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RECENT TRENDS IN DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EMERGING WORLD

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Panel:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. KHARAS: Good morning everyone, and welcome to Brookings. Thank you all very much for joining us for today's conversation on recent trends in democracy and development in the emerging world. My name is Homi Kharas. I'm the director of the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings, and we're delighted to host this event, jointly, with CIPPEC, the Center for the Implementation Public Policies for Equity and Growth in Argentina.

So, I think it particularly appropriate that we are having this event today. It's Halloween. Halloween is a day where there are some things that are scary, and, hopefully, some things that are less so, and it seems to me that democracy is falling squarely into that particular vein. A bunch of scary things happening. Kind of interesting, and almost unthinkable that, you know, we've got to the stage where major events, like COP 25 and the APEC Summit, have been canceled because, in many ways, of the failure of democracy to, actually, deal with issues. Riots in Chile have cost, to date, something on the order of 1.4 billion U.S. dollars.

This is happening in the country that, for many years, was thought of as being the most stable democratic place in Latin America, so, and, across the world, I think, we have these kind of -- this sense that things are moving a very new, and very different way, than they did in the past, and it's important, of course, not just because of democracy, and the fact that, you know, accountability, and people's -- how people think about their ability to influence their own lives is affected by these processes, but, also, by the impact that this can have on economic growth and development, and I spent a lot of my career working on East Asia, and people used to say what's the secret to East Asia's economic success, and some people would talk about export oriented, you know, manufacturing, and things like that, but, ultimately, people would always come back to the politics, and they would say the thing about East Asia, that is different, from the rest of the world, is that, in East Asia, ultimately, if you want to know how a policy issues is going to be resolved, it's going to be resolved in terms of what benefits economic growth.

That's going to be the driver of political change, and people relied on that. I think if you were to ask that question today, I don't think you would get the same answer, either in East Asia, or anywhere else in the world, and, so, this is, perhaps, one of the big conundrums. How do we, actually,

think about democracy, think about the effect that it's having on economic growth and development, and how do we, really, understand all of these -- all of these movements that we see so visibly on the streets, across the world.

So, there's a huge amount of, what I would call, armchair analysis of these kinds of issues, and much less actual scrutiny of the data of people's opinions, about democracy, and, so, we're particularly delighted to have here Richard Wike, the Director of Global Attitudes Research, from the Pew Research Center, who, actually, has been conducting a number of polls on people's attitudes towards democracy. What we're going to do, this morning, is Richard is going to start with some descriptions of some recent polls, including some quite recent polls on -- this is the 30th Anniversary of the fall of The Berlin Wall, so, particular interest in what happening in Europe. So, he'll start with that, and then moderate a panel. I'll leave it to him to introduce the panelists, as they come up, but, essentially, to cover Latin America, Africa, and South Asia. So, I'm looking forward to a really interesting conversation. Richard, the floor is yours for introductory comments. Thank you.

MR. WIKE: Thank you, Homi, and thanks to Brookings and to CIPPEC, for organizing and hosting this. Thanks to our terrific panelists, who will join me up on the stage in just a few moments. Thanks to all of you, for being here. Lots of people in D.C., are a little groggier than normal, today, after all, after watching the Nat's triumph in game seven of the World Series. So, thanks for -- yes, go Nat's -- thanks for making it out, this morning, to be here.

I'm really happy to be a part of this discussion, and I look forward to moderating our discussion, in just a few minutes, but, as Homi said, I'll sort of start things off by sharing some of the public opinion research, that we've done, around the world, at Pew, looking at attitudes towards democracy, to sort of set the stage for our conversation.

To me, when we look at the trajectory of democracy around the world, it's really important to understand public attitudes about democracy. What do people think about democratic principles? Are they satisfied or dissatisfied with the way democracy is functioning in their countries? Of, course, as we all know, there's been a lot of discussion, over the last few years, about the health of democracy, around the world. If you look at places like Freedom House, the Economists Intelligence Unit, International Idea.

Organizations like these, I think, have done a great job of tracking some troubling trends,

when it comes the health of democracy. They've identified a number of places where we've seen democratic backsliding, and, if you look at public opinion studies, they, too, I think, have identified some troubling trends, in some cases, maybe some places where support for democracy is waning a bit, with the very least instances, where commitment to democracy, among average citizens, isn't as strong as we might think, or as we might hope.

So, let me jump in a little bit and share with you. I have just a couple of slides on some data we've collected, at Pew, that, I think, highlight some of these issues, including a, maybe, a less of a commitment to democracy among average citizens, than we sometimes think, and I'm going to start off by showing you some data from a study we conducted, back in 2017, in 38 countries around the world, and, so, all these numbers you see, here, are median percentages, across those 38 countries, and, basically, what we did is we asked people about five different regimes types, or five different approaches to government, and these were modeled on some questions, that you may have seen before, from something called The World value Survey. Although, we changed the questions a little bit.

So, you know, first of all, we asked them about Representative Democracy. Do you think that's a good or a bad way of governing our country, and what we see is that people, overwhelmingly, say it's a good thing. They like direct -- Representative Democracy, a median of 78%, across these 38 Nations, saying that's a good way to govern. They, also, like direct democracy. A median of 66% say a system, in which average citizens decide on major laws, rather than elected officials, is a good way to govern, and I think that reflects what we've seen in many parts of the world, in recent years, which is, maybe, a renewed interest in participatory democracy, and things like that, certainly direct democracy has been a part of some of the populist parties we've seen active in Europe, and elsewhere. So, you know, this kind of picks that up.

People are very interested in direct democracy, and many think it's a good way to govern. We also see a fair amount of support for non-democratic alternatives, as well. So, we ask about a system in which experts rule, rather than elected officials, and publics are almost evenly divided, when it comes to whether or not that's a good idea, or a bad idea. We also ask about a strong leader model, where you've got a strong leader who doesn't have to bother, essentially, with parliaments, or courts, and this is less popular. Still, across these countries, you've got a median of 26%, who say this is a good way to

govern, could be a good way to govern.

The least popular model that we tested is military rules. Still, you've got almost a quarter, essentially, saying military rule could be a good approach, and, if you look across nations, you do see more support for some of these non-democratic approaches, in emerging and developing countries, but you also see substantial minorities, in many advanced economies, and many countries that have been labeled, in the past, as consolidated democracies. So, if you look at something, like military rule, even, I believe the number is 17%, in France, 17%, in Italy, 17%, here, in the United States, who say that that could be a good way to govern. So, nearly one in five Americans, saying military rule, could be a good approach, which in some ways is a pretty stunning number, but it's also very consistent with what other surveys have shown. So, you -- looking across these various measures, to us, I think, reflected the fact that Represented Democracy is a popular idea. People tend to embrace it, but, perhaps, a surprising number are open to other approaches to government, as well, and this is a separate set of questions. This is dated from 2015.

We, actually, have some new data on all these questions, that we will have available in early 2020. So, if you're interested, you know, stayed tuned for that, but this is a battery of questions, where we, essentially, read people a list of six democratic rights and institutions, and, for each one, we asked them how important is it to have this in your country? So, as you can see here, we've got religious freedom, gender equality, competitive elections, free speech, media freedom, freedom on the internet, and when we asked these questions, what we typically see is that big, big majorities say these things are least somewhat important, you know, these, again, these are median percentages, across 38 countries, that we polled, all around the world.

When you look at the very important numbers, however, they're a little lower, right, and, if you look at the three different forms of free expression, you've only got about half, or a little bit more than half, saying that these things are very important. So, again, thinking about democratic commitment, what you see is that, you know, there's a decent number of people out there, who say these things are somewhat important, but not necessarily high priorities, and, when we asked these questions, we do, also, see some differences across countries, and across regions, and that's what you see a little bit of, here.

So, this is our three questions, on forms of free expression, free speech, freedom of the press, being able to say what you want, without censorship, on the internet, and this the share of the public, in these regions, as well as the United States, saying that it's very important to have these things in our country. So, you can see, in the U.S., there tends to be relatively high support, about seven in 10, or so, saying these are very important to have in our country, pretty high support in Latin America, a relatively high support across the 10 EU Countries, we polled, that year, and then you can see lower levels of support in the Asia Pacific Region, as well as in Africa, and the Middle East.

So, again, thinking about what this tells us, looking across all these measures, I think, it highlights the fact that maybe commitment to democracy isn't always as strong as we might think, you know? On the one hand, looking at those other questions, people like representative democracy, but many are opened to non-democratic approaches, as well. When it comes to democratic principles, again, people tend to embrace them, but they don't always say it's very important. They aren't always strongly committed to those principles, and I think this lack of commitment, in some ways, in public opinion, can potentially open up space for illiberal political actors, would be authoritarians. It gives them some space, essentially, to operate.

One other thing I'll mention, that we've seen in our data, over the last few years, is that even among people who are committed strongly to liberal democratic values, they're often unhappy with how democracy's actually working their country. We did this last year, where we tried to look at what's driving dissatisfaction with democracy, and how it's performing in Nations, around the world, and we, you know, learned that, as you might expect, it's a lot of different things, right? It's, in some cases, economic factors, if you're unhappy with the current economy, you're more likely to be unhappy with the way democracy's working. If you don't think that there are good opportunities to improve your standard of living, you're more likely to be dissatisfied with how democracy is working, but there are, also, some explicitly political factors, as well.

If you think that politicians are mostly corrupt, in your country, you're more dissatisfied. If you think the politicians and political leads don't listen to average citizens, don't care what average citizens think, you're more dis -- you're more likely to be dissatisfied with how democracy is functioning, in

your country, as well. So, there's a lot of things driving the unhappiness many people feel about the way democracy's working, and, then, one final thing I'll mention, that Homi already eluded to, is that, at Pew, we released a report, a couple of weeks ago, looking at public opinion in Europe, three decades after the fall of the communism, and, you know, one thing it showed is that, if you look at the former communist nations in Central and Eastern Europe, overall, among publics there, there are few regrets about the end of the communist era.

However, as they look back, across the last three decades, they also think that progress has been uneven, and they think that some people have benefitted much more from all of the changes in society, than others, and I think this sense of unfairness, about the way political systems are operating, is something that's pretty clear from our data, in Central and Eastern Europe, and I think maybe some of these same frustrations could be a factor in the other regions that we're going to talk about today. So, I look forward to discussing that with our panelists, and I welcome all of you up to the stage. Thanks.

MR. NOORUDDIN: Thank you.

MR. WIKE: Terrific, great. Thank you. I think we're all mic'd up now, and we look forward to having a conversation, here, on the stage for a little bit, and then we'll have open things up to the floor, and take questions from the audience, as well. So, we're really fortunate to have three great panelists here today. I think you have handouts with all of their full bios. I won't run through all their accomplishments here, but just sort of briefly introduce them.

Irfan Nooruddin is a professor at the Walsh School of Foreign Policy, down the street, at Georgetown University. Julia, you came from a little farther away. Julia Pomares is Executive Director of CIPPEC, which has been mentioned, a think tank, based in Buenos Aires, and then Landry Signe, from the Africa Growth Initiative, here, at Brookings, is also a David Rubenstein Fellow, in the Global Economy and Development Program, here, and welcome all of you.

Let me start off by asking our panelists to maybe just provide an overview of what you think about democratic trends in the various regions that you focus on, and, in particular, maybe, focus on what just happened, in terms of the big elections, in the region, and what that tells us, or doesn't tell us, about democratic trends in the region, or around the world. So, Landry, let me just start with you.

Obviously, we've had some big elections in the past year, in South Africa. Maybe start

there. Tell us what we can learn from that, and how does speak to broader democratic trends in the region?

MR. SIGNE: Thank you very much for the question. I will first like to thank Sabastian, for organizing such a timely event on a critical topic.

So, perhaps before speaking about the case of South Africa, I would like to present a broader overview of the situation in Africa, in general.

MR. WIKE: Yeah.

MR. SIGNE: So, we have seen a substantial increase of accountability, and citizen demand for democracy, on the continent. For example, according to an Afro Barometer Survey, about 77% of African demand democracy. About 75% want a two terms limit, and over 53% will prefer accountable governments, compared to non-accountable government, but with faster decision-making processes. So, overall most African citizens, according to Afro Barometer Surveys, would prefer accountable government of over efficient governments. So, that is one important point.

The second point, also, that I would like to highlight, is the fact that, as of 1988, over 94% of African countries were undemocratic, and, if we just look at the past five years, about 55% of the leaders, in Sub-Saharan Africa, have changed. So, this is -- and 50% of those change through meaningful and democratic elections. So, I think those are some progress which are not often highlighted.

So, of course, I may be discussing -- so, that demand for democracy is driven, also, by accountability. If you take, for example, the impurity of vertical accountability, so, which means free, fair, transparent and meaningful elections, so, the selection of leadership through those criteria, of course, requiring a minimal level of political rights civil liberties among order. Countries, such as South Africa have come to a change of leadership through free and fair election to equality or is vertical accountability.

When we discuss horizontal accountability, which means checks and balances, if we look at the case of South Africa, it will be telling. Zuma had to resign, given the corruption scandal. As a matter of fact, elections were organized in May, and the ANC received his lowest call with a little bit over 57%. We have, also, seen a substantial decrease of the Democratic Alliance, which was elected -- which received only 20.8% of the vote. Where we have seen a substantial increase of extremist political parties,

for example, EFD economic freedom front, one tenth point eight percent, up from 6.4%, or the Freedom Front Press, also, 12.4%. So, we are seeing the increase of extremes, or Extremist Political Party.

Now, of course, in the case of South Africa, we have a few challenges, especially the question of governance with corruption, the Eskom Scandal, but we also have the question of human capital, job creation, among order -- over 27% of the population doesn't have a quality job, let alone the level of education, among other challenges. We can also speak about woman rights. During the World Economic Forum, that I attended on Africa, in September, so, many protestors came to contest the way women are treated. It's violence that's against women.

So, this is the case of South Africa. Now, if I discuss a little bit, also, in Nigeria, elections were delayed, due to violence. We had conflicts, of course, of quorum, but also the conflict between herdsmen and farmers, and the case of Nigeria is where the (inaudible) is quite telling us, as you know, Nigeria is the largest African Economy, and has numerous challenges, of course, Boko Haram, you have extreme poverty. So, according to some of the estimates, by my colleagues and leader, Homi Kharas, here, so, Nigeria is hosting the highest proportion of extreme poor people, and we have, also, the separatist movement in the Biafra Region, among other factors.

More than 94 million of people, in Nigeria, live on the -- below poverty line, extreme poverty line. So, having said that, despite the challenges, we have the changes in countries, such as Zimbabwe. Although the departure of --Mugabe had left the room to another, not more accountable leader, and, perhaps, let me highlight a positive development in the case of Kenya, for example, where the Supreme Court had to cancel the elections, took -- although, the (inaudible) was supposed to have one. So, I think, overall, those are some of the trends that we have. I am not certain, although, in individual conversation, including some leader, who will tend to reject the question of democracies, and accountability, taking four restriction cases, such as Rwanda or Ethiopia, which are economic outperformers, per some of the indicators, they still color a clear demand for democracy in Africa, and this growing, at least, according to Afro Barometers.

MR. KHARAS: Yes, great. Thank you. Julia, you've had some interesting developments in Argentina, of late, right? There's been elections there. There had been contested elections recently in Bolivia, a lot of upheaval in Chile. You know, you start off where you want, but give us a sense of what's

happening in Latin American, and how can we make sense of it?

MS. POMARES: Yeah. I will, first, start by thanking Sebastian and Homi, for having the opportunity of organizing and working on these together. Thank you very much. It was a very intense electoral calendar, this year, and, actually, last Sunday -- oh, well, we have the round off in Uruguay, but, oh, it's almost ended after six presidential elections, this year, and, if you start the cycle from mid-2017, that is the start of the presidential cycle in Latin America. We had 12 elections. So, I think, there is a big trend, that you can first take out of those elections, is that you cannot say that we have, now, a trend towards the right or the left, but we have a trend towards punishing incumbents, and I think that's quite an important trend, that it's quite different from what we've had, over the last wave of elections, in Latin America.

We used to have longer electoral cycles, and we start having shorter, or at least this seems to be the start of a shorter electoral cycle, where the electorate, and especially the middle class, are angry, discontent because of the slow economic performance, and it starts punishing incumbents. We had, except for Bolivia, Venezuela, and Honduras, we had a lot of problems in those elections, irregularities, changes in Constitution, in those three countries, incumbents were reelected, but it very, very different what is going on, from the other countries, and we had -- and the second trend is that we have the punishment in the ballots, and, also, we have people in the streets.

At other times in history, I think, we tend to go for one or the other. Now, we have the two together, and I think that it's a novelty of these days, especially after what you were saying, that Chile, probably, Chile is the most surprising situation because it's a -- I think it's quite different from other countries, in Latin America. Chile is very paradigmatic in many ways, in the economy growth, and the stability of democracy, and the Rule of Law, improvements over their return to democracy. The Chile -- the Chilean case, I think, deserves some separate attention. I think, if you could say, Argentina, it's getting to the limits of having inclusion without growth, Chile, and to the limitations of having growth without inclusion, and, now, we are debating how, and we were talking with Homi, this morning, if it's -- this is going to be the end of a model, of a successful model, or it's just the natural consequence of the model, that we have a very -- a bigger middle class that it's having more demands, and Chile used to have a poverty rate of 40%, and, now, has a poverty rate of eight percent. So, more than 30% of people are, now, not hungry,

or asking for more -- for moral public services, and I think it's no coincidence that, in many countries, in Latin America, where all these demonstrations are taking place, are after an increase in the public transport fares, or the energy fair. So, it has to do with the quality of public services, and I think it tells you a lot about what are the challenges ahead.

MR. KHARAS: Yeah, great. Well, thank you, and, Irfan, you know, thinking about India, obviously, 2019 has been a big year for elections, there. You know, many of you may have seen the economists last week, I believe it was, had a special report on India, and it was a lot of -- a pretty pessimistic take on what might lie ahead for a second term from Modi. So, you know, what can you say about what these elections mean, in terms of democracy, in India, maybe for South Asia, or there's some broader global trends that we can see reflected, and what's happening in India, as well?

MR. SIDNE: Great. So, I'm going to advance three propositions, generally, for the sake of provocation and conversation, as we go forward. So, let's start with South Asia.

South Asia, I think, represents both the bright spot for democracy, around the world, in the sense that multiparty competitive elections are carried out across the region, and have now, for a while, but it has also in a sense sort of the canary in the mineshaft, if you would, of the problems with democracy, in the developing world, writ large. So, this is -- probably reveals more about my college career than I'd want too, but, right, think about having the -- your college friend who went out seven days a week, came home at 3:00 in the morning, every night, and managed, somehow, to be no worse for the wear, and, 25 years later, still trying to do that, and, now, recovers a little slower, you know, and gets up a little later, looks a little worse around the eyes, and you suspect that the liver is about to fail at any moment.

I think, that's South Asia, right? I mean, in that -- we praised South Asia, so much, about the democracy because it represented, for us, I think, in the 1990's, an example of a developing region in India, in particular, that was able to get competitive electoral democracy instantiated, while ignoring the fact that the public institutions of each of these countries, whether it was the court, whether it was media, whether it was the rules governing civil society, were being undermined from within, such as the supporting tissue, the liver, if you worked, right, in this very terrible analogy of mine, right, was essentially being weakened, and, now, for us to sort of look and suddenly say why is it that, in Pakistan, 70 years

after holding elections, we still don't have successful transfers of power, from civilian government to civilian government, and, even with Imran Khan in power, there's very few Pakistan observers, that I know of, in Washington or elsewhere, who actually think that the military is not really in charge, and that the military's role, in Pakistan Society, has become, in fact, if anything, greater, under -- in the last few years, than it used to be.

Why, is it that, in Bangladesh, where we have competitive elections, there's -- elections are decreasingly characterized for violence against candidates and supporters, and you have an incumbent, now, who's in her third term, you know? That's typically a bad sign, when people are winning three consecutive terms. They tend to not want to give up power, the fourth time around.

In Sri Lanka, we have an election coming up that everyone expects will be along ethnic lines, in ways that might return Sri Lanka to really terrible days, and, finally, you have India, right, which, in many ways, is, of course, still, and I want to make sure I say this clearly, still, I think, of paragon of virtue in terms of competitive elections, right, and maybe have the selection at the National level that lead to Prime Minister Modi coming back with a tremendous majority, but, yet, this last week, Tuesday, its Haryana and Maharashtra, where the BJP, his party, had been in power, went to the polls, and the same voters, who, five months ago, had given the BJP a huge National Mandate, the party lost seats in both states, right? Voters are sophisticated enough to be able to distinguish between National and State Elections, and even what appears to be a behemoth, right, in the BJP loses seats in competitive elections at the state level.

