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THE END OF AN ERA?
THE INF TREATY, NEW START, AND THE FUTURE OF STRATEGIC STABILITY

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. ROSE: Good morning and welcome to the Brookings Institution. My name is Frank Rose and I'm a senior fellow here in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. And thank you so much for joining us this morning.

The title of today's event is "End of an Era: The INF Treaty, New START, and the Future of Strategic Stability," a very timely subject indeed. Last month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would suspend its obligations under the INF Treaty and that pursuant to Article XV of the treaty, the United States would withdraw from the treaty in six months. In response to that announcement, the following day Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia would also suspend its obligations under the treaty. Unless something dramatic occurs, the INF Treaty will come to an end this summer.

That said, I don't want to use our event this morning to debate the pros and cons of withdrawing from the INF Treaty. There's been plenty of debate over the past month or two on that subject. Instead, I'd like to use our time to discuss the future of strategic arms control, trying to answer three broad questions.

First, to what extent is the demise of the INF Treaty a symptom of broader challenges to the existing U.S.-Russia strategic stability framework?

Second, what's the future of the New START Treaty?

And third, how might we update the existing bilateral strategic arms control framework to make it more responsive to the emerging security environment?

And we have a fantastic panel this morning to help us explore these issues in more detail. First, we have Michaela Dodge, who currently serves as a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation. In addition to her long career at Heritage, she has also served as a senior defense policy advisor to Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona.

Next we have Lynn Rusten, who currently serves as vice president for global nuclear policy at the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Lynn has a long history working

nuclear arms control issues on the National Security Council, where she served as senior director for arms control; the State Department; the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and on Capitol Hill.

Next we have Pranay Vaddi, who currently serves as a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Prior to joining Carnegie last year, Pranay held numerous positions at the State Department in both the Arms Control Bureau and the Office of Legislative Affairs. And as part of his job in Legislative Affairs, he was responsible for getting my nomination as assistant secretary through the Senate. So many people will say bad things about Pranay. I am not one of them. (Laughter)

And last but not least we have Amy Woolf, who currently serves as a specialist in nuclear weapons policy with the Congressional Research Service. It's fair to say that Amy is one of the most knowledgeable people in Washington on nuclear weapons policy and programs. When I meet with new congressional staffers often who are trying to get up to speed on nuclear weapons, they ask me who should I have them talk to, and I always say talk to Amy. In addition to Amy's long career with CRS, she also worked at the Pentagon in 1994 on the Clinton administration's Nuclear Posture Review.

So here's how we will conduct today's roundtable. First, I will ask the panelists about four or five broad questions, giving them each some time to respond. And following that, we'll open the floor to questions from the audience.

So on that note, Amy, let's start with you. And, you know, I'd like to begin by trying to place the INF Treaty's demise in a broader framework. As I mentioned in my introduction, there's been a lot of debate over the past couple of months on the pros and cons of the United States withdrawing from the INF Treaty. However, one of my concerns about that debate is it has been too focused specifically on the INF Treaty and not focused enough on the larger challenges to the U.S.-Russia strategic stability framework.

Given your historical perspective on arms control issues, one, do you believe that the demise of the INF Treaty is an isolated event or part of a broader decline of

the current U.S.-Russia strategic stability framework?

And second, do you have any thoughts about actions that the United States could take over the next couple of months to effectively manage the demise of the INF Treaty in a way that doesn't take down what remains of the U.S.-Russia strategic stability framework?

So, over to you.

MS. WOOLF: Well, thank you, Frank. And thank you, Brookings, for having me here this morning.

It's easy to try to link the current state of Russia and U.S. relations to the problems we've been having with the INF Treaty, but that I think mixes up cause and effect. The problems with the INF Treaty actually started more than 10 years ago.

Russia made it quite clear in the mid-2000s, around 2006, 2007, that they saw great value in intermediate-range cruise missiles as a response to their national security concerns, to their strategic stability concerns. They've gone all-in on deploying cruise missiles on land, at sea, in the air. We're all familiar with the calibers they've been shooting into Syria. It's almost inevitable to expect that this would have come to land-based missiles, as well. So Russia responding to its view of its strategic needs decided, according to some schools of thought, to develop a land-based cruise missile.

The United States quietly started calling them out about it in the early part of this decade. So it's certainly true that the relationship between the United States and Russia in debating what's going on with the INF Treaty has hardened in the years since the United States and Russia have had other problems in their relationship, specifically starting in the 2013/2014 timeframe. But I don't believe that the INF Treaty is a cause of that. It's more a result of that hardening in the relationship.

Now, how not to have INF disrupt the rest of the strategic relationship, there are lots of suggestions floating around in the community for subsequent measures that the United States and Russia could look at to make sure that the deployment or even the

development of intermediate-range cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, does not become the irritant that it was in the 1980s. And a lot of people in the arms control community and the strategic studies community talk about regional limits on intermediate-range missiles or limits that would only include a ban in Europe, but would allow the missiles to run free in Asia.

Having a long historical memory, that gives me worries because we considered that during the INF discussions and limiting the missiles to being only in Asia, but not in Europe, not only upset our Asian allies, but the missiles are mobile. And if during a crisis Russia were to move its missiles or even the United States, if we stored missiles in the United States and moved them during a crisis, the movement of the missiles during a crisis could be extraordinarily destabilizing. And if you're worried about strategic stability, between the mobility of the missiles and their short time of flight, uncertainty is more of a problem in my mind than the actual deployment of the missiles.

So it would be important for me to see the United States and Russia recognizing what the real cause of concern would be for me. I don't know that it'd be the Russians' or the United States' concerns. But if I were asking or looking for something that the two countries could do in the next few months or years, it would be discussions on how these deployments are related to their broader security concerns and not related to their concerns with each other, if that is the case. And how changes in those deployments are not pointed at each other, trying to get at the instabilities caused by both mobility and short time of flight.

MR. ROSE: Thanks very much, Amy. Any of the other panelists want to comment on this? Pranay?

MR. VADDI: No, I think looking back to the negotiations, as Amy pointed us in that direction, is important. I mean, the Russian military was against the treaty as it was designed when it was being negotiated. It was one-sided, they knew it. I think we knew it, as well.

So I think it's important to recall after Putin arrives how Russia's mindset

changed. This is after U.S. airpower was used and demonstrated to great effect in the Balkans, in the Middle East. And Russia had this in their mindset in the mid-2000s. I mean, Putin, when he arrived at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, remarked unchecked American unilateralism and NATO unilateralism as being a core problem for Russia and it should be a core problem for global security. So I don't think it's that surprising that Russia embarked on a program starting with the Iskander in the mid-2000s and short-range missiles deployed in its periphery. And then obviously with the SSC-8 and the INF violation, developed a system that eventually led to the demise of the INF Treaty.

So I think to answer Frank's original question or address Frank's original question I don't think that the failure of INF or the demise of INF, the eventual termination of INF, is necessarily a thing that lends credence to Lavrov's recent statement that bilateral arms control is dead and we need to be multilateral. I think that INF had its own sort of wrinkles for Russia and, for example, New START does not because they're complying with it. They seem to appreciate what the treaty does for their own national security. And by and large, their behavior in New START has been good.

MR. ROSE: Lynn, Michaela, anything you'd like to add?

MS. RUSTEN: So I'll just add, I mean, I think we don't want to spend our time so much on history as moving forward, but I will say I think it's interesting that so far no one has mentioned the role of the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and how that may have instigated the development of certain systems on the Russian side, including some of the strategic ones that are now begin talked about and possibly the decision to go forward with these missiles that are prohibited by the INF Treaty.

But I think more of the issue is the future. And getting to your punchline I think this just shows, I mean, we are in this period of increasing instability and moving away from regulation between U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And in some quarters complacency about that, about whether that matters and whether this is a trajectory and a trend that we need to try to avert, and so I think that's about what we're about to get into now

moving forward.

MR. ROSE: Great. Thanks, Michaela?

MS. DODGE: I'd like to skip to the second part of your question, which is how do we manage a little bit of the future? And I think part of the key to management of the demise of INF Treaty is not just the relationship between the United States and Russia, but it's also the relationship between the United States and its allies. And it seems to me that after doing a little bit of catch-up with our allies, we all got on the same page and I think that's commendable. And sort of maintaining that unity within the alliance will be very important for just broader international security rather than just U.S.-Russia relations.

MR. ROSE: Great. Well, let's look at the future now. And Lynn, let me come to you. Lynn, you led the State Department's backstopping efforts on the New START Treaty in 2009 and 2010. And as a result of that, she won the Secretary of State's award for international security. A little plug for Lynn there. So if there's anyone who understands the treaty in Washington, it's you. Therefore, I have two questions for you. The first is a softball, the second's not a softball.

So my first question is should we extend the New START Treaty by five years as allowed under the terms of the treaty? And if yes, why?

My second question is opponents of extending New START argue that we shouldn't extend the treaty because it fails to capture new Russian systems, like hypersonic glide vehicles and autonomous nuclear torpedoes. Do you think the critics have a valid point? And if so, how would you address those concerns?

MS. RUSTEN: Well, it won't surprise you to know that I think we should be extending the New START Treaty on the first principle that when you're in a hole, stop digging. And when I say "when you're in a hole," as I have just mentioned, I think we're on a really dangerous trajectory right now with Russia in terms of, first of all, the overall context of the relationship where relations between the West and Russia are understandably extremely strained as a result of a whole lot of behavior that I don't need to recite here, but including

Russian -- well, starting with Ukraine and Russian interference in U.S. elections and responses that we've taken. I mean, there's a whole -- so, you know, we are in this downward spiral. And on top of that, we have the overlay of increasingly divergent views on our nuclear forces and military forces really.

And so, as has been said, the New START Treaty really provides something very fundamental. I mean, first of all, it constrains the competition in nuclear forces. We're going to talk about ways in which it doesn't do that entirely, and that's because it's never a static situation. Treaties are static and military programs of countries are not static.

But even more important than the limits I'd argue are the verification and the predictability and stability that provides, which is really easy to take for granted when you have it and when you lose it, you realize how important it is. I mean, we have incredible insight into Russian strategic systems and vice versa through multiple exchanges of data on the status of these forces, you know, virtually every day. Intrusive 18 onsite inspections a year that each side participates in to go and confirm actual warheads deployed on systems, which is unprecedented, which we didn't have in the START Treaty.

And so that foundation of verification and predictability it provides as well as the limits so that we on our side can be planning against kind of a known environment is really important. And if we lose that it will be irreplaceable. And at first, what happens over time is, I mean, we almost take for granted how much information we have that's accumulated really going back to the SALT days and the START days and now. And over time that information will atrophy. And I'd be willing to wager that probably the uniformed military and the intelligence communities are probably the stronger advocates for continuation of mutual regulation of our strategic forces, and there's a reason for that. It benefits both of us.

When you have that foundation in place, I mean, none of the problems that we have, even in our strategic relationship with Russia, whether it's now the reintroduction of banned missiles under the INF Treaty, whether it's some of these new or exotic capabilities,

none of them get better if you take away New START. Some of them can be addressed through New START, some of them could be addressed in addition.

There's nothing if you extend New START that keeps you from, number one, having additional agreements or understandings. They can be legally binding. They can be transparency. They can be reciprocal measures. Nothing prevents you from doing that in conjunction. Nothing prevents you from negotiating a new treaty that would supersede New START before the expiration of the additional five-year period. But it gives you this platform of stability on which to work on. And also, it makes it a lot easier and quicker to do anything that you might overlay on top of it, you know, in a dream world even further reductions. Because you don't have to renegotiate all the verification provisions, which is what takes so long.

Do you want me to go to the new systems?

MR. ROSE: Yeah. Or why don't we actually come back to that? I know --

MS. RUSTEN: I just want --

MR. ROSE: Oh, yeah, go ahead. Go ahead.

MS. RUSTEN: So I just want to say, so we first saw this. I mean, what's interesting is the original START Treaty, which I also helped negotiate, had an Article V prohibition on some of the types of systems that we're now seeing prohibited: underwater- and air-based strategic range nuclear systems or ballistic missiles I think. Those prohibitions are not in New START, but what the negotiators had the foresight to put instead was a provision on new kinds, which said if either side was believed to be developing a new kind, which is a different than a new type, of strategic system, that there's a mechanism for discussing that in the implementing body for the treaty and talking about whether or not it would -- the treaty should apply to it.

So there's a mechanism to talk about it. There's no obligation, you know, a mutual agreement to agree that something should be subject to the treaty, but there is a mechanism.

And I'll just say one last thing, which is something like there's some things there's no question about. So the new Russian Sarmat ICBM, which is a MIRV'ed heavy missile, that's a new type. It's an ICBM. It clearly meets the definition of an ICBM. I couldn't believe there would be any debate that that would come under the treaty.

MR. ROSE: Great. Lynn, thanks for that great overview.

Michaela, let me turn to you. My guess is you have a slightly different perspective on this issue, so I'm going to kind of poke at this issue a little bit more. So why don't you say a few words?

MS. DODGE: Yeah. You know, I think there are good reasons to think long and hard whether we're going to extend New START. Part of the rationale for me is that over the past 10 years or, you know, since New START entered into force, I don't really see where a treaty contributed to stabilization of Russia's behavior. So we have Ukraine, we had a chemical weapons attack in the UK, we have Russia fighting on behalf of Assad in Syria and in Iran.

I also think that the argument about New START not covering new types of Russia's strategic weapons is a little more nuanced than that and that it is the sort of value and contributions of New START verification over time will decrease as those things that Russia develops outside of the treaty framework become more important and become more prominent in Russia's national security strategy. Now, of course, there is also the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, but we've beaten that horse in I think every single arms control agreement we've ever had, so I don't see that going away anytime soon.

Right now, the question is, you know, do we have a partner in Russia with which we can extend New START? And I do think that the response to the question is not a slam dunk, you know, straightforward extend by five years, as my colleague thinks.

MR. ROSE: Great. Amy, Pranay, anything you'd like to add on this point?

MS. WOOLF: Within the debate in the United States on all sides of the issue there is this view, contrary to what Lynn said, that we should extend this treaty first and

then try to expand it; that we should extend it on the condition that Russia agree to expand it to include these new types of systems and even possibly to include nonstrategic nuclear weapons. And that could sound like a noble cause. You know, wouldn't it be better if we had a treaty that covered everything rather than a treaty that only covered some things?

It's worth remembering Russia also has a list of things that it would like in a bigger treaty, and that includes limits on U.S. missile defense, limits on U.S. precision strategic weapons be they cruise missiles of Prompt Global Strike, and limits on other countries' weapons, which is a reference to the UK and France. So none of the people who I've heard advocating for a bigger treaty as a condition of extending New START has mentioned a willingness to talk about any of these issues that Russia's going to put on the table.

So Russia is going to put these things on the table and we know from experience over the last seven years that that's too much to put on the table. There won't be a new treaty that incorporates all those items. So arguing that we ought to try to incorporate more of Russia's stuff in a new treaty as a condition of extending New START is basically arguing that it's better to have no limits on anything if we can't have limits on everything because it means you're willing to let New START go.

And it's integrating itself into the debate over the future of New START if you listen to the voices around. And it's worth remembering that Russia will have a role in this, too, and they have an opinion.

MR. ROSE: Did you want to say something, Lynn?

MS. RUSTEN: I do. I mean, I think it's really important, and this isn't directed at you, but to sort of not have a sloppy discussion about this. And what I mean is the beauty of the extension provision of New START is that it doesn't require advice and consent here or approval in the Russian Duma. I mean, you know, when the Senate gave its advice and consent to that treaty, it consented to the provision which was that the Executive Branch in its wisdom could decide, you know, if the Russians agreed, to extend

the treaty for up to five years.

The only things you can do in that context are things that can be agreed to with Russia in terms of encompassing any other systems. It would have to be agreed to as viability and effectiveness changes in the context of the treaty, which means you can't bring in nonstrategic nuclear weapons into the New START Treaty. I mean, you could have some kind of parallel or separate agreement. There's different things you could do, but there's no way you can do that without actually constituting, in my view, an amendment.

On the other hand, the one thing that you could in principle do is have this discussion about strategic-ranged nuclear systems that could become subject to the treaty under the New Kinds Provision by mutual consent, which in my view, if it's mutual, wouldn't require an amendment. And I don't actually preclude that that couldn't be part of a discussion.

MR. ROSE: Pranay, anything to add on your end?

MR. VADDI: Yeah, I'll try to be brief. I think everyone has touched on the sort of various questions to ask regarding a New START extension. But at the risk of adding more on the pro extension column, I think people should -- I think the U.S. Government should hit singles where it can, especially right now. So bureaucratically extending the New START Treaty is a smart thing to do. I don't have a ton of confidence that whether it's NSNW, whether it's the new exotic strategic-ranged system, that there is an interest in actually sitting down and having a wide-open negotiation with the Russian Federation on these issues right now. Extension is easy for the reasons that Lynn has cited.

Allies, I think, have closed every statement they make about the INF Treaty citing their hope that the New START Treaty will be extended for as much as allies were on board with the decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty and suspend it. As Michaela pointed out, none of the facts of Russia's behavior in the INF Treaty apply to their behavior within the New START Treaty. So I think that'll be a lot more difficult and you risk diverging NATO, for example, much more than it did -- with regard to the INF Treaty if you fail to

extend New START or come up with some sort of replacement plan.

Lastly, I'll touch on modernization cycles. I think as New START was being negotiated and when it was eventually ratified, Russia was in the process of fielding their new modernized strategic-range systems, namely ICBMs, a new SSBN, a new SLBM. The United States hasn't really started its strategic modernization yet. The cycles are offset and that's natural. That's been the case since the history of nuclear weapons started.

That being said, it seems prudent for the United States to want to keep insights available, inspections going, data exchanges going while Russia has a modern strategic rocket force than the United States. I think we incentivize Russia pursuing more things, whether it's outside of New START or within New START, if we don't have a framework treaty within which to discuss these issues at the BCC. Thanks, Frank.

MR. ROSE: Well, Pranay, you're not off the hook yet because I want to ask you a question. Now, you've done some work about the INF Treaty in China. Last week at the Heritage Foundation, Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas was, according to press reports, asked a question whether the United States should extend the New START Treaty. And again, according to press reports, he responded that the United States should only extend New START if China agrees to join the treaty.

Now, I think we all know that China is not going to become a party to the New START Treaty. That's just not going to happen. That said, I think many experts argue that over the longer-term China will likely become the major strategic competitor to the United States. That said, if that is indeed the case, the United States is going to need to find a way to bring China into a future arms control or strategic stability framework.

So my questions to you are as follows. Do you agree that the United States needs to find a way to bring China into a future strategic stability framework? And if so, what are some of the practical near-term steps the United States can take to begin that process?

MR. VADDI: Thanks, Frank. I'm glad you addressed Senator Cotton's comment, so I don't feel a need to spend more time on that. But I think that we have to start

at the beginning with China. We have enjoyed with Russia a certain muscle memory that has taken decades to achieve as far as strategic arms control go. So I think first we have to ask ourselves in Washington and in the United States Government what are the drivers of a potential conflict with China? What could actually start a war? Or what would incentivize the United States to strike China and vice versa? Are there incentives for China to participate in arms control? If you answer those questions, you know, are there incentives for China to participate in arms control and what does that arms control actually look like?

I think that focusing on a New START-like, formal, treaty-based arms control agreement with China is unrealistic. As I'm sure everyone in the audience knows better than I, China has a relatively small nuclear weapons stockpile in terms of their strategic-range delivery vehicles, in terms of the warheads that get put on it. It's relatively small and it's been that way since the 1960s. I think there are open questions in Beijing as to whether they can continue to maintain such a small strategic deterrent in the face of U.S. advances in conventional precision strike capabilities, U.S. advances in missile defenses.

So I think that the U.S. should be looking at China in a way that we are not trying to incentivize China to sprint to parity. I think that we should be happy that China has a relatively small strategic nuclear arsenal. And then figure out ways that we can start -- and this gets into the second question, Frank -- figure out ways that we can kind of create stability in the kind of regional hotspots that may exist in the Asia-Pacific, the areas in which we are more likely to become entangled, as a colleague of mine who's done a lot of research in, entangled into a conflict that eventually leads to escalation to a nuclear war.

As far as concrete examples, I think it would be useful to approach the Chinese about any sort of military-to-military communications regime, any kind of incidents at sea, or avoidance of incidents in the air-type agreements as a starting point. Ultimately, these are the types of things that should spring from a U.S.-China strategic dialogue or a strategic stability discussion, which I think have been -- during the Obama administration were not that fruitful and during this current administration they haven't really taken foot.

Other ideas like putting a nuclear risk reduction center in Beijing, information exchanges, database declarations, some of these things drive against the opacity with which China approaches its nuclear arsenal currently. But I think there are ways for the U.S. to find incentives to bring China to the table on these. I don't think that coercive angle that we have taken thus far with China has driven them into wanting to cooperate diplomatically, so we have to think about how we can actually achieve that.

MR. ROSE: Do any of the other panelists have anything they'd like to add?

Okay. Well, Michaela, let's go to you. We've talked a lot about nuclear weapons this morning, but we really haven't talked about some of these new and emerging technologies, like cyber, outer space, artificial intelligence. If you read the literature out there, there's a feeling that these new and emerging technologies are increasingly impacting strategic nuclear calculations.

So my question to you is as follows. Can we have effective strategic arms control in the future without taking into account these new and emerging technologies? And how would you incorporate these new technologies into future arms control agreements?

MS. DODGE: I think part of it depends on what you mean when you say "effective." But it seems to me that even today from our debate right on this panel there is this feeling that we're missing maybe a little bit something how do we take into account and how do we grapple with these new technologies and potential new threats ahead of us and how they interfere with our traditional notions of arms control.

