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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. O'HANLON: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to Brookings. Happy mid-August. Thank you for making some time for discussions of Africa issues and coming to Brookings on this day right smack in the middle of the time when a lot of people are at the beach.

I'm Mike O'Hanlon with the Foreign Policy program and the Africa Security Initiative. Suzanne Maloney and I from Brookings would like to welcome you along with Landry Signé, who's in our Global Economy and Development program. And we're joined as well by Matt Carotenuto, who's a professor at St. Lawrence University, a university with which we frequently work together on Africa issues, which also runs an excellent program in Nairobi. It just celebrated its 45th anniversary. Matt was there doing research and bringing some alumni along on the trip. They have a great semester at Africa program.

And then finally, joining the panel is Jon Temin from Freedom House; leads their Africa program and previously worked in the Obama administration's Policy Planning staff and the U.S. Institute of Peace. I want to also thank Jon for an outstanding article that he co-authored in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, the July/August issue, on some of the new, promising democratic movements in some of Africa's biggest countries, which was largely the inspiration for this event, although we modified it a little bit and we added Kenya and Tanzania to the list, along with South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo where I was a Peace Corps volunteer 100 years ago when it was still -- practically before Belgian Congo days, and also Nigeria and Ethiopia.

So between these six countries we have roughly half of Africa's population represented and, frankly, a fair amount of hopefulness. No one's going to be Pollyanna-ish here and say everything's going great, but we thought it was a useful way to bring together a conceptual framework to talk about countries that have at least some promise on the democracy front, on the economics front, and more broadly, even though, of course, they all struggle and any progress is still fragile.

So with that, I'm going to stop, hand the baton so to speak to Suzanne Maloney, our deputy director of the Foreign Policy program and one of the country's top Iran experts. By the way, Iran's not too far from Africa, so she thinks about this continent herself. And she's going to be our moderator today.

MS. MALONEY: Thanks, Mike, and thanks to all of you for coming out on a Monday morning August. I'm glad to see such a packed house and look forward to a really interesting and inspiring conversation.

I'd like to start with Professor Carotenuto. If you could give us a kind of historical sense, situate this moment over the course of history. Where do we stand? And particularly if you might focus on Kenya.

MR. CAROTENUTO: Thank you. Thanks, Mike, and thanks, Suzanne and Brookings, for inviting me.

When I was thinking about this event, when we think about sort of African security kind of broadly defined across the continent, as a historian I think I definitely want to emphasize, and I'm sure my colleagues would agree, that there's not a sort of one-size-fits-all approach, that we have to think about local histories, cultural context, and even the colonial legacy 50 years removed in most places from independence.

Security, I think, when we think about this, as well, it depends on good governance and accountability, protection of human rights, access to basic services, and a growing and also inclusive economy. So it's a very complex topic even if we're thinking about these six countries or any one of them individually.

If we think about African governance, let me just say a little bit about that historically since I think we will talk quite a bit about governance questions, African governance is often defined as kind of conventional thinking on democracy where we've seen gains across the continent without, for instance, the precondition of being a middle-income country.

Voter turnout and enthusiasm for the electoral process remain very high

across the continent, which I think is a good thing. It's also important for us to realize that these are relatively young democracies in this context, that most African states didn't have their first national election until the 1950s, some not even until the 1990s if we think about South Africa.

And if we think about the last 50 years or so, we can think about the 1960s and '70s, early '70s, as this sort of moment of hope and optimism, but one that often took an authoritarian turn, where Cold War politics backed up dictatorial rule, and really a lot of nationalist leaders criminalized dissent as being unpatriotic, which set course some problematic natures towards African governance questions and issues related to security throughout the '60s, '70s, and '80s.

The end of the Cold War, as many of you know, sparked political liberalization across the continent and a lot of gains in terms of democratic governance throughout the '90s. But we've seen a bit of a backslide in some places, and so a lot of the democratic gains in the last 10 years or so have been uneven across the continent. I'm sure my colleagues will talk about this.

So current trends, in thinking about this, if I think about some of the major issues that are framing a lot of these debates, one of which is about decentralization of political power, whether local government, national government, the Executive Branch has say. Often that has focused on a winner-take-all approach in African elections, which has been a recipe for potential conflict.

Often if you think about sometimes we focus too much on elections and we don't necessarily think about institutions. And one of the things that I think many of will talk about is the role that institutions play in providing checks and balances for peace and security questions across the continent.

How African states deal with dissent and marginalization in their communities across their countries is also quite important. Youth voices, women's voices, ethnic and religious minorities are also important to discover.

And for a historian, you know, thinking about kind of justice and reconciliation questions, particularly in close conflict situations, have often framed how issues of insecurity have been persistent in some areas of the continent.

And finally, just before I get to Kenya for a minute or two, thinking about kind of the role that regional bodies play, the African Union first and foremost, also regional bodies like ECOWAS in West Africa; how they play in managing regional issues of security within the continent and not just from outside forces.

If we think about Kenya, an area that I do most of my work and that, as Mike said, our institution has longstanding off-campus program there, if we think about Kenyan issues of security, I can think about them in a few ways, one of which is the external threat. And so if you read the press, much of the external threat come from issues that are developing in relationship to Somalia, particularly the Al-Shabaab insurgent group that formed in 2006.

And since 2011, the Kenyan military have had an operation in Southern Somalia and then joined the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in the region. That has not quelled the cross-border issues that sparked the invasion of Kenyan security forces into Southern Somalia. Since 2011, there have been more than 250 attacks in the country that can be attributed to Al-Shabaab, including several high-profile ones that many of you might know: the Westgate Mall attack in 2013, the Garissa University attach in 2015, and then most notably and most recently the January attack of the Dusit Hotel in Nairobi, which marked the third anniversary of Kenya's largest military defeat outside the country.

If we think about this from an external threat it's really important for us to think about kind of issues of marginalization. The northeastern part of the country has long been sort of marginalized in issues of local development, often referred to as the "northern frontier district" from the old colonial days. It was a backwater for national level investment in infrastructure, education, and all of these things have contributed to many of the sort of local Somali population and the Kenyan Somali population feeling quite marginalized and

ripe for recruitment issues amongst Al-Shabaab, which has exacerbated some of this question.

The issue of how Kenya has reacted and dealt with that security question from an external sense has been very heavy-handed -- one scholar noted that it was like killing a mosquito with a hammer -- where extrajudicial violence often targeting Somali populations indiscriminately and refugee populations that are protected under U.N. regulations. Threats to close the Dadaab refugee camp since 2016 have been quite problematic. And we can get into some of those kind of questions and more issues and complexities as we talk about it.

From the internal standpoint, governance and internal divisions certainly frame a lot of the security questions kind of regionally, but also specifically to Kenya. Electoral violence, three of the last six democratic elections in Kenya since 1991 have been marked by high levels of political violence. That's often because, as I said before, Kenyan elections have often been a winner-take-all approach, and so there's a lot vested in these.

But if we think about political violence in Kenya I think it's important for us to talk not just about reductive terms, like ethnicity, but also think about kind of larger questions of inequality, where if we look at the history of marginalization in the country that has fueled some of this -- competitions over land, the lack of dealing with historical injustices dating back from the colonial period -- are all at many of these complex roots in thinking about them.

And just as one tidbit on that, you know, if you look at voting analysis from 2013, the opposition candidate in Kenya won the top 8 most unequal counties in the country and 68 percent of the poorest regions of the country. So clearly, there's a class issue here which is often obscured by debates about ethnicity and other forms of identity politics.

So what are the bright spots? Kenya has a robust civil society, a relatively free press fighting for human rights and accountability, but a messy history of criminalizing dissent. Infrastructure and development investments have been quite high in recent years,

but at what cost? China now owns more than 20 percent Kenya's foreign debt, much of that is fueling the infrastructure revolution in Kenya and lots of debates over what is the cost that that's going to have in the future.

A lot of debates are about devolution of power, trying to check the historic power of the presidency in Kenya. These debates are quite healthy. And a lot of us who study Kenyan politics are quite pleased with what's happening at the local level; people's interest in races of governor or members of county assemblies, holding checks and balances at the local level rather than that at the national level.

And if we look finally at the latest attack that happened in January of 2019, the Dusit Hotel, Kenyan security forces responded in ways that were much more effective in dealing with that attack if we compare it to, for instance, the Westgate Hotel *[sic]* attack in 2015, which was marked by inorganization, who was in charge, how are people going to respond. Within minutes of that attack commencing, albeit quite severe, the Kenyan security forces were on the ground and they were able to successful evacuate more than 700 people from that region, from that area of the city.

So I think there's a lot to say. If we think about this, though, we're not just talking about Kenya. We're talking about it in a regional context and in a continental context, so I think it's important to say how has this affected Kenya's role in the region? Kenya is a major player in East Africa; it has been historically the kind of center of governance and business. But this history of both political violence, dealing with dissent, dealing with threats from terrorism I think have hindered Kenya's ability to interact and provide any sort of model in the region.

Not being outspoken, for instance, about checking authoritarian rule in Rwanda, Uganda, and even more recently in Tanzania. I think that is somewhat at the heart of really making it difficult for Kenya to sort of maintain itself as a regional player and the sort of regional center for East Africa.

So I'll stop there and let my colleagues fill in.

MS. MALONEY: I'm going to ask Landry Signé, who's a David Rubenstein fellow in our Brookings Program on Global Economy and Development, to speak to the questions of both Nigeria and, to the extent that you're willing and able to fit it in in our early moments, also South Africa. Two countries experiencing successful, interesting, dynamic internal politics and obviously playing an enormous role in setting the both political and security agenda for the regions.

MR. SIGNÉ: Excellent. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mike, for convening this panel. So perhaps before speaking about Nigeria and South Africa, I want to complete some of elements related to the voter trends on the continent.

So let's say that many of the critical factors affecting the overall economic performance and political and (inaudible) performance for the continent include the rapid urbanization and population growth. By 2030, Africa will have 1.7 billion people, which is important, and about 80 percent of the growth will be in cities, major cities. So that will also have an impact on stability knowing that in the '90s, for example, democratization occurred due to political popular mobilization in major cities.

So a second factor, the digital one, digital transformation, it is critical because we have seen that in countries such as Tunisia or even Egypt. Government transition occurs after mobilization through social media, so it's extremely important. Very simply in the late '90s, New York City had more mobile phone subscribers than Africa, where now Africa has 100 million mobile phone subscribers.

So another factor is the rapid industrialization in the industries without smokestacks, which are different from traditional manufacturing, but also job-intensive. This is important because more than 60 percent of the African population is below the age of 30 and we have an important shortage in terms of employment, so unemployment is very high.

So we have a couple of (inaudible) original integration with the African (inaudible) which could facilitate or worsen political stability. So you have a good illustration of mobilization in South Africa where people were not happy of adding older sub-Saharan

Africans coming for work, including from Zimbabwe.

And finally, there's also democratic backsliding. So I think the continent has made a lot of program from the '90s to 2010, about, but you have seen many countries even if they were not democratic, which have regressed in terms of political rights, civil liberties, among other factors. All the democratic (inaudible) are taking an authoritarian turn. I think, for example, of countries such as Benin, which is taking an important authoritarian turn.

So those factors are important because they are not disconnected to how countries are run. And in some cases, like in the case of Cameroon, for example, they have contributed to generate violent extremists in the northern part and a succession movement in the northwest part of Cameroon. So they're extremely important.

So now coming to Nigeria and a little on South Africa, we'll mostly be speaking about the recent election and the prospect related to this election. As everyone knows, the incoming president, Buhari, has won elections not just at the national level, but the gubernatorial, the senatorial. That those multilayer gains are important to highlight because we already know that most African countries are what I would call a hyper-presidentialism, which means that even in democratic systems they president can function in a way which is not very different from some authoritarian regimes.

So there's a check and balance, but the check and balance is quite limited. It's almost like the winner-takes-all politics where the president could be or the prime minister could be democratically elected, but, however, in the way things are being in the way of running the country, the parliament or the judiciary has a limited impact. So the development in Kenya was then, therefore, very interesting when the Supreme Court decided that a new election would be held after the contestation.

So the first one to highlight is that the president, the APC, the political party of Buhari, has won election at all the levels. So which means that the level of checks and balances is quite needed.

But now perhaps let me speak about four or six key trends in Nigeria, why

Nigeria is extremely important. So first off, Nigeria is the most prosperous African country and also has about 20 percent of the GDP of the continent and 75 percent of the GDP of the West African region. So Nigeria is just too big to ignore.

A second point is also related to extreme poverty. So Nigeria has about 94 million people living below the extreme poverty line, which represents over 47 percent of the population. So if you really want to end poverty on the continent, you have to address extreme poverty in both Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and then the numbers at the continental level will be much lower. So extreme poverty is a critical factor, especially with the demographic boom which will be (inaudible) either in dividends or in a potential bump.

So a second factor, as most of you know here, Boko Haram and in general the Islamist insurgency movements in the northeast. So, of course, now they have spread. We also have the Islamic State of West Africa Province, which has led to more than 2 million displaced people and thousands of people dead, which has implications in terms of a humanitarian crisis. And that doesn't just affect Nigeria. It also affects the broader (inaudible) regional with Cameroon, with Chad, among other countries which are affected by Boko Haram.

So we also have as one of the challenges the nomadic herdsmen and the farmers. So this conflict is extremely important. It has led to the death of thousands of people. And it's critical as we see due to climate change among other factors, the change of habits, there is a deep drought and desertification. For example, a drop of rain went from -- like the rainy season went from about 150 days on average to 120 days, so which is problematic for both the farmers and the herdsmen. So this is another important factor over the competition for arable land, for water, which adds to insecurity and conflicts among other factors.

So we also have the tensions in the Niger Delta, so we have some (inaudible) from time to time. But they remain important and need to be effectively

addressed, so it contains the militancy. So some improvements have been made, but I think there's still an important gap.

Which brings us to the separatist (inaudible), which also remain important. You can see that the task of anyone who will be president of Nigeria is extremely complex between economic, social, cultural, security, humanitarian challenges. So it's not easy to lead a giant like Nigeria.

And when we add to that factor corruption, it is true that President Buhari has taken a lot of actions, but more transparency is needed and the level of corruption is still incredibly high. Like some of my engagement with some investor who told me how much they pay to cross the border. So those factors -- and we also know about some of the challenges related to when President Buhari decided to suspend the chief justice.

So let me end about Nigeria now. And I will continue later after giving the floor to one of my colleagues to speak about South Africa.

MS. MALONEY: Terrific. Thank you so much.

And let me now turn to Mike. You were a Peace Corps volunteer in Congo, I think quite a few years ago, but you have been following the situation there very closely, particularly over the course of the past year and have had an opportunity to engage with President Tshisekedi. And I wonder if you'd say a few words about where you think things are going in the DRC.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Suzanne. And I'm going to just put my ideas out as a brief provocation and Jon or others can correct me because I'm not going to try to be perfectly analytically balanced. I'm feeling hopeful about DRC and that's going to be my bottom line. And there are a lot of reasons not to be too hopeful. But as a person who was a Peace Corps volunteer there during the 1980s and saw the Mobutu era decline, which, of course, culminated in the end of the Mobuto regime and civil warfare in the East, and now we have an Ebola outbreak that the World Health Organization has just declared a world health emergency, public health emergency, you might wonder how anybody can talk about

hopefulness.

