PARTICIPANTS:

Introduction:

FRED DEWS
Managing Editor, Podcasts and Digital Projects
The Brookings Institution

Host:

JONATHAN TEPPERMAN
Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy

Guest:

BRUCE RIEDEL
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Center For Middle East Policy
Director, Intelligence Project
The Brookings Institution
(Music)

DEWS: Welcome to the Brookings Cafeteria, the podcast about ideas and the experts who have them. I’m Fred Dews.

This week I’m excited to share with you the first episode in a special podcast produced jointly by Foreign Policy and The Brookings Institution. On each episode of “And Now the Hard Part,” host Jonathan Tepperman, FP’s editor in chief, and a Brookings expert discuss one of the world’s most vexing problems and trace its origins. And then the hard part: Tepperman asks the guest to focus on plausible, actionable ways forward.

In this the debut episode, Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel shares his insights on challenges in the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia, America’s oldest alliance in the Middle East.

Upcoming guests on the weekly eight-part series include North Korea specialist Jung Pak, Europe and Russia expert Alina Polyakova, and Brookings President John R. Allen. You can subscribe to “And Now the Hard Part” on Apple Podcasts or Google and listen wherever you get your podcasts. Learn more at foreignpolicy.com/podcasts.

And now here’s Jonathan Tepperman with Bruce Riedel.

TEPPERMAN: From Foreign Policy and The Brookings Institution, welcome to our new eight-part series, “And Now the Hard Part.” I’m Jonathan Tepperman.

On each episode we’ll identify one vexing problem somewhere in the world, trace its origins, and then offer a way of forward. Today, sorting out the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): He’s been visiting the White House and won plaudits from the U.S. media, but is Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman of Saudi Arabia really a reformer?

SPEAKER (from audio clip): Amnesty International has called on the United States to halt arms transfers to Saudi Arabia or risk being complicit in war crimes in Yemen.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): At a time of seemingly unprecedented partisanship between
Republicans and Democrats, at least one objective at least appears to draw bipartisan approval: rejecting Donald Trump’s continued support for Riyadh.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman is responsible for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.

PRESIDENT TRUMP (from audio clip): If we abandon Saudi Arabia it would be a terrible mistake.

MR. TEPPERMAN: Our guest today is Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at Brookings and a former CIA analyst. And just a quick note: we spoke to Bruce before the latest attacks on the Saudi oilfields, but he addresses the issue broadly, as you’ll hear. Here’s our conversation.

So, Bruce, it seems to me that the core problem is how should Washington, how should the United States manage its relationship with Saudi Arabia at a time when, on the one hand, the kingdom is becoming less important to U.S. interests than in the past due to the change in global energy markets with the rise of the U.S. as a producer and, at the same time, under Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, the country has become a more erratic, more difficult partner in many ways. Does that sort of sum up the two sides of the problem?

RIEDEL: I think very much so. Saudi Arabia is America’s oldest ally in the Middle East. The relationship goes back to 1943, when President Franklin Roosevelt hosted two future kings in the Oval Office. It has always been bound by a deal that Roosevelt essentially struck in the 1940s: the United States would provide security of Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia in turn would ensure access to the world’s largest supply of gas and oil.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): In cordial conversation with Colonel Eddy as interpreter, the Saudi Arabian king and American President discussed mutual problems of trade and relations with Saudi Arabia.

RIEDEL: That bargain doesn’t make sense anymore. We don’t need their gas and oil. The world economy needs it, but the United States doesn’t need it. In fact, in some ways we’re competitors in the
global energy market.

And in terms of Saudi security, as you said, the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman has engaged in a series of foreign adventures, most notably in Yemen, that have not enhanced Saudi security, not enhanced American security, rather have probably detracted from both and created the worst humanitarian disaster in the world today in Yemen.

TEPPERMAN: Let’s talk about that a little bit more. How has the war in Yemen become a security problem for the Saudis and for the region and for the United States when, after all, it was to solve a security problem which was the presence of Iranian-backed insurgents, the Houthis, that sent the Saudis in in the first place in 2015?

