

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION  
FALK AUDITORIUM

THE IMMIGRATION CHALLENGE IN A DIVIDED EUROPE  
A RAYMOND ARON LECTURE FEATURING FRANÇOIS HÉRAN

Washington, D.C.  
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**PARTICIPANTS:**

**Welcoming Remarks:**

JOHN R. ALLEN  
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**Featured Speaker:**

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Migrations and Societies Chair, College de France  
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**Discussant:**

ANNE C. RICHARD  
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**Moderator:**

CÉLIA BELIN  
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## P R O C E E D I N G S

GENERAL ALLEN: Ladies and gentlemen, welcome this evening.

Welcome to Brookings. We are very happy to have you with us so late in the day. The weather has held for us, it's a beautiful, almost-spring day, and we are glad to have you with us.

The audience tonight will have the opportunity to hear the lecture. We are also live-streamed as well. So, for those of you coming in from outside the Brookings Institution you're most welcomed to join us this evening.

I have the honor this evening of introducing the *Raymond Aron Lecture*, which is an annual series co-organized by Brookings Center for U.S. and European Studies, the Embassy of France to the United States, and the Policy Planning Staff for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This lecture which was launched in 2004 is named for Raymond Aron, a renowned scholar of the post-war France, and a great defender of liberal democracy, and a friend of the United States. Over the years this lecture has become a well-established and prominent forum for leading French scholars and officials and their American counterparts to speak on critical issues affecting the trans-Atlantic relationship.

Let me first take a moment to thank our partners at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the French Embassy, the French Ambassador, Gérard Araud, has been great friend of Brookings, and a frequent guest in these halls, and he'll be greatly missed when he leaves Washington at the end of April.

We are also joined this evening by a Member of the German Bundestag, Johannes Vogel, and we welcome you this evening to Brookings, sir.

Ambassador Araud, unfortunately, couldn't be with us for lecture this evening, but I do have the opportunity to welcome the Embassy's Deputy Chief of Mission, Nathalie Broadhurst. Thank you, Madame. We are very grateful for your presence this evening, and for the great support of the Embassy.

The topic for this evening's lecture is "*The Immigration Challenge in a Divided Europe*" and it is our distinct pleasure to have Dr. François Héran with us to provide this lecture for this evening.

Dr. Héran is a Migrations and Societies Chair, at the Collège de France in Paris. He is the Founder and Director of the Interdisciplinary Institute of Migrations under the auspices of the French National Center for Scientific Research. And he has previously served over 10 years, as the Head of the French National Institute for Demographic Research.

In his lecture, Dr. Héran will discuss the ongoing immigration debate through a sociological and demographic lens. He will also compare immigration policies put in place in Europe and in the United States, and identify the factors behind the diversity of migration patterns across the Western World. And this could not be a more timely and important subject, Doctor, so thank you very much for sharing your thoughts with us this evening.

We are also honored this evening to be joined tonight by Georgetown University Adjunct Professor, Anne Richard. Anne is joining us from the Institute of the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, where she was also a 2018 Centennial Fellow.

Prior to her current position she was the Assistant Secretary at State for Population Refugees and Migration in the Obama Administration in 2012 to 2017. And I have to say, it was my great honor when I was assigned at the State Department to work closely with Anne during a very, very difficult time in the Middle East associated with the Islamic State and its explosion on to the scene, and the refugees and migration that resulted.

And last but not least our own Célia Belin will moderate tonight's conversation. Célia is a Visiting Fellow in the Center for the United States and Europe here at Brookings. Prior she served for five years in Policy Planning Staff at the French Foreign

Ministry.

So, in a few minutes I'll welcome Dr. Héran to the stage for his lecture. After the lecture, Anne and Célia will join him on stage for a moderated discussion, and questions and answers with the audience.

And a final reminder that we are on the record very much today, and we are streaming live, so those of you on the Internet, you are most welcomed to join us, as we always do.

So, with that, Doctor, we welcome you to the stage. And thank you for joining us this evening. (Applause)

MR. HÉRAN: Thank you very much for this introduction. I'm very grateful to the Brookings Institution and to the French Embassy for this invitation. I'm very glad to have the honor to add my name to this prestigious series of the Brookings researchers, the invitees to the Brookings Institution.

Well, as you know, demographers are attached to facts. We love facts. And I think that in these rough times it's important to get an idea of the order of magnitudes of the phenomena we are talking about, and it's very important according to me to objectify the debate with data.

And fortunately we have now more and more precise on migrations issues, especially because of the work, the organizing work of Eurostat, especially OECD, has done work, the considerable work to gather reliable data and migrations.

And so I'll just make the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary migrations, a very empirical distinction, but it's useful I think, and I begin with extraordinary migration.

So this huge inflows and sudden inflows of refugees from the Middle East, and let's just take the first year of the so-called migrant crisis in 2016, and these are the absolute number, and the way the number of asylum seekers whose dossiers have been dealt with, have been treated by the different countries across Europe.

As you can see, and as you know, Germany had a very huge number of applicants. I had to cut the bar because it's out -- off the graph, of course, and 750,000 applicants have been treated in this year, 2016. And more or less nearly 60 percent of them have obtained protection from the German Government.

And France comes in the second rank, by the number of the applications, but in the force by the number of positive decisions but of course, this kind of comparison doesn't make sense, because countries have different sizes, and in order to control for the size of the population, and to some extent to take into account the receiving capacity which is of course proportionate to the population, to the size of the country, it's absolutely indispensable to have -- to make calculation per capita.

That is controlling for the population, size of the population, how many positive decisions have been issued for asylum seekers across Europe. And you can see that Sweden is ahead with 4,500 positive decision of protection to asylum seekers per one million inhabitants.

And then Germany, Austria, et cetera, you see that the average, European average is about 1,000, and France is nearly at the middle of this average, which is rather different from the general discourse which obtains in France about how generosity in terms of asylum.

We are in fact occupying the 17th rank in Europe by our capacity to give protection to asylum seekers. And we are more or less at the same level as Italy, we don't have any lesson to give to Italy, Italy has no lesson to give to us. We are approximately at the same level.

But U.K. is doing worse, and U.K. is taking advantage of its isolation and insulation, and its position of course, the U.K. has a lot of ordinary migrants coming from Central Europe, but this is about asylum seekers.

And you can see -- I don't know if my mouse is working -- no, so I have -- well, it doesn't matter.

So, some countries occupy a bizarre position in this graph, for example, Malta and Cyprus. Malta and Cyprus of course are victims, I could say, of the Dublin Regulation, they have to cope in first line with the arrival of the refugees. And this explains why they have your -- they are inserted between Austria and Switzerland, Norway, these rich countries.

