We need to develop a stronger tool against corruption, and Ambassador Eisen, has been one of the real champions on behalf of anti-corruption, he's done great service, and I applaud him, his efforts in that regard.

But the legislation he's referring to would establish a review of every country in the world, like we do in trafficking in persons, with tier ratings. No country is perfect, but there are standards that countries must have, including independent judiciary, and having anti-bribery laws, and those -- and having bureaucracies that are not -- don't receive bribes, and how their public contracting is done.

There are standards for how you can judge how a country is meeting its obligations to fight corruption. If we had tier ratings and took action against those that are unacceptable, it would be a game-changer in regards to the global response to corruption, as we've seen the global response to trafficking. That legislation, Senator Young and I have introduced that legislation, it's been reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I think that would help us in our toolbox to preserve democracies.

We've got to invest in our foreign assistance and democracy building, we take a look at the foreign assistance budget, it's too small to start off with, but the percentage of that budget that goes to the democracy building is -- it's just a small, small percentage. We need to do a better job in helping countries develop and protect democratic institutions.

We we've invested a lot in Central America? Not enough, Central America is extremely
vulnerable. These are democratic states that are very vulnerable of losing -- of being effective democracies. So we need to invest in democracy, it's in our national security interest. We need to block arm sales to those countries that are using these arms against their own people.

Senator Durbin has joined me in legislation that would do that. America's military technology is what every country in the world wants, every country, and we should not just make it available because the country is our NATO ally or a friend, supposedly, if they're using this might against basic principles of democracy.

And we've got to counter the propaganda. We can't be naive about this. When Russia attacked us in 2016 we provided funds in Congress to fight what they were doing in the propaganda, the administration held those funds up for way too long, but there's bipartisan support for us to get in this game to make sure that we get information out there that's accurate because, false information is now a tool being used to bring down democratic institutions.

We have to have disclosure laws on social media to protect our election system, there's legislation pending that would deal with that, other countries have responded to put guardrails on social media, we need to do the same here in the United States. And we need to support civil societies, America needs to support civil societies in countries around the world.

So, we had the Confirmation Hearing for Secretary Sullivan to be Ambassador to Russia. The questions many of us asked, including this Senator, is whether our embassy, our mission in Moscow will be a beacon of hope for civil societies in Russia. And Secretary Sullivan answered affirmatively, and that he would take direct steps to continue the tradition of our mission in Russia. I think that's extremely important.

The stakes could not be higher. This was the way I started. And I appreciate what you're doing today. China is using their economic power to try to influence democratic institutions. Russia is using an asymmetric arsenal in order to compromise democratic institutions.

I authored a report in January of last year on Russia's asymmetric arsenal, on what they're doing to attack democratic states, primarily in Europe, and now also here in the United States. And so we got have adversaries out there, that are trying to bring us down.

What Hungary, and Turkey, and Poland, and other countries are doing, they're playing
into Russia’s playbook, they’re helping Russia accomplish its objective to divide us and bring down
democratic institutions. They're weakening NATO, they're weakening the commitments under the
Helsinki Final Accords, this is what's happening and we have to counter that. The stakes could not be
higher.

So it's most important thing we can do. The most important thing we can do is get our
own house in order. Fight here in America for the principles of democracy, honesty human rights, rule of
law, independent judiciary, separation of branches of government, anti-corruption measures, including
enforcement of the Emolument Clause of the Constitution of the United States.

America's leadership, by our own actions, is so critical to preserving and expanding
democracy. And that's what I hope will come out of this session today with the expert panelists that you
have. I look forward to hearing the -- hearing about their conversation, but also The Playbook for
Democracy it is an incredible contribution to preserving our democratic system here in the United States,
and America's leadership for democracy around the world. Thank you again for what you're doing.
(Applause)

MR. EISEN: Okay. Senator, thank you for that inspiring an incisive analysis of the
challenges we're facing, but of the solutions. The ones you've already helped implement, and the others
that we know you're going to fight for in order to address the health of democracy, as we mark 30 years
since the end of the Cold War.

Little could we have imagined in that flush of optimism, and the proclamation of the end
of history, that these historical factors of illiberalism that's so afflicted the Post-World War I Century would
be back upon us once more today. So we thank you for your leadership and for your kind words. Thank
you, Senator, thank you. (Applause)

With that I'd like to pivot towards-- pivot towards The Democracy Playbook, the Playbook
is blue, but we are green so we have not printed the entire Playbook for you can find it online on the
Brookings website, there are executive summaries available outside, and you can get the entirety of the
Playbook in a virtual form.

The project was born out of a gap in the scholarship on democracy when Alina, Torrey
and I worked together on The Anatomy of Illiberal States, our last report about the crisis of democracy in
Europe, particularly in Central Europe and in Turkey.

We were surprised at how much attention was given to what had gone wrong, but apropos of Senator’s focus, how little to pulling together the solutions, grounding that in the best of both social science, where a tremendous amount of work, scholarship has been done, but also practice, and packaging it in a way that is useful to every stakeholder in a democracy. Whether you are a political party that is in power, whether you are in the opposition, judges, another law enforcement officials, civil society, independent media, business, international organizations, we all have a stake in the health of democracy and there was no one-stop-shop to pull this information together.

So we enlisted our friend, Susan Corke, who is the Head of the Secretariat of the Transatlantic Democracy Working Group, and we got to work on *The Democracy Playbook*.

We didn’t only do a desk research, or Washington-based research, really one of the most important things we did in producing this volume that we’re releasing today, was to travel to Europe again and again and at GLOBSEC in Bratislava, at the Warsaw Security Forum, to meet with emerging leaders from across Europe, particularly Central in Eastern Europe, and talk to them about the challenges they were facing, their ideas about solutions, get their reactions to our ideas, share outlines and early drafts so that the first edition, and we hope it’ll be the first of many, we’re acutely conscious that there’s much, much more to be done, and in our approximately 100-page Playbook, although those of you who work through all -- nearly 400 of the footnotes may ask us to spare you a second edition.

We’re going to keep going with the project. We know there’s much more to be done, but this first edition is richly informed by the experience of the champions of democracy on the ground, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. And it was such a pleasure to work with my colleagues.

And I’d like to introduce them now, if I may. Susan Corke, as I said, the Director of the Transatlantic Democracy Working Group, has joined us from just down the street, at GMF, as a Senior Fellow there. Susan is working to build a bipartisan transatlantic platform for promoting democracy. Before she was at GMF she was Director of Countering Anti-Semitism and Extremism at Human Rights First, and the Director of Programs for Europe, Eurasia and Southeast Asia Freedom House, and held numerous senior positions at the Department of State.

Susan, come on up, take a chair, any chair. That’s a lie, take the last chair.
Next to Susan, is my colleague Alina Polyakova. Alina, if you'll join us. Alina is the Founding Director of the Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology here at Brookings, where she is also a Fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe. She's an Adjunct Professor of European Studies at Johns Hopkins University, where my teenager will be matriculating next year, so we're excited about that.

Her writing and research -- be nice to her if she takes your class Alina -- her writing and research is regularly featured in major outlets across the United States and around the world, and before coming to us at Brookings she was the Director of Research and the Senior Fellow for Europe and Eurasia at the Atlantic Council.

And then finally, I'll invite Torrey Taussig to the stage. Come on up Torrey. Torrey is a Research Director, the Research Director in the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at the Harvard Kennedy School's Center for Science and International Affairs. She is a Non-Resident Fellow Here at Brookings, and the Head of Strategy and Operations for the North American Group of the Trilateral Commission.

She was just a Robert Bosch Foundation Fellow based in Berlin, so she's been studying these issues up close for the past year, and has held a series of positions before that here at Brookings, including leading our Foreign Policy Programs Democracy Working Group.

So now that you know who our distinguished panelists are, I'm going to take a seat myself, I see that I'm at the end, and we're going to talk a little bit about The Democracy Playbook.

Oh. There are a few stray seats, so if you're standing and you want to sit down you should feel free while I find my seat to find one for yourself. Please, come on up and do that.

Okay ladies. It's been a pleasure working with you on this project. I am proud of what we've produced. I continue to be amazed that when we went looking for this, it wasn't out there. We couldn't just pull it off the shelf.

In November of 1989, the Fall of the Berlin Wall, 30 years ago this week, marked the beginning of Europe Whole and Free, as George HW Bush called it. After the collapse of the Soviet Union democratic governance spread across the continent, our friend, Frank Fukuyama claimed that we had reached the end of history. Although he will tell you it became more of a slogan and what he actually
claimed was much more nuanced than that.

The idea was, or to be most intellectually charitable, the question was: Was a liberal democracy going to take hold globally as the final form of government? And I'd like to kick off our conversation here today by asking our panelists, we'll just go down the line starting, at the end with Torrey, ask our panelists to tell us why, in your view, 30 years after the Fall of the Wall, are we seeing such a degree of authoritarian resurgence, particularly in the Former Soviet Bloc? How did we get here? Should we have seen it coming?

Torrey, we'll start with you.

MS. TAUSSIG: Well, thank you, Norm. And thank you all for being here. It's an important time to be talking about these issues. It's been a pleasure to work with the three of you and the whole team on this Playbook this Democracy Playbook.

As Norm mentioned, we are coming up on the 30th anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall, we're in a very different time today when it comes to energy, and revitalization of democratic project. But what I wanted to start off by saying is that, I don't think that the democratic project that was envisioned in 1989 has failed. I think it's very much an unfinished project.

And over generations, in fact over centuries, democratic momentum around the world has waxed and it has waned. And Norm, you mentioned the Francis Fukuyama End of History Debate. I don't think it was wrong in the Proclamation that democracy is the most advanced, or representative form of government we have in the world. It was, in fact, a mistaken assumption that it would march on inevitably, without constant defense, without constant reinvigoration.

And today it is clear that we are in a moment of disrepair, in democratic momentum and in institutions around the world, which is why it's so important to be working on these issues now. And we've seen, not just in Europe, but around the world, democracy, if you look at indices such as those by Freedom House that it is in its 13th consecutive year of decline in political freedom, civil liberties.

In that time one in six democracies around the world has failed, and in Europe it's interesting because it's been somewhat of a slow boil, it hasn't been through overt coups, authoritarian takeovers, the illiberal trends we've seen have been through relatively democratic processes.

And alongside headline capturing issues like the return of authoritarianism under
Erdoğan, or the illiberal resurgence in Poland and Hungary, there has been a decade-long perhaps longer trend in the erosion of citizen trust in democratic institutions, which is hard to measure in ways that we could see in, again, overt authoritarian takeovers and coups.

And this distrust in democratic institutions has led to a resurgence of populist parties by citizens who feel that their governments are unable to meet economic grievances and defend against security concerns, and that is where we are today.

MS. POLYAKOVA: So just to directly follow up what Torrey just laid out. First of all, yes, it was such a pleasure to work with all of you on this report, and also our previous report that we collaborated on, that has been part of a much longer initiative by all of us across many institutions, to first understand the tools that so-called illiberal states use to try to undermine democracy, and this report we tried to provide a playbook for how to respond, as you’ve said, Norman, as the Senator pointed out.

And I think this is the bright light that I would like to focus on. You know, as Torrey was saying, and as your comments prelude, this is a really key moment to remember where we were in the euphoria of 1989, and the 1990s. I think in that euphoria we got lost on the notion that democracy, you know, The Third Wave Of Democratization that followed the Fall of the Soviet Union, so an explosion of democratic governance and across the world because of the collapse of the Soviet influence across the world, and especially in the former East Bloc.

And I think we assumed for a long time that this was a linear line, a linear line of progress towards liberalism of the small isle, towards greater democratization. But what we're experiencing now is that is the reality that these are -- these processes don’t happen in a linear trajectory, that they come in ebbs and flows, right.

And what we've seen is a sort of backlash to that very, very rapid process of economic liberalization, and democratization, especially in the former East Bloc countries, that has taken the face and the form of these self-styled illiberal states.

But I think what we're seeing now is a backlash to that backlash, if you will. And I think this is the bright light that I see. I mean certainly, you know, governments like in Hungary and Poland have increasingly consolidated their control. Certainly we have seen an autocracy emerge in Turkey; certainly we have seen authoritarianism emerge in Russia.
But what I see now is that in at the local level there's pushback. And in looking at the four Central and Eastern European countries, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary, all of the major cities now have an opposition mayor, right.

But at the national level the main party, the populist party still dominate, but we're seeing in the local level that there is traction for a different kind of idea that we haven't hit a place where civil societies could really have been dismantled, this is the key difference.

You know, as opposed to where we were 30 years ago, we've had this 30 years of development, of civic groups, of independent media, and they are still there, and they are still active, and they deserve and need the support of countries like the United States, and also of international institutions.

And just quickly, you know, I think it seems to us in this moment that these, you know, so-called populist forces came out of the blue. But as Torrey pointed out, it hasn't just been a slow-burning democratic recession, it's also been a slow burn on the emergence of these political movements. And we just haven't really been paying attention, and we're still not paying attention, in other parts of the world as similar processes are happening.

You know, Erdoğan didn't become an autocrat out of the blue, Putin didn't become authoritarian out of the blue, you know, Orbán didn't emerge out of the blue. But we weren't paying attention, and we need to start paying attention now. Thank you.

MS. CORKE: And I want to echo that has been a real pleasure working with all of you on this --

MR. EISEN: I was afraid you were going to take exception to it, Susan.

MS. CORKE: (Laughter) But one of the really great reasons why this has been such a good process was that it was collaborative, it was inclusive and, you know, we took the time to refine and test it ourselves, had sort of a design-thinking mindset in doing it. So the process itself is, you know, something that we want to model as we're making recommendations.

I want to start out by giving an anecdote. A few weeks ago I was at Forum 2000 in Prague, which was started by Václav Havel, and it was on the eve of course of the 30th Anniversary of 1989, and Lech Walesa was given a similar question. And he said: The problems of today can be solved.
When I started the fight versus communism nobody believed me, and it took me 20 years and one Pope. You don't need your own Pope, you don't need 20 years, what you need are ideas, vision and solidarity.

So, think we need to remember that. Both Torrey, and Alina talked about the ebbs and the flows, you know, we've seen it work before, we have that going in our advantage. I was in middle school in 1989, and a lot of the, you know, student leaders that helped overthrow communism are now in their 30s and 40s, and they are the ones that, you know, they have this in their DNA, and they are the ones that are still fighting.

A couple of things though that we did do wrong along the way, there is the sense of inevitability, we saw democracy as an end state, and our Co-Chair Jeff Gedmin said it really succinctly, he said: democracy is a process, it's not an end state.

And if it's a process that means it needs continuous inputs it needs tuning, it needs review, where there are bumps in the road you need to rethink it, retool it. And that's what we failed to do. A lot of the policies and approaches that were designed to supposedly support democracy were built around this idea of it being a linear process. Even the U.S. assistance framework was built on this graduation model that democracy is achieved, you graduate out of the need from support. So that's one thing that needs to be rethought.

The 2008 global financial crisis was a pivotal period, it exposed that the roots of democracy were not deep in many places. It also provided openings to Russia and China who were happy to stretch their power to challenge the Democratic World Order.

But this contemporary thread it's not a new one, it's one we've faced before, and I think Torrey was telling us, not to focus too much on the negative, and that's really true, and I would encourage us to go back, not just 30 years but 70 years. At a Trans-Atlantic level the U.S. and Europe have built an amazing interconnected infrastructure, built on values, for security and democracy.

After World War II the U.S. implemented the Marshall Plan to rebuild European economies, and you have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, we have a foundation of institutions, we have a foundation for collective security, for shared values and obligations.

So we already have a strong foundation to work from, and there has been a lot of
progress, and the vision of Europe Whole, Free and at Peace was made real. But that's not to -- you know, what we're here to do today is also to understand where mistakes were made, the so-called elites they handled the drivers of discontent not well in terms of understanding the hardships that it was creating for people, the growing inequality. They became removed from people in the countryside. It was the sense that those in the capitals didn't understand what was going on.

So, one core essence in our Playbook is that if democracy is going to prevail against authoritarianism, it's because people are willing to fight for it, that they are willing to seek the truth, that they're willing to use all available space to press for freedom, and because democracy shows that it can deliver.

MR. EISEN: Perhaps we should think of our elections as a permanent, democratic revolution, instead of as a periodic citizenship event along with -- along the lines that democracy is a process, and not as an end state.

Torrey, Alina, Susan, we worked hard to -- we divided the writing in the Playbook with myself, and Susan, and our colleague Andrew, talking about some of the domestic issues, and Torrey and Alina focusing on the international. But I'm going to ask everybody about everything here this morning.

I'm going to start at the end again with Torrey, with the responsibility and the opportunities of the first of our political stakeholders, the actors who are involved in the contestation of democracy, those who have political power, parties, elected officials, those in positions of authority -- we'll turn to the opposition and others in a moment -- but Torrey what are the things that someone can do if they're actually in a position of political authority in one of these challenged democratic states?

MS. TAUSSIG: So, Norm, I think you very importantly mentioned that even though we were focusing on domestic and international actors, the approach that we all took is that democracy rests in the hands of the people just as it did in 1989 during true democratic revolutions, as it does today.

And so as much external or international support, and cooperation you can have from foreign governments, NGOs donors, international foundations, if there is not genuine enthusiasm and involvement from domestic actors, democracy cannot be fundamentally revitalized and defended.

And I also think it's important that you mentioned, it is not just a task for civil society, or
political opposition, or those on the outside to be banging on the door, and trying to push back on these illiberal trends. Across Europe, to varying degrees, there is political opposition operating within these governments, and there are important measures that these political opposition groups, establishment, political parties can take.

You know, for one I think it's important to maintain a high but level playing field to the extent that establishment parties in governments across Europe do not kind of fall to the lowest common denominator of democratic transparency, of political transparency, all the better. When it comes to times of elections what we've seen, interestingly, in Hungary recently is political opposition groups rallying and coalescing together in order to defeat Fidesz in local-level elections across the state. That was an interesting and important tactic that I think we could see mirrored elsewhere.

I mean I'll let the two of you elaborate on this, but I do think it's very important that we focus not just on those on the outside but those who are in the establishment to take actions too.

MR. EISEN: Alina, how can the opposition address the challenge of a digital authoritarianism? For that matter, how can every stakeholder address the challenge of digital authoritarianism? As we look at the level playing field in elections, and as elections as the foundation of our democracy, the expression of the popular.

Well, there has been a rise of a variety of uses of digital information technology by authoritarian regimes, to surveil, to repress, to manipulate populations, to intrude on elections. How is digital authoritarianism exacerbating the challenge of maintaining a level democratic playing field of keeping elections fair? And what can be done about it?

MS. POLYAKOVA: So, I will say that I think this is an area that we need to pay much more attention to the second edition, because I think well we did very well in this first edition, and again this presupposes the need for more follow up on this, as you said, Norm, despite the hundred pages we already wrote, is that we were looking at what has been successful across the world, we scoped out many, many studies, as many, many footnotes show, to kind of distill what are the best practices for success, and where have some interventions, you could say whether it be by domestic, political opposition groups, or by international have actually failed.

But we tried to find those best practices that could be applied first and foremost in the
Frontline States of Central and Eastern Europe, but hopefully globally as well.

But I think what we need to start thinking about is The Democracy Playbook for the 21st Century, and that's what we have to think about the issues around technology, and the digitization of information, how the information is being increasingly used to subvert democracy.

You know, it wasn't long ago that we assumed that the digital revolution was going to produce the fertile ground for a fourth-wave of democratization, the Arab Spring, the Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine. These were all mobilized through the use of social media, right, and then we thought there was going to be a boom. The open information, open society, of pluralism, perfect match, right, as citizens can challenge corrupt authoritarian leaders.

But we have completely pivoted away from that debate now, where we find ourselves today is really concerned about how authoritarian states, primarily right now China, but also Russia, are using these technologies to try to attack democracies, to undermine democratic institutions.

And this Playbook, you know, the Senator talked a lot about what happened in 2016 obviously, and what continues to happen on a daily basis with Russian disinformation campaigns, I mean I think every day there's a new story about this.

And other countries are copying this playbook, certainly other authoritarian states, but also groups inside the countries of concern. And so in a way social media looks a bit like a -- like a carnival mirror, you know, excuse reality. And what I mean by that, it's over and over again you see extremist groups, more radical groups being much better presenting themselves as legitimate, credible actors on the digital space, which disproportionately makes them look, you know, far more normalized than they are actually in real-life.

So, you know, a party like the AfD in Germany is still a minority party, like it doesn't get the kind of votes you see the mainstream center-right party get in Germany, even in some regional elections. But they have far more followers on social media, they're much more active, they've much better understanding how to reach a broader swath of the population through these tools. And I think to me this is the concern that I have.

MR. EISEN: Any best practice or example that you want to identify that has worked?

And we're in the early days of figuring out what the effective line of defense against the digital election
tampering, and authoritarianism looks like. But anything that jumps out?

MS. POLYAKOVA: Look, I think we're in really, really early days. So right now we're in this trial-and-error period where there's a lot of -- tools being developed to track and monitor things like disinformation campaign from foreign actors, but we don't really know yet what's having impact in our interventions.

So I think what comes out in our report that's really critical here, is again the role of the international donor community is that, you know, we need to coordinate our support better, and we need to focus that support not the usual suspects, and specifically in the digital domain, you know, independent media and civil society organizations need to have the capacities, the basic capacities to function, to be able to push back themselves, in their own countries, in their local communities against these kinds of incursions, but also against their domestic disinformation from specific extremist groups.

But I think right now there's a lot of things being tried, and I think just go back to what Senator Cardin correctly said about how the U.S. Congress has allocated, and authorized, and appropriated a lot of support for the State Department to use, to try to support civil society groups in their fight against disinformation specifically. I think we need to see much more of this.

MR. EISEN: I'll just volunteer, that the Macron campaigns clever defense against hacking, and digital manipulation bears study. You wouldn't think that you need to prepare yourself for digital war as a part of a European, and we are focused on Europe, both in this first edition of the Playbook in the conversation today, you wouldn't think that would be necessary as a part of a modern political campaign in Europe, but it very much is.

Susan, I want to dig deeper with you into the relationship between what you do as the Director of the Transatlantic Democracy Working Group. to describe what -- with a focus on Europe -- what other, let's put the digital to the side for the moment, what other tactics and strategies you think are successful to support civil society actors, NGOs, and to renew the promise of democratic institutions, looking at having spent as much time as we have with our European rising leaders, looking at the situation in Central and Eastern Europe?

MS. CORKE: Thank you. Good question, Norman. That's, myself having spent a lot of time working in the field with frontline democracy defenders, I think that's one thing that we need to do is
kind of go back, go back to the roots. You know, too often, particularly here in D.C., I think we talk in terms of grand terms, of democracy, and freedom, and institutions.

But really, in order to succeed we need to go back to the grassroots level, you know, we started this Transatlantic Democracy Working Group, admittedly, in the wake of the Trump election because the environment here has become so partisan, and those of us who had worked in Democratic and Republican administrations had previously agreed on the big things. That Europe mattered, that the alliance with Europe mattered, that having our security grounded in values and respect for human rights, that that mattered.

We became alarmed and felt like we needed to create a mechanism for coordination that these things -- that these issues were big ones, that it wasn't for a single individual, so we banded together, and we agreed to stand together on principle, where we saw democracy deteriorating, and putting at risk our security, we agreed that we would stand up together and that we would help to educate, and inform, and draw attention to the environment.

So, in terms of concrete examples, where this works best, and it was important to have our emerging leaders working with us on this, is understanding what they see is working, what are the key areas where there is legitimate demand on the ground, where they believe that there is a strategy, and the right actors, and the possibility of success, and that they help us identify where they need international support.

So, where they need us to help amplify the message by calling on Congress to be having hearings and, you know, showing that the U.S. still cares and pays attention, that there needs to be funding but funding that is cognizant of the current realities, and is tech-savvy, and has a longer-term time frame, and builds into the approach and understanding that democracy is not linear.

So, you know, at its best is when you have an example of say in Poland, and the judiciary was under attack, and there were hearings in Congress, there were numerous reports by members of the Transatlantic Democracy Working Group, and Polish civil society brought these cases to the European courts for further review.

So, so I think the main takeaway is that it's not one silver bullet, it is the interaction of multiple actors who are all doing their role to be pushing for democracy.
MR. EISEN: And I will say we meet with our European interlocutors despite the severity of the -- variable severity of the challenge in these countries, they're optimistic, they're energized, they're looking for specific strategies, and so you can't help but emerge from those conferences feeling challenged. And we're going to bring some of them to Washington, D.C., and to Brookings as part of this, and to the TDWG as part of this ongoing Transatlantic dialogue.

I am going to do a quick round with the panel now, and then turn it over to the audience for questions. Do we have some friends with microphones here, who are ready? Good. I see one microphone. I guess we'll use one microphone.

But first we're going to do a quick round of the panel. We've talked about government, civil society. What about the private sector; the responsibility of business, firms, corporations, investors, institutional investors, to promote democracy?

We heard a little bit from Alina about the need for vigilance to the dark side of technology. Just quick reflections on the panel for the role of the private sector, and in particular social media companies, as we address this crisis of democracy, challenge of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.

Torrey, we'll start with you. Just one-minute answers, please, guys.

MS. TAUSSIG: I think there's a huge role for private industry and private enterprise to play, to flip that a little bit when we're looking at who, international actors, donors, foundation, should be seeking to support or collaborate with, we typically think of local and domestic NGOs, and political opposition groups.

But there's a tremendous array of public -- I'm sorry -- of private industry actors, non-profit and for-profit, but when it comes to businesses, think tanks, universities, looking at non-traditional actors on the ground to support, is critically important. And just to say one very brief point on disinformation, social media companies have a tremendous role to play in countering illiberal trends, and it's not one that we've seen them fully step up to.

As Alina mentioned, a few years ago technology looked like it was prime to advance a fourth wave of democracy, and since then they've become echo chambers for disinformation, and polarization. And it will be on behalf of the social media companies and governments to better regulate
this type of speech, to remove content from platforms that don't meet content standards. To ban political advertising as we've started to see some companies take. It's a first step. I'd be curious to hear your take on this.

But yeah, I think there's a number of steps private sectors can take, non-traditional actors on the ground like I mentioned, and also social media companies.

MS. POLYAKOVA: I mean just very briefly, I'm going to say something to contradict what Torrey said. But I think, again this is why we need a follow up to really dig into these issues. Look, social media companies it's fun to beat up on them, but they're not the really -- they're not the enemy here, they should be part of the partnership in how we frame democratic moves, how we support democratic mobilization.

I think on the content control question, which you mentioned Torrey. I find that we have to be very, very careful about treading that line, because we will find ourselves very quickly in the zone of censorship and, of course, if we go down that path where we ask companies to take down specific content, we can't do that in the United States, first of all, we have the First Amendment, and I mean hate speech is protected in the United States.

It's not the same in Europe, and Europe, for that reason hasn't (inaudible) much quickly in this content moderation zone, but I think if we go in that direction too far it really puts us on the same trajectory as countries like Russia, as countries like China, who would love to see democracies, you know, undermine our own commitments to free speech.

They would love to see us be hypocritical in this way. So I think we have to find a different path, and that is a core debate that's happening right now. And I will say one thing that I think was so fascinating from our conversations with the emerging leaders, is that we have participation from some Russians who are still in Russia, and we asked them about: How do you use social media? Is it helpful to you? And they said, you know, we're grateful to have YouTube, we're grateful to have Facebook, because without these companies we would have no way to even get our ideas out, to get our voices out.

So I think we have to remember that these companies do have a positive role to play in other parts of the world, and that they need to be at the table, they need to be partners in this space,
they're not the enemies here.

MS. TAUSSIG: Actually just to follow up, I completely agree with that. And to follow up, it is important for these companies to remain open channels of speech, and if we look at the Anatomy Of Liberal States Toolkit that we did last year one of the first steps that authoritarian leaning and a liberal governments take is to remove free speech, to take over private media companies, to make them mouthpieces of the government, and social media companies are much harder to regulate and control in that way. So, right, it's a very fine line.

MS. CORKE: And another emerging leader for Belarus made that point. He said, you know, without having access to the Internet we are so isolated in Belarus. You know, with all its problems I've had to -- have no way to work. So, you know, and technology and the social media companies they're here to stay so, you know, as I've, during this project and in others, talked to a lot of civil society activists, they want to have the skill set and the tools to be able to operate effectively in this environment.

A couple of quick points on the role of the private sector, and we go into this in the report, but the operating conditions that exist in democracies are what allow businesses to flourish, any companies that have a long-term perspective are better served, by supporting democratic conditions. You know, when they operate in a country like Russia there will be a lot of pressure on companies.

I actually at one point worked at the Embassy overseeing the Law Enforcement Section, and a lot of companies would come in wanting to have advice on, you know, how to work in the Russian environment. You know, in Russia, you know, Microsoft found out that Russia tried to use it as a puppet that, you know, they said that they were going after software piracy, which is true, that's a real problem in Russia, but the Russian government steered them to be enforcing it, in particular on independent, media organizations, civil society.

And, you know, Microsoft ended up realizing that they were actually helping to implement the Kremlin agenda, and finally reversed course.

So number one for businesses, is don't be a puppet for the government to help them to do their dirty work, it is up to the companies to understand the context that they operate in, and to make sure that they have the Hippocratic Oath of “first do no harm”. And then the next stage they can of course seek out corporate social responsibility programs that actually try to understand the local context, and do
active things that can create better democratic conditions.

MR. EISEN: Okay. With that, we're open for questions. We have a microphone in the back. Raise your hand if you have a question. We'll start, we're going to start at the front and we'll work our way back. And, Marylyn, come on up here, this gentleman and the white shirt has a question. Oh. We have two microphones, excellent.

QUESTIONER: Hi. My name is Lando Lipsky. I just have a question about the context. I mean I think it's great that you guys have focused on Europe. I'm originally from Romania. But what happened 30 years ago would not have happened in a vacuum, and would not happen today, I don't think. So what happens when the U.S. abdicates its role as the leader of the free world? What happens when disinformation happens in America from the -- from the White House? And what is the incentive for the private sector to do the right thing? I think it's great what you all said, but like if the money is there, why should they, you know -- and they're not -- that there's no sanction on them here in the U.S., why would they do the right thing?

MS. POLYAKOVA: I can start with that if we want. I mean I think absolutely, I think what you're outlining is a (inaudible) geopolitical context in which the United States and either even Western European countries as well, and traditionally U.S. allies, could be much more divided. There's a huge rift between the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, is quite nuanced in many ways.

But also the broader context that there's a huge amount of uncertainty instability, and when it comes to social media companies I have to say that I think they are trying to struggle with this question. And I think you've hit the nail on the head, because we need to move away from thinking about content controls, and towards how do we change the economic incentive structure, that has built an Internet.

In the 1990s that was all about the free, open, anonymous Internet. I think the reality is that we can't go on like this and still maintain a digital domain that is governed by democratic principles. So with all those democratic principles, these companies I do think adhere to, at least rhetorically, they say they do. And we need to hold them at their word. It's about transparency, so introducing transparency into how the algorithms work, it's about accountability into having more information shared with researchers for example about -- when they do these takedowns that we hear in the news all the
time. How are they attributing this? How are they doing the actual research?

And I will say that I have seen progress on this, it's not as fast as we would like, but it is moving in a right direction. I think what's going to be really key is where the U.S. goes in the regulatory space, because where Europe has gone is not necessarily in the same direction where the U.S. is going.

And there are a lot of bills being considered, and as Senator Cardin mentioned, the bill on disclosures in the U.S. Congress right now. None of them have passed yet but I think it's about rethinking how we even structure the regulatory framework around these issues to change the incentive structure these companies are functioning under.

MR. EISEN: Okay. The gentleman there had his hand up early, very good.

MR. PANIKKAR: Thank you. My name is Ashok Panikkar. I'm with Meta Culture. We have been working in the area of conflict management and strengthening the values of democracy for almost 15 to 20 years. I have a question and a suggestion. Firstly, congratulations; I was just looking at the abstract, and it's fantastic.

I'm wondering why two stakeholders are missing, and these are the stakeholders I work with. The first is educational institutions. Okay. The second is the people, and the reason why I say this, is I worked in India for 12 years and I left India because by 2015/2016 it was clear we were going to lose our democracy. And it wasn't because of the opposition, it wasn't even because of the nationalist parties, it was because the values of the average Indian were not democratic.

We have not in 70 years imbibed democratic values, democratic skills, democratic disposition. So my suggestion to you folks is for the second edition, please pay attention to the people without whom civil society or the opposition parties really cannot do very much. Thank you.

MR. EISEN: Well, I'll take that one, if I may. You know, we're acutely cognizant in doing work of this kind, and we were inspired by other work that's out there, including Gene Sharp's *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, in doing the work of this kind, and kind of pulling these threads together contemporaneously, today in a modern edition where there was nothing exactly like this paper. You always have to make choices.

One place where the literature is very rich, is on the responsibilities of individuals, we cite to some of that literature, and we talk about the role of the people on page 42. You could do an entire
report on nothing other than that, but we thought that that was a space that was well addressed, where some of the other areas not so much, just for the first edition. We agree with you it has to be expanded.

We do talk about educational institutions. This is in the chapter that Torrey and Alina were responsible for. We do talk about educational institutions in section two as one of the actors, particularly outside of the capital cities universities are a very important partner, a very important source of democratic energy, of resistance to a liberalism that should be studied.

Relationships built by international organizations, donors, and other international actors, and utilized as a non-traditional node of democracy advocacy. We talked about a little bit, but there's much, much more that needs to be said about that. So basically we're having a heated agreement with you.

MS. CORKE: I'll just note on that on that too, and also fighting for academic freedom is within the Transatlantic Democracy Working Group is one of the areas that we have focused on. So in Hungary with them forcing Central European University out of the country, one of the premier academic institutions in Central Europe, that was one of the examples that has not -- of Trans-Atlantic solidarity that has not been successful yet, but we are -- you know, we were able to get a really broad range of people from universities, and government, and authors who were willing to stand in support for Central European University, so I that is one of the areas that we do need to fight for.

And to your point, you know, all of these institutions they are made of people and, you know, the silver lining now is that there is a realization that democracy is an active sport you have to play it.

MR. EISEN: Torrey, did you want to say something?

MS. TAUSSIG: That's okay. I want to get to the questions.

MR. EISEN: Okay. Good. This gentleman sitting in the front with the light-colored jacket as (inaudible) --

QUESTIONER: Thank you. I lived for 40 years under communism so you might understand my deep-state concern about democracy worldwide, and in this country as well. This is a beautiful piece of research. Congratulations.

My question to you is: where's the leadership with so many actors? Are you going to
consider that somehow in the next report? Could this be something like Benjamin Barber’s Parliament of Cities -- World Parliament of Cities? How can this work? In the second somehow the subsidiary thing is, have you looked into the really deeper explanations of this pendulum of democracy and non-democracy which is the human nature?

I mean if you look at the sandbox where toddlers play, you have the bullies, you have the speaker of the box, you have the herding behavior, but you also got the kids who build sand castles. Is that the answer maybe or --

MR. EISEN: Thank you.

QUESTIONER: Thanks.

MR. EISEN: Thank you. All right; I'm going to go down -- we're reaching the end -- so I'm going to go down the panel and I'm going to ask everybody, you can take your pick of this gentleman's very good two questions.

We are very -- I'll begin by telling you on your first question, we are very, very focused on the human dimension, not just producing another paper. On your second question there's a lot of research, there's a lot of scholarship on the causes, we tried to focus on the solutions and we have worked very hard in and around this paper on the human dimension, moving forward, of the leaders on both sides of the Atlantic.

But Susan, I'll start with you, and we'll just go down the row before we wrap.

MS. CORKE: Sure. And I would just emphasize that. I mean the value of this Playbook will be what we -- what we do with it, and part of the design of including the emerging leaders where we were hopeful that this -- that they would be the practitioners, that if we wanted something that would be valuable to them, and that we were creating a feedback loop with them and hopefully a group that would be -- continue this practice of sharing their struggles, getting inspiration from those who had faced similar challenges in other countries.

So, you know, one thing that we would love to do is to kind of test this in practice, and have people who are implementing it, and reporting back on it, and have this be a dynamic product that we could do a second edition, and refine it if we find that, you know, certain assumptions don't play out well in certain contexts.
MR. EISEN: So we have the dozens of emerging leaders across Europe who've worked with us, and met with us repeatedly on this, who also are committed to these ideas, we're going to continue to work with them. And we have our American leaders, here at Brookings, at GMF, in the Transatlantic Democracy Working Group, that's the human infrastructure, of these ideas. Not to mention all of the millions of allies of democracy on both sides of the Atlantic and around the world. Alina?

MS. POLYAKOVA: Just very quickly. I think your question also goes back to the question that was posed earlier about these public opinion polls showing that, you know, people are -- across Europe and the United States don't trust their institutions as much, that even the United States there's something like a third that consistently say that they are -- they would be comfortable living a strong man style government,

And so we're seeing some of these questions emerge around young people who we always think are somehow innately more democratic, but actually, you know, they're not necessarily in every single country. So I think this is -- but this goes to the question, I think we have this assumption and there's something about human nature that's immovable, right.

That human -- the opinion, public opinion is not shaped by the factors, but of course it is. And I think what we're seeing now is that public opinion is being shaped by these more radical, more extremists, more populist leading groups across the world.

And I think the question now to me is: What is the response? What is that centrist narrative, right? And what we've seen is this is not -- none of this happens in a vacuum. As we've seen the emergence of these populist forces, we've seen the collapse of the center-left across Europe, the complete collapse of center-left parties. So, the question for me, and this report starts to get into that, is how do we reinvigorate, right, that narrative, right?

And this has come up a lot in our work, and I think the something we'll continue to address, because that will shape public opinion going forward.

MR. EISEN: Torrey we gave you the first word on the panel, and we're going to give you the last word on the panel, if I can impose upon you, we're a little over time.

MS. TAUSSIG: Okay. I have one positive statistic to push back on, not push back on -- counter these other trends (inaudible) not being as invested in democracy and in two brackets of
responses.

First, positive statistic, the Pew Research Center conducted a poll this summer which said that although citizen trust in democratic institutions are at a record low in the United States over 8 in 10 Americans said that they were confident that public trust in institutions could be turned around with the right mechanisms. So we have runway.

Two brackets of responses, I think a lot of these questions touched on how can we reinvigorate democracy, what actors are involved? The fundamental base level is that in order to defend democracy it must be shown to work. You have to give citizens something there to fight for, and at the citizen level we have an individual and collective response to reinvest in our communities, our offline communities, and engage in debate with one another.

We also need to elect pro-democracy candidates in office, in the United States, and in Europe, and internationally. And governments also have a responsibility. And this may seem out of left field, we haven’t talked about economics a lot but it is fundamentally important for advanced democracies, advanced economies to close economic inequality and income gaps that have been growing, at least in this country since the 1970s.

And if you look at drivers of populism one of the major splits is between urban and rural divides. And so governments, such as ours should be focused on how to bridge these urban real divides and invest in policies of inclusive growth that reach those citizens, not just in our urban populations, not just in certain socio-economic classes, but inclusive growth that touches all citizens.

MR. EISEN: I want to thank Susan, Alina, Torrey, Senator Cardin, our other co-author Andrew Kenealy, all of the team here at Brookings who worked on the report, all of those who are with us virtually today. And all of you who are here, the ones who asked such stimulating questions, and everyone in the room, I know every one of you would have asked a question if we had time.

We look forward to continuing the conversation, and we thank you for being with us, and for your support of democracy in the trans-Atlantic relationship, and around the world. Thanks very much everyone. (Applause)

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