So, the economists, right, berating Mr. Modi, is sort of interesting because, in 2014, Modi was their poster child. He was what was going to bring economic reform, the Gujarat model, and we very conveniently ignored the fact that, until three months before Modi was elected in 2014, he was on a no visa list for the United States. I mean, we had the potential, that a Prime Minister of India would have been denied a U.S. visa, for the previous ten years, because of his alleged complicity in anti-Muslimism riots, in the state for which he was Chief Minister, and then events, the economists puts him undercover, President Obama embraces him, right, walks him around the MLK Memorial, et cetera, which is all fine, that's diplomacy, but the notion that we should suddenly be surprised, that five years later, anti-minority prejudice is on the rise, that Hindu-majoritarianism is on the rise, that the media has been cracked down

against. The civil society suggests, to me, a failure of memory, that is pretty unconscionable when it comes to analysis.

So, just to wrap this up, I think, this is true, then, of the developing world, writ large, or, maybe, like I said, for prevacation and conversation. I wrote a book, a couple of years ago, with Tom Flores and George Mason, called Elections and Hard Times, where we analyzed every competitive national election, and competitive very broadly understood, right? There were more than two parties that were allowed to compete. It didn't have to be fair election, didn't have to be a free election, but were at least two parties allowed to be on the ballot, and we analyzed every election, since 1945. It's available on Amazon, in case you're looking for Christmas gifts, for friends and family, right, but what is true, across the developing world, is that we have undermined the ability for incumbents to run for elections on the basis on the kinds of things we know are good for democracy, programmatic appeals, based on policy platforms, et cetera, right? These are states that are largely bankrupt, that have impoverished in term of their fiscal space, that are recovering from violent conflicts, domestically, and what the democracy promotion industry has done, has gone out and say hold a competitive election as quickly as you can, right, and let's hope it all goes really well, right? We'll send a couple of monitors, we'll do -- we'll, you know, we'll advise you on how to setup your electronic voting machines, how to get voter rolls going, and, guess what, in the intervening five years, after the monitors have left, and before they come back for the next election, these are governments that are looking around, and they don't have a budget with which to build schools.

They don't have budgets, which build infrastructure. They're laden with structural adjustment programs, from the IMF, and others, that push fiscal austerity. They become members of the WTO, and have to cut trade taxes, which is the one thing, developing countries, in order to collect. When you -- governments don't have the money to spend on big public policies, but still have to win an election, they use other tactics. They use patronage to their kinship groups. They give out pork, as it were, and, when then that fails, they harass, they intimidate, and, when all of that fails, they steal elections, outright.

In other words, maybe we should be thinking, really, not about whether or not, I mean, then, this research is fabulous, there's angelic wisdom of that, but not in the sense whether individual citizens, in these poor countries, around the world, are trying to figure out what democracy means, are

committed or not, or whether or not the elections are free and clear, but whether or not the rules of the game and the international system have been rigged against any possibility of success, for the consolidation of democracy, in the developing world. So, I don't know whether that's very complete Halloween, like it's really, really pessimistic, or, maybe, you know, for the sake of optimism, that what we know worked in the developed world is that it was a consolidation of states. It was state building, that preceded democratization. What we're doing in in the developing world, by necessity, is trying to build states at the same times as we build democracies. That is -- that's what we've got to do. I'm okay with that, but we need to think about how to support them in doing that, how to actually take the development part of democracy, and development as seriously as we do the democracy part, or I think we set them up for failure.

MR. KHARAS: Thank you, yeah. Well, you highlight some important ways that state building, the institutions play in making sure that democracies are healthy, right? Another type of institution, that is widely viewed, as being important to the success of the democracy, right, are political parties, right, and, you know, in various parts of the world, party systems have been in an upheaval view. Certainly, if you look at Europe, you know, some of the traditional parties have fallen away, and new parties have arisen, party systems have fractionalized, and things like that.

What role, and I'll stick with you Irfan -

MR. NOORUDDIN: Sure.

MR. WIKE: -- for just a moment, then, in thinking about the institutional mix that democracy needs. What role do political parties play? You know, what do we know about the health of political parties, in South Asia, and, then, you know, generally, where are political parties at, and in either encouraging, or not encouraging democratization and merging nations?

MR. NOORUDDIN: One of the canonical works, in political science, is a book, from 1968, by Sam Huntington. It was the first of former democracy. You know him, maybe, for the book he wrote, in '91, called the Third Wave of Democratization, but, in '68, he wrote a book called the Political Order of Change in Societies, in which he argued, quite controversial for the time, that the introduction of the democracy, in a lot of these newly and decolonized countries, was going to cause chaos because, essentially, people were going to come in the streets, and they were not going to have avenues, by which

to represent their views, to channel those, in ways that were peaceful and productive for democracy.

So, when I see that high support for direct democracy, in your slides, I channel Huntington, and say that's not a good sign, right, that, in fact, representative party based democracy, which is Huntington's analysis, is, really, what has kept our countries, like India, the strong congress party, in its early years after independence, essentially, on a democratic track. So, I guess, that's my way of saying, I think parties are critical. I don't think we can think about democracy, without strong political parties, and party-based competition, and, by that measure, I think this is another place where we need to be concerned.

In South Asia, we have parties that have turned into personalist vehicles, and, then, in India, there is a bit of joke, as to the number of parties that contest any National election. Thousands, upon thousands, an average number of parties, in every district, in the parliamentary elections is over ten, right? It's the same exact electoral system as America's, right? It's a first-past-the-post, whoever gets a plurality win. In America, that has resulted in two parties competing in every election, and, in India, there's ten different parties in every district because each party becomes a vehicle for me, right? It's my party, it's for me, and then it'll be for my wife, and then it'll be for my son, and then it'll be for my son's wife, and we'll hand it down over generations. That means that no -- the basis for party loyalty, right, becomes much more personal, than it does ideological and programmatic, and I think one of the things, that we need to challenge ourselves on, is that ideology kind of got a bad wrap in the '90s and 2000's. We wanted these pragmatic technocrats, who would go make good policy, but ideology is what binds parties, and parties are what support democracy, and, so, maybe, we have to think about what kinds ideology are we comfortable with, as we go out, and support, and build parties, in the developing world.

MR. KHARAS: Landry, you referenced, I think, in South Africa, you know, sort of lower vote shares for ANC, maybe compared to what they used to get. There's, as I understand it, been some divisions within the DA, the biggest opposition party in South Africa, in recent, you know, months. What do you say about the health of democracies, and the health of political parties in Africa? Are there any trends that we can talk about? Do you see the same problem with parties becoming too personalized around individual leaders, or -- what's your assessment?

MR. SIGNE: As a matter of fact, parties have always been overly personalized on the

continent. We have -- you are seeing, now, an increase on the emulsification of political party, and you highlighted a very important point, the lack of programmatic party, political parties, and mostly ethnically motivated, or ideologically motivated. So, those are some of the trends that we have on the continent, and, in fact, we are -- in countries, such as Benin in, for example, leadership change occur with an outsider. So, we often see outsider coming. So, unless we have a more institutionalized political party, in a given country, or a variety of political parties, I think African democracies will remain quite unstable.

Now, coming back to one of the points that you mentioned, about the relation between state building and democracy, I think -- I have conducted a study, at the Center -- at the Stanford Center on Democracy Development Rule of Law, and, looking at Africa as an experiment, there's no clear connection between what should come first, whether it's a strong state, whether it's economic development, or democracy.