Also in a place where President Tshisekedi, even though he was not the preferred candidate of former President Kabila, is still seen to have won an election that was not clean. We had previous panels here in the last 12 months where we tried to get then candidate Tshisekedi. And we also had a couple of Congolese, we had Tom Perriello, President Obama's former Great Lakes envoy, talking about the politics in DRC. And a lot of people are very worried, think the election was again rigged to some extent; were concerned that Tshisekedi had done a deal with Kabila.

And there may have been some kind of an understanding for all I know, but I'm still hopeful because, as Jon wrote in his *Foreign Affairs* article about Angola, even when there's an effort to sort of control a progression, there's an opportunity for a new president to break from the past, at least to an extent, at least to begin to reform human rights practices. And Felix Tshisekedi being the son of the famous human rights campaigner and activist Étienne Tshisekedi, who just passed away fairly recently, has a powerful family tradition of promoting human rights.

And even though Congo's political institutions are certainly not strong, the judiciary is not completely independent, the prime minister and the parliament may be still at the behest in many ways of Kabila, there is an opportunity for at least some political space to emerge here.

We've seen Congo go up and down in its economy with the vicissitudes of copper prices, with the effects of conflict in the East, and now Ebola again, on its ability to engage. But nonetheless, there is gentle, positive movement on the economic front, as well. Still one of the poorest countries on Earth. If you look at the CIA Factbook, it ranks well over 200. I didn't even know there were that many countries on Earth, but anyway, Congo ranks so badly it's even a higher number than the number of countries I thought were on the planet. But I guess that reflects that I'm not quite up to date on the exact count.

But the point is still there's been some gradual, positive movement. And the

bottom line that I want to really drive home is that I know the Congolese people and it's just the most vibrant society. It's the most energetic people. Yes, political institutions have been weak. Yes, corruption is pervasive, but this is a people that has a powerful spirit, an entrepreneurial spirit. And I think in a way if government can just partly get out of the way, we'll be in a place where we can do a little bit better.

I have some ideas on specific means by which we could expedite this in the months and years ahead, but I'll save that for later on. My bottom line is that a little over a half-year into President Tshisekedi's tenure I see at least glimmers of hope on a number of fronts: human rights, some degree of political distancing from the Kabila predecessor, some degree of movement on the economy, and to me it's a lot more than I've seen in 35 years of watching and living and loving Congo. So I'm going to voice a positive note.

MS. MALONEY: Great, thank you.

Jon, let me turn to you. We've talked a lot about elections, the outcomes of elections, and the prospects for the development of genuine strong institutions of checks and balances around the region. You've written both specifically and broadly about the prospect for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, and I wonder if you could give us a broad tour and maybe focus in a couple of countries of your choosing.

MR. TEMIN: Sure, I'm happy to do that. Maybe the place to start is really to note the fact that we are seeing an incredible rate of leadership change in sub-Saharan Africa right now. And this is a region that is stereotyped as the place of these aging autocrats who stay in power for decades. And there are definitely still a few of those.

But just to give you a few statistics, in the first half of this decade, 2010 to 2014, there were nine transfers of power amongst heads of state. Since then, from the beginning of 2015, there have been 26 of them. More than half of those transfers have been between political parties, from one party to the opposition.

Another statistic, in the beginning of 2015, of the 49 leaders in power in sub-Saharan Africa, right now only 22 of them are left. So this is really an historic rate of

change, probably an historic rate of change for anywhere in the world and certainly from Africa. And that's coming with a lot of promise and opportunity. It's coming with a lot of threats, as well.

Let me talk in particular about the country that I think is the most important story we are talking about here today. And all of what my colleagues have talked about are really important stories that we can dig into. For me Ethiopia is the most important story we're seeing right now.

This is a country of more than 100 million people, fast growing, in a very strategic part of the continent -- in the Horn, close to the Gulf, close to other parts that really matter for security and other reasons -- a country that has for a long time been deeply authoritarian under the leadership of the acronym is the EPRDF, a coalition of political parties. So authoritarian that in elections in 2015, the EPRDF won every single seat in the parliament, 400-and-something seats. But that was really the tipping point in some ways.

In 2016, you started to see large protests in the two largest regions, Amhara and Oromia regions, that through a various series of events led to the prime minister stepping down early in 2018. The ruling party, the coalition goes into this very prolonged process of picking who's next and they come up with a gentleman named Abiy Ahmed, who was not particularly well-known to anybody, and turns out just to be this ambitious, frenetic, ball of energy and a real reformer in many ways.

He's I think 42 years old. He's from the Oromo ethnic group, the largest ethnic group in the country. And he came in and really did these audacious moves, freeing thousands of people from prison. Ethiopia has or had an incredible number of political prisoners. Seeking peace with the archrival, Eritrea, and doing a lot to really open up political space and freedoms in Ethiopia, which I know from a lot of conversations in Ethiopia, is deeply appreciated by many Ethiopians. And he's pushing through some legislation to support those freedoms, new legislation concerning civil society in particular.

That's the good story. But with every good story comes a challenge, too.

And he is really facing a substantial backlash right now, as are some of the other leaders we're talking about.

He's facing a backlash from the old regime, the folks who were in power who have lost out right now. And that in Ethiopia is a particular ethnic group, the Tigray, which had been dominant for many years, are a modest size of the population, but held real political power. They're now on the outs and they are pushing back in a number of ways.

He's also facing some substantial ethnic violence throughout the country. Because what happens when the space opens up so quickly and there are so many good things that come in with that, some bad things fill that space, as well. And part of what you're seeing in Ethiopia is really heightened ethnic identity and ethnic tensions filling that space.

And you're seeing a lot of ethnically driven violence accompany that, so much so that there were 3 million, approximately, internally displaced people in Ethiopia as of recently. And then last year, 2018, Ethiopia had created new more IDPs than any country in the world. So the honeymoon is ending for Prime Minister Abiy. But it is still an incredible opportunity in Ethiopia to transition from an authoritarianism to democracy.

Big test coming up next year. Ethiopia is scheduled to have elections next year. It's unclear if they can really get things together in time to do that and if they can provide enough security to make for an enabling environment to do that.

But bottom line, this is a really important story, one worth watching along with the others and one which has a lot to do with I think the trajectory of democratic governance across the broader continent.

MS. MALONEY: Thank you, Jon. That was terrific, all of you.

And I want to come back to Landry on South Africa, but first what I'd like to do is get you all to say a word or two about U.S. policy and the current administration, as well as how we can look at some of both taking advantage of some of these new opportunities that have been presented by the series of transitions, but also get ahead of

some of the real threats that are facing each of these countries and the region as a whole.

Matt, you talked a little bit in your intro about the kind of Cold War framing, which dominated U.S. policy for decades. I think, and I, of course, come at this from the perspective of someone who works in the Middle East, there has been a temptation to look at much of the world through a kind of counterterrorism framing to some extent over the course of the past 15 to 20 years.

You also have brought in the issue through your book of this kind of personalization of U.S. policy, and particularly the identity of the President. Obviously, President Obama had a particularly orientation toward Africa as a continent in general. President Trump has articulated himself in a perhaps less positive framing. Can you say a few words both about the kind of history and the current administration? And then I'll try to engage the rest of you, as well.

MR. CAROTENUTO: Yeah, thank you. Yeah, in thinking about sort of U.S. policy, I mean, certainly I think with the Obama administration there was a lot of hope on the continent and somewhat expectation that given his African roots of his paternal heritage that he would, you know, fundamentally change the way the U.S. interacts with the continent. I think the analysis so far has been that that has not been the case and there's not been a fundamental shift in the Obama administration itself.

The Trump administration I think is still formulating their Africa policy. I'm sure my colleagues would have something to say more about that.

In terms of looking at U.S. relations, I mean, I think a couple of things in terms of security in particular. If we're thinking about this, I think, as Jon mentioned in his article, his really important article I think in Foreign Affairs, is that it's been historically too much emphasis or perhaps on just humanitarian and maybe public health-related and less on kind of governance and institutions.

I think certainly when you look at these changes and these positive bright lights that we're talking about sometimes on the continent, it's often coming from civil

society, from institutions. Like Landry mentioned, the historic role that the Supreme Court played in Kenyan election in 2017, overturning a presidential election for the first time in the history of the continent. But that was followed up by an election not too far along later that was boycotted by the opposition. Right? So clearly that institutional check was not enough to fundamentally change the system.

So where is the follow-up? And I think the U.S. can play a role, for instance, in helping those civil society groups, those institutions on the ground that are looking to change things from the institutional level: legislative level, judicial level, et cetera.

Secondly, if we look at U.S. policy on the continent in the last 10 or 20 years, there has been an increased role that the U.S. military has played, particularly in the vein of counterinsurgency and terrorism activities. If you look at Somalia, for instance, since 2017 there's been a marked increase in the number of airstrikes in Somalia.

There's been a recent report by Amnesty International I believe this year, earlier this year, that highlighted some of that -- the effects of that increased activity, which include an increase in civilian casualties and an increase in IDPs throughout Somalia. So that certainly is not -- while it may be targeting Al-Shabaab from the context of a security standpoint, it is certainly not helping Somalia on the ground, you know, with national cohesion and local kind of institutional-building that's going to help it in the long term.

So I think we have to be very cautious of the role that the United States military plays. But we have to also provide a lot more support for the vibrant civil society organizations which across the continent are really advocating for much of this change that we see happening perhaps at the top.

MS. MALONEY: Landry, do you want to chime in? Particularly you talked a lot about both urbanization and digital transformation. What are the ways in which the United States can work with regional leaders to promote and take advantage of some of the opportunities for economic development?

MR. SIGNÉ: Excellent point. So last December, the Trump administration

released the Africa policy. I think that was the fastest strategy release in recent decades by an American President around three major points. The first one was security, especially countering violent extremism. The second one was prosperity, for which details were announced more recently. And finally, stability through institutions, democratic development, and foreign aid.

So more recently the administration released what is called Prosper Africa, so focusing on prosperity, which is important for two reasons, for two major reasons. The first one is that it's the first time that the U.S. administration is deciding to coordinate the action of about 18 agencies in order to improve the relations between the U.S. and Africa, especially in terms of trade and investment. They went from doubling to substantially increasing two-way trade and investment between Africa and the U.S., so extremely important.

And a second point is private sector-led, so which is extremely important. So the Trump administration for many of the things which have been controversial at least acknowledge the tremendous economic potential of Africa. And I think despite some words which were inappropriately used, it is a good thing to have an administration which looks at Africa from the tremendous opportunities instead of only authoritarianism and security aspects, which is what everyone was thinking at the beginning, that the Trump administration would only focus on security.

Yes, focus on security is extremely important. But the economic performance is also related to security. You have the nexus, security development-humanitarian, so most of the conflict that you have on the continent evolves in underdeveloped cities, region, and order. So this is an important one.

And I have just authored a chapter in a forthcoming book on fragility in Africa, leaving no fragile state and no one behind in fragility in Africa. And I think there are a few things which could inspire the U.S. policy towards Africa is the focus on cities and region, which is also aligned with one of the publications that Mike led at the beginning of

the year on Libya.

So quite often the U.S. focuses at the national level, which is good. I'm not saying like it's a bad thing to do. However, I said previously, about 80 percent of the African population will be going in major cities, so if we overlook those cities, we may not be effectively addressing some of the core challenges on the continent.

But also private sector development is extremely important. How will we address unemployment on the continent? So government cannot create those jobs. So I think by support for private sector development and creating (inaudible) infrastructure you have substantial -- a better performance.

And finally, a positive development which was just announced I think last week or so, the United States Trade Representative has issued a joint statement with the African Union on creating the development of U.S.-Africa relations through the African Continental Free Trade Area. This is a tremendous development, especially as the U.S. has been favoring bilateral or country-specific relations versus a regional or continental one. So I think there are many good things being developed.

So I'll be specific. For example, in the case of Nigeria, I think that an important aspect will be to support both state, but also city and provinces' or regions' capabilities and capacity, including for service delivery, accountability, effectiveness (inaudible).

It is true that most foreign aid toward Nigeria goes to health, which is an extremely important aspect. However, in order to be able to sustainably deliver, an institution should be taken into consideration. So that is an important factor.

Also, it may be partly the responsibility of Nigeria, the support of the military should be much more important. So we have seen the girls who were abducted (inaudible) and perhaps the Nigerians were not as enthusiastic at welcoming the U.S. support. But you have seen that with the support, including in terms of intelligence, for the fight against Boko Haram. With the support from the U.S. the fight against Boko Haram has been much more

effective. So that is another critical factor.

We have to acknowledge the leadership of the U.S. when it comes to military activities and your expertise in countering violent extremism (inaudible). I think African countries should not shy away from that. I think the contrary, acknowledge and receive such support.

MS. MALONEY: let me just interrupt you for one moment because I think that's a natural segue to Mike O'Hanlon.

MR. O'HANLON: So I want to offer a thought about Congo, and thank you. And picking up, also, on a point that Matt had made and maybe taking it to the next dimension. And Matt may or may not agree with me.

Matt pointed out, correctly I think, that we need to be careful about how we use the U.S. military in Africa. But I'm worried that we may underdo it just as much as we may overdo it. Because putting on my main hat here at Brookings, sort of defense analyst, as the others in the crowd who do that for a living will understand, and many of the rest of you, the U.S. military is focusing on China and Russia these days as part of the National Defense Strategy of Secretary Mattis and President Trump. That builds on what the Obama administration was doing in the last couple of years. And that tends to downplay other regions in the world in sort of zero sum terms to the extent that there are finite number of American military forces.

However, I would point out to friends who are worried about China and Russia that we're competing with both of those two countries in Africa as well as in other parts of the world. We don't want to only think about the Western Pacific and Eastern Europe when we think Russia and China.

And one of the things that we're seeing go on, including in DRC, is a big Chinese role. By the way, the Chinese role is not all bad. I was a Peace Corps volunteer in Kikwit, 350 miles inland from Kinshasa, the capital. You could drive that in one day when I was a volunteer. A decade later you needed a Land Rover and a week to get from point A

to point B. The Chinese have rebuilt the road and it works again.

So I'm not here to say that everything China does in Africa is bad, but we don't compete as well as we could. We're doing better now with the BUILD Act and some other tools that I think Congress and Senator Coons and a number of other key officials have pushed. We should continue to up our game in the economic and diplomatic and investment realms.

But a specific idea that I'd like to see us consider for Congo would actually require a bit more American military presence on the continent. And it's the idea of helping the Congolese military under a new president reform so they can gradually do more of the job that we've relied on the U.N. peacekeeping mission to do in the East now for a couple of decades.

At some point, not immediately, but at some point we've got to try to help that U.N. peacekeeping mission work its way out of a job, which means making the Congolese military better, able to protect in the first instance health workers trying to quell the Ebola outbreak, but, more generally, trying to stabilize parts of the country that right now cannot really progress economically because of insecurity as the number one problem.

So I would like to see the United States consider deploying advisory teams into the field to work with the Congolese military under the U.N. peacekeeping umbrella, but in a more specific, targeted way that resembles some of the things we've done in Iraq and Afghanistan, just at a smaller scale. So to me that's an idea that the time may be right for with a new president to the extent we can see him willing to make some reforms in his own army that will allow this kind of an idea to have potential.

And by the way, while I have the floor, I also want to briefly thank my good friend and intern from this year, Hannah Markey, a great St. Lawrence University student. So thank you, Matt, as well. I appreciate the effort, a Summer Intern Class of '19 in general and Hannah in particular. But thank you, Suzanne.

MS. MALONEY: Great. Jon, I'm going to prevail upon you perhaps to say

an extra word or two just about the Horn and some of the security dilemmas there, if you might. But please, take the conversation whichever direction you prefer with respect to U.S. policy.

MR. TEMIN: Well, let me just pick up on U.S. policy and I want to make three real quick points in particular.

One is how important it is to focus on institutions and not individuals. As exciting as some of these new leaders are, Prime Minister Abiy, President Ramaphosa in South Africa, some of the others, we have to avoid playing into any sort of cult of personality, which can happen easily. And we've seen time and again cult of personality can be the lifeblood of authoritarian rulers.

These are encouraging leaders, but what matters are the institutions. What matters are the rules of the game that they are able to change that are going to outlive those leaders. That's why what Prime Minister Abiy in Ethiopia is doing in terms of changing some legislation is so important. He's got a long way to go, but that's the kind of change the United States should be supporting more than anything else.

Second point, and Matt talked about this, is support to civil society. It is so crucial. To get into South Africa just briefly, the quick story here, after the remarkable transition to democracy and under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, more recently there was the leadership of President Jacob Zuma, which really proved to be disastrous in many ways. And South Africa fell into this situation of state capture where there was large-scale corruption amongst many of the elites.

When you talk to many South Africans what they will point to in terms of how South Africa has been able to right the ship to some extent under the leadership of President Ramaphosa are three things: the role of the judiciary, the role of the media, and the role of civil society. Because all three of those were critical to exposing state capture, to exposing what was happening under President Zuma, and to generating some momentum for change and generating some cries amongst the population for change.

The United States investing in that kind of civil society engagement throughout the continent, we don't invest much in South Africa because civil society is relatively robust, but investing in that kind of civil society engagement, the media in particular, investigative journalism, is so important and a huge bang for the buck in terms of spending taxpayer dollars.

Last point in terms of U.S. policy, the United States needs to call things like we see it in Africa. This is true across the world, but I think particularly in Africa we find ourselves twisting ourselves into a rhetorical pretzel sometimes and it comes back to bite us.

In 2017, there was a coup in Zimbabwe. It was a textbook definition of a coup. The United States didn't call it that for various reasons because certain rules kick into effect when you call it a coup. Ultimately, we don't do ourselves any favors by not calling it what it is.

DRC, by most accounts President Tshisekedi did not win that election. Now, in many ways this is progress because President Kabila is not there and President Kabila's handpicked successor is not there. But the United States, along with many others, chose to support an outcome that we probably know was probably not the outcome.

These things get us in trouble time and again. And I think U.S. policy often needs to get back to calling it like we see it.

MS. MALONEY: Great advice. Landry, since we've final come to South Africa, I wanted to prevail upon you to perhaps add just a few quick words on that country. Because obviously, it's an important actor and we have danced around the region, but we've just now started the conversation about South Africa.

MR. SIGNÉ: Absolutely. A few interesting developments. In fact, the ANC has had its lowest score at 57.5 percent even if President Ramaphosa was reelected. So that's an important point to highlight.

But in addition to that, another important factor is the fact that extremism is on the rise, also, in South Africa. For example, the EFF, Economic Freedom Front, of Julius

Malema has won 8 percent from 6.4 percent in the past election. And the Freedom Front Plus has won 2.4 percent. So it's problematic to see that extremism on the rise. Where the Democratic Alliance has also had a lower score, 21.8 percent from 22.2 percent, in the past elections. And why do we see like the decrease of a traditional political party and the increase in terms of extremism?

I think it's also related to the broader economic situation and corruption in South Africa governance, effectiveness, or the lack of governance and effectiveness, and accountability. We all know how Zuma got ousted.

And human capital, also, is critical. Poverty in South Africa is (inaudible)? No, it's one of the countries which has the highest level of inequality across the world. So as long as those challenges -- and as I was discussing before, this connection between economic development, security, and the political configuration which need to be taken into consideration.

So moving forward, the question of human capital is critical. So in South Africa the question of industrialization, (inaudible) looking for the model. In fact, when you look at the continent in general, over 50 percent of the combined consumer and business spending is located in three countries: Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa. So they are countries which are critical for the continent.

We also know investment is extremely important. Most of you have probably followed the Eskom saga with the challenges related to energy. Energy is critical and about 90 percent of energy comes from Eskom, which is heavily in debt. I think the last time I checked it was about 30 billion of debt. And that despite the coming of about 27 new players in the energy sector with a contract (inaudible).

So I remain hopeful for -- having interacted with President Ramaphosa, I'm quite hopeful for South Africa because I think he's capable. But capability is not enough. And as Jon has mentioned, things have to go beyond individual to focus on an institution. And I think one of the very best things which could be done now is to empower the national

prosecuting authority, allocating enough resources and independence to investigate cases of corruption, fraud amongst order. Because without trust in the government, we'll continue to see the increases in extremism. So that doesn't just happen in the United States.

MR. TEMIN: Suzanne, if I can add just one point on South Africa. And part of the reason why the current transition they're undergoing is so important is about South Africa's foreign policy, as well, and about South Africa's potential to flex their muscles beyond their borders on the global stage in a productive way. South Africa is right now on the U.N. Security Council. It has one of the two-year rotational seats. Next year, President Ramaphosa will take up chairmanship of the African Union. This is a great opportunity.

But under President Zuma, until real recently, South Africa was, frankly not a productive force on the international stage and was really finding itself siding with authoritarians and with anti-democratic forces much more frequently than it did under President Mandela and to a lesser extent under President Mbeki.

So part of what I'm looking for in South Africa is just as President Ramaphosa is trying to make this pivot domestically, is he going to make a pivot on the international stage? Because South Africa, especially given the remarkable story, can be such a positive voice and can be such a model. Are they going to return to that now that they have an opportunity?

MS. MALONEY: Great. Well, I'd like to open it up now to the audience. We have a standing room only crowd. We have four panelists and at least six countries and broader regional issues. So what I'll do is ask each of you to ask a question -- not a statement with a question mark at the end, but actual question -- to identify yourself, and to keep your question one part only, please.

And I'll take three at a time, so if we can start right here in the front and maybe get all three on this side and then I'll turn to the next side. And let me just say that my approach to handling questions and finding people, a lot of hands go up. I like to make sure there's a diversity of people asking questions as well as the diversity of people on the

stage.

So we'll start right up front.

MR. OTUBURI: Good morning, everyone. My name is Godbless Otuburi. I'm the legal state coordinator for the Not Too Young to Run from Nigeria and also the founder of Ready to Lead Africa. I'm a guest of the State Department in the United States on the Mandela Washington Fellowship Program.

Part of my experience here has been really great because I learned firsthand how this country was built. And it was built on the backbone of quality education. I have had heated conversations with State Department people and say why are we not investing and ensuring that we redesign the support for African countries to mean quality education? Thomas Jefferson said you cannot be ignorant and free. It never has been and never will be. No matter the investment in Africa that other countries, I am sorry, if we do not have an educated population, it will not yield result.

So my question is, what is the United States doing to ensure that we tie the hands of African leaders to invest in education and increase the level of its quality so that in 20 years' time we won't be sitting here and talking about these issues again, but we'll be talking about the progress that we are making ourselves as partners and not as people who are looking for aid? Thank you.

MS. MALONEY: Now there are more than three on this side, but I'll take the gentleman right here and the lady in the back who still has her hand up. The gentleman right here in the black suit.

MR. QWETI: Yes, thank you very much. My name is Nea Qweti. I am an immigrant from Ghana. I've done U.S.-Africa policy for decades.

I want to respect the moderator's instructions and narrow all the different questions I have to just one, but let me say I worked in the anti-apartheid movement for 11 years and I take issue with the analysis that has been given of the current state in South Africa. I wish we had more time to debate it.

But my question, Mike, thanks for doing this. But I just looked at the topic again and it said security in Africa. We haven't talked about the Sahel. Mali went through a crisis. The Sahel is huge. We haven't talked about North Africa. There is a war in Libya. There are so many security issues in Africa that in my mind have deteriorated since the start of Africom. I thought there would be a focus on that.

Now, I thank you for doing this and I thank -- I'm glad that you covered so many other issues. But security is so important and Africa is big. So my question is, will you promise me that you will do a real security forum and let us talk about these major security issues? And as the good point that you made is you can't compete against China by pulling back on security issues in Africa. So will you organize another panel? (Laughter) Thank you.

MS. MALONEY: Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: I promise. And, in fact, we have and we will. So you can go on and add another question if you want. Took care of that one quickly, but thank you. This one's on the six countries we mentioned, so.

REV. DR. WALKER-SMITH: Good morning. I'm Angelique Walker-Smith from Bread for the World in Washington, D.C. I'm the senior associate for Pan-African and Orthodox Church engagement. Thank you so much for the presentations on this morning. My question has two parts to it, but I'll be quick.

One is that I haven't heard much about women's empowerment and gender equity and the role of women in any of these discussions. I think that warrants some discussion just like the generational issue, so I'd like to hear more about the role of women relative to security and the other issues mentioned.

And then I'd like to also hear more about the specific area of faith and religion as a motivation for why it is values and morality may help inform why one wants a more secure environment. I think there's a tie-in there also specifically to women, as well.

So if you could relate to those questions in more depth I would certainly

appreciate it. Thank you.

MS. MALONEY: And at Mike's encouragement I'll take one more question. There was a lady just behind you, I believe.

MS. MADIAS: Good morning. My name is Adelaide Madias. I'm a Cameroonian activist, so I'm the leader of an organization called (inaudible) USA.

So as a person coming from Cameroon, I'm wondering how, considering the situation going on right now in Cameroon, because there have been talks of genocide going on in the southwest and the northwest of Cameroon. And if you look into the issues in Cameroon and think about the strategic geographical location of Cameroon in the Gulf of Guinea, I'm wondering why there was no mention of those issues. I see that if Cameroon does implode, it's going to be a major issue in the whole region.

And talking about China, also, we just learned recently that China has acquired lots and lots of lands in Cameroon. And as a U.S. citizen, also, for me that's a deep concern considering that we do have a military hub in Cameroon. And the U.S. has been really invested in the fight against Boko Haram.

So I'm wondering what is the U.S. position as the war and all of the other political crises in Cameroon are concerned at this time? Were you planning on holding another meeting on this issue very soon? Thank you.

MS. MALONEY: Thank you. You know it's a great panel when we've already had two requests for more panels and more in-depth conversation. (Laughter) And I know we have about 23 minutes left if I'm reading the clock right. And we've got a lot more questions to get through.

I'm going to ask our panelists to take the questions that have just been posed on education, on women, on faith, and on the situation in Cameroon and the role of China in Cameroon. You don't have to take all of them and you don't have to take any of them if they're not questions you want to. But who would like to start?

MR. O'HANLON: I'll pass. I'll start by passing.

MS. MALONEY: Okay.

MR. CAROTENUTO: I'll start. So obviously, I mean, I think the questions give us a real sense of the complexities of the issue of security in a sort of both local level, national, and regional level.

Just speaking briefly about kind of education, I mean, when I teach my kind of intro to African Studies course, one of the things that I emphasize to my students is that actually when you look broadly at African governments and particularly local level investment, education has been one of the major investments that Africans themselves have prioritized, right, since independence. And vast gains were made even though the starting, so many people didn't have access to education at independence; a lot more people do now. It's not enough and I think it does contribute to instability.

There was recently a report by I believe the International Crisis Group that was talking about northeastern Kenya in relation to the Al-Shabaab question and saying how basically the instability has -- teachers have fled local schools and kids are not being able to go and get that education. And that's actually long term helping people be potentially susceptible to these radical ideas and recruitment to these extremist points of view. So I certainly agree that education needs to be our priority in any foreign policy issues when it comes to the continent.

The issue of conflicts when we're mentioning either Cameroon or the Sahel or back in East Africa, there is a regional dimension there and I think our panelists here have talked about this on and off. But the role that regional organizations plays is really important. And so if we think about the role of the African Union and perhaps the inability of the African Union historically to intervene in security questions, there's a history of nonintervention there that has recently been tried to be addressed, but not fully. I don't think the African Union has played as prominent a role as it could have played in many things.

But there are bright spots. Right? ECOWAS in West Africa intervened in Côte d'Ivoire in 2011, intervened in the Gambia in 2017, and helped transitions there. So I

think that that shows a lot of promise in these regions.

If we think about women's voices, for instances, that's extremely important not just in, you know, counting numbers of women parliamentarians, but in how they are being voiced within civil society. And so recently, of instance, in Uganda, a very prominent female activist, Stella Nyanzi, was arrested and given an 18-month prison sentence for writing a poem for the president. Certainly I know the African Studies Association, which I'm a member of, has been outspoken about that.

But regional issues, has the Kenyan government sort of reached out to Uganda to express discontent of that kind of level of prosecution of an academic for freedom of speech? I don't think that that has risen to that level. So that's just one example, I think, of many where you can look at those kind of individual cases, but really think about them more broadly in terms of a policy level.

MR. SIGNÉ: So I will try answer very quickly. Education, extremely important, but I think Africans should also take ownership of their own policy. We all know that education is important.

When I'm engaging with heads of state and government they acknowledge that fact. So I think especially through civil society and elections on all the factors it's important for Africans to allocate an important budget versus expecting external players to force countries. That's exactly what Africans have tried to avoid by creating such (inaudible) African Union, among other factors. But definitely I think the U.S. is encouraging African leaders to invest more in education.

So we have discussed about the Sahel. We invited the president of Mali. Did you attend when he was there? So the president of Mali came here. The topic was about the Sahel and it is a topic which is dearest to my heart and I think to many of the panelists here, also. And we cannot speak enough about it.

So I think we have decided to focus on six countries today. And even those six countries, each of those countries will have been the topic of an entire day of a

conference or panel. But very point, we have to keep talking about those challenges because it helps formulating solutions for governments.

So in terms of women empowerment and gender, extremely important point. That is an issue that was in one of the recommendations I had, but I didn't have time to elaborate. But when speaking women empowerment I think one of the very best ways is to include women in formal decision-making processes, such as what happened, for example, in Rwanda, South Africa now, and Ethiopia where 50 percent of the women are part of the cabinet, and also as members of parliament, et cetera.

So we should not just look at women and girls in a very paternalistic way in the way that let's do things for them. We have to put -- or we have all together to work with each other, everyone is well represented and I think the outcome is likely to be better.

Finally, in terms of Cameroon, I think I briefly connected the situation with Boko Haram and I have also highlighted the challenge in the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon. So I see in the audience also a former Peace Corps past ambassador -- former Peace Corps in Cameroon, first ambassador in Somalia after a very long time.

But yes, definitely those issues are critical. But as you can see, we don't even have enough time to speak about the six countries that we have identified for today, who, by the way, represent more than 50 percent of the African population, so no one should be overlooked.

MR. TEMIN: Just briefly on a couple points here. One, on the education question, a very good question. And let me just pause to say it's great to see one of the YALI fellows here. This is a wonderful program that invests in young leaders from across the continent. And also the association you're associated with, Not Too Young to Run, is a really great effort in Nigeria to encourage young people to run for office in a country where there aren't enough of them. So I would encourage everybody to check that out.

I don't think the United States is going to make a lot of progress by telling

leaders you should invest more in education. I think it goes in one ear and out the other. I think the progress is going to come when we invest in civil society organizations and probably people like you who are going to agitate for that domestically, who are going to organize around those issues, who are going to demand those things from their national government and from their local government. And of course, in Nigeria it has 36 federal states that can be quite powerful themselves and that might be where the advocacy needs to be. But I think those kind of investments in civil society, in national ability to advocate for these things, ultimately gets a lot more than whatever sort of rhetoric we might use about how other countries should spend their own money.

Just quickly on the very important issues on gender dynamics, I want to highlight what's going on in Sudan right now, which has not been a country of focus for us, but which also is undergoing a remarkable change, one that is very much driven by women who have been leading the protest movement, who have been taking great risks, and who have really been out in front in the change that we're seeing. The story has yet to conclude and it could go in either direction.

You know, the challenge there is that women, when playing such a prominent role in the protests, then things get to negotiations and it's all men. And that is such a missed opportunity and that is really a mistake. It's a mistake amongst the Sudanese and it's probably a mistake amongst the greater world for not insisting that women play a much more prominent role in negotiations there, in negotiations really across the continent.

MR. O'HANLON: Suzanne, could I add just one thing on faith, which wasn't touched on as much? I would just give a shout-out to the Catholic Church in DRC. Those of you who track DRC will know that it played an important role last year in whatever imperfect resolution we had of a very shaky election process, making sure elections happened in the first place; they were not completely rigged in favor of the Kabila-preferred candidate; and then that they did not lead to violence.

So those are three pretty big accomplishments even if the outcome, as Jon

said correctly earlier, was not ideal. And I think the Catholic Church, Congolese Catholics, had a very important role in holding their own politicians accountable. So that was a positive step along the lines that was discussed by the question on faith.

MS. MALONEY: Great. Well, let's do another round of questions. We'll take three from this side this time and, hopefully, I can get a few more back on both sides. Starting again in the front.

MR. JONES: Good morning. Thank the panel. My name is Bernard Jones. My question to the panel is -- I appreciate the time that the panel made this morning. My name's Bernard Jones. I'm with a company called (inaudible) Risk Management Group.

My question to the panel, under the acting (inaudible) the state of African security, my question is, is there a lack of brain trust for the Big Six based upon how they're structuring deals via China and U.S. involvement? Because historically, we talk about China is eating African lunch and America's not being involved based upon who you talk to.

And we talked about African security. I ask the question who's negotiating the deals? Who is the brain trust? Where is collaboration? Where is the partnership? So if you could address the lack -- not the lack of brain trust because we know African countries are smart, but everybody needs a little help. Thank you.

MS. MALONEY: Great. Just behind. And I hope there's a lady on this side who might like to raise her hand.

MR. BROOKS: Thank you. Great panel. My name is Doug Brooks. I'm at the International Stability Operations Association, contractors that support peacekeeping stability operations.

My question is on the quality of African militaries involved in ending conflicts on the continent. The U.S. has been involved a long time in ACOTA and other programs to improve African militaries, and they have been taking roles not just in Somalia, but also in South Sudan and elsewhere. I'm just curious, are we seeing a large-scale professionalization of African militaries in Africa that makes them more effective in

addressing problems on the continent?

MS. MALONEY: And I think there was a woman in the back.

MS. SILKOVSKI: Hello, my name is Ann Silkovski. I've worked and lived in Niger, Senegal, and Tunisia.

Can anyone shed light on the Niger, the least educated country in the world, penetrated by Boko Haram from Nigeria, and where I have a friend who's founder and CEO of an organization setting up a private school system in a country that's too dangerous for the Peace Corps?

MS. MALONEY: Okay, so we'll start with these three. And I hope if we can get relatively telegraphic answers, we might have time for another question or two from the audience.

MR. O'HANLON: So I'll start to be quick and say on the question from Doug, who I think knows more about African militaries writ large than I do, but we've heard both Jon and Matt talk about progress I think in Ethiopia and Kenya, if I heard them right, but I would not yet say there's been progress in DRC. And that's part of why I want to see this American advisory effort at least seriously considered.

MS. MALONEY: Okay. So any comments on who's making the deals and on Niger? Who's making the deals? Landry?

MR. TEMIN: I mean, I'll just say it's a really good question on who's making the deals and on ensuring that the African states that are negotiating with China are negotiating from a position of strength and from a position knowing what they're getting into. You know, the whole sort of characterization of U.S. against China, a new Cold War and all that, I think that's kind of silly, frankly.

China is there, they're going to be doing deals, and they're providing a lot of what African nations want. But I think it is a really good point that when they are doing those negotiations, they need to know what they're getting into. And so maybe that's an area for additional support, technical assistance, so forth. I suspect Landry probably has more

thoughts on that.

MR. SIGNÉ: So most of the largest deals, and I think I said earlier that we have a hyper-presidentialism, most of the largest deals either offices of president or prime minister are involved to a certain extent. So I am not concerned about the interest of China through Africa. What is instead important is how African leaders prioritize the interest of their own citizens versus having quick deals for -- including some with corruption involved.

So I think, of course, we speak about the Chinese being bad, et cetera, et cetera. So I don't think -- I think that when the Chinese come to many of the African countries, they have a clear interest, they have a clear agenda. And so on the African side also to establish priorities and to ensure that along the way those priorities remain on the top of the agenda. And a better outcome would probably be achieved by thinking about the citizens first versus some side resources for some of the government.

MR. CAROTENUTO: I'll just add very briefly to that, I agree with my panelists up here. I think Landry's point about, you know, the executive brokering these deals and sometimes claiming political wins locally, I mean, if you think of, for instance, take Kenya for example. I mean, Uhuru Kenyatta bent his reelection campaign on delivering this massive infrastructure project which was finished shortly before the first election in 2017, developing the railway or upgrading the railway from Mombasa to Nairobi. That was funded by the Chinese through huge loans. All of a sudden, now really people are starting to realize what that might mean to the Kenyan economy, particularly when the railway's not making the kind of money that they predicted it would make in terms of the infrastructure.

And then shortly after, winning reelection Uhuru Kenyatta failed to get the second funding full amount of loans needed to complete the second phase of the project. So that clearly is problematic sort of on the level of how we think about these kind of large-scale infrastructure developments.

However, right, when you look at the Chinese, for instance, you know, if you travel around the continent and you're seeing a major presence building roads, particularly

infrastructure. In terms of international relations I think that makes a difference. People are seeing the impact of Chinese engagement in ways that they have not seen, for instance, from the United States or the European Union in the same ways that they used to in the past. So that, I think, is changing opinions and getting discussion on the ground for better or for worse in a number of ways.

And then just this sort of quick little add to the African military question, I think, you know, when you look, for instance, again using Kenya as an example, the response to the Dusit attack clearly showed that there has been some partnerships with sharing intelligence, training in dealing with sort of a terrorist act like that to a good extent. However, right, in many places, Congo, particularly in Kenya, corruption is a big problem in terms of institutions making change and, you know, making progress. If you look into the Al-Shabaab activity into Kenya, a lot of it coming across the border, has to do with people who are able to bribe their way across the border.

