

ALGERIA'S UPRISING: A SURVEY OF PROTESTERS AND THE MILITARY

SHARAN GREWAL
M. TAHIR KILAVUZ
ROBERT KUBINEC

ALGERIA'S UPRISING: A SURVEY OF PROTESTERS AND THE MILITARY

**SHARAN GREWAL
M. TAHIR KILAVUZ
ROBERT KUBINEC**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On April 2, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika resigned from office, becoming the fifth Arab president to fall to a mass uprising since 2011. Protests have continued since his resignation, calling for the fall of the entire regime. We conducted an online survey of over 9,000 Algerians, gauging their attitudes towards the protests and their goals. The survey also includes a large sample of 1,700 military personnel, allowing us to compare and contrast their attitudes with the protesters.

The majority of Algerians in our survey support the protest movement and want a complete change of the political system. Protesters and non-protesters alike are fed up with corruption and would prefer a transition to democracy. The lower ranks of the military—the soldiers and junior officers—largely agree with the protesters on these demands, but the senior officers are more resistant. However, moving forward, protesters are likely to come into conflict with military personnel of all ranks over the military's political and economic privileges post-Bouteflika.

INTRODUCTION

Algeria today is in the throes of revolution. Having ousted President Abdelaziz Bouteflika on April 2, mass protests have continued since, demanding the overthrow of the entire regime. The military, having begrudgingly endorsed protesters' calls for Bouteflika's resignation, is now attempting to shepherd the transition to best preserve its interests.

Major questions remain open. Who are the protesters, and what are their demands? What are the military's interests, and can the protesters accommodate them during a transition? To what extent are Islamists still popular? Finally, what lessons have political forces and the military learned from Algeria's failed attempt at democratization in the 1990s?

To shed light on these questions, we conducted an online survey of 9,000 Algerians between April 1 and July 1. The survey targeted two populations of interest: protesters and military personnel, two demographics who are likely to shape the nature and outcome of Algeria's transition. Of the 9,000 respondents, over 4,200 self-reported as protesters and nearly 1,700 self-reported as military personnel. Drawing on this unique data, this paper explores to what extent the protesters and the military see eye-to-eye on Algeria's future, and on what areas they are likely to come into conflict.

Our survey provides six main findings:

1. **Overall, we find very high support for Bouteflika's resignation and for the protest movement.** Even among non-protesters, over 60% support the goals of the protests and want them to continue. The majority of Algerians in our survey want a complete change of the political system and support democracy as the best form of government.
2. **The current transitional roadmap is untenable.** Only 20% of protesters in our sample believed that the now-cancelled July 4 presidential elections would have been free and fair. Instead, they want a new constitution and the removal of the "2Bs": interim President Abdelkader Bensalah and Prime Minister Noureddine Bedoui. There is also high support for revolutionary demands such as confiscating assets of businessmen close to Bouteflika and banning senior Bouteflika officials from running in future elections.
3. **While the uprising has been leaderless, several figures are popular among the protesters.** These include opposition activists like the economist Fares Mesdour, human rights activist Mustapha Bouchachi, and Democratic and Social Union leader Karim Tabou. But just as popular are statesmen who served prior to the Bouteflika regime, including former president Liamine Zeroual, former prime minister Ahmed Benbitour, and former foreign minister Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, all of whom have already been floated as potential consensus candidates between the protesters and the regime.
4. **Islamists, whether of legal or illegal stripes, are not very popular.** However, neither are secular political parties. Ideology does not seem to be a strong determinant of political support. Instead, centrist figures seen as being able to bridge ideological divides, and especially those who refused to participate in elections under Bouteflika, enjoy the most support. At this stage, however, very few respondents have made up their minds about who they would vote for in presidential or parliamentary elections.
5. **Within the military, the lower ranks are very supportive of the protests and their goals.** On almost all questions, soldiers and junior officers are similar to protesters in their attitudes. Senior military officers, by contrast, are more cautious, expressing skepticism toward democracy and toward a revolutionary path. This vertical divide within the military has likely inhibited army chief Ahmed Gaid Salah's ability to repress the protest movement thus far.
6. **Civil-military relations will be a major obstacle to democratization.** There are significant differences between protesters and military personnel of all ranks over whether the military should referee the political arena, whether to investigate the military for abuses committed in the 1990s, and whether to increase the military's budget. However, there are also some areas of agreement: Protesters largely agree

with the military on granting it veto power over national security decisions and having a defense minister with a military background. Most surprisingly, at this stage, there is little support even among the protesters for removing army chief Gaid Salah, though there is also little support for him to play a political role.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with a short section on our methodology, describing how we over-sampled Algerians who self-reported as either protesters or military personnel. We then proceed with four sections discussing the results of the survey: 1) attitudes toward the protests and their goals, 2) attitudes toward the transitional roadmap, 3) attitudes toward leaders and parties, and 4) attitudes toward civil-military relations.

METHODOLOGY

Algeria's uprising has grabbed the world's attention, and with it, increased news and analysis of the country. Journalists and researchers on the ground, especially Algerians themselves, are providing invaluable interviews, documentaries, and personal assessments for which there are no substitutes.


To complement these reports, we sought to conduct a survey to better assess how popular the protests and their goals are. Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate the reliability of existing survey companies in Algeria, and none of them may be free to ask the types of sensitive political questions we are interested in, especially to military personnel.

We therefore pursued a more creative approach to conduct our survey. We purchased advertisements on Facebook that advertised the survey to Algerians who are living in Algeria and over 18 years old. We offered 100 DZD (less than \$1) in mobile phone credit as an incentive for completing the survey. Between April 1 and July 1, over 9,000 Algerians clicked on our advertisement and filled out the survey.¹

We employed demographic quotas to match the general population on age and gender, and Table 1 suggests the sample is representative on those two demographics. However, the Facebook sample tends to over-represent other demographics, such as higher education. It also over-represents urban areas, though Figure 1 shows that respondents still come from diverse regions of Algeria.²

TABLE 1: DEMOGRAPHICS OF CIVILIANS IN THE SURVEY (N=7,293)

Demographic	Census (%)	Our survey (%)
Female	49	48
Age < 30	55	54
College-educated	48	60
Algiers	8	16
Unemployed	12	21

FIGURE 1: MAP OF CIVILIAN RESPONDENTS

The slight urban, educated bias is a blessing, rather than a curse. The protesters—the topic of this report—also likely skew more educated and more urban than the general population.³ Indeed, of the 7,293 civilians in the sample, over half—4,249—reported attending at least one protest, while 3,044 have not attended any. Using Facebook therefore provided us with a uniquely large number of protesters from which we can better generalize about their political attitudes.

There is of course one major limitation to our data, which is that all of our respondents are on Facebook. While nearly 50% of Algerians have Facebook accounts,⁴ there may be socioeconomic or psychological differences between Algerians who are on Facebook and those who are not. Accordingly, we cannot, and do not, claim our sample is nationally representative. Instead, it over-represents a population we are interested in: protesters.

The second and more unique advantage of Facebook is that it allows us to target military personnel. We targeted advertisements to those whom Facebook has determined has an interest in the military; for instance, those who “like” Facebook pages about the military or who report in their employment history that they’ve worked in the Ministry of Defense. While not all of these individuals have served in the military, targeting ads just to this subset allows us to significantly oversample military personnel. Overall, 1,727 survey takers self-reported as active-duty or retired military personnel.

These military respondents represent a cross-section of the Algerian military. Of the 1,700 personnel, 468 were soldiers, 1,169 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and junior officers, and 90 senior officers (from the rank of Major and up). About 44% of the military personnel were active-duty, with the remainder retired. Unfortunately, there are no publicly available demographics of the actual Algerian military for us to compare our survey sample to. However, the survey sample is at least consistent with our expectations: There are very few women,⁵ the lower ranks are younger than upper ranks, and the officers more educated than soldiers.

TABLE 2: DEMOGRAPHICS OF MILITARY SAMPLE (N=1,727)

Demographic	Soldiers (N=468)	Junior officers and NCOs (N=1,169)	Senior officers (N=90)
Active-duty	41	44	44
Female	6	4	12
Age < 30	42	38	0
College-educated	16	60	72
Algiers	10	10	18


In short, while our survey data are not nationally representative of all demographics, we succeeded in oversampling the two demographics we care most about: protesters and military personnel. We should caution that our non-probability sample should not be used for making general statements about the Algerian population—for example, what the average level of support for democracy is for the population as a whole. We can, however, provide evidence of the differing levels of support for democracy between demographics represented in the survey.

SECTION 1: ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PROTESTS

We first examine general attitudes toward the protests and their goals. Overall, we found very high support in our sample for the protest movement. Over 82% said they supported or strongly supported the goals of the protests, and 82% wanted the protests to continue.⁶

When we break up the sample, however, important differences emerge. Figure 2 presents the data for five sub-groups: protesters,⁷ non-protesters, soldiers,⁸ and senior officers. Soldiers and junior officers are nearly as supportive of the protests as the protesters themselves, with about 80-90% support. Non-protesters and senior military officers, however, are noticeably less supportive, by 20 to 30 percentage points. While a majority of these groups still say they support the protests, they appear to be more cautious toward them.


FIGURE 2: SUPPORT FOR THE PROTESTS



The high level of support for the protests among junior officers and soldiers corroborates one of the authors' earlier claims that the military's lower ranks would have been unwilling to fire on the protesters to defend former president Bouteflika.⁹ Moving forward, this level of support for the protests among the lower ranks is likely to continue to limit army chief Gaid Salah's ability to repress the protest movement.

We then turn to specific goals of the protest movement. The initial target of the protesters was President Bouteflika: calling at first for him not to run for a fifth term, and subsequently for him not to extend his fourth.¹⁰ Ultimately, he resigned on April 2, two weeks shy of the end of his fourth term. Almost everyone in the survey—95%—supported Bouteflika’s resignation. Protesters and non-protesters alike were happy to see the ailing Bouteflika go. Once again, senior military officers were slightly less supportive (83%), but still the vast majority supported his resignation.


FIGURE 3: SUPPORT FOR PROTEST GOALS



These results suggest that almost everyone recognized that Bouteflika’s time was up. What happens afterward is another matter. A major demand of the protesters has been a complete change of the political system. In our survey, 82% of protesters supported or strongly supported a complete change in the regime. Similar numbers are found for the soldiers and junior officers. However, non-protesters and senior military officers are significantly lower. Only 68% of non-protesters, and only 58% of senior military officers support systemic change. Again, it is important to remember that this is still a majority, but it reflects a much more wary attitude toward the fall of the system.


Similar results obtain when examining the economic demands of the protesters. About 70% of protesters, soldiers, and junior officers rank the economy as “very bad” and corruption as “very high.” While many non-protesters and senior military officers agree, they do so at slightly lower rates.

FIGURE 4: ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES




If Algerians are frustrated with the current political system, what do they believe to be the ideal system? Overall, 61% of protesters agreed or strongly agreed that “a democratic system may have its flaws, but it is better than other political systems.” A similar 58% of protesters agreed that democracy is somewhat or completely suitable for Algeria. However, once again, senior military officers were less supportive, with only 48 and 42%, respectively, agreeing with these statements.

FIGURE 5: SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY



Finally, we asked respondents about their expectations for how the transition will turn out. At this stage, almost everyone is optimistic that Algeria's transition will end up in democracy. About 90% of protesters, soldiers, and junior officers found it likely or very likely that the transition will result in democracy, while about 80% of non-protesters and senior military officers thought so as well. Only 15-20% believed that transition would end up in a military takeover, and even fewer (about 5-10%) believed it would end up in a civil war.¹¹

FIGURE 6: PREDICTIONS OF HOW UPRISING WILL END



For a country whose last attempt at democratization resulted in a military coup and then a decade-long armed conflict, these are reassuring findings showing that people expect a peaceful resolution. Today, Algerians of all stripes are hopeful and confident that this transition will not be like the last. *How to transition to democracy, however, is another matter.*


SECTION 2: TRANSITIONAL ROADMAP

There are major disagreements over how to run the transition. The initial approach of the regime had been to follow article 102 of the constitution, which made the president of the Senate, Abdelkader Bensalah, the interim head of state for 90 days to oversee presidential elections on July 4.¹² During this time, the current government, led by Prime Minister Nouredine Bedoui, could not be changed according to article 104.¹³

Protesters, however, rejected this path, noting that figures from the Bouteflika regime—Bensalah and Bedoui—could not shepherd a transition away from said regime.¹⁴ In our survey, the majority of respondents rejected the regime's path. Asked about the planned July 4 presidential elections, only 22% of protesters believed they would be free and fair, and only 18% thought they should stop protesting and start campaigning. Soldiers and junior military officers had similarly low numbers. Non-protesters and senior military officers were slightly more supportive of the regime's path, with about 35% and 41%, respectively, believing the July 4 elections would have been free and fair.


Ultimately, in the face of mass protests against the July 4 elections, only two, relatively unknown figures put forth their candidacies. On June 2, the constitutional council rejected those candidates and cancelled the July 4 elections altogether.¹⁵ The council urged interim President Bensalah to organize elections at a later date, implying that the regime would prefer he overstay his 90-day mandate. But without the constitution to legitimize this preferred roadmap, it is likely to be rejected even more strongly by the protesters.¹⁶

FIGURE 7: ATTITUDES TOWARD JULY 4 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS



The protesters, after all, want a complete change in the political regime, not a transition led by the old regime. But what does a complete change entail? In the survey, we asked about four actions in particular. First, rewriting the constitution, which currently prescribes a presidential system with little judicial independence.¹⁷ Second, seizing the assets of businessmen close to the Bouteflika regime, many of whom have already been arrested in the wake of his ouster.¹⁸ Third, removing the “2Bs”—President Bensalah and Prime Minister Bedoui, two holdovers from the Bouteflika regime—and replacing them with consensus candidates or a national unity government. Fourth, banning senior officials from the Bouteflika regime from running in future elections.


FIGURE 8: FALL OF THE REGIME



Each of these four demands see high support among protesters, soldiers, and junior officers. About 80-90% of each of these groups support revising or entirely rewriting the constitution, seizing the assets of prominent businessmen, removing the 2Bs, and banning senior officials from running in elections. Non-protesters and senior military officers were generally less supportive of each of these actions, especially removing the 2Bs, which was supported by only 68% of non-protesters and 56% of senior officers. Still, these revolutionary demands against the Bouteflika regime enjoy high support across the spectrum.

However, there was very low support for two other transitional actions: the prosecution of Bouteflika, and the removal of army chief of staff Ahmed Gaid Salah. Only 37% wanted to put Bouteflika on trial, and only 24% wanted Gaid Salah removed. While Bouteflika had been a major target of the protests, the target was primarily his continued stay in power, and less about him as a person.¹⁹ As an ailing octogenarian he may have even garnered some sympathy, removing revolutionary desires for his imprisonment.

FIGURE 9: SYMPATHY FOR BOUTEFLIKA AND GAID SALAH



The low support for removing army chief Gaid Salah is more puzzling. Protesters have in recent weeks increasingly chanted for Gaid Salah's removal, but at least at this time, these calls do not appear to enjoy high support even among the protesters themselves. There are important and expected differences across groups, with protesters about three times as supportive of his removal than senior military officers (29% versus 10%), but desires for his removal are still very low across the board. This low support does not appear to be the result of survey respondents being afraid to openly state their desire to remove Gaid Salah: We also conducted a list experiment²⁰ that similarly reveals only 28% support for his removal. One explanation may be that the protesters want Gaid Salah to remove himself from the political arena, but do not mind if he remains as head of the army. Moreover, Gaid Salah may have succeeded in increasing his popularity as a result of calling for the removal of Bouteflika and cracking down on the Bouteflika clan.²¹

In sum, the current transitional roadmap is untenable. Algerians want a complete change of the political system, and will not be satisfied with a stage-managed reshuffle within the regime itself. Algerians support revolutionary demands to tear down the Bouteflika clan: to remove the 2Bs, to prosecute corrupt businessmen, and to ban Bouteflika officials from running in elections. Protests will continue if the regime simply sticks to the current constitution and holds elections with no guarantees of political freedom or a genuine transition to democracy.

SECTION 3: LEADERS, PARTIES, AND IDEOLOGIES


The leaderless nature of Algeria's protest movement has thus far helped it to survive. Without a hierarchical organization, the regime has been unable to smear or arrest the leadership of the protest movement. However, this does not mean that there are no figures that enjoy popularity among the protesters. Moving forward, these figures can play an important role in negotiating with the regime on the path forward.

In the survey, we asked the protesters who they trusted to speak on their behalf. We floated eight names, as well as provided a write-in option of "other" and "no one." Respondents could check as many names as they wished. In addition, we asked a second, more general question, asking respondents for their level of support for almost 20 individuals on a 0-5 point scale. Across both questions, the same patterns emerged.

Former statesmen

First, somewhat surprisingly, the most trusted individuals among the protesters are former statesmen who served prior to the Bouteflika regime. Former President **Liamine Zeroual** (1994-99) was the most trusted to speak on behalf of the protesters, receiving support from 36% of protesters in the survey. He was also the highest-ranked in the general support question, receiving a score of 3.1 out of 5. Zeroual, 77, did not serve in the Bouteflika regime, and as president was one of *Les Dialoguists*, preferring to negotiate with rather than eradicate the Islamic factions during the civil war in the 1990s.²² Zeroual's name has been floated multiple times as a consensus candidate between the protesters and the regime, and our survey data suggest that many protesters may indeed trust him in this role.

FIGURE 10: WHO DO PROTESTERS TRUST TO SPEAK FOR THEM?




The second most supported individual among protesters in the general question was another oft-floated consensus candidate, former foreign minister **Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi**. In our survey, Ibrahimi received a score of 2.7 out of 5. Like Zeroual, Ibrahimi, 87, did not serve in the Bouteflika regime, serving instead in various ministerial roles between 1965-88. He also pulled out of the 1999 election that brought Bouteflika to power, claiming electoral fraud.

Similarly, the former prime minister **Ahmed Benbitour** (1999-2000), is highly ranked among the protesters, receiving a score of 2.5 in the general question, and receiving support from 23% of protesters to speak on their behalf. While Benbitour, 72, served as Bouteflika's prime minister in his first year in office, he soon resigned from his post due to disagreements with Bouteflika. He has since been an influential opposition figure in Algeria.

Since none of these former statesmen have been a part of the ruling elite since 2000, they are not tainted as being part of the Bouteflika regime. Having the trust also of the military (see appendix), they may be able to help shepherd the transition forward as consensus candidates. However, it is important to note that while popular, none of them enjoy the support of the majority of the protesters, with Zeroual, the highest, only enjoying the trust of 36% of the protesters in the survey. This could limit their ability to function as consensus candidates, at least individually.

FIGURE 11: LEVEL OF SUPPORT AMONG PROTESTERS



The opposition

The next most popular group among the protesters are centrist opposition figures who refused to engage with the Bouteflika regime. Most of them also remained outside of or distanced themselves from the existing opposition parties.

Fares Mesdour, 45, an economist at the University of Blida, leads the opposition group, with 25% of protesters in the survey saying they trust him to speak on their behalf. He also receives a score of 2.6 out of 5 among protesters in terms of general support. Mesdour has become known over the last few years for his anti-regime stances during media appearances. He has not been involved with party politics in Algeria, and his fiery attitude may have provided him some popularity among the protesters.²³

Mesdour is followed by **Mustapha Bouchachi**, 65, a well-known human rights activist. Bouchachi enjoys the confidence of 18% of the protesters in the survey, and a general level of support of 2 out of 5. A secular lawyer, Bouchachi defended members of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in court after the 1992 coup, and went on to chair the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights from 2007-12. He is therefore viewed as a centrist figure who can unite different factions of the opposition. Bouchachi served as a member of parliament from the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) from 2012-14, but resigned from his post claiming that the parliament was toothless and his participation was simply legitimizing the regime.²⁴

The millionaire businessman **Rachid Nekkaz**, 47, also fares relatively well with a score of 1.9. Born and raised in France, Nekkaz previously ran, unsuccessfully, in both presidential and municipal elections in France. He then renounced his French nationality in an attempt to run in the 2014 and 2019 Algerian presidential elections. Along with his flamboyant personality, he is an outsider to the Algerian political system and claims to bring change, and may therefore enjoy some popularity among the protesters. Despite opposing the niqab, he has also committed a million euros to paying the fines for any woman convicted of wearing one in Europe.²⁵

Karim Tabou, 45, the former secretary-general of the FFS, is also well-received, with 11% of protesters trusting him to speak on their behalf and receiving a score of 1.7. After leaving the FFS in 2011, Tabou co-founded the Democratic and Social Union (UDS), a centrist front that seeks to “transcend false cleavages.”²⁶ Tabou and the UDS have boycotted elections and sustained a rejectionist discourse toward the Bouteflika regime.

Finally, the exiled diplomat **Mohamed Larbi Zitout**, 56, a leader of the Geneva-based Rachad movement, is also among the more supported political figures. Zitout receives a score of 1.6 among the protesters. The Rachad movement, led mostly by Islamist figures, has sought to bring ex-FIS members together with secular forces to unite the opposition. Operating primarily in exile, Zitout has also not been directly involved with electoral politics under Bouteflika.

Meanwhile, politicians affiliated with opposition parties, and especially those who took part in the political processes under Bouteflika, are not seen as credible by the protesters. Zoubida Assoul, president of the Union for Change and Progress (UCP), and Sofiane Djilali, president of the Jil Jadid (new generation) party, both receive very little trust from the protesters to speak on their behalf. Similarly, in the 5-point general support question, former prime minister Ali Benflis, president of Talaie El Houriat,

earned just 0.9, while Louisa Hanoune, president of the Workers' Party, and Said Saadi, ex-president and founder of the Rally for Culture and Democracy, come in at a mere 0.3 apiece.

Importantly, Islamist leaders also perform poorly across the board. Ali Belhadj, the head of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Abdallah Djaballah, the head of the Justice and Development Front (FJD), Abderrazak Makri, the head of the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), and Kamel Guemazi, an ex-FIS leader, received average levels of support of only 1.2, 0.8, 0.7, and 0.5, respectively, out of 5.²⁷

The main difference for the varying levels of support for the opposition actors seems to be their involvement in the political system under Bouteflika. Leaders such as Benflis, Makri, Djaballah, Djilali, and Hanoune and their parties have been integral parts of Algerian politics for the last 20 years. They have been demanding rather limited change through reforms, and in the eyes of the protesters, may have played a role in legitimizing the regime.²⁸

The more favored opposition figures, by contrast, have had a more critical view of the Algerian political system. Mesdour, Bouchachi, Tabou, and Zitout have all either not participated at all in elections or taken a more rejectionist stance in recent years. Their views and limited involvement with the political system may have created a more positive image for these opposition actors in the eyes of the protesters.

The regime

Not surprisingly, the lowest ranked individuals in the surveys are those associated with the Bouteflika regime. Former president Abdelaziz Bouteflika (0.7), his brother Said (0.1), Prime Ministers Ahmed Ouyahia (0.1) and Nouredine Bedoui (0.2), and the interim President Abdelkader Bensalah (0.3) are among the least favored political figures in Algeria. Similarly, the recently arrested former intelligence chief Mohamed Mediene (0.4), also known as General Toufik, fares quite negatively among the protesters.²⁹ Even former foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi (0.3) appears to have been tainted by the brief association with Bouteflika in his final days in office.

The one exception to this pattern is army chief **Ahmed Gaid Salah**, who polls relatively well among the protesters, coming in 4th with an average level of support of 2.5. It is possible that his role in removing Bouteflika, and subsequent crackdown on the Bouteflika clan, has contributed to some goodwill toward him. Either way, this level of support corroborates the earlier account of few protesters wanting his removal.


We have focused thus far in the section just on the protesters, and examined who they view as leaders. In the appendix, we present the data for non-protesters and military personnel as well. Results are largely the same, with Zeroual, Gaid Salah, Ibrahimi, Mesdour, and Benbitour topping both lists.

Who would win in elections?

To examine how each of these figures would fare in an election, we asked respondents who they would vote for “if free and fair presidential elections were held tomorrow.” Figure 12 presents the results among civilians—protesters and non-protesters together.

As expected, about one-quarter of the respondents do not know who they would vote for, but they do plan to vote. Only about 8% said they would not vote. At this stage, there is no clear favorite, as none of the candidates receive more than 10% support.


FIGURE 12: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS POLL



Topping the list are the same figures that emerged from the previous questions: Ibrahimi (10% of the vote), Mesdour (10%), Zeroual (10%), Benbitour (6%), and Nekkaz (5%). Polling at 4% is a more comic political outsider: Ghani Mahdi. A political satirist, Mahdi had previously announced his candidacy for the now-cancelled April presidential elections.

Interestingly, army chief Ahmed Gaid Salah, who was one of the most supported figures in the general question, is not strongly supported as a presidential candidate, receiving only 4%. This may indicate that even though Algerians support him in general and do not want him removed from his army position, they also do not want him as president, reinforcing the distinction between the military and politics.


None of the leaders of political parties, whether Islamist or secularist, garner more than 1-2% of the vote in the presidential poll. This failure of political parties is reflected even more starkly in the parliamentary poll. We asked respondents, similarly, which party they would vote for if free and fair parliamentary elections were held tomorrow. Almost half of our respondents do not know whom they would vote for and another one-quarter do not plan to vote at all. In other words, over two-thirds of our respondents do not find any of the existing political parties deserving of their votes.

FIGURE 13: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS POLL

None of the parties, meanwhile, receive more than 3% in the survey. The ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) comes in at 3%, as does the banned Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). They are followed by three opposition parties from diverse ideological backgrounds: the Front El Moustakbal (FM), a FLN-splinter led by Abdelaziz Belaid; the leftist FFS; and the Islamist MSP. However, it is important to reiterate that none of these parties receive more than 3% support for the parliamentary elections.

In the parliamentary poll, we included the FIS, though it is unclear whether it will be legalized or if its members will be allowed to re-group into a new party. We did however gauge attitudes towards these two paths. Overall, only about one-quarter of the sample supported lifting the ban on the FIS or allowing it to re-group into another party. Demands for FIS participation are therefore low, but not non-existent. We should not interpret this one-quarter, however, as all being FIS party supporters: This likely reflects general pro-democracy and inclusionary sentiments, and indeed includes supporters of other parties.

FIGURE 14: SUPPORT FOR LEGALIZING BANNED MOVEMENTS



In the parliamentary poll, we did not include the banned Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (MAK), representing the ideologically more radical Kabylie movement. Support for legalizing the MAK was even lower than for the FIS, coming in around 7%. Calls for the autonomy or secession of the Kabylie region are not positively received. Combined, these results for the FIS and the MAK suggest that while Algeria has moved on from the experiences of the 1990s and early 2000s and do not widely support the FIS or the MAK, these tensions are not entirely resolved. The lack of support for these movements' right to exist or participate in politics suggest that reconciliation has not fully occurred.³⁰

To recap, these trends in Algerians' political attitudes indicate several important points. First, with the exception of army chief Gaid Salah, the regime enjoys very little legitimacy. Bensalah, Bedoui, Bouteflika, and Ouyahia were some of the very lowest ranked figures in our survey. While there is support for Gaid Salah, there does not appear to be much support for him playing a political role.

Second, opposition parties are also not credible in the eyes of the electorate. None of the parties received more than 3% of the vote in our parliamentary election poll, and opposition figures associated with parties do far worse than independent opposition

figures, like Mesdour and Bouchachi. Relatedly, attitudes toward the individuals and parties do not seem to follow ideological divides. There is low support for both secular and Islamist politicians and parties. The more favored names in the opposition camp are known to be centrist figures who can communicate with an ideologically vast array of political actors. Ideology, at least for now, appears to be a less important concern than a politician's status as an outsider.

Finally, former statesmen may enjoy support as consensus candidates to shepherd the transition. Former president Liamine Zeroual, former foreign minister Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, and former prime minister Ahmed Benbitour enjoy some of the highest levels of support in the survey, even among protesters. These individuals may be seen as having sufficient levels of distance from the Bouteflika regime while also bringing important expertise in governing. However, it is important to note that none of these figures on their own command the support of even a majority of the protesters. Large numbers of Algerians in the survey, at least one-third, did not express support for any of the figures named and do not know who they would vote for moving forward. The political field remains fluid and open for new challengers and contenders to enter the mix.

SECTION 4: THE MILITARY AND POLITICS

Perhaps the central question in Algeria's uprising is the position of its military. Having played a major role in the country's independence movement, the army commands historic legitimacy as the savior of the nation. It has chosen or approved every one of Algeria's presidents, ruling from behind the scenes. Most importantly, the military aborted Algeria's last attempt at democratization in the 1990s after elections appeared set to bring the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) to power.


In this second chance at democratization, will the Algerian military once again abort the transition? Some scholars argue that the Algerian military has become more professional and apolitical since the 1990s, and thus would not repeat that disastrous scenario.³¹ Others, however, point to the major political role that army chief Gaid Salah is already playing as evidence that the top brass wishes to continue to play kingmaker.³²

What are the interests of the Algerian military today? Do the protesters see eye-to-eye with the military on these issues, or are they likely to come into conflict? Our unique survey of military personnel and protesters allows us to examine both of these questions.

We can first examine the political role that the military envisions for itself moving forward. Does it wish to be the referee or arbiter of the political arena, intervening when a party like the FIS is poised to take power? In the survey, about 45-50% of military personnel agreed or strongly agreed that the military should be the referee of the political arena, with only 25-35% disagreeing.³³ Importantly, results did not differ much between junior and senior officers, suggesting that the next generation of officers may also largely prefer this political role.


Civilians, however, reject such a role for the military, albeit narrowly. Only about 30% of civilians supported the military playing referee, while about 40% opposed it. In line with the massive, awe-inspiring chants calling for a "civilian, and not military, state,"³⁴ a significant number of Algerians do not wish to see the military play this political role.

However, protesters and the military are in relative agreement on another aspect of the military's political role: whether the military should wield veto power over national security decisions. Almost 70% of military personnel surveyed—whether junior or senior officers—supported having veto power. Interestingly, civilians largely agreed as well, at only slightly lower rates.


FIGURE 15: POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY

Friction over national security decisions were a major cause of Egypt's failed 2012-13 transition. The elected president, Mohamed Morsi, had made a series of decisions that the military disagreed with, such as negotiating with militants in the Sinai and saber-rattling with Syria and Ethiopia.³⁵ If civilians in Algeria instead surrender security policy to the generals, it could avoid creating friction that could spark a coup. On the other hand, democratization will by necessity require removing this veto power eventually, as the elected president must be the commander-in-chief.

Economic policy may also serve to be a source of friction between the military and protesters. Algerian military officers profit from a swelling budget and (often illicit) enrichment opportunities, and enjoy post-retirement careers in both state-owned and private companies.³⁶ In the survey, about 40% of military personnel believed that the military should wield veto power over economic decisions, with only about 20-30% disagreeing. Similarly, only 33% of senior officers believed that involvement in economic activities distracts from the military's national security mission. Civilians, however, largely do not wish to give the military veto power over economic decisions, and do view economic activities as distracting from the military's mission.

FIGURE 16: ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE MILITARY


There are at least two other potential points of contention between the military and the protesters. The first is whether to investigate the military for abuses committed during the civil war of the 1990s. Amnesty International has found that Algerian security forces “were responsible for thousands of extrajudicial executions, disappearances, and the systematic use of torture” during this time.³⁷ Families of victims have organized into human rights groups such as the *Collectif des Familles de Disparus en Algérie*, and are likely to lobby for investigations if Algeria were to democratize.³⁸ In the survey, a majority (58%) of protesters agreed that the military should be investigated. However, only 33% of senior military officers agreed.

FIGURE 17: POTENTIAL CIVIL-MILITARY FRICTIONS

A second potential conflict between the eventual elected government and the military is more mundane: whether to increase the defense budget. Only 30% of civilians agreed, perhaps viewing employment or health as being bigger priorities during the country's current economic crisis. But 50% of senior military officers want a large budget, despite it having nearly tripled in the last ten years.³⁹

There are also several areas where we expected, but did not find, differences between the military and the protesters. The vast majority of respondents, including military personnel, found a civilian president acceptable. Bouteflika, after all, was a civilian, despite playing a minor military intelligence role in the war of independence.

On the other hand, the majority of respondents opposed a civilian as defense minister, including a majority of the protesters. While effective civilian control over the military often requires a civilian defense minister, this could be another short-term concession to grant the military during the transition.

FIGURE 18: ATTITUDES TOWARDS A CIVILIAN SERVING AS PRESIDENT AND DEFENSE MINISTER

In short, there are several potential conflicts over civil-military relations moving forward. Protesters and the military disagree over whether the military should referee the political arena, whether the military should be investigated for the 1990s, and whether the defense budget should be increased. However, there are also sources of agreement that could serve as short-term concessions to the military, including granting the military influence over security decisions and having a defense minister with a military background. If civilians can remain unified against the military serving as referee, they may be able to force the military to remain in the barracks.

CONCLUSION

Algeria today is at a crossroads. Protesters are taking to the streets en masse every Friday demanding a complete change of the political system. The regime is attempting to navigate and survive this revolutionary moment, but the current path is untenable. Protests will likely continue until a genuine democratic transition is initiated.

The regime has few options but to concede to these demands. Our survey suggests that the protest movement and its goals have widespread popularity, even among non-protesters. Most importantly, the lower ranks of the military—the soldiers and junior officers—also widely support the protests, limiting army chief Gaid Salah’s ability to repress the protesters or impose his preferred roadmap.

According to the Algerians in the survey, an initial path out of the crisis may be through so-called “consensus candidates,” particularly those elderly statesmen who served in government prior to the Bouteflika regime. Liamine Zeroual, Ahmed Benbitour, and

Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, may be able to command sufficient trust among the protesters and the military to shepherd the country to a brighter future.


Algerians today are confident and optimistic that this uprising will result in democracy, unlike their aborted transition of the 1990s. But challenges remain, especially vis-à-vis the military. If an eventual elected government conflicts with the military over national security decisions, cuts its budget, or prosecutes officers for previous abuses, it may provide grievance for a coup even among the lower ranks. Protest leaders will need to tread carefully to preserve their transition.

A critical factor in keeping the military in the barracks is whether Algerians can remain unified in their demand for democracy. While ideological cleavages are muted today, it is possible that some degree of polarization will emerge between Islamists and secularists, Arabs and Berbers, the left and the right. If as a result of this political polarization, opposition parties begin to call on the military to serve as a referee, a coup is much more likely. For democracy to succeed, political forces must temper this polarization, pursue consensus and compromise, and above all, remain committed to the transition.


APPENDIX



In this appendix, we first present the levels of support for various political figures among non-protesters, soldiers, junior officers, and senior officers, respectively. We then present the wording of all survey questions used in this paper.

APPENDIX 1: LEVEL OF SUPPORT AMONG NON-PROTESTERS



APPENDIX 2: LEVEL OF SUPPORT AMONG SOLDIERS



APPENDIX 3: LEVEL OF SUPPORT AMONG JUNIOR OFFICERS**APPENDIX 4: LEVEL OF SUPPORT AMONG SENIOR OFFICERS**

Survey Questions:

The questions used in this report are presented below in the order of their appearance in the text.

We present the questions in English, though 93% of respondents took the survey in Arabic with the remainder in French.

Section 1: Attitudes toward the protests

1. Do you support or oppose the goals of the current wave of protests in Algeria? [*Strongly support, Somewhat support, Neutral, Somewhat oppose, Strongly oppose*]
2. Do you think the protests should continue? [*Yes, No*]
3. On April 2, Abdelaziz Bouteflika resigned from office. Did you support or oppose his resignation? [*Support, Oppose*]
4. Would you support a complete change of the political system? [*Strongly support, Somewhat support, Neutral, Somewhat oppose, Strongly oppose*]
5. Generally speaking, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the economic situation in the country? [*Very dissatisfied, Somewhat dissatisfied, Neutral, Somewhat satisfied, Very satisfied*]
6. In your opinion, what is the current level of corruption among government officials in Algeria today? [*Very low, Low, Moderate, High, Very high*]
7. Do you agree with the following statement: "A democratic system may have its flaws, but it is better than other political systems." [*Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neutral, agree, Strongly agree*]
8. Suppose there was a scale from 1-5 measuring the extent to which democracy is suitable for Algeria, with 1 meaning that democracy is absolutely inappropriate for Algeria and 5 meaning democracy is completely appropriate for Algeria. To what extent do you think democracy is suitable for Algeria? [*1-5*]
9. In your opinion, how likely is it that the current uprising will lead to... [*For each: Very likely, Likely, Neutral, Unlikely, Very unlikely*]
 - a. Democracy
 - b. Military Takeover
 - c. Civil War

Section 2: Transitional roadmap

10. On April 10, it was announced that presidential elections will be held on July 4. Do you think these elections will be free and fair? [Yes, No]
11. Do you think the protesters should continue protesting or start campaigning? [Continue protesting, Start campaigning]
12. What should happen to the current constitution? [Stay the same, Amend, Entirely rewrite]
13. Would you support or oppose the following actions? [For each: Strongly support, Somewhat support, Neutral, Somewhat oppose, Strongly oppose]
 - a. The confiscation of assets of businessmen close to Bouteflika.
 - b. The removal of interim President Abdelkader Bensalah and Prime Minister Nouredine Bedoui.
 - c. Banning senior officials of the Bouteflika regime from running in elections.
 - d. The prosecution of Abdelaziz Bouteflika.
 - e. The removal of Ahmed Gaid Salah as army chief of staff and deputy defense minister.

Section 3: Leaders, parties, and ideologies

14. Who do you trust to speak on behalf of the protesters? *[Check all that apply: Zoubida Assoul, Ahmed Benbitour, Fodil Boumala, Mustapha Bouchachi, Soufiane Djilali, Fares Mesdour, Karim Tabou, Liamine Zeroual, Other, No one]*
15. Please indicate your level of support for the following individuals on a 1-5 scale, where 1 indicates the lowest level of support and 5 indicates the highest level of support. *[For each, 1-5]*
- a. Abdelaziz Bouteflika
 - b. General Ahmed Gaid Salah
 - c. Ahmed Ouyahia
 - d. Nouredine Bedoui
 - e. Lakhdar Brahimi
 - f. Said Bouteflika
 - g. General Toufik (Mohamed Mediene)
 - h. Ali Benflis
 - i. Abderrazak Makri
 - j. Ali Belhadj
 - k. Said Saadi
 - l. Mustapha Bouchachi
 - m. Karim Tabou
 - n. Louisa Hanoune
 - o. Liamine Zeroual
 - p. Ahmed Benbitour
 - q. Fares Mesdour
 - r. Mokrane Ait Larbi
 - s. Ali Ghediri
 - t. Abdallah Djaballah
 - u. Rachid Nekkaz
 - v. Abdelkader Bensalah
 - w. Mohamed Larbi Zitout
 - x. Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi
 - y. Mouloud Hamrouche

16. If free and fair presidential elections were held tomorrow, who would you vote for?

- a. Abdelaziz Bouteflika
- b. General Ahmed Gaid Salah
- c. Ahmed Ouyahia
- d. Lakhdar Brahimi
- e. Ramtane Lamamra
- f. Said Bouteflika
- g. Ali Benflis
- h. Abderrazak Makri
- i. Ali Belhadj
- j. Said Saadi
- k. Zoubida Assoul
- l. Mustapha Bouchachi
- m. Karim Tabou
- n. Louisa Hanoune
- o. Liamine Zeroual
- p. Ahmed Benbitour
- q. Fares Mesdour
- r. Mokrane Ait Larbi
- s. Ali Ghediri
- t. Abdallah Djaballah
- u. Rachid Nekkaz
- v. Ghani Mahdi
- w. Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi
- x. Other: _____
- y. I will not vote
- z. I will vote, but I do not know for whom.

17. If free and fair parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, who would you vote for?
- a. National Liberation Front (FLN)
 - b. National Rally for Democracy (RND)
 - c. Movement of Society for Peace (MSP)
 - d. Rally for Hope for Algeria (TAJ)
 - e. Ennahda - Justice and Development Front (FJD)
 - f. Socialist Forces Front (FFS)
 - g. Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD)
 - h. Workers' Party (PT)
 - i. Future Front (FM)
 - j. Algerian Popular Movement (MPA)
 - k. Vanguard of Freedoms (Talaie El Houriat)
 - l. The New Generation (Jil Jadid)
 - m. Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)
 - n. Mouvement pour la Jeunesse et le Changement (MJC)
 - o. Mouvement Démocratique et Social (MDS)
 - p. L'Union démocratique et sociale (UDS)
 - q. Union pour le Changement et le Progrès (UCP)
 - r. Alliance nationale républicaine (ANR)
 - s. Front Algérien pour le Développement la Liberté et l'égalité (FADLE)
 - t. Other party: _____
 - u. I would not vote
 - v. I would vote but I do not know for whom.
18. Do you support or oppose lifting the ban on the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) to become a legal political party today? [*Strongly support, Somewhat support, Neutral, Somewhat oppose, Strongly oppose*]
19. Do you support or oppose allowing former politicians from the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) to legally participate in politics under a different organization? [*Strongly support, Somewhat support, Neutral, Somewhat oppose, Strongly oppose*]
20. Do you support or oppose lifting the ban on Ferhat Mehenni's Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (MAK) to become a legal political party today? [*Strongly support, Somewhat support, Neutral, Somewhat oppose, Strongly oppose*]

Section 4: The military and politics

21. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
[*Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neutral, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree*]
- a. The military should be the referee of the political arena.
 - b. The military should have veto power over national security decisions.
 - c. The military should have veto power over economic policy.
 - d. The military's involvement in economic activities distracts from the military's mission to defend the country.
22. Would you support or oppose the following actions? [*Strongly support, Somewhat support, Neutral, Somewhat oppose, Strongly oppose*]
- a. Investigations into abuses committed by the military and security forces in the 1990s.
23. Do you think the government should increase or decrease the budget of the Ministry of Defense? [*Increase a lot, Increase slightly, Keep the same, Decrease slightly, Decrease a lot*]
24. What background should the President have?
- a. Civilian [*Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neutral, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree*]
25. Suppose a position of Minister of National Defense was created, separate from the President. What background should that Minister of National Defense have?
- a. Civilian [*Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neutral, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree*]

REFERENCES

- 1 The survey was administered in Qualtrics, and featured a large Princeton University logo at the top of each page. The consent form likewise listed our university affiliations.
- 2 One strategy to deal with this bias would be to post-stratify or weight the survey sample to resemble the population. When doing so, results are largely the same, and thus we present here the unaltered data for the sake of simplicity.
- 3 Most accounts of the protests have noted that they occur primarily in cities, and are often led by university students. See, e.g., Francesca Paris, "Students Protest Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's Bid For Fifth Term," NPR, February 26, 2019, <https://www.npr.org/2019/02/26/698245250/students-protest-algerian-president-abdelaziz-bouteflikas-bid-for-fifth-term>; Amir Mohamed Aziz, "Protesting Politics in Algeria," *Middle East Report Online*, March 26, 2019, <https://merip.org/2019/03/protesting-politics-in-algeria/>; Daniel Brumberg, "Negotiating a Path Forward in Algeria," *Lobelog*, April 18, 2019, <https://lobelog.com/negotiating-a-path-forward-in-algeria/>; and Thomas Adamson and Nadine Achoui-Lesage, "Wit and grit: Algeria's sizeable youth lead fight for change," *Associated Press*, April 23, 2019, <https://apnews.com/215d7672a79e4d87946d14569d685f66>.
- 4 "Internet World Stats," <https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm>.
- 5 For more on women in the Algerian army, see Dalia Ghanem, "Women in the Men's House: The Road to Equality in the Algerian Military," Carnegie Middle East Center, November 4, 2015, <https://carnegie-mec.org/2015/11/04/women-in-men-s-house-road-to-equality-in-algerian-military-pub-61463>.
- 6 The wording of all survey questions used in this report can be found in the appendix.
- 7 Protesters are respondents who reported participating in one or more protests.
- 8 Includes non-commissioned officers (NCOs).
- 9 Sharan Grewal, "Why Algeria's army abandoned Bouteflika," *The Washington Post*, Monkey Cage, April 5, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/05/why-algerias-army-abandoned-bouteflika/>.
- 10 Farah Souames, "Algeria's bloodless coup," *Africa is a Country*, March 17, 2019, <https://africasacountry.com/2019/03/algerias-bloodless-coup>; Sharan Grewal, "Bouteflika's Bid for Time," The Brookings Institution, March 14, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/14/bouteflikas-bid-for-time/>.
- 11 These were three different questions—respondents did not need to choose between these scenarios (and accordingly, numbers exceed 100).
- 12 Yasmina Allouche, "A battle has been won, but the struggle continues - what now for Algeria?," *TRT World*, April 3, 2019, <https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/a-battle-has-been-won-but-the-struggle-continues-what-now-for-algeria-25515>; Rayane Anser, "Bouteflika's removal won't resolve Algerian protesters' concerns," *The Washington Post*, Monkey Cage, March 28, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/28/bouteflikas-removal-wont-resolve-algerian-protesters-concerns/>.
- 13 Sharan Grewal, "Algeria's army calls for the president's removal," The Brookings Institution, March 27, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/27/algerias-army-calls-for-the-presidents-removal/>.
- 14 Abed Charef, "Algeria's paradox: To achieve democracy, citizens must reject July election," *Middle East Eye*, April 26, 2019, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/algerias-paradox-achieve-democracy-citizens-must-reject-july-election>.

- 15 Associated Press, "Algeria Cancels Presidential Election, in Potentially New Political Crisis," *The New York Times*, June 2, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/world/africa/algeria-elections-canceled.html>.
- 16 Sharan Grewal, "The Cancellation of Algeria's Elections is an Opportunity for Democratization," The Brookings Institution, June 4, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/06/04/the-cancellation-of-algerias-elections-is-an-opportunity-for-democratization/>.
- 17 "Algeria: Bouteflika Resignation an Opening for Rights," Human Rights Watch, April 9, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/09/algeria-bouteflika-resignation-opening-rights>.
- 18 "Algerian police arrest businessmen close to Bouteflika's inner circle," *France 24*, April 22, 2019, <https://www.france24.com/en/20190422-algeria-police-arrest-businessmen-bouteflika-inner-circle>.
- 19 M.Tahir Kilavuz, "Here's why Algerians are protesting," *The Washington Post*, Monkey Cage, February 25, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/25/heres-why-algerians-are-protesting/>.
- 20 In a list experiment, respondents are asked how many items in a list they agree with, rather than openly having to state that they support a sensitive item. For more on list experiments, see: "Research on Elicitation of Truthful Answers to Sensitive Survey Questions," Harvard University, <https://imai.fas.harvard.edu/projects/sensitive.html>.
- 21 Beyond businessmen, the regime has also arrested Bouteflika's brother and presidential advisor, Said, and former prime ministers Ahmed Ouyahia and Abdelmalek Sellal, among others. See: "Algerians keep protesting despite arrest of top officials," *Al-Jazeera*, June 14, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/algerians-protesting-arrest-top-officials-190614182116764.html>.
- 22 Robert Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 18-39.
- 23 "Shahed Jidal bayna Fares Mesdour wa Abudjerra Soltani Qanaat Ennahar," May 5, 2019, <https://youtu.be/-i40mckSssA>.
- 24 "L'ex député du FFS Mustapha Bouchachi humilie Aref Mechakra sur le plateau de France 24," May 4, 2017, <https://youtu.be/BaiRf7TChKo>.
- 25 Justin Stares, "Muslim face veil fine in Belgium paid off by French businessman," *The Telegraph*, August 17, 2011, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/belgium/8707630/Muslim-face-veil-fine-in-Belgium-paid-off-by-French-businessman.html>.
- 26 "L'Union démocratique et sociale est née," *Algeria-Watch*, November 4, 2012, <https://algeria-watch.org/?p=39690>.
- 27 For more on the limited influence of Islamist movements in Algeria today, see: Dalia Ghanem, "The Shifting Foundations of Political Islam in Algeria," Carnegie Middle East Center, April 2019, <https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/05/03/shifting-foundations-of-political-islam-in-algeria-pub-79047>.
- 28 For more on the Bouteflika regime's tactics to weaken and control the opposition, and the opposition's failed responses, see: M. Tahir Kilavuz, "Reconfiguring the Algerian Regime: On the Stability and Robustness of Authoritarianism in Algeria," *Al-Sharq Forum*, May 2, 2017, <https://research.sharqforum.org/2017/05/02/reconfiguring-the-algerian-regime-on-the-stability-and-robustness-of-authoritarianism-in-algeria/>.
- 29 For more on Toufik, see Bruce Riedel, "Unveiling Algeria's Dark Side: The fall of the Butcher of Algiers," The Brookings Institution, May 8, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/05/08/unveiling-algerias-dark-side/>.

- 30 For more on this, see: Hamdi Baala, "Aux funérailles de Abbassi Madani, l'enterrement de l'amnésie bouteflikienne," *Huffpost Maghreb*, April 29, 2019, https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/aux-funerailles-de-abbassi-madani-lenterrement-de-lamnésie-bouteflikienne_mg_5cc554ece4b04eb7ff96cc54. Army chief Gaid Salah has since attempted to "play the Berber card" and divide the protesters by banning the Berber flag and arresting protesters brandishing it. See: "Algeria arrests 18 protesters over Berber flag," *Asharq Al-Awsat*, June 24, 2019, <https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1782106/algeria-arrests-18-protesters-over-berber-flag>.
- 31 Robert Mortimer, "State and Army in Algeria: The 'Bouteflika effect'," *Journal of North African Studies*, 11:2 (2006), pp. 155-171; Adlène Meddi, "Algeria's army: Separating the facts from the fictions," *Middle East Eye*, September 28, 2018, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/algerias-army-separating-facts-fictions>; Ryad Kramdi, "After two decades, Algerians consider a future without Bouteflika," *France24*, March 11, 2019, <https://www.france24.com/en/20190311-algeria-protests-bouteflika-health-president-election-economy-oil-unemployment>; James McDougall, "How Algeria's army sacrificed a president to keep power," *BBC*, April 6, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47821980>.
- 32 Lamine Chikhi, "Kingmaker once more, Algeria's army confronts demand for real change," *Reuters*, March 29, 2019, <https://af.reuters.com/article/algeriaNews/idAFL3N21F48F>; Sharan Grewal, "Algeria's army calls for the president's removal," The Brookings Institution, March 27, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/27/algerias-army-calls-for-the-presidents-removal/>.
- 33 The remainder registered "neither agree nor disagree."
- 34 Lynda Abbou, "A Alger, les manifestants donnent une réponse cinglante à Gaïd Salah," *Maghreb Émergent*, May 10, 2019, <https://maghrebemergent.info/a-alger-les-manifestants-donnent-une-reponse-cinglante-a-gaid-salah/>.
- 35 "Marching in Circles: Egypt's Dangerous Second Transition," International Crisis Group, August 7, 2013; Sharan Grewal, "Why Tunisia didn't follow Egypt's Path," *The Washington Post*, Monkey Cage, February 4, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/04/why-egypt-didnt-follow-tunisias-path/>; Hicham Bou Nassif, "Coups and nascent democracies: the military and Egypt's failed consolidation," *Democratization* 41:1 (2017).
- 36 John P. Entelis, "Algeria: democracy denied, and revived?," *Journal of North African Studies*, 16:4 (2011), pp. 653-678; Erin Cunningham, "Will Algeria's army be the dark horse in the next election," *Public Radio International*, March 26, 2013, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-03-26/will-algerias-army-be-dark-horse-next-election>; "An Algerian Military Purge as a Survival Strategy," Stratfor, October 10, 2018, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/algerian-military-purge-survival-strategy-for-itself-government>; Robert Kubinec, "Politically-connected firms and the military-clientelist complex in North Africa," Socarchiv, 2019, <https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/mrfcu/>.
- 37 Amnesty International, "Algeria: Unrestrained Powers: Torture by Algeria's Military Security," July 9, 2006, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde28/004/2006/en/>.
- 38 Jessica Mecellem, "These three groups are pushing Algeria to change," *The Washington Post*, Monkey Cage, April 26, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/26/new-algeria-three-groups-watch-transition>.
- 39 "An Algerian Military Purge as a Survival Strategy," Stratfor, October 10, 2018, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/algerian-military-purge-survival-strategy-for-itself-government>.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Sharan Grewal, Ph.D., is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and an assistant professor of government at the College of William & Mary.

M. Tahir Kilavuz, Ph.D., is a postdoctoral fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School.

Robert Kubinec, Ph.D., is a postdoctoral fellow at Princeton University and an assistant professor at New York University Abu Dhabi.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The survey was approved by the ethics boards at the College of William & Mary and at Princeton University. We are indebted to the generous funding of the Global Research Institute at William & Mary.

Brookings recognizes that the value it provides is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities supported by its partners reflect this commitment. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings research are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars.

BROOKINGS

The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
[brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu)