“America First” is “America Alone
As the United States retreats from the international order it helped put in place and maintain since the end of World War II, Russia is rapidly filling the vacuum. Federiga Bindi’s new book assesses the consequences of this retreat for transatlantic relations and Europe, showing how the current path of U.S. foreign policy is leading to isolation and a sharp decrease in American influence in international relations.

Transatlantic relations reached a peak under President Barack Obama. But under the Trump administration, withdrawal from the global stage has caused irreparable damage to the transatlantic partnership and has propelled Europeans to act more independently. Europe and America explores this tumultuous path by examining the foreign policy of the United States, Russia, and the major European Union member states.

The contributors to this volume highlight the consequences of U.S. retreat for transatlantic relations and Europe, demonstrating that “America first” is becoming “America alone,” perhaps marking the end of the transatlantic relationship as we know it, with Europe no longer beholden to U.S. national interests.

Federiga Bindi is a senior nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Jean Monnet Chair and founding director of the EU Center of Excellence, University of Rome Tor Vergata.

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS
Washington, D.C.
www.brookings.edu/press
Jacket design: Cameron Zotter
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In July 1958, U.S. Marines stormed the beach in Beirut, Lebanon, ready for combat. They were greeted by vendors and sunbathers. Fortunately, the rest of their mission—helping to end Lebanon’s first civil war—went nearly as smoothly and successfully, thanks in large part to the skillful work of American diplomats who helped arrange a compromise solution. Future American interventions in the region would not work out quite as well.

Bruce Riedel’s new book tells the now-forgotten story (forgotten, that is, in the United States) of the first U.S. combat operation in the Middle East. President Eisenhower sent the Marines in the wake of a bloody coup in Iraq, a seismic event that altered politics not only of that country but eventually of the entire region. Eisenhower feared that the coup, along with other conspiracies and events that seemed mysterious back in Washington, threatened American interests in the Middle East. His action, and those of others, were driven in large part by a cast of fascinating characters whose espionage and covert actions could be grist for a movie.

Although Eisenhower’s intervention in Lebanon was unique, certainly in its relatively benign outcome, it does hold important lessons for today’s policymakers as they seek to deal with the always unexpected challenges in the Middle East. Veteran analyst Bruce Riedel describes the scene as it emerged six decades ago, and he suggests that some of the lessons learned then are still valid today. A key lesson? Not to rush to judgment when surprised by the unexpected. And don’t assume the worst.

Bruce Riedel joined Brookings in 2006 after 30 years service at the Central Intelligence Agency including postings overseas in the Middle East and Europe. Riedel was a senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four presidents of the United States in the staff of the National Security Council at the White House.
The United States has invested billions of dollars and countless diplomatic hours in the pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution. Yet American attempts to broker an end to the conflict have repeatedly come up short. At the center of these failures lay two critical factors: Israeli power and Palestinian politics.

While both Israelis and Palestinians undoubtedly share much of the blame, one also cannot escape the role of the United States, as the sole mediator in the process, in these repeated failures. American peacemaking efforts ultimately ran aground as a result of Washington's unwillingness to confront Israel's ever-deepening occupation or to come to grips with the realities of internal Palestinian politics. In particular, the book looks at the interplay between the U.S.-led peace process and internal Palestinian politics—namely, how a badly flawed peace process helped to weaken Palestinian leaders and institutions and how an increasingly dysfunctional Palestinian leadership, in turn, hindered prospects for a diplomatic resolution. Thus, while the peace process was not necessarily doomed to fail, Washington's management of the process, with its built-in blind spot to Israeli power and Palestinian politics, made failure far more likely than a negotiated breakthrough.

Shaped by the pressures of American domestic politics and the special relationship with Israel, Washington's distinctive “blind spot” to Israeli power and Palestinian politics has deep historical roots, dating back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. The size of the blind spot has varied over the years and from one administration to another, but it is always present.

**KHALED ELGINDY** is a nonresident fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, where he was also a resident fellow from 2010 through 2018. He previously served as an advisor to the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah on permanent status negotiations with Israel from 2004 to 2009, and was a key participant in the Annapolis negotiations held throughout 2008.
The Suez crisis of 1956—now little more than dim history for many people—offers a master class in statecraft. It was a potentially explosive Middle East confrontation capped by a surprise move that reshaped the region for years to come. It was a diplomatic crisis that riveted the world’s attention. And it was a short but startling war that ended in unexpected ways for every country involved.

In this book, the story is broken down into three distinct phases. In each phase, the reader sees the issues as they were perceived by each country involved, taking into account different types of information and diverse characteristics of each leader and that leader’s unique perspectives. Then, after each phase has been laid out, editorial observations invite the reader to consider the interplay.

Developed by a group of veteran policy practitioners and historians working as a team, *Suez Deconstructed* is not just a fresh way to understand the history of a major world crisis. Whether one’s primary interest is statecraft or history, this study provides a fascinating step-by-step experience, repeatedly shifting from one viewpoint to another. At each stage, readers can gain rare experience in the way these very human leaders sized up their situations, defined and redefined their problems, improvised diplomatic or military solutions, sought ways to influence each other, and tried to change the course of history

**PHILIP ZELIKOW**, the White Burkett Miller Professor of History at the University of Virginia, has experience with high-level statecraft in each of the five administrations from Reagan through Obama. He was also the executive director of the 9/11 Commission.

**ERNEST MAY** was the Charles Warren Professor of History at Harvard University, where he also directed the Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History.
Kings and Presidents

SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE FDR

Updated Edition

Bruce Riedel

Saudi Arabia and the United States have been partners since 1943, when President Roosevelt met with two future Saudi monarchs. Subsequent U.S. presidents have had direct relationships with those kings and their successors—setting the tone for a special partnership between an absolute monarchy with a unique Islamic identity and the world’s most powerful democracy.

Although based in large part on economic interests, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has rarely been smooth. Differences over Israel have caused friction since the early days, and ambiguities about Saudi involvement—or lack of it—in the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States continue to haunt the relationship. Now, both countries have new, still-to-be-tested leaders in President Trump and King Salman.

Bruce Riedel for decades has followed these kings and presidents during his career at the CIA, the White House, and Brookings. This book offers an insider’s account of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, with unique insights. Using declassified documents, memoirs by both Saudis and Americans, and eyewitness accounts, this book takes the reader inside the royal palaces, the holy cities, and the White House to gain an understanding of this complex partnership.

BRUCE RIEDEL joined Brookings in 2006 after 30 years service at the Central Intelligence Agency including postings overseas in the Middle East and Europe. Riedel was a senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four presidents of the United States in the staff of the National Security Council at the White House.
Nationalism, often the scourge, always the basis of modern world politics, is spreading. In a way, all nations are willed into being. But a simple declaration, such as Grouvelle’s, is not enough. As historian Liah Greenfeld shows in her new book, a sense of nation—nationalism—is the product of the complex distillation of ideas and beliefs, and the struggles over them.

Greenfeld takes the reader on an intellectual journey through the origins of the concept “nation” and how national consciousness has changed over the centuries. From its emergence in sixteenth century England, nationalism has been behind nearly every significant development in world affairs over succeeding centuries, including the American and French revolutions of the late eighteenth centuries and the authoritarian communism and fascism of the twentieth century. Now it has arrived as a mass phenomenon in China as well as gaining new life in the United States and much of Europe in the guise of populism.

Written by an authority on the subject, Nationalism stresses the contradictory ways of how nationalism has been institutionalized in various places. On the one hand, nationalism has made possible the realities of liberal democracy, human rights, and individual self-determination. On the other hand, nationalism also has brought about authoritarian and racist regimes that negate the individual as an autonomous agent. That tension is all too apparent today.

As one part of the global democratic recession, severe political polarization is increasingly afflicting old and new democracies alike, producing the erosion of democratic norms and rising societal anger. This volume is the first book-length comparative analysis of this troubling global phenomenon, offering in-depth case studies of countries as wide-ranging and important as Brazil, India, Kenya, Poland, Turkey, and the United States. The case study authors are a diverse group of country and regional experts, each with deep local knowledge and experience.

*Democracies Divided* identifies and examines the fissures that are dividing societies and the factors bringing polarization to a boil. But this book is not simply a diagnosis of what has gone wrong. Each case study discusses actions that concerned citizens and organizations are taking to counter polarizing forces, whether through reforms to political parties, institutions, or the media.

The book’s editors distill from the case studies a range of possible ways for restoring consensus and defeating polarization in the world’s democracies. Timely, rigorous, and accessible, this book is of compelling interest to civic activists, political actors, scholars, and ordinary citizens in societies beset by increasingly rancorous partisanship.

**Thomas Carothers** is senior vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and director of Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program. A leading authority on democracy and international support for democracy, he is the author of numerous critically acclaimed books and articles on these topics.

**Andrew O’Donohue** is a research fellow at the Istanbul Policy Center and was previously a James C. Gaither Junior Fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
The Sovereignty Wars
RECONCILING AMERICA WITH THE WORLD
With a New Preface

Stewart Patrick

As the 2016 election made clear, sovereignty is also one of the most frequently invoked, polemical, and misunderstood concepts in politics—particularly American politics. The concept wields symbolic power, implying something sacred and inalienable: the right of the people to control their fate without subordination to outside authorities. Given its emotional pull, however, the concept is easily high-jacked by political opportunists. By playing the sovereignty card, they can curtail more reasoned debates over the merits of proposed international commitments by portraying supporters of global treaties or organizations as enemies of motherhood and apple pie.

Such polemics distract Americans from what is really at stake in the sovereignty debate: the ability of the United States to shape its destiny in a global age. The United States cannot successfully manage globalization, much less insulate itself from cross-border threats, on its own. As global integration deepens and cross-border challenges grow, the nation's fate is increasingly tied to that of other countries, whose cooperation will be needed to exploit the shared opportunities and mitigate the common risks of interdependence.

The Sovereignty Wars is intended to help today's policymakers think more clearly about what is actually at stake in the sovereignty debate and to provide some criteria for determining when it is appropriate to make bargains over sovereignty—and how to make them.

STEWART PATRICK is the senior fellow and director of the program on International Institutions and Global Governance (IIGG) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). His areas of expertise include multilateral cooperation in the management of global issues; U.S. policy toward international institutions, including the United Nations; and the challenges posed by fragile, failing, and post-conflict states. Patrick writes the blog The Internationalist.
Moscow Rules
WHAT DRIVES RUSSIA TO CONFRONT THE WEST

Keir Giles

From Moscow, the world looks different. It is through understanding how Russia sees the world—and its place in it—that the West can best meet the Russian challenge.

Russia and the West are like neighbors who never seem able to understand each other. A major reason, this book argues, is that Western leaders tend to think that Russia should act as a “rational” Western nation—even though Russian leaders for centuries have thought and acted based on their country’s much different history and traditions. Russia, through Western eyes, is unpredictable and irrational, when in fact its leaders from the czars to Putin almost always act in their own very predictable and rational ways. For Western leaders to try to engage with Russia without attempting to understand how Russians look at the world is a recipe for repeated disappointment and frequent crises.

Keir Giles, a senior expert on Russia at Britain’s prestigious Chatham House, describes how Russian leaders have used consistent doctrinal and strategic approaches to the rest of the world. These approaches may seem deeply alien in the West, but understanding them is essential for successful engagement with Moscow. Giles argues that understanding how Moscow’s leaders think—not just Vladimir Putin but his predecessors and eventual successors—will help their counterparts in the West develop a less crisis-prone and more productive relationship with Russia.

KEIR GILES is a senior consulting fellow at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He also works with the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), a group of subject matter experts in Eurasian security with a particular focus on the wide range of security challenges coming from Russia.
Where do Vladimir Putin’s ideas come from? How does he look at the outside world? What does he want, and how far is he willing to go? The great lesson of the outbreak of World War I in 1914 was the danger of misreading the statements, actions, and intentions of the adversary. Today, Vladimir Putin has become the greatest challenge to European security and the global world order in decades. Russia’s 8,000 nuclear weapons underscore the huge risks of not understanding who Putin is.

Featuring five new chapters, this new edition dispels potentially dangerous misconceptions about Putin and offers a clear-eyed look at his objectives. It presents Putin as a reflection of deeply ingrained Russian ways of thinking as well as his unique personal background and experience.

**FIONA HILL** was director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings. **CLIFFORD G. GADDY** is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings. Hill and Gaddy are coauthors of *The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold* (Brookings, 2003).
Political risk now affects more markets and countries than ever before and that risk will continue to rise. But traditional methods of managing political risk are no longer legitimate or effective.

In *Tectonic Politics*, Nigel Gould-Davies explores the complex, shifting landscape of political risk and how to navigate it. He analyses trends in each form of political risk: the power to destroy, seize, regulate, and tax. He shows how each of these forms reflects a deeper transformation of the global political economy that is reordering the relationship between power, wealth, and values. In a world where everything is political, the craft of engagement is as important as the science of production and the art of the deal. The successful company must integrate that craft—the engager’s way of seeing and doing—into strategy and culture.

Drawing on a career in academia, business, and diplomacy, Gould-Davies provides corporate leaders, scholars, and engaged citizens with a groundbreaking study of the fastest-rising political risk today. “As tectonic plates shape the earth,” he writes, “so tectonic politics forges its governance.”

**Nigel Gould-Davies** is an associate fellow of Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He teaches at Mahidol University International College in Thailand. Between 2010 and 2013 he held senior government relations roles in the international energy industry. From 2000 to 2010 he served in the British Foreign Office, including as ambassador to Belarus.
Reluctant Warriors
GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THEIR U.S. ALLIANCE DILEMMA

Alexandra Sakai, Hanns W. Maull, Kerstin Lukner, Ellis S. Krauss, and Thomas U. Berger

Germany and Japan are two of America’s most important allies and are at the center of Washington’s strategic calculations in Europe and Asia. Yet the key roles they play in U.S. foreign policy in the economic and diplomatic realms far outweigh any contributions they have made on the military front.

Given their histories, this is certainly understandable. But their long-term reluctance to share the defense burdens of alliance with the United States has become a perennial source of frustration for Washington. In *Reluctant Warriors*, a team of noted scholars critically examines Germany’s and Japan’s cultures of anti-militarism in the context of their alliance relationships, showing how and why both countries have modified their military postures since 1990. They also assess how far these countries still have to go and the risks the United States takes if it makes too simplistic a demand for the two countries to “do more” militarily.

**ALEXANDRA SAKAKI** is a senior associate in the Asia division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin.

**HANNS W. MAULL** is Senior Distinguished Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and Senior Policy Fellow for China’s Global Role at the Mercator Institute for China Studies.

**KERSTIN LUKNER** is managing director of AREA (Alliance on Research on East Asia) Ruhr, a research and teaching alliance of the Universities of Bochum and Duisburg-Essen, Germany.

**ELLIS S. KRAUSS** is Professor Emeritus of the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California, San Diego.

**THOMAS U. BERGER** is a professor at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University.

Can Germany and Japan do more militarily to uphold the international order?
Europe and America

THE END OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP?

EDITED BY Federiga Bindi

Foreign policy is like physics: vacuums quickly fill. As the United States retreats from the international order it helped put in place and maintain since the end of World War II, Russia is rapidly filling the vacuum. Federiga Bindi’s new book assesses the consequences of this retreat for transatlantic relations and Europe, showing how the current path of US foreign policy is leading to isolation and a sharp decrease of US influence in international relations.

Transatlantic relations reached a peak under President Barack Obama. But under the Trump administration, withdrawal from the global stage has caused irreparable damage to the transatlantic partnership and has propelled Europeans to act more independently. Europe and America explores this tumultuous path by examining the foreign policy of the United States, Russia, and the major European Union member states. The book highlights the consequences of US retreat for transatlantic relations and Europe, demonstrating that “America first” is becoming “America alone,” perhaps marking the end of transatlantic relations as we know it, with Europe no longer beholden to the US national interest.

FEDERIGA BINDI is a senior nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Jean Monnet Chair and founding director of the EU Center of Excellence, University of Rome Tor Vergata.
The European Union and North Africa

PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

EDITED BY Adel Abdel Ghafar

The ongoing upheaval in North Africa has presented many challenges to Europe, which previously had been comfortable with the status quo of authoritarian leadership in much of the region. Now in its ninth year, the turmoil has forced European leaders to rethink their approaches to the region, based on the now-obvious reality that the brief hopes of early 2011 for the spread of democracy and economic progress will not be fulfilled anytime soon.

In this book, experts from Europe, the United States, and the Middle East discuss what has happened since the so-called “Arab Spring” emerged and how those often-bewildering events have affected both North Africa and the European states across the Mediterranean. The book is based on papers presented at a March 2018 conference sponsored by the South Mediterranean Regional Program of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Chapters focus on events in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia—and offer ideas for how the European Union can adopt fresh approaches to the region, moving beyond its frequently uncertain and shifting responses of recent years.

ADEL ABDEL GHAFAR is a fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and at the Brookings Doha Center, where he was acting director from 2016–17. He specializes in political economy, with research interests including state–society relations and socio-economic development in the Middle East–North Africa region. He is the author of Egyptians in Revolt: The Political Economy of Labor and Student Mobilizations 1919–2011 (Routledge, 2018), and the lead editor of The Middle East: Revolution or Reform (Melbourne University Publishing, 2014).

How Europe can hit the “reset” button after years of failed responses to North African turmoil
The Senkaku Paradox

RISKING GREAT POWER WAR OVER SMALL STAKES

Michael E. O’Hanlon

China claims the tiny and uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. If they seize one or more of them, what should the United States do? Japan also claims them, and they are covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Presumably, the United States would feel obliged to come to Japan’s military assistance to reestablish control of the occupied territory. But, if the conflict escalated, a major war between nuclear-armed countries could result—all over a few barren pieces of land with little if any inherent importance.

This is what Michael O’Hanlon calls the Senkaku paradox. The logical application of a formal U.S. security commitment could lead to a war far out of proportion to the importance of the immediate stakes. The Senkaku scenario is only one example of a broader set of scenarios that could, for example, also involve small-scale Russian attacks against NATO allies of the United States. Such scenarios may be more likely in today’s world because both Russia and China have an interest in testing, and weakening, the U.S.-led global security order, even where they might not have territorial ambitions of a more traditional sort. With the Obama and Trump administrations’ renewed emphasis on great power strategic competition, this question has become even more urgent.

In *The Senkaku Paradox*, O’Hanlon develops an integrated military-economic-diplomatic strategy to reduce the risks of great power war and military escalation over very limited stakes.

MICHAEL O’HANLON is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy. He is also director of research for the Foreign Policy program at Brookings.

America needs better options for resolving potential crises.
Bytes, Bombs, and Spies
THE STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS OF OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS

EDITED BY Herbert Lin and Amy Zegart

Offensive cyber operations have become increasingly important elements of U.S. national security policy. From the deployment of Stuxnet to disrupt Iranian centrifuges to the possible use of cyber methods against North Korean ballistic missile launches, the prominence of offensive cyber capabilities as instruments of national power continues to grow. Yet conceptual thinking lags behind the technical development of these new weapons. How might offensive cyber operations be used in coercion or conflict? What strategic considerations should guide their development and use? What intelligence capabilities are required for cyber weapons to be effective? How do escalation dynamics and deterrence work in cyberspace? What role does the private sector play?

In this volume, edited by Herbert Lin and Amy Zegart—co-directors of the Stanford Cyber Policy Program—leading scholars and practitioners explore these and other vital questions about the strategic uses of offensive cyber operations. The contributions to this groundbreaking volume address the key technical, political, psychological, and legal dimensions of the fast-changing strategic landscape.

HERBERT LIN is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University.

AMY ZEGART is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies (FSI), professor of political science [by courtesy] at Stanford University, and a contributing editor to The Atlantic. She is also the Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, where she directs the Robert and Marion Oster National Security Affairs Fellows program. She is founder and co-director of the Stanford Cyber Policy Program.
Bombs without Boots
THE LIMITS OF AIRPOWER
Anthony M. Schinella

It sounds simple: using airpower to intervene militarily in conflicts, thus minimizing the deaths of soldiers and civilians while achieving both tactical and strategic objectives. In reality, airpower alone sometimes does win battles, but the costs can be high and the long-term consequences may fall short of what decision-makers had in mind.

This book by a long-time U.S. intelligence analyst assesses the military operations and post-conflict outcomes in five cases since the mid-1990s in which the United States and/or its allies used airpower to “solve” military problems: Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Lebanon in 2006, and Libya in 2011. In each of these cases, airpower helped achieve the immediate objective, but the long-term outcomes often diverged significantly from the original intent of policymakers. The author concludes that airpower sometimes can be effective when used to support indigenous ground forces, but decision-makers should carefully consider all the circumstances before sending planes, drones, or missiles aloft.

ANTHONY M. SCHINELLA is the National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues on the National Intelligence Council. He has spent more than 25 years serving in the U.S. government assessing foreign military forces and operations.
Think Tanks
THE NEW KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY BROKERS IN ASIA

James G. McGann

Policy research institutes—better known as think tanks—are long established and well known in Western countries but have developed only in recent years in much of the rest of the world. Globalization is partly responsible for the new growth in think tanks, since few issues are totally domestic and governments and citizens increasingly understand the need for well-informed policy advice.

Think tanks have become especially important in many Asian nations over the past decade, coinciding with their rise to new prominence in international affairs. Asia’s major players—the People’s Republic of China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore—and more recently countries in Central Asia like Kazakhstan now have major think tanks. These institutions have become the go-to organizations for proposals and policy advice on key economic, security, social and environmental issues.

This book by a noted expert in the field traces the growing influence of these policy actors in Asia, places the trend in historical context, and explores how the region’s countries have fostered the growth of think tanks with uniquely Asian characteristics.

James G. McGann is a senior lecturer of International Studies at the Lauder Institute, director of the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program and senior fellow, Fels Institute of Government at the University of Pennsylvania.
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