They certainly will transform framework in which we think about things like verification, about limitations, reductions. Pranay talked about muscle memory and how we have to start from scratch with China. We have to start from scratch with artificial intelligence; to some degree space and outer space arms control, although we have a little bit of precedence there, but we haven't done anything for a very long time. We don't have language developed. We don't have shared understanding developed with our partners and other states as far as these technologies go.

Now, there is a complicating factor, too, that in some of these technologies the United States Government is lagging behind as far as development, technology development goes. So, for example, in hypersonic glide weapons many would make the case that the Chinese program is much more advanced than the U.S. program, maybe Russian, too. And so it's very difficult to think about any kind of arms control when we don't really have that much to put on the table. And again, that echoes the difficulty with Russia modernizing its nuclear forces and the United States taking a lot longer to modernize its nuclear forces, and what it potentially means for the next arms control agreement even in sort of the more traditional sense of the word.

There is a whole host of developments in the nuclear area, particularly, again, in Russia with new nuclear weapons outside of a traditional arms control framework. And so I think going forward we basically have two options.

One is figure out how we can put in place linkages between different sets of issues that Russia will care about, that China will care about, that other countries will care about, and negotiate about those. Even though, historically speaking, it's always very difficult to make those linkages and figure out what the trade-offs are and what implications those linkages have for our future negotiations.

And our second option is to develop capabilities to sort of not match, but develop capabilities where it is in our national security interests for other reasons and see how can we make the other party, I guess, worried enough that it will be interested in negotiations, that it will be interested in having transparency insights into what the United States is doing.

And again, Pranay mentioned about our interest in notifications and data declarations and verification provisions, but it cuts both ways. So as we modernize and develop our nuclear forces, I imagine that the Russian Federation will be very interested in having insight into what the new systems are and how Russia can get more insight into what it is that the United States is doing.

MR. ROSE: Lynn?

MS. RUSTEN: Yeah, I wanted to jump in and agree with much of what Michaela said, maybe not all, to say that, so, first of all, I think we all understand that arms control, of course, isn't an end in itself. It's a tool. And it's a tool toward an objective of I think in terms of trying to prevent the use of nuclear use, of managing strategic competition.

And so I think we really -- I worry a lot about the capacity of policymakers to understand the implications of this rapid technological change and what it means for strategic stability, for objectives. And so something like, you know, we worry a lot about cyber risks to nuclear command and control, and a lot's been written on that. But it's a really serious concern. And, of course, the threats can come between adversaries, but it also can come from third parties.

And we have a vested interest not only in the security of our command and control and warning systems, but we have a vested interest in, for instance, Russia's command and control and warning systems being accurate and working as they should, and not having presidents responding to potential false of mischievous warnings due to cyber interference in eight minutes. So that's one thing.

And I'll just say that, you know, one thing is to have -- this goes to the need for a broader strategic stability conversation with Russia. We also need it with China, as well, to really start to talk about these things. We've also got the blurring of conventional and nuclear capabilities in terms of hypersonics. What are the strategic implications of that?

And there's different tools for addressing these things. It's not all formal arms control. There can be transparency. There can be an attempt to develop norms in the cyber realm, for instance, even though there's real challenges, of course, with verification. But some of it is having an understanding on what the concerns are and as well as what Michaela said in terms of there are some areas where we should have common interests and concerns and there are other areas where we have different concerns. But we need to begin to address them and find the areas of overlap.

MR. ROSE: Yeah, Lynn, I think that's really one of the critical points coming out of today's panel. You really can't think of the nuclear issue as siloed from the space and cyber issue. I think all of these strategic capabilities issues are kind of interrelated.

Indeed, last year, I had to testify before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Russian and Chinese nuclear doctrine. I spent about half the testimony talking about nuclear weapons, but the other half of the testimony was focused on things like offensive cyber capabilities and the threat to nuclear command and control, outer space systems, and other emerging technologies. So that's one of -- over the past several years that's one of my focuses is, again, we need to look at these nuclear issues in a more integrated fashion.

Pranay and Amy, anything you'd like to add on this point?

MS. WOOLF: I'm going to say essentially what Lynn just said, but start from a slightly different perspective. From the perspective of emerging technologies affecting strategic nuclear forces and our concept of strategic stability I have no dispute with that. I think that it is absolutely true that the world we're coming into is very different from the one that those of us who have been doing this for a while have been working in.

But I've also noticed over the last few years that every time one of these emerging technologies is discussed in a context with the nuclear arms control world, I don't understand the language people are speaking. But they reach out and say, well, we don't like this. This is scary. Other countries are doing awful things. We need to do arms control on this.

And as Lynn just said, arms control is not always the solution when there's something out there that is worrisome and can pose a threat. I mean, arms control is a solution when there's a trade space, when there's cooperation in some sense that you can have norms and agreements. But there's this sense that if we just stop the technology from developing, then we won't have to worry about that. We are not in that world now.

So when you think of arms control or either the role that these technologies

play on our strategic stability and arms control discussions or the role that arms control and strategic stability discussion can play on these systems, on has to draw a broader view of what is arms control and strategic stability. You have to think about it as more of a cooperative threat management endeavor, finding out information, sharing concerns, the sort of thing that we started in the nuclear world 50, 60 years ago, and forgot that that's the first step before you can get to the things we now consider arms control.

MR. ROSE: Pranay, just briefly, I think we have to figure out what our starting point is as far as the U.S. Government goes. So what are the characteristics of these technologies? How would the United States military see utility in these technologies and actually use them in a potential conflict? How would our adversaries do the same?

I think, you know, when you look at something like cyber, obviously we're very secretive of a cyber capability. We may only be able to use it once before it's countered and useless to us again and it's very hard to attribute. Now, data's very distinct from the character of weapons that have been controlled through arms control agreements in the past. And all of these different technologies have completely different attributes unrelated to cyber, unrelated to an ICBM.

So I think we have to grapple with our own U.S. Government understanding of these weapons and how they fit into a potential conflict before we can go about negotiating limits on them or bans or et cetera, because none of those things may be appropriate. What may be appropriate is just getting a sense for how other countries approach using these tools themselves in a military conflict.

And I think as Amy referenced, you know, and Lynn references, dialogue is important because, for example, we probably want to make sure that Russia and China don't see any utility in going after U.S. early warning assets or attack assessment assets, those types of things that we may interpret to be preludes to a first strike from China or Russia. To me that forms the framework of some kind of joint understanding or agreement right there.

So maybe starting to think about the potential results of these capabilities

being used and trying to put a limit on those activities, which prevents us from falling to the place I think we all are, which is we don't really understand when a 20-year-old comes and talks to us about AI or talks to us about cyber. I don't and I can't fit those things into a New START-like framework. But there are the end results of the use of these capabilities that are worrisome and that we should look to try to limit.

MR. ROSE: Great. Well, let me ask one broad question before we turn to the audience for their questions. And I'd like you to take some time and kind of draw this out because I think it's a really, really important question and it really goes to many of the issues we've discussed this morning.

Okay. Putting aside who's President in 2025, you have been tasked by the U.S. Government to come up with a new strategic arms control, strategic stability framework. And my questions to you are as follows. What countries would you include in that framework? What weapons systems that our potential adversaries are deploying would you seek to limit? And here's a tough one, where do you think the United States could accept some limitations on its own military capabilities? And finally, what happens if there's no agreement? What does that mean for the future of strategic stability?

So who wants to start? Lynn?

MS. RUSTEN: So I may not entirely answer your questions.

MR. ROSE: That's fine.

MS. RUSTEN: I mean, I worry about, you know, where are we going to be in 2025? And I think I started out that, you know, we're on a trajectory in our bilateral nuclear relationship with Russia which is going like this. And if we don't want to be there, and "there" might mean military conflict, accident, all kinds of bad things, you know, we need to actively do something to put ourselves on a different trajectory, and so -- before we have the luxury of talking about some of the things you've addressed.

And so, you know, we really need to get back to basics, in my view. We need to re-engage on mil-to-mil contacts at multiple levels. We need to have more serious

strategic stability. We have to empower the State Department and the interagency to have a strategic stability conversation with the Russians on these issues which is more than just a polemical sort of going back and forth.

I mean, we need to ask ourselves whether we think we're still in a situation that we were in the Cold War where, at the end of the day, security is mutual; that we cannot, with a nuclear power like Russia, you know, have sort of a unilateral approach to our security that doesn't depend on some cooperation with the other side. And that also means some measure of willingness, getting to your question, to accept some self-restraint because you see advantage in that because you're also restraining the other side. So I think we need to kind of get back to basics.

But to answer a little bit --

MR. ROSE: Yeah, yeah.

MS. RUSTEN: -- I mean, I still think there's room, because of the disparity in forces, there's still room for further reductions between the United States and Russia before we could bring in other powers. It's clear that that has to include a much broader conversation which includes missile defense and includes these conventional systems with strategic capabilities or strategic effect.

And so you have to kind of have these conversations and show that you're addressing all the issues, although not necessarily on the one agreement or one negotiation. And again, I think the forms of agreement can be extremely different. It doesn't all have to be legally binding, formal arms control.

MR. ROSE: Great. Pranay?

MR. VADDI: No, I totally agree with everything that Lynn said. I think the questions here are sort of what has happened since the end of the Cold War to arms control? Have we sort of shifted along with the rest of the world and those of us who work in arms control with those of us who follow foreign policy more generally? I mean, we have ended essentially bipolarity a long time ago, yet we haven't taken steps, and you've seen

this with the attitude Russia has had to largely the regional security architecture that underpinned things like the INF Treaty or that was composed of things like the INF Treaty, CFE, Open Skies, things that were sort of focused on Europe as a region and promoting regional stability, have largely been taken apart.

Now, there are still regional stability issues that exist in Europe and are worse now as a result of that. And those same regional stability issues or similar issues are in the Asia-Pacific. So I think the United States should take a look at these regional hotspots and then decide what are ways that we can use arms control as a tool to lessen tensions in those areas or at least increase transparency in such a way that some regional conflict doesn't result that eventually drags into a strategic nuclear exchange. I think that's an important approach for now.

As Lynn mentioned, I think it's important that we actually be open to diplomatic dialogue on these types of issues with both Russia and China. Obviously, I come from the State Department, so no talking is too much for a diplomat, but it's important that we actually sit down and have these dialogues. Some are mature in the case of the United States and Russia; some need to get mature quickly in the case of the United States and China.

But ultimately, if we're not open to talking, we're never going to be able to figure out what are the types of assumptions that we are making that are incorrect? What are the types of potentially inadvertent actions that can occur as a result of that, of those incorrect assumptions? I think that until we have a dialogue of that nature, it's going to be really difficult to see what future arms control agreements can come forward.

MR. ROSE: Thanks, Pranay. Amy?

MS. WOOLF: I'm going to rebel against the question. We have been sitting here for almost an hour and we've never defined what we mean by "strategic stability." We all seem to think we all know what we're talking about, but we've never defined what we mean by "strategic stability." And I'm sitting here with something next to me, which is my

very favorite piece that's ever been written on this, and it's from 1985. It's called "What Went Wrong with Arms Control?" It's Tom Schelling. And in a couple of places in here he defines strategic stability the way I think most people in this room probably think about it as first strike stability. "If you have a survivable second-strike capability, then you have stability. It doesn't matter whether you have arms control or not, but if you have secure, survivable forces where identified with what came to be called strategic stability." That's what he says.

Strategic stability is broader than that. And before I actually answer the question or try to, I want to go back to something Lynn said earlier. Lynn mentioned the relationship between the demise of the ABM Treaty in 2002 and the new Russian strategic systems that we've been worried about since last year. That is a classic case of instability, strategic instability. Putin told us when he revealed those weapons that they were a response to something that happened 15 years earlier, the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

At that time, Russia looked forward and said, oh, my god, the United States is going to deploy broad-scale missile defenses and we need to develop technologies that can go under, around, and through those defenses, whether it's an intercontinental cruise missile, an underwater drone. We -- if they had asked us, and actually they did, and we answered, oh, our defenses aren't going to be aimed at you. They didn't believe us.

So there was an instability in their strategic environment in 2002 that they responded to. The weapons appeared in 2017, 2018, and now we feel an instability because they can shoot those weapons at us and we have no defenses against them. So strategic stability has a much longer timeline to it is you don't think about it as crisis stability.

So if you're asking me in 2019 what I think we should do in 2026, I want to see that as a long view. I want to think about it as not which weapons do I want to limit. I don't have particular concerns with hypersonic glide vehicles, particularly if they're nuclear armed and on Russian ballistic missiles because those are similar to -- they're just maneuvering warheads on the existing missiles that we have. And we have nuclear

deterrence to respond to that.

But I have concerns that we don't know what it is, in 2019, what we will be concerned about in 2026. We don't know what the Russians will be concerned about in 2026. We don't know what the Chinese will be concerned about or what our allies will be concerned about. Strategic instability exists when one of the players in this game has a concern about something they see coming down the pike in the long term and they react now to it, and we don't know what that space looks like because it's the future.

So what I would do either in 2026 or between now and 2026, the first thing I would do is I wouldn't call it arms control. Arms control evokes an image. It's an image of legally binding treaties that require limits or reductions in offensive nuclear weapons. And you've already heard from everyone on the panel there's much more to arms control than just legally binding treaties. But when you're talking to people who haven't spent years in the field, they do and I'm sure many people in the room know people who feel this way. Arms control means we need treaties, and we don't.

So I would stop calling it arms control. And I also would stop calling it strategic stability. Because, as I said, we all have different definitions of strategic stability.

So what I would do is I would recognize that the instabilities we'll be dealing with in 2026 are coming down the pike now. We don't know what they'd be, so we want to think about the process of talking to our adversaries, talking to our allies, talking to the different components of our government now about the things that worry. Is it cyber? Is it AI? Is it hypersonics? What do we think will make us feel like we need a military response in 2026?

So the first thing would be to stop calling it arms control, stop referring to a strategic stability, and maybe focus on a package of measures, proposals, unilateral steps that are more focused and specific to addressing emerging concerns, which, of course, means we have to start by defining those emerging concerns. And this could be within the nuclear weapons world or across domains, but until we define what those emerging

concerns are and talk to the other countries that are also defining their emerging concerns, we can't define strategic stability or develop measures to affect stability.

MR. ROSE: Thanks very much. And let me also say that article by Tom Schelling from 1985 is excellent. One of the other issues he gets into in the article is the tension between the character of weapons and numbers of weapons, which is I think a very, very useful discussion to have now.

Michaela, anything you'd like to add before we turn it over to the audience?

MS. DODGE: So I think that the U.S. Government has taken a useful step in terms of what the future looks like, what future worries look like with the National Defense Strategy. And I think looking at how we implement that strategy going forward and how we work in an environment of a great power competition with Russia and China will be one of the important principles for whatever happens in 2026.

I do agree that we have to get more creative than just kind of good, old arms control. There is different shades of what should we call it next? Twitter context, what should we call the next arms control? There are different options that we have.

I also think one of the kind of underappreciated roles of the United States that will continue to assume importance in the future is that of a partner who can mediate potential conflicts between two states who have nuclear weapons and don't like each other. So U.S. influence in conflicts between India and Pakistan and making sure that those conflicts will not go nuclear, I think that aspect will continue to be important in the future because countries will not give up nuclear weapons anytime soon.

And so nurturing those relationships, nurturing those elements of our government that pursue and built those relationships will also be very important.

MR. ROSE: Great, thanks. So let's move to questions from the audience. I ask a couple of things. One, there is a microphone coming around. Two, that you identify yourselves and ask a question.

So why don't we start back there with Bob Einhorn? And let's take three at

a time. So, Bob.

MR. EINHORN: Frank, thank you very much. Excellent panel. Thank you all.

So I ask the panelists, and you, too, Frank, if you're considered a panelist, what they think about the following approach. So the United States and Russia agree to extend New START and at the same time they issue a high-level joint statement saying they will enter into consultations, high-level consultations, not negotiations, consultations on the implications for strategic stability and arms control of the following: nonstrategic nuclear weapons, conventional systems with strategic implications, emerging technologies with strategic implications, third-party capabilities, and, what else, new kinds of strategic offensive forces.

In other words, this is a kind of directed schmooze, strategic schmooze, strategic stability talks with an agenda. It avoids Amy's problem of making New START extension conditional upon agreement to limit certain kinds of systems. It's a consultation. It's the beginning of strategic stability talks. It's a political commitment to enter into such talks.

MR. ROSE: Okay, next question. Right there.

MR. COCHETTI: Yes, my name is Roger Cochetti. I work with private equity in the technology sector. And there was little mention in the panel of one of the underlying issues that I think deserves more attention and that is the impact of the decline of arms control, the ABM and INF and probably START, on nonproliferation and the NPT review. So could anyone on the panel talk about the consequences for nonproliferation of (inaudible)?

MR. ROSE: And let's take one more. Right here, right up front.

MR. MIN: My name is Sang Min. I'm a reporter from the Radio Free Asia. I want to know if there is any relations or implication between the end of the INF Treaty and the North Korea nuclear and missile issue. If there is, can you tell me what implication or

relations will be for the end of the INF Treaty for the North Korean nuclear issue?

MR. ROSE: Okay. Who wants to start? Lynn.

MS. RUSTEN: I'll start. So, you know, Bob, I think your formulation is great. I'm sure when it's being negotiated with the Russians they would add in missile defense to your list.

MR. EINHORN: Conventional systems with strategic implications make the list.

MS. RUSTEN: All right, there you go. And that's the rejoinder.

And it could all be topped with a Reaganesque, Gorbachevesque statement reaffirming that nuclear war can't be won and shouldn't be fought. And my sense is we came close to doing so, you know, that there was discussion of this kind of thing at the Helsinki Summit. And, you know, sadly, there was no -- well, everyone knows how that went awry afterwards and the press conference and, you know, very little follow-through.

So the question is, is there the will and, frankly, the capacity to undertake the kind of serious strategic stability talks that you outlined. But to me that's exactly the right direction and your point that it needs to come from the leaders. It needs to come from the presidents, a demand signal to their governments that we should get serious about talking about these issues. And the extension of New START is the signal that we're not interested in a kind of uncontained competition; that we want to continue to have some guardrails on our strategic competition and to kind of understand that we have a stake in each other's security in a way. If we're really entering great power competition, then you need more than just a military tool, if it's available, to try to mitigate the threats that you see from another country.

Your point about -- the gentleman who raised the NPT, absolutely I'm remiss in not mentioning that or nonproliferation in general, but I think people underestimate who maybe aren't watching closely the disillusionment of the international community and the non-nuclear weapon states with what they see as an increasing failure of the nuclear

weapon states to live up to their commitment to continue a disarmament process. And we are indeed headed toward a very rough 2020 50th Anniversary Review -- is that right, 50th? -- NPT Review Conference where if we can't at a minimum come into that conference saying that the U.S. and Russia have agreed to extend New START, we are going to be in really bad shape. I'll leave it at that.

MR. ROSE: Amy?

MS. WOOLF: On the agenda for strategic stability talks, there's no question it would be really nice to have, as Lynn said, political leadership on establishing an agenda and sitting down and actually having the talks. But the list is long and the Russians have their own list. And to get agreement within the U.S. Government to have a talks on a list that includes some of the Russian priorities would be difficult no matter who was President and what is in the majority of Congress.

U.S. policy right now as enunciated in both the Missile Defense Review and in the President's statement during the rollout is the United States will never under any circumstances consider any limits on missile defense. Well, Russia won't hold any talks that don't contain the possibility of discussing limits on missile defense.

We would like to talk to the Russians about limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. No question that's been a goal across administrations and across partisan divide. And the last time we had Track 1.5 and Track Two discussions with Russians about nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the 2010, 2012 timeframe, they made it clear they would not go forward with talks on their weapons until we pulled all our weapons out of Europe, something we're not willing to talk about now.

So even though the agenda makes logical sense, and, as Lynn said, with presidential directive we could have that agenda, it still has to work its way through the political system in both the United States and in Russia. And so good ideas are great until you try and get everybody else to agree to that.

On the NPT Review Conference issue, as Lynn said, the international

community in many quarters is extraordinarily distressed about U.S. and Russian reductions about the supposed commitment to Article VI. There is a rejoinder to that from those who would argue that even if the United States and Russia were walking into every review conference with further reductions in their nuclear weapons, the international community would still be slapping at us this, and that's probably true. So even though going into the review conference with New START extended may not buy us much. I'd agree with Lynn, going in without it will cost us.

On the question of INF and North Korea, I think you can probably handle the Asia side of this better, but when the withdrawal from INF was announced, there was this secondary line about and, oh, by the way, we can know respond to China's INF missiles. If you listen to, read, talk to the people who focus on Asia and focus on threats in Asia, having U.S. land-based missiles to address the North Korean threat is on their list of things they'd like to have. But there's lots of things on the list of things people would like to have.

So I'm not sure and I really doubt there's a direct connection that anyone would say, oh, we need to get out of INF so we can deploy missiles that we can use in a Korea contingency. But once we're out of INF, people will find a use for missiles in the Korea contingency.

MR. ROSE: Pranay?

MR. VADDI: To Bob's point, I think that's a great framework. I think making the precondition, if that's what we want to call it, as soft a precondition as possible to extension is important.

I think more importantly, and for all the reasons that Amy and Lynn cited, you know, bureaucratically, the only way I see a New START extension decision being reached by this administration is if you can somehow Trumpify the New START Treaty. If that means connecting it to this administration's strategic stability dialogue with Russia, that's great. If it means something else on the margins, like additional declarations or transparency into NSNW, that's great, as well. I just find it hard to believe the administration

would just be able to quietly extend the New START Treaty in its current form without at least having some kind of window dressing on it.

As far as the review conference goes, I agree with the previous comment. I think the only thing I'll add as far as sort of the ban treaty supporters versus those who are opposed to it, people should recall the stress that a bad review conference can place on NATO, especially basing countries for U.S. nuclear weapons. The potential for a post-INF and post-New START world free of all constraints for countries that really still hold on for dear life to arms control, whether it's due to symbolism or regional security and stability questions in Europe, walking out of the review conference with no consensus, emptyhanded, no New START extension, I personally wonder whether basing countries will see enough uproar from their domestic populations that they really call into question nuclear sharing arrangements.

MR. ROSE: Michaela?

MS. DODGE: You know, I think there will be uproar on the part of the basin countries almost no matter what, just because the mood in Europe has long term been sort of against technical and nuclear weapons on their soil.

Now, I will take the North Korea question partly because I'm not there on New START extension and I don't think that it should be extended. And I think it will be very, very difficult to come to any sort of agreement with Russia as it is today on U.S. missile defenses or Russia's missile defense or new kinds of nuclear weapons that Russia has, but the United States doesn't. Not to say that we should be doing these things just because of Russia. We should be doing them if we have good strategic rationale for us and our security interest.

I think many people are trying to portray the INF Treaty withdrawal as something that the United States did to counter China. But I think there is a very easy counterargument to it, which is if Russia wasn't violating the INF Treaty, the United States would still be bound by the treaty today. You know, it doesn't get to the North Korea per se

because I'm not familiar with U.S. military planning on the Korean Peninsula. But I would like to submit that if Russia did not violate the INF Treaty, we'd still have the INF Treaty even though some find utility of the INF-range missiles in China scenarios. And we know there are some problems with that, but I'll leave it at that.

MR. ROSE: And Bob, let me respond to your question. I think you're absolutely correct, we need to have a broader discussion on strategic stability beyond the U.S.-Russia bilateral framework. And I think there are two ways we can potentially do that.

First, we could use the existing P5 process, which includes the Permanent Five members of the U.N. Security Council. Indeed, at the end of the Obama administration we started a discussion on the future of strategic stability with a seminar that I chaired in New York as assistant secretary. I went into the room with very low expectations and I was pleasantly surprised. Unfortunately, I don't think we have had as robust discussions at the P5 level, but that's one of the recommendations that I would make to this administration.

Another alternative is to have a trilateral discussion between the United States, Russia, and China on strategic stability. One of the challenges you face in the P5 format is it quickly goes into nonproliferation-related issues. If you have the United States, Russia and China at the table, it's much more a focus on strategic considerations.

And let me just also pick up a point that Pranay raised, and that is the length between U.S. allies and deterrents in arms control. I always like to remind this administration is that in many allied countries there's a strong anti-nuclear feeling. And one of the ways that our allies are able to manage that and do what they need to do on nuclear deterrence is having robust arms control in nonproliferation involvement and engagement. And if you don't do that, it really begins to kind of crumble that consensus in many of these allied countries.

And for example, you may have seen an article in the *Wall Street Journal* about maybe three weeks ago how the Social Democratic Party in Germany is starting to question NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. That's not a good thing.

So my message to the administration is I understand that you have concerns about arms control, but understand how you deal with the arms control and nonproliferation issue will have an impact both here domestically in the United States, but also with our allies to build support for nuclear deterrence.

So let's take another round of questions, start here. Right up here in the front, second row.

MR. ULLMAN: Frank, you're an elegant moderator. My question is for you. I'm Harlan Ullman with the Atlantic Council and the Naval War College.

First, a bias. We should drop the word "cyber" and use the "information warfare" because cyber is too short and too narrow a term.

And second, nobody's talked about Britain and France. And I assure you Moscow is worried about them.

Frank, tell me why I should not be pessimistic. In this administration you have nobody with any real experience in these kinds of issues, the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the new Chairman, and a National Security Advisor who is opposed to arms control. At the same time, you see Russia reducing its budget because it's outflanked us in many systems. And quite frankly, given our nuclear modernization for B-21, Columbia, and ICBMs, that is unaffordable. Nuclear deterrence costs about 6 percent of the budget. It's now going to be in excess of 10 percent. And this is the last year, barring a crisis, we see budget increases.

So we're going to have a huge choice to continue our nuclear deterrence and drop our conventional forces, so we're stuck. You an administration that's largely opposed to this and budget which is a Damoclean sword, which would lead to structural disarmament. Tell me why I'm wrong and what do we do under those circumstances?

MR. PRYCE: Hi, Jeff Pryce from Johns Hopkins SAIS. A couple questions on the premise of the end of the INF regime.

One is that our START framework is in many ways premised on the

existence of a ban on intermediate-range weapons. For instance, 5,500-kilometer threshold is clearer because it's either countable or it's banned, and that is going to go away. Nonstrategic weapons, you know, are going to be a lot harder to deal with if there's no limit on intermediate-range weapons. So that's one question.

Second is the China argument for withdrawal from the INF Treaty was basically that the cost to our security in freeing Russia from any constraint was outweighed by the benefit to us in freeing us from constraints with respect to China. So I wonder if you could do a balance, and this is probably -- well, for anybody who wants it, a question, what are the concrete opportunities, military opportunities, for us compared to those for Russia with the end of the INF regime?

MR. ROSE: Great. And right there, Ambassador Kennedy.

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: Oh, no, I actually had had my hand up earlier. But Frank, you answered the question I was going to ask was, what do people think about the other possibilities to deal with these issues? Because I'm also somewhat skeptical about the leadership doing a U.S.-Russia thing. So P5 I think you took on, but are there any other fora such as the P5 that people could see that could mitigate some of these issues since we seem to have such a difficulty in dealing with things on a U.S.-Russia basis? I mean, multilateral approaches, in Northeast Asia some sort of using the old six-party talks to deal more broadly with Northeast Asia's security. I'm just groping for anything because I see such inability, frankly, of our leadership to tackle many of these things, but I hope I'm wrong.

MR. ROSE: Okay, great. We'll come back for one last round of questions. Why don't I turn it over to the panelists? Let's start with Amy, then go to Lynn.

MS. WOOLF: Ambassador Kennedy just gave me the right to read the first sentence in the Tom Schelling article. I don't think that finding a forum is really the problem. What Tom Schelling said in 1985, "Arms control has certainly gone off the tracks. For several years what are called arms negotiations have been mostly a public exchange of accusations."

If you look at the U.S. and Russian statements in the CD this week, it's all accusations. So it's less, in my mind, a question of finding a forum where we can have discussions than a question of finding the political will to have discussions regardless of the forum.

And part of the problem with that is in the U.S. Government that's relatively cyclical. We are not in a new place. This was 1985, which is the end of the first time of the Reagan administration. And the Reagan administration's arms control proposals in the first term were accusations. And the second term brought us real treaties. So it is somewhat cyclical, but it is not a matter of where, but a matter of whether we are willing to have the conversations, so I can't fix that problem.

On the question of the dividing line between INF and New START and what problems that would cause, we have one really specific problem already: Russia tested a ballistic missile to just over 5,550 kilometers to keep it out of INF question. It was the first thing we thought was going to be the noncompliant weapon in INF and to make it count under New START. And they did not deploy it. Now they can bring it back and deploy it at 5,200 kilometers and not count it under New START.

So the absence of a dividing line there will create new risks for allies in Europe because 5,200 kilometers isn't really an added problem for us, but then one has to ask why is Russia deploying new types of intermediate-range systems that can target Europe, and ask about the instabilities and the short time of flight there. So clearly, there is a gray area between the two treaties that isn't so much about which treaty do you count things under, but which threats are now being reimagined that were here in the 1980s.

On the why not be pessimistic, and I know you directed this to Frank, but I can't give you a reason not to be pessimistic. I think everything you said is absolutely true, but you missed on piece of it. And I always go back to the New START hearings when the hearings themselves were not going particularly well. The people were coming up to testify about the wonderful and emerging relationship between the United States and Russia and

the reset. And the members eyes were glazing over.

Now, Admiral Mullen walked in and declared that it had been nine months or seven months at the time, because old START expired in December of 2009 and he testified in July of 2010, and he declared it had been seven months since he'd had inspectors on the ground looking at Russian nuclear weapons. And that turned the tide, reminding the members of the committee that we do arms control for national security reasons, not for warm, fuzzy reasons.

And I bring that up because generally if you're looking within this administration for support for New START, you get it from the military. You get General Hyten and General Selva testifying about the value of transparency, the value of predictability, of limits on Russian forces. Whether that's enough to outweigh the either benign neglect or outright opposition to arms control in other quarters of the administration, I can't make predictions. I also worry about the value of their support because it's started to be caveated in the last couple of weeks with concerns about the new Russian weapons.

So you can see an evolving argument coming out in the administration and it's one that I think Michaela's made, as well, and that others hold true, as well, that it's up to Russia to address our concerns with these emerging technologies. And if they don't, it's their fault if New START doesn't get extended. And if that line of reasoning takes hold, then nothing the military says could have an effect. But you do hear different points of view form the military. So if you're looking for anything to hold onto, that will be where it is.

MR. ROSE: Lynn?

MS. RUSTEN: Okay, I'll try and take on a couple of these questions. Yeah, it's hard not to be pessimistic across the board, but I think it's our duty to continue to speak out and offer advice to anybody who is or isn't listening about how to turn things around. And I will say there's even -- somehow Amy's escaped this whole panel with very little discussion of Congress, and Congress' role. And I think there are a couple -- so I'll say a few things, there are a couple things.

And obviously, I mean, we have the modernization issue and you're absolutely right that I don't think it's a question of no modernization, but there are -- as usual, we're avoiding hard choices. But the day of reckoning is coming and there's going to have to be some decisions about which aspects of modernization, nuclear modernization, are higher priority and which aren't compared to other opportunity costs in the defense budget, let alone the overall budget. So that's going to happen.

But that also means, you know, I think there is a constituency in Congress for not just funding nuclear weapons, but also pursuing an arms control track. And I think there'll be some recognition in parts of the administration that there needs to -- there are some in Congress who aren't going to be interested in funding an unconstrained arms race and so they're going to want to see where's that component of our overall strategy. So that's one ray of hope in terms of voices.

You know, I'm discouraged that everybody is just kind of writing off that New START won't be extended. I don't believe it because I think allies -- in other words, I don't think the debate's over. I think allies are going to have a voice. I think Congress is going to have a voice. I think there'll be some in the administration. And so, you know, I think it's really important to be making the case why it's important for our national security.

The other point I'd make about Congress is, you know, the politics of Russia are just all screwed up, as everybody knows, for lots of reasons. You know, the Mueller investigation, distrust of our President dealing with Russia. But Congress on both sides of the aisle really need to create an allow political space for the kind of normal diplomatic and military-to-military engagements that we've been talking about. I mean, you know, there has -- because the risks are really high if we don't allow that to go forward.

Can I just go to some other questions? On START and INF, I think I actually disagree with the proposition, whoever said it, that New START was kind of -- you know, the ranges are all kind of premised on INF. Because well before there was INF, there was SALT, there was SALT II, START. You know, all of this has been premised on a range

which has been pretty constant. But I do think if we're now in an environment where there are intermediate-range nuclear-capable systems and you want to "do something about it," the problem is the will and the interest and where's the overlapping interest. But, you know, maybe there's been discussion about going to a regime where you're actually --

MR. ROSE: Lynn, we've got about five minutes left.

MS. RUSTEN: Okay. Okay, governing all warheads would be one way to go if you're really just addressing nuclear warheads. I'll stop.

MR. ROSE: Great. Pranay and Michaela, we've got about five minutes left, so let me turn it to you and to either answer the questions or any final remarks.

MS. DODGE: I will give you a reason for optimism, and that's not a position that I'm often in as a former Eastern European. But Churchill reportedly said that Americans can be counted on doing the right thing after they've exhausted all the other possibilities. So I do hope that as we are facing these very difficult choices that we will do the right thing. And I hope that we will not exhaust that many possibilities because stakes are just too high.

On the INF real quick, concrete military opportunities, you know, even if we don't see today that we wouldn't be able to deploy INF-range missiles today, that doesn't mean that a situation will not arise in the future that makes those deployments possible and that makes allies willing to host INF-range missiles. Now, additionally, even if we do not deploy them, our adversaries or potential adversaries will have to take them into account anyway. And so there might be some utility in those systems even if today we would not be able to maybe deploy them.

MR. ROSE: Great. Pranay, you have the last word.

MR. VADDI: Well, as it should be, right? (Laughter) So I guess reasons for hope, as Lynn referenced, I think Congress is becoming attuned to nuclear issues. They're being forced to do it now, whether it's through new members to Congress, through new staff. I think the NDA process will focus a lot on nuclear issues. Chairman Adam Smith has sort of made -- his planted his flag on nuclear issues as far as his approach to the committee

process. New START, I think, will be the center of a lot of that discussion because there are going to be ways in which Congress will look to try and incentivize the administration to pursue extension, at least on one side of the aisle.

I also think that the presidential primary season has already started, of course, and people have introduced stances on nuclear policy issues very early. That should lead to a discussion about nuclear issues that we have largely been able to avoid, at least at that level, for some time.

And I think that there should be a goal here, which is reinvigorating a relatively neutral debate on arms control as opposed to a politicized one. And maybe that is what we're going to see happen with the congressional process and with the primary season going.

Another reason is that New START is still in force right now. The uniformed military seems behind it, as Amy has said. Given that it's still in force, given that it provides a basis upon which to discuss these issues tied to a treaty in Congress and in the primary season, I think that's a good thing.

Quickly on the INF question, I'm worried that where the administration ends up on a position for New START extension is that unless nonstrategic nuclear weapons are constrained, we will not pursue extension of the treaty. I think there's a little bit of hypocrisy to that position given that the one treaty which seemed to govern some of the delivery systems that would be used to delivery nonstrategic nuclear weapons was the INF Treaty, and we just withdrew from that and suspended our obligations under it. So we're sort of creating the space underneath the 5,500 kilometer threshold for all countries to build these weapons, including Russia and other countries that were waiting to see what the United States and Russia do in that space to develop their own systems.

So my hope is that they come to some sort of conclusion, whether it's in the debate over New START extension or strategic stability talks in the future to try to find a way to limit this space again. And maybe it's just additional transparency and regionalization or a

high ceiling, but there has to be some way to talk about what comes after INF.

MR. ROSE: Well, thanks so much to all the panelists. I thought this was a great discussion. We didn't spend our time fighting about INF, but we looked to the future. And I think every panelist provided some very useful ideas about how we manage this very, very complicated strategic environment.

So please join me in thanking the panelists. (Applause) And just for your reference, next month Brookings is going to begin a year-long effort looking at the future of strategic arms control, and we hope to have a report next spring.

So thank you so much for coming. It was a great event.

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