

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

IN KISSINGER'S ORBIT:
A CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR WINSTON LORD

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. LI: Good afternoon. I'm Cheng Li, director and the senior fellow of the John L. Thornton China Center here at the Brookings. It's my pleasure to welcome you to this very special event.

As I stand here introducing our two speakers, really two legendary figures in American diplomacy. In my mind, I'm far away and long ago. The place is Shanghai, my birth place, the date is February 21st, 1972. President Nixon and Ms. Nixon along with Dr. Kissinger at Winston Lord who had the meticulously prepared this historical visit arriving Shanghai that morning before heading to Beijing. That scene which was supported in Chinese media both symbolically and substantively ended two decades of a mutual animosity between China and the United States.

The result was a formation of strategic anti- Soviet alliance which contribute to enhancing the prospects for peace and the stability in the world and eventually led to the end of the Cold War. For me, a teenager then, and for many other Chinese who lived through the Cultural Revolution, the name of Harry Kissinger embodies wisdom, diplomacy, great stance of history, grand strategy and most importantly in the Chinese context, hope that the opening of China was not only a turning point in history, but also an event that profoundly changed our lives - lives of millions, millions of people.

Today, we are at another historical crossroads where the United States is facing formidable geopolitical and diplomatic challenges. But the most consequential being the U.S.- China bilateral relationship. It is an understatement to say that it was still in great need of wisdom, diplomacy, great sense of history and grand strategy. And in these trying times our words and actions should be driven by hope instead of fear.

We are fortunate to have with us today, two of America's most prominent diplomats, who not only witnessed many historical dramas but also are visionary strategic thinkers who can provide the necessary historical context or insights at this challenging time. They can guide us to look back into history and share their insights and experience of working

alongside the towering giant of American diplomacy, Dr. Henry Kissinger.

Especially learning from Kissinger's approach to dealing with foreign leaders in an ever-changing world. The Ambassador Winston Lord's words, I quote: the art of leadership, negotiation and the making of foreign policy.

Our two speakers certainly do not need an introduction, yet I'd still like to say a few words about each of them very quickly. The author of the new book, "Kissinger on Kissinger," Ambassador Winston Lord was given the nickname "Kissinger's Kissinger" and during his time serving as Dr. Kissinger's special assistant in the Nixon administration. He has also served as a director of the State Department Policy Planning staff, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, ambassador to China and assistant secretary of state in the Clinton administration.

In addition to his renowned deep understanding and appreciation of Chinese culture, Ambassador Lord has a strong reputation for advocating for intellectual freedom, civil society and universal values. Ambassador Lord, we are so honored to have you with us this afternoon at Brookings with my good friend, colleague, and mentor Strobe Talbott will moderate today's discussion.

Talbott served as the president of the Brookings Institution for 15 years from 2002 to 2017 and he was the person who hired me at the Brookings, 14 years ago. A Rhodes scholar, a foreign correspondent for Time Magazine, a renowned expert on both India and Russia, a distinguished diplomat who served as deputy secretary of state and an instrumental leader of both Yale Center for the Study of Globalization and Brookings, Strobe surely has had a storied career. During the advance trip to Beijing by Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Lord, Strobe was in the flying press corps covering them. We are honored to have Strobe to lead today's conversation. After their fireside chat, they will open to audience questions.

Ambassador Lord has also kindly agreed to sign books following the event in our lobby. Ladies and gentlemen with my personal gratitude and admiration, I would like to ask you to join me in giving our two wonderful speakers a warm round of applause.

MR. TALBOTT: Thanks Cheng, when I can already see that this auditorium has a number of your friends and your colleagues and I am very, very proud to be in both of those categories. Let's start with the origin of this very, very small book that has grappled with very, very big issues and events and persons over to you.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Thank you Strobe and Cheng Li, first a few grace notes. There are many friends who have worked with me in all my stages of my career, so I'm pleased to have them here, they've all agreed to laugh at my jokes and ask some softball questions but surely, I'm very happy to see them here as well as family members.

If you detect a real friendship among the three of us here, it can be well documented. First, let me say my respect for Cheng Li, one of the top China watchers in the United States and don't take my word for it, he may not want me to say this but I know he meets regularly with a guy named Kissinger on China affairs. So, what higher accolade than that and in Strobe and I have intersected twice really in addition to our general friendship, one when he was covering Kissinger and Nixon and the other one, we were both in the State Department together. I want to make clear, I hold no grudge against you Strobe for beating me out as deputy secretary of state. It's true, Warren Christopher was down to two choices and he correctly chose Strobe over me but I've never really resented that. I want to make that clear.

Now, I'll get into the origins of the book but let me just say what a distinguished grade he's had in four fields, journalist, diplomat, think tank leader and author of books including a new one coming up next year.

On the book, first I want to say, we want to try to boost sales a little bit, so I've been talking to our publisher and we're thinking of changing the title. I got this idea from Tom Welcoe (ph), an old friend. We put out a press release a few months ago about the book coming out, he saw it on his very small iPhone. He saw the title of the book but unfortunately

the last two letters of the title got erased. He couldn't see it, so he went out and got a hundred copies, thought he was buying the book Kissinger on Kissing. So, we're thinking maybe of changing the title to boost -- to boost sales.

Now to get to the origins of the book, Henry had never done an all history, believe it or not, here he was in his early 90's. A few years ago, I and other colleague conducted a series of videotape panels on Nixon foreign policy initiatives, the four in his book, Vietnam, China, Russia and the Middle East and it was more like timeline with some of the key participants. At the end of it, I thought wouldn't it be good to get Henry to reflect almost a half century later on the strategic environment and what he was up to. He never done it so, I sort of had to talk him into it. The first one went so well, he agreed to keep going. To make a long story short, we took the six interviews over many hours turned them into a transcript which forms the essence of the book, not only on those four issues, when he remarkably in his early 90's, after 50 years remembers not only strategic directions but tactical milestones and anecdotes that were both revealing and amusing but we drew them out in other issues like leadership, strategy, negotiations, organization of foreign policy and so on. So, I think the book, in addition to being very manageable he said it's a little book.

In fact, I've always said to Henry he and (inaudible) have one thing in common, namely they have both produced little red books. So, we wanted to make sure it was a little white book and not a little red -- little red book. But I do think it's for many -- the younger generations these events are ancient history. For those of us more familiar, an older generations it's a nice way to get back into that era as well as the generic subjects I mention go beyond any decade and it's about more accessible than a 1000 page memoire but above all they could be used for not only future historians but I would argue future practitioners of foreign policy. So, that's the origin and the targets of the book.

MR. TALBOTT: Well, that's a good -- but for me to say to you that I've had a little bit of time with Henry, even in the press corps, we called him Henry and you have said, and I guess with Cheng that what we're talking about today is what it's like in the -- in the orbit of

Kissinger himself and I can just imagine that the gravity in that orbit would be pretty intense.

What was it like to work with us men?

AMBASSADOR LORD: I do have in the introduction forward to the book a snapshot of Henry, a personal portrait which tries to capture some of his personality. I have to express that the outfit by utmost respect, affection and gratitude for having worked with him but he was also a pain in the neck. So, I label it the agony in the ecstasy and I'll illustrate in a serious way how it was like to work for him. The toughest thing to do for him was speech writing, among my other duties, I was fortunate to be involved in all the issues we've talked about. I was the one person on the staff that was paired with the experts and I was in there to help Henry with the global perspective of how it all fit together but I also had the unfortunate task of writing speeches for him. So, it would go somewhat like this, he would call me into an office, give me a topic, I'd do a first draft and give it to him and a couple of days later he'd call me into his office and say Winston is this the best you can do and I said, I thought so Henry, let me take another crack at it, I'd go back do a second draft, I go in, he says are you sure this is the best you can do and I said Henry, I thought so but I'll keep trying, anyway this goes on for about six drafts and I'm really getting quite annoyed.

So, I go in there on the sixth draft and, of course, he asked the same question. So, I said Henry, look, I've tweaked every paragraph, I've looked at every colon and semi-colon, I cannot improve this any further, this is the best I can do, so he turned to me and with a smile and said in that case now I'll read it.

Now, he was someone to drive you very hard, although he would select your strengths, he knew I could write pretty well, so he would push me on that. If someone else couldn't write but they were good on research and negotiations, he would push them on that. So, he stretched my patience, he stretched my nerves but he also stretched my capabilities and my horizons that I'll -- I'll always be grateful. It is no question that he would sometimes lose his temper and get mad and yell at his staff but the interesting thing was, it would be over small things, not big things. So, when the Yom Kippur war broke out in October '73 we were in his

suite at the Waldorf Astoria for the UN general assembly and in the midst of calling the president, the foreign minister, the prime ministers of these countries and this chaos, here he was polishing a UN speech very coolly in the midst of the crises.

On the other hand if his assistant had too big a schedule for him he say -- he say, what am I a dentist, you know, and he'd get really upset and one other example of what you would think would be a small thing he got upset about, on a secret trip to China in July '71, which we went to see whether we could set up Nixon's trip the year later -- by the way at the Segway and most of you know, I was the first person in the China after 22 years, we cut off relations in 1949 and no American official had been there for 22 years. So, a lot of people think Kissinger was first but that's not true, we were on a Pakistani plane, a Pakistani's up front, we and the Chinese in the back, as we got close to the Chinese border, I went to the front of the plane, left Henry in the back and I got there first. He, of course, elbowed me and got off the plane first but he got upset because his staff assistant didn't pack any shirts and he was -- he wasn't worried about negotiating with Jo (inaudible) or the fact that K2 were out our window and we were on a James Bond mission, no, no, no, no, he had no shirts. I, of course, said to Henry, you haven't started negotiating with the Chinese yet, you've already lost your shirt. So, he bought one from his -- another assistant, a very important man and (inaudible) unfortunately, John Holdridge was about 6'3 and Henry went around looking like a penguin and the shirt had a label that said made in Taiwan, so.

So, my point is under crisis, he would keep you cool, he would be cool himself but he could get impatient and yes, he did beat up on the staff, he certainly demanded excellence but one thing I really admired about him, he detested yes men and yes women. The first year I was on the (inaudible) in '69, I was not in the west wing, I was sitting over in what's now called the Eisenhower Building helping the (inaudible) system but also sending him occasional memos and sort of a mini policy planning staff on issues coming up or what we ought to be doing differently and several of them were critical.

Henry hired me in February 70, not despite those memos but because of them.

He wanted to meet people to argue with him, as long as it was not much, he sent a mentality and it was well and logically presented. So, I'll always be grateful. We shared some tremendous emotional moments. He himself had said that just about the most highest emotional moment of his career in his life was when we made a break-through in October 72 in the Vietnam negotiations after three or four years and after I'd almost quit two years later, he said what do you want to do, try to make peace or go on waving a placard. So, when that breakthrough came, we were in the garden and we shook hands and we said we did it and for Henry, that's always been -- and for me as well, one of the emotional eyelets. So, look, nobody's perfect, he has his flaws but this is a remarkable person, not only what he did while he was in office but the fact, he's still having such a major impact in his mid-90's fifty years later.

MR. TALBOTT: Let's take another couple of extraordinary figures. Nixon, and also Ford and (inaudible) and Joe and Dun Chow Thing, could you just put a kind of a thumbnail sketch on each of those.

AMBASSADOR LORD: How many hours we got, I mean -- it really is going to be tough to condense but yeah, the answer's yes. First Nixon, I've worked for seven Presidents of both parties, I'm a flaming Centrist bi-partisan, I'd say with total objectivity was by far the most brilliant on foreign policy, credibly well-versed and credibly strategic and is thinking that's what linked him with Kissinger whom he had never met before I hired him. And after all Nixon, we all know the dark side, so I'm not going to deny that or excuse it but here he was a conservative anti-communist from California, slightly anti-semantic, distrustful of the East Coast and Ivy League Colleges, who does he hire as his natural security advisor, we never met, a Jewish immigrant who worked for Nelson Rockefeller for several years. So, from Harvard, so, who did he pick on the domestic side Patrick Moynihan. His record on domestic policy by the way holds up not only well by itself but compared to other presidents we could name. So, it was a real tragedy that he was removed from office. I think he deserved to be removed from office. I think it's trivial compared to what we're seeing today but that's another issue but it's -- the shame is that he was poised for a tremendous second term, not only he is (inaudible) election but after

inheriting an incredible landscape which we can discuss about in '69, we open up with one fifth of the world's people, they talked with the Soviets, ended the Vietnam War, we thought on a credible basis, began process of peace in the Middle East, his domestic achievements and then it was all down the drain.

So, it's a real tragedy but I really will always admire his strategic approach and whatever his demons and he had demons and paranoia, he always put the natural interest first. So, when we were moving toward an agreement, he kept cautioning Kissinger not to make a deal that really wasn't solid. He would not make a deal to help himself get re-elected. He wanted to do the national interest and I think he was sincere on that.

But Ford was obviously different, he didn't pretend to have the strategic approach or the grasp for foreign policy of Nixon and therefore he delegated this essentially to Henry and backed him up beautifully and had a good deal of courage. When he was being challenged by Reagan in the '76 primaries, he encouraged and backed Henry, when Henry undertook one of his most remarkable achievements that people forget about, Southern African diplomacy is not in the book because it was in the Ford administration in which we brought the principle of majority ruins Southern Africa to the fore of American diplomacy (inaudible) on our policy and promoted the independence of Rhodesia and Libya with a remarkable achievement but it cost Ford in the primaries and conservative states like Texas because they didn't like the fact we were doing this in light and majority rule in Southern Africa approach. In fact, we got off the plane in West Africa in the middle of this and the Texas primary had just gone to Reagan over Ford and probably over this issue, it was that close. So, the press called, I don't think including you, serenaded it as we got off the plane and Airforce One, the eyes of Texas are upon you and so on. So, he was a courageous man, of course, he killed his career by pardoning Nixon which I think it was the right thing to do but he knew that would defeat him.

I do fault him for dropping Nelson Rockefeller under right-wing pressure and essentially keeping Kissinger away from his convention. So, the man had flaws and one other incident to demonstrate that he was a very decent man and I think he did a great service to the

country by healing it but I wouldn't say he was the quickest on his feet. I'll give you an example, we were with Chairman Mao, I hate to drop meetings but this is the fifth meeting with Mao, and he was really sick at this point and this was in 1975.

So, as Ford comes in Chairman Mao says, I will soon receive an invitation from God. Ford looks a little puzzled about that. At the end of the meeting he's going out, shakes the chairman's hand, said thank you Mr. Chairman, it was a great meeting and I want you to know that I really hope you get that invitation from God very soon. I think the translator said the President wishes you 10,000 years or something, he was a good translator.

Anyway, a good man but obviously totally different and it was really Kissinger's foreign policy and I think Kissinger's greatest single achievement is nothing in his book but the fact that after Watergate with the erosion of executive authority and American credibility with the resurgence of Congressional tactical oversight and the loss of American prestige around the world that he kept the China and Soviet initiatives alive. We couldn't really advance them greatly but they didn't collapse, went further in the Middle East with two more shuttles and did the southern African strategy and laid out the agenda on issues like energy, (inaudible) to see north, south relations. So, to hold the country together is the one America that was highly respected around the world, and at home is really quite an achievement. It's forgotten today but he's very controversial, Henry is, there is no question about it and he has his flaws, as I said but I would always remember that contribution. Now, I hate to give such a long answer. I got to keep going here right.

MR. TALBOTT: Oh, by the way, you -- we're going open up the conversation after this.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Okay. And we can discuss any issues, it doesn't have to be China, it could be any -- and it could be current issues or past issues. So, I got to do the other three. Okay.