RIEDEL: The Saudis panicked when they saw the Iranian-based Houthis taking over the country. They had no real strategy for what to do next. The crown prince, who was then defense minister, adopted a strategy of air war, air war linked to a blockade.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): Doctors tend to survivors of deadly airstrikes in the rebel-held city of Douma. The Saudi-led coalition hitting --

MR. RIEDEL: Well, it has produced only humanitarian suffering. More children malnourished every day.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): -- a destructive civil war. The United Nations warns up to 13 million civilians are at risk of starvation.

RIEDEL: Infectious diseases that are easily resolved are rampant in Yemen.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): Cholera has rapidly spread throughout the country. This hospital, already crippled by war, is overwhelmed.

RIEDEL: The Iranians spend a pittance in supporting the Houthis. And nobody knows exactly how much, but they send a few advisors and they send technical help to the Houthis missile and drone operations. The Saudis are spending a fortune, at least $25 billion a year and maybe as much as $50
billion a year. That’s an awful lot of money even for a country with the Saudis oil wealth.

If you look at it in strategic terms, Iran, the country we’re supposedly trying to contain here, is the winner. Then look at it in these terms, the Houthis are firing missiles and drones at Saudi cities, at Saudi oil installations. They just hit one a thousand miles away from the Yemeni capital. Tehran’s not being bombarded by any missiles. Tehran isn’t under threat from drone attacks. Saudi Arabia’s major cities and major oil installations are under attack. Sooner or later, one of those drones is going to secure a devastating hit. What do we do then?

For the United States this is also all a detraction. We want to contain Iran not in Yemen. We want to contain Iran in Iran. We want to fight al Qaeda. Instead we’re fighting or our allies are fighting the Houthis while al Qaeda continues to grow in Southern Yemen. It’s a mess.

Long before Jamal Khashoggi became a symbol of Mohammad bin Salman’s reckless mistakes, the war in Yemen was an even larger symbol of his reckless decision-making and lack of a strategy to achieve an endgame that was reasonable.

TEPPERMAN: So let’s run through the rest of the charge sheet against MBS. We’ve talked about Yemen. You just mentioned Jamal Khashoggi, the Saudi national who was a U.S. resident, a columnist for The Washington Post, who was murdered we now know at the crown prince’s direction in Turkey. What else highlights the crown prince’s dangerously bad judgment?

RIEDEL: Well, first on the Khashoggi affair, the U.N. Special Rapporteur’s report indicates very clearly that this was not a one-off, that this was a part of a pattern of going after dissidents at home and abroad. In addition to that, the Yemen war, the siege of Qatar.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, as well as Egypt have all cut diplomatic ties to Qatar. They’ve imposed an air, land, and sea embargo on the country.

RIEDEL: Even specialists in the Middle East find it hard to understand what is the problem between the world’s only to Wahhabi states: Qatar and Saudi Arabia? Why is the siege here?
It’s in one sense humorous, but in another sense it’s very important because it has shattered Gulf unity in dealing with the Iranians. So instead of trying to put more pressure on the Iranians, the siege of Qatar has actually given the Iranians an out and led to the Qatars moving closer to the Iranians.

TEPPERMAN: And what is, by the way, your understanding of why the Saudis took the step against Qatar?

RIEDEL: I think it’s really simple. Saudi Arabia sees itself as the big daddy in the Persian Gulf and everyone else is supposed to be the subordinate sons. Qatar was too big for its britches. As one Saudi said to me often, the Qatars forgot they’re just a village and the Saudis just couldn’t handle that anymore.

There were other manifestations of it: the Al Jazeera network, Qatari support for the Muslim Brotherhoods, things like that. But mostly, when you really get down to the bottom line, this is about envy between two Gulf countries over who really is the most important in the region.

TEPPERMAN: And what about the theory that what’s really happening is that the Saudis are being played by MBZ, Mohammed bin Zayed, who’s the crown prince and de facto ruler of Abu Dhabi? And there is a real dispute between the Emirates and Qatar, who they see as sort of a wayward cousin or brother. So MBZ, the theory goes, for his own reasons has manipulated the Saudis into this dispute, which the Saudis don’t really have a stake in. What do you think of that?

RIEDEL: I think there’s certainly an element of truth to that. MBZ is, as one American official described it to me, the provocateur. He knows how to push MBS’s buttons and get him riled up.

The problem is that he doesn’t have any way to control that once that energy starts. And I think what we’re seeing today is the Emirates now beginning to have serious second thoughts. They’re largely withdrawing from the war in Yemen. They’re trying to avoid conflict with Iran. I think they’re having second thoughts about MBS.

It’s also possible that they know a lot more about what’s going on in the royal family in Saudi
Arabia or almost certainly they do. They have far better access than anybody in the West does. And if that’s the case, they may be hearing signs that there’s trouble in Riyadh and maybe it’s not a good idea to be overly identified with MBS if you’re looking ahead for the future.

TEPPERMAN: Interesting.

RIEDEL: Yeah.

TEPPERMAN: Now, what makes all of this especially problematic and acute is that the Trump administration has recently announced plans to send U.S. troops back to Saudi Arabia for the first time in 16 years. What explains that?

RIEDEL: I find this quite puzzling. The Saudis never really wanted us to be there. They agreed to us coming in August 1990 because the alternative was the Iraqi invasion. The whole time we were there, for the next 13 years, the Saudis tried to deny that there were any American forces in the kingdom. That’s, of course, impossible to do and even more impossible after the Khobar Towers were blown in 1996.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): Good evening. It’s been an agonizing day for Americans. So many people waiting to hear from Saudi Arabia about the dead and the wounded in last night’s attack.

TEPPERMAN: This is a housing complex for U.S. service members.

RIEDEL: That’s right, a housing complex where our Air Force personnel enforced the No Fly Zone over Southern Iraq. The pro-Iranian group blew it up. I think 19 American airmen were killed.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): The force of the explosion was enormous. Those who died apparently died from some kind of concussion, but they were thrown against the wall, thrown --

MR. RIEDEL: I was there just hours after the explosion.

TEPPERMAN: You were with the CIA at the time?

RIEDEL: I was with the Department of Defense. I was with Secretary Perry. And we negotiated a new deal with the Saudis that we would move our troops out of the Khobar Towers area, which was in
the middle of a Saudi city, to a new base in the desert called Prince Sultan Air Base. It is a godforsaken place, but that’s where we’re going back. American airmen are going back to Prince Sultan Air Base.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): -- so they can fly U.S. advance fighter jets out of there, patrol the area for any Iranian aggression, put a Patriot missile battery in there --

TEPPERMAN: And why do you think that is?

RIEDEL: The Houthi missile drone attacks on Saudi cities are probably part of that. I think the Saudis would like to get us on the ground and the progressively involve us in the air defense of Saudi Arabia and maybe over time in even more.

I think, also, the tensions between the U.S. and Iran and our allies in the Gulf that have spiked this summer probably encouraged the Saudis to ask the Americans to come in. Whether the Saudis have given much thought to how this will play, especially among conservative Saudis, is an open question at this point. Whether the Trump administration thought about that at all, I think clearly they didn’t.

TEPPERMAN: How many troops are we talking about, do you know?

RIEDEL: So far we’re talking about a thousand or so.

TEPPERMAN: And does this concern you?

RIEDEL: You know, we have sufficient bases in the Gulf: Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait. We really don’t need more bases. And what concerns me is that it ties us more and more directly to the reckless foreign policy decisions of Mohammad bin Salman.

TEPPERMAN: So why is it that the Trump administration doesn’t seem to view anything that we’ve just discussed as a problem?

RIEDEL: I think for the President Saudi Arabia is that glittery new object with all this money. He thinks it has all this money. In fact, it doesn’t really have that much free cash to spend on things.

When the President went to Riyadh in 2017, he announced he’d signed $110 billion worth of arms deals with Saudi Arabia.
PRESIDENT TRUMP (from audio clip): If we don’t sell it to them, they’ll say, well, thank you very much, we’ll buy it from Russia, or thank you very much, we’ll buy it from China. That doesn’t help us, not when it comes to jobs and not when it comes to our companies --

RIEDEL: I wrote a piece for Brookings calling it fake news. There were no contracts. In some cases there weren’t even discussions. These were imaginary arms deals. But the Saudis knew how to play on Donald Trump. They put his picture all over the country. They put up huge billboards on skyscrapers. They entertained him lavishly, albeit, you know, in the Saudi style. And I think he came away feeling like he really had found a partner and he’s not going to abandon that partner.

TEPPERMAN: Now, this isn’t the first crisis in U.S.-Saudi relations. Explain how this one is different.

RIEDEL: Yes. Saudi Arabia and the United States have had multiple crises over the years. While we do have a security interest in Saudi Arabia, we have no values in common. I recall having worked in the White House when senior Saudi officials would come. When any foreign official comes to the United States and comes to the White House, the White House puts out a sheet on how we and France or we and Ireland share so many common values. Well, I scratched my head because I couldn’t think of any common values we shared with Saudi Arabia. We’re a democracy; they’re an absolute monarchy. We believe in freedom of the press, freedom of religion; they don’t believe in any of those kinds of things.

As a consequence, we’ve had what I call several near-death experiences in this relationship. The most importance, of course, was in 1973, when Saudi Arabia cut oil exports to the United States.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): -- to the United States.

PRESIDENT NIXON (from audio clip): We are heading toward the most acute shortages of energy since World War II.

RIEDEL: Saudi Arabia did more damage to the American economy than the Soviet Union ever did to the United States.
In 2001, the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 15 of the 19 hijackers were famously Saudis. That led to another near-death experience. And there have been other ones.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): How did one of America’s closest allies become the home of its most bitter enemies.

RIEDEL: What’s different about this one, though, is in those previous cases the quarrel was almost entirely about policy: America’s relationship with Israel, Saudi Arabia’s involvement with terrorism, things like that. Those were resolvable because you could find a compromise on the question of policy. This one does have policy differences, but it’s also mostly around a personality, Mohammad bin Salman. Mohammad bin Salman has become toxic in Washington.

Personality-driven near-death experience is much harder to resolve. We can’t ask the Saudis to remove Mohammad bin Salman from the line of succession. And even if we did, it’s unlikely they’re going to do it.

TEPPERMAN: Right.

RIEDEL: So how does this relationship survive if it has a toxic crown prince and perhaps soon-to-be king in the middle of it? It may be able to limp along under the Trump administration, but is it going to survive if there’s a Democrat in the White House?

TEPPERMAN: Okay, Bruce, so having outlined the problem, let’s now pull back and talk a little bit more about how we got here, fill in some of the history. In 2015, this young Saudi royal, who’s not that well known in the States, outside of Saudi Arabia for that matter, Mohammad bin Salman, suddenly becomes crown prince.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): The 31-year-old already holds a number of important portfolios, from heading the Economic Council to leading the Defense Ministry.

TEPPERMAN: That year was also the start of the war in Yemen. Now, this is 2015. Those are still the Obama years, so the problem can’t all be laid at the Trump administration’s feet. Why was the
Obama administration’s response so passive or, in fact, helpful to the Saudis when the war in Yemen began?

RIEDEL: Two American presidents bear responsibility for this. To be fair to President Obama, he may have been somewhat reluctant, but it didn’t matter. The United States supported the Saudi war effort. We provided the Saudi military with the spare parts and the logistics and the training and the expertise that keeps the Royal Saudi Air Force in the air, that keeps the Royal Saudi Navy at sea. Without American support, without the spare parts and logistics, the Royal Saudi Air Force literally would be grounded in a matter of days.

TEPPERMAN: So what explains this virtually unchecked support from the Obama administration? Is it just because that’s the traditional way that U.S. presidents have treated the Saudis?

RIEDEL: I think there’s a number of reasons, but I think by far the most important was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. 2015 is when the JCPOA was being debated.

TEPPERMAN: The U.S.-Iran nuclear deal.

RIEDEL: The U.S.-Iran nuclear deal was being debated. There was, as you will recall, a very close debate. One of our biggest partners in the Middle East, Israel was a clear no and campaigning on the Hill.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): Netanyahu said Iran might cheat in any number of ways, including stockpiling uranium ore, which is known as --

RIEDEL: I think the Obama administration did not want to have the Saudis come out clearly opposed to the deal or take a provocative step that encouraged an Iranian step that would sink the whole deal for reasons nothing to do with nuclear stuff. I think that keeping Saudi Arabia on the sidelines of the Iran nuclear deal was the single most important driving factor.

