

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Leaving No Fragile State and No One Behind in a Prosperous World: A New Approach

Landry Signé

Hundreds of millions of people are left behind in fragile states despite the efforts of the international community to make progress on development and alleviate conflict. People in fragile states are victim to persistent poverty,¹ enduring violence, poor public facilities, deteriorating infrastructure,² limited civil and political liberties,³ deteriorating social conditions,⁴ minimal to nonexistent economic growth,⁵ and, often, humanitarian crises.⁶ Research and policies on state fragility build on concepts of limited state capacity, legitimacy, insecurity, stability and socioeconomic, demographic, human development, environmental, humanitarian, and gender contexts to determine states' apparent effectiveness or ineffectiveness in fulfilling the role of the state. Within this context, fragility has become a catch-all concept encompassing fragile states, weak states, failed states, collapsing or decaying states, conflict-affected countries, post-conflict countries, brittle states, and states with limited legitimacy, authority, capacity, governance, security, and socioeconomic and human development.

1. Collier (2007).

2. Rotberg (2011).

3. Bah (2012).

4. Van de Walle (2004).

5. Brainard and Chollet (2007).

6. Nwozor (2018).

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When used without conceptual clarification and contextual consideration, as is often the case, the concept of fragility lacks usefulness for policymakers, as the various types, drivers, scopes, levels, and contexts of fragility require different responses. Neglecting to consider the complexity and multidimensionality of fragility and failing to tailor solutions to individual contexts undermines the effectiveness of the global fight to leave no fragile state behind in a prosperous world and to leave no one behind in fragile countries. For simplicity, “fragility” in this chapter will broadly refer to states’ capacity to “manage conflict, make and implement public policy, and deliver essential services.”⁷ Building on this definition, this chapter brings nuance to the concept of fragility and systematizes policy solutions based on political conflicts and policy ambiguities through the introduction of a framework for a new approach to fragility.

Too many fragile states remain left behind in this prosperous world,⁸ constituting a serious risk to global stability and prosperity. Fragility as a concept has been addressed in practice through the diplomatic, political, economic, development, humanitarian, and security fields; each of these fields often implementing distinct solutions to achieve specific goals over the past two decades. Despite the implementation of numerous solutions, and some notable success stories, the international community has not succeeded in eliminating fragility, and many countries have remained “trapped” in fragility for decades. While the misalignment of resources, including aid, investment, and technical assistance, has contributed to the persistence of fragility, many attempts to address fragility have failed even when given sufficient resources. To face the complexity, a new approach that focuses on the political economy of policy implementation and service delivery is needed to more effectively implement policies designed to target the root causes of fragility and leave no one and no country behind. Such an approach should also align resources to the needs and capacities of countries and consider the individual contexts of countries, including their level of policy ambiguity, conflict, decentralization, and private sector support.

The application of sufficient, targeted resources—including aid, foreign direct investment, and tax revenue—is critical to fight fragility. In fact, some fragile countries are also among the lowest recipients of aid per capita: among the bottom twenty recipients of aid per capita, nine are classified as having moderate or serious fragility, and one is classified as having high or extreme fragility.⁹ As stated by Landry Signé (2018), studying how institutions shape development

7. Marshall, Monty G., and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall (2016). State Fragility Index and Matrix 2016. Center for Systemic Peace. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFI/matrix2016c.pdf>.

8. World Bank (2019a, 2019b); OECD (2018).

9. The countries with moderate or serious fragility among the bottom twenty recipients of aid per capita are Egypt, Indonesia, the Philippines, Iran, India, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Equatorial Guinea. Angola is the only country with high or extreme fragility in the bottom twenty.

strategies, economic growth, regional integration, and structural transformation in Africa,¹⁰ this chapter also illustrates that:

key arguments against aid from Dambisa Moyo's *Dead Aid* (2009) or William Easterly's *White Man's Burden* (2006) are partially wrong, while Paul Collier's *Bottom Billion* (2007), Jeffrey Sachs's *End of Poverty* (2005), Nicolas van de Walle's *Overcoming Stagnation in Aid Dependent Countries* (2005), and Steven Radelet's *Primer on Foreign Aid* (2006) critical but favorable perspectives about aid are mostly right. Of course, indigenous and entrepreneurial solutions with "searchers" (Easterly 2006), private investment, trade, and entrepreneurship (Moyo 2009) are of critical importance and should not be substituted by foreign interventions. However, despite many failures and "horror stories about aid bureaucracy" (Collier 2007), if aid is appropriately structured with better policies and accountability (Radelet 2006; van de Walle 2005), the world's poor [and fragile states] require more aid, not less (Sachs 2005). Rightly done, "aid makes private investment more attractive and so helps to keep capital in the countries." Aid is therefore "part of the solutions rather than part of the problem. The challenge is to complement it with other actions" (Collier 2007). A well-targeted, tailored, and structured aid program is good for both the poorest and for business, especially when integrated in a broader pro-growth, pro-business, pro-poor agenda with accountable and effective governance with responsible and competent political leadership.

This is particularly relevant for fragile states, understood to be natural recipients of aid.

This chapter systematically studies fragility, and the critical importance of assisting people left behind in fragile countries, while providing solutions to leave no state behind in a prosperous world. The originality of this new, synthesized approach to studying state fragility lies in streamlining the solutions at the development-security-humanitarian nexus with a novel implementation framework. This chapter builds on the existing literature on state fragility, which arose in the 1990s and defined the role of the state for its citizens and the general characteristics of state failure. It then uses both case studies and descriptive statistics to explain why some countries have remained trapped in fragility while others have exited it, and moves on to propose strategies that can be used to eradicate both fragility and poverty in those countries.

Using data from the previous twenty years, this chapter undertakes a quantitative analysis of fragile indicators' prevalence in State Fragility Index-classified

10. Signé (2018).

states. The chapter expands the State Fragility Index (SFI) classifications and advances the discussion on fragile states and populations being left behind by using qualitative data—including historical research, content analysis of political structuring, and examples of institutional success—and quantitative data—including data indicating economic development (tax revenue, foreign aid, foreign direct investment [FDI], and poverty headcount), human development (education and youth, life expectancy, gender gap, refugees, and internally displaced people), and the prevalence of conflict.

The chapter concludes with new solutions to state fragility that harmonize the roles of the domestic and international private and public sectors for the initial benefit of the population and then the overall benefit of the state. The chapter also provides a new implementation framework to bridge the gap between the policy intentions and the implementation outcomes aiming at fixing fragility and people left behind in fragility, and provides options to operationalize policies that take into consideration the levels of policy ambiguity and political conflict within countries. This overview and analysis of the numerous indicators of fragility brings nuance to the discussion on why defining fragility has been thus far inconclusive and inadequate in inspiring solutions to fragility in all contexts.

Fragile States Left Behind in a Prosperous World

Fragile states are consistently left behind despite myriad policies attempting to address fragility. According to the OECD (2018), 1.8 billion people, or 24 percent of the global population, continue to live in fragile contexts in 2018. By 2030, people living in fragile contexts will total 2.3 billion and by 2050, 3.3 billion people. These numbers indicate the pressing challenge to address fragility in the short and long term.

Implementing effective solutions to fragility is one of the most difficult tasks for policymakers due to the cyclical nature of the causes and drivers of fragile states (table 11-1), evidenced by the consistency of fragile state rankings (figure 11-1). The political economy of policy implementation and service delivery^{11, 12} and access to resources have consistently hindered the international community's efforts to improve the economic performance and resilience process in fragile states in general, and in Africa in particular.¹³ According to the World Bank, in 2017, excluding Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria, just 3.2 percent of all FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa reached fragile states, showing that outside of a few major

11. This includes the level of political conflict and complexity in a given state, and the clarity or ambiguity of the relevant policy options.


12. Signé (2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d).

13. Signé (2017a, 2018).

Table 11-1. Drivers of Fragility

Political	Social	Conflict	Economic	External	Geography and climate
Weak institutions (Jackson 1982; Kaplan 2008; Rotberg 2002, 2003)	Limited rights	Civil war (Rotberg 2003; Lindemann 2008; Ross 2004)	Limited growth (Marshall 2008)	Intra-state conflict (Ayoub 1996)	"Bad neighbours syndrome" and urbanization (McLoughlin 2012)
Low participation (Ghani 2009); Mass electoral politics (Mansfield 2008)	Ethnic tensions (Brown 2012; Rotberg 2003)	Enduring light conflict (Rotberg 2011)	Low income and economic decline (McLoughlin 2012; Marshall 2008)	Transnational instability (Ayoub 1996)	Environmental risks (Vallings and Moreno Torres 2005)
Patronage systems (Brown 2012)	Gender oppression	Escalating ethnic conflicts (Goldstone 2008)	Global economic shocks (McLoughlin 2012)	Regional guerillas (Goldstone 2008)	Landlocked infrastructure (Collier 2007)
Leadership mistakes (Rotberg 2003)	Lack of social contract between incumbent elite groups and constituent ethnic communities (Douma 2006)	Revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, genocide and politicide (Esty and others 1998)	Weak infrastructures (Rotberg 2002)	Highly politicized international political economy policies (McLoughlin 2012)	Natural resources (Collier 2007; McLoughlin 2012; Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005; Rotberg 2003; Ross 2004)
Structural flaws (Rotberg 2003)	Group grievances (Christensen 2017)		Increased income inequalities (Sachs 2003)		
"Political capacity": organizational age and legitimacy (Jackmann 1993)	Severe identity fragmentation (McLoughlin 2012)		Lack of competence in economic governance (Brainard and Chollet 2007)		
Repressed political competition (Goldstone 2008)	Horizontal inequalities and poverty (McLoughlin 2012; Hinds 2015)				
Limited resources offered to politicians (Bates 2008)					

Figure 11-1. Persistence of Fragility



Source: State Fragility Index and World Bank Group.

countries, little FDI reaches fragile African countries. The inconsistent and incomplete application of aid and FDI to fragile states traps states within perpetual cycles of fragility.

Fragile contexts are characterized as “off track” and, thus, very unlikely to independently improve government effectiveness, build the private sector, reduce conflict and violence, respond adequately and quickly to natural hazards, and minimize environmental risks. Low education levels and health challenges characterize fragile states and reinforce future fragility. State failure relates to state fragility in that it is considered a “continuum of experiences” afflicting states with weak institutions and the characterization of “a cycle of failed government, persistent poverty, and civil war.”¹⁴

14. Chandra and Ramesh (2005); Collier (2007).

People Left Behind in Fragile States

Within fragile states, it is vital to ensure that the needs of the population are met and that no one is left behind. The premise of “leaving no one behind” lies in addressing the interrelated concerns of poverty, inequality, humanitarian crises, and rights abuses. Globally, people are left behind as a result of social marginalization, economic disparity, political ineffectiveness, environmental challenges, and structural challenges. As of 2015, the percentage of people living at or below the international poverty line of US\$1.90 per day was 35.9 percent in thirty-five fragile and conflict-affected situations.¹⁵ This represents a decrease of over 20 percent since 1990, but an increase from 138 million people to 166 million during the same period.¹⁶ Figure 11-2 shows the frequency and trend of extreme poverty among SFI-designated fragile, trapped, and not fragile states.¹⁷

Estimates that half of the world’s poor will live in fragile countries by 2030 often do not factor in the compounding effect of violence on creating instability and poverty. People caught in crises are at higher risk of being left behind, and reactionary policies to violence in fragile states without contextualizing policy solutions prevent long-term improvement. Figure 11-3 demonstrates the relationship of political violence and state fragility; however, further interdisciplinary research is needed to understand the causal linkages between fragility and economic or social motivations for unrest.

Large-scale conflict and low-level violence also have contributed to the recent dramatic increase in refugees and displaced persons throughout the world. Displaced persons totaled an estimated 68.5 million globally in 2017, with the refugee population totaling 16.2 million of all displaced persons.¹⁸ Half of all refugees are children, and refugees generally remain refugees or exiled persons for ten years on average.¹⁹ Refugee-hosting countries also face the threat of fragility; twelve of the top fifteen refugee-hosting countries are considered fragile, and thirteen are classified as low- or middle-income.²⁰

Fragile states also share the challenge of widespread gender inequality. Across

15. World Bank (2018b).

16. Ibid.

17. The SFI scores countries from 0 (no fragility) to 25 (extreme fragility) are based on the country’s effectiveness and legitimacy in the areas of security, politics, economics, and social or human capital. Countries with a score of 16 or higher are classified as having high or extreme fragility, while countries with a score between 8 and 15 have moderate or serious fragility. In 2018, twenty-three countries were classified as highly or extremely fragile: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Burundi, Somalia, Ethiopia, Chad, Iraq, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Angola, Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Pakistan, and Rwanda.


18. Samman and others (2018).

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

Figure 11-2. Poverty Headcount and Fragility


Average Poverty Headcount
Ratio at \$1.90 a Day (2011 PPP)



Data sourced from State Fragility Index and World Bank Group

Figure 11-3. Conflict and Fragility

Average Magnitude of Societal
and Interstate Major Episodes
of Political Violence



Data sourced from State Fragility Index and Center for Systemic Peace

all low- and middle-income countries, 50 percent of women who marry before the age of eighteen, thus reducing their access to education and other opportunities, are in fragile and conflict-affected states.²¹ By 2030, this number is projected to reach 70 percent, or approximately 3.2 million young women.²²

Primary school enrollment is also lower in fragile states, indicating the reinforcing effects of fragility on long-term sustainable development. Figure 11-4 shows that while the most fragile states have made some progress to improve the educational future of youth, they still have the lowest levels of primary school enrollment when compared to less fragile states.