Mao, let's remember now, Mao (inaudible) with Hitler and Stalin for the gold medal of horrible dictators in the 20th century. So, that's a background of all of this what we felt

we had to open up.

MR. TALBOTT: He had his flaws.

AMBASSADOR LORD: He had his flaws. Okay. The cliché is, you know, you see someone and you know the great historical figure and therefore that's why you're drawn to them but, in fact, he's the kind of person when he walk in the room, you just felt this -- however, sick even in his first meeting with us, he was -- this man was a powerful person. He was not (inaudible) contrast, he spoke in blood strokes, in fact, in the first -- in the meeting with Nixon which I was at and was cut out of, as you may know, the proof I was here is in the book and I won't go into this story now, it's in the book. But when Henry and I came out of the meeting we were a little disappointed because Mao kept saying he didn't want to get in a substance which Nixon wanted to and kept saying talk to Joe (inaudible) about this, but what he did, we realized in the next few days as we negotiated with Joe (inaudible) that he had really set the strategic framework for the key issues. So, whether it was Taiwan or the Soviets or Indochina he said enough to give Joe (inaudible) the framework to work with. Mao would not only, just in this meeting, but all his meetings would use illusions and symbols and you either thought, he was brilliant, you were stupid because you couldn't figure out what he was saying or maybe the guy was senile, you know. I think it was usually the former. I mean, for example, he used the phrase "empty cannons" when he talked about Chinese anti-American propaganda. He said it's just an empty cannon, we just do that for show. The Soviets with a polar bear, you know.

MR. TALBOTT: Mm-hm.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Watergate was nothing, he referred to it as breaking wind, he said, so these are the kind of the (inaudible), finally, the other illusion was one I've already mentioned with Ford, I'm going to get an invitation from God, so that's the way he would operate. Now, sometimes we did have trouble figuring him out.

In one meeting, I think it was the third one which is Kissinger, he said I want to send 10 million Chinese women to the United States, now, we didn't know what the hell he was talking about. Just because Henry Kissinger was supposed to be a secret swinger, I don't know what it was about. So, we couldn't figure it out. I get home and I talked to my Shanghai-born Chinese wife who knows China better than anyone. She immediately said no, she's having -- he's having trouble with his wife Madam Mao, politically and she was right, of course, the (inaudible) and Madam Mao. So, it took one Chinese to figure out the other but anyway he was -- he was very subtle even as he was very brutal. Joe and I, of course, was a complete contrast, elegant mandarin, elegant presentations, very well briefed. He never had any notes or briefing books and therefore Nixon didn't either because he didn't want to be one-upped. But by the way Nixon prepared for this visit more carefully than any President I've ever seen. He went through six briefing books I put together for him with obviously the government's help and every page was marked up and as we flew over to China, he kept coming back in Air Force One and asking us for more information and so on. But in this meeting, he didn't want to have notes because Joe didn't have notes. So, Joe would -- Henry said he's the most impressive diplomat he's ever met. I would of course echo that although he had his ruthless quality too. You don't get to be where he did, doing it, but he also did not damage limitation, of course, of Mao's accesses.

In addition, to presenting the Chinese position very beautifully and firmly but also in a way you could negotiate and with great historical contrast he had tremendous charisma, it's an overused word but he was the kind of person that just was so attractive and he used gestures very effectively. For example, one of our party got sick on one trip, he sent his personal doctor over and one of the more memorable gestures he made was on a trip we made, and Kissinger and Joe (inaudible) had just finished a long discussion, by the way the previous discussion Joe (inaudible) I showed both his long view and his one upsmanship because Henry asked him -- they'd finished and so they loved to talk about history and philosophy. So, Henry asked him, Mister Prime Minister, what do you think the impact of the French Revolution was and (inaudible) replied it's too soon to tell. So, that's the kind of guy he was.

Now, the last incident with Joe was, we finished our last meeting with him and in an extraordinary gesture he offered to walk Henry back to the guest house. Now, the backdrop to this were the previous three days, Henry and I would often go outside the guest house which we knew was bugged in order to discuss tactics, the trees were probably bugged too. But -- so, we'd go out there but every time we got to a certain bridge as we walked around the grounds, the PLA guy would pop up and stop us from crossing. We couldn't figure this out, of course, we talked about it in the guest house. So, after this final meeting, Joe (inaudible) says look, I'll walk you home, he walks Henry home, he doesn't make any reference to anything but where does he walk us, over that bridge. So, this is the kind of guy he was. He was remarkable and one poignant point I will make about him though and is really sad and I guess this is the way he survived but this comes from Mao's doctors so, we're not making this up.

In '75 and '76 both Mao and Joe were very sick and clearly going to be dying. Mao wanted to make sure he outlasted Joe because he wanted to make sure the succession went probably with the gang of four and Joe was leaning toward Don (inaudible) and so on. Joe had cancer and he needed an operation. Mao forbade the operation. Now, I don't know whether it would have saved Joe's life or not, he probably would have passed away anyway but Joe knew that Mao had stopped him from having an operation which he needed. What did Joe say as he went for the final passage of his life? Long live Chairman Mao, it's really rather sad but there is still a debate whether he prevented much greater damage or he was an enabler. Sounds familiar doesn't it? I go with the view that he could -- you know, he had to do some of this stuff in order to survive. In all the meetings with Mao, Joe who's so dominant his own meanings were not only differential in Mao's presence but almost obsequious, you know.

And then very quickly on Deng Xiaoping totally different, very small, his feet wouldn't much touch the ground, constant smoker, spit in the spittoon all the time, totally unconventional, very positive on US China relations and on the opening to the war on reforms as you would expect and we would often go to China or when I was there as ambassador and the early parts of visiting officials' trips would be pretty tough but Deng would end it on a positive --

positive note. I think the verdict on him will go down extremely mixed. On the one hand, his opening of China, the reforms, incredible economic performance ever since. He deserves tremendous credit. The other hand on the political side, he was ruthless, he was the front man for Mao in the 1950's, the anti-rightist movement. When Wei Jin Zing democracy will help him get into power after Mao's death, he immediately imprisoned him. He sacked two party secretaries who were too liberal for him (inaudible) and then of course, he was responsible for the Tiananmen Massacre. So, I have very mixed feelings about him.

MR. TALBOTT: And I don't think Henry ever had real good chemistry with him.

AMBASSADOR LORD: With Deng?

MR. TALBOTT: Yeah.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Well, not Joe -- because Joe was so much more of a strategic and historical thinker like Henry and they bonded that way. But it was pretty good chemistry. It wasn't -- it certainly wasn't tense but nothing could match the Joe Kissinger conversation so I think historic in every way.

MR. TALBOTT: Okay. Sir?

SPEAKER: Thank you. Sir, thank you.

SPEAKER: Here's a microphone.

SPEAKER: You ended your talk a little early, they went quicker.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Yeah, you should feel free to ask more questions too, if you want, yeah.

SPEAKER: While we get -- while we get the mics, one of the things that -- a number of things that I've found in the book was particularly interesting to me and that -- is that your -- the government, our government Russia -- Soviet experts were very worried about moving over and opening to China. And you say in the book that it was absolutely the opposite.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Yes. When Nixon and Kissinger came into office, they each wanted to reach out to China. Nixon's emphasis was somewhat more on World order, you can't leave (inaudible) people outside angry and so on. So, he was thinking it was sort of a

global structure. Henry was thinking more balance of power, playing them off in triangular diplomacy against Moscow but they had the same view coming in. One week after Nixon's -- I'm going to get to your question, one week after Nixon's inauguration, he sent a memo to Henry saying get in touch with the Chinese. That's how high the priority was. There was a series of public signals we sent the condition various ordinances even as we tried to get in touch with the Chinese (inaudible), it's all in the book but the point is there was enough out there so that smart people like the Soviet scholars you're talking about, scholars on the Soviet Union picked up the direction Nixon was heading. No one at that point could predict, it would be so dramatic as a secret trip and so George Kennan, I may get these names (inaudible) but George Kennan, (inaudible), Tommy Thompson, Chuck Bolan -- Chip Bohlen, all cautioned Nixon who they knew was overwhelming priority when he came in with his settle down the Soviet US tensions in a nuclear standoff said to him if you open up a China, you're going to really mess up relations with Moscow. Nixon and Kissinger didn't agree with that. Here's what happened. We, in the first couple of years while we were trying to get in touch with the Chinese, we had a real negotiation with the Soviets that weren't really going very well and there was a couple of crises, Middle East, Cuba and so on.

