THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM AND TARGETED VIOLENCE

A CONVERSATION WITH ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY KEVIN K. McALEENAN

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PROCEEDINGS

GENERAL ALLEN: Friends and colleagues, and distinguished guests, members of the media, whether you’re here in person or you’re coming in via the webcast, good afternoon, and welcome to the Brookings Institution.

My name is John Allen, and I’m the president here. And we’re very pleased to have you with us for our event which is co-hosted with our colleague institution, The Heritage Foundation. And it is entitled: A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence.

As the name suggests we’re hosting today the release of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s new counterterrorism strategic framework, as well as hosting our honored guest, the acting secretary of homeland security, Kevin McAleenan. He’ll shortly provide his remarks which will unveil this effort.

Since its creation on 11 September since -- after 11th September, in the dark and challenging days of 2001, DHS has been a critical platform for combating terrorism in all its horrific forms. Time and again dedicated servants of the department working hand-in-hand with their peers throughout the U.S. government and the military have kept America safe from threats both foreign and domestic. And I’m proud to have served alongside many of them over the years as our commitment to national security remains steadfast to this day.

The Department of Homeland Security is a bulwark of our freedom and our safety.

The threat we’re facing, however, has evolved and adaptation is required. Rising to meet that challenge is the new strategic framework that we’ll be discussing today. And ladies and gentlemen, it could not be more timely.

All across America the threat of domestic terrorism grows by the day, with anything from pro-extremist rallies, to bomb threats, to active shootings becoming common interventions in our media headlines and our daily routines. And this of course says nothing of the terrible epidemic of gun violence which we’re experiencing as a nation today, violence that takes the lives of thousands of innocent Americans each year.
What's more, racially and ethnically motivated violence, in particular that inspired by White supremacists, the sources of which -- of this violence -- are antithetical to our shared and cherished valid values, this scourge is also on the rise.

This reality has driven a wedge into already strained political, socioeconomic, racial, ethnic and religious divides, and has made our nation less fundamentally safe, less prosperous, and ultimately less free. The threat is clear, and it is real. And thankfully finding ways to combat all forms of terrorism and targeted violence is central to why we're gathered here today.

This strategic framework on which the secretary will comment briefly is a product of the tireless work of DHS's colleagues, and often was the result of consulting with a variety of outside experts as well to develop and hone the details. And some of those experts were our very own from Brookings and The Heritage Foundation.

It's a serious document, with serious goals and objectives, and actions, and well worth our time to read and to consider in detail. But let me also be clear in saying that it took vision to conceptualize and to develop this document.

And I commend the department and in particular the acting secretary for taking a stand on these issues which grow with seriousness -- in seriousness every single day. So we've got a lot to do this afternoon. The acting secretary will soon come to the stage and provide some remarks about the framework, and once he's concluded I'll join him for a very brief one-on-one conversation here on the stage.

And to help facilitate your questions, following the secretary's remarks, we'll be passing out note cards which our staff will collect and will produce for me on the stage. It's a very short time line, ladies and gentlemen, and I want you to recognize that our ability to take questions from the audience may be constrained by that time line.

As you fill out the cards I'd ask you to put the name and the organization on the top, and a question as opposed to something else, and please write legibly. Once we've concluded, the acting secretary will depart and then we'll transition to a featured panel of
very distinguished experts.

Susan Hennessey, our senior fellow at Brookings and executive editor of the Lawfare, will moderate the panel; Jim Carafano who is vice president and E.W. Richardson fellow of The Heritage Foundation will be joining us; Seamus Hughes, the deputy director of the Program of Extremism at George Washington University’s Center for Cyber and Homeland Security; George Selim, senior vice president of programs of the Anti-Defamation League; and Chad Wolf, the senior official performing the duties of the under secretary and assistant secretary for homeland security, for strategy, plans, analysis and risk.

It is quite a line up. And they’re going to discuss amongst themselves with Susan moderating for about 45 minutes, using the same note card system as I described before.

So with that, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Acting Secretary McAleenan to the stage. (Applause)

MR. McALEENAN: Thank you, General Allen. And thank you so much to Brookings and Heritage for hosting us today. I really appreciate, Dr. Carafano, for your participation in the event as well. It’s an honor to be among such an impressive group of academics, public servants, and experts to lay out the Department of Homeland Security's new strategic framework for countering the evolving terrorism and targeted violence threats that we face today.

Our department was created in the wake of the devastating 9/11 attacks charged with coordinating and unifying the nation’s Homeland Security efforts, and our mission is multi-dimensional built on the five pillars of prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery.

The origin story of the department is a key element of our nation's response to the September 11th attacks and our founding was intended to improve the ability to defend against foreign terrorist organizations seeking to harm the American people.
The al-Qaeda organization first and foremost loomed four years after the 9/11 attacks as the homeland’s most significant terrorism concern. Then, as now, our first priority was and is to defend the country against terrorism, to ensure that no terrorist has access to the homeland or can exploit our trade travel or immigration systems. This is the Department of Homeland Security’s core charge.

And as President Bush put it at the National Cathedral just three days after 9/11, “The commitment of our fathers is now the calling of our time.” I put that quote above my cubicle in November 2001 in the national office of anti-terrorism in the former U.S. Customs Service as a reminder of our purpose while we worked to advance a compelling and new priority mission.

It is a DHS calling that has been heated by thousands and a mission that has been maintained with success for nearly two decades. It is who we are. As a department we are aware that the threats to the homeland continue to evolve. Today they have evolved beyond those foreign terrorist organizations to include emerging challenges with domestic terrorism and targeted violence here at home.

Targeted violence refers to any incident of violence that implicates homeland security, in which an attacker selects a particular target prior to the violent attack. We continue to see violent acts inspired by hateful ideologies across our nation.

On April 27th of this year, a gunman opened fire at the Chabad of Poway Synagogue in Poway, California, killing one and injuring three others. The anti-Semitism that motivated him was ignorant and cowardly, and this attack was just one in a string of acts of targeted violence our nation has recently seen.

That was my third week as acting secretary, and the department mobilized quickly to respond. We had recently commissioned the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention to galvanize and integrate our diverse efforts to secure the nation and to help prepare communities all across the country, building off previous department efforts to address all forms of targeted violence that threaten our homeland regardless of the
ideologies or lack thereof animating them.

As this office began coordinating prevention efforts across our broad department it became apparent that we had more work to do. Given the events globally in Christchurch, New Zealand; and closer to home at the gathering of multiple congregations of the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, as well as the burnings of African-American churches in Louisiana in March and April, I requested a new subcommittee of our Homeland Security Advisory Council, co-chaired by General Allen and Paul Goldenberg, to explore how we could improve our efforts to secure faith-based organizations against targeted violence and domestic terrorism.

And we began developing a strategic framework that would build on our success in the struggle against foreign terrorist organizations, and incorporate lessons learned from those successes to develop an approach to address the evolving threats of today.

As we are in the middle of these efforts our nation was struck again, this time twice in the same weekend in El Paso, Texas, and Dayton, Ohio. With over 4,000 DHS professionals, agents, and officers and their families living in El Paso, this attack hit very close to home for us.

Six family members of DHS employees were killed, and one DHS professional was shopping in the Walmart at the time of the attack, and due to her training was able to render life-saving aid to one of the victims.

That attacker sought to kill Hispanics, and his online manifesto was rife with references to multiple hate-based ideologies. The majority of our El Paso team working to protect our nation, to uphold the rule of law, and care for vulnerable migrants arriving at our border is Hispanic. These professionals are American patriots who work every day to protect what our nation of immigrants is all about.

So we stood together, alongside leaders from El Paso, the state of Texas and Mexico to addresses this attack with moral clarity. We said it was hate. We said it was
domestic terrorism. That it had no place in our society. And it reinforced our confidence and
the focus of our strategy we have been developing for several months.

As the president put it, “In one voice, our nation must condemn racism,
bigotry and white supremacy; these sinister ideologies must be defeated.”

Our department recognizes clearly and unambiguously that today’s
terrorism and targeted violence threats stem both from enemies foreign and domestic, from
multiple ideologies, or in some cases none at all. Some of the most serious threats we
continue to confront today have been part of the department’s focus since its inception, like
the ongoing threat from foreign terrorist organizations.

In coordination with our partners at the Department of Defense and across
the intelligence community the Department of Homeland Security has defended against the
foreign terrorist threat for nearly two decades. We have developed sophisticated methods to
target this threat including a defense in-depth approach to our homeland security.

This posture pushes our borders outward, extends our zone of security, and
ensures that we’re aware of the movement of illicit actors long before they attempt to enter
the United States, and as a result we’ve been very successful at denying terrorists entry to
the U.S. or through our travel systems.

Today the large majority of our encounters with foreign known or suspected
terrorists occur well beyond our borders, and we coordinate with international partners to
take operational actions. But foreign terrorist organizations and radical Islamic terrorists
continue to plot against the United States, continued vigilance and enhancement of our
department’s efforts to thwart them is crucial.

ISIS and al-Qaeda remain the two most pressing radical Islamic terrorist
threats to the homeland, through their potential to direct plots, and also to inspire
homegrown violent extremism in their name. Homegrown violent extremists have conducted
eight lethal terrorist attacks in United States since 2014 claiming 83 lives.

One demographic from the conflict in Syria and Iraq represents a critical
concern for the United States and much of the world, foreign fighters. The Syria conflict attracted some 40,000 individuals from foreign countries as combatants, while many died on the battlefield thousands have left the region, returning to their home countries, or often going to remote parts of the world where they can more easily plan or facilitate continued terrorist attacks.

As the primary federal agency responsible for travel intelligence against all threats, it is critical that the department understand who these actors are, prevent them from entering the United States and our partner nations, and to protect our trade and immigration systems from their exploitation.

We will continue to extend our reach beyond U.S. borders to detect these threats, improve our vetting capabilities and to disrupt any illicit trade activity that funds terrorism, and improve and adapt our screening capabilities, among other efforts.

However, the overall terrorism and targeted violence threat has evolved, not only do we face serious threats from a greater number of disparate actors, and at any time since 9/11, but we also see these actors exploiting modern communications and emerging technologies including, for example, everything from social media, to hacking activity, to unmanned aircraft systems, to facilitate, plan and execute their attacks.

Domestically, as we have seen in the attacks in Poway, El Paso, Pittsburgh, Charleston and elsewhere, there is evidence of this growing number of threat actors who seek to attack the seams of our diverse and vibrant social fabric, and incite our nation's most vulnerable populations, our youth are disenfranchised and disaffected to violence against their fellow citizens.

These individuals are motivated by various violent extremist ideologies, including those that can be described as racial, ethnic, anti-government, or anti-authority in orientation, including very concerningly, and increasingly, white supremacists violent extremism.

Attackers often plan and carry out their acts of violence alone and with little
apparent warning, and in ways that limit the effectiveness of traditional law enforcement investigation and disruption methods.

Today, white supremacist extremism is one of the most potent ideologies driving acts of targeted violence in this country. The FBI has highlighted a 40 percent growth in these investigations. White supremacist violent extremism’s outlook can generally be characterized by hatred for immigrants and ethnic minorities with a historic focus on the African-American community.

I would like to take this opportunity to be direct and unambiguous in addressing this major issue of our time. In our modern age the continued menace of racially-based violent extremism, particularly white supremacist extremism, is an abhorrent affront to our nation, the struggle and unity of its diverse population, and the core values of both our society and our department.

It has no place in the United States of America, and as the president has called us to do, we will work to defeat it. In this evolving threat environment our department must double down on the successes of our traditional counterterrorism efforts, powered by our unique authorities and operations in the international and border environments, while simultaneously expanding our focus to provide a coordinated approach in the prevention of terrorism and targeted violence originating within our borders by extremists of all ideologies, and empowering whole-of-community efforts across the country.

While the challenges facing our nation are great, the department will continue to operate with clear eyes and urgency on the threats we face. As acting secretary, I consider it our duty and a moral imperative for the dedicated and talented workforce of the department to help lead this effort. That is why today I’m pleased to announce the release of the Department of Homeland Security’s strategic framework for countering terrorism and targeted violence, representing our vision and commitment to the American people to address the evolving terrorists and targeted violence threats.

Rather than starting from whole cloth, this strategic framework
acknowledges the department's successes in the counterterrorism fight, across intelligence, targeting investigations and operations, and seeks to apply many of these tools our department has developed over the years to counter foreign threats, and the lessons learned from those experiences to counter emerging threats within our borders.

We will do this in a transparent manner to hold ourselves accountable to the American people, and maintain our commitment to respect critically important privacy and civil liberties, protections that are ensconced both in our Constitution and in the Department of Homeland Security's core values.

Designed to amplify and execute the Trump administration's 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the first strategy for counterterrorism in this nation to mention domestic terrorism. The strategic framework has four key goals: understand the evolving terrorism and targeted violence threat environment, and support partners in the homeland security enterprise through that specialized knowledge; prevent terrorists and other hostile actors from entering United States and deny them the opportunity to exploit the nation's trade, immigration, and domestic and international travel systems, prevent terrorism and targeted violence here at home, and enhance U.S. infrastructure protections and community preparedness.

We will not become complacent in protecting the homeland from the foreign terrorist threat through this strategy. However, the vast and diverse skill sets within the department allow us to employ a counterterrorism strategic framework, the targets foreign and domestic actors with some of the same effective and flexible tools in concert with Americans privacy and civil rights expectations, and commitments.

While driving forward in addressing the foreign terrorist threat, building on our foundation we are also turning our attention to the growing and emerging threats within our borders. And first and foremost that means that the department's new strategic framework aggressively targets the threat of targeted violence in the United States.

As we know well these attacks have a broad impact on American citizens
and our national climate, not only do they take innocent lives, but they diminish citizens' perception of safety in communities and public spaces. These attacks pull at the civic seams of our diverse country, which is why enemies, foreign and domestic, seek to incite this type of violence within our borders.

While other departments and agencies have separate and vital roles to play, this framework amplifies the lines of effort specific to the Department of Homeland Security in the domestic terrorism realm, which are prevention and protection.

The Trump administration’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism calls on the U.S. government to champion and institutionalize prevention, and create a global prevention architecture with the help of civil society, private partners in the technology industry. The Department Homeland Security will do just that, pursuing a whole-of-community approach to prevention as the best way to protect at-risk individuals without infringing upon cherished civil liberties.

Individuals, families, private and nonprofit groups, faith-based organizations, and state local territorial and tribal organizations are often in the best position to prevent an individual's mobilization to violence.

In this strategic framework our prevention efforts focus on empowering partners in state and local government as well as the private sector to enhance the security of citizens here at home. This approach serves as a powerful example of DHS's whose role as a communicator, coordinator and enabler, responding to the national level crises across multiple jurisdictions and entities.

To empower our state and local partners we will enhance and expand our capabilities across the department to help ensure that they have the resources, personnel, training and other assistance needed to intervene before an individual commits violent acts.

These efforts, to be coordinated by our Office Of Targeted Violence And Terrorism Prevention but driven by our components in the field include training community stakeholders, conducting threat and vulnerability assessments, active shooter exercises,
partnering with state local governments, and nonprofit organizations to inform common risk factors, to help prevent mobilization to violence, and find those off ramps and intervention opportunities. And sending department personnel to the field to assist state and local governments in establishing their own prevention programs.

Second, we'll provide them with the latest understanding of the threat from terrorism and targeted violence. The strategic framework introduces an annual state of the homeland threat assessment that will provide current analysis and data on the state of the threat that the homeland confronts, helping to inform all levels of government and the broader public.

In addition, the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center, or NTAC, plays a leading role in behavioral analysis and trainings, spreading threat assessment models as they've been doing for more than two decades to stakeholders across the country, helping to identify individuals who may be mobilizing the violence.

In their latest analytic report, “Mass Attacks In Public Spaces,” NTAC found that the vast majority of cases of mass attacks and targeted violence studied in 2018, families, friends, or bystanders had raised concerns about violent actors prior to them committing violence, providing an opportunity for an intervention if we take a whole-of-community effort and provide the tools to state and locals that they need.

We will also counter terrorist and violent extremist influence online by engaging our partners in the private sector. The private sector plays a very significant role in social resilience and has the ability to inform the public of the risks associated with the spread of violent extremist ideology.

We will continue to support the efforts by tech companies, NGOs and community partners to spread counter-messaging campaigns seeking to steer individuals away from messages of violence. It is clear to us that we must institutionalize and scale our prevention efforts because intervention can and will prevent tragedies, but because not all attacks can be prevented, we must simultaneously work to build our resilience and our ability
to respond and recover when they do occur.

Our nation’s infrastructure and public spaces are high-value targets for terrorism and targeted violence, and we consider it department responsibility to spread awareness across a threat environment, the private sector and the public. Fortifying our communities against targeted attacks is within our control, and we are well positioned to promote preparedness in our partners.

The department has a small protection mission handled by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency which leads federal government efforts to mitigate the nation’s infrastructure and prevent vulnerabilities.

CISA’s soft target and crowded spaces guide provides tools, resources and training to key stakeholders to help prepare for and respond to active shooter events. Since the program’s inception in 2011 there have been more than 300 workshops with nearly 40,000 participants and 930,000 successful completions of online training.

It’s imperative that we increase the number of communities prepared to perform their role in preventing and protecting against, mitigating or responding to, and recovering from these attacks. Preparedness is a shared responsibility and we are calling for everyone’s involvement, not just the government.

Recent studies and lessons learned from our foreign partners show us that prevention protection tools work, and the first national-level strategic framework to apply these tools to both terrorism and targeted violence simultaneously is what we’re offering today.

As this strategic framework explicitly states, terrorism and targeted violence overlap as problems, and therefore require a shared set of solutions.

DHS is introducing new methods of creating a more comprehensive understanding of the challenge of terrorism and targeted violence, both within and outside the federal government. Importantly, it explicitly recognizes the need to focus and protect our most vulnerable populations particularly our youth.
And as our department is always forward-looking, the strategic framework is designed to assess DHS's past, and provide a guideposts to its future. It intentionally focuses on how emerging technology can exacerbate these threats but also how technology can help provide solutions to counter them.

The strategic framework is our formal recognition of the emerging threat of targeted violence in the United States, and it makes clear that our whole Department is committed to addressing that threat, just as we are committed to addressing the threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations. At the same time we intend for this framework to articulate, a vision, a vision for how our nation will respond to the evolving threats we face.

Our department has dedicated operators and personnel, some of whom are in the audience, who will play a critical role in implementing this strategic framework with vigilance and integrity. But we will only be successful with an extensive whole-of-government approach in collaboration, dedicated resourcing from Congress, and the commitment of the American public.

DHS will follow our strategic framework with a public action plan explaining to the American people in greater detail how we intend to accomplish our goals.

So, I'll close with this. I've been with the Department of Homeland Security since its inception, joining a predecessor agency after 9/11 I've participated directly in development of our efforts to prevent terrorists from accessing the homeland, along with U.S. customs, and border protection, and interagency colleagues, and I'm well acquainted with the foreign terrorist threats to our homeland.

At the same time I have watched this threat evolve to what it is today, and with targeted violence and domestic terrorism, unfortunately, taking increasing prominence. That's why I'm convinced that this expanded and balanced approach is necessary. We, at DHS, have committed our resources to addressing this threat, that time is now to take additional steps, and there's already significant work underway.

We look forward to collaboration feedback from diverse stakeholders,
including our outstanding panel, which you'll hear from shortly, to enhance our action implementation. And I thank you for your time and attention today. (Applause)

GENERAL ALLEN: Thanks very much; wonderful. Okay, ladies, gentlemen, we're on a short timeline. So let me quickly ask the first question, and then we'll get some from the audience. A very comprehensive layout on the strategic framework, and I think many folks here have heard of parts of this, but I don't know that they've ever heard of it all together.

MR. McALEENAN: Right.

GENERAL ALLEN: So, what's new? To recap, why the need for the strategic framework, and what's new in this framework ultimately that's to the benefit of the country?

MR. McALEENAN: Well, I think it's very clear given the types of attacks we're facing, the public response, the concern are nationally, that we need to do something compelling and urgent, and very clear. All right, coming from CBP and seeing how we could work, even though most of our actions were operational and directly coordinated, we can work through industry to do things like secure the global supply chain, to help enhance security standards, to inform, to provide threat assessments, and provide guidance on steps that could be taken.

Looking across the department, understanding what CISA is doing, Secret Service, FEMA, Federal Protective Service. We have all these capabilities reaching out to communities around the country, we need to coordinate integrate and galvanize that effort, and make sure that everyone understands the tools, resources available and is focused on this problem, focused on getting in front of it and preventing pathways to violence, but also being prepared to respond effectively.

GENERAL ALLEN: Mr. Secretary, how do you feel, or how have you sensed the willingness of the private sector to step up to be a partner with you in this? This is a critical issue.
MR. McALEENAN: Yes. I think they're very willing. And we're seeing the same thing from state and local communities, nongovernmental organizations, as you know from your faith-based work on the Homeland Security Advisory Task Force that there's a lot of ownership and willingness to partner, what they need is the tools. What threats are they - - are they facing? What are the best practices to be ready for potential act of targeted violence? You know, everything from, you know, evacuation plans, to understanding how to help a young person find a pathway off that route to violence?

I mean, those are the kind of things that we're seeing, wide open partnership. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center in their mass attacks in public spaces, they've done training for 12,000 people this calendar year alone. Mental health professionals, school resource officers, state and local government, that's the kind of engagement we're getting. We want to make sure we're wielding that without overlap, and prioritizing on risk and making sure everyone knows the resources are available.

GENERAL ALLEN: A similar question on social media platform. Those are very powerful, and they can work to our advantages, they can really work to our detriment. How are you finding that that challenge?

MR. McALEENAN: Yes. So, there's lots of thorny challenges that the strategy does not fully solve. And one of those is the conversation we have to have on the issues and the conversation online that is, unfortunately, helping accelerate a pathway to violence. It's providing individuals that might be disaffected or angry with validation, with the community around their feelings. And we have to understand without policing ideology, or affecting speech, how we see that risk and how we can intervene as a community in advance.

GENERAL ALLEN: And that's the issue of balancing free speech, privacy, against the hate that can be promulgated and ultimately penetrated into society on these social platforms.

MR. McALEENAN: Exactly. Right.
GENERAL ALLEN: Mr. Secretary, where would you like to see, given this framework and the work of the department, the partnerships that you are creating, where do you want to see us in 6 months 12 months, 18 months, as a result of what's just happened today?

MR. McALEENAN: Sure. Well, we developed an immediate surge action plan, which I did not cover because then it would have been a very long set of remarks, it was already long. But we're going to implement that immediately. But beyond that we were developing an action plan that's going to provide that roadmap with specificity on the interagency partnerships, on our expectations for the DHS components and their outreach to the whole-of-community efforts.

But it's also going to probably result in some resource implications. We have asked for an out-of-cycle budget increase to support the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Office, and that build out as well as some additional grants for prevention of violence out in the field. But we think we're probably going to need more to fully realize this effort.

But we do have a tremendous amount of capability, resources and dedicated experts already on staff in providing this guideposts, and how do we want them to approach their mission, we think we're going to see immediate impacts.

GENERAL ALLEN: That's terrific. And I'll ask for the cards now if I could, please? Thank you very much.

I think it's Tom Warrick of the Atlantic Council. Thank you for the question. The question calls for more efforts and programs to make it succeed. Do you know how much more this strategy framework will cost, and has the White House and Congress given you, the DHS, what you think will be the resources today, and given you an indication of the willingness to give you the resources in the future for this? And what it's going to cost?

MR. McALEENAN: Right. I may have given three answers to that question now on my last response. But the president, after El Paso, called for resource needs for the
FBI, for other domestic terrorism efforts across the interagency, and so we're assessing that right now. We're talking with the professionals, (inaudible) and seeing what we need from Congress to further support that effort.

But again with the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Office, with the efforts across DHS, from CISA and the Secret Service, at the FPS, FEMA, our intelligent analysis shop and our operating components, we think we can make an impact right away.

GENERAL ALLEN: You mentioned perceptions of safety, and of course the department in the last mass shootings has paid a personal price for this. How do you think Americans view in their current perception of safety? Is it a misperception, or a perception that the department can help to inform with respect to how safe our population is?

MR. McALEENAN: That's a good question. I mean we don't -- we see two things. We don't want people to be complacent that something can't happen here, we also don't want people to be scared to go outside. And so what I think -- and the president after El Paso he said: we cannot afford to be hopeless. We can't afford to sit pat on our laurels, but we have to take action.

And what we're trying to do, you know, from really across the department, is empower citizens to be resilient, to so understand risk factors, to be able to identify them, to know how to respond. Right? All interventions are not created equal.

GENERAL ALLEN: That's right.

MR. McALEENAN: Some require a law enforcement intervention, some are more of a conversation, some are mental health or a family support effort that's required. So we want to provide people the awareness and the tools, really in that whole-of-community effort. I mean it's consistent across our counterterrorism mission, targeted violence, but it's also what we're trying to do with cyber and foreign influence. And there is an important statement on resilience against foreign influence in this strategy as well.

GENERAL ALLEN: I want to thank you for the very clear public statement on white supremacists, white supremacy, its hateful ideology. That is something all
Americans need to hear about all the time, because we're all victims of it.

MR. McALEENAN: Right.

GENERAL ALLEN: Regardless of our origins, we are all victims of it, and I want to thank you for that, and the more our country commits to that the safer we will be in the end. You talked about, in the context of foreign influence and foreign terrorism, that the department has pushed its borders out, the country has pushed its borders out.

MR. McALEENAN: Right.

GENERAL ALLEN: Could you talk to us a little bit about the partnerships that you see overseas? What form does that take? I don't know necessarily that America is well informed on that. We're safe in many respects because of that. What does that really mean?

MR. McALEENAN: Sure. I mean that that's been, you know, really a multi-decade effort across the interagency. The U.N. Security Council supports continued improvement in this area with the Resolution 2396. But DHS, and really CBP have been at the forefront of creating this capacity internationally.

These are things like creating the ability to create a watch list, to analyze passenger manifests, to identify known threats, to collect biometrics and create these interdictions, and really have a shared visibility of potential movement of security or threat actors and be able to coordinate on operational action.

So it's something that we've been working closely with the Europeans for four years, they've taken a number of significant steps both in their law and in their operationalization of it over the last five years. We have a very good network in the Western Hemisphere working on identifying threats heading toward our border, especially from outside the hemisphere.

And we're going to continue to build on that capacity that's called for explicitly in the strategy. Again this is not a shift of DHS focus entirely, it's a balancing of DHS focus, and really trying to build on the outstanding capabilities techniques and
international partnerships we've already developed.

GENERAL ALLEN: And those are essential. They really do keep the border distant from our shores. That's really important. One more question. "The report does identify multiple threats, but what will DHS actually do to prevent White nationalism and disinformation campaigns that's support it? Are you forming any task forces or specific organizations within the context of your ability to answer that, that will be focused on that threat and that challenge?"

MR. McALEENAN: Right. So, a couple different answers: first, you want to emphasize Department Justice and the FBI remain the primary investigative entity for domestic terrorism. DHS supports them extensively as the largest provider of agents and intel analysts to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces all around the country. So that, I think that's the first part of that answer.

But specifically, and again the action plan is going to lay all of this out: what steps are we going to take? One, is the engagement with the private sector, again, not policing ideology, but the private sector has the ability, as Cloudflare did in the immediate aftermath of the El Paso attack, to make a decision to not support a website that's become a cesspool of hate, for instance.

That's the kind of decision-making we want to see out there in the private sector. The task force that you're working on: how do we prevent and protect violence against faith-based organizations and houses of worship? And that has a direct correlation with getting out in front of a White supremacist extremist attack.

So we're going to take a lot of specific steps through this strategy. One I want to highlight in particular is the state of the Homeland Threat Assessment. Our intelligent analysis directorate has dramatically increased their reporting on domestic terrorism, 150 percent increase last year, and a lot of those finished intelligence and tactical reports have involved White supremacist extremism.

So we're pushing that out through our fusion centers all around the country,
we have liaisons on sheriff's offices, in police departments, and we're trying to get that information out that can help aid state and local law enforcement to take effective action. Again, that's where DHS is not the operational entity, but we can support it. On one last point.

GENERAL ALLEN: Sure.

MR. McALEENAN: If we see white supremacist extremist connections with international organizations, say, in Europe or elsewhere, we already have ongoing investigations and national target center interdiction efforts to prevent that collaboration and correlation internationally.

GENERAL ALLEN: Terrific. So, with the deployment of the framework today, are there one or two real seams or gaps in how we are postured today to protect our citizens that you'd like to see be closed by this?

MR. McALEENAN: Yes. I do think that conversation on the online aspect is really important, and it's not one that DHS is going to own alone. That's a whole-of-society conversation, or congressional engagement. But, you know, it's become too easy to get validation for your ideology, even if your ideology is shifting, and we are seeing that.

The other concern that it provides is really an acceleration, the velocity of cases the FBI talks about have increased dramatically from inspiration to action, and we want to make sure that we're thinking through how to get in front of that.

GENERAL ALLEN: And one final question. I know your time is very tight. You did talk about the six family members who were killed in the shootings, and the one family member who was able to make a difference at a critical moment.

MR. McALEENAN: Yes.

GENERAL ALLEN: This is an easy question I think. But I think Americans need to hear this as well, and that is to tell us about the people that are part of your department. A and I see a TSA, Transportation Security Administration officer out in the audience. I see a Coast Guard officer out in the audience. It's a diverse organization of
really dedicated people. Can you tell us a little bit about who's in this department please?

MR. McALEENAN: Sure, yeah. And I would name them, but they prefer their anonymity. Because I see some folks out in the audience who, you know, outside of maybe Troy Miller, our director of field operations in New York have done more than any other people in DHS to address the foreign terrorist threat and prevent its access to the United States.

But, you know, the professionals we have at Department Homeland Security are a daily source of inspiration. They're incredible. I was out with them at Laredo, Texas, and San Diego, California, earlier this week. You know, completely different operational areas but seeing how they're making improvements to our border security.

You know, with talks with one -- I'll give you one more example. David Henderson, I'll name him. He's a Laredo DFO, he's finishing his 49th year in federal service, and he's going to be retiring in about six weeks. And what he wanted to talk about was the progress over the last five years, and then the things that he was, you know, frustrated to have to leave unfinished.

For instance, we're trying to build a port of the future where the truck never has to slow down as it crosses the border, it can be scanned in motion, it can be targeted for risk, both the driver, the cargo, in an integrated fashion. And he wanted to see that realized, but he's not going to get that done before October 31st, but we have a lot of professionals who will maintain that effort.

So, it's a tremendous group of people that continue to work every day to secure our country, and it's an honor to work alongside them.

GENERAL ALLEN: Thank you for your leadership. Thank you for deploying this important framework. We look forward to being a platform to help you continue to improve it as time goes on, along with our partnership with Heritage. And thank you for being with us today, Mr. Secretary.

MR. McALEENAN: Thank you, General. I really appreciate it. Thanks so
much; all right. (Applause)

MS. HENNESSEY: In the interest of time I will get started while my fellow panelists are being mic’ed up.

And so, thank you to General Allen, and to Secretary McAleenan for the important discussion we just heard.

I'm Susan Hennessey. I'm a senior fellow here at the Brookings Institution, and the executive editor of Lawfare. I'll be moderating this panel today.

Before I introduce our panelists, we'll remind everybody that we're doing the same note card procedure, so please, just if you have any notes for the panel write down your name, your affiliation, your question and who it's directed to, and just pass it to the end, and somebody from Brookings will collect it, and we will address all of those at the end. And I'll give a brief reminder whenever we have sort of last call for questions.

I will briefly introduce my fellow panelists now. You all have they're very impressive and very long biographies in your printed material, so I will give a very brief snapshot of those biographies.

So, next to me as Chad Wolf, who's the senior official performing the duties of the under secretary and the assistant secretary for strategy, plans, analysis and risk in the Office of Strategy Policy and Planning at the Department of Homeland Security. He's been with the Department of Homeland Security since 2007.

Seamus Hughes is the deputy director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University. He previously worked at the National Counterterrorism Center, and was the senior counterterrorism advisor for the Senate Homeland Security Committee.

Past him is James Carafano, the vice president at The Heritage Foundation, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E.W Richardson fellow.

And past is George Selim, senior vice president of programs at the Anti-
Defamation League. He previously served as DHS's first director of the Office for Community Partnerships, and has served in the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations.

So, thank you all for being here today. To get things started I will ask Under Secretary Wolf to share some prepared remarks, as sort of his reflections on the strategy.

MR. WOLF: Sure. Let me first, by thanking both Brookings and Heritage for hosting the event today, as well as my panelists. I get the privilege to talk up here but I want to acknowledge all my fellow DHS folks that are in the -- in the audience. They are the ones that are doing this work, so I get to talk about it, but they actually do it. So, it's a tremendous asset that they are here today.

I'll touch on three points that sort of people have asked me over the last several weeks as we talk to folks about the strategic framework. What are the takeaways? What do you take away from this?

So three points which the secretary, the acting secretary hit on, but I think is important to sort of underscore: one is the evolving nature of the threat. So we've been focused, as a department, since the inception on international terrorism, on foreign terrorist organizations, and the like, and how do we stop individuals from exploiting our trade, travel and immigration systems.

What we are seeing now is a change and a focus. We are starting to see a troubling rise in domestic terrorism-related events. And so what that requires is for the department to shift its focus and its priorities as well. So, that's sort of point number one.

Point number two would be the targeted violence that the acting secretary talked about. I think that's an important point. A lot of our stakeholders are still very concerned about your traditional terrorism-related events, but they are also growing extremely concerned about our soft target attacks: mass shootings, whether they're at stadiums, nightclubs, schools. And perhaps those attacks aren't tied to any one ideology but they're concerning nevertheless. And what are the tools and resources that our local communities need to protect themselves? So, that's point number two.
Point number three would be our prevention mission as a department. I don't think that's one that's well understood. I think most folks understand what the department does from an aviation security standpoint, from a targeting standpoint as folks come into the country, maritime cargo, air cargo come in, as sort of traditional bread-and-butter counterterrorism efforts. But what's called out in the strategic framework and what I think is different than in years past, and what the acting secretary has really elevated is in the prevention space.

And whether we talk about a-whole-society or a whole-of-community approach, as well as working with our social media, or a whole-of-community approach, as well working with our social media and Internet providers, that's really the sort of the difference maker.

So, those are three big buckets I believe the acting secretary touched on. I would underscore each of those, and that's really what stands out in my mind with strategic framework as versus others in the past.

MS. HENNESSEY: So, this is a really dense document, and I think we could have probably five different discussions for an hour about any one element of it. So, to sort of kick us off, I'd like each of the panelists to sort of share. And so to ask each of you to share sort of what is your big takeaway? What did you -- reading this, what was your sort of overriding reaction of what's important here?

And George, maybe I'll start with you, and we can move inward from there?

MR. SELIM: Thank you Susan, and thank you to all those at Brookings and Heritage for hosting this great event today, and for the department to facilitating this really collaborative engagement on such an important topic.

So, three quick points: the first is that I greatly appreciate both the document and the Secretary specifically pointing out the fact that over the past decade more American lives, murders and homicides in the United States, lives have been lost at the hands of
domestic terrorists, individuals in this country than have at the hands of foreign-inspired terrorist organizations. And that's such an important point that's both rooted in this document on page eight, and the secretary spoke to explicitly.

Second, the document points out, and as the secretary mentioned also, the annual Homeland Security Threat Assessment. I think this is something that many advocacy organizations, scholars, think tanks and American citizens find to be reassuring in the sense that the department is going to take stock for the nature of risk and threat across the country from a whole range of sources, not just from foreign terrorist organizations. And I think this is really an important element that has been one of the key missing nodes in our homeland security apparatus for some time.

And third is the dynamic that the strategy calls out for community resilience and community partnerships. I mean this is such an important statistic. As we know in 2017 calendar year we saw a 57 percent increase in anti-Semitic incidents across the United States. Calendar year 2018 was the third highest year of anti-Semitic incidents across the country, and that's coupled with the Department of Justice and FBI's own that shows a 17 percent increase in hate crime across the board, affecting all ethnic religious minority communities and protected classes in this country.

So the state of homeland security is one that many communities across this country, Jewish, Muslim, Latinx, LGBTQ, and others, do not feel safe in their own homes. So as we start to think about implementing this framework of homeland security it's critical to acknowledge the fear and anxiety that many communities feel when they pray at their house of worship, or that they gather in their community centers across the country. And I think the acknowledgement of that in this strategy is an important element to start repairing much of the damage that has been inflicted on those communities in recent years.

MR. CARAFANO: Yeah. I think we absolutely disagree. I take a totally different interpretation of what's going on. The first thing I wasn't to say is thank you for Brookings, for hosting the event with The Heritage Foundation.
And I do want to say, Chad, we did a report with CSIS which was the first ones to recommend that we have an undersecretary for policy. So, you’re welcome.

(Laughter)

I don't think it actually reflects an evolution of the threat, the threat is changing, threats always change, we can have a discussion on that, will be happy to do that. But what I do think it does is it reflects an evolution in the department and one which arguably is constructive.

And the reason for that is if you actually look at the functional elements of the department, and you look at the statutory mission of the department it was designed, and Homeland Security's main mission is to really deal with the transnational terrorist threat. And its instruments, its capabilities, its authorities, are really designed to do that and that's what it primarily does.

And the reason why the transnational numbers are so low is because they're actually doing a pretty good job. Even if you look at, domestically, where there are groups with transnational links the value of DHS really isn't that international role. So, the probably the most memorable is the Times Square bomber that even though he was -- acted domestically, he was caught because of DHS, because they flagged him as he tried to leave the country.

Now, that doesn't mean there is no role for the Department of Homeland Security in dealing with domestic terrorism and its related cousin, targeted violence. And I think the very strong analogy, the appropriate analogy is the way we address disaster response.

We have what's called in the United States all-hazard response, right. When there's a big disaster FEMA shows up. And we have this big debate about whether FEMA should be in the department or not, because not everything that FEMA responds to his homeland security. So why is it in the Homeland Security Department?

So some smart guy -- which is remarkable that somebody in the Congress
could be smart -- said, look, when there's a disaster we can't sit around and wait and say, okay, we've got to figure out if this is another 9/11, or if this is a gas main. You know, we've got to respond and save lives, because that's the mission of public safety, and we'll sort the rest out later.

So in all these defenses we have one national disaster response system. And I think that's the right analogy for DHS, although DHS is not really a domestic security agency, and dealing with domestic terrorism is not really a DHS job. They have capabilities and instruments that are useful in helping and supporting that because they're there, because they're there for the baseline mission of the department.

And similarly with targeted violence, we're not going to sit around when there's a mass shooting to say, okay, you know, was he a crazy nut job, or is he a left wing terrorist or a right wing terrorist, we're going to respond. And I think what the document reflects is the -- and appropriately, and what we should focus on is the efficient use of DHS resources in support of public safety missions, because the real executors here are the state and local government. What DHS is really doing is supplying support to the state and local governments which really, really have the (inaudible).

And I want to say one thing just real quickly, which is, you know, talk about the elephant room that we don't talk about, the problem with this issue, and dealing with what's the appropriate public safety response, because it's over-layered by a massive political debate.

And let's be honest, everybody wants to politicize this issue, whether it's gun control, or we hate white supremacists and let's connect them the Republicans, or we hate left-wing politicians so let's connect them with anti-power or whatever.

And that I think is if we try to analyze what the department is and should be doing through our political agendas which people all want to do, it does a great disservice to the instrument. And in turn if the instrument tries to be tuned, in tuning itself to account for what people politically want to do, we're not going to do good public safety.
And so I applaud one key finding which is, we're not running around battling ideologies here, right, which is not the department's mission. We're running around and we're operating in the public safety space which is responding to acts, preventing acts, and I think that very clear line where, which we deal with where there is the precursor of a crime. Where there's a clear logic intent to a crime that requires an intervention where you're providing resources and capabilities to jump in, and I think that's the sweet spot the department really needs to stay in.

MR. HUGHES: I'm going to be relatively short because I want to think the question-and-answer is going to lead to some interesting conversations.

First of all I want to commend DHS for a very broad and far-reaching comprehensive report strategy that covered a whole host of issues, and that's, you know, speaking to the mission that is DHS.

My big takeaway of looking at these 30 pages was: it's a radical shift. And in many ways you saw kind of the holdover from the Obama ministration in terms of efforts, but the inclusion of targeted violence is going to change the way the Department of Homeland Security operates. And I don't think we fully kind of get that.

In fact, the strategy calls for definitions for targeted violence, but you're going to have to get the FBI and NCPC, with their own authorities, to sign on to that idea, and look at that. That also means that the way you approach those issues can be radically different too. So, if you're talking about terrorism prevention or countering violent extremism, you know, we talk a lot about community resiliency but the way you approach countering violent extremism for targeted violence is radically different than the way you would approach it for, say, jihadist-inspired terrorism.

It's also radically different when you talk about domestic terrorism. You're not doing a round table with sovereign citizens telling them, you know, how wrong they are. Right? And so they're going to have to shift the way they approach this in many ways.

I do want to commend the department for the announcement of the annual
Homeland Security Threat Assessment. I think that’ll be helpful not only for academics but the public, to get a full sense of -- you know, when we talk about international, domestic, targeted violence, what do the numbers look like? You know, what does the threat look like? How does it change? And I think that responds to a lot of bills we’ve seen in Congress, both on the Republican and Democratic sides.

And then finally, I’d mention, you know, it’s on page 24, so I don’t want people to miss it, but there is a talk about recidivism in this. I mean look at domestic terrorism and international terrorism, you know, the prison sentences are getting increasingly shorter, and the programs in order to reintegrate these individuals back in is increasingly small too.

If terrorism is a form of crime, however important it is, you're going to see recidivism in any form of crime, and so they're going to have to wrap their head around that.

MS. HENNESSEY: So that’s all I think incredibly helpful framing. And sort of picking up on Seamus’ last comments, and sort of for the first question for. You know, this word “targeted violence” to sort of key in a little bit on the definitional stuff here. So this document uses the term “domestic terrorism”, uses this word “targeted violence” but the second one I think is a little bit less familiar to people.

I understand it's not a brand new term, but it is a little bit new in this context, and so, you know, let's drill down a little bit on what exactly are we talking about whenever you say targeted violence?

MR. WOLF: Sure. So, it’s not a new term, to your point. So DOJ has used it, Secret Service has used it for several years. So, what we’re talking about are acts of violence that are premeditated, so the venue or the place has been identified beforehand. I think the difference that we’re talking about in differentiating targeted violence versus domestic terrorism is not tied to any one ideology.

So it’s individuals. Again, only mainly lone actors but not always, are taking certain actions, some of which they leave manifestos, some they do not, that are targeting
institutions in a way to make it look like a terrorist act. But again, I think the key that we focus on, again, at the department is it’s not tied to any one ideology is the key there.

So when we look at domestic terrorism and we start looking at ethnic, racially-motivated, anti-authority, anti-government, environmentalism, abortion, you know, you can go down the list of a lot of ideologies that are tied to specific domestic terrorist events, and it could be the same on the international terrorism side.

So what differentiate from a departmental perspective on targeted violence is just that, and again a lot of the manifestos and information that's left behind point to that as well.

MS. HENNESSEY: So, George, you in your opening comments sort of touched on the surge, and then sort of a number of essentially domestic threats we've seen, and that it actually outstrip sort of the foreign inspired or foreign connected threats in terms of actual impact here in the United States. You know, listening to this definition of targeted violence as being sort of untethered from ideology. Does that reflect the actual threat that we're seeing? Is it sufficiently comprehensive? Is it over-inclusive? You know, how does it sort of match with the threat landscape as you understand it?

MR. SELIM: So I think that the way that it's laid out in this framework meets or comes to pace with where the numbers we've seen over the past 24, 36 months for the nature and scope of threats. Whether they be -- to Jim's point earlier, whether they be on the far left of the ideological spectrum, on the far right, you know, of no ideological inspiration at all that we can determine yet, like we saw in the Las Vegas country music concert shooting in the fall of 2017.

And so I think the framework appropriately scopes that in a number of different ways. My contention would be that we've seen and the security professionals and the analysts have seen this evolution over the past decade, and we probably should have been at this point a bit sooner.

Having said that, I'm pleased that the department is at this place now, I think
the context and scope is absolutely appropriate for where we are today. And it I sense from the secretary's remarks, and from how this document is laid out, there's enough flexibility to continue to adapt, whether there be ideological or other targeted violence evolutions happen over the next 24 to 36 months.

MR. CARAFANO: Can I just follow up that?

MS. HENNESSEY: Yes.

MR. CARAFANO: So, I completely agree with what you just said, and I completely disagree with Seamus.

MR. SELIM: It's your turn now.

MR. HUGHES: Yeah, yeah.

MR. CARAFANO: But this is not -- this is not going to transform the department in any other way because -- in any way because this is basically a public safety responsibility that DHS is executing, and in the space that it's operating it's -- you're not going to be able to tell much of a difference between whether this is the array of the things we just talked about, or the targeted violence thing.

So it doesn't really dramatically require them to do things dramatically different than they were doing before, that's why it's a strategic framework and not a strategy. It's just saying -- we are doing exactly what you said, we are organizing this mission for the long term to make a constructive contribution to national public safety, most of which, in this particular area, is actually going to be done by state and local governments. I mean to the point the Department of Homeland Security gives out fire grants, they've been doing that since day one.

SPEAKER: Yes.

MR. CARAFANO: It hasn't changed -- it hasn't turned fire departments into national security instruments, and it hasn't dragged the department into running state and local fire departments. So that actually the history of the department, and how they've addressed it to the dual mission of being a homeland security agency primarily responsible
for dealing with transnational terrorism, and providing a bunch of national public safety functions, many of them in support of state and local governments, they've done that, and they haven't drifted and transformed. So I just think history is against you. I think you're wrong.

MS. HENNESSEY: So I'll give Seamus an opportunity to stand up for himself, if he wants to defend this sort of proposition.

MR. CARAFANO: But do it sitting down.

MS. HENNESSEY: But this really is a radical speech.

MR. HUGHES: Yeah, I know. Jim completely, completely convinced me.

(Laughter) How novel and un-DC. No, I actually do think it changes -- yeah, DHS is going to continue to do what DHS does. You know, when we set it up when I was in Congress, you know, 20 years ago it made sense.

But it does change in the actual implementation on some things. You know, for example, the way you engage with tech companies on targeted violence is going to be different the way you deal with ideologically-motivated violence, in terms of that. It's going to radically change the way you deal or want to address countering violent extremism issues.

I mean will we see if, whether this is just a word and kind of an expansion a little bit, and whether this is just DHS moving on the normal course of DHS. But if they did put down a marker then you need to shift the way you approach it. And I think if you add the word targeted violence in there you're putting down a marker.

MR. SELIM: Susan, can I make one last point on this?

MS. HENNESSEY: Uh-huh

MR. SELIM: Sorry, one key point. General Allen made the point when asking the secretary the question, what are the gaps and seams that exist? When we look at this issue in totality, whether it's the investigative lead of the Department of Justice and the FBI, their ability to prosecute, the core function of prevention as it's built out within the Department Homeland Security, the FBI, the Department of Justice, and other state and
local law enforcement and Homeland Security entities across the United States, that is still a seam and a gap, to some extent, that continues to be filled.

This framework is an attempt to fill that gap in the prevention space because of the nature of the threat today. And so as we think about this issue understanding, as the secretary point out, there's an action plan that assigns roles and responsibilities, et cetera, that's a key component to making sure that gaps and seams on prevention, irrespective of its targeted violence, or ideologically motivated violence, is absolutely the next reasonable conclusion that Department should be taking. Sorry, Chad.

MR. WOLF: Yes. So, I would agree and disagree with all my panelists.

SPEAKER: That will work.

MR. WOLF: I would say, you know, part of the strategic framework is to provide that leadership, and I think that's what the acting is doing. I mean, we're here today talking about targeted violence, and what does that mean. We wouldn't have been up here two years ago talking about that. So I think there's a benefit to that.

Second point, we created, or the acting secretary created the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention at the Department, at the headquarters level, that helps from an umbrella standpoint, pulled together all the different pieces that the DHS and its components are doing, from CISA, to Service, to INA, and others, and making sure that we're all pushing forward, you know, with one united front,

So, I think there is -- there's actually a lot of benefit when we talk about targeted violence, and there is a difference in how the Department is approaching this, not only through the terminology, and the lexicon, but also through the prevention mission. So I think it's -- I think it's somewhere in between.

MS. HENNESSEY: And, Jim, I want to sort of push you on this idea, or sort of, or tease it out a little bit. So, in your comments you mentioned that DHS has been really, really successful and provided a lot of value in its mission sort of directed at transnational tourism organizations and events. I think it's safe to say the government operates in a world
of limited resources, and even if additional resourcing comes, we still have limited resources.

So, if the sustained focus on the sort of transnational elements has had real value and done real work, and the department is now also saying they're going to shift into this new space, and resources aren't going to magically increase, how do you square that? Are you saying that they can do it all at the time?

MR. CARAFANO: Yes, but this is the genius of the all-hazards approach, because the reality is that the spaces that DHS are moving into, are natural public safety support missions that they were already doing. So, I agree that the value of kind of -- and this is one of the -- as we struggled with the organizational structure of the department over the years and looked at reforms and everything else, the great challenge is, is how do you operationalize across these different entities and really bring effectiveness to all the things they can do.

And again, to go back to the case of the Times Square bomber as, you know, a tremendous example which couldn't have happened in the old days, right. So pre-DHS, you could have never gotten that information about who that person is in real time, and get it to the guy at the airport in LaGuardia to knap -- to get the guy, and then bring the FBI in. That just wouldn't have happened.

And so the great challenge has really been synchronization across platforms to mimic capabilities, and I think that's exactly the point Chad gets to. What makes that happen? Leadership, and focus, and guidance; so I do think it's a question of leadership, focus, guidance, organization, not really a question of resources, because I really -- I really do think the that's what the all-hazards rule says.

We can't have a separate fire department for terrorists, and earthquakes, and fire departments, and heart attacks, and kittens up a tree, so we have one instrument which is capable of adequately supporting the needs of the community. And I do want to get into cyber at some point, so don't forget. (Laughter)

MS. HENNESSEY: All right. We'll look back into it. And actually this is a
perfect segue, because the question I plan to ask Seamus now was another sort of element of this strategy is a note on the role of the internet in radicalization. And this is the thing you've written a lot about, you know, this is a document that specifically if -- briefly, mentioned places like 8chan and Gab. What is the role of DHS, you know, on these platforms, or more traditional social media platforms, sort of in addressing the threats that they're describing, as emanating from these places?

MR. HUGHES: Yes, absolutely. And so the strategy I think rightly has three points. The first is to engage with tech partners on this issue. The second is to support counter-messaging by nongovernmental organizations. And the third I think, and to DHS's credit, a call out to support the First Amendment, and protections on that.

Those are all very valid and approaches, and in fact we've had a history over the last five to ten years of engagement of tech companies on these issues. My concern is it's as these organizations are going to be kicked off of more mainstream sites, the industry standards are going to be different.

And so maybe 8chan doesn't want to take your phone call from the DNI or NCTC, right, and they have an incentive and a belief that, you know, the free speech wins over all. Right? As opposed to Google, or Twitter, or Facebook which got hammered by The Hill and then decided to pull back, and so this is going to be very different than it was in the next five years, especially as you go increasingly to more niche sites like Telegram and HM.

MS. HENNESSEY: Were you surprised to hear the Acting Secretary early in his comments with General Allen, I think I'm accurately characterizing, saying that he was commending Cloudflare on its decision, you know, to remove services? These are controversial issues or the notion of being able to de-platform these places and through private actions. Should we understand that to be sort of a government endorsement of that? Is that it is that an area in which we want to see the government taking action or --

MR. HUGHES: Yeah.
MS. HENNESSEY: Or am I over-reading his comment?

MR. HUGHES: No. I don't think so. I mean, listen, every administration wants to put the finger on the scale every once in a while and not want -- and then the lawyers tell you can't. When it comes -- when it comes to this it makes sense that they would call for that, and they're going to have to balance this, again this third point which is protect First Amendment with given the (inaudible) that Cloudflare put down the website.

But the Obama administration did the same thing. You know, Jim Clapper flew to Silicon Valley and told them they should take down most ISIS propaganda, and wouldn't you know, that actually happened. Right? And so every administration is going to do that. The question is whether it's a forcing function or you're just using the bully pulpit.

MS. HENNESSEY: So before we sort of move to the cyber question that Jim wants to answer, you know, Under Secretary Wolf, you know, this strategy argument talks a lot about law enforcement partnerships in a little bit of a vague way. The unnamed or not frequently named partner or party is the FBI.

MR. WOLF: Right.

MS. HENNESSEY: And so I'm curious, you know, if you can sort of elaborate what is the role of the partnership, and how does this strategic framework change what sort of the relationship between places like DHS and the FBI, and DHS state and local governments, and all that?

MR. WOLF: Sure. Well, first of all we have a very strong relationship with them, and I think the framework talks about a number of ways that we can improve that relationship and improve the information sharing. So whether we're talking about, you know, again our work with the social media companies, and in the larger platforms, DOJ and FBI are our partners, as well as others in the interagency are our partners in that discussion.

DHS, to get back to the last question, DHS interacts with a lot of the social media companies, you know, on a daily/weekly basis. And we do that a couple of different ways. We do that through the GIFCT which is sort of an industry group that I believe they're
going to be making some announcements next week at UNGA, to sort of formalize that group.

And we are certainly encouraging that and have been encouraging them to do that for some time. So we continue to talk with them about how to pull down content, terrorist-related content quicker, faster. How do we provide off-ramps when appropriate? How do we do a number of other things? Counter-messaging that the department is not really involved in, but the platforms are along with NGOs and other -- the private sector.

So we also, from a departmental standpoint, the department hosts a number of digital forums where we go into individual communities and we play sort of a collaboration between DHS, those tech companies that come into those communities, as well as local, private NGOs that maybe not have that reach to a Facebook, or to a Twitter, or to whoever, and we provide that link up.

And they provide some solutions and start talking, and that dialogue continues. So that goes back to what we talked about is a community-based approach or a whole-society approach. And so it's things like that where we can pull in the tech community, and pull in the private sector that I think is really going to provide value over the next two to three years as we look at in the prevention space.

MS. HENNESSEY: But it's to you, Jim, to make, you know, the observations you want to about cyber.

MR. CARAFANO: It's a bit of a Debbie Downer here. Look, don't get too enamored in all the -- in the rhetoric and the strategic framework about cyber, because the reality is, is DHS has virtually zero statutory authority over these -- over these private sector companies. They can't make them do anything, and they're not going to make them do anything, right.

What DHS is going to do is in some respects what they've always done. Chad just actually excellently described this, it's mostly an advisory role. They provide information, and suggestions, and best practices, and sometimes they use them effectively,
sometimes they don't. Sometimes they actually tell DHS good stuff, and we use it effectively.

So that's really business as usual, and the fact that they bring targeted violence into the discussion, that's all to the good. But honestly, that's business as usual.

Where DHS is going to make a difference is in the dark web where -- which is really the most dangerous activity because it's out of sight, and it's not just about radicalization, it's about where people can do things that are actually illegal and dangerous, and get ready to kill people.

And that's the space where DHS and FBI do have substantive authorities, and they can work effectively and that is very effective on the preventive front, so that's really good stuff.

And just the last point to make, is the center of gravity here is really the private sector actors, because we can all debate what the regulatory framework could be, or should be, or would be, or whatever, and we'll debate that ad nauseam, but right now the preponderance of authority of dealing with this really rests with the platforms themselves and what content they wish to host and not host.

And what do we want out of a really good tech company? Well, we'd really like three things. One is, the one thing we love about the Internet it is that it is a public square of free ideas, right. It is the most powerful tool for free expression, and to create, share, in live and enrich ideas, and we'd hate to see that go away just because some yahoo, you know, wants to get on there and say, you know, whatever.

The other thing is, it is one of the great engines of economic freedom. It has generated more wealth than anything, and we would hate to put strictures on that that actually prevent people from getting on there and coming up with really cool ideas on how to make money.

And the third thing is, you know, we would like a company that would actually not get our children killed; right? That they wouldn't get abducted by child rapists
and -- or whatever other bad things.

And okay so which of those are really important? And the answer is: we'd like all three. We'd like a company that is as free as possible, we'd love a company that just, we can make tons of money, and we'd like to be safe. And the answer is: striving to achieve all three has to be the goal of a good, responsible company.

And the reality is, at the end of the day despite whatever laws and everything else, they know more about their platforms than anybody else. They know their algorithms, they know their capabilities, they know how people exploit it, and I think the challenge for them is the challenge that I laid out before is, we have a -- we have a political debate where people would like political outcomes, and they'd be happy to hijack public safety to get their political outcome.

And then we've got the mission of actually keeping people safe, and keeping his daughter from being abducted, and keeping his grandmother from losing all our money to some guy in Nairobi. Right?

And they've got to -- they've got to navigate that and step up with that, and they've got to have good, honest discussions with our lawmakers and the framework, they have to have good discussions with Chad and his folks, because when they partner together in trust and confidence, and they actually do things that put all of us first, as opposed to focusing on political agendas, they actually accomplish some really good stuff.

MR. WOLF: Two quick points, I would say -- sorry George, I'll let you go.

MR. SELIM: Go ahead.

MR. WOLF: I completely agree on the dark web, and there's a lot of great work that DHS is doing, and I could go on there. I would say it's business as usual from an authority standpoint.

MR. CARAFANO: Right.

MR. WOLF: I agree with you. I would not say it's business as usual as far as the leadership standpoint.
MR. CARAFANO: Yeah, fair point.

MR. WOLF: There is a number of things that the department has done over the last two years from, you know, really working with the social media companies that you see that are happening today that has laid -- you know, we laid the groundwork, along with the interagency had laid the groundwork to get them to a certain place.

Do we think they can do more? Absolutely, but I think I wouldn't characterize it as business as usual of, you know, it's what we've been doing day in and day out. So, I do think there's been a lot of good work there. The authorities, yes, but I think the Department will be the first one to stand up and say we need to (crosstalk) --

MR. CARAFANO: Right. I mean, and just one -- some people responding and then said, oh, my, god, DHS is going to tell, you know, Twitter to take The Blaze offline, because terrorists like to read Twitter. And you're not going to do that, and you can't do that. That's my only point.

MR. SELIM: One addendum to the point that Jim and Chad made on the dark web. Christchurch New Zealand targeting Muslims, Poway targeting Jews, El Paso targeting Hispanic and Latinx immigrants, not the use of the dark web for planning operation or coordination, 8chan a publicly-available browser and webpage that we can all go to, it's actually not up today. But like there is, in fact, problems on the dark web -- but the open web too has a lot of stuff we should talk about.

MR. CARAFANO: Fair enough.

MS. HENNESSEY: So, Jim said that he was going to be a downer. George, I want to give you the opportunity to be a downer as well. And, you know, what we're describing here is an incredibly complex problem and, you know, everybody on this stage has noted sort of strengths and weaknesses. What's missing from this document? Whenever we actually think about, what the threat looks like and what changes are going to be needed to meet it? What do you not see in here?

MR. SELIM: What's missing is what the secretary and Chad have alluded to
in terms of the next steps. The next steps are the action plan for how are we going to take these priority actions that are carefully laid out throughout the document, and how are we going to execute those. And related, what's our M&E? What's our measurement and evaluation for knowing that we're doing a good job, and who in the department is accountable for driving that every single day, and holding all the pieces and parts of this large organization accountable?

And second, the associated funding. The Secretary alluded to the fact that there was an off-cycle request for additional resources, and so as we see the framework, and we can evaluate the merits of: is this the right layout, and organization, and construction? And then we get into the execution of it and associated resources.

Those two pieces are critical to knowing that if the document we're looking at today can be ultimately successful in the measurement as he alluded to in 12, 24, 36 months.

MS. HENNESSEY: So, Seamus, there's been formally a CVE program at DHS for a long time using sort of some of the language we've seen here, of sort of ideologically neutral, or ideologically inclusive language. One critique of that program from the Obama administration on; has been that that was the terminology being used. The reality was that those efforts were actually only being focused on one form of violent extremism, namely a sort of Islamic extremism.

Why shouldn't someone look at a document like this and say, this is more elaborate window-dressing, it's sort of more going down the terminology, but we're going to see the same thing we've seen in prior administrations who've tried to sort of put their arms around this problem. Do you think this is something different? Or how would you sort of respond to someone who would launch that type of critique?

MR. HUGHES: No. I think you can ask me again in six months. When you look at the -- if the action plan comes out and gives the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention the lead in a number of areas. If the allocation of resources in The Hill
asked for plus up on countering violent extremism grants which, you know, are set to being zeroed out, if all of those things, right; that'll be the determining factor.

You know, we've seen both in the Obama ministration and the Trump administration, a shrinking of personnel and resources towards this. And so if they're going to be serious about terrorism prevention they're going to have to plus up.

MS. HENNESSEY: So, before we -- I'll continue asking questions, but just sort of a last call for anyone who has note card questions to write those down and share it to the end, and we'll take time at the end to talk about it.

MR. CARAFANO: Can I just -- while we're writing card here, I just have a CVE comment. I thought the problem that CVE programs is they're wildly ineffective, and it wasn't that they were targeted on one group, is that oftentimes the department was partnering with people which were actually fomenting extremism. So they were really crappy often about picking their partners, and I think there's a real question in the efficacy of the whole idea and I thought was a horrible place for the department to work.

I think the department should get out of the ideology business, they're not well-suited to that, they're a law enforcement agency, and I thought was actually what the strategic framework describes about where the FBI and DHS partner great is they are law enforcement agencies and those activities. And when they partner on the prevention and the response, and the precursor activities themselves, that's a sweet space where they work very effectively, but broadly having DHS kind of combat bad ideas, is just a bad idea.

MR. SELIM: So is the person who ran that office and oversaw that grand program, I totally disagree. (Laughter) But Jim and I can have coffee afterwards, and I can - - I can make my case to him.

MR. CARAFANO: Okay.

MS. HENNESSEY: So, we've mentioned resourcing, and the importance of resourcing to take this from a strategic vision to an actual reality. What do those resources look like? You know, does DHS have what it needs? Is it able to get what it needs? You
know, or is this all just sort of a nice idea and some leadership values, but a long way off from actually getting what you need to act?

MR. WOLF: Sure. And the acting secretary, you know, sort of touched on it briefly. I don't think DHS is where it needs to be from a resource standpoint to really address the threat and everything that we've talked about today. I would say a couple of things, one he's directed a number of actions to occur today. So without increasing, you know, resources or funding all the folks from DHS that are in the audience, Secret Service, CISA, CRCL and others, are surging resources today. So, we're just doing that sort of out of edified.

That's not sustainable in the long term, so as he mentioned, he requested an out-of-cycle budget request for FY '20, I can tell you that the department is leaning in on the FY '21 request. We're currently working with OMB and others on that. So hopefully that will -- that will turn out, but yes that you will see more resources dedicated at least from a DHS perspective, on the prevention side, as well as some of the other topics that we touched on.

MS. HENNESSEY: For you or for anyone on the panel. Is it just a money problem, or is there also a need for new legislation, for new authorities' resources?

MR. WOLF: I'm going to pass on that one, to these guys.

MR. SELIM: I would argue, Jim may disagree, that a little -- the nature of what we're talking about here is in some ways, is a paradigm shift. It's not kind of the post-9/11 world as we know it. The world has changed. I mean, and the strategy alludes to this, the communications infrastructure, the speed, and nature, and scope of radicalization and mobilization is different today.

And when you see 4chan, 8chan, Gab, when you see vitriolic, bigoted rhetoric packaged neatly next to bomb-making instructions on the open web, this isn't -- this is a threat environment that didn't exist a decade ago, per se. And it's changed, and it's a lot faster, and coupled with the nature of a hyperpolarized environment politically, it's a very
combustible mix.

And so the position that we're in today with the speed and rate of information packaged with this concept that many White supremacists refer to as accelerationism, like I need to do something today, I need to go into the synagogue, I need to walk into this Walmart and execute the threat against a White majority in this country, that's a very lethal combination that we see playing out.

And so positioning, whether it's the federal government, or state and local, and community officials to address that is, I think, one of the paramount challenges that we will face for the years to come.

MR. CARAFANO: So I'll mention an area, and I think -- I think the secretary mentioned it, and Chad, you might have mentioned too, which is that the adversarial use of drones domestically as a threat. We just had this situation with the attack on Saudi Arabia, a combination of 17 cruise missiles and drones, and a significant elevation and kind of -- of what you can do with drones and payloads.

And that technology is proliferating rapidly, it's available domestically and we're not there yet in terms of what -- because largely this is a state and local problem, because we're not going to see drones with, you know, thousand-mile, you know, ranges were you going to launch a drone from, you know, Utah and we're going to hit the capital with it.

We're going to see things that happen, probably within the scope of a 50, 100, a couple of miles, and so it's largely going to be in the area of state and local governments, but a lot of that airspace is actually owned by FAA, and there are some regulatory issues there.

We do have to kind of have a management system there, and at some point we have to empower state and local governments on how they can protect large venues and communities and everything else, and the private sector is going to be bringing on defensive technologies, and you don't want a defensive technology that that jams and brings down the
drone, and also jams the entire emergency response network for the fire department; right.

So there's a lot of stuff to be unpacked and I am a little worried that we're -- I know we're working on it, I'm just a little worried that the other guys are going to work on it faster.

MS. HENNESSEY: So, there's a little bit of that elephant in the room anytime you're talking about a preventive law enforcement mission with a domestic focus that has an ideological element to it. Right? Even though it encompasses many ideologies, and that elephant in the room is the First Amendment. One of the reasons why it's been difficult for the FBI and other law enforcement to be fully effective in this space is because there's not material support laws that sort of provide criminal predicate at an earlier stage.

Should we be concerned about overreach here, as we start to hear agencies like DHS that are -- that are focused on prevention, that are getting involved earlier in the cycle, focusing on these issues, focusing on what people are saying? You know, does that give anybody here sort of heartburn? Or is that where the threat is, and so that's where we need to see DHS go?

MR. CARAFANO: Well, you know, do remember most of this is really going to fall on the shoulders of the private sector and state and local governments, and there are the ones they're going to have to deal with the legal issues, the liability, there are issues of freedom of speech as you've seen.

In some sense it's like not the DHS's problem, right. But you're right as people have to be very thoughtful, not just how they work in this space, but how they communicate what they do in this space, because there are people on both sides that are terribly sensitive. There are conservatives, for example, who would say, any time you mention this thing what you're trying to do is to try, you know, link me to some skinhead White supremacist, and that scares me.

And on the other side there are people that think, for example, every time you don't emphasize this means you don't really care about my synagogue and everybody in
there is going to die, right? And so it is both a public -- public affairs, public speaking challenge for state, and local, and private sector, and a very significant management challenge as well.

MS. HENNESSEY: So the undersecretary, and then George.

MR. WOLF: Yes. Obviously this is a difficult issue for the department, and it's why we are very specific when we talk about the issue, and in identifying folks that are radicalizing to violence. So radicalization on the Internet, and doing what you want to, that's not what we're focused on. It's the violence part that we are extremely focused on.

It's also what you'll see in the strategic framework time and time again is a community-based or a whole-of-society approach, so a lot of what we do is providing resources, training, people and intelligence at times to those local communities. Those are the individuals; those are the groups that are going to see folks that perhaps are prone to radicalization to violence first.

It's not going to be DHS officials out in the field, there's never going to be enough of that. So, a lot of what we do from a departmental perspective is different from what DOJ does. They prosecute, they investigate, they do that. We are more, again, on the preventative side, we have some protection activities as well, but more on the preventative side, and working with the local folks to do that.

MR. SELIM: Making a homeland security policy that's data informed and data-driven is critical. Two pieces of legislation to call out, Susan, to answer your question, the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act I think helps us get closer to making policy that's data informed and data-driven, as well as the Data Act, another element to get a more widespread accounting of hate crimes and bias-motivated crimes. Currently there are dozens of cities across the country with populations of 100,000 people or more that affirmatively have report zero hate crimes are bias-motivated crimes in their communities.

So as we think about really assessing this in coupling with an annual threat assessment coming out of DHS, those two pieces of legislations help get us to better inform
data-driven policy.

MR. HUGHES: I would -- the short answer your question is yes. Listen, I know what international terrorism is, I know what domestic terrorism is, I know what targeted violence is because I read your 1995 report; right. But it's not a lexicon in DHS, right. It's an understanding maybe in HHS and things like that.

So, if you introduce a new term of art in there you're going to have overreach in some nature as people try to figure out what the right and left latitudes are of that. So, yes, it should be a concern.

MR. CARAFANO: Can I? You know, it's not strictly a quantitative problem. And you go back to your original, you know, well more people die from domestic terrorism than foreign terrorism, right, which is interesting but, you know, belies the point that what the foreign terrorists are trying to do is far more expansive and have -- and scope, maybe more capabilities. And the reason why the foreign terrorist maybe has gone down is actually because the department is actually doing a really good job.

And that's perhaps why domestic terrorism seems like more so (inaudible). And so I don't see it as -- I don't disagree with you, I completely agree with you, we ought to have data, and it ought to be data that inform, but the department is in the business of risk. Risk is threat, vulnerability and criticality, and that even, that's not a strictly quantitative measure.

And so they have to think about what's the best to protect the nation as a whole. I want to applaud the department, and Seamus is exactly right. Good for you for doing the National Threat Assessment, right, because they try doing a national risk assessment which was the stupidest activity any human being could think of, because you cannot measure national risk, right, because you what you can't define vulnerability in a way that that really, really makes sense.

I mean so you can't -- you can write a report and say, this is the national risk assessment, but it's a lie because you really can't pull all that stuff together in a way that's
But you can define threats in a way that makes sense, and touch on the quantitative issues which ought to be data-driven, but also looking at the intent of the adversaries, what their goals are, and that's a much more reasonable and achievable project. And I applaud the Department for doing that.

SPEAKER: I agree.

MS. HENNESSEY: So, we'll turn to questions, and if anybody has them and wants to pass them to the end, please do so now. So this question is, "In the Internet age if you censor one platform another will pop up. Government sanctioned or forced censorship seems like un-American and ineffective action. Is this view addressed in the strategy plan?"

MR. WOLF: We certainly touch on, obviously, the role that social media platforms and the tech community writ large, has been mention on stage here, it not DHS's, you know, role alone to police the internet. That's not what we do. DOJ, FBI and others certainly have a role when they talk about investigating any type of companies to include the tech companies.

So, that's not really what the department is doing. We're certainly much more in a partnership with these tech companies to talk about how they're, again, able to pull down content. We are not looking to censor or regulate at this time. But how do they pull down the content? How do they provide the (inaudible)? Are they doing enough?

And I think what we have seen over particularly the past two years, if you go back two years I think there was -- I think that the consensus in government was that not nearly enough is being done in this space. We're not seeing a collaborative approach, and we want to see more. And I think over the past couple of years we've seen that, we want to continue to work with them. We think more can be done, and as I indicated earlier I think, you know, the announcement next week I think is a step in the right direction, and we hope to see more along those lines.
MR. HUGHES: What else to say? I mean, despite my boyish good looks, I'm not a huge believer in the idea of internet radicalization, right. Of course these guys are online because the average age is 28. And so they're online, but they're online next to their best friend, and in the same room watching (inaudible) videos.

And so if you look at the -- if you pull down the cases, it's really also an in-person network. I mean there's a reason why 5,000 folks left from Europe and only 250 left from the U.S. to go join the Islamic State. It's because there was an in-person network that worked it out.

And so I think we sometimes focus on the online environment because it's the most overt manifestation of a threat, and it's frankly if I'm a congressional staffer it's the easiest thing to do. You know, tech companies, you take care of this problem. As opposed to, DHS here's new grants money, measures of effectiveness, and this is how you're going to do counter violent extremism programs.

That is all hard, and political, and things like that, where it's an easy win to go to the tech companies and say just, you know, take down the Internet.

MR. CARAFANO: Seamus' point is really important, and it shouldn't be missed.

MR. HUGHES: All right.

MR. CARAFANO: No, no, really. Do you know what? You know, I'll give you another good example, is India, right, where there's massive, you know, and very, very little radicalization. And because, you know, people look at the mass of the content and then they say oh that's the problem, but what we've -- what we've seen over, and over, and over again where a social network has -- its influence is where it's connected to a human network underneath that.

If there's no human network underneath that, you know, occasionally you get a Christchurch or a Somalia, but you're not going to see that organized campaign of violence, and that's the real danger, and so I think sometimes we make a big mistake if we
focus on this, and we ignore that, because if there's no human network most of that social stuff is not really going to accomplish anything.

I just want to make one quick point to say what Chad said in just, you know, very blunt terms. They can't censor anybody. They don't have the regulatory to do that, right. And I think one of the things we have to be really sensitive from is there are groups on the right and the left who are concerned that this is going to evolve into censoring political free speech, and marginalizing their ability to express themselves.

And I think that's why I think it's incredibly important that we be very precise and clear that this -- that whatever you're doing is not a threat to that, because they're going to believe that and even when you tell them clearly that it's not they're still going to believe that and you -- so we just have to be very, very careful about what we say we're actually doing here.

And you cannot go to people and say, your concerns aren't legitimate, because there are conservatives that being kicked off networks, and they do feel like they're being censored. And just telling them, no, you're just a yahoo, that doesn't really -- that doesn't really make them feel any better.

MR. SELIM: I agree.

MS. HENNESSEY: So, the next question is, "Can you elaborate on the frameworks approach to emerging technology issues, particularly unmanned aerial systems?"

MR. WOLF: Sure. The strategic framework does touch on UAS and how we counter UAS. We have a program office in the policy offices that help coordinating the authorities that the Congress so aptly gave the department, I believe last year, to counter the UAS threat. It is a threat, we see it in a variety of different environments, both from the border, but also elsewhere, Secret Service and others have been involved in the threat, and how to counter the threat for some time.

So we see it manifesting, and we certainly see it as an emerging risk both in
emerging technology, and how do we address that. So DHS has some very limited authority, so I think part of what we talk about when we talk about UAS is trying to level set where the department is, and what we can and can't do. Aside from the service who has discrete authorities, you know, the department has some very, I would say, limited authorities that we are undertaking as it relates to DHS covered facilities and assets, but as well as some of sort of the mass gatherings that we look at.

So the strategic framework certainly touches on that, and that's a big component as we look ahead down the line of where do we need to put our resources, and we talked about budgeting and resourcing, and as we look ahead to FY '20s kind of past us from a budgeting standpoint, but as we look ahead to '20 -- '21, '22 and beyond, how we bolster the Department's CUAS capabilities is part of that conversation.

MS. HENNESSEY: Do you have other thoughts on that part of the framework? So sort of, you know, we're getting close to the end of time here and, you know, this is not in -- it's a new focus, but it's not an entirely new thing for a big Federal agency to shift its focus, and to add something else into its mission, and to unveil big strategic frameworks, and we've done it in the past.

What are the lessons learned, particularly as we look sort of on DHS's track record over the -- you know, with respect to the transnational terrorism threat. You know, what are the things that, as you shift your focus to this domestic set of issues, you know, mistakes, lessons learned, what are you taking from that, or should be?

MR. SELIM: I'll start. Having run one of the offices that was doing this work early on at DHS. And to Jim's point, even though I disagree with his premise that this was a bad idea and it was -- it was flawed from the get-go. That tells me that the federal government or the Department Homeland Security can do a better job of explaining what it does, why it does it, and how it came to those conclusions.

There's room for the federal government writ large, DHS specifically, to improve the way that it provides transparency to the American public. That it engages with
its citizens, that we kind of roll out different programs and initiatives. There's always room to do that better, some of those lessons I learned the hard way, as Jim rightfully points, out and I think the department is taking some steps in this framework to make its framework, to make the appropriate priority areas more public, more engaging.

And my hope is that conversations like this happen in cities and states across the country with a diverse set of local leaders who can engage in thoughtful conversations about how to apply and how to engage with the department.

MR. WOLF: You know, I think you have to stay in your core competencies and stay focused on the mission, because the reality is that as somebody really as happy and says, oh, my, god, this is so awesome, they're dealing with targeted violence. Tomorrow some city will sink beneath a hurricane, and the department will be excoriated because they were focused on targeted violence, and they ignored the hurricane. Right?

Or we're going to be focused on targeting violence, and tomorrow they'll be a 9/11, and the first article that's going to be written is, well, that's because Department Homeland Security was asleep at the switch, they were focused on some -- worried about some skinhead, and they were ignoring al-Qaeda and that's why we all died. Right?

You cannot win that fight, they cannot win that fight. All they can do is, do their job within their core competencies, and focus on the mission, but your point is exactly right. And there was a point I was trying to make too, is we'd be an idiot to recognize that there's -- this isn't surrounded by politics, and the department has an extra obligation to speak with clarity and consistency often, even when people aren't listening, trying to explain, we are doing a risk-informed public safety mission to the best of our ability with the people that we have.

Even as people yell at them that you're -- you know, you're just a bunch of, you know, you're running concentration camps or whatever. That's all they can really, really do. And I do kind of applaud them for, you know, trying to, on this effort at least initially, trying to kind of explain that and lay that out. So, good for them, but it's a tough job.
MR. HUGHES: I would say I think this framework marries up well with the White House's National Counterterrorism Strategy. And I think I understand also, given where the NSC process is, that DHS in some ways got out in front of an implementation plan for the National CT Strategy. And I think in many ways lay down a marker.

And so in order for this policy to be effective there's going to have to be an interagency process for this, because the fact that DHS does CT work that in many ways marries up with FBI and DOJ, they're going to need them to sign off. And the only way you sign off is a national kind of White House implementation plan.

And so I applaud DHS for getting out in front and saying this is what we're going to do, but the rest of the interagency is going to have to fall in line.

MR. WOLF: So, I would say we're engaged in those conversations with the interagency. So, I would agree with that. I would also agree with James's point that the department has a PhD in criticism, so I appreciate that. (Laughter) We deal with that every day. Back to your question though, you know, what's changed or what are the markers, I think the proof is in the pudding. So, as I think maybe Seamus mentioned, in six months from now what does this look like, and what has the department done, and how has it positioned itself.

But I do want to caution, when we talk about resources, and we talk about, you know, what more can the department do, that's not going to show up overnight, that's not going to even show up perhaps in six months from now. So, we're a budget cycle off, and a fiscal year off, so that's going to have to catch up unless something dramatic happens.

I will say one of the lessons learned is, you know, early on we pulled in, particularly because of the nature of the topic we're talking about when we talked about First Amendment, when we talked about domestic terrorism, pulling in the, you know, our experts at the department on privacy and CRCL, I think was critical in understanding the concerns that they hear from their communities, respective communities, and building that into the framework.
And that was something that the acting secretary made a priority. So we did that early on, I don't know the department's always been best at that but that is reflected in this document as well.

MS. HENNESSEY: Please join me in thanking our panelists.

(Applause)
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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

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