You can see also that Spain in the right place, and Portugal are in a very low position, but this is explained by the fact that these countries have been, for a very long time, immigration countries and not emigration countries, so they were not equipped, from the legal point of view, to deal with asylum applications, contrary to France. France receives asylum seekers since the 19th Century.

And the order, the countries, the end of the distribution has been put on the right side of the graph, and the red spots correspond to ex-Communist countries. These countries share some specificities, they've never been accustomed to non-European migration during the reconstruction years, the post-war reconstruction years, they don't have any Colonial past, and of course a Colonial past plays a very important role to track special channels between metropolis and the colonies.

And they also have developed this national narrative based on the Christianity against Islam which plays a very important role in the narrative.

What is important is we are fascinated by this speech or by the discourse of Viktor Orbán, but in fact all the ex-Communist countries now in Central Europe are doing exactly the same, from the Baltic countries to Slovenia, exactly the same. So, there is no correlation between the political regime of these countries, and the way they behave towards asylum seekers. There are deep reasons, and not only political reasons.

If we summarize the comparison between France and Germany the way the two countries behave vis-à-vis asylum seekers, it must be summarized that way, just look at the last line of the slide, we received five times less asylum seekers than Germany, and we gave positive decision to 10 times less people.

The problem is, why? How can we explain such huge differences between European countries? If you get back to this graph between Poland, 14 asylum seekers obtaining a positive decision of protection, compared to Sweden they're just a sea between - - a sea between these two countries. And this difference is a huge gap. It's very rare to find so many -- so huge differences between countries across Europe.

So, let's take an experimental case, which is Germany, Germany is still marked deeply by the reference between West and East, and here is, in the last census they took in 2011, the share of population, of migrants and their children, so first and second generation summed up, amid all the population, (Speaking in French) as they say, according to the Länder.

And you see that the last five Länder, the new Länder from the ex-Eastern Germany, don't have even 5 percent of the population composed of migrants or children of migrants, which is very, very low, as compared to Hamburg, for example, where it is 28 percent. So, this is of course the legacy of 40 years of communism.

And if you compare now with this data, also from the 2011 census, you can see here the proportion of people who declared voluntary navigation to an official Christian church, and this a semi-public institution they have, according to the Länder.

And you can see that more less three-quarters of the population of Western Germany has declared an affiliation. This commands the key distribution of the Church tax, and this goes then to the church institution such as Caritas, German Caritas, or the Jakorny.

I've had a long discussion some days ago with the President of Jakorny in Germany, and they have 4,000 employees, not counting the (inaudible), and just the permanent employees, and this is of course linked to the (inaudible) System which applies in Germany.

The Christian values still matter in this country, and can explain in some part the extraordinary, caritative power of Germany which was spectacular during the migrant crisis. And you can see that, and your new Länder was in a completely different position.

The vast majority of the people didn't answer this question on religion, or even explained that they had no religion.

So, in France, for example, in the -- well, Angela Merkel, just one week after having lunches -- her famous call to "wir schaffen das", made a statement in front of the Congress of her -- Party saying that: well, all the migrants are human beings, they are all children of God.

Of course this kind of argument is absolutely unthinkable, in France you cannot imagine any political leader making this kind of explanation, but in Germany it is taken seriously, it plays a role, it's something very, very serious.

And it has something to do with a fantastic capacity that Germany demonstrated to welcome migrants in such big proportions, despite all the events that occurred later in the second phase.

Now, let's put this immigration crisis into a broad landscape, and let's look, have a look at all kinds of immigration. And this is the kind of graph we can make now quite recently, thanks to the fantastic work done by OECD. OECD now is publishing something very new which is not only the number of foreigners who reside on a permanent basis in a country through permits of stays, but also other persons who are settled here on the basis of free circulation, because of the free circulation that obtains in Europe.

And you can see here and this is just before the crisis and this is after the crisis. Let's see before the crisis. And let's begin with the first countries: Canada, Australia and New Zealand, these countries are selecting their migrants.

In blue, in dark-blue you have the person selected on the basis of the point system, they have -- they master the language, they have higher education, certificates, or they have several years of professional experience, they are not too young, not too old, et cetera. So, it's a sort of a competition organized on the basis of human capital.

And in the other blue zone, corresponds to their family. It's not a reunification, it's an immediate unification of selected workers and their families, and if you



add up the two stripes, you arrive in Canada at 65 percent -- 65 percent of the foreigners who relied -- the new foreigners, and this is of an inflow, an annual inflow, the new corresponds to selected persons.

And then you have in brown the family reunification, ex-post-unification. Okay? And in green the humanitarian or asylum treatment.

If you compare with the USA, the four stripes, it's completely different, completely different. USA is the world leader of family unification with very few work selection, and a little bit of humanitarian titles.

And then let's go to France. France is a leader in Europe of family unification, 40 percent, and the gray area, the gray zone corresponds to the free circulation. If you compare France with Germany, at the end of the graph, you see that Germany, that two-thirds of the foreigners who reside in Germany now are people coming from -- are citizens from Europe attracted by Germany, especially from Central Europe.

So it gives you an idea of the attractive power of the economic and society of Germany; so in comparison, in proportion, twice as big as the attraction of European citizens in France.

Look at, in the middle of the graph, Sweden. Sweden has the world record of humanitarian assistance, one-third of the residents; foreign residents have received a title on this ground.

So, now let's look, the following graph, that in fact in order to better understand what happens I will use this graph, it's the same as the one that I've presented but I've given to each country, a size, the thickness of the stripe is proportional to the number of immigrants, and of course because United States doesn't count the same as Luxembourg, for example, or New Zealand.

And so it gives you an idea of the exact proportion and the surfaces are significant. You can see these numbers correspond to thousands. In the United States in 2015, 680,000 people in the world have entered into the United States on the basis of family

reunification.

This is a sense, and you can see that in Germany, for example, it was in France we have 100,000 people on the same ground, which is by far the biggest introduction of family grouping in reunification in Europe. And you can see just at the beginning of the crisis, human crisis, how important is the humanitarian action of Germany.

And now look at what happens in 2016. 2016 corresponds to the bulk of the immigration crisis and you can see that Germany has fantastic -- you know, in a fantastic proportion increased its capacity to welcome asylum seekers, but not forgetting its capacity to attract European citizens from the rest of Europe.

Meanwhile, USA has still increased the number of people received on the base, on the family unification, and the asylum seeking in the U.S., 157,000 people, is much less than what has been done in Germany.

So, if we look at what happens in France, for example, how can we explain the importance of this family unification in France and in the U.S. as well? This is a question I will deal in the last slide.

Here is the distribution of the permits of stay, the first permits of stay delivered to non-European people since 2005. I've mentioned at the end of the graph the political transitions, the Minister -- Nicolas Sarkozy was the Minister of Interior for five years - - four years, and then President of the Republic, and then Hollande, but as you can see it doesn't matter really.

We cannot say that the political power really has an important margin of influence on the number of permits of stay delivered year after year. The major increase is the number of students, and now we try to reduce the number of students by elevating the fees, but if you look, the two in the intermediate, as the layers.

The spouses of French and family unification, it's rather stable, incredibly stable because every two years we have a new legislation in which they harden the conditions for spouses or children, et cetera, to unify.

So, of course the refugees has increased a little it's normal, taking into account the crisis, permanent work is more or less due to so some regularization but there is little proportion of the permits of stay since -- because we have stopped the work, direct work, immigration from the '70s, like Germany, like Sweden, like other European countries, and like Canada or New Zealand.

And well in every good statistic you have always an "other" category, I will not comment. Now, if we look, and not in detail but just to give you an idea, what is exactly this -- what are these family reasons?

The spouse of French citizens is something rather easy to establish, but then parent of French citizens, it depends from the age of the child, at what age a child entered into France, a rather complex combination of the criteria.

And then you have a series -- a dusting of different categories, and anthropologists who have followed the roots or the career, the administrative career of the immigrants through these categories explained that in fact many of these persons, who receive the title for the first time in the year mentioned, in fact, were already residing in the country sometime since 10 years, or even more.

So, it's a sort of regularization, which takes the form of a family unification, but in fact an important part of these people could have received asylum protection status of a refugee sooner, or even a work permit.

If you look at the United States we have more or less the same situation. It's strange to see that despite very different legal systems the judiciary is completely different in its organization, but in fact we have a coalition of actors, which more or less defends the habeas corpus of immigrants, the coalition of MPs and the NGOs, that are which more or less arrive at its results, despite all the restrictiveness -- the restrictive decisions taken that, yes, there is a lot of family unification.

And in the case of U.S. we have the most refined categorization of -- there are presently in the official statistics published by the Department of State, 247 categories of

migrants, it's incredibly detailed. For example, you have fantastic categories like non-Cuban spouses of Cuban asylees, things like that, you know, which have their special category, and are enumerated.

And more or less it is much more sophisticated as the French system, and because the Department of State publishes every year the number of applicants, who, everywhere in the world qualify, do qualify for these categories and are waiting for permits.

There are three million people, more than three million people, between three million or four million people outside United States are presently waiting for permits of stay, 40 percent of them are Mexicans, and many of them are in the last categories, brothers and sisters. It's collateral kinship links which does not exist in France but exists in United States, but with a waiting time of 20, 24 years on average for some of these categories.

So, it's a strange, a very strange system, but it has more or less the same -- the same configuration, the same result as in the French system, instead of clarifying the categories, instead of saying from the beginning, okay, you cannot -- we accept a lot of people provided they wait years and years, decades sometimes, and this is how we have this result.

So, I think we will leave for the questions and answers, more discussions about the theories that can explain this. There are seven, for example, the pause dependency analysis says, okay we have been trapped by some legal provision that has been taken two decades ago, and now we cannot change our views, things like that.

I don't think it's a good interpretation. I think that, in fact, the family unification is a principle, a very strong principle, which is now in the European Convention of Human Rights, and the principle of this of course has been elaborated, or phrased in some specific circumstance.

But in fact the Council of State in France, for example, has (Speaking in French). How to translate this? (Speaking in French) means to extract, to unveil, to bring out, to bring out a principle which was already existing but that whose consequences were

not evaluated to the right measure.

So, I don't think we are prisoners of the past, I think we are able to face the new situation, a new regime of human rights, but also we have to consider this with pragmatic issues, and this will be a point to discuss now. Thank you very much for your attention. (Applause)

MS. BELIN: Hello everyone. My name is Célia Belin. I'm a Visiting Fellow here at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. And I'm delighted to be moderating this part of the evening.

Mr. Héran, thank you very much for a brilliant presentation. I'm sure our audience has many questions and is impatient to grill you.

I feel it was worth waiting two hours in line yesterday at Dulles Airport in the immigration line, which is clearly ironic. (Laughter)

Before we engage in a conversation with you, I would like to welcome our second speaker, Anne Richard. We have asked Anne to deliver a response to Dr. Héran's remarks, in order to shed a light, a different light, an American light maybe on those issues of immigration in Europe and beyond.

Anne made a special effort to be on stage with us tonight, and we are very grateful. Thank you very much, Anne.

It is clearly a reflection of your passion for those topics. Anne, as John Allen said earlier, was between 2012 and 2017 Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration in the Obama administration.

During her time in government Anne was instrumental in fostering international cooperation on migration, prior to joining the administration Anne was Vice President of Government Relations and Advocacy for the International Rescue Committee. She he also served at Peace Corps Headquarters in the U.S. Office of Management and Budget earlier in her career. And since leaving office in January 2017 Anne has been teaching at Georgetown University.

Anne, we look forward to hearing your perspective as a policymaker on immigration in Europe and in the U.S. Thank you.

MS. RICHARD: Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you to our Speaker for a really dynamic presentation. Thank you to John Allen, my friend, for welcoming both of us. And then Célia and I, Célia has been trying to get me to this platform and we are very happy to be here, but it turned out we had the same mentor at one point, Guillon Paul Montierre, who, until an illness, was one of the leading thinkers about U.S.-French relations.

And he was in fact one of the Founders on the Center on the United States and France that was a predecessor to the Center on the United States and Europe here at Brookings. And so I feel like this is suddenly, welcome home.

MS. BELIN: Sure. Absolutely!

MS. RICHARD: So I welcome very much what François has said, in part because he did show the differences across Europe, and these differences have made it much more difficult to find solutions to many of the practical and political tensions that have really risen since the summer of 2015, and the very large numbers of refugees and migrants coming across from the Middle East and further afield, to Europe.

And Europe looked to the U.S. for solutions, the U.S. looked to Europe for solutions and, unfortunately, we don't have a very constructive story to tell in the subsequent years. I would like to say though, that my experience within the Obama administration before 2015, the U.S. was a leader on migration issues, but we were a quiet leader in a way that diplomats can be on many issues.

When the United States spoke, this is what I discovered sitting behind the placard that said "United States" at major international migration conferences, when the U.S. spoke everyone listened. You could hear a pin drop in the room. This happened whenever we were discussing refugees in Geneva, but also in sort of a traveling series of international conferences and regional conferences on migration.

This happened despite migration not being a key issue at the White House, or in Congress, or in the press, or in the public, but this all changed then in 2015 and really came to a head when Aylan Kurdi's body washed up on that beach in Turkey, and everyone became seized with this issue, and many of the journalists had to become overnight much more expert in this issue.

And so in the subsequent years you may hear true things about migration, you may hear false assertions about migration, but you're hearing a lot more about migration in the United States, and in some ways this was always the norm in other countries, but in the United States there was just a certain amount of quiet about it. We saw that really in very domestic terms, and really focused on who was coming across our borders, and not so much international migration issues.

Our messages in the United States Government were crafted through the interagency system and emphasized U.S. acceptance of immigrants being a diverse society, and especially rights. Coming out of our government people would speak up for human rights, for labor rights, for treating people with dignity.

Now, this is not rocket science, but in these kinds of international conferences, sometimes very simple statements about the importance of respecting the rights of migrants would really speak volumes. Of course there were tensions, you know, especially over undocumented workers in the United States, but we were a good performer overall in contrast to other countries, I would maintain.

And when I led interagency delegations to international conferences on migration we had representatives from several parts of the State Department, the Human Rights folks, the Labor Special Envoy, the Trafficking Persons Office, Department of Homeland Security always sent folks, the Labor Department's International Office, U.K. Agency for International Development would send someone, usually people interested in Diasporas or remittances.

And then also we would generally bring someone from a think tank, like the

Migration Policy Institute, Kathleen is here; or the Institute for the Study of International Migration, or from an operational NGO.

And that alone, just showing up with someone who was not a government official, sometimes spoke volumes to other governments about how to have a conversation in one's country about migration issues.

I found that other countries really put much more prominence on these issues, and some of these were countries that were sending countries. For example, the Philippines, or Romania would have ministers in their Cabinet who were concerned about their expatriates abroad. And in Sweden, for example, when they hosted the Global Forum on Migration Development, they had a Minister of Development, and they also had a Minister of Migration.

And so in some ways he was my counterpart, and in some ways he really -- you know he was a Member of the Cabinet, he far outranked me.

And one of the true leaders of this conversation that was taking place, was Peter Sutherland, who is now deceased, but as a Former Irish Attorney General, one of the founders of the World Trade Organization, you know, reading his Wikipedia page, you wouldn't believe the life he's had.

But he was the Special Representative of the Secretary General on international migration, and he played a very important role of continuing the conversation and looking for very constructive ways to solve problems and move the ball forward, and he was a delightful, very entertaining person. So he was a driving force behind good ideas, and the rascally Irishman.

His role today is played by Louise Arbour of Canada, who's been very busy following through on all the things launched, and some of them really initially thought up by Peter Sutherland.

And so when the European refugee crisis occurred, it didn't have to be a crisis, but became, certainly, a political crisis, suddenly our top partners in the world, our top



partners in dealing with all sorts of crises around the world, the other major donors of the world, is how I was used to thinking of a lot of the Western European countries, they suddenly turned inward.

So, what has changed in -- and one of the things President Obama did was to organize and lead a Leader's Summit in September 2016 at the United Nations. There were two days, a U.N. Day on September 19<sup>th</sup> that came up with the New York Declaration launched the Global Compact on migration, the Global Compact on Refugees Process that ended recently.

And then there was a day that President Obama led trying to get the country of the world to commit to do more to help refugees.

What has happened since? Well already in the Trump campaign we had a lot of anti-refugee, anti-immigrant, and really hostile language, that continues to this day, and you've all heard it: invasion, crisis, rapists, Middle Eastern terrorists, MS-13, shithole countries, and of course the big exception is Norwegians: we love Norwegians. Sorry.  
(Laughter)

The Trump administration has done a number of things, and I think you're probably more used to hearing about the anti-refugee actions, the travel ban, drastic cuts and resettlement, they stopped funding for certain U.N. agencies, in addition to U.N. Population Fund, then also the one that provides assistance to Palestinian refugees, UNRWA.

The Attorney General put out a Justice Department Guidance to not give asylum to women fleeing intimate-partner violence, and which had been the case for several years, or people fleeing criminal gangs. And this has become very controversial, then the Central Americans fleeing north do they deserve an opportunity to claim asylum in accordance with International Refugee Convention.

There were also anti-immigrant, and you're aware of the -- you know the main focus on that has been about the dreamers but, you know, with someone like Stephen

Miller in the White House, he is leading a whole series of things against refugees, against immigrants, and to the point where a Senator said: we can't get anything done if Stephen Miller is in the room.

But also anti-migrant, and here's the examples where, and then I'll finish up. The U.S. early on withdrew from the Global Compact on Migration. It was supposed to go to a conference, but like I said, we did all the time, you never heard about them. But the Trump administration withdrew because they said this voluntary agreement would impinge on our sovereignty, which was nonsense. The U.S. did not engage on this major world effort.

We did participate on negotiations on the Global Compact on Refugees, but then walked away from it at the end. The U.S. also, diplomatically, asked other countries to give up on the Global Climate -- the Global Compact on Migration, and convinced Hungary, Poland, Austria, Italy, Bulgaria, Australia and Israel not to sign on.

We had traditionally led the International Organization for Migration, and that was led by an American, most recently by Ambassador William Swing, a revered and influential international diplomat. The Trump administration put forward Ken Isaacs from Samaritan's Purse.

Samaritan's Purse is a North Carolina-based, international, humanitarian organization, that's faith-based. It was created by Franklin Graham, Billy Graham's son, and he lost the election to Portuguese Official, Antonio Vitorino because he had tweeted out a lot of anti-Muslim rhetoric, and you cannot run an international organization if you do not have respect for a very large segment of the world's population.

Meanwhile, Germany has become a major player, increased donations to UNHCR, it's the number two donor now, it chaired, well, along with Morocco for two years, the Global Forum on Migration Development, it chaired the follow on to Climate, Migrant Initiative, called the Nansen initiative; they chaired the Platform for Disaster Displacement, and now Bangladesh is the Chair, and France is the Vice Chair.

And they have really put a great deal of focus on integration, and trying to --

all those people who came to find ways to make them part of German society, in a way that will work. I think the impact of the Trump policies has been to aid right-wing governments in Europe, I also think though they have, without a vote in Congress, managed to discard a key component of America's identity. And that really has shocked me. So, why don't I stop there?

MS. BELIN: Yeah. Thank you, Anne. I think that it raises many questions. We'll go back to many of them, in particular the reaction of our Western democracies in terms of the European refugee crisis.

But maybe I'll kick up this conversation with a few questions, and I'll start with you, Dr. Héran. Our lecture series is named after the renowned French intellectual, Raymond Aron, who was altogether a Philosopher, a Sociologist, a Historian, a Journalist, and at the time of Aron, intellectuals around him were guided by ideology, in particular, communism.

But Aron really stood out for his constant skepticism, and for his refusal to obey simplified truths, just to pay respect to a certain ideology.

You have authored a very interesting book in 2017 called, *Avec l'immigration, With Immigration*, in which you argue that it is futile to be either for or against immigration, as immigration is a reality.

You plead for committed neutrality, and you see your job as a scientist, as providing objective analysis for policymaking. But we just discussed it. Today's debates are heavily ideological. How do you see the recent evolution of the debates? And how can we move to a discussion based on facts as you presented today, on reality instead of ideology?

MR. HÉRAN: Well, there are two contradictory trends by now. On the one hand the development of fake news, and we have seen this, particular all the attacks against the Global Compact of Marrakesh, and all the vision that have been -- that have circulated about this.

But on the other hand, we have also this huge movement of fact-checking;

of course even the -- for Nationale, the Assembly 1 Nationale has its own fact-checking tribune in his review. But it's striking that precisely, for example, when there was these polemics about the Global Compact, many journalists restored the truth in explaining exactly the status of this document, and the importance it had.

And so we have these two conflicting trends, and so I think that the cultural fight is not over, we have to continue, and my role as an expert is to -- well, to give to the public debate, or to fuel the public debate with a simple data, and a local data, or something. Everybody can understand that, and I hope that this -- that tonight it has been that.

But of course my problem now is that our political leaders are extremely prudent, including President Macron, and it's very difficult to find any statement which tries to, well, to explain exactly what happens.

For example, to say, okay, we are not the most generous country in Europe for asylum seeking. Even if we take into account only the number of applicants, and not the number of refugees risen to attain the status of refugee, we are still at the 13th position in Europe, controlling for the size of the population which is very --

So, I think that in the public debate, especially now when we -- on the eve of the European elections, we should have a public speech from the highest authority much more akin to the data, or to the realities. We cannot deny the existence of migration. Now, more or less, a quarter of the French population is either immigrant or a child of at least one immigrant, a quarter. In Germany it's more or less the same proportion. In the United States it's a little more, 27, or something like that, if you sum up the two generations.

So all the ideas are, well, let's calculate what the cost, what's the immigration cost-wise, consisting trying to calculate what is exactly the cost of a quarter of the population, and for the three other quarters, which is absurd.

So, if you take -- if you consider the order of magnitude of immigration, the fact that we have arrived at a point that now it's irreversible, we cannot imagine a world without immigration. It's absolutely impossible, and so we have to face this in the correct

way.

A lot of problems do exist, the integration of the second generation, the commitment to value, to ethical values, which all the religions, that do not necessarily consider without a special effort, and so on, and so on, but even -- well, I think that the general scene is that immigration is here, and we have to face it, we have to do with it, and that's it. And this should be stated, should be claimed more rigorously, I think, by the political authorities.

MS. BELIN: So, just a follow-up question. Among the claims, so the French authorities are not necessarily making that particular claim, but President Macron has talked about his desire to transform France's migration policy from, as you showed, a policy of mostly family reunification, into some sort of Canadian model of work migration primarily, plus associated families.

But in your book you explained that contrary to what populist promised it is actually impossible to change overnight the immigration of a country. And I'd like to know, given that the explanation you might be giving, if Macron is really -- is capable of changing migration policy, or is there a sort of a fatalism there in the recognition that it is what it is and changing government does not change the fact of migration policy?

MR. HÉRAN: I think that by now he has not very clear ideas about the topic. It's not really a priority for him. And if you look at his campaign book, "Revolution", it was only some allusions to the immigration issue, it was not very precise. And the candidate which had the most, by far, detailed information on immigration issues, was Alain Juppé. That it did not really work.

Now, in fact there is, the Canadian model is now often cited, for example, during the parliamentary debates about the new -- the recent law on asylum and immigration, but people don't understand what is the Canadian model; they believe in France that Canadian has quota to diminish migration. It's exactly the opposite.

The Canadian quotas are objectives, and the objective is more or less to

have each year selected migrants which correspond to 1 percent of the Canadian population, 30 -- sorry, 300,000, 330,000 new immigrants selected, well, and because of the -- the smallest were 1 percent of the Canadian population.

In France, it would correspond to 600 -- or 650,000 immigrants each year, which is a selected for -- on the ground of their work skills. The Canadian system is very special because de facto, it eliminates the vast majority of the Hispanics, because they don't have the level of education which is required, they don't have the professional experience required, and so on, and they don't master English and French. Okay?

And Canada can afford, it can offer, it has this luxury of selecting its migrants because they have one and only one neighboring country at the south border, United States, ten times more populated than them which, de facto, integrates a Hispanic population, whatever the level of skills.

So this is, possible when you are a peripheral country, it's not a coincidence that the other countries which select migrants are Australia and New Zealand, the two other --

MS. BELIN: So geography plays a role?

MR. HÉRAN: -- peripheral countries, isolated countries. The weight of geography, of the geographical factors is very important, the same for of the British, for example, but not to the same extent of course.

So I think that the Canadian model is not at all -- it cannot be generalized, and in the field of ethics, you know that the country and the criterion that's something -- a principle can be ethical if it can be reversed, if everybody can claim it. If it's only what a situation resting on the teachings -- from the position of the heart, on a specific position, it's not ethical.

So, the Canadian system could not work without the support of the United States, and the direct support of the United States, and this is very important too. And so every time I can, I repeat this to the French Deputies, or attempted to.

Just one brief remark; for example, a Senator Karuchi, an intelligent man, one of the leaders of the Government's right, let's say, has presented an amendment, an amendment in the last debates on the law on immigration. Say, okay, France should on the Canadian model, the Parliament should vote every year, the number of immigrants we should welcome corresponding to our receiving capacities. And this receiving capacity will be defined by experts, objective experts.

Of course I felt concern by this on the basis of economic criteria, demography criteria, and so on, and so on. Okay. But if you do so, if you, for example, you consider that a reasonable objective could be the average observed across Europe, you should multiply by two the number of asylum seekers to which -- to whom you could give the status of refugee and not divide us.

So they don't understand that the Canadian quota has in fact, that it's -- the paradox of Canada that it selects migrants without reducing the numbers, so by (inaudible) the number some, and so --

MS. BELIN: It's an expensive model. It's not a restrictive model.

MR. HÉRAN: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

MS. BELIN: Let me turn to Anne. Anne, during your time in the administration, you recall that you were at the heart of migration, and refugees, including during the European refugee crisis, and I want to take you back to this time which were particularly difficult politically, but also from a humanitarian standpoint.

And recalling Raymond Aron, once again, Raymond Aron was deeply convinced that intellectuals needed to provide policy options even when they were far from perfect. There's a famous quote by Aron: that political action was not -- is not the choice between good and evil, but between the preferable and the detestable.

So I was wondering what your thoughts of our Western democracy's response to this crisis? Was it adequate? Was it even ethical? And what could Europe and the U.S. have done better, or differently?

MS. RICHARD: Well, I think before the crisis already President Obama had been called a "Deporter-in-Chief". And so he was being attacked from the left for carrying out U.S. laws to deport people who had arrived and did not have a good claim, did not have a credible claim. And so there was -- I think that he was living in that (inaudible) area between, you know, not a perfect policy from a human rights standpoint, but trying to balance, you know, different pressures.

But I would say in terms of giving us all a grade in how we responded to the large numbers coming across the summer of 2015, we did not do well at all. And I think for us at the time in the U.S. government we were surprised by how difficult it appeared for Brussels to organize an effective response.

And it did, you know, promote ideas but the member -- the EU member countries did not comply. So the most dynamic nation at the time, as you said earlier, was Germany. We have very close relations with Germany, we had a very skilled Ambassador at the time who instantly tried to find ways to bridge between the U.S. and Germany, in helping come up with ideas for the Germans to deal with so many newcomers coming in at once.

The key difference between everything happening in Europe and discussions about people coming to the U.S. was that large numbers had walked across Europe without being screened. And there was a fear, especially after the Paris attacks of November 13<sup>th</sup>, there was a fear these people would just keep walking across the Atlantic Ocean, (laughter) and carry out terrorist attacks in the United States.

And you would have thought, you know, Paris was sort of right past Miami, or something, that it was so close, that it was an American city. So, there was a piece of that, that was good that so many Americans care about what happens in Paris, but there was a piece of it that was unreal, and very much exaggerated concerns about refugees being likely terrorists carrying out attacks in the United States.

So I think when history looks back and examines this period, I think the



disappointment many of us felt that we weren't coming up with really solid solutions will be also the conclusion of historians.

The thing that we did that got a lot of support from leading figures in Europe was President Obama's decision to really make attention to refugees such an important part of his last U.N. General Assembly Meeting. The problem there was that the following administration did not continue that, but instead has set the whole course the opposite way around.

But the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, which is the U.N. Refugee Agency's formal name, and The World Bank are in fact using the commitments that countries made at that time to follow up and to discuss ways, you know, to keep trying to make progress on how the world deals with refugees of migrants.

So, there's a lot of international diplomats who have taken this groundwork that was laid in 2016 and advanced it but, you know, what we are all hearing in the newspaper, and radio waves, et cetera, Twitter feeds is, you know, a lot of really hostile rhetoric from coming from many, many different segments of our societies, and in some cases from leaders in governments.

MS. BELIN: Thank you. I'd like to open the floor to the room for questions. Please raise your hand, wait for the microphone which is around, and identify yourself by name. And please keep it short, just one question. Kathleen, in the front --

MS. NEWLAND: Thank you very much. I'm Kathleen Newland from the Migration Policy Institute, and I have a question for Dr. Héran. If you believe polling data, which I don't always, the policies of the current administration are not in line with American public opinion, which is still very positive toward refugees, favors legalization of migrants who've been here a long time, and so on, and is fairly positive about migration.

The question I wanted to ask you is: how much the position of the French Government, as reflected in admissions, is reflective of public opinion in France? In other words, are our leaders being led by public opinion, or are they leading at all? Thank you.

MS. BELIN: Do you want to -- yes, go ahead.

MR. HÉRAN: Immediately answer? Okay.

MS. BELIN: Yeah. Yeah.

MR. HÉRAN: Do you know, we have in France what has been observed in all liberal democracies. The famous policy gap, you know, this notion. It means that all liberal democracies, without any exception, do welcome more migrants, systematically more migrants than the public opinion would admit, and then the politicians themselves will admit.

There is there is always more migrants than is expected and desired by the public opinion and by the political spheres. And this is one of the major points of research now. And one of the explanation in that, okay, but the public opinion and the political class, let's say, underestimate the importance of the international commitments, and the importance of the rights-based immigration.

For example, we have very frequently and in every electoral campaign, in all the programs, we can look at the primaries and the presidential campaign we had two years ago, and many of these programs say: oh, we should have received only the migrants who are strictly adjusted to the needs of our economy. Okay? This kind of sentiment; but the idea that immigration should be correlated with the economy is no longer available, is no longer obtained since the '70s.

Since the time we decided, we took the decision, and the same in Germany, they took decision to stop the work immigration, and since that time in the old immigration countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, France, et cetera, there is no correlation any longer between the business cycle and the immigration inflows. Okay.

This kind of thing is systematically ignored but it explains why we continue to receive migrants, because the vast majority of the migrants migrate because they have the right to, because they had the family unification, even if we multiply the obstacles to the hardened conditions, that you have this. Okay.

And if you want to reduce drastically the number of family -- of migrants

coming on the ground of the family unification, for example, Marine Le Pen, wanted to divide this by and then by 10, and then by 20, reducing the 200,000 permits to 10,000, which means the abolition of migration. Okay? There's no -- it's more or less equivalent.

But even François Fillon, for example, mentioned a drastic reduction of family grouping, some of the leaders of the Directoire (Inaudible) are dreaming about the fact that we could reduce to the extreme this. The problem is, how can you divide a right by two? How can you divide a right by ten?

The only way is to put -- is to claim in the most certain way that, okay, now France, the country of the human rights, and so on, will officially announce that we will resiliate the court international conventions on family grouping on the rights of the children, and so on, and so on.

Do you imagine that France could do such a thing? This is also policy, but policy at a higher level, not the kind of policy you can change by some electoral campaign or from overnight, it's something much more stable. And so I think that it could be, it should be one of -- the role of the political leaders to stress, to insist on this, the matters of the immigration in our countries.

And there is, still, a coupling -- a correlation between migration flows and business cycle is a new -- in the new immigration countries such as Spain, or Italy, or Greece and, for example, the most wonderful example we had was the subprime crisis that in Spain burst in one year the business bubble, and the migrant bubble. It's very spectacular.

But this is possible only in the new immigration country not in the old immigration country, like France, Germany or -- so this is why we will not -- we will always have this situation of a gap between the public opinion and what is really -- okay between the outputs the political outputs, speeches, laws, et cetera, and the real outcomes of a migration policy.

MS. BELIN: Okay. Let's take more; over there in the back?

QUESTIONER: Hello. Thank you for this enlightening conversation. Have you not noticed, by any chance, that maybe except to diehard gullibles, your narrative increasingly rings hollow. Too bad I don't have time to debunk your arguments, of course, but the days of bringing the Muslim demographic bomb is coming to an end across Europe as more and more people see what it's all about.

And the thing is, I want to congratulate you by the way, because right now of course, you know, it's falling flat. Merkel is on pre-retirement. Macron is politically, you know, basically a walking dead. Okay? And so this game is over. Now, by the way, I want to congratulate you also --

MS. BELIN: Do you have -- do you have a question?

QUESTIONER: Yeah. Could you kindly comment on the fact that the second largest church in Paris was set on fire this weekend? Okay, this is the kind of wonderful things you have achieved --

MS. BELIN: Thank you for your question --

QUESTIONER: -- never mind stuck on being the world -- rape capital of the world. Keep it up.

MS. BELIN: Alina, good luck.

MS. POLYAKOVA: Hi. I'm Alina Polyakova. I'm Célia's colleague in the Center on the United States of America and Europe here Brookings. Thank you for the fascinating conversation.

I wanted to ask you to maybe think one level above the migration numbers, because it has always struck me about the differences between all of the European countries that you so clearly showed, and the types of migrants submitting, the proportions of migrants, is that -- regardless of those numbers, you know, immigration and opposition to immigration has become the key rallying call for mobilizing in the (inaudible) populous that have become anti-immigrant party across Europe.

And to go even deeper than that, well you showed in the breakdown in

Germany, the district breakdown, or the Länder breakdown, is that today in German, of course strongest in the areas where there is the lowest number of immigration, and you could say the same thing for Hungary, or Poland where I think your number was 14 asylum seekers were admitted in one year, which is in itself telling.

So, I was wondering if you had specifically been able to make that link in a more methodological way. I know you have to dig down much deeper, and it'd be curious, specifically, if you had done that kind of research on France. So, to the district level data, and mapped it on top of support for the National Front, if you're able to see that areas are more homogeneous, that you had more support. So I'd be curious to hear your thoughts on that.

MS. BELIN: In the interest of time, let's take a third question. Bill?

MR. DROZDIAK: Bill Drozdiak. A question about the future and the impact on climate change; The World Bank says 250 million people will be on the move as opposed to 65 million. Today Lake Chad is drying up, millions of people who live off of Lake Chad are going to be on the move, and these projections have been seized upon by populist nationalist leaders like Matteo Salvini, to whip up growing fears, even though the number of immigrants into Italy has dramatically reduced, his popularity keeps growing up because he plays on these projections.

So, I'd like to hear both of you give your opinions as to how we can best perceive these projections, and also their political impact?

MS. BELIN: Okay. Anne, if you want also to comment on the American public opinion regarding immigration including in region, maybe more so tied to immigration when there is less migrant actually. François, do you want to start?

MR. HÉRAN: So, yes. You know, there are two competing theories to explain the importance of -- or the sentiments against immigrants. The first idea, the most common, it's consistent saying there's this sort of threshold, the tolerance says threshold, and if the proportion of migrants is by climbing and clearing certain threshold done, then

xenophobia will burst, et cetera.

And the other theory is a theory of the -- it's called sometimes the contact theory, that if you are familiarized with migrants, if you have the experience, personal experience of migrants, you're much more tolerant.

And this, the contact theory has been illustrated by the German case because, yes, it is precisely in the areas where you have not even 5 percent of the population including the two generation that the xenophobic movement surge.

So, the first immigrant which appears in the landscape is already a threat, whereas in Hamburg, or in the North, I mean Australia, et cetera, of course the far right also has reaped some, but not at all in the same proportion as in the what the other sources of course of the discontentment in the Eastern Germany -- they're difficult to isolate the variable, and to weight exactly how this factor is really playing.

But we have an incredible story in France which also mitigates for the contacts -- the theory, it is a rumor, a very strange rumor, which has been observed in some regions in the west of France and in the Northeast, around the Poitiers, Nia, or these little cities of the Southwest France, where there was a very, very low percentage of immigrants, and no African immigrants, because the African immigrants are very much concentrated in the Parisian region, you know.

And also in Champagne, around the Champagne-Ardenne, and the rumor said that, well, these Africans that are appearing now did not exist before, they are here because the municipality of the suburban region in Paris sold these immigrants to the municipalities of the receiving regions, and so there was a sort of trade-off market, et cetera.

So, it's strange -- a very strange rumor, it is very well documented in Wikipedia, and now we may all get hold and use it. It's called the Rumor of the (inaudible), the Rumor of '93 -- 93 is the number of the (inaudible), the bottom (inaudible) which is by far the bottom (inaudible) with more migrants. But the idea that these departments have sold out their excess migrants from Black countries, and from Black Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa,

to these municipalities; and to the point that the mayors of these municipalities, and some of them were belonging to the right, (inaudible), the Mayor sitting in Champagne-Ardenne suited -- so the NGO was some groups for this.

So, so main operation, the first operation of strangers, visible strangers, visible strangers, and the color of the skin plays a very important role, was putting the people in a new state. And I think that the main reason for me of the opposition to migrants in an ex-communist country is that communism has created on family (Speaking in French) -- would you tell it in English?

MS. BELIN: Jailed?

MR. HÉRAN: As jailed people, there was no -- only as (inaudible) the people. The only migration possible was a work migration, family unification was prohibited. And this is very important to remind, that the only countries in which family reunification is prohibited, are the Gulf countries and the Communist county before the Fall of the Wall, the only historical examples.

In a liberal democracy, family unification exists by rights. So, communism has completely isolated the people and they have never been familiarized with the existence of non-European people working with them and helping for the economic reconstruction, and this is a very important support for me to the contact theory which explained the facts much more directly than the threshold theory.

MS. BELIN: Do you want to answer on the climate?

MR. HÉRAN: Yes, the climate.

MS. BELIN: Because we have only about five minutes --

MR. HÉRAN: Well, I'm not at all a climate skeptic, not at all, I think that the change, the present change of climate as a human origin, it's now very clear, but I'm very skeptical about the idea of climatic -- of climate migration, and the number you have mentioned, 250, is always the same. It comes from the Stern Reports; we don't know exactly what is the origin of this figure, and the problem is that the definition of migration in

this idea, which looks like a rumor by some, it's a very specific definition.

Because how can we be sure that, for example, the elevation of the sea level, which is this very progressive mechanism, that a phenomenon like Katrina, for example, or earthquakes in Haiti, and so. To what extent can we be sure that this will provoke international migration?

Not simply displacement to the rear country, we don't know we know, we have no evidence of this by now. Of course we can always mention the Maldives. How do you say in English, Maldives?

MS. BELIN: Maldives

MR. HÉRAN: Maldives?

MS. BELIN: Yeah.

MR. HÉRAN: Maldives, but well, this is a very specific country, and very few population. So, the problem with the natural phenomena that their chronology is very different, you have sudden events, in two seconds an earthquake destroys a population. Or you have centuries -- some progressive events which takes decades or centuries.

In each case we have no -- there is no evidence that really this will provoke a climate migration. I have to comment on this, because what is very striking now, is the success of both theories, it's the theory that there are some demographic migrations, and there are some climate migration, that is objective migration, objective facts.

You don't even -- you don't need to prioritize the (inaudible) of the races or to have a cultural vision of the threats. No. It's the fight is now to give you a sort of objective vision of the threat, it's got some demographic migration or climate migration.

If you look at migrations from the demographic point of view, there is a fantastic tool now available since a few years, the bilateral migration database which classifies all the migrants between the countries of birth and the countries of residence, and it's a coherent matrix, you know, made up by OECD, IMF, the United Nations, and so on, and what is the lesson we can derive from it -- we can draw from this matrix?



That it's not the poorest of the poorest country which migrates to the rich country, not at all, 75 percent of the Sub-Saharan Africa -- African Sub-Saharan migrations are directed towards another country of Sub-Saharan Africa.

So, so if you look, for example, not only the indicator of the wealth of the country, but also, for example, the fertility, the countries with the highest fertility don't migrate to the countries with the lowest fertility. We have this mechanical idea, this mechanical metaphor -- these hydraulic metaphors of that what is overcrowded will -- mechanically goes to the under-crowded, the deserts.

Or, the dry to the wet, or the under -- the over fertile to the over fertile, and so on, but look for example to the Balkan country -- and it will be my last remark -- if you look at all the ex-Communist Balkan countries, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Kosovo, these countries, 22 percent of this population lives abroad.

It's one of the most important flow -- outflow of migrants in the world, 22 percent of the Balkan countries, the Western Balkan countries, in Africa is only 2 percent or 3 percent of the Sub-Saharan Africa which lives outside.

And the Balkan countries have the highest records of low -- the lowest, low fertility as the demography said. So, this lowest low, I can't really -- by the criterion of fertility, do migrate in a massive way to a country with higher fertility. So, if every time you look at these metaphors, hydraulic metaphors, mechanical metaphors, they are eloquent, but a metaphor is not true because it is eloquent.

MS. BELIN: Thank you very much. And I think we don't have much more time for any questions. But I'd like to give a chance to Anne, to maybe interject if you want. On both the question of maybe American public opinion, and in general reflect on your own take of this administration immigration policies.

You've mentioned it a bit earlier, but that we can see clear anti-immigrant policies, but what if -- is there anything that this administration can do that would make sense if it does want to fight illegal immigration but do respect the rights of the people in this

country. And maybe just a few words Anne.

MS. RICHARD: On the issue of climate migrants, one of the problems we have is that all of the international conventions and organizations are set up to deal with people fleeing good, old-fashioned conflict and persecution. And so there is no home for these issues, you know, in the international community of organizations, and to point people.

And there's so much going on that no one wants to take it on either, so that's why I appreciate the countries that have, Norway and Switzerland, and Germany, and Morocco, and Bangladesh, you know, stepping forward to look at these issues.

I find in Washington and my MPI friends will correct me if I'm wrong. I mean there's very few experts wrestling with these issues, it's mentioned a lot, but when we're really sitting down doing serious research I would say, my colleague, Elizabeth Ferris said, at Georgetown is -- and also Alice Thomas, Refugees International.

So, I think there could be a lot more attention paid to the issues that you raised. One of the things that we talked about with the Ambassadors in 2015 and 2016 was to -- that they be comfortable talking about the American tradition of being welcoming to refugees and immigrants, but that we also had another tradition which was, once a group had arrived in the U.S. they joined with other Americans to shut the door to the next group coming.

And that this was also a tradition we had had over decades and decades, and each group would try to do it to the next group. And the reason was because while these most recent arrivals, okay, they will fit in our country and in our society, this next group, no way can they be trusted to join our society.

And if you go back and look at the rhetoric it really resembles a rhetoric against Muslims and against Central Americans today that somehow there's just something innate about them that they couldn't possibly fit in our society. And so, you know, that they are a threat to Christianity, or that they are rapists. That's the type of language we've heard today, but also that we -- you will hear in Europe and in the United States.

So if those are concerns, I mean there's other ways to advance -- you know to fight rape, it doesn't have to be done through your immigration and migration policies.

The President has talked against chain migration, and that is an acceptable term, but it can also be called family reunification, and I think one reason America has endorsed family reunification for so long it was part of -- many American families had arrived because one person would come first and send money -- or get a job make some money and send money home to have the next family member, and the next family member, and the next family member.

So that it was a normal process, you know, from the 1800s. So that, I guess, if you wanted to discuss in the United States, and if the Trump administration wanted to discuss this, I wouldn't trust them, but if they wanted to discuss this seriously, that they could talk about the mix of people could come in.

I think there's a legitimate question there about who do we want and, you know, what are our priorities? I would just caution, you know, the refugees who come to the United States are by and large very successful, and many of them come with nothing, so I'm just not that impressed that we have to have, you know, I think the President would say real estate investors and supermodels as a priority coming in or marrying.

And so I think that, you know, many people can do well in the United States. What Europe should be looking at, what Americans should be looking at is: why do we have different levels of fluidity within our society?

Why do some migrants do very well in some countries and less well? Why are they frozen?

I mean when I -- I lived in France just for a short time, but I was really struck by the (inaudible), and how the political parties at the time, I think it's changed in the last 15 years just, you know, ignored. They had no political power, people living in these suburban areas around the cities.

The funny thing I saw once was a guy who was darker skinned, who was in

the subways once, and he had a T-shirt, and he'd written on it "I'm from the suburbs", to show what a tough guy he was. And I thought, that would never translate into Washington, you know. (Laughter)

That's not how we roll. But I think this is where we should be looking deeper is, you know, how no matter who is in your country, how do we allow for this, you know, American dream, this upward mobility, this rewards for hard work?

Because I think that is the essential problem that a lot of the discontented publics have right now.

MS. BELIN: I feel terrible that we are out of time. This has been a brilliant conversation. Thank you both for being here. Thank you, all of you for joining us. And join me in thanking them. (Applause)

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