While progress has been made in primary education, there remains a gender gap in education access within fragile countries, particularly at the secondary and higher levels (figure 11-5). This is indicative of a wider issue of gender equality in fragile states, where women are less likely to have educational, economic, and other opportunities and more likely to marry early and be subjected to gender discrimination.

Two of the final important measurements of human development in fragile states compared to the rest of the world are the health and life expectancy of individuals. Life expectancy measures indicate a state's capacity to ensure the physical well-being of its citizens through agricultural and food programs; affordable, accessible, and high-quality healthcare; and security from violence. Figure 11-6 shows the average life expectancy of people living in fragile states at different levels of severity. While average life expectancy has increased in all categories of states over the past decades, those living in extremely fragile states continue to have much lower average life expectancies than those in less fragile or stable states.

Two Decades of Focus on Fragility


The focus on state fragility has not been isolated within the highest echelons of international development or security communities. States and international organizations have all contributed their shaping ideas toward defining and fixing “fragile” states. The early 1990s saw the rise of “fragility” both as a concept and a reality that development organizations first addressed using broad donations targeted toward state building and capacity strengthening as the foundational problems of “fragile,” “failing,” and “decaying” states. Weak institutions and political inefficiencies drove the debate on pulling fragile states out of the known reinforcing factors of recent (or ongoing) conflict, poor economic performance,

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

Figure 11-4. Primary School Enrollment and Fragility


Average School Enrollment,
Primary (% net)



Data sourced from State Fragility Index and World Bank Group

Figure 11-5. Gender Gap in Education Access and Fragility


Average Gap in Secondary School
Enrollment (Difference in % Net Enrollment
Between Males and Females)



Data sourced from State Fragility Index and World Bank Group

Figure 11-6. Life Expectancy and Fragility

Average Life Expectancy at
Birth, Total (Years)



Data sourced from State Fragility Index and World Bank Group

low institutional quality, and inadequate enforcement of government contracts or rule of law.²³ These conclusions were reinforced by a general belief in “structural reform” for poverty-stricken, conflict-affected countries and accompanying policies to draft donor agreements with strict policy adherence to accountable governance and market liberalization.

The World Bank and the OECD have contributed to conceptualize and disseminate the concept of “fragile states,” setting a global agenda on aid prioritization and policy solutions to fix fragility. The World Bank institutionalized the donor-driven agenda against fragility under its “low-income countries under stress” (LICUS) approach, launched in 2002.²⁴ “Severe,” “core,” and “marginal” LICUS countries were determined according to their per capita income within the International Development Association eligibility, the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment’s (CPIA) overall performance, and its specific ratings for public sector management and institutions.²⁵ These criteria now determine “fragile states” according to the changed lexicon, but the fundamental understanding of fragile states remains located within prior efforts to secure conflict-affected states, strengthen post-conflict countries, address weak institutions, and develop critically underdeveloped nations, helping them transition to self-reliance.

The OECD also has played a major role in the creation and diffusion of donor interests in regard to fragile states. Starting with the Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnership, headed by the United Kingdom in 2003, international experts and organizations were brought together at the OECD to tackle governance and post-conflict reconstruction issues. This process became the Fragile States Group, which leads data collection on countries that fail to implement development aid and works to incorporate “fragility” as an independent focus for the OECD.²⁶

The agenda on fragility has been influenced through key convenings, including the Rome Declaration (2003),²⁷ aimed at coordinating and harmonizing aid, and the Marrakech Action Plan (2004),²⁸ focusing on managing development

23. Deléchat and others (2015).

24. Carvalho (2006).

25. Nay (2014).

26. Ibid.

27. The Rome Declaration was the result of the first High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which outlined the principles driving donor commitments. Some principles included accounting for “partner country” priorities, harmonizing missions and reporting, cooperating with other donors, and supporting government leadership and ownership of development results. For the full declaration, see: OECD, “HLF1: The First High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness,” Rome (2019), www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/hlf1-the-first-high-level-forum-on-aid-effectiveness-rome.htm.

28. The Marrakech Action Plan came out of a 2002 roundtable on measurement, monitoring, and managing results and the 2003 Development Committee’s intent to create an action plan focused on improving statistical capacity. The action plan suggests an interdependent approach

results. Although these events were not specifically organized to address state fragility (as they were related to the developing world in general), they have since been recognized as foundational to coordinating aid in fragile contexts. In 2005, world leaders approved the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,²⁹ committing their countries and donors to improve the impact quality of aid on development.³⁰ The Paris Declaration, more straightforwardly, acknowledged the need to adapt aid delivery in fragile states, to align national development strategies with donor policies and procedures, and to enhance accountability and transparency in implementation.

The follow-up to the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action,³¹ adopted in 2008, solidified the global focus on fragile states through a development lens. This resolution emphasized the authority and responsibility of developing countries to manage the development process through local institutions and partnerships with donors, civil society organizations, and the private sector. The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (2007) put state-building first in its list of principles for addressing states emerging from conflict or facing severe poverty and development challenges. These international strategies were accompanied by regional and national efforts to streamline development assistance—private and public—toward specific fragility-related issues, including conflict, violence, poverty, gender inequality, and low human development. These early attempts to institutionalize strategies to address fragile states recognized the interconnected aspects of fragility but failed to prevent or solve many cases of modern fragile states. A lack of consensus about fragility as a “syndrome” or a “symptom” has led scholars to question the validity of state-building as the primary approach to solving fragility. Whereas most development

between national and international partners to create a more effective international system better suited to support development efforts. For the full report, see: Willem de Vries, Sylvester Young, Trevor Croft, Antoine Simonpietri, Charles Lufumpa, Brian Hammond, Robert Johnston, Jan Vandemoortele, and Roger Edmunds, *The Marrakech Action Plan for Statistics: Better Data for Better Results—An Action Plan for Improving Development Statistics* (English) (World Bank Group, 2004), <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/493571468279866267/The-Marrakech-action-plan-for-statistics-better-data-for-better-results-an-action-plan-for-improving-development-statistics>.

29. The Paris Declaration resulted from the second High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, focusing on five pillars: ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability. The main contribution of this document lies in its specific implementation measures and the establishment of a monitoring system to assess progress. For the full declaration, see: OECD, “Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action,” www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm.