So, what you have seen, on the continent, is that we can have ideally -- and I deeply believe that quality institution and state capacity are critical, no matter if the country's democratic or authoritarian because public services and goods have to be delivered to citizens, so independently of the nature of the political regime. So, I guess in the case of Africa, I will say, yes, of course, we need support to strengthen state capacity and to reduce the gap between policy formulation and implementation, and implementation outcome, but, however, I think that it is not, and I don't say that it's what you meant. I don't think that is either or because auto-return regime are very oppressive, and sometimes weak state is your only mean to remain indefinitely in power. So, sometimes, state failure, a fragile state, are the fact of political leaders trying to keep power indefinitely. So, I think it is important to contextualize, at least, in the African case, yes, we need more support to state capacity, whether it's independently of the nature of the political regime, but, on other hand, it is important to make progress toward democracy, or at least a better representativity of the citizens. Citizens are, anyway, demanding for it.

MR. KHARAS: Yeah, yeah, and, Julia, it would be, you know, great to hear from you on the health of political parties, or democratic institutions, generally, in Latin America. I, also, wanted to pick up on one really interesting thing, you said a moment ago, which is that kind of two different things are happening, right, like governments are being punished at the ballot box, and people are getting into the streets, too, right, and you can see that, obviously, in Chile, other parts of the world, recently,

Lebanon, Hong Kong, elsewhere. Well, there's protests happening, that are getting a lot of attention. So, I'm interested in -- and those are all driven by, maybe, different factors, in different countries, but are there some commonalities, too? Is there anything you see, that, like, is happening in, say, Chile, for example, that resonates in other parts of the world, and how effective are these protests? How effective are these instances, in which people pour into the streets, and try to bring about change, so? Take any of that you like.

MS POMARES: Okay, I was thinking of what U.S.A. -- and about more sophisticated voters, and I think that the same is going on in Latin America because you had voters punishing incumbents, but also a split between -- more split ticket voting, and having minority governments in Congress. So, voters are getting much more sophisticated, and to put it quite provocatively, political parties are not getting that sophisticated, in a way. So, we have an imbalance there, where political parties and the ways in which a representation is being channeled. It's not being up to the task, and I think that -- what we are discussing, in Chile, is that we have, now, electro participation in Chile, at 45%, almost half of what is electro participation, Argentina, for example. So, low levels of people are going to the ballot, and, also, we're having political parties that look to be quite unrooted from society.

So, I think, there is a problem in political representation, and, so, when you have moments of economic growth, well, probably that is not that important, but when you are facing deep problems, as we are facing now, or starting to face, now you need a better representation. So, that will be my first thought, about that, and I think the other one is about this kind of impressive thing that we are seeing kind of, as Homi was saying, this morning, collective actions. So, there's not coordination for climate change of governments, but there is coordination of people in the streets, that they all go to the street at the same time, in different places. So, what can we tell about that?

I think it's probably too early to tell. So, I won't take the risk of saying if -- how that is taking place. We know that social media and -- it's, obviously, playing a part, but I think that there is -- quite evident that Latin America is facing, all over the rest of the world, the problems of coordination. So, we are not having help from outside. Problems are very personalistic. Leaders, in the most important countries, discussing on Twitter. So, there is a problem with the -- in the international ruler, and people in Latin America are starting to feel that they're a bit far behind. So, I think that there is -- there's probably

some diffusion and replication of social demonstrations that are -- is taking place, and, at least, in Argentina, and in Uruguay, we are seeing what is going on in Chile, and we start thinking, well, maybe this is also important to take into account, that something similar can happen, soon. So, I think there is an interesting trend to look at, at how this coordination take place, and how, even if it's not coordination, but, at least, this diffusion and transmission, from one country to another one.

MR. WIKE: Yeah, yeah, and it's interesting to think about sort of a sophistication gap, as you kind of mentioned, right, between, like, voters, on the one hand, and these ossified political parties, on -- and in another hand, and political parties being unable, maybe, to keep up with some of the changes happening, in society, and happening politically, one of which is -

MS. POMARES: Yeah.

MR. WIKE: Go ahead. Yeah.

MS. POMARES: I think there is something to take into account, that I forgot, is that we had an increase in middle classes, in Latin America, about -- by about, I think, 30 -- 50%, from 2003 to 2009, in just six years, according to a World Bank report. The amount of middle-class people, in Latin America, has expanded very, very strongly. So, I think that is, obviously, part of the equation. We have more and more people that -- they have a job, but they spend two hours to get to their job, on a very bad public transport. They have problems sending their schools -- their kids to public schools because they have very low quality. So, they struggle to get a private school. They have problems with their health insurance because the hospital, in their village, is not -- offer good quality. So, the -- you have a better income, but that doesn't mean that you have a better wellbeing in all the other dimension, and I think that is part of the problem, now.

MR. WIKE: Their expectations of a resident, yeah.

MS. POMARES: Yes.

MR. WIKE: Yeah.

MR. NOORUDDIN: I think -- so, I appreciate all the pushback, and I agree. I mean, no part of what I said should be taken to mean that this is an endorsement, or some sort of crude sequencing, right? Let's suspend democracy for -- till we've got the development piece set. Let's suspend democracy till we have state building, but I think we need to come to terms with the fact that the

conditions under which we're asking developing countries to democratize, in the current era, are unlike anything for which we have successful precedent. So, two facts, again, reported in the book I had mentioned. One is think about the post conflict experience, right? At this point in time, by the data that Tom Flores and I collected, one out of every four elections happening at the national level, anywhere in the world, is happening in a post conflict or conflict environment, where they lead an active armed militancy happening, somewhere in the country, or they're -- or within five years of having had an armed insurgency, a civil war, in their country.

The idea that we can go from that to competitive elections that are going to be consolidate-able, right, that we can consolidate, that are going to be long-lasting, as opposed to elections that are likely to replicate the ethnic and other cleavages, that have led to the conflict in the first place, seems overly optimistic, if not outright naïve, right, and, yet, that's exactly what revolves these countries through. When I talk about state capacity, I want to make it very concrete. I'm not talking about strong states because strong states can be strong police forces. They can be the use of the military, et cetera. I want to think about fiscal capacity, right? So, again, these data are not perfect because we don't do a great job, as a development community and being able to a great access to tax data, but, to the best of our ability, we collected tax data. We normalized them. We corrected for currency fluctuations, for interest rates, et cetera rates. So, take that for what it's worth.

By 2010, the average OECD country, including the United States, has an average per capita tax revenue, approximately \$10,000, right, between \$8,000 and \$10,000. This was 10 years ago. The average country in Sub-Saharan Africa had a tax per capita revenue of \$150. In Sierra Leone, and, again, these data are spotty. They're not perfect, but, in Sierra Leone, by our calculations, if you start from when the Civil War begins, to the current period, the average tax revenues, that the state was collecting and reporting, was a dollar, okay, which is not to say that that's all the revenue. There's plenty of oil revenue. There's plenty of natural mineral revenue, but the state capacity to actually do things in public policy around -- that you build ideological political parties around -- which you build programmatic policy, it has just been absolutely undermined. Latin America's interesting because Latin America, of course, was much richer when we -- just in terms of pure income, but I think it forces us to ask what are the -- what is the scar tissue of the frequent economic crises that have buffeted this region?

So, we think of Argentina, right? I don't know that we have great research, and maybe you can point me to it, but of what happens to attitudes, what happens to the ties that bind politicians to their citizens, in ways that are good for democracy, if every five years, as you were saying, we can essentially -- do you remember that crisis, or are you talking about this crisis, right? Which currency crisis are we discussing, and the idea that citizens can experience these major shocks to their day to day life, the doubt at having an effect on how they think about their -- the people who represent them, the parties that claim to have had their best interests, just, again, it seems to me, pretty a theoretical, in ways that, then, lead us to be surprised, when, all of a sudden, it appears that citizens are not enamored by some theoretical notion of competitive democracy. Why should they be?

MR. SIGNE: So, I do agree, but let's put in context the fact that, without accountability, you will see you have corruption. For example, I -- conducting -- when conducting some research, right? We compute this, a capacity problem, in term of tax connection, but it's also a corruption aspect.

In some countries, that I will not necessarily name, the Tax General Manager can, or Director, can offer a break of up to 30 percent to any taxpayer. The Minister, himself, can offer a tax break of up to 80 percent. Now, what happened? Why don't we have enough resources? So, yes, I do agree that we have a challenge of capacity, but, even with the actual capacity, what is the gap between the actual capacity and the outcome of what is collected, and I think part of what explained the limit, the underperformance, is, of course, corruption, and the limited Rule of Law, what I like to call Rule by Law.

Sometime, you have clear rules, but leaders will be applying them to some and not other, to your -- it will be applying them with your regal, to your opponent, and not to your friend. So, yes, that capacity is clear, and I totally agree with you. We cannot do much with outset capacity, whether it's your democracy, or another term regime. However, if you do not have a certain form of accountability, even with state capacity, government will extract resources, and direct them to your personal account, versus certain public good.

MR. WIKE: Okay, great. We'll let -- I want to make sure we have some for folks in the audience to participate, as well. So, let's open it up for questions, and, yeah, we've got plenty of hands already. Then, we have some microphones circulating. So, when you ask a question, please, identify yourself, keep the questions brief, and what we'll do is we'll collect three questions and give our panelists,

then, a chance to respond. I think, maybe, we're starting off back here. Is that right, with our colleague?
Yes.

MR. ZEMKO: Hi. I'm John Zemko, with the Center for International Private Enterprise. As I'm listening to, you know, where we started, about the pulling on democracy, and how people feel about democracy, in general, for those of us who have been working in this world of democracy development for quite a few years, I've begun to ask myself, do we really know enough? We know how people feel about democracy, or lack thereof, but do we really know about how -- enough about how people feel about their democracies, or how they understand their democracies, or their lack of democracy, for that matter, and I'm wondering if we couldn't do, collectively, the moderator and the panelists, in particular, is there more that we need to do, in the international community, to understand what lacks, in these democracies, to help bring that understanding, not just about how they feel about the term, but how they understand the term, but in their context?

MR. WIKE: Yeah. Thank you. Okay. Let's get two more. Maybe right here, and -

MR. COONROD: Thanks. I'm John Coonrod, with the Hunger Project, and I'm a nut for decentralization. Development happens in communities. All politics is local, and having democracy that delivers really requires strong local governments, and Africa, other than Kenya, and Indian States, other than Kerala, maybe Tamilnadu, have very weak local governments, very underfunded local governments, and, so, I just wonder, and this move to autocracy is recentralizing a lot of power in a number of countries, so, I'm wondering what any of you have seen in trends towards strengthening local, you know, local governance, and greater devolution of resources, as a key to having democracy that can deliver.

MR. WIKE: Okay, and I think, maybe, have one more, back over here. Is that right?

MR. GOODFRIEND: (off mic)

MS. POMARES: I don't -- I couldn't seem -

MR. GOODFRIEND: Maybe the mic's off?

MR. WIKE: Not -- yeah.

MR. GOODFRIEND: Hello. My name's Andre Goodfriend, a serving Foreign Service Officer. In discussing democracy, the -- I think there's a -- we've talked about direct representation, or representation, a direct democracy, but in -- there's a -- what's missing, perhaps, is a definition of liberal

democracy, with, particularly, in the either direct democracy, or representative democracy, could be liberal or not liberal, either majoritarian, if it's, let's say, not -- if it's not liberal, or constrained by respecting universe -- the universality of human rights, if it is liberal. In looking at the democracy, in these various regions, there's a, in particularly, with the growth of populism, which, I think, divides groups into an internal group and an external group, and talks about how we, the people, and that our will should not be constrained by laws, that the will of the people should always be -- should always supersede laws, at -- which is a growing trend in pushing for democracy. How is that reflected in the various studies that you've made, in the various areas, as there is this push for what appears to be a majoritarian democracy that's particularistic in its focus, rather than a more liberal democracy, that's universalist, with respect for human rights?

MR. WIKE: Great. All right. Let's stop there, and we can take these three questions. Maybe we -- if we start, maybe, with the last one, about, sort of, majoritarian versus liberal conceptions of democracies, and, Julia, do you want to take that, and then talk about what you see?

MS. POMARES: Definitely a very good point on what's absent from our previous conversation. I tend to think that, when we compare situations of polarization, in some of our countries, in Latin America, and say, well, it's quite similar to what is happening in the United States, in terms of how polarization takes places in -- on the social media, on -- in the public discourse. We tend to forget that it's not the same to have polarization in a liberal democracy, that in a democracy where the liberal component is very weak, and polarization is quite more dangerous when you don't have very strong Rule of Law institutions, and my take on building on what you were saying, previously, is that, when you have the process of building a state at the same time of building the democratic institutions, we had a tendency of putting more importance on the majoritarian part of the equation, rather than on the liberal part of the equation, and I think what is -- what we are witnessing in several countries in Latin America, and we are seeing in, now, with the election, we saw this in Bolivia, for example, is that the liberal part of democracy is still very, very far away from -- for being developed, and I think, in this scenario of demonstrations in the streets, and a lot of demands from the public, it's -- the tension grows, and I think it's quite complicating, and it will probably get more complicated in the future.

MR. WIKE: Yeah, and, then, maybe we can talk about decentralization of -- Landry or

Irfan, if you have thoughts about, like, you know, the -- what's happening at the local level.

MR. NOORUDDIN: I want to start, though, with your question, so, and I agree completely with what Julia, but I want to use a different word, right, than liberal. Really, I think what we have understood, at this point, and this is what, I think, animates our recognition that liberalism, as a concept, is what is missing, in a lot of electoral democracies, is that institutions that preserve liberalism are counter majoritarian, right, that the reason that they do what they do, the reason that they can talk about the universality of human rights, is because they do not bow to popular pressure, and, therefore, are not subject to the whims of majority opinion.

That is when they quote do their job well, right? That is when the media does its job well. It punches up, as opposed to punches down. It becomes a weighted check government, as opposed to -- for populations, a, that's an incredibly sophisticated concept, right? We like to win, and, if we've just won an election, and our guys are in charge, we want them to be able to do a bunch of stuff, and if, all of a sudden, some court is telling them you can't do this, we get frustrated. It's not just in India. It is in advanced industrial democracies. It's here, in the United States, as well.

The stakes of what it means to be counter majoritarian have really been changed, though, because so much of this competition has become on the basis of identity politics, in terms of -- it becomes zero sum, as opposed to -- in terms of economic policy debate. So, we take India and the last election, right, hinder majoritarianism was visible in the political campaign. That was both because a party had a particular campaign strategy, but also because, on economic issues, there is very little daylight between the major parties, right?

The signature policy achievement off the current government, what is called the goods and services tax, or GST, right, was developed by the previous government, right, and I can go down a list of six to eight major initiatives that have literally just been named. I mean, they changed their acronym to include a different leader, as opposed to the old leader, and what they did. They don't disagree about cash transfers. The disagreed about how large the cash transfers would be, right? So, but, when you're debating issues, as to what the role of minorities, what is the identity of the nation, then the zero sum, and then, when the courts intervene, right, it becomes -- the stakes are just a great deal higher, and, so, I think we want to think about counter majoritarianism.

I think the devolution, your point, sir, is a very good, and Anjali Bohlken, who is a professor at Georgia Tech, has written a book about -- essentially about -- I think it's called Democracy from Below, or -- but, essentially, arguing that the -- and has collected a global data set on decentralization reforms and the democratization of decentral. In India, we've seen -- actually, I think they're going to see a stripping of panchayat level powers, by the current government, by what -- and, so, which is, I think, troubling for public service delivery and last mile delivery, but it's also the case that we have had this philosophy in India, where the local elections are not partisan elections. You contrast that to the United States, where, you know, the joke is that all the way to the dogcatcher, there's a party ID, and there is something about learning party loyalty. There's some so -- I guess, maybe, what I want to say is that the language of polarization has a dangerous, slippery slope for big -- arguing that we should not care about party labels, that those are problematic. We should all be some sort of notion of independence. We go for the best policy. We go for the best ideas, when, in fact, parties, right, in partisan polarization, is what makes democracy work, as long as what they're organized around are things that are not easily construed as zero sum, right, and that don't involve people, as much as they involve ideas and the share of a budget. It's definitely worth thinking about it.

MR. SIGNE: So, just quickly, electoral versus liberal democracy, I think, in most of the African countries, we have, what I like to call, including democratic countries, Hyper Presidentialism, so, which means that we have elections. They may be free fair meaningful, but, once elected, the leader may rule almost like in an authoritarian country, and this partly explained by the weak horizontal accountability. So, I have just published a book chapter on horizontal accountability, and the challenge to democratic development in Africa. So, that is one of the telling, but most of the President can do almost anything, and they will not face the rigor, or either the Constitutional Court or of the Parliament. So, a policy option could be to really empower and increase the eco autonomy of institutions, such as Parliament, Supreme Court, the Judiciary, in general.

Yes, local development is critical, but, on the other hand, it is important to also have quality leadership because, as of now, we have local leaders who have a budget, and, although it is still asymmetrical, they are still not delivering to the extent of the budget that they receive, and, so, we can also have a reproduction of the national -- this functioning, at the local level. So, it's really important to

build quality institution and capacity at the local level, and not just expect that, by decentralizing, you would automatically have better outcomes, and, finally, what people understand about democracy.

I think that in some of the Afro barometer Surveys I was shocked to see that, in some of the other returned countries, more than half of the population were thinking that they were in a democracy.

MR. NOORUDDIN: Yep.

MR. SIGNE: So, it is -- so, which means that education remain -- and political socialization remain critical.

MR. WIKE: Yeah. That's the thing we've seen in our surveys, as well, is that, let's say, people support for expression, but they define it very differently, in different parts of the world, right? So, yeah, some of them -- what these principles mean, sometimes, really varies around the world. Let's get, maybe, three more questions. Yes, if we can get one, maybe you, and then, you, sir, and then, maybe, one more, in the back.

QUESTIONER: (inaudible) in Spain. I'm here, a visiting Fellow, at the CSS, for some weeks. Just to question -- taking -- leaving aside China, you know, do you think in your areas, or in your countries, new technologies, especially IT technologies, have empowered more society and other people, or the government and the state?

MR. WIKE: Okay. Thank you. Okay. Let's get two more, and I think the gentleman, over here.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Good morning. My name is Julian Goldstein. I'm a junior international affairs major at Howard University, also, a writer with the Political Review, on campus. With respect to development, and coupling that with democracy, I believe a source, in 2000 -- the World Bank, in about 2017, '18, had cited that about seven out of 10 of the world's fastest growing economies were all within the continent of Africa, partly tied to and related to investment from Chinese stakeholders. Could you discuss, particularly, you, sir, on how -- when you talk about ideological trends, obtained in shipping investments to a continent, as well as how the CFA Franc plays a major consequence in lack of development throughout the western region?

MR. WIKE: Great. Are there -- anyone else have a question they want to add? This --

what will -- yes?

LAURA: Hi. My name is Laura. I work at IREX. My question is actually for Julia. What do you see the trends in the region are related to freedom of the press, visa vies the role of the press, in the democratic process? Thank you.

MR. WIKE: All right. All right. Julia, why don't you just start off with the last one here, and give us your thoughts?

MS. POMARES: Okay, the last one, and, also, I would like to say something about Andres' -

MR. WIKE: Yeah.

MS. POMARES: I will start the new technologies. I definitely think that they are reshaping politics in -- at least in Latin America, and you were talking about local governments and the evolution, and part of the local reaction is taking place on the social media. So, I think all this debate about the role of local governments, now, is much more influenced by social media and new technologies, and, actually, more than probably national politics, we have people sending messages on WhatsApp about the services that are not working in their village and there's a lot of demand. I think there is also in -- the anxiety also has been increased by new technologies. There's a friend of ours working the creative sector that says that we wait no more than 45 seconds to answer a WhatsApp message from a friend. So, if we cannot wait more than 45 seconds, so, how are we going to expect that a government takes years to, I know, build a new highway in our village.

So, we are getting much more anxious, and I think that it's a problem, especially for local government, and regarding, Laura, your question about freedom of the press, I don't think that the trend is very positive in some of the countries. I think that the era of this -- social media and new technologies are pushing for more freedom of information and freedom of the press, but, because many of the media outlets are being purchased and are owned by governments, there is still -- part of the deficit in the Rule of Law and liberal democracy, I think, has to do with the role of press, and, especially with the cases of corruption that are -- we have -- you haven't talked about corruption, but definitely, still, a very important problem, in Latin America, and it's something that is also -- triggers demands when you are facing a bad economic situation. So, I think that we have to keep looking at these, these trends, very closely for the

next years.

MR. WIKE: And, Landry, there was a question about China and Africa, if you want to respond.

MR. SIGNE: So, the Chinese presence in Africa, and I think we hosted the President of Guinea, recently, and his point was he's open to capital coming from any country. So, competition is healthy. I think the challenge is what African leaders do with those resources, or the type of deal that they're negotiating. Are they negotiating deals to serve the public good, or are they negotiating bad deals to enrich themselves? I think that is probably one of the challenges.

So, yes, Africa fast economic performance, you have seen the African Continental Free Trade Area, which was adopted last year, came into force this year, and country will start trading next years, as of July. So, definitively, new technologies are contributing, also, to the fast-economic performance. Before, in the late '90s, New York City had more mobile phone subscribers than Africa, and, now, Africa has hundred of million -- has many -- over 700 million mobile phone subscribers. So, these are other important -- which facilitate political protest. We have seen what happened in Sudan, for example, when the protest started as -- with economic motivation, and given the increase of the cost of bread, something as basic as that, and given the lack of reaction of the government, become a political protest, which followed a model of political transition in Africa, and, by the way, have a political transition tracker, at the Africa Growth Initiative. So, you can look at it on our website (inaudible) and dependence. We have been monitoring leadership change on the content.

Related to France, and the CFA, of course, we have had many challenges in the past few years, but what is more important is the alternative proposed by African leaders. So, we have -- we don't have a unique voice; for example, leaders, such as the President of Chad, who'll be voicing his concern, and will be strongly opposed, where you'll have leaders, such as the President of Senegal, or the President of Cote d'Ivoire, who will be promoting such a currency. It is critical for any country to control its monetary policies. So, that is a matter of fact. Now, what are leaders doing to organize and appropriate transition? I think that remains a question of concern.

MR. WIKE: And, Irfan, I want to give you chance to weigh in on the question about technology.

MR. NOORUDDIN: Sure.

MR. WIKE: You know, how is it impacting things in India or South Asia?

MR. NOORUDDIN: So, again, you know, the best of times, the worst of times. I mean, in every village that I go to, in India, there's now kiosks, at which farmers can get 20-30 pub services from the government, no longer having to go stand in line, no longer have to pay a middle man because technology allows that to be much more directly accessible, whether it's a printing of a birth certificate, a land title, marriage certificate, et cetera. So, in the sense of public service delivery, I would say that citizens have been much more empowered by technology, including the digitization of records, making them more amenable to freedom of information requests.

In India, we call it the right to information, RTI, as well. So, those are, I think, are the positive, and, you know, quite obvious. We are, in a sense, with -- per the communications and WhatsApp has been in the news quite a bit, and faithful because of the role of disinformation in South Asia. I mean, what do -- literally, the WhatsApp changes to the number of people you can forward a message to in one go. It's now limited to five people at a time, right? It was made in response to the Indian elections, where mass WhatsApp's were being sent to spread rumors that were being linked to the onset of violence, you know, riots against minority communities, et cetera.

So, the -- how to regulate that information landscape means that the technology companies are so far ahead of the governments that have to deal with them, that we either get very ham-handed approaches, or we get pretty imperfect kind of ones. On this, I think the question of privacy is going to be the critical one, and, so, maybe, I'll close with that. The breaking story in the Indian Press, over the last 24 hours, has been the revelation that someone, we don't know who yet, used state of the art Israeli spyware to monitor the WhatsApp chats of a couple of dozen significant civil society leaders and journalists, right?

Apparently, this is extremely state of the art. I mean, the supposition or the allegation is that the government had something to do with this, right, but in a world in which, right, so much of this is being done over WhatsApp. So much has -- was being done electronically. The ability of governments to monitor journalists and to constrain free speech is something that I think we're going to have to keep an eye on because that technology is evolving so rapidly, both in terms of our ability to be a little hidden from

government, to organize on social media, but also government's response to that is to find new surveillance technologies. So, in that sense, we're in a brave new world, all right, and -- but it's not undeniable that technology has both brought governments much closer to people, in terms of service delivery, while maybe having some deleterious effects on the quality of information, the quality of conversations, and the polarization of society.

MR. SIGNE: Similarly, Facebook has just announced that they suspended three account networks, which were linked to, I think, in over 200 account and one million people inferencing or -- and deferring in domestic politics in Africa, including supporting parties, candidates, or promoting -

MR. NOORUDDIN: Wow.

MR. SIGNE: -- special interest -

MR. WIKE: Yeah.

MR. SIGNE: -- and linked to Russian Financier, so. So, technological -- both -- our technology represent both a unique opportunity to advance democratic development, but, also, can pose a risk, if countries do not take the appropriate policy measures -

MR. WIKE: Yeah.

MR. SIGNE: -- to prevent such disinformation and manipulations.

MR. WIKE: Okay. Well, we're almost out of time. Let me just ask -- real super brief answers from our panelists.

MS. POMARES: Yeah.

MR. WIKE: We've talked a little bit about the year that's behind us, now. What are you going to be looking for, in 2020, in terms of the indicators that tell us something about the health of democracy and the regions that you're focusing on? Like, what should we be looking for, in the coming year, and paying attention to? We'll start with you, Irfan. What should we look for in the new year?

MR. NOORUDDIN: Sure. I mean, the most immediate is the selection that's coming in Sri Lanka, and I think we've got to keep an eye on it. There's a real concern that this, as I said, is going to be fought on pretty significant ethnic lines. There's a number of ruling families, right, who have multiple numbers. There's some 12 candidates running for President, three from the same family. So, this doesn't bode well. We should keep an eye on that, and I want to just make sure we mention Afghanistan,

right, as a South Asian is, I'll be a little imperial, and we'll claim Afghanistan as South Asia. That's how it is at the Atlantic Council, where I also have an affiliation, but what's happened in Afghanistan is just -- is sad, right? I mean, well, the selection both represents the incredible bravery and commitment to democracy of the Afghan people. Initially, I would go -- have gone and voted, given the risks to voting are there, but a low turnout, and, now, a set of results that have been delayed significantly, are in a way that's going to undermine the legitimacy of the results, one way or the other, and, so, I think those are the two that I would ask all of you to pay attention to.

MR. WIKE: Great. Julia, what about Latin America?

MS. POMARES: There is no election to see because they are almost over. So, now, we are going to have to take attention of how this new cycle evolves. I will say two things that we need to pay more attention. One is the impact of the lack of regulation of platform economies and the impact on the labor market. I think it's something -- we have many, many people, now, in Latin America, working as independent workers for these platforms, and it's part of a very different type of an informal economy in Latin America. I think that is going to impact on democracy and on attitudes toward democracy, and another trend, in society, that will have an impact on democracy is whether we go and -- regulating the use of Facebook, on the use of -- how we regulate algorithm and what is Latin America going to do about that, at least. Now, it's quite an absent discussion. Although, Europe is working on that. There's a lot of debate in other countries. In Latin America, it's not debatable, how we should go on with that.

MR. WIKE: Yeah, a big issue in lots of places, these days, yeah. Landry, what about Africa?

MR. SIGNE: So, our thing that -- there are a couple of things. One is to watch carefully at all the political or popular mobilization that we will have on the continent. So, we may have, in that part, of more authoritarian leaders than people think. So, watch very closely. So, the second point is to invest in state capacity. I guess you will be very happy, but also in a political party institutionalization because we thought the demonstration of political party -- we cannot be going far, as well on cyber security because most of the African -- the website of most of the African governments, including some from Presidencies, and Ministers, Administrators of Interior Central Banks could be happening in a matter of minutes. So, it's -- cyber security will be very critical, and that -- it doesn't just concern Africans, but

also anyone else engaging with Africa. So, we are all concerned.

MR. WIKE: Okay, great. Well, thank you. Thanks, again, to the Brookings and CIPPEC.

Thanks to all of you for coming and join me in a round of applause for thanking for all of our panelists.

Okay.

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