TEPPERMAN: Now, when King Salman takes the throne and then elevates his son, the consolidation of the rule proceeded very quickly and seems to have been very successful, at least for the
moment. How do you explain that?

RIEDEL: Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy. It makes no pretensions of being a democracy or of encouraging the mass of people to be involved in the decision-making process. But kings prior to King Salman it was also a consensus-based absolute monarchy. The king would reach out to the various factions of the family and the king would carefully try to build a consensus among them. He would also reach out to the Wahhabi clerical establishment, the traditional co-partner of Saudi Arabia, and to business elites.

Under King Salman and particularly under Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman that consensus-building approach has been shattered. Not only are they not reaching out for consensus. Many of the prominent princes of the kingdom have found themselves incarcerated and literally shaken down for some of their wealth.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): He rounded up more than 200 Saudi businessmen and princes and government ministers and he held them at the Ritz Carlton Hotel for more than three months until they paid hundreds of millions of dollars to get out.

RIEDEL: These include, for example, two of the sons of the late King Abdullah, one of whom is still in prison months after he was originally arrested. This undoubtedly has produced some backlash very hard for us on the outside to measure.

TEPPERMANN: It seems like it’s worked much better than anyone thought was possible.

RIEDEL: It’s very difficult to say. We do not have an independent window into what’s going on, A, in the kingdom and, B, more importantly, in the House of Saud. There are some indications of trouble. The very fact of the nature of the crackdown and the continuing business of the crackdown and the creation of a state-controlled hit team, the one that went after Jamal Khashoggi, suggests to me there’s a little more trouble here than meets the eye.

But there’s no question Mohammad bin Salman is in charge today and, barring some significant
change, will become the next king of Saudi Arabia. And given his age, he could be the king of Saudi Arabia for a half a century to come.

TEPPERMANN: How much of this is Washington’s fault?

RIEDEL: Well, the United States certainly bears responsibility for some of this. We don’t pick the leadership of Saudi Arabia, of course, but by coddling Saudi Arabia for so long, arguably 76 years now, we certainly encourage the Saudis to see themselves as the number one Sunni Muslim power in the world and Iran’s nemesis.

Obama fell out with the Saudis, though, curiously on another issue. His what we regard as lackluster support for change in the Arab Spring was regarded by the Saudis as way too much support. When Obama like helped give Mubarak the boot, the Saudis were appalled.

PRESIDENT OBAMA (from audio clip): To President Mubarak, it is my belief that an orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now.

RIEDEL: That’s when the Saudis really lost interest in President Obama and when the relationship began to go down. But I think Trump did worse than that. He gave the Saudis the impression they could get away with anything and I think they still see that. Clearly, the administration’s response to the Jamal Khashoggi affair has sent the message to Riyadh that they can literally shoot someone on Fifth Avenue and walk away from it and get away from it just as Donald Trump promised that he could do to someone on Fifth Avenue.

TEPPERMANN: Right.

PRESIDENT TRUMP (from audio clip): Whether he did or whether he didn’t, he denies it vehemently. His father denies it, the king, vehemently. The CIA doesn’t say they did it. They do point out certain things and in pointing out those things, you can conclude that maybe he did or maybe he didn’t.

TEPPERMANN: Let’s talk a little bit about how you first got involved in the Middle East.

RIEDEL: I got involved in the Middle East as a two-year-old accompanying my mother and father
to the Middle East. My father was with the United Nations. His first posting in the Middle East was Jerusalem. At that time, East Jerusalem was still part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

We moved a couple years after that to Beirut, Lebanon. In the 1950s, Beirut, Lebanon, was regarded as the Paris of the Middle East, and it really was. It was a beautiful, beautiful city. You could literally go skiing in the afternoon and swimming the next morning. But in 1958, shortly after we arrived, their civil war began. And on July 15, 1958, American troops stormed the beaches of Beirut, the first time American troops went into combat in the Middle East ever.

SPEAKER (from audio clip): The Mid-East itself settled to an ominous, slow simmer as United States forces in Lebanon continued to build up with some 10,000 Marines and paratroops securing the air and sea gateways to Lebanon.

RIEDEL: Our long history of military involvement in the Middle East literally begins in Beirut in July 1958. Undoubtedly, my early involvement helped spur interest in Middle East affairs.

TEPPERMANN: And you’ve been involved with the Middle East professionally your entire career.

RIEDEL: That’s right. I was hired by the CIA in 1977 to work on Syria.

TEPPERMANN: Okay, Bruce, now for the really hard part. What should the United States do to solve the problem? Or to pose the question in a different way, how does Washington sustain this relationship with Saudi Arabia at least enough to get what it wants from the Saudis in the region without becoming complicit in MBS’s and Mohammed bin Sultan’s recklessness and participating in moves that will only worsen Saudi security, regional security, and U.S. security?

RIEDEL: If your friend is driving drunk, the last thing you should be doing is giving him more to drink. I think the first place for us to start is to end the war in Yemen and we have the power to do that. If the United States cuts off the supply of spare parts, expertise, advisors, logistics, all that kind of stuff to the Saudis, the Saudis are literally going to have to stop the war.

Now, in fact, if we tell the Saudis that this is our intention to do this, the Saudis know where it’s
going to lead and they’re going to have to start looking for a political solution to the war in Yemen. I think that would be the first step to do it.

The Congress is already there. The Democrats and a considerable number of Republicans, more than you might suspect, have voted against arms sales to Saudi Arabia. The President has vetoed that, but there is a way to move forward that would make that happen.

In this administration there are people on the Hill who want to attach cutoffs of aid to the Department of Defense authorization bill. The President’s not likely to veto the Pentagon authorization bill. That would tie his hands.

I think all of those things are eminently doable with strong diplomacy and by using the leverage we have in our military assistance to Saudi Arabia.

TEPPERMAN: Why not just cut the Saudis loose entirely? After all, where are they going to go? Do we really need them? And do we need to worry about them so much?

RIEDEL: I think we have an interest in continuing a military-to-military relationship not at the level we have now because Saudi Arabia can be a negative player in the region. It is a negative player in the region. And these levers are useful for trying to constrain bad behavior on the Saudis’ part.

But fundamentally, the relationship has changed. They need us a whole lot more than we need them. And what we need is a White House that recognizes that the balance of power has shifted dramatically in our favor and is willing to use that leverage.

TEPPERMAN: Okay, but you conduct diplomacy with the administration that you have and the President you have. We’ve talked now about what the ideal policy towards Saudi Arabia would be and the ideal resolution. What do you think is the best that we’re likely to get from the Trump administration and from MBS?

RIEDEL: I don’t think we’re going to get much help from the Trump administration at all and even less from MBS. I think the most effective way to change the situation is through the Congress.
There is a majority, particularly in the House, but also in the Senate, that wants to use the leverage we have.

I hope that this will come to a culmination this fall. Certainly, it will come to a culmination if a Democrat is elected in November of 2020. And if you look at all of the Democratic candidates, they’re all pretty hard on Saudi Arabia.

And the Jamal Khashoggi thing isn’t going away. You know, many people thought, well, this -- you know, it’ll blow over in a month or so. I think it continues to reverberate powerfully not just in the United States, but in Western Europe and other places. And it could happen again.

The track record of Mohammad bin Salman is one reckless bad decision after another. There’s no reason to believe we’ve reached the end of the road.

TEPPERMAN: Bruce Riedel, thank you so much for coming on the podcast.

RIEDEL: My pleasure. Thank you for having me.

TEPPERMAN: Bruce Riedel is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution and director of the Brookings Intelligence Project.

Thanks for listening to “And Now the Hard Part.” I’m Jonathan Tepperman, FP’s editor in chief. Our podcast is a collaboration between FP and The Brookings Institution. Our production staff includes Dan Ephron, Rob Sachs, Maya Gandhi, Camilo Ramirez, Anna Newby, and Emily Horne.

Next time on the podcast, countering Russian disinformation. The Cold War is over, but the battle has moved online.

POLYAKOVA (from audio clip): Sometimes there were stories fabricated with actors, you know, claiming that there were all these atrocities committed by the Ukrainian military that weren’t true. Sometimes it was a Jewish coup. Sometimes it was a fascist Jewish coup.

TEPPERMAN: Brookings scholar Alina Polyakova tells us what’s possible and where Putin might be vulnerable. That’s next week on our show.