30. OECD (2018).

31. The Accra Agenda for Action recommitted states to the Paris Declaration’s five pillars and proposed improvement in ownership, inclusive partnerships, delivering results, and capacity development. For the full declaration, see: OECD, “Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action.”

practitioners advocate for institution-building over strict security assistance, especially in fragile or conflict situations, some scholars³² problematize the role of local elite actors in corrupting state-building initiatives.

In more recent years, strategies developed at the World Bank, African Development Bank, and U.S. Congress showcase efforts to revitalize the fight against fragility with contextualized, targeted solutions. Building on the momentum of the Paris Declaration (2005), Accra Agenda (2008), Dili Declaration (2010–11),³³ Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011),³⁴ Monrovia Roadmap (2011),³⁵ and New Deal (2011),³⁶ global institutions recognize fragile states as the main obstacles to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).³⁷

The World Bank has consistently focused on providing aid to mitigate the

32. Lamb (2015).

33. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in 2010 led to a declaration of the four priority challenges to effective cooperation in conflict-affected and fragile states. This dialogue and declaration specifically mentioned capacity development, aid instruments, planning processes, and political dialogue. For the full declaration, see: PBS Dialogue, 2011, “Dili Declaration: A New Vision for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,” International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/45250308.pdf.

34. In 2011, government, civil society, private sector, and other actors met at the fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness to reach a consensus on enhancing development cooperation. The Busan Partnership Agreement supports four main principles: 1) ownership of development priorities by developing countries, 2) a focus on results, 3), partnerships for development, and 4) transparency and shared responsibility. For the full agreement, see: OECD, “Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation,” Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (July 2012), www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf.

35. The Monrovia Roadmap resulted from the Second International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in June 2011. The Roadmap set out five objectives to “reduce and prevent conflict and human suffering and to reach the [Millennium Development Goals] MDGs in situations of fragility and conflict.” The five objectives included: 1) legitimate politics, 2) security, 3) justice, 4) economic foundations, and 5) revenues and services. For the complete report, see: International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “The Monrovia Roadmap on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding” (July 2011), www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/monrovia.pdf.

36. The New Deal resulted from the same forum as the Busan Partnership and furthers partnerships among fragile and conflict-affected states, development actors, and civil society to improve development policy and practice. The New Deal narrowed the Busan Partnership’s priorities for stakeholders toward achieving the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), using the FOCUS outline for assessment and engagement and the TRUST model in implementation and monitoring. For the full deal, see: International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States,” www.pbsdialogue.org/media/filer_public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the_new_deal.pdf.

37. The seventeen Sustainable Development Goals are part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted in 2015 by all United Nations Member States. These goals provide a framework and call to action for all countries to enhance efforts toward ending poverty, hunger, and fifteen other deprivations. For more data on the SDGs, see: “Sustainable Development Goals,” United Nations, 2019, <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300>.

impact of fragility, conflict, and violence, a strategy echoed by the LSE-Oxford Commission in its recent report on escaping fragility and consequent extreme poverty, mass migration, terrorism, illicit trafficking, and violence.³⁸ The World Bank outlined a highly-targeted approach in 2018 to address the specific challenges of fragile states by doubling the financing allocated to solving the root causes of fragility, and considers youth unemployment, low job creation, gender inequality, and a lack of government services as the primary root causes of fragility that can be addressed from the development perspective. Thus far, the World Bank has allocated \$2 billion for countries hosting large numbers of refugees, and has supported the development of the Kakuma Refugee Camp's entrepreneurial programs, a cash-for-work program in the Central African Republic, and the Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project.³⁹ These programs all support a state-building approach to solving fragility, emphasizing the power of development-focused resources.

The U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) defines the specific role of the United States in building resilience against violent extremism—one of the compounding factors that can propagate the fragility trap. This strategy follows the World Bank's turn toward prevention, prioritizing those partnerships with civil society and governments that can create inclusive governance processes and community consultations against violent extremists' attempts to undermine resilient states. USIP outlines responsibilities for each branch of the U.S. government to ensure these partnerships receive adequate funding, national attention, and technical support from U.S. agencies with expertise in security and intelligence.

The African Development Bank (AfDB) (2015), in its 2014–19 strategy to address fragility and build resilience in Africa, also focused heavily on the political economy and conflict aspects of fragile states. The AfDB prescribes a regional approach to fragility—specifically including non-state actors, women, and the private sector—to build resilience and combat the spillover effects that jeopardize the development of entire regions that host fragile contexts. The AfDB lists five drivers of fragility on the African continent, including poverty and exclusion, the youth bulge, urbanization and spreading informality, extractive industries and climate disruption, and resources. These drivers inspire the AfDB's funding decisions, which focus on inclusive politics, citizen security, justice, and traditional human and development needs.

These strategies represent the shift over the last two decades from a strict focus on institution- and capacity-building to greater attention on foreign aid and investment. But although aid has supplemented the provision of public goods,

38. World Bank (2019b).

39. Thornton (2018).

it has also become a replacement for tax revenues and resilient fiscal policies that can more sustainably and reliably respond to changes in aid levels or external economic shocks. Figure 11-7 shows the consistently low levels of domestic resource mobilization (DRM) among fragile states over the past forty years. Such a low level of DRM means that the support of the international community is necessary to address fragility, as most fragile countries have, thus far, not been able to mobilize sufficient domestic resources to finance their political, social, economic, and institutional development and exit fragility.

Some Successes, but Not Winning the Battle


The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 and the SDGs in 2015 has facilitated the mobilization of the international community to comprehensively address issues related to poverty, inequality, insecurity, and other global development challenges. In turn, and as a result of domestic prioritization and increased levels of aid, improvements have been seen in the health and education sectors. In general, aid to fragile countries has increased as a result of greater attention to the unique challenges faced in fragile states and the potential effects of fragility on hindering other states' development and success. Figure 11-8 shows the levels of aid to fragile states over the past two decades. When looking at the aggregated data, the group of countries with high or extreme levels of fragility has, overall, received more aid than others, both in real terms and as a percent of GDP. However, on a per capita basis, fragile and non-fragile countries receive similar amounts of aid. This is indicative of a wider issue, where resources—financial or otherwise—are not provided to those states or regions that are the most in need or could use them most effectively. Among the top ten recipients of aid per capita in 2017, only one country was classified as having high or extreme fragility and two as having moderate or serious fragility.⁴⁰ Despite the coordination of the international communities in pursuit of the SDGs, there remain issues regarding the misalignment of resources.

It also is important to note the disparity between aid to countries that are highly or extremely fragile compared to those that have only moderate or serious fragility. While countries in the high or extreme stages of fragility certainly should be prioritized, countries in the moderate or serious stage are susceptible to becoming more fragile without the necessary resources to counter growing threats to stability. In some moderately or seriously fragile countries, particularly

40. The top ten recipients of aid per capita in 2017 were, in order: Syria, the Solomon Islands, Jordan, Mongolia, Serbia, Cape Verde, Lebanon, Montenegro, Timor Leste, and South Sudan. Of these, South Sudan is classified as having high or extreme fragility, and Syria and the Solomon Islands are classified as having moderate or serious fragility.

Figure 11-7. Tax Revenue and Fragility


Average Tax Revenue (% of GDP)




Data sourced from State Fragility Index and World Bank Group

Figure 11-8. Aid and Fragility


Average Net ODA and
Official Aid Received
(Current Billions of US\$)



Average Net ODA and
Official Aid Received
(% of GDP)



Average Net ODA and
Official Aid Received
(Current US\$ Per Capita)



- Fragility
- High or Extreme
 - ▲— Moderate or Serious
 - Low or None

Data sourced from State Fragility Index and World Bank Group

those still in the process of exiting fragility, there may be more scope for support with official development assistance.


New strategies for addressing fragility have increased the focus on FDI and business-first engagements in fragile states, although this focus has yet to translate to significant increases in FDI to fragile states: as figure 11-9 shows, highly or extremely fragile states still receive, on average, little FDI in real terms and as a percent of GDP, although FDI has increased on average in moderately and seriously fragile states. Joe Huxley (2019) found that only 3.23 percent of all foreign direct investment in Sub-Saharan Africa reached fragile states in 2017.

Though the current paradigm of addressing fragility encourages a focus on economic growth and the building of self-reliant economies, FDI and other development assistance funds and projects are often not coordinated enough or subject to the same levels of domestic accountability. Corruption and resource mismanagement on the part of international and domestic actors continue to undermine the work of development and investment stakeholders and keep states in intense need during crises and poor growth during “stable” periods. Furthermore, approaches to fragility are heavily reliant on a humanitarian-development discourse that prioritizes the requirements and interests of donors over the entrepreneurial potential of individuals and firms in fragile states. This, and the generally high perceptions of risk to investing in fragile states, explains the very low levels of FDI in highly-fragile states and indicates the challenges that remain to overcome risk perceptions and incorporate fragile states into the global push for entrepreneurship and domestic growth.

Other drivers of growth and fragility reduction are expansionary, adaptable fiscal policies that can accommodate low demand and domestic consumption. One successful example of poverty reduction and economic growth occurred in the Kyrgyz Republic. Since the end of the Soviet Union, the Kyrgyz Republic has faced poor growth due to challenges of structural transformation, weak governance, poor connectivity, and a limited industrial base.⁴¹ Growth began in the early 2000s when remittances from exported migrant labor began fueling domestic consumption and the provision of services. Strong fiscal policies allowed for the transition from low-productivity agriculture to more informal urban employment. This transition encouraged growth, while import-export bazaar trade sustained growth and contributed to significant poverty reduction between 2005 and 2009. Still, the country risks falling back into sustained fragility and low growth due to high remaining levels of poverty and vulnerability to shocks. Numerous fragile states have experienced similar trajectories of limited gains and threats to return to poverty and fragility.

41. World Bank Group (2018b).

Figure 11-9. FDI and Fragility



Data sourced from State Fragility Index and World Bank Group

New Approaches to Addressing Fragility

A new approach to addressing fragility is necessary to fill the theoretical, methodological, and policy gaps of previous and current policies. Table 11-2 outlines current policy options that can be carried out by internal and external stakeholders, with some policies requiring the support of both groups. Current policies, however, have too often failed to effectively address the cyclical nature of the drivers of fragility, thus leaving people behind. This doesn't mean that such policies are technically irrelevant in all cases, but that the political economy of implementation in fragile contexts is not sufficiently taken into consideration, as further elaborated in the next section.

A comprehensive approach to state fragility must be based on the intent to build state resilience and ensure that all aspects of fragility are addressed simultaneously and contextually. State resilience requires a long-term agenda and the establishment of sufficient political will and social cohesion within the populace to maintain the state in the short- and long-term. The focus on resilience will require policymakers to structure state investment so that it does not increase the vulnerability of the state or the population, preventing leaders from putting the short-term accumulation of power over the long-term need of breaking the cycle of fragility. Special attention must also be given to women, girls, and youth, as they are often the most likely to be left behind.

Many organizations and stakeholders are now beginning to develop new strategies for fragility, including the World Bank, the EU, and France.⁴² Donors are also seeking to “harmonize” aid, which will necessarily lead to a change in levels of contributed aid, either overall or by specific donor agencies. This change in aid levels should lean toward an increase in humanitarian assistance where extremely fragile situations call for extra funding and international mechanisms of accountability. Furthermore, in fragile states with prominent civil society and private sectors, foreign aid should consider transitioning toward rebuilding commercial and economic sectors for the overall growth of the state. Two approaches that are currently underutilized and still being developed include private sector solutions and city-based approaches. These solutions account for context, the role of the private sector, and local actors within the security-development nexus of fragility interventions and can, thus, help lift states from fragility and ensure no one is left behind within fragile states.

The private sector and business community have the resources and

42. These strategies include the World Bank's future strategy for fragility, conflict, and violence (consultations currently ongoing); the EU's *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* (reaffirmed in 2016) focusing on peacebuilding, state-building, and improving international cooperation with fragile states; and France's *Prevention, Resilience and Sustainable Peace* strategy (2018) focusing on prevention, inclusive governance and the social contract, and improved coordination of French actions.

Table 11-2. Current Approaches to Fragility

Internal	External
Decentralization of decisionmaking, implementation, and mobilization of resources (Von Haldenwang 2016; Prah 2004)	Private investment focused on job creation and decreasing infrastructure gaps (LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development 2018; François and Sud 2006)
Inclusive resource mobilization in rural and urban areas (OECD Report 2018)	Partnerships with civil society organizations (CSOs) (OECD Report 2018)
Economic diversification of exports and domestic production (OECD Report 2018; EU 2011)	Technical assistance to improve core service delivery (security, water, education) (McLoughlin 2012; Chauvet and Collier 2005)
Domestic security strategy adapted from the international security strategy (LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development 2018; USIP 2019)	Peace and conflict mediation (Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005; Diamond 2006; Kimenyi, Mbaku, and Moyo 2010; EU 2011)
Institutional reform and strengthening at the national and local level and provision of inclusive institutions (Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005; Hout 2010; CICID 2018)	Facilitated aid , both monetary and technical, particularly to generate turnaround in post-conflict situations (McLoughlin 2012; Chauvet and Collier 2005; Rajan and Subramanian 2005; Diamond 2006; EU 2011)
Political settlements that expand institutional representation (Kimenyi and others. 2010)	Regional partnerships and cooperation (Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005)
Formal (social) recognition of group identities and creation of shared national identity (Kaplan 2008; LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development 2018)	Debt relief (LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development 2018)
Power-sharing and political settlement particularly for the resolution of conflicts (LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development 2018; Yoo 2011; Jones, Elgin-Cossart, and Esberg 2012)	Engagement with local groups and leaders to help build coalitions for reform (USIP 2019)

Macroeconomic policy reform to achieve stability and accelerate growth (World Bank 2018; Rajan and Subramanian 2005; EU 2011)	Supporting international accountability efforts through funding of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation programs and increased transparency (USIP 2019; EU 2011)
Strengthening rule of law by increasing checks, accountability, and transparency (World Bank 2019a; Baker 2007)	Political assistance to support democracy and facilitate political transitions (Rajan and Subramanian 2005; Diamond 2006; Kimenyi, Mbaku, and Moyo 2010)
Improved domestic resource mobilization to finance higher levels of public investment and enhanced social services (World Bank 2019a; EU 2011)	Humanitarian and relief efforts , including refugee support, containment of diseases and famine (Baker 2007)
Regeneration of legitimate power (Diamond 2006)	Long-term approach (Rocha Menocal 2011)
Cooperation between military and law enforcement (Dempsey 2006)	Coordination across institutions and actors (Zoellick 2008; CICID 2018; EU 2011)
Recognition and use of traditional institutions for conflict resolution and governance (Prah 2004; Kaplan 2010)	
Re-establishment of security through disarmament, demobilization, peacekeeping, and security sector reform (Brinkerhoff 2005; EU 2011)	
Labor market and entrepreneurship programs (Blattman and Ralston 2015)	
Inclusive education programs (Chauvet and Collier 2004; Ghani and Lockhart 2009)	
Gender inclusive/specific programs and policies (Baranyi and Powell 2005, OECD Report 2018)	
Improvement of health systems (Newbrander, Waldman, and Shepherd-Banigan 2011)	
Improving legal capacity for justice and regulation (LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development 2018; EU 2011)	

management potential to contribute to conflict resolution; unlock growth and development; and finance specific initiatives, including for dialogue among conflicting parties, national conflict resolution and prevention programs, local negotiations for services, and programs to reduce grievances both locally and nationally.⁴³ Other short-term measures include creating jobs, particularly those that can employ demobilized military and security forces; building business opportunities in immediate service delivery for relief from conflict and fragility; designing training programs to accommodate infrastructure and regulatory challenges; increasing access to domestic capital flows, including microfinancing and remittances; and strengthening national and local institutions to prioritize domestically-driven businesses and industrial development.⁴⁴

In the long term, the private sector should take the lead in facilitating the entry of new enterprises to local, national, and regional markets. Encouraging regional investment in new post-conflict or post-fragility private sector enterprises will increase capital flows and instill confidence in international investors to promote long-term business and stability. Additionally, ventures in telecommunications and mobile services, such as telemedicine and mobile banking, can thwart residual institutional corruption and fill gaps in service delivery.⁴⁵ Finally, the private sector, which is often by necessity inclusive in its actions, can play a crucial role in mitigating social exclusion. The private sector infiltrates different socioeconomic strata further than the public sector,⁴⁶ and its relationship with citizens can bring stability by creating a feeling of inclusion throughout all of society, preventing the emergence of violence related to exclusion.⁴⁷

The private sector's contribution to state stability can be enhanced through its partnership with the public sector at the local level. Indeed, strong local government institutions foster development by encouraging private sector investment: when institutions are solid, the private sector benefits from transparent and accountable business dealings with the local government, which improves processes such as resource governance.⁴⁸ To respect local contexts, the private sector can also apply conflict-sensitive business practices. These consist of proactive efforts from companies not to interfere with the host country through its operations to minimize the impact those operations could potentially have on enhancing violence or corruption.⁴⁹

43. Peschka and Emery (2011).

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.*

47. Ingram and Papoulidis (2017).

48. Besada (2013).

49. Ballentine (2005).

FDI also must be specifically targeted toward economic development priorities that address underlying dimensions of conflict and corruption, such as unemployment, service supply constraints, and unvaried domestic production.⁵⁰ It is important to acknowledge that FDI in the private sector and large-scale business operations, such as in extractive resource industries in Central Africa or mining operations in the Dominican Republic, has increased fragility in some countries.⁵¹ Investing and generating economic opportunity on the back of political, ethnic, religious, or social tensions will only further reduce stability and peace within already fragile states. Still, FDI in local industries has the unique advantage, compared to nation- or donor-led stabilization policies, of removing the economic conditions that contribute to groups' grievances, poverty, hunger, and political rivalry—creating short-term and long-term avenues for exiting stages of fragility.⁵²

Current approaches tend to favor private sector involvement through mandatory, internationally set regulations in conflict-driven countries. The main justification for this approach is that it is extremely difficult for national governments to act as regulators of the private sector in weak states because of their poor institutional capacities (figure 11-10), which creates a need for the international community to oversee the process of mandatory regulation. This approach can be efficient, particularly when it combines domestic legislation and monitoring actions of international governance. For example, in the case of the Kimberley Certification Scheme, penalties were applied for noncompliance with domestic legislation, altering the balance of incentives and resulting in efficient regulation.⁵³ Overall, such regulatory partnerships are expected to be efficient solutions to state fragility issues by providing strong regulation frameworks that strengthen states' legitimacy and allowing for private sector participation in state-building processes.

Although addressing fragility requires the coordinated involvement of actors at many levels, including through the private sector and at the local, rural, urban, regional, national, continental, and international levels, subnational and, in particular, city-based approaches are currently underutilized. Approaches to state fragility often overlook the impact of fragile cities on causing, perpetuating, and solving fragility. Developing appropriate solutions for cities such as Lagos in Nigeria or Kinshasa in the DRC will have a substantial impact on poverty and fragility reduction; 90 percent of future population growth throughout the


50. Ganson and Wennmann (2018).

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Ibid.*

53. Ballentine (2005).

Figure 11-10. Government Effectiveness and Fragility



Data sourced from State Fragility Index and World Bank Group

world is projected to occur in the developing world's cities and their surrounding communities.⁵⁴ Rapid urbanization and changing demographic dynamics can often drive national grievances.

A decentralized approach to addressing fragility by considering the impact of cities and their local governing institutions can provide necessary insight on solutions to general state fragility. As the social contract that exists between citizens and the federal government on the basis of security and service provision also exists at the urban municipal level and rural subregional level, the purview of local governments to provide contextualized services, welfare, representation, and security to urban citizens should be prioritized as an avenue for stabilization, growth, and development.⁵⁵

Foreign assistance and stabilization policies are still largely targeted toward the centralized state system⁵⁶ and specific rural areas, which are often afflicted with the most severe consequences of conflict, hunger, poverty, and disaster. However, the economic and social strata of urban areas also can experience these devastating effects and are likely to undermine humanitarian efforts to fix state fragility at the rural level. New practices in humanitarian relief have begun to focus on the regional and local levels, including cities, as sites requiring the same level of attention within the security and development nexus.⁵⁷ This new focus is bringing increasing attention to the vulnerability of cities within development, emergency, and environmental action discourse. Urban violence, for example, was acknowledged as one of the most pressing challenges in the 2007 conference on the Red Cross pilot project in Rio de Janeiro,⁵⁸ and increasing emphasis is being put on the study of humanitarian implications in cities where levels of violence are on par with Abidjan or Mogadishu, such as Medellin or Ciudad Juarez.

While fragile cities have been identified as a new challenge within humanitarian discourse, it is less clear how their characteristics and dimensions are to be defined. Some strong links between city and state fragility exist, including the rupture of social contracts binding citizens with the government, the weakness of governance systems,⁵⁹ and the inability of public authorities to deliver basic public services. The notion of urban conflict is also strongly identified as a defining element of fragile states, and the study of urban violence often relies on the same frameworks used in studies of state fragility. For example, a report issued in 2010 by the London School of Economics argued that analysis of fragile cities

54. Muggah (2015).

55. *Ibid.*

56. Muggah (2013).

57. Nogueira (2014).

58. *Ibid.*

59. Muggah (2013).

must be based on the typical analysis applied to fragile states. The notions are clearly intertwined.⁶⁰ On the other hand, fragile cities have many characteristics that distinguish them from fragile states, and many new concepts are emerging that are linked to fragile cities but disconnected from state fragility. For example, the emergence of the concept of “military urbanism” focuses on cities as the first site of warfare in the twenty-first century, and consequently reshapes the approach to fragility with a special focus on a new paradigm of urban settings.⁶¹ The implications of this new focus are the attribution of violence to the speed of urbanization, which differs from the approach taken to study state fragility.⁶²

The unique characteristics of fragile cities complicate typical solutions to state fragility and engender a need for decentralized rather than top-down approaches. Cities are highly complex environments with various levels of governing arrangements, and their management relies on their relationship with national governments. As cities are not sovereign and do not have full autonomy over their resources and laws, implementation of solutions is particularly difficult.⁶³ One method of implementing solutions to address fragility in both rural and urban areas is to build systems in which transparency and accountability are central elements. Often, the divide between local government elites, international actors, and the local population prevents the implementation of effective governing bodies. Building solutions that promote effective governance reconstruction—a core parameter for stability—requires filling the gaps of legitimacy, security, and effectiveness, and can be done only through transparency and accountability.⁶⁴

Framework for a New Approach to Fragility

These solutions, as well as the current approaches to fragility detailed in table 11-2, can be successful only when paired with effective and contextualized implementation strategies, given the critical role of the political economy of implementation in successful delivery.⁶⁵ Fragile cities, in particular, present new challenges for solution implementation. One means to improve the design and implementation of interventions into fragile states is to contextualize implementation strategies based on the prevalence of political conflict or complexity. This method is based on policy implementation theories that examine reasons why critical differences occur between the initial intent of a policy and the outputs

60. Nogueira (2014).

61. Muggah (2013).

62. Nogueira (2014).

63. Selby (2018).

64. Brinkerhoff (2007).

65. Signé (2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d).

of that policy after the final stages of implementation and methods to improve the success of policy implementation. Working from an adaptation of Matland's conflict-ambiguity model (table 11-3), policymakers can determine a relative level of political conflict or violence and the clarity of policy goals or means within a country to determine the primary tools that should be used to address fragility. Framing approaches within this matrix can help establish comprehensive policies that restore security with the long-term goal of building institutional resilience and domestic capacity to grow. It can also help better align the provision of financial and technical resources to states that are most able to use them to eliminate fragility and improve the lives of their residents.

This matrix also can provide a useful framework for operationalizing the wide range of solutions available to policymakers and development organizations.

Approaches for Low Ambiguity/Low Conflict

When levels of both conflict and ambiguity are low, implementation is likely to succeed if the necessary resources are available and implementation is mostly administrative in nature. Overall, states with low ambiguity and low conflict have clearly-defined goals and a set of well-understood procedural steps to accomplish policy goals. Rwanda typifies this category due to the country's clear and generally accepted development policy goals. In Rwanda, there is low conflict, due to consensus among government officials and the country's relatively high levels of stability, and low ambiguity, due to the clarity of policy goals and processes. Rwanda now requires additional financial resources, including FDI, aid, and tax revenue, as well as reinforcement of current administrative capacity to foster development and implementation of various solutions. Liberia and Sierra Leone provide other examples of countries that, in recent years, have had low ambiguity and low conflict.

This scenario of fragility has the highest initial potential of exiting fragility. Without focused resources and international, regional, and local support for the state, though, fragility can become ingrained. International and domestic actors should focus on the mobilization of domestic resources for investment, infrastructure, and growth prospects and the provision of aid for technical services. The stabilization of the economic and social sectors of the state will ensure institutional resources are allocated for low-level securitization and political expediency and can lead to a smooth transition out of low-level conflict and into resiliency.

Table 11-3. Political Conflict/Policy Ambiguity Matrix

	Low Conflict	High Conflict
Low Ambiguity	<p><i>Type of implementation:</i> Administrative – clear goals and strategies exist but labor, capital, or technological resources are needed</p> <p><i>Factors needed for success:</i> Resources, motivation, learning, competency, processes</p> <p><i>Potential internal strategies:</i> Public-private partnerships, encouragement of entrepreneurial and moderate-risk ventures, employment support, and training programs</p> <p><i>Potential external strategies:</i> Private investment focused on resource-building, partnerships with civil society organizations, technical assistance</p> <p><i>Illustrative case:</i> Rwanda</p>	<p><i>Type of implementation:</i> Political – clear goals and strategy exist but conflict makes implementation difficult</p> <p><i>Factors needed for success:</i> Power, autonomy, governance, leadership</p> <p><i>Potential internal strategies:</i> Domestic security sector reform, inclusive political participation, inclusive resource mobilization, inclusive education and gender programs</p> <p><i>Potential external strategies:</i> Peace and conflict mediation, facilitated aid with donor accountability, regional partnerships and cooperation</p> <p><i>Illustrative case:</i> South Sudan</p>

High Ambiguity	<p><i>Type of implementation:</i> Contextual – overarching goals may exist but strategies are vague or disagreed upon and consensus is needed</p> <p><i>Factors needed for success:</i> Vary based on contextual conditions, institutional factors, organizational structures, and culture</p> <p><i>Potential internal strategies:</i> Institutional reform, decentralization of decisionmaking, and implementation</p> <p><i>Potential external strategies:</i> Partnership with civil society organizations, regional partnerships and cooperation</p> <p><i>Illustrative case:</i> Equatorial Guinea</p>	<p><i>Type of implementation:</i> Symbolic – overarching goals may exist but strategies are unclear and conflict further complicates implementation</p> <p><i>Factors needed for success:</i> Coalition strength, incentives and constraints, network management, communication, conflict reduction</p> <p><i>Potential internal strategies:</i> Domestic security sector reform, inclusive political settlements, formal recognition of group identities</p> <p><i>Potential external strategies:</i> Peace and conflict mediation, facilitated aid with donor accountability, regional partnerships and cooperation for security and stabilization</p> <p><i>Illustrative case:</i> Democratic Republic of Congo</p>
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Approaches for Low Ambiguity/High Conflict

In the scenario of high conflict and low ambiguity, power is the prime determinant of successful policy implementation, as successful implementation depends on the ability of the government to ensure the compliance of other actors. Low ambiguity and high conflict countries include Mali and South Sudan. In South Sudan, for example, the establishment of the country in 2011 represented a clear policy response to fragility in Sudan. Conflict now exists between the country's political parties, but both major groups have clear leadership and political strategies. The primary challenge for the country, then, is not to refine policy strategies but to resolve conflict and provide an inclusive base for graduation from fragility.

With high conflict and violence but solidified political parties or institutions, the state will also be challenged to recognize all the identities and groups within its boundaries. Thus, these situations must have strict accountability for inclusive political participation in security operations, reform, and transitions out of conflict, as the formal recognition of all groups' identities will build the foundation for long-term resilience. These situations will also require a focus on the disparities between urban-rural areas to ensure full implementation of security and governance solutions. Solidified political will has high potential to encourage foreign direct investment and private sector revitalization during the securitization process. Political leaders should, therefore, facilitate labor market and entrepreneurship programs to address economic and social grievances before these grievances reinforce conflict and overall fragility.

Approaches for High Ambiguity/Low Conflict

This scenario typically represents state fragility fueled by a variety of domestic grievances that permeate the local political arena and create tension among local actors. These states can often be "trapped" in fragility, with political disagreements and constant transitions preventing total reform. Implementation in this scenario is highly dependent on contextual conditions, as policy and implementation strategies are rarely clearly defined or substantial. Often, broad goals may be widely accepted, but there may be a lack of clarity in how these goals should be met. Equatorial Guinea provides an example of a high-ambiguity, low-conflict fragile context. While little conflict exists in the country, specific international policies and implementation strategies to successfully remove the country from fragility are unclear. Intersecting issues of governance, natural resource capture, inequality, and low human development further complicate the development of effective policy strategies and increase ambiguity. In recent years, Haiti has become a high-ambiguity, low-conflict country.

The first area of opportunity for international and domestic actors in this scenario is to implement institutional reform at the national and local level that can pave the way for future inclusive political reforms. International actors should especially prioritize partnerships with neutral civil society organizations to avoid introducing political preferences into the domestic scenario. Domestic actors can coordinate with regional and international actors to introduce dispute resolution processes designed to anticipate and resolve political disputes in the short- and long-term that might undermine efforts to build resiliency.

Approaches for High Ambiguity/High Conflict

High-ambiguity, high-conflict situations are those most likely to produce and sustain fragility; success in these scenarios relies on the strength of the implementing coalition. High-ambiguity, high-conflict situations are common in fragile contexts. Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and the DRC, for example, all fit in this category. Somalia provides another illustrative example: the extent of internal violence and inadequate government structures in the country continually demand immediate action, while state illegitimacy, lack of formal enterprise, and a severe proneness to internal shocks prevent resolutions in the short- and long-term. Somalia's fragility is reinforced by its limits to establishing central institutions as well as the nature and scope of its lawlessness and the dynamics of its armed conflicts. Approaches to addressing fragility in Somalia should focus on the security sector and regional cooperation as well as inclusive political settlements.

In situations where states face high levels of conflict and uncertainty about the strength of incumbent institutions or political leaders, international and domestic actors with the intent of addressing short- and long-term fragility need to focus on reinforcing, stabilizing, and strengthening authority. Research acknowledges that high-conflict situations need security and stabilization in the immediate period of intervention, but securitization of conflict should be coordinated with the potential to become a long-term national security strategy. In high-conflict scenarios, the coordination among international, continental, and regional actors is imperative to ensure broad-scale support for solutions and long-term support of the programs implemented during conflict. International actors can ultimately encourage the decentralization of decisionmaking and the mobilization of resources, but political and security strategies also must account for the domestic context, including the inherent capacity of local security forces and the specific shortcomings to establishing security in said state. Foreign aid may be invited by the host country, but invitations for aid and mandates for its extent and role should be determined before aid enters a fragile context.

Conclusion

The ongoing, dynamic study of state fragility demonstrates the complexity of why states become and remain fragile and the need to leave no one behind within fragile states. One of the primary methods of addressing fragility used by the international community and domestic actors for decades is to develop strategies that seek to prevent worsening fragility and the devolution of states from “stable,” and to continuously encourage resiliency against shocks that may induce long-term fragility. This approach has made some progress but has not accomplished the ever-challenging task of pulling states out of the fragility trap and into a process of sustainable recovery. By better considering the political economy of successful implementation⁶⁶ and aligning resources to the individual contexts of countries through the use of an ambiguity-conflict framework, the efficacy of approaches to fragility can be improved and fewer people left behind. This approach can also help to better align the use of resources, including aid, foreign direct investment, and tax revenue, for the countries and people who need them most.

The process of implementing solutions requires input from all internal and external stakeholders, with the assurance that marginalized and underrepresented groups have their opinions heard at the decisionmaking level. Incorporating the private sector can be an effective means of implementing solutions due to its ability to both contribute to and exacerbate state fragility. The decentralized approach also necessitates an analysis of city fragility, which complicates typical solutions to state fragility and engenders a need for decentralized rather than top-down approaches. These approaches, in addition to other current solutions, can be more effectively implemented when framed within the context of a country’s levels of policy ambiguity and political conflict. Using this framework, policymakers can determine the relative level of conflict and the clarity of policy approaches within a country to determine the primary tools that should be used to address fragility and the resources that are needed to support graduation from fragility. Overall, the method of defining and categorizing state fragility in this report adds to the extensive research already done on the subject and contributes new ideas about how to adapt solutions to the context and specific needs of fragile states and populations.

66. Signé (2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d).

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