So what are we doing? What is the kind of local civil society able to do? How can we support those efforts of people being -- you know, calling out these kind of changes and trying to sort of rein in some of the institutional corruption that does hamper and hinder African militaries and other institutions across the continent?

MS. MALONEY: Great. I think we have time for two more questions. We'll take one from I think each side. So if I could get this gentleman here and then this woman over here.

SPEAKER: Thank you. I'm (inaudible) from the United Kingdom. But there's been a lot of discussion about security in the conventional sense, which is obviously important. But for me in the time that I spent in Africa, which is quite significant now, it's -- I think for me it's the definition of transnationalism in the sense we have a huge amount of food security. When you have the encroachment of the Sahara increasingly because of climate change and generally a brain drain from now areas like Northwest African and sub-Saharan Africa, how can these six and the African Union take a greater role in addressing

security issues in a nontraditional sense?

SPEAKER: Thank you. (inaudible). What are some of the -- three of the major challenges you're seeing (inaudible) in terms of security? And what are your recommendations (inaudible).

MR. O'HANLON: I'll repeat that because I don't think we heard. So the three major challenges in East Africa in terms of security; recommendations for what to do about it.

MS. MALONEY: That would be a whole other panel entirely. (Laughter) But we'll see if we can get just a couple. And why don't we do one more last question here? And I'll ask each of the panelists maybe to give just a minute on all these questions. I know that's not enough and I know we haven't been able to get to all your questions, and any closing thoughts. So last word from the audience.

SPEAKER: Do you think we can achieve real democracy in Kenya, in South Africa, and other African countries without addressing the issue of land distribution, which is one of the driving forces that is creating all the -- even elections violence is still attached to land issues? Thank you.

MS. MALONEY: Let me go in reverse order of the panel, so starting with you, Jon.

MR. TEMIN: Sure. That first question is a really good one because it gets at the question of Africa's voice on the international stage. And part of the reason that voice has been relatively weak is because the big states have been relatively weak, the states that we're talking about today. And that's why I think some of the transitions that we're seeing in some of these places, while tenuous and can go either way, can be so impactful even beyond the time. And in particular, it's South Africa and Nigeria more than anything else. These are the two heavyweights. And if they can pivot, and South Africa is working on it and Nigeria has a way to go, they can be a voice on the global stage, as they should be. Nigeria's going to be the third largest country in the world population-wise by 2050.

When you talk about issues like climate change, Africa is more affected by climate change than possibly any other part of the world. Where is the African voice on climate change? It's not there for the most part.

Africa is increasingly affected by digital rights issues, but is the voice there? Not so much.

This is where the big states really need to exert themselves. And again, it's why South Africa's important, it's why their position on the Security Council is potentially important. I think that's something to really watch going forward.

Also on South Africa, on the land distribution issue, it is obviously a big hot potato for President Ramaphosa, a very difficult situation to deal with. He's facing a lot of pressure from parts of his own party to move forward on expropriation of land, you know, and he's got a tricky balancing act because he has to be responsive to his party and responsive to a very genuine call amongst many South Africans for that.

But at the same time, expropriation is not an attractive possibility for all the investors that South Africa needs. And President Ramaphosa has promised to bring in something like $100 billion in new investments. And so he needs to be very careful about the messaging that he's sending to the outside world. So a really tricky balance. It's an explosive issue in so many cases, so many places, but we probably don't have time for that now.

I just want to say one other thing if this is my last chance. I appreciate all the very nice feedback on the *Foreign Affairs* article. I encourage everybody to read it. I do just want to pause for a minute to note that that was a co-authored piece with my friend Judd Devermont down the street at CSIS. So I want to note that, as well. Thanks.

MR. O'HANLON: Here, here.

MS. MALONEY: Mike, to you. I also want to note that I haven't heard anyone respond to the Niger question that was raised. It wasn't part of the mandate for this panel, but if anyone wants to throw that into their final words, please do. Mike?

MR. O'HANLON: I'll pass. I'll save that for another time. I've already promised that future event, so I'll get to some of those other issues with a future panel.

MS. MALONEY: Okay. No final comments on some of the questions raised?

MR. O'HANLON: I think DRC, the only country I'm going to claim to be able to talk about with even partial expertise, is -- the future security agenda was a very good question. The DRC's still wrestling with sort of the old-fashioned security agenda.

And even though climate change and global warming are affecting DRC, it was already a really hot, rainy place when I was there in the 1980s and it doesn't have that much desert. So I'm not going to take advantage except to say, and just to back up Jon's point, that I think some of these countries getting stronger internally and cohesively is going to then allow them to get to issues which are not really luxuries that we can wait to talk about later, but it's very hard to talk about them when you're weak in a classic internal sense by traditional measures.

So I don't want to suggest we have to do this all sequentially, but these countries need to keep going on a positive path and get stronger so they can address the new security agenda, can increase their voice on the world stage, all the things that Jon said.

MR. SIGNÉ: Yes, I think particularly addressing the question on democracy, land distribution, or economic development it is not either/or. I think driving forces should be involved at all the levels simultaneously. Democracy is intrinsically important independently of the economic benefits. And we cannot either ignore what some would call (inaudible) or human capital, human development on the other hand.

So yes, I think democracy can evolve independent of the older form of challenges which could be faced. However, those -- for democracy to sustain and to improve the quality of democracy, those challenges should be addressed, as well.

So in terms of conventional assistance, conventional form of security, I think

it's an important question, we could discuss more about it, but there are (inaudible). So I think at the beginning I spoke about some of the economic transformations, ongoing transformations, on the continent, including poverty in Nigeria with more than 94 million people living below the extreme poverty line or inequality in South Africa. So those are proportional related.

And we didn't talk a lot, we didn't discuss a lot about Tanzania, but Tanzania, for example, is a place where I lead a sociocultural safari there where the goal was to bring investors and to teach the young looking for the traditional (inaudible), but teach them also a transformation. And one of the things that we visited were schools and hospitals. And in one of the hospitals involved, 30 percent of the newborns were not reaching the age of 18 months.

So yes, those types of challenges are still real and should be properly addressed. But again, they are broad issues. So I think I will stop there because I can go on and on and on. (Laughter) I used to teach classes for three hours, so.

MR. CAROTENUTO: And I know we're virtually out of time, so I'll be very brief. And just, again, talking about the issue of environmental security, I think that's a very important point and we could have obviously a whole day on that.

There are bright spots, right? We can learn a lot from the African continent on this from actors on the ground. Ethiopia just planted 350 million trees in a single day. Right? Kenya opened the largest wind plant in the northern part of the country just this past month. Right? So there are some bright spots that we need to look at and think about.

In terms of East African security kind of more broadly in questions like that, I think things like freedom of expression, promoting media freedom is key. We're seeing downturns in that in places like Uganda, Rwanda, and now more so in Tanzania much recently. So we have to think about that.

We have to think about inequality and that has to do, also, with the issue of land. And land politics are still plaguing every former settler colony on the continent. There

hasn't been an example of really a good way of solving that problem, so it needs more attention.

And then just thinking about accountability more broadly, judicial accountability when we talk about corruption and these kind of questions. Moving forward, you know, for instance, the Kenyan president did lead efforts in arresting the governor and the finance minister, but most people are quite skeptical that until we see someone in prison we don't yet know if those efforts are really fruitful moving forward. So thank you.

MR. SIGNÉ: Perhaps just before the conclusion I just want to remind you that we have many recent books just released on Africa at the bookstore there, including a couple of mine on African transformation, African development, and on innovating development strategies in Africa. So I encourage you to stop by the bookstore when going out.

MS. MALONEY: And Mike O'Hanlon's called the "Senkaku Paradox," as well.

So let me ask you all to join me in thanking this phenomenal panel. And thank all of you for coming. (Applause)

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