Introduction

Germany, Japan, and the International Security Order

Few countries in the world have benefited more from the post-1945 international security order than Germany and Japan. Thanks to their alliances with the United States, neither country has had to develop their own, independent nuclear deterrent capabilities or acquire conventional capabilities to the extent that they would otherwise have needed to ensure their security. For over sixty years, Germany and Japan have been allowed to focus their energies on domestic development, becoming prosperous, democratic societies with a high standard of living. And few countries have played a more important role in helping the United States sustain that international order than Germany and Japan. Both have long been the most powerful countries in their respective regions (it is only in the last two decades that Japan has been overtaken by the People’s Republic of China) and their willingness to rely on the United States for their security gave Washington tremendous leverage in what, from a strategic point of view, were the most important regions in the world: Europe and East Asia. During the Cold War, the rapid growth of the German and
Japanese economies played a crucial role in the reconstruction and economic development of their respective regions, and access to German and Japanese industrial resources gave the United States a decisive advantage in the long, twilight struggle against Communism.

Yet while Germany and Japan contributed in many ways to the U.S.-led international system, after World War II they have been remarkably reluctant to make military contributions to operations beyond the defense of their own national territories. This was perfectly understandable during the Cold War. Its geopolitical context implied threats to the security of the two countries themselves. They had to rely on external military as well as economic and political support against these threats, primarily from the United States. To legitimize this support in the eyes of the Congress and the electorate, Washington needed West Germany and Japan to rearm. Their governments reluctantly complied with the American pressure, skillfully exploiting the leverage that it provided for their own political purposes. West Germany required U.S. support—and, ultimately, U.S. nuclear guarantees—to protect its territory and its political autonomy by deterring the hugely superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact. The geopolitical context in East Asia was more complex, but Japan, too, on balance, was a net importer of security during the Cold War: neither Tokyo nor Bonn could mobilize sufficient resources to guarantee their own security, let alone contribute resources to the security of others beyond their own borders.

Moreover, the memories of German and Japanese military aggression and its consequences engendered powerful institutional, normative, and external constraints on both countries with regard to the use of force. Therefore, persuading their electorates to rearm turned out to be a tough challenge for political leaders in both countries. With the encouragement of the occupying Allied powers, West Germany and Japan had passed constitutions emphasizing their peaceful foreign policy intentions following World War II. Enacted in 1949, Germany’s Basic Law (Grundgesetz) provides in Article 26: “Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional.” Furthermore, the federal
government is responsible for strictly regulating the manufacture, transport, and marketing of weapons for warfare. Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 constitution goes even further, renouncing the country’s sovereign right to go to war, the threat or use of force, and the maintenance of armed forces “or other war potential.” For most of the postwar period, the Japanese government’s interpretation has been that the country thus maintains “the inherent right of self-defense” but not the right to engage in collective self-defense. Japan was thus prohibited from any intervention to protect the United States, making the U.S.-Japan alliance highly asymmetric (as the mutual treaty commits the United States to protecting Japan) and causing strain in the bilateral relationship.

Undergirding these institutional structures are strong cultures of anti-militarism and nonintervention that emerged in Germany and Japan after 1945. These “cultures of anti-militarism” are the product of the traumatic experiences of defeat in World War II and the lessons that became institutionalized in the German and Japanese political systems in the postwar era, albeit in rather different ways. In the case of Germany, the inhibition against the use of force took on a strongly moralistic dimension that was closely linked to the condemnation of Nazism and the crimes of the Third Reich. It also was associated with a deep suspicion of nationalism and a strong penchant to pursue German interests through multilateral frameworks, what Wolfgang F. Schlör calls the Federal Republic’s “instinctive multilateralism.” Japan, in contrast, chose to pursue its idealistic form of anti-militarism on a unilateral basis, in what Takashi Inoguchi has called “one-country pacifism” (ikkoku heiwa shugi). Given Germany’s and Japan’s respective “peace constitutions” and widespread public skepticism about the use of military means in foreign policy, policymakers in both countries thus have been under significant pressure to legitimize decisions for military interventions.