And Nixon wanted a summit with the Soviets and they kept turning him down, thinking they had him looking eager. So, as we finally got to the point where we were going to China to set up a summit with the Chinese, we gave the Soviets who did not know where this was happening, one last chance to have the Summit first and I got a call from Al Haig, Kissinger's deputy on the way to Pakistan, we were on a public trip at that point and he said over the phone in code language that wouldn't fool my four-year-old grandson, said that they've turned us down again on the summit. So, therefore, we decided to go with China first.

To get to your point about the impact and the Soviet scholar's advice we get to China within days of the announcement of Henry's trip and the President's forthcoming trip, the Soviet's rushed out to (inaudible) and asked for a summit, we made progress on a (inaudible) agreement, we made major progress in arm's control and this all happened within a matter of

weeks, so I think it's fair to say what Nixon and Kissinger were trying to do would not mess up Soviet, well, they were trying to improve it by getting their attention which they obviously did which gets into the whole issue of a strategy and triangular diplomacy.

SPEAKER: Sir, thank you, thank you Ambassador Lord for writing this great book. Strobe, thank you for acknowledging me for a question. Strobe is also my former boss.

AMBASSADOR: A little louder, I think...

SPEAKER: Can you hear me now? Oh, thank you. I was thanking Ambassador Lord for writing this great book and thanking Strobe, my former boss, for acknowledging me for a question. Ambassador Lord, right on the first page of Chapter 1, you open with a quote which stuck with me as I read the book and the quote was a core principal of the president speaking of Nixon, was that since you paid the same price for half measures, you should adopt bold moves. I think we certainly saw that with China, we saw that with Rhodesia as you mentioned and with Soviet Union.

What's missing in the book is Kissinger and Cuba and I wonder how you take this quote and what you guys did on Cuba and talked to the group about that holding this quote up to what you did with respect to Cuba.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Well, if he thinks that something makes sense, he says you go ahead fully and you take your chances because you're going to pay as much of a price for half measures and you may not succeed. I've never remembered him even talking about Cuba, it's interesting and at that point, we're now talking only a few years after the Cuban missile crisis and so on. So, it's a question I've never gotten before, to be honest. It just never came up. Now, I can only surmise that he felt he could take on only so many dramatic issues at one point and that he was going to have enough trouble with his base and his anti-communist pro-Taiwan people on the opening to China, enough trouble from the rite on Datoid with the Soviets, not to mention the controversy of ending any war in Southeast (inaudible) like the one we were engaged in. Not to mention the Israeli-Arab tight rope in the Middle East. So, I think he, undoubtedly felt this was not as high a priority, you had a nuclear weapon standoff with a

major power, you had a quarter of the world's people, you had a war you had to get out of and you had the importance of the Middle East. So, I think it was a matter of priorities. So, this never came up.

MR. TALBOTT: I'm going to -- I go to the lady there. But -- but, did you put your hand up? No, okay.

SPEAKER: (Inaudible).

MR. TALBOTT: And please feel free to ask about today's world and our foreign policy.

SPEAKER: Thank you for your introduction, your new book, I'm a student from (inaudible) University and my question is that according to your understanding of the Kissinger's grand strategy, your opinion, what should the US government do face the rising China and what should you ask to face the trade -- operating trade conflicts with China? Thank you.

AMBASSADOR LORD: I'm afraid I just didn't understand the question.

SPEAKER: Oh, sorry.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Sorry. I'm sorry.

SPEAKER: Yeah, okay. My...

MR. TALBOTT: Slow down a little bit.

SPEAKER: Oh, okay. According to the Kissinger's grand strategy in your book, in your opinion, what you guys should do face the rising China and what should you guys do to face away the upgrading trade conflicts with China?

AMBASSADOR LORD: Okay, so basically, China applies to Kissinger's strategic approach, how do you think I or perhaps him, but in this case, I have to be me would approach the China, US relationship today and then you said specifically the trade part?

SPEAKER: Yes.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Okay. I just want to make sure I have it right. Good question. The quick answer is the following. First of all, we're at the most serious juncture in US - China relations, certainly since Tin Amen, maybe since the very opening. Part of that is

structural, rising power versus an established power, you're going to have tensions no matter what. Particularly, if you have any illogical and some other differences between them, so it's going to happen, no matter who's leading or what's happening. So, you got that general background. Previous crises occurred usually over one issue, planes colliding, bombing the wrong embassy, the Taiwan and at a time when China was much weaker than they are today, of course, so those crises will by no means is serious and they were fairly quickly resolved compared to we now face which is a major problem.

Let me say that -- I'm not saying the United States is totally blameless and China is totally at fault but I will say that the current crises is primarily China's fault and it would have happened whether Trump was president or not.

Since 2008, and I say this to someone who has worked for 50 years for this relationship and we'll continue to do so and hope we can stabilize a relationship and I'm going to reject the dragon slayers as much as I reject the Panda Huggers and I'll get back to that in just a minute. I'm down the middle on this but I think we have to acknowledge it, since roughly 2008, the Chinese turn in domestic and foreign policy has been very ominous and you don't have to talk to me, you talk to think-tank scholars all across this country, former government officials as a unanimous opinion, it's a different opinion what you do about it but I think everyone would say there's been a sharp turn particularly under Xi that has brought this crisis about. It doesn't mean we're not blameless. And I'm going to make this a shorter answer, we got more question but it's a big question. Very quickly, stepped up repression at home, censorship, what they're doing to religious minorities, the horrors and Chin Zhang, the destroying of any institutional restraints in China, you know, dictator for life, communist party being considered everywhere, going backwards on economic reforms, violating WTO agreements, that's just on the domestic side, then you get mercantalistic protection, this is the policies on economics, you get intellectual property theft, you get cyber warfare, you get militarization, the South China Sea provocations and the East China Sea squeezing Taiwan, squeezing Hong Kong, promoting influence in other countries, not just the US but Australia, New Zealand and many others that is not only just

legitimate public diplomacy but sometimes covert and corrupt and has to be opposed. So, that's what's, what about this problem, it dates to 2008 where the financial crisis when the US fell on its face, China looked pretty good. China was stronger felt a sense of (inaudible) and had the coming out party of the Olympics and so ever since then, they've been much more aggressive abroad and repressive at home. I say that as recognizing the legitimate claims to a greater share of the world's power and respect and then we should not make them an enemy.

Now, having said that, there are two distinct responses to this to get to your question, what we ought to do that I think are both wrong and I've eluded to them. One of those who feel, and a many of our friends I highly respect but basically feel that the current problem is essentially both sides, we both have been screwing up, not primarily China, like I think it is and that we don't really have to change our policy that engagement which I supported should be continued but we got to look after our own sands as well as China. I dismiss that group, I think it's too weak of response to China when they are the culprit. The other side is even worse because I'm closer to this group than the other side who would make China a permanent enemy, inevitable enemy, we try to de-couple, try to contain, all of which are impossible and I call them the dragon slayers. My view is in between them and we had to toughen up our policy in certain areas to respond to Chinese aggression and repression but that we should also continue to look for errors we can cooperate. Most of which Trump has destroyed.

The final point I'd make -- so, I think we ought to look at it as I did with many other colleagues in a task force report, course correction. So, to go to Asia's society, course correction, you can get this report which goes down the middle as I've suggested namely manage the conflicts that we can't solve, still seek cooperation where we can, get a little firmer but don't turn them into enemies, don't over-react against Chinese citizens, have a McCarthy-like period and so, be selective in your surveillance of what's going on here in our own society. So, I think we ought to look at it as a competition, it is a strategic competition. It doesn't mean enmity and we ought to welcome it, because we have assets compared to China, that I think are very favorable to us and if we can get our act together, we can compete.

China's got 14 neighbors, all of whom are either had border clashes, territory disputes, they harbor terrorists and they have nuclear weapons. We've got Mexico and Canada and two oceans. We've got energy independence almost, we've got better universities, a better entrepreneurial system, a better political system if we don't screw it up, better demographics, immigration if we don't screw it up. So, we have tremendous -- they've got a debt problem, an aging population, pollution, energy problems, a terrible water problem coming up, I can go on and on forever.

So, we ought to welcome the competition but Trump is the least -- deserves credit for helping to raise the consciousness of the competitive nature of our relationship but he's responding in just the wrong way because of the three principal areas we need to compete with China, he's messing up. One is our domestic strength. This is to a foreign policy in general, not just China. Get our act together, not only in a terrible political polarization and the invective and so and distrust but also investing in our future whether it's infrastructure, energy, education, so that we can compete which ought to build on our strengths. Above all, our demographic and immigration strengths and so many other things that are being destroyed and we're hardly projecting ourselves as a city on the hill in terms of our soft power and our democratic ideals. So, the domestic strength is the basis of China foreign policy, our foreign policy toward China. Secondly, working with allies. What are we doing picking fights and trade disputes with allies when we all ought to gang up on China because they've all got problems with China's economic position?

Just in general, we pull out of a trans-Pacific partnership which was terrific economically and geo-politically against China and so we messed up, we're messing up under this administration and working with other friends and allies and when you have love letters from dictators and you pick fights with your democratic leaders, it's just upside down genuinely and genuinely but also with China. And then finally, use international institutions to magnify our inherent strengths, we can lead now but it's more like galvanizing coalitions rather than dominating and so when you pull out of the Iran deal, the climate change or the trade pacts in

Asia, you're also not helping your policy toward China. So, credit for recognizing the threat but a very poor reaction in terms of policy with the current administration.

MR. TALBOTT: That was a long list of nasties. There's one more, at least I've heard of it and it's in the papers, and that is the Chinese are going to see if they can do what the Russians did to our last election, next year. That they're going to try to hack into our election.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Well, they will said either that in the Taiwan elections in January. They're already doing that there. They're certainly capable of it technologically as is Iran. It's not just the Soviets. I'm not so sure they'll try to fool around in our election.

MR. TALBOTT: And they probably -- we don't want to hurt the -- our -- Trump's rival, whoever it is because the...

AMBASSADOR LORD: Well, you know, I think they're ambivalent about who they'd want to win. The one reason they might interfere -- I think they may not because they figure they'd get caught, not that they're totally shameless but I think they -- I don't know, I don't want to be naïve. They might well, interfere. Certainly, the Russians already trying again. But they have the capability and they're certainly doing it in Taiwan. So, they may well do it here but I'm not so sure they wouldn't want Trump to win. On the one hand, they can't stand his unpredictability and his seat of the pants and his occasional insults. On the other hand, they must love the fact that he's destroying American democracy, destroying American credibility, messing up with our allies, leaving the field on climate change and other issues to China. He's doing -- he's doing a good job of making China great again. So...

MR. TALBOTT: And Russia.

AMBASSADOR LORD: And Russia, so, I'm not so sure. So, both their ambivalence about who they want to win and the possible blow-back if we can uncover evidence, I'm not so sure they're going to do it but they certainly can and it won't be a matter of (inaudible) restraint, it will be a matter of calculated self-interest as always.

MR. TALBOTT: Good, you've been very (inaudible). Thank you.

SPEAKER: Bruce Guthrie, you talked about talked about trying to contrast

Nixon with the current guy and how he did not use foreign policy and foreign use for political business and whatever needs. In 1968, there would -- have been an issue that Nixon had sent Claire Chennault over to the Paris peace talks to say don't do a deal with Johnson, you'll get a better deal with me. Johnson considered this to be treasonous but he didn't actually bring it up and it wasn't actually revealed for many years afterward. Did staff within the Nixon group know that this had happened and how did they feel about it?

AMBASSADOR LORD: Well, I'm happy, I can say, I didn't know and I'm not trying to duck your question. I've never fully gotten to the bottom of this. It doesn't smell right to me frankly because it would be treasonous, it would be very comparable to today's issues, if in fact, Nixon ordered Claire Chennault to go to the South Vietnamese and say in effect, don't make a deal with Johnson, you know, wait -- wait for Nixon, that really would be outrageous, that's the allegation. I think there was something on TV just within the last week. I honestly don't know the exact and I'm not ducking this, I just haven't figured it out and I've never gotten a straight answer. I've never factly discussed it at length with Kissinger, I should but my impression is that Chennault was a real self-promoter. So, if you made me guess -- I'm not saying Nixon was incapable of dirty deeds and certainly Kissinger wouldn't have done this but it's possible that Nixon saw Chennault, they discussed Vietnam and being a self-promotor, she invoked Nixon's authority for what she was saying and she might have said, you ought to wait for Nixon to get a better deal and sort of implied Nixon was telling her to say that. I can't say that's true but that's my best -- as I've thought about this issue because I think it's very tawdry by appearances, that's my best guess is that she embellished her conversations with Nixon and therefore, you have this appearance of interference. So, that's the best I can do but I would agree with you. If it's absolutely true and in fact, Nixon said to her go do this, it would be outrageous.

MR. TALBOTT: The lady there. Right there.

SPEAKER: Ambassador, I'm the reporter from (inaudible). So, you know, with this escalation of the use of China trade tension has spread to other fears like technology and

even education but do you think could this actually be an opportunity for China to promote its image with all this attention on it, on the international stage. Do you think China is ready for that?

AMBASSADOR LORD: I'm afraid, again, I had trouble hearing.

MR. TALBOTT: Me too.

SPEAKER: Um, yeah, so, with the escalation of US China trade tension...

AMBASSADOR LORD: Right.

SPEAKER: ...as spread to other feuds, like technology and even education, could -- do you think -- could this competition dynamic could actually be an opportunity for China to promote its image in an international stage. Do you think China is ready for that?

AMBASSADOR LORD: Well, if you mean China promoting its interests on the international stage, there's no question they put a lot of effort recently under what you would call soft power. It was trying to improve its image is what -- the kind of thing you're getting at. And they've made a tremendous effort, including influencing other countries and societies in ways that aren't acceptable. I won't get into detail now. But they haven't been very successful because you cannot -- you can sell China and China's history and culture, God knows, I'm a tremendous admirer of that. You cannot sell their political system, you cannot sell ethnic cleansing, you cannot sell locking up a million people. You cannot sell crushing descent. So, they're never going to succeed in my view, no matter what they try with that system. Now, they certainly can influence whether it's airlines or hotels or National Basketball Association Leagues or Hollywood movies with their economic clout but they're not going to do it through projecting a better image in my opinion.

Now having said that, I want to make very clear. I'm being tough on China but on one good relation, so I think it's important that we maintain as many non-governmental exchanges, think tanks, send Chun Lee to China every couple of months and cultural and other exchanges and above all, welcome Chinese students, welcome Chinese scientists. There's some reason for concern about some theft of technology or using Chinese students as weapons

and so on. We do have to pay some attention to that but we shouldn't over-react. China's over-reached but we shouldn't over-react. We ought to be very selective and careful and try to maintain these personal non-official bonds as best we can as a buffer so that the whole relationship doesn't go down the tubes.

MR. TALBOTT: The gentleman there on the edge.

SPEAKER: Hi, Carl (inaudible). Thank you for your patience with what might be a provocative question. I'm a retired special agent...

SPEAKER: You haven't seen patience yet.

SPEAKER: Retired Special Agent US Customs and my question pertains to the global opium trade. Of course, how Congress controlled for a 150 years is a free port by the British as a result of prevailing in the opium wars in the mid 1800's and that's largely forgotten today but some say even that even the Vietnam conflict, the opium trade out of the Golden Triangle was relevant from the US perspective and even today it said that US troops have protected poppy fields in Afghanistan in the opium trade on Afghanistan is apparently flourishing where in 2001 it has almost ceased. So, can you comment on the history, especially with respect to China and Hong Kong of the opium trade and who controls that in today's world?

AMBASSADOR LORD: I'll give a short answer because I don't have an answer. I just don't know anything about this subject except the general impressions in the opium war. So, I'm not going to bluff with false knowledge here. I don't know who controls it. Obviously, gangs control it. I know that we have a real problem with China and Fentanyl and that the imports there which is a similar problem. And there have been areas like Afghanistan where we've made trade-offs, economic sustainability versus the drug trade which maybe were ugly but beyond that the general comments like that, I really can't answer your question. I'm sorry. I'm just going to be honest.

MR. TALBOTT: Yes, sir.

SPEAKER: Thank you Ambassador, (inaudible) with (inaudible) News. I'll just ask a question about today as you must be following the Chinese (inaudible) today and even

though talks haven't really concluded yet but in a pair of tweets this morning, the President seems to be fairly optimistic about this round of talks. My -- so, my question is if the two sides were to reach some kind of a deal, some say mini deal, what do you think would be the short-term impact for (inaudible) relationships? Thank you.

AMBASSADOR LORD: If they reach an interim deal it would be a very modest one. I think it will help the relationship from deteriorating further for the short-term. It's not going to solve any of the problems either economic or political. Even as we speak, they may be deciding, I just have no idea how it's coming out.

Obviously, Trump's calculation is the following which is better for me to get re-elected, it's got nothing to do with the national interest. It's just a matter of how can he get re-elected. So, if he thinks a modest deal, restrain from putting on more tariffs in exchange for buying more soybeans and maybe some gestures in intellectual property rights that we've seen for 40 years by the way. If he thinks that it's good for the economy and good for getting him reelected, he'll go that direction. And he'll probably call it the greatest deal since the magna carter.

If, however he thinks that will make him look weak and the anti-Chinese forces will go after him and the economic forces and it looked like he was weak, then he may not. He's going to watch the stock market, so he figures a mini-deal will help the stock market. I suspect that might be the tipping point. And it really is a matter of election count. It's got absolutely nothing to do with what's in our interest. So, I can't tell you how it's going to come out because he's probably conflicted which is going to help him more or hurt him less. But to answer your question, I think we (inaudible) this point or you can do is a mini deal and keep on the Agenda the real problems which the Trump administration's credit, they've identified. The real problems cannot balance a trade. Although, when you have a 450 billion dollar deficit, you know, over a billion dollars a day, that gets to be real money, you know, but the point is that, you all know the arguments about exports and imports and it's not one all bad, and none are good. The real problem is force technology transfer intellectual property threats, saga warfare, subsidies,

breaking WTO rules, these are the key issues. There's no way they're going to be solved this week. So, they're going to have to put them on the Agenda to look at. So, they'll probably kick the can down the road, but I don't know, the whole thing may fall apart. I just -- I get my instinct and it'd be better right now once they come out with a very thin deal and say we're still going to go after these issues seriously and the Trump will make it a tremendous break-through.

MR. TALBOTT: Right over here please.

SPEAKER: (Inaudible). Talk to us a bit about you're thinking regarding Hong Kong.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Sure.

SPEAKER: Major issue I don't need to elaborate on that and is there any solution possible and if not, is this going to be a continuing traumatic situation for the West?

AMBASSADOR LORD: Well, one thing we can say is the result of Hong Kong, one country, two systems is dead if it is ever alive. The incumbent in Taiwan will get re-elected and Hong Kong will never be the same again financially as a pass point. So, that's already happened it seems to me, the Chinese have managed to re-elect the person they don't want to lead Taiwan. Having said that, I have no -- it even tells you how it's going to come out. I don't believe them because nobody knows how it's going to come out. There's good news and there's bad news. The good news is, it shows that the yearning for democracy, and it's not just about democracy, I understand. But the other issues, housing and so on is not dead in the world. We've had a bad 10 years in terms of all the grads and populous and nationalists taking over in democracy on the retreat. This is the most hopeful demonstration in the other direction, together with some snippets and the Soviet Union, you may want to come at Russia whatever they call it these days and some other -- some other areas that are happening. So, there may be some push-back and so, they have a right, because the extradition bill really was the tipping point, I won't go in detail now, we don't have time. I want to get more questions.

If you ask me how it's going to come out, the answer of course is no, but if you want my best bet, and this is what the Chinese would hope, I think, is that they'll wear this thing

out. Now, on the (inaudible) movement lasted for a while and they got worn out. This one really had sting power, it's extraordinary in terms of demonstrations. But I think the Chinese feel that, first of all, because they totally mislead their own people, so they whipped up nationalism on this thing, they're playing up (inaudible) and there have been some and it's not -- it's not good either morally or it's a tactic. They're working the tycoons and their interests. They'll continue to lock up leaders and they might even suggest to Carrie Lam throw a couple of crumbs out there, not anything basic but some trumped-up, excuse the pun, inquiry on police or some gesture and hope the combination of peeling off some of the protesters, the pressures financially, the tycoons and so on, the acts of violence that this thing will finally wear itself out. I'm not saying it's going to happen if you make me a bet, that would be my bet. The bad news is it could end tragically of course. I don't think the Chinese have any desire to go in there. They went obviously. Although the fact that they wouldn't pay a big price, Trump would probably say well, it's too bad but so you went in there and crushed everybody, he wouldn't give a dam. And the Chinese didn't really pay too much of a price after (inaudible), there's a very temporary. So, if push comes to shove, they're not going to let Hong Kong drift away. That's for sure. But I don't think they have to and I assume they don't think they don't want to. So, that's my best guess. I can't make a firm prediction.

MR. TALBOTT: Yes, sir. You can take the mic and all right -- and then give it to the person behind you.

SPEAKER: Absolutely. Good afternoon, my name is Julian Kyle Lewis from the American University, here in Washington. Ambassador, you spoke on the speeches that you wrote on behalf of Henry Kissinger. And what I would like to know is could you talk about like your creative process of just you sitting down at the table drafting documents that -- and if you think about it, it's not like you're writing for the President, you're writing for a diplomat who would eventually transcend administrations. So, did you know, the ramifications of your words as you were putting them down on the page, that they would be remembered forever and ever? And like could you go into the creative process of how you felt? What did you feel like? What was

your inspiration?

AMBASSADOR LORD: Well, it's an interesting question. To those who can't hear but what it felt like to write for Henry in words that presumably you had lasting significance. First, I don't want to exaggerate my role. These really were his speeches. I'll give you a sense of the process but I don't want to exaggerate my role in this by any means. Secondly, when I got to the State Department under the Ford administration, I had two terrific speech writers working for me in the policy planning staff and I was sort of orchestra director but they were the first violins I mean

They really did the hard work and I would help them and give some advice. The basic process would be in a little bit the way I've already described it but essentially, he would say, here's what I want to talk about. So, he would outline already the basic themes of the speech and the structure. He took speeches very seriously because even if US press wouldn't pay them much attention, the congressional committees were but above all, foreign embassies would. So, he could set strategic emergence that sent signals around the world about American policy.

Secondly, he saw them as deadline producers. For example, he gave a major speech but Moynihan gave it on his behalf because we were in the Middle East on a shuttle we were -- but shuttling with Egypt and writing a huge speech at the same time. It was one of the more exhausting moments of my life. But for that speech he wanted to make a series of initiatives for the developing world, economic -- which took economic steps by the treasury and commerce part and a lot of those were being resistant. So, by having a deadline of a UN speech, he could force bureaucratic decisions and presidential decisions up against that deadline when he couldn't get it done before. So, he took speeches very seriously. Most secretaries of state don't. And I think, he also took it very seriously in his last couple of years at post-Watergate setting forth the Agenda of coming issues and framing it for future administrations. So, I think he had a sense of the significance of it. I certainly did, writing for the top diplomat at the time but I didn't -- first of all, I don't want to exaggerate my role and secondly, I didn't think of the cosmic dimensions over many decades and even his speeches aren't necessarily remembered today but some of them are pretty dam good. We'd have a good tactic on the speeches particularly when I was in the state department. I told my poor guys who were doing the basic draftings, I said don't get discouraged, he's going to treat you like the anecdote I told earlier and he'll literally throw the speech on the floor and say it's nonsense. I said, he's going to do that, so get ready for that but keep your best pages and your paragraphs. Don't throw them away. About the fourth or fifth draft, we'll put them back in again and we would literally would do that and by then he even liked it. You know, he thought it was brilliant. But he was -- and these were his speeches. First, the intellectual cement, the inspiration, the objective and the way he'd lay out the boat on lines and then how he would reach structure in the early drafts and then in the final drafts he literally was doing line by line. The guy is a brilliant writer. I think if he never (inaudible) his books would make him a major figure in American diplomacy and history.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Yes, sir?

SPEAKER: Matt Delsory (ph), University of Maryland. Saying 50 years ago --

in the public mind at the time and I think since, Kissinger has gotten the predominant credit at the -- to some degree at the expense of Nixon for the opening to China. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about in the first say two years what the relative roles were? Obviously, at the end they were reinforcing toward opening to China but who was pushing what the --

AMBASSADOR LORD: Yeah, my question is essentially credit between Nixon and Kissinger on the open to China. I apply that more generally to foreign policy and Kissinger with great sincerity, by the way, he's got a tremendous ego. I know that. But you look at his memoirs and you look in his book, he's constantly telling you how Nixon was crucial both the strategic direction which they shared but his laying out the courage to make tough decisions. Going to China was not inevitable, I mean there was not going to be very controversial or going in the Middle East or ending the Vietnam War, or bombing North Vietnam just before Moscow summit. A lot of decision, took a lot of courage and they were only presidential decisions that could be made. So, both in terms of strategy and courage, he gives full credit to Nixon, including on China and specific issues. They were perfect fit because Nixon had the strategy, he cared about the general tactics and we would write memos that helped him in his -- saying what we planned to do and why but he would approve it but then he would leave the details to Kissinger, never second guess him.

When we were in October '72, it was '71 but setting up the Nixon trip, after the secret trip and a public trip the Chinese completely switched strategies on a (inaudible) with us. I don't have time to go into detail but it meant revising our whole approach of how we were going to describe the presidential visit. We had no way of communicating with the White House in those days but Kissinger had enough confidence that Nixon would back him up that he agreed to the Chinese approach, which was the Shanghai communicate basically to each side, citing their differences instead of the usual kumbaya type of communicate and so that's an example of how he would (inaudible). Kissinger gives him full credit for it. I know, specifically on the China opening, as I said earlier, they both wanted to do it, it was slightly different emphasis. Nixon had written the foreign affairs article about global order and keeping China as part of it and having

stability. Kissinger (inaudible) with the Soviets but they both saw the arguments in the other direction.

So, if you force me and force Kissinger to say who deserves the most credit, you have to give it to Nixon. He had the political courage to do it but, of course, Kissinger was brilliant in the way he carried it out. And as I mentioned, Nixon sent a memo to Kissinger, February 1st, 1969, get in touch with the Chinese. Now, obviously Kissinger deserves a lot of credit for the way we've sent public signals to condition publics and the way we got in touch with through various countries with the Chinese and that is negotiating on behalf of Nixon when we got there. So, they both deserve credit and you're right, sometimes people tend to give Kissinger more credit. I'm not sure that's true though. Even the fiercest critics of Nixon, usually cite the China opening as well, even this son-of-a-bitch did this good thing, right, but he got this one right. Which I think is unfair because I think you look at the middle east and Daejeon and some other issues and domestic promises.

MR. TALBOTT: Arms control.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Arms control, yeah. I can say (inaudible), I should throw in arms control more specifically. He deserves a lot of credit for other things besides that, even as he gets hit for -- for Watergate.

SPEAKER: Thank you.

MR. TALBOTT: Yes. (Inaudible).

SPEAKER: Kay Usho, I'm retired Department of Labor employee. Ambassador Lord, if a Democrat wins the next election what's the most important thing that the new president should do, or things, to try to correct...

AMBASSADOR LORD: Well, I...

SPEAKER: ...America's position.

AMBASSADOR LORD: The most important and it's -- who knows what is possible, is to bring this country together again. That underlies everything. With now and these all clichés but they have the virtue of being accurate, we're retreating into two camps, we're

living in bubbles, the divisiveness and the rhetoric and the distrust, nothing can get done. Democracy is getting a terrible name. We don't even know what truth is anymore and fake news, our institutions are eroding, so obviously, whether it's foreign policy or domestic policy where it all starts, somehow, we've got to somehow become a functioning democracy again both for the health of our country and as an example to the world. So, that's a general expectation but everything else flows from it, whether we can get the kind of investment in our future that we need and the legislation we need, whether we can restore our civil liberties where we can ease racial tensions, whether we can fix, get back to immigration which helps this country and not hurts it and it's getting destroyed, whether we can have some faith in the news media, it's going to take incredible effort and we have a terrible legacy to overcome but that's clearly what we got to do.

MR. TALBOTT: Yes. There down here?

SPEAKER: I wanted to ask about -- about Kissinger and the bombing of Cambodia.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Right.

SPEAKER: I think what little I know that brought him down in estimation.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Sure.

SPEAKER: And what was your opinion?

AMBASSADOR LORD: That's a very fair question. There's a lot of issues that controversial as it would be on a series of issues like we were dealing with. The bombing of Cambodia, as you may recall, took place secretly with only a few people in the government and Congress knowing about it. And so, the issue is should we have done it and should have been kept secret. I was somewhat on the (inaudible) side in most of the Vietnam debates, having that said that, but I understand the Cambodian bombing. Let's recall the following, the north Vietnamese had violated Cambodia and Laos Sovereignty for years. For example, in Cambodia they're sitting there 30 miles from Saigon and safe bases in Cambodia going in, killing Americans and Vietnamese and then retreating back over the border. So, in terms of whether

it's the Cambodian incursion later or the bombing which you're referring to, trying to do something about these bases in North Vietnamese invasion of another country it seemed to me an ethical and legal grounds was justified. So, I had no problem with our bombing those because (inaudible) who was the head of the country at that point approved it. So, we were doing it, we weren't (inaudible) the North Vietnamese were and we had the approval of the leader of the country and that is why it was kept secret. He didn't mind us doing it because they were threatening his sovereignty but he would be too embarrassing for him, it was public, so we kept it secret for (inaudible). Now, could we have led a few more senators know and so on and with every legal scholar agree with the argument, I'm not sure about that but I do think the basic arguments of who ruined sovereignty first in Cambodia and why you have to keep it secret are pretty persuasive.

MR. TALBOTT: That gentleman. Yes.

SPEAKER: Thank you. What was Kissinger's role during the October '73 war between the Arabs and Israel.

AMBASSADOR LORD: I'm afraid I can't tell you because you have to buy my book to find out. No, seriously, very quickly, it is in the book. When Nixon and Kissinger came in, one of the objectives was to supplant Soviet influence in the Arab world. Soviet arms were essentially dictating diplomacy then. And their objective was to show that only America could get territory back for Egypt and the others. Only America could mediate peace as being a friend of Israel but willing to talk to the Arabs. That the Soviets being so one-sided could give them arms but they would never get any of their political objective, they needed our help. The situation was not right for our trying to do that until October '73 and also Nixon and Kissinger had their hands filled with Vietnam, China, Russia and so on so that they couldn't take that on at the same time and the situation wasn't right. So, Secretary of State Rogers was given that portfolio but it couldn't go anywhere. When the Egyptians attacked in October '73 they made major inroads against Israel for the first time. Israel counter-attacked and had surrounded the Egyptian Eighth Army. Nixon and Kissinger decided let's freeze that situation before that Army is

destroyed. They sent Kissinger and I was with him to Moscow to get an immediate cease-fire before the Egyptian Army was wiped out. What were Nixon and Kissinger thinking? For the first time both sides were ready to negotiate because for the first time Israel was sobered up by the military defeats that it incurred with the Egyptian invasion and so they realized, you know, maybe they need something beyond just military power to preserve -- you know, preserve their security and for the first time the Arabs were totally humiliated being like the 67 (inaudible) that they had managed to at least inflict some initial casualties on the Egyptians -- on the Israelis and so before the Israelis could once again humiliate the Arabs and wipe out the Army, we went to Moscow and with Moscow's help we got a cease-fire in place. Once that happened, we then moved on to the first shuttle of returning some territory to Egypt. So, that was his role, it was obviously central and it is laid out in the book.

SPEAKER: Okay. Hi, my name's Marty LeClair. What's your take on the current situation with the Russian and US nuclear arsenal? You know, I know, it broke down, we pulled out of it and so could you comment on that please?

AMBASSADOR LORD: I'm glad you asked Strobe Talbott that question.
(Inaudible).

MR. TALBOTT: I was very impressed of (inaudible) answer to the guest question when we would get out from under Trump and he was right to put it to our domestic mess and getting it out of the way. But in the two most big global dangers are the destruction of these various agreements and institutions that have helped us not blow ourselves up and the other one of course is climate change.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Thank you. I can't approve on that. You can go to the next question.

MR. TALBOTT: Over here. The lady and then you can have the gentleman back of her and here.

SPEAKER: Oh, thank you. My name is Genar, I'm an undergrad student here at the...

SPEAKER: Oh, sorry, you can...

SPEAKER: Oh, you're sure.

SPEAKER: Oh, I'm so sorry, on that.

MR. STROBE: You can do a duet.

SPEAKER: Perfect, I'm an undergrad student at George Washington University here and I'm from China, so it means so much for me to just hear this part of the story because that was my earliest memory on, you know, from policies on diplomacy and that's kind of got me where I am right now. My question is actually kind of shifting the gear a little bit. So, I'm wondering what would you think the NATO allies going to play in the part of, you know, the -- where Americans trying to rebalance into Pacific region, when we see Germany struck, you know, a deal or with China last month or even with (inaudible) initiatives spouting, you know, help shoot the NATO, or (inaudible) or Europe balance this sort of power to mimic? Yeah, thank you so much.

AMBASSADOR LORD: That's an interesting question. Europe China access is extremely important to China's playing a lot more attention to Europe these days with investment, even as you said the Belt and Road Initiative. They are trying to split the unity of the European forces and not only NATO but European community on issues like human rights and even trade. I think Europe is as fed up with China's (inaudible) trade policies as the United States. That's why to be picking fights with them as well as Japan and Canada and so on, it just is not good strategy vis a vie China.

So, in terms of the US aspect, we ought to be lining up the Europeans with us to put pressure on China on issues by trade. But the President is so obsessed with who pays the most for bases, some of which is legitimate issue, they ought to pay more but at the expense of NATO's solidarity I -- I do think despite what's happening in this Country, the Democratic ideals that tie us to NATO are not just the military situation means we have nothing to worry about in terms of NATO or Europe lining up with China against us. I think they're still going to be wary of the security aspects even as they're interested in the economic and that's true of almost every

country in the world. All of Asia doesn't want to choose between us. They want China's economic strength and they want our security umbrella. So, I'm not worried about the interaction. I am worried that we're not getting them on our side whether it's human rights and so on. Now, I think this can be repaired but under the current administration it's a serious handicap.

AMBASSADOR LORD: You wouldn't have -- yes. Chun?

SPEAKER: Yeah.

AMBASSADOR LORD: A mic up here please. We've got lots of mic's, right over here.

SPEAKER: So, let me ask you first. First, I thank you so much for that very candid and (inaudible) assessment. And my question to you is that when we talk about the strategy or with negotiation or diplomacy, we also have to look at the -- some interest we may compromise or may as you said to pay attention to China's legitimate natural interest.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Right.

SPEAKER: So, in that regard, in which area if you suggest a President and that maybe future President or current president, United States should be a little bit more sensitive because this is area, we probably should be more sensitive from Chinese perspective. We cannot (inaudible) just very tough on China. So, if that's the case, which area, we may, you know, do much better job to understand Chinese position and therefore negotiation better or maybe it's not the right word, a compromise and (inaudible).

MR. TALBOTT: That's a very fair question because I've given the rationale from a response in certain areas but I also said the US is not blameless or that I don't want to put all the blame on China, although, I think they deserve the bulk of it and also some of it's built in rising versus established power. I'd answer your question three ways, first, the first is impossible but ideally you should do it, I've been promoting this for years (inaudible) including Kissinger. A strategic dialogue between our leaders. It can't happen now. I mean, Trump wouldn't know what a strategic dialogue was and frankly the Chinese (inaudible) either, so we -- it's hard but

ideally, I'd like the two countries and this is the first part of your question, to have this kind of dialogue. The US would say and it gets to your question, we -- and mean it, we genuinely welcome your rise and we welcome the competition, it's going to make us get our own act together and we're going to compete with you. We're not trying to contain you, we're not trying to keep you down. Secondly, in the Pacific, you have legitimate security concerns because of geography and history, we have so, so we can both co-exist in the Pacific, there's room for both of us. We're not trying to crowd you but you can't expel us and we -- countries want both of us, let's work out a Pacific community together with other countries. Thirdly, on the world stage with your rising power, you deserve more seats at the table and so does India and Brazil and a few others. So, we welcome you being a quote, responsible stakeholder, greater influence, you have a right to reforming the system, you do not have a right to overthrow it or to violate long-standing international law and norms. So, let's work out a strategic relationship, on those basis. The Chinese would say in return, we are a rising power, we deserve it. We're here to share responsibility for the world system, not to replace the United States even if we could. In Asia, we agree we both have interests that co-exist but please keep in mind our legitimate security concerns and on the world stage, we do want some reforms but it's benefitted us and it's helped us to grow. We recognize that. We're not going to overthrow it. This is all nebulous, it's important, it's impossible right now but that's the kind of strategic framework I'd like to have.

Secondly, you look for errors you can cooperate and here Trump has destroyed them. The Iran deal, the climate change, these have been destroyed. We still have some areas, anti-piracy, pandemic plagues, drug control, UN peacekeeping, there are some areas that China has been responsible in international governance so let's work together in those areas where we can cooperate and we're -- the problems probably can't be solved unless we do cooperate, like climate change.

And thirdly, on sensitivity that is more difficult to define. I'll take one example but I want to be very careful. I'm not suggesting this, I just don't know enough. We do fly very

aggressive oversight reconnaissance flights near Chinese territory. I honestly don't know whether we're required to do that much. They're pretty provocative. I'm not saying we shouldn't do it or cutting it down. I'm just saying it's an area of at least I'd like to know more about whether that is something that we don't -- we don't have to rattle their cage that much. What we get out of intelligence isn't worth the provocation. Taiwan, I think we are respecting, I believe in strengthening Taiwan and maintaining strong relationship and (inaudible) squeezing it. But we shouldn't come out for independence and so on, but I think that's one we're already respecting. So, there's some areas but I think it's a three-layer thing, you know, what is our strategic intention, where can we cooperate and then within that, where can we maybe find areas, we ought to be more sensitive.

AMBASSADOR LORD: Well, this has been really terrific. When I heard some time ago was a (inaudible) and this has been a virtuoso performance this afternoon. And we want you to come back. Sometime maybe in the summer or the fall of next year for another book. It's going to be called Lord, on Lord, My Lord.

SPEAKER: Thank you so much.

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