

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

FALK AUDITORIUM

DEMOCRACY, NATIONALISM AND POPULISM:
THE U.S., ISRAEL, AND BEYOND

Washington, D.C.

Monday, October 7, 2019

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. SACHS: Good morning, everyone. Thank you very much and I apologize for the delay. Long story short, it's my fault. Thank you very much for coming.

We have -- we are delighted to see packed house for what is obviously the top issue in the news today which is the philosophical aspects of nationalism. But besides everything that's happening in Turkey and in Washington and in Jerusalem and in Iraq and in Egypt and let's not forget London where both Shany and Yuli spent a lot of time, besides that, this is the hottest topic.

So the title of our panel today is Democracy. Nationalism and Populism and we are looking at it from a perspective, especially of U.S. and Israel but not focused solely on that. So this is not really about the state of Israel today. We will have other panels on that. It's more about the real questions of democracy, nationalism and populism.

And I'm absolutely delighted to have three stellar guests with us today. I won't read you the full bios, you have them with you but a few highlights. To my immediate left is profession Yuli Tamir. She is the president of Shenkar College in Israel but she's also a renowned political philosopher. She was famous for a book called Liberal Nationalism which really laid a foundation for -- an argument for liberalism and nationalism not only as not contradictory but as complimentary.

She -- more recently, her recent book is Why Nationalism? She was also a founder of the Peace Now movement in Israel and later a Minister of Education in the labor led government of Ehud Barak.

And to her left is Shany Mor, how was a former official in the Israeli government on the National Security Council in charge of international foreign affairs but also a political philosopher actually with training in Europe as well as the U.S. and Israel and he splits time between London, the U.S., Paris and Israel and has written a lot both in Tablet Magazine, in Mosaic and in many other publications, especially on issues of democracy.

I will tell you if you read Shany's stuff, you will have an opinion. It is always illuminating, it is always interesting. I have truly learned a lot including when I have disagreed sometimes. I usually do not.

And to his left needs no introduction in this room and to this audience and I will do it

anyway is Bill Galston, he is senior fellow, in fact he is the Zilkha fellow and we are in the Saul/Zilkha room in governance studies here at Brookings, the Brookings Institution. He is also a former official of government. He was a senior official in the White House under Bill Clinton. He is also a political philosopher and has had an illustrious career in academia.

He has written I think the last count is 9 or 10 books and the most recent one and very relevant for our discussion is Anti-pluralism, a discussion of exactly this phenomenon of populism in recent times.

All three to my mind give a wonderful -- give wonderful examples of nuanced debates of what are extremely un-nuanced conversations today. So why don't I start there. We are supposedly here in a bastion of supposedly liberal, supposedly elite and a few other supposedly's alarmism about the wave of masses at the gates. And I think I won't expect a panel of experts here at Brookings to raise the alarm.

So I would like to start with exactly the reverse. And actually ask each one of the three of you to discuss one of the three topics in our title and tell us what is good about it? What should we not be worried about especially in contemporary conversation?

So Yuli, if I may start with you and nationalism obviously. What is good about nationalism today? Why should we not be as concerned as I'm guessing many are.

MS. TAMIR: Well, good morning and pleased to be here. Well, it all starts with the definition as we know, as we political theorists know, and depending how you define something, you can refer to it as more adventurous or less.

I think my definition of nationalism and the part of it I cherish a lot is this ability to look at political communities as communities that are able to produce some sort of collective identity which is both (inaudible) but also cultural, historical that creates among members of that community a sense of solidarity. I do not believe that modern states could have survived without the sense of national solidarity.

Sometime as I show in my book it is very much a question of debate. Sometime it's taken for granted and in those years, we take our national identity for granted. We actually seem to forget how important it is. But then comes a crisis and when the crisis comes, we certainly understand that we need to turn inwardly in order to solve our conflicts and to solve the problems we are facing.

I think it's important to say that this round of nationalism is very different from previous ones because it comes from bottom up. Nationalism was usually, I know a lot of people now sort of identify nationalism and populism. Nationalism usually was the issue that the elite introduced into the conversation in order to recruit the people.

And now we are witnessing for maybe the first time a nationalism that comes from below and the demand to put our country first that is not coming necessarily from the elite but from the people. So it's a different kind of nationalism. Should -- we should be aware of the differences because I think they lead to different solutions than nationalism usually produced in the past.

MR. SACHS: Thank you. So if we think of nationalism today, part of the reason Israel is relevant to this conversation is not just about Israel per say but the fact that ideas of nationalism are exported from Israel quite a lot. There are some Israeli thinkers who have become famous as icons of supposedly the new nationalism. Yuan Kazoni and others were cited frequently by Steve Bannon and many others. What are they getting wrong if you can summarize that in a few words?

MS. TAMIR: It's not a question of getting it wrong. I think like every other ideology there are different versions of that ideology and they are taking the more religious, conservative, maybe fundamentalist view of nationalism. So I'm not surprised Bannon likes it.

My struggle which is I think a little bit more difficult is to prove that for us liberal progressive democrats there is something to be gaining from using nationalism and that if we surrender nationalism to the right religious camp, then we find ourselves in a great disadvantage and probably losing some of the best arguments we can have in order to regain power.

MR. SACHS: Okay, thank you. All right I want to come back to a bit about what that means in terms of precise policy but first I would like to turn to Bill. Populism is one of the dirtiest words we are hearing in conversation the last few years. Tell us why that is wrong. What is good about populism?

MR. GALSTON: Well, I suppose that having written a book about what's not so good about populism, it's fair of you to turn the tables on me.

So, you know, and you know, I, you know, I'm not retreating one step, you know, from my sense that populism in many of its manifestations represents a threat both to pluralism, that is understood

as legitimate and even welcome heterogeneity. And it also represents a threat to the liberal strand of democracy because it tends towards a form of majoritarianism that is very impatient with restraints on the powers of majority to do whatever they want.

Having said that, let me offer two defenses of the upsurge in populism that's occurred over the past decade or more, different populous scholars will give you different origin points.

First of all, there have been important failures at the elite level in many, many democracies. And obviously, the great crash of 2008 and 2009 was a big delegitimater. The failure of governments of in Europe and the UK and the United States to get their arms around the immigration crisis and the various cultural worries that the immigration crisis has spawned was another failure.

And in many respects, I would say particular in the United States we witnessed a series of foreign policy failures over the past 20 years. You know, I believe that in the broadest sense Osama Bin Laden won and we lost. Elites in both parties took their eyes off the ball and, you know, went into the Middle East in ways that spawned the new catch phrase of the emerging presidential campaign, endless wars.

And while America slept, China rose and here we are. So, you know, elites of both political parties have a lot of answer for so that's defense number one of the rise of populism.

Defense number two and I guess this will be a segue to perhaps Shany's comments, it represents a failure of representation. That is to say that in many countries just not -- not just the United States, there was an agreement at the elite level on certain propositions that left the dissenters in both political parties feeling unrepresented, voiceless and disrespected. And you can keep a lid on those sentiments only so long before the pot blows and I think it's fair to say that it has.

MR. SACHS: So you mentioned there before we went in the sense of pluralism you spoke about the danger and one of the major ones is majoritarianism as you describe it, perhaps an unbridled rule of the masses. And many have seen this as a problem for democracy which I -- many assume now is in deep crisis. Shany, tell us why it's not in deep crisis and majoritarianism is fantastic.

MR. MOR: That's my question.

MR. SACHS: Yeah.

MR. GALSTON: You call that a question.

MR. SACHS: You can do with it what you want. (laughter)

MR. MOR: I'll tell you one in a very bleak place in what I think is the totemic crisis which is not in the United States and not in Israel and not in Hungary, I think it's in Britain.

MR. SACHS: In Britain.

MR. MOR: Yeah. I think when we look back at this era, at this present crisis of democracy that we are in and want to think of the exemplar we are going to think -- we are going to have forgotten about some of the bright faces --

UNKNOWN: Speak up.

MR. MOR: Yes. We are going to have forgotten about some of the bright faces and orange hair that we think of today and we are -- and the Brexit crisis will stay with us.

MR. SACHS: Maybe hold the thing.

MR. MOR: Sorry. Is this a bit better?

MR. SACHS: Yes.

MR. MOR: Okay. So I say, I preface all that that I think Brexit is the exemplar of our crisis and it is the place to find all that the worst aspects of it but to answer your question I want to point to one really positive, really nice thing for me as an observer in what is otherwise a catastrophic situation. And that's this.

When this goes down on the 31st of October of whenever it does, the guy who is going to have his name on it, Boris Johnson, is really the guy who deserves to be responsible for this. It's not just that because he is performing as he is performing as prime minister, which anybody can make a judgment one, and it's not even just because of the cynical way he pushed the referendum in 2016, is actually a culmination of the entire brand, empty populous brand of politics that he has brought, and not just him.

Why do I like this so much? Why am I getting so much pleasure out of this? Because it is so rare in our complicated democratic institutions. What I have seen in both the United States and Israel is bad ideas that never die. And bad ideas that nobody is ever accountable for. They can keep failing and when they do fail, it's always, you know, in the U.S. it's very easy, a bad idea fails, it's because of well, because of federalism.

It's because state governments did something different than what the federal government was doing. It was because the Congress was in the hands of the opposition. It was because an act of the Supreme Court got in the way of doing things like that. It was because of a million things. You can have an idea as bad as the one that says for example lowering taxes on the rich will increase revenues. One that makes no economic sense and has been empirically refuted come back as policy three times now. And each time have the same unsuccessful outcome and not change the debate at all.

In Israel you have very similar things on a host of more sensitive topics that I don't want to get into but suffice it to say loss of very brilliant ideas have been implemented in policy, brought results that were very different from what they were supposed to do and as far as anybody is concerned in the domestic Israeli political debate, it's because of the Supreme Court, international organizations because the (inaudible) did this, because of Beebe has mystical powers that managed to interfere with what otherwise are great ideas we had only -- and Boris Johnson will actually I think will actually be responsible for his own failures.

MR. SACHS: So I think what you are saying is if this, in a general sense, not just in the UK Brexit sense, what you're saying is when majorities actually get to decide, their decision can also fail and then we actually put policy to test. If we always have safeguards away from majority rule, from the will of the popular will, we never are able to actually test policy properly.

MR. MOR: I would narrow that quite a bit from the way you've stated it. I do think it's very important in democratic politics to be able to make mistakes. And I do think there is a very important aspect to collective decision making that involves learning from mistakes.

In Israel we have a very strong tradition of this in one narrow field of public decision making which is in the military. So there so a very strong tradition of something goes wrong, there is a commission of inquiry, heads roll, someone is responsible, and ideally the lessons are learned.

One of the problems with this Israeli method is that it's only done after failure, it's never done after successes. I have long held the opinion that if we had a commission of inquiry after '67 instead of just after '73 we might not have arrived at '73. But it exists in that very narrow domain.

A democratic population a collective also needs to have room to make mistakes and correct those mistakes, hopefully not fatal mistakes. That's as far as I could go. I think the way you've

stated it is quite a bit father than --

MR. SACHS: Well, that's my job.

MR. MOR: Okay.

MR. SACHS: So I want to touch on, I mean, we have touched on three sort of very broad concepts. I want to bring it down to specific policy and especially harder ones. So one is immigration. We speak about nationalism and populism demands, about democracy, about who actually votes. In the United States certainly there is a very interesting, very polarized sometimes I think even silly conversation about immigration where the president has put forward a very strong, very robust anti-immigration, anti-legal immigration and perhaps also limiting legal immigration or at least changing it, that kind of agenda.

And the reverse if you look at the even the first I believe Democratic debate you would see a very strong reaction to the other in the other direction. Is this what you are talking about in terms of the need for -- how does this relate to the need for solidarity among citizenship? Where would a liberal approach to nationalism lead us in the immigration debate?

Would all the hands that were raised in the Democratic debate saying immigration should not be a crime or illegal immigration should not be a crime, just a misdemeanor. Does that fit in that?

MS. TAMIR: Well, I think the question of immigration is a crucial one but that's not the right question you're asking. Sorry.

MR. SACHS: Go ahead.

MS. TAMIR: I thought about what you do with the people who are here. There is a huge difference between how you treat the people who have already entered and make their life here and whether you have a policy of entry. That's a different issue. In all the European countries, I think it's, I know the United States usually doesn't like to learn from Europe but that's a case where the European experience is very important.

All the European countries including Germany that had the idea of an open door immigration not only withdrew from that but have now realized that that caused catastrophic consequences both politically and socially.

And the interesting thing is that now social democrats in Europe are taking the middle line. They are saying we are not opening the doors, we have having a policy that allows some people to

come in, certainly refugees and asylum seekers but we also as a nation have a right to defend our borders, to decide who comes in and the reason they give is the interesting one. It is because we want to retain our welfare system and you can't endlessly open the door if you want to have a functional welfare system.

MR. SACHS: Why not?

MS. TAMIR: Because the welfare system is built on an ongoing transgenerational contract between people who are staying and working together and that is something that if you go to the best countries in the world for in my point of view, social democrats in Denmark, in Sweden, in the places that where social democracy really works, the first thing they -- by the way also in Canada which is another example Americans don't usually like.

If you -- the more you are for social justice and distributive means, the more interested you are in who enters why and how many. It's -- this is an exchange, it's a cruel exchange. We would like everything to be well and we can bring everybody in and then give them welfare and pensions and, you know, do everything we like and everything will be settled down and it will be lovely. But that's not life. Life is about conflict. And that is a conflict that I think liberal democracies didn't handle very well.

And now what you see in the European scene is a withdrawal and a very clear connection between three ideas that I think are going to be the main basis for a liberal national I think sort of a social agreement. It's about immigration, which has a question about who comes in and a question of how you treat those who are already in, welfare and equality.

So its present generation, future generations and while you think about how these two future and present generation work together, you understand it's also about continuity, stability, borders and control of borders. So you don't have to go the Trump way in building a wall is probably a foolish idea but you have to have an immigration policy.

And I think the way that -- I'm not to judge the Democratic party here or liberals in America but I think the way they don't have been able to construct a very clear policy and every time that there is a debate it goes about so what do we do with the children who are here? The children who are here are here. And that is an important issue and you should, they shouldn't be deported under no

circumstances.

But what about the children on the borders? And those is going -- the more we talk about ecology, demography, future crisis, those issue are not going to go away. And the people rightly would trust somebody who has a policy on that that is neither totally open and not also not entirely self-serving.

MR. SACHS: Bill, I would like to turn to you in his debate in the American context.

MR. GALSTON: Um-hum.

MR. SACHS: Yuli is describing a potential emerging consensus on the environment, on the welfare state, and on immigration. Would that apply to the United States?

MR. GALSTON: Not so much. But the exception here interestingly is immigration. The reason we have this, you know, polarized debate about immigration is not because there is no American consensus on how to move forward. This represents a political failure of, you know, of catastrophic proportions. And let me tell a story to illustrate what I mean.

There were a number of failed efforts at immigration reform starting in 2006 and ending in 2013. In 2013, which represented the most serious and promising effort, the so called gang of eight got together in the Senate, four Democrats, four Republicans. They worked in good faith for months. They came out with a comprehensive, balanced and in my judgment very sane and wise proposal.

That proposal was put before the Senate of the United States. It got 68 votes. All 54 Democrats and 14 Republicans. You know, it wasn't just constructed in a bipartisan fashion, it was supported in a bipartisan fashion in the Senate by a veto proof majority.

It went over to the House. It was never voted on in the House. The speaker of the House of Representatives refused to allow it to come to the floor for a vote. If it had been allowed to come before the House -- to the floor for a vote it would have passed. Why didn't it get to the floor? Answer the majority of the speaker's party opposed it.

So it would have passed with a minority of the majority and a majority of the minority. And the -- and because I am something of a nut on American public opinion, you know, I monitor very carefully public sentiment on the different basic building blocks of the 2013 bill.

Public sentiment has not changed. There is a 60 percent majority in favor of every major building block in that bill.

MR. SACHS: Can you describe the building blocks? What are the central one?

MR. GALSTON: Well, the building, the building blocks involve first of all a very robust program of border security including hundreds of miles of new fencing or call it what you -- barriers, call it what you want. Authorizing the National Guard, you know, to participate in southern border security backed by an appropriation of \$46 billion which is more than Donald Trump has ever dared to ask for.

It wasn't just border security, it was also interior enforcement, you know, through the imposition of responsibilities on employers to make sure of the technological system called e-verify in order to make sure that people who are applying for jobs in fact are entitled to hold jobs and work in the United States.

On the flip side, it would have -- it would not have cut in anyway the number of legal immigrants coming into the United States on a regular basis. But it would have reoriented the system of legal immigration in a roughly speaking Canadian direction.

We are the only country in the world that awards two thirds of its green cards on the basis of family relationships. The average in the rest of the world's democracies is between 20 and 25 percent. We have turned the world's immigration system on its head in the United States and there may have been a good reason to do that in 1965 but in 2019, those reasons are no longer as pertinent as they were more than half a century ago.

And finally of course, getting to Yuli's point, it did right by the people who were already here. Right. It, you know, it incorporated the Dream Act, which would have regularized the status of all the young people who are brought here as minors or even infants and given them a path to citizenship and similarly for the famous 11 million adults who are already here.

So it was an extremely well balanced bill with something for everybody. It deserved to succeed in the Senate. It did not deserve to fail in the House and it was a failure of representative government that has harmed the American people and the country very severely. You asked so --

MR. SACHS: There you go.

MR. GALSTON: -- I laid it out and, you know, it would be one thing if we were dealing with a country divided and at loggerheads with each other and on some questions that's where we are. But not on this one.

MR. SACHS: So if I can turn to another issue that's in hot debate and especially in Israel and we will circle back to Israel because we are the Center for Middle East Policy and before we open up to questions.

There are similarities in the debates between in the U.S. and in Israel about judicial review and the proper role of the judiciary in public life. Shany mentioned earlier the possibility for public opinion to succeed or to fail and obviously the main check on many of decisions certainly by judiciaries -- by legislatures is the judiciary.

Am I right, Bill, that right now in the United States that debate has changed, that it seems to be in a different place perhaps because the Supreme Court is slightly different than it was just a few years ago?

Or is this raging debate between different interpretations of the constitution different places put on what the constitution should do in judicial review, is that still as hot as it was in the past?

MR. GALSTON: Well, I would draw a distinction here between Israel and the United States. You know, in the United States of course we have a written constitution that dares to speak its name, you know, not a system of basic laws cobbled together into half of a constitution.

We have a Supreme Court that was established as part of the constitutional establishment. It was understood very early on according to my reading of the federalist papers, it was understood in the constitutional convention that the Supreme Court would enjoy the power of review. Shany may have a different view on that subject, I hope not.

But and so there was -- there is not an issue in the United States about the courts legitimacy as an institution. The debate is displaced onto the modes of interpretation and also the perimeter of the courts responsibility.

But, you know, the, you know, in both Israel and the UK, Shany and I were talking to this before things got started, the Supreme Courts are a much more recent creation and some would say self-creation.

And I will also say that in the case of Israel's court for a self-created, mostly self-created body, it has been remarkably aggressive, you know, in accepting and taking unto itself the power to decide issues which in the United States would be policy issues, not decided by courts.

MR. SACHS: Thank you. Shany, I'll turn to you and I'll end with you, Yuli, on a similar note. In Israel right now, one of the big questions that that came before the last two elections this year was the question of immunity from -- for the prime minister. And there would be various ways that Netanyahu might pursue immunity for himself from potential criminal charges. He is right now holding hearings with the attorney general to decide on the indictment. The attorney general will decide of course.

And in the end, what seemed to be the tack for Netanyahu was not to pass any special bill on immunity, but rather simply to rely on existing legislation that allows the Knesset to give him immunity but crucially to limit the power for administrative review by the Supreme Court that might have overruled the Knesset.

I'll just repeat that for clarity. The Knesset could have given, the parliament could have given Netanyahu immunity but then everyone would expect the Supreme Court to say that is null and void because it was not done for proper reasons.

Netanyahu and the right wing that supported him were expected to pass legislation what would curtail that administrative review. It seems in one sense to have passed because Netanyahu did not succeed as he wanted in the election but am I correct that in fact there is a very broad consensus on the Israeli right that judicial reform is due irrespective of Netanyahu and that we should expect and maybe from your point of view we should or should not in fact do it, dramatically change what Bill described as very expansive Supreme Court.

MR. MOR: There are so many questions wrapped in there. I'm going to try --

MR. SACHS: Choose which one you want.

MR. MOR: -- I'm going to try to answer them adequately and to speak also to what Bill said. Obviously the Israeli constitutional system is radically different from the American one. I wouldn't advocate, I mean, you know, Philadelphia was an amazing thing no doubt. I wouldn't advocate anything like the U.S. condition for a newly established democracy. And I certainly would not advocate anything like Article VI as an amendment procedure which is essentially makes it impossible to make any real constitutional changes.

I'm not sure and I accept your reading of the role of the court. I very much believe that

the court has a very important role to play in reviewing government actions and in government decisions and in Israel this is a particularly acute problem because so many of the important controversial decisions deal with Israel's presence in the West Bank which is extra parliamentary.

MR. SACHS: So what you mean by government in the Israeli context --

MR. MOR: As executive --

MR. SACHS: As executive.

MR. MOR: -- actions. Yes. And so I don't have any dispute there with the role of the court. I'm troubled with the role of the court in the balance between the court and the parliament. And I'm particularly troubled by some of the constitutional adventurism of the last two or maybe even three parliaments in Israel.

It's true that we have a set of basic laws. I think that's a fundamentally good system when it operates correctly. What's missing in that balance is essentially what is missing is a proper amendment procedure because one a proper amendment procedure would essentially empty out this entire controversy about whether the Knesset can overrule the court.

The one that I would suggest is very simple. I think any change to a basic law should only go into effect once it's passed a third reading of two consecutive parliaments. In other words, you cannot just as the last two parliaments have done in Israel create new basics laws. Sometimes basic laws that pass with a bare majority that have in them super majorities to make changes. They entrench themselves in really funny ways which of course makes no sense because the next parliament could just eliminate that entrenchment.

There have been a bunch of very reckless changes that are, that have been done, particularly by the current right wing majority in expectation of losing its majority, right. So a norm that was a basic law goes into effect only when it's passed by two consecutive parliaments I think is the only thing we would need in this case.

Obviously I think a much looser norm like the one that the prime ministers allies talked about recently where the Knesset could just on its own by a majority overturn the court decision is reckless. But I also think that some of the interference of the court in pure legislation has been reckless.

And there is a sociological aspect to this as well. A lot of Israeli liberals have taken it as a

given that we are just doomed to lose elections. And so we hold on to all sorts of non-democratic institutions whether its institutions like the court, whether its international bodies, whether it's global civil society. We can have a few short term victories there. That's for sure. The long term costs are very, very high.

Empowering a liberal court to overturn popular legislation means in the long term empowering an illiberal court to overturn legislation we might like. I don't want to take that risk and we are already seeing signs of that.

MR. SACHS: Thank you. Yuli, you are a former minister but also a former member of Knesset. What is your reading today of the mood? I think it's a rather different political environment than the one when you were a politician. Do you think we are facing dramatic changes in the relationship between the legislature and the Supreme Court in the Israeli context? What is your take on what Shany just said?

MS. TAMIR: I actually agree with very much of what Shany said. First of all I think the court has become a victim of its own success. The court, you know, tried maybe under Barak the Supreme Court Barak to do too much too fast without building a consensus.

And I want to go back to Bill's very nice descriptions about immigration. It shows as in something very important. You can create a consensus if you are ready to go through a process where bipartisan powers sit together, discuss and then come to an agreement and somehow compromise their political instincts when they see the disagreement is functional but maybe not working for their own benefit in the short term political debate.

And I think that the thing to do with the court is very similar to what you described about immigration. I think it is both entirely possible to create bipartisan agreement on how the court should work which on one hand will limit some of the courts ambitions and I entirely agree that this is a huge failure of the liberal left in Israel and maybe here too.

Rather than working politically or educationally, everything is delivered to the court. Once the court has been changing, now there is nothing because the court is not going to be with us anymore so we are sort of orphans. So that's a very bad strategy.

On the other hand, there are things that I think there are on the margins of the Israeli

society and the very right wing politics. The (inaudible) of the politics, the people say its God not the court. Those people must be, you know, sort of pushed out of the political system. And also within the right you will find people who agree that we are not going to go to rabbinical authorities rather than that court on major issues.

So you can build bipartisan agreement and talking about, you know, my understanding of nationalism it's about this really new kind of thinking that's saying yes, in order to survive we have to look at our population, not to say -- not to fall into the populism trap. See what bothers them and find bipartisan solutions that can keep them together.

I think keeping your own society together has been sort of dismissed as something trivial but I think this is now the major tasks of more societies around the world who are falling apart including Britain.

I think the thing that you see in just, I just came from the UK and the thing that you see now it's even not about Brexit. It's about whether England or Britain or the whatever it is going to be in the future is going to survive together and a lot of people who were for the Brexit now see this internal sort of schism as a reason to rethink it.

So I think we always look at the extremes. I think there is much to do in the center and we have neglected the center entirely and people just, you know, move to the next thing because that's, you know, it's very hard to tweet a center view position because it has more than 400 and 140 whatever words in it. But it is much more important to discuss it.

MR. SACHS: I think we are now at 280 at Twitter, tweeted characters.

MR. MOR: Can I say one thing though because I think something that's happened to left and right and Yuli addressed it's happened in the left obliquely and I think it's happened in the right.

If there has been one ideological trend in the last 40 years in the west, it's been this massive privatization of political ideology. And on the left this has meant a shift away from social democracy and the kind of values of solidarity that used to win elections, at least 50 percent of the time and build institutions of real social solidarity. There were lots of problems with those, I mean, I'm not idealizing these post war welfare states. There were lots of problems about them, they were very conformist, they, you know, and not always particular tolerant of difference or whatever, not always giving

recognition to minority groups and society but they did manage to take entire populations of people in all the north Atlantic countries and in Israel. People who were at most the sons and daughter, if not maybe the grandsons and daughters of poor barely literate farmers and move them into a modern liberal middle class.

And the left traded those values of social democracy for a whole bunch of very privatized, very liberalized left wing values which spoke to voices that hadn't been heard before but left behind this entire edifice of social democracy and the right did too. It replaced it's kind of -- I'm talking about the center right here, not the far right, but a certain kind of one nation type of solidarity that didn't necessarily have the welfare aspects to it with a very privatized, very individualist, often extremely almost theological sense of selfishness as a higher value and this privatization of ideology really country by country, each in its own way, each at its own time but from the 1970's onward managed to capture the main center left and center right parties and managed to capture the discourse to the loss of everyone.

MS. TAMIR: And it's all I think in many countries going back, I mean, you can really -- again Europe, the European context is a bit different but you can see the move to the center and I think social democrats in any countries are now reviving their grip on the public imagination because they say well, we have gone too far. Let's go back to the center and let's remember what we cared about and let's create a new consensus.

And I think this new consensus is going to be this mixture of liberal, national, some social views. It's not going to be very tidy from the point of view of theoretical, you know, maybe sort of pure argument but it's going to be as I believe used to say that group politics is based on untidy compromises and I think that's very true.

MR. SACHS: You're (inaudible) I should say. Bill.

MR. GALSTON: Just a couple of comments. I mean, there is a certain historical irony that the upsurge of internationalism came about during a period of a lot of social solidarity within nations. The upsurge of nationalism has come at a period of intense divisions within nations and nationalism in the context of national divisions I think is a very, very volatile addition to the political cocktail and one that worries me.

I would be less worried about nationalism if social solidarity were in better order. Now

Yuli would say that well, nationalism can now conserve to perhaps recreate in 21st century circumstances social solidarity. I hope so but I'm not quite as confident for the second (inaudible) for the reason I'm about to state in my second intervention.

And that is that the change in the focus of left leaning politics that you've both correctly pointed to is no accident, comrades. Because it represents, you know, it is a response to changing class structures and if I may be Marxist, modes of production, right.

I mean, the social democracies of the United States and the UK and western Europe were created during the heyday of the manufacturing economy and which led to the creation of mass middle classes everywhere which in turn triggered a shift if you look at public opinion that people like Ron Engelhard have documented towards quote unquote post material values and as a result we have declining center left political parties and rising green parties in, you know, in a number of European countries and, you know, and this represented a distinctive new political sensitivity that rests on, you know, a new mixture of material and immaterial but not irrelevant interests.

And I don't think that the center left social democratic parties of, you know, of Europe and the UK and to some extent the United States can simply be recreated on the old foundations because the old foundations have been eroded by economic and social change.

So, you know, so I don't think that moving back to the center is exactly the right formulation here. There has to be a moving forward to the center which will perform be a new center, not the old center and it's going to have to reflect a different economic program because of economic changes and also a different cultural program because of cultural changes. And what exactly will that look like? Nobody knows exactly.

MR. SACHS: And we will continue this conversation in a minute. I would like to open it up for questions from the audience. As we do at Brookings, we ask that they be questions so that they have an actual question mark at the end. Be very short please so we can hear our speakers and if you wouldn't mind identifying yourself before you speak. We have microphones coming and we will call on you. So please right here in the front.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Hi, I'm Orië Meer with Americans for Peace Now and my question is mainly to Yuli and Shany and it has to do with a recent feature I think of Israeli populist

discourse which is the idea of annexation in the West Bank and the idea of not removing even one settler which is something that Netanyahu said in the course of the two, past two election cycles.

How would you explain the, this discourse given the fact that most Israelis do not support annexation and would support some kind at least of a territorial compromise in the West Bank?

MR. MOR: I don't think there has been the dramatic change that perhaps you are seeing. I mean, I remind you that in Israel until about 20 years ago, at least half the political system opposed any withdrawal of any kind from the West Bank and everyone expect for the most far left parties opposed two states and today that's almost a consensus view.

The word annexation can mean multiple things. It can mean this very fraudulent plan of Naftali Bennett to supposedly annex area C which is in reality just an annexation of 100 percent of the territory without giving rights. But also under the rubric of the word annexation are things like the land swaps that were talked about or very partial border changes.

The word is deliberately ambiguous. A lot of the alarmism about it in the last two election cycles isn't really about any actual change in policy. In the event both this prime minister and really all three of his predecessors have been tested in this sense when they were faced with real negotiations for real possibility of a peace agreement.

In all their cases, regardless of their ideological affiliation they were willing to go pretty close to 100 percent. None of them was willing to go to 100 percent but all of them were willing to go very, very far. But they never had as somebody on the other side to actually sign on the dotted line for a full peace agreement, reconciliation with Israel and recognition of Israel.

I'm not sure and, I mean, the prime minister and people around him make a whole bunch of reckless statements and a whole bunch of stupid promises. They're not terribly different though from the things that we heard in previous elections. I mean, I remind you Ehud Barak was elected in 1999 promising never to leave (inaudible) and (inaudible) and he was certainly willing to leave both of those in his negotiations as well.

MR. SACHS: Yuli, I'm sure you agree with everything.

MS. TAMIR: Yeah, I don't agree. I think the interesting thing is the notion of annexation has been totally taken out of the debate. Nobody talks about annexation. This was an election that the

word annexation or occupation wasn't mentioned. Right, left, center, maybe Merritt said something about it but it was totally, totally in the periphery of the debate and it is still in the periphery of the debate.

And if you are asking what kind of government will be erected, people say okay, let's agree on, you know, the basic lines of the government. Nothing. Neither on occupation or on annexation. This is exactly what you're saying that this issue has been transformed into a minor irrelevant issue that's, you know, nobody also takes seriously.

You know, Smoteridge and the people that want to build a third temple but they're not very serious discussions of any political solution in the Middle East which is not to say that if something comes up, I don't know if Trump comes together with the program and there will be, you know, something that would open up a negotiation. There will be again some attention to the issue.

But now, at -- if you ask how people vote in Israel now, why do they support this or that candidate, annexation is not part of their concern and that's a huge I think failure of the left I should say of us, the people of (inaudible). We started with making that an issue and yet we failed and it's a huge failure of the political system that doesn't even try to give some solutions to the problem. It's just for them -- it's a -- it's something that you -- decent people don't mention over dinner. It's going to be there. We shouldn't offer a solution because there is none.

MR. SACHS: Okay. We are going to open it up for more questions. Preferably not on who is going to be the next prime minister but rather on democracy and populism. Yes. The gentleman in the glasses here.

QUESTIONER: My name is Jeff Minnich, I'm with the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence. What role do you think faith has played in the divisions that you've addressed this morning?

MR. SACHS: Faith.

MS. TAMIR: Oh my god.

MR. GALSTON: That's the right start Yuli.

MS. TAMIR: Yeah, that's a good start. (Laughter) Tremendous. I mean, the big -- in my book, I write very little about Israel because I think the debate in Israel is really became much more of a religious debate than democratic debate. And you hear these people on the religious right and you understand that they're as you could understand from what I said earlier, I'm for negotiations and looking

for ways in the middle but there is no middle between me and Smoteridge. There is --

MR. SACHS: And Smoteridge is a member of the Knesset from the far right.

MS. TAMIR: In the far religious right because there is no common language. You know, there is nothing you can say to people whose major considerations regards to, you know, when God is going to intervene in a miraculous way and recreate a third, you know, temple or will somehow allow us to disappear the, you know, to allow the Arab to disappear by some, you know, heavenly intervention.

It's sort of this is a really messianic language that has nothing to do with the kind of debate that we are having now. And this creates a real tragedy because you can't -- there is no way to convince these people on the basis of the ongoing dialogue that we commonly have in democratic theories and I think democratic theory has given too little attention to what happens when religious powers come into play.

And I recommend, highly recommend that you see this very wonderful HBO series, Our Boys. And when ho see the people there discussing what they should be doing, you understand that they are in a different world. And their considerations are totally detached from our consideration and this gap is so deep that I don't know how to do anything about it.

MR. SACHS: Bill, is the gap unbridgeable and if so, is polarization just a given? I mean, the United States certainly faith is a major issue. The United States is a very faith based society, a lot of religion in, certainly in society if not in politics.

MR. GALSTON: Well, it certainly doesn't make things any easier and, you know, let me explain briefly. When I was a young man, there wasn't a really big difference in levels of religious observance between the two political parties.

If anything, you know, just statistically one would say that the Democratic Party was somewhat more religious and the Republican Party which was sort of more upscale, country club, et cetera. You know, they went to church because it would look bad if they didn't but not because anything very significant was going on there.

And over the past half century, we have increasingly divided into an increasingly religious party and an increasingly secular party, all right. And, you know, and one presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, Pete Buttigieg, is trying to appeal to, you know, progressive people of faith and there

are some.

But I can tell you on the basis of survey research that Brookings and other organizations have responses, they are not nearly as dense on the ground as people of faith who are strongly right leaning and who form the fundamental building block of the Republican electoral coalition.

It's interesting to look at the countries I think at the countries where, you know, both the nationalist and the populist survey are linked to religion in some ways. The United States is one, Israel is another, Hungary is a third, Poland, classic example, right, where the debate between the right and the left has turned out to be a debate about the role of Catholicism in Poland's national life and the left has found itself on the losing side of that debate.

And in a country where 98.6, yes, precisely 98.6 percent of the people are Catholics, that's their normal temperature, it is very difficult to take the European side of that debate and emerge triumphant.

So, yeah. But on the other hand, for all sorts of reasons, the impact of religion on the divisions in the UK, you know, has been all but nonexistent. And so, you know, so there are two -- your faith question is wonderful because it illuminates a division within the politics of the west.

MR. SACHS: Shany.

MR. MOR: I want to continue on what Yuli said and particularly focus on what happened with the sect of the population that she mentioned. For me democracy is a question of habit. I think there is something very important about coming back over and over and doing democratic things. I think it's what I always write about that I call the habit of legitimate disagreement. It's also the habit of voting, it's the habit of losing. And as we said at the very beginning of this discussion, it's the habit of making mistakes and then correcting.

In the case of Israeli democracy, you've brought together a lot of people who had no experience of democracy and somehow managed to make it work within the institutions that were created in 1948. People who came first of all as we know 20 percent of Israel's population is Arab, about half of Israel's population comes from the Middle East. Even the half that comes from Europe, my family came from Poland and Austria, they had no habit of democracy in either of those countries. So there's no reason to feel superior about that.

Nobody, there was not a great (inaudible) of British Jews. And we made it work. What happened with the ultranationalist religious (inaudible) public was not just something that is endogenous to its religious devotion or to its ideology but that it lived the lifestyle that was extra territorial physically and judicially to Israel's democratic institutions.

And over 52 years living outside of the place -- by the way, within Israel, you have people whose religious outlook is even more fundamentalist than the settlers, right. You have parts of the ultra-orthodox public whose theology is much more fundamentalist and yet, they constantly have this interaction with Israeli democratic politics which sometimes involves very satisfying victories, it often involves very embittering defeats, but it always involves coming back the next day.

It involves a certain set of assumptions about speech acts, about debates, about voting, about actions in the marketplace, about all these things. By creating this special regime outside of Israel's boundaries, we have allowed something which already was a very delicate mad mix of fundamentalism and nationalism to interact and to grow on its own without ever having to deal with those difficult habits --

MR. SACHS: But still the vast majority of certainly modern orthodox or national religious live inside Israel. Most of them are not settlers whether they support settlements or not.

MR. MOR: No, but this political movement which has been so damaging to Israel and so threatening to its democratic constitution in a way by the way that other anti-constitutional movements in Israel, right, and we have, I mean, I can give a whole list, right. There is basically I think today in Israel you can identify five anti-constitutional kinds of political practices. I would list them, I would say you have a sort of a neo fascist brand of politics, you have a radical left anti-constitutional brand of politics, you have a fundamentalist brand of politics, you have a jihadist brand and you have what I call the supremacists which is essentially the settler movement.

What distinguishes the first four from the fifth is two things that I think might be coincidental. But that there is two important ways in which the first four are different from the fifth one. The first one is that the fist four are all containable. They're scary, but the Israeli system has managed to deal with them. They don't have any real victories. They have a few.

But the delicate system we have of elections and courts that are free press and all these

things has managed to stop at the door almost all the threats that came from the first four groups, not all, but almost and not from the fifth.

The second one and I think this might be coincidental, I haven't figured out if there's a link between these two things but the second one is that the first four all are part of global movements.

And the fifth one is really unique to Israel. There were things that looked like the settler movement in Israel in other democratic countries, right. I mean, the Irish ascendancy is a classic example but also I think, you know, (inaudible) and the Portuguese presence in Mozambique and even more historically I think there is kind of an east Prussian, you know, this sort of these ascended German minorities in places and there were things like it but there is nothing like it anymore in the world quite like the West Bank settler movement.

I don't see a link between those two things but I'm open to being persuaded otherwise. I have thought about this a lot. I think it's a coincidence, those two facts but there is a big difference.

For me as a democratic theorist, if I have to point to one variable that explains it, it's that. It's that by being extra territorial you don't have to interact with all the disappointments and the frustrations of a daily democratic habit.

MR. SACHS: Okay. Why don't we take a couple more questions? We might even take them together. So one hand here so that will be together and another one right by just reach ahead.

QUESTIONER: Hello. I want to thank the panel for an excellent discussion. My name is Elliott Horowitz, I'm a retired economist. And I would like to -- anyone on the panel to comment on current Israeli policy towards immigration with for example from Ethiopia.

MR. SACHS: Okay. And I think one or two rows ahead of it, yeah. Right here.

QUESTIONER: Hi, I have a question for Yuli. You make me want to read your books but I want to know what's your opinion on if we can have nationalism without like jingoism? And I think Mr. Galston mentioned at least in America maybe we need a restructuring of social structures but how -- what's your opinion on that?

MR. SACHS: Okay. Who would like to take first? Yeah, we can take one more right here. Sorry. One more.

QUESTIONER: Yeah, hi. Howard Marks, unaffiliated. So my question to Yuli is about

national identity you mentioned as part of nationalism. And I think we had a discussion just now about faith.

But the issue in Israel right now is about the actual on the ground things like Shabbat observance by the state as well as religious authorities and this is a very, a huge issue over there and maybe you can discuss that in more detail. Thank you.

MR. SACHS: Okay. Who would like to go?

MS. TAMIR: Should I?

MR. MOR: I think all the questions were for her so she should go.

MR. SACHS: Well, we will have all three comment.

MS. TAMIR: Actually I think the debate now about, you know, the way the Shabbat is being preserved in Israel (inaudible) this is exactly the debate I would like to have in Israel about nationalism.

It's, it takes, you know, the more religious and the more cultural and the more traditional aspect of what it is to be a Jew which is a sort of a complicated thing as you know anyhow, put it into a debate that is actually I think very from my point of view, very productive.

We have lived according to the status quo for many, many years. It's changing. And by the way, it shows that the whole thing is changing because more people want religious education. For example there's a huge debate about education. More people want secular education. And Israel has no secularism. Israel had less than more observing Jews and now there are lots of people say don't touch my child's, you know, curricula with all sorts of religious belief.

Tell them about the Jewish people, tell them about history, language, culture, teach them (inaudible), forget about the -- we don't want religious in schools. So this debate is very productive. I think in a way it shows a maturity of the Israeli society and a change as Bill said.

It's a changing -- you never return to the consensus that has existed in the past. You are building a new one and that's a very interesting thing and the most interesting thing in it and its related also I think to other questions is the carrier of this debate now is Lieberman. So when the Russians came to Israel, people said, you know, the Russians are going to make Israel more socialist and more secular.

Socialism was the last thing that the Russians wanted to hear about. They wanted to be

brutal capitalists. Now by the way they are coming back because they realize what brutal capitalism means and they are going to be secularists. They weren't secularists, they were trying to find a place in the spectrum of Jewish identities in Israel.

Now, suddenly in a very interesting way, 30 years later, it's all coming together to a debate about what it is to be a Jew in Israel and what it is a Jewish state that is for me interesting and actually very, very -- I welcome this debate. I think something good is going to come out of it.

As for the question about the immigration, I think I'm -- I should answer it. I have been the minister of immigration for several years.

MR. SACHS: Yes, that's fine.

MS. TAMIR: The Jewish, the immigrants just now there was another wave of -- not wave, it's a small number but another 6,000 Jews were allowed back to make (inaudible) from Ethiopia. The question of the (inaudible) from Ethiopia is more complicated than it seems.

Every -- I was a minister of immigration about 12 years ago and we thought we had brought in the last Jews from Ethiopia. And the numbers keep on growing. So there is a, it's a very, very difficult process to really analyze who is coming, why, and how and who is entitled to come.

But I think there is a great openness and in many ways the Ethiopian community in Israel has matured to a community that has a political power and a political will and they demonstrate and they demand their rights and in many ways its again it's a positive --

MR. SACHS: But aren't these demonstrations, I mean, these relate to the two issues you raised earlier about immigration. One is about who comes in and you addressed that. But the second is on all those already in Israel.

These demonstrations by many in the Ethiopian Israeli community expressed extreme anger at discrimination. It was not just participation in democratic life, it was an expression of a profound sense of disenfranchisement.

MS. TAMIR: Right.

MR. SACHS: Isn't that a sense of failure?

MS. TAMIR: No, actually. That's a sense of success. Because when they came they were quiet, obedient and had no power to express their, you know, standing. Now they have a little

shape, there are people in the Army, there are people in the media, they have people everywhere. In the academic world, in the (inaudible) system and they demand rights.

And it's true that they are, there is discrimination and color is an issue but when a community has the power to stand up for itself, they couldn't have done it 20 years ago. They have learned the law, they've become citizens, they've become empowered citizens and they fight. Sometimes they are right, sometimes they are wrong but there are players in a political sense. That happened within 20 years.

If you ask me if this is a sign of integration I would say yes. People don't demand rights when they don't feel they belong. They demand rights and they close dialogue and the --

MR. SACHS: Build a highway.

MS. TAMIR: The highway at the crowdest hour of the day because they assume the people in the car know who they are and think they are right. And that's a sign of power for me and I think that what happened to the Ethiopian community it's not the end of the process but we are on route and I think it's a lot has to do with the way they have gained their identity within the Israeli system.

MR. SACHS: So there was another question and I think it's very important. I would like to get the others comments on this as well but yours to after. Can we really have nationalism without the jingoism? Can there be this sense of solidarity without arising all the other sentiments?

And in the U.S. and the Israeli cases, these are very acute. Can you have a nationalism without a clear other -- sorry for the phrasing of this but in Israel we are talking about the debates on Jewish identity that applies to four fifths of the population.

There is a fight that is not Jewish and the category of Israeli has in fact weakened in public opinion compared to the category of Jewish at last in the ways people identify themselves first. I may be wrong.

MS. TAMIR: Well, I just, one sentence because I don't want to dominate the conversation. No, I don't think so. I think that this election proved also and what I said about the Arabs and the Ethiopians is also true about the Arabs. You should -- the most thought after politician now on Israeli TV is Iman (inaudible).

MR. SACHS: He is the leader of the joint Arabs.

MS. TAMIR: The head, the leader of the joint Arab leagues. It has never happened before. He sits on every panel. He has a view on everything. And his view is very clear. We have disagreements, but we have disagreements as citizens and as Israelis.

And Israel always had this need and maybe other nation states have the same need to work on, you know, to work on two different levels. There's the Jewish identity and there is the Israeli identity and then they interact but in the Israeli sphere, more voices than ever are being legitimized and have the power to demand what they want to achieve.

So for me the Arab story of his election is that this is, you know, the counter intuitive (inaudible) deselection not in order to, you know, to allow the Arab leagues to flourish and now when people say what do you think will happen at the third election, Iman (inaudible) states on television says in the next election we will be 20 percent more because we are players now.

So I would say that the two things happened together. It's hard for us to understand but those things don't -- it's not an either or situation. It's this and that happening together. And as I said a lot of untidy compromises but also a lot of promising things. I'm less pessimistic than most, maybe than most people about what's going to happen because the ground is shaking and something new is going to emerge.

MR. SACHS: Bill, you before expressed hope that Yuli is right, that solidarity can emerge or that nationalism can foster solidarity but some skepticism, especially in a divided society and this relates to the question on jingoism. Can you elaborate a bit more on that skepticism or on your fears in this regard?

MR. GALSTON: Well, first let me offer an unrelated comment --

MR. SACHS: Go ahead.

MR. GALSTON: -- which is and this is literally the first time this has ever occurred to me and so I decided to give revenge to this thought by making it public. (Laughter)

And that is that, you know, as I reflect on this conversation, it occurred to me that Israel and the United States are arguably the only two countries in the world where immigration policy, the definition of it is absolutely central to their respective national identities. And so, you know, I think it's no accident, again, that we have had -- we have had this debate. So that's point number one.

Point number two, the rise of nationalism in divided societies means the intensification of the debate within those societies between nationalism and internationalism in most cases. And is that good for business? I think probably not.

It's certainly to the extent and I think Yuli and I, you know, agreed to the extent that a sustainable policy is going to have to be forged through a coming together of the combatants and a conversation where the legitimacy of yielding some ground on either side in the name of, you know, of a forward movement for the country as a whole needs to be recognized to the, you know, to the extent that, you know, that nationalist and globalist have now become political epithets and ordinary political discourse. You know, I hope that this leads to a recreation of solidarity. The evidence on the ground has been thin so far.

Can nationalism avoid jingoism? Well, it depends on what you mean by jingoism. But let me just, whatever you mean by it, I think my answer would be no. Not entirely. Right. There is no political movement that will not yield excesses at its periphery.

And so the question is on balance what is the judgment to be made, the political judgment and even yes, a moral judgment about the intensification or weakening of different forces within a society. In my judgment, nationalism becomes jingoism when one of the following things happens.

Number one, it leads the conviction we are not just separate from other peoples or countries but we are better. Okay. Number two, putting ourselves first means that we don't care about anybody else anymore. Right. That and there are probably other ways of characterizing the excesses, the excesses of nationalism but just to take one of them, if I could put it on the table.

I don't know of a single political leader in a democracy who's ever campaigned on the proposition that I will behave as though the wellbeing of people half a way -- halfway around the world is just as important as the wellbeing of the citizens I have been elected to serve. That is a, that's a hard sell.

But there is a lot of daylight between saying that, you know, on the one hand and a version of nationalists that says at the other extreme we don't care about what happens to other people except in so far as what happens to them affects us.

So look, I was in the Clinton Administration. One of the worst decisions of the Clinton

Administration, Bill Clinton has said so publicly, was his, you know, his decision not to go into Rwanda to try to prevent or mitigate the genocide.

Now it was not his view that the people in Rwanda didn't matter. Right. But if it had been his view that the people in Rwanda didn't matter and that we weren't intervening for that reason, that would have been I think, you know, a form of culpable jingoism.

And I have to say just looking at today's headlines, for the United States now to pull out of northern Syria and leave the Kurds to their fate, is in effect telling them that we cared about them only in so far as they were instruments of our national purpose, and now that they've done their job, we have no further obligation. We will leave them to their fate.

Similarly, leaving behind translators in Iraq and Afghanistan and even to some extent in Vietnam, right, treating people -- here I'm going to sound like a contiant, as though they are simply means to our ends is everywhere and always a mistake. And if that's your view of jingoism I agree with your critique of it and it's to be avoided.

MR. SACHS: Shany, last comments.

MR. MOR: Yeah. Just on two things that were said here. In terms of the immigration debate being central to identity, I think it's one of the things that makes me most uncomfortable and that I think explains also the polarized counter reaction about the discussion since 2015 in the U.S. regarding the Mexican border.

Because it is supposedly a discussion about migrants, about people moving from one place into another but in reality it's so obviously a coded discussion about a minority that exists in the United States which is why people react to it the way they do.

Many people don't even know that there is zero net migration in the last decade if not more --

MR. SACHS: Of Mexico.

MR. MOR: -- from Mexico into the United States. In other words, you can talk about immigration from Mexico to the United States and everybody knows and particularly when you say hostile things about it, that in reality you're actually talking about a large American minority.

You might think that that makes it more politically correct, you know, it's the same way -- I

lived in Britain for four years and people would often want to tell me that they want to criticize Israeli policy. And after about five minutes I realized they really just wanted to say nasty things about Jews and Britain. And it was this kind of just say it that, you know. And then they don't understand why everybody wants to circle the wagons around but of course, that's going to be the natural reaction.

And so too -- that's something that's very, very frustrating about that debate because it feels like a politically correct way to attack a minority that's in the United States and not a discussion about immigration which is a very serious issue.

And so that kind of I think ties in very nicely to the proposition that you made about the connection to immigration to identity particularly in American identity and in Israeli identity too.

And regarding what was said here, I also just want to agree, I guess this is pretty boring. I think that the debate about Shabbat is fascinating, fruitful, really interesting for all the reasons that were said plus one additional one.

It's not just because it ties into questions about Jewish life and about identity and about the balance between minority and majority, there is something very, very interesting, almost an uncompleted discussion that needed to happen after 1948 which is as Jews we changed completely our political status. It's one thing when you are -- the political reality of Jewish life pre 1948 was the reality of an extended family with an informal social network which worked very well for the kind of political issues that we might have had to deal with.

When you're suddenly responsible for and you can practice Shabbat in a certain way when you are a minority and you can practice Shabbat in a certain way when you are an extended family or an inflamed social network. When you are suddenly the ones responsible for the hospitals and the police and the army, you have to reconsider not just for convenience, the same way as I was saying about our presentation.

It's not just a convenience, it's actually in itself you have to fundamentally reconsider what these things mean and I'm not somebody who thinks that Shabbat has no importance. I actually think it has a very great social democratic importance as well.

But this is something we have needed to think about already for 71 year and we are doing it now. Sometimes the debate is tedious, sometimes it's inflammatory. But for the most part with all

or the various elements and the ones that were enumerated here including Ethiopians, including Russians, including Arabs who have an enormous amount to say it's relevant. An enormous role to play in the debate about what an Israeli Shabbat is.

I think the discussion is very fruitful and I agree very much that it shows a certain maturity of our domestic politics and also of the entire project of Jewish national liberation.

MR. SACHS: In one minute, the last word.

MS. TAMIR: Yeah, can I end with a joke?

MR. SACHS: Yes. Please do.

MS. TAMIR: There's a story about, you know, two Jews debating about the Shabbat and they come to the rabbi and the rabbi listens to one Jew and then he says well, I think you're absolutely right. And then the other Jew comes in and he says what he thinks about the Shabbat and the rabbi said to him you are absolutely right.

So they say to him so what do you mean? He says well, what's the tradition they ask him this way or this way? He said well the tradition is this debate. (Laughter) And I think that's the really good thing that happened to us. We are back to our tradition.

MR. SACHS: Wonderful. So in that vein, this exactly debate is our tradition here at Brookings too so please join me in thanking very much Yuli Tamir, Shany Mor and Bill Galston, our own. (Applause) Thank you all for coming and please stayed tuned for more programming.

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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