There is broad consensus that these cultures of anti-militarism played a significant role in shaping German and Japanese security policies and postures, leading the two countries to pursue the foreign and security policies of “civilian powers.” There is, however, considerable disagreement about exactly how significant these cultures of anti-militarism have
been and whether they will continue to be influential in the future. The anti-militarist culture thesis first became prominent in the 1990s, as part of what Iain Johnston called the "third wave" of strategic culture theorizing. Analysts of German and Japanese foreign policy who made use of the concept were disagreeing with scholars and pundits who believed that a remilitarization of Germany and Japan was inevitable and that freed of the constraints imposed by the Cold War the two nations would soon re-emerge as major military powers. Instead of dramatic change, argued the strategic culture theorists, German and Japanese defense and security policies would be guided by a continuing reluctance to play a greater military role.

Within a decade, the debate seemed to have been resolved in favor of those who predicted continuity of domestic limits over change to the full use of force in foreign policy. Despite a fundamental shift in the material structural foundations of the international system—the transformation of the bipolar East-West conflict into a unipolar one, with the United States as the one remaining superpower—and despite marked changes in the German and Japanese domestic political systems, the low-key German and Japanese stance on military issues basically remained intact. Skepticism regarding the use of military means in foreign policy continues to be the prevailing public sentiment in both countries, even though the respective generations who lived through the war have dwindled in numbers. For example, a 2015 public opinion poll found that only 25 percent of German respondents thought their country should play a more active military role in helping to maintain peace and stability in the world, while 69 percent felt it should limit its military role in world affairs. Another poll in 2015 similarly found that 23 percent of Japanese respondents would like to see their country play a more active military role in securing regional peace and stability, while 68 percent preferred that Japan limit its military role. Finally, external factors also helped to solidify Germany’s and Japan’s reticence about taking active military roles. Following the war, even many U.S. allies and strategic partners were reluctant to see them take on a larger military role. As Lee Kuan Yew, the prime minister of Singapore, who had suffered through the Japanese occupation after 1941,
famously said when Japan debated sending troops on overseas peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s, encouraging the Japanese to send even limited numbers of troops abroad is akin to giving chocolate liqueurs to a recovering alcoholic.

Yet Germany’s and Japan’s most important ally was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their reluctance to prepare for the use of military force. Already in the 1970s, American criticism of German and Japanese “free-riding” became increasingly tense, and during the Gulf War of 1990–91, it reached a fever pitch when Berlin and Tokyo stood out for failing to send even token military forces to the region. To many Americans, it seemed that Germany and especially Japan were taking advantage of the situation to pull ahead of the United States economically—as Senator Paul Tsongas put it in 1992, “The Cold War is over—and Japan has won.” American pressure certainly had been one of the external influences that, over the subsequent three decades, led Germany and Japan to increase, slowly but surely, their international military roles, thus beginning to export security rather than import it.

Despite the significant changes that both countries undertook in their military security postures from 1990 to 2019, their culture of antimilitarism endured. Thus, Germany’s and Japan’s skepticism about the use of military force persisted, as did the underlying gap between their approach to international security and that of the United States. At times, these differences in views would boil over, most notably in 2003, when Germany, together with France, Russia, and China, opposed the U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq in the United Nations Security Council. Nonetheless, a final rupture in the alliance relationship was avoided.

Today, once again, the plate tectonics of international politics are shifting, driven by the relentless onslaught of technological innovation. The rise of China as a regional and possibly global challenger to U.S. dominance in East Asia and the world, the return of Russia as a military power bent on undermining Western interests and objectives, and the “third reverse wave” that set back earlier advances of democratic governance across the globe and threatens to engulf even well-established Western democracies profoundly challenge both the domestic and the international
foundations of American dominance and the Western liberal order. In this context, the question of what Germany and Japan can and will do to uphold their respective alliances with the United States and the core tenets of the present international order assumes a new urgency—and in this context, Berlin and Tokyo will also have to revisit and redefine what they are willing to do in terms of military security.

This issue has two different aspects. From the American perspective, the reluctance of Germany and Japan to prepare for the threat and use of military force frequently appears as “free-riding,” which complicates securing what Washington considers desirable measures to sustain the “liberal international order” (including its dominance by the United States). From Germany’s or Japan’s point of view, however, their anti-militarist culture, reflecting their own, collectively traumatic past experiences with the use of force, reasonably cautions against putting too much faith into what military power can achieve. In short, while America may be better attuned to the realities of great power politics but tempted too often to define any problem as a nail to be hammered down, the reluctance of Germany and Japan to consider the use of force beyond self-defense may be tinged by their emotional responses to their own historical experiences, but it may also be better attuned to the complexities of today’s international relations.

While the foreign and security policies of Donald Trump may be the proximate cause for an upsurge in anxiety in both Germany and Japan about their respective alliances with America, deeper forces are likely at work. Almost two decades of apparently interminable warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq have given rise to growing frustration among the American people over the United States’ continued commitment to maintaining international security. At the same time, the growing military power of a rapidly rising China, a resurgent Russia, and a nuclear-armed North Korea have made the potential costs of a conflict in Europe or Asia soar. Some argue that the United States no longer has either the will or the ability to maintain the international security order—at least not in its present form—and these scholars and policy experts are calling for a far-reaching rethinking of America’s post-1945 grand strategy and a retrenchment and scaling back of its alliance commitments. The United States, according
to this line of reasoning, can no longer afford to maintain its far-flung military forces overseas, and to the extent that it attempts to do so, it is encouraging its allies to continue to shirk their responsibilities to maintain peace and security in the international system. Instead, they argue, the United States should concentrate its forces in the Western hemisphere and avoid getting involved in military conflicts overseas unless they threaten vital American interests—a strategy that has been called variously “selective engagement,” “restraint,” or “off-shore balancing.”

Such views are by no means uncontested. Many U.S. mainstream policymakers—including some of the most senior members who previously served in the Trump administration, such as former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and former National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster—almost instinctively remain attached to maintaining the current alliance system. Many academic analysts argue that the advocates both exaggerate the costs of maintaining a forward military presence in Europe and Asia and underestimate the potential risks of trying to scale back U.S. overseas commitments in the rather naïve expectation that U.S. allies will take up the slack and succeed in maintaining regional stability. Retrenchment, those analysts argue, would lead to regional confrontations that inevitably would drag the United States back in—as it was drawn in in 1916 and again in 1941—at greater cost in blood and treasure than if it had maintained a strong and credible forward presence to begin with. By working more closely with its allies, and by reconfiguring jointly their military forces and diplomatic strategies to meet the challenges of a changed international environment, the United States should be able to help preserve an international order that has ensured an unprecedented level of peace and prosperity for the world.

Irrespective of the relative merits of both arguments, Germany and Japan clearly have some influence in the way in which this debate will play out. If Japan and Germany, the third- and fourth-largest economies in the world, fail to “step up to the plate” and meet the expectations of Washington, acrimony over burden-sharing could further undermine the alliances and heighten the prospect for U.S. strategic retrenchment. American hesitation to become too involved in Russia’s invasion of west-
ern Ukraine or in the Syrian civil war may be early signs of U.S. retrenchment, which would make Germany’s and Japan’s unwillingness to pick up international security burdens even more difficult in their relationships with the United States.

Whichever way the two countries will resolve those issues, their policies will have a profound bearing on the evolution of their respective regional security orders, which, in turn, continue to be of strategic importance for the future of global order. In the past, the self-restraint in their military stances significantly strengthened Europe’s and East Asia’s security arrangements, which ensured stability and predictability. For example, West Germany’s self-restraint made possible the whole edifice of European integration and the European Union, which from its inception had a strong security dimension. Moreover, the Bundeswehr originally was fully (and still is, very largely) integrated into NATO’s multilateral military command structure, while in the case of Japan, military integration with U.S. forces in East Asia is strictly bilateral and rests on a more informal basis. Military integration within their respective alliance frameworks meant that neither Germany nor Japan were able to project force unilaterally, which helped to reassure their neighbors.

As we have seen already, both Europe’s and East Asia’s security environments have significantly deteriorated in recent years. Europe was shaken by Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014, marking the first time since 1945 that a major European power sought to redraw its own borders by force of arms. To the south and across the Mediterranean, Europe is faced with instability, illegal migration, brutal civil wars, and failed states. Extremism and terrorism, as well as new hybrid threats such as cyberattacks, also pose new challenges to the region. In Asia, tensions have grown amid China’s rise and its increasingly pronounced rivalry with the United States. The region is faced with historical animosities and multiple unresolved territorial and maritime disputes. With growing distrust between the United States and China, but also among other regional states, there is significant risk of unintended conflict, for example through strategic errors or miscalculations about intentions. Furthermore, North Korea’s advances in nuclear and missile pro-
grams imply new threats to regional security, especially to South Korea, Japan, and the United States. The sense of instability amid these deeper structural shifts in the international order is further exacerbated among U.S. allies and partners in both Europe and Asia by President Trump’s “America First” policies and his tendency toward impulsive actions.

Ironically, the peculiar, “civilian power” security approaches of Germany and Japan that might now contribute to undermining their alliances with the United States have made them profoundly dependent, not only materially but also mentally, on those alliances as the ultimate guarantor of their national security. They now have to find new answers to their alliance dilemmas: what kind of military security posture will they have to adopt to sustain their alliances with the United States and the kind of international order they need? How might they do this without also entangling themselves in military interventions that their voters will not accept and that their elites do not perceive to be in their national interests? Can their alliance with the United States be reconciled with the domestic constraints posed by their enduring cultures of anti-militarism?

Our starting point into this inquiry is the observation that since the 1990s, German and Japanese security situations have undergone significant modifications; their cumulative results have been impressive. Proponents of realist interpretations of foreign policy formation thus argue that while the legacy of history and a culture of anti-militarism may have been a shaping factor in Germany’s and Japan’s military security posture in the past, structural forces, such as the balance of power, have been gradually eroding those restraints, leading to a “normalization” of German and Japanese security policy. Yet their anti-militarist cultures have continued to impose important constraints and thus produced military policies that are strikingly different from those of other, comparable countries to this day. Britain and France are perhaps the most obvious examples, although in their cases it could be argued that as nuclear powers with permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council they may be in a better position to justify higher levels of defense expenditure and support for interventions. However, even much smaller countries, such as Canada or South Korea, are able to make equal or greater military contributions. With less
than half of Germany’s population, on any given day Canada has had as many troops on missions abroad—8,000—as does the much larger Federal Republic. And whereas Japan sent only 650 troops to Iraq on a tightly constrained humanitarian aid mission, South Korea sent 3,600 combat troops.

Therefore, the normalization thesis strikes us as misleading: Germany and Japan continue to show military security postures that are significantly different from what one would expect from “normal” countries (however that may be defined). Our working proposition postulates fundamental continuity in the strategic cultures of Germany and Japan, and significant policy modifications in the realm of military security. “Fundamental continuity,” however, does not equal a complete resistance to evolution in the cultures of anti-militarism. We assume that those cultures have undergone modifications below the threshold of fundamental change, and we postulate that those cultures have themselves produced those modifications. We also assume an interaction between the elite’s foreign policy changes and the public’s anti-militarist cultures: by their debates and actions, foreign policy elites can contribute to modifications or reinforcement of the public’s attitudes.

The key issue here concerns cultural change. Although the problem had not been ignored entirely by the earlier waves of cultural theorists in foreign policy analysis, there has been a general tendency to view cultures as self-replicating systems that are resistant to change. This view assumed that change tended to come slowly and in an incremental fashion, accompanied by considerable resistance. Significant shifts in underlying cultural predispositions were assumed to occur in response to internal or external shocks to the system—such as a revolution or a lost war.

This view, in fact, did imply a theory of cultural change, although the aspect of how and why change would occur was initially not given much attention. Since then, a new, “fourth” wave of strategic culture theory has emerged, and it professes a dynamic understanding of culture: cultures are seen as evolving frameworks of overlapping ideas and narratives that can and will be evoked, but also routinely subtly reinterpreted, by “norm entrepreneurs” in response to changes in the international envi-
ronment and domestic politics. These theorists draw particular attention to the interaction between changing international circumstances on the one hand and domestic discourse and political adjustments on the other. For example, external developments may confront policymakers with inherent dilemmas in their foreign policy cultures, in which different tenets of those cultures conflict with each other, forcing a reinterpretation. Consequently, domestic debates and politics may lead to a gradual reconstruction of the embedded norms, ideas, and narratives that form foreign policy cultures, and to the crafting of new compromises on the parameters of acceptable state behavior. In these situations, political elites can act as strategic “users of culture,” seeking to redefine the limits of what is permissible and legitimate by recasting their agenda as the most appropriate response to the particular circumstances of the times.

This more dynamic understanding of culture may allow us to better appreciate the modifications that have taken place in German and Japanese defense and security postures since 1990. The analysis in this book follows such a dynamic understanding of culture, seeking to trace both continuity and change in the anti-militarist cultures of the two countries. We pay particular attention to how changes in the internal and external environments of Germany and Japan have interacted with their cultures of anti-militarism to produce the specific trajectories of both countries’ security policies and postures. In doing so, our analysis highlights how the evolution of German and Japanese security policy approaches since 1990 has been shaped by the interaction of their anti-militarist foreign policy cultures with the bilateral, regional, and multilateral frameworks of alliances and institutions in which Germany and Japan are embedded, but also by the interactions of those cultures with their domestic politics and institutions. As far as the external factors are concerned, what is key are threat perceptions—perceptions held by the two countries (or, more specifically, by their foreign policy establishments and their attentive publics), which tell us how these states evaluate their regional and international environments from the point of view of their own security concerns, but also the threat perceptions and security concerns of their allies, and especially the United States, since those will shape their expectations...
of what Germany and Japan should do as “good allies.” Security policy decisions taken in Berlin and Tokyo, and the resulting overall security postures, will be produced within their domestic political environments. This, again, will involve the interaction of their cultures of anti-militarism with domestic institutions, including political coalitions, party constellations, and leadership.31

Methodologically, therefore, we consider the anti-militarist cultures of Germany and Japan as the primary factor to help us understand Germany’s and Japan’s evolving military security posture. Yet we also consider another key factor as equally important. This factor (our second independent variable, as it were) is the alliance contexts in which both countries are embedded. In some sense, the cultures of anti-militarism grew out of the post-war occupation of Germany and Japan and the Cold War; the occupation powers promoted the development of those cultures of anti-militarism, for example through the Nuremberg and Tokyo War tribunals and through their domestic propaganda of civic reeducation and initial media censorship. From its inception, those cultures thus reflected both endogenous and external influences. Moreover, the incipient Cold War meant that neither country really had much choice about its foreign and security posture: they had to follow the expectations of the occupying Western powers. This is not to deny the important fact that farsighted political leaders in both Germany (Konrad Adenauer) and Japan (Shigeru Yoshida) recognized the opportunities inherent in those predetermined alliance orientations, and therefore strongly supported—and exploited—them.

Nor is this presence of the United States “at the creation,” to paraphrase Dean Acheson, only a thing of the late 1940s. During the Cold War, both countries were, in the felicitous phrase of Peter Katzenstein, “semi-sovereign”32 or, as James N. Rosenau put it, “penetrated systems,”33 in which the influence of the United States was exercised not only through traditional channels of diplomatic communications but also through a broad range of transnational channels. This situation continues to this day, albeit in different ways: the United States—as well as other U.S. allies, although perhaps to a lesser extent—are “present” within Germany and Japan in a myriad of different ways, economically, socially, culturally,
and politically, and therefore contribute to shape the evolution of those countries’ security postures both from without and within. To the extent this presence feeds anti-American resentment, its implications can also be paradoxical. Yet this, too, represents a form of influence.

Relations between Germany and Japan and the United States, therefore, are much more than just traditional alliances. Nevertheless, they also are security alliances, subject to what Glenn Snyder has identified as “the alliance dilemma.” According to Snyder, alliances are dominated by opposing fears. On the one hand, there is the fear of abandonment—that when push comes to shove and a country faces attack from another power, the ally may choose not to honor its commitment. On the other hand, there is the fear of entanglement—that one’s ally may pull one into a costly, potentially even devastating conflict in ways that undermine one’s own national interests. Because of their extreme security dependence on Washington, the alliance dilemma is particularly acute in the case of U.S.-German and U.S.-Japan relations.

Note that the two prongs of the dilemma point in opposite directions: fear of abandonment will induce a state to take measures to strengthen the ties with the ally while fears of entanglement argue for distancing oneself from one’s ally. In the case of both Germany and Japan, their anti-militarist cultures complicate the alliance dilemma yet further, producing a specific variant of the “fear of entanglement” alliance dilemma. For those cultures could weaken the motivation of foreign policy decisionmakers (if they share the culture of anti-militarism themselves) or (even if they do not share it) constrain their ability to cooperate in military terms: if and when the United States pursues policies that are perceived as “militaristic” from the perspective of anti-militarist cultures, governments in Germany or Japan will find it difficult to cooperate with America.

In short, while demands from their principal ally, the United States, as well as fears about losing America’s security guarantees, in situations where Germany or Japan themselves are concerned about external threats to their own security, tend to push Germany and Japan toward more robust military security postures, fears of entanglement—but, above all, their cultures of anti-militarism—work in the opposite direction. The sa-
lience of the alliance dilemma will, of course, depend on the external environment in which the alliance operates—or, more specifically, on the ways threats are perceived by its leaders, its foreign policy establishments, and its attentive publics.

Divergent expectations, demands, and interests within the alliances are thus transmitted into the internal political context of Germany or Japan, where they are processed and turned into policies and military security postures in the domestic politics of foreign policy decisionmaking. As we noted, decisionmakers may or may not themselves share the tenets of their country’s anti-militarist culture. If they do, they will be motivated to heed its policy implications. If they do not, they will still have to consider the constraints imposed by it. Thus, they will need to compromise with others in the foreign policy establishment who share that culture (for example, within their own party, among coalition partners, or in opposition parties that may be able to mobilize veto power or at least significantly complicate the decisionmaking process). Ultimately, the constraints of an anti-militarist culture will be most effective if and when they affect the chances of political leaders to get their preferred policies adopted or to be re-elected. Leaders, in turn, can try to improve those chances by offering new interpretations of the meaning of anti-militarism, thus making their preferred policies appear compatible with its norms, and hence legitimate.

Purpose and Organization of the Book

This is the analytical framework for our book, in a nutshell: we want to understand the role the cultures of anti-militarism will play in Germany’s and Japan’s military security policies in the future by looking at what happened to them over the past three decades. In doing so, we see policy outcomes shaped by (a) those cultures (our central explanatory factor) and their interaction with (b) the perceptions of their respective external security environments by their leaders, their foreign policy establishments, and their publics; (c) the expectations and demands posed by their allies, in particular the United States, as well as more generally the institutional contexts in which each country is embedded; and (d) the domestic political context in which decisionmakers operate and where they need to
secure legitimacy and support for their preferred policies. Our focus is on the post–Cold War era, but we also summarize and discuss trends and shifts since 1945. In particular, our analysis seeks to answer three sets of questions. First, we compare and assess the extent to which German and Japanese political cultures of anti-militarism have undergone change over the last twenty-five years. To what degree are Germany and Japan still constrained by their anti-militarist institutional and normative structures? How is this change similar or different? And what are the consequences of these developments for the two countries’ alliances with the United States? Second, we try to understand how German and Japanese political elites—faced with skeptical, anti-militarist constituencies—seek to establish legitimacy for specific military policies and more generally for adjustments in their overall approach to the use of force. Are there particular trends and patterns of legitimization in each country? Do they differ? For example, what role do global norms play, such as the responsibility to protect civilians from human rights abuses? Third, what are the variables shaping the particular trajectories of each country? How have domestic debates on military security policies been influenced by external developments, for example by shifts in regional power balances and stability that affect threat perceptions and by developments in domestic politics (such as elections and changes in governing coalitions and leadership)?

In conceptualizing the term military security policies, we differentiate between direct and indirect forms. Stepping up defense expenditures and investing in new armament, or participating in a military operation by sending troops abroad, are security policies that directly build military power and use military tools. The aims of those policies might include individual and collective self-defense or collective security, for example through participation in military missions mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC) to maintain or restore international peace and security. Under the rubric of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), this could include participation in military operations aimed at stopping severe internal humanitarian crises without the target country’s consent.

Indirect forms of security policies include nonmilitary actions to support alliance partners or other countries engaged in military operations, for example through material assistance and backup support like the pro-
vision of bases or weaponry. In this context, our book pays particular attention to German and Japanese arms export policies, which remain understudied despite the fact that the two countries’ approaches crucially affect international politics and security. Arms exports may offer a way for German and Japanese policymakers to influence security dynamics by substituting boots on the ground with arms on the ground—a course of action that may find more acceptance among the anti-militarist public.

This book is organized into four empirical chapters, followed by a conclusion. Chapter 2 summarizes key developments in Germany’s and Japan’s Cold War–era anti-militarist cultures, highlighting how external and internal developments shaped both countries’ approaches. It shows how, during this period, despite great pressures from the United States, both countries made few dramatic changes to their security policies. Those that they made were primarily designed to pacify American demands without exposing them to the risk of involvement in military adventures abroad beyond the defense of their own country (Japan) or region (Germany).

Post–Cold War developments, since 1990, are analyzed in chapter 3. The chapter shows that deviations in both countries’ domestic political environments and foreign threat environments became more pronounced during this time, especially since around the start of the millennium. These changes have prompted some significant shifts in German and Japanese approaches to the use of military force. Nevertheless, the chapter also highlights the broader continuity in which German and Japanese policies are embedded, with both countries clearly exhibiting reluctance when it comes to military interventions.

Chapter 4 analyzes specific German and Japanese intervention decisions, showing how policymakers sought to establish legitimacy for their particular course of action. The chapter focuses on post–Cold War decisionmaking, but also gives an overview of the Cold War era. It finds that Germany and Japan did not participate directly in military interventions during the Cold War but rather used indirect forms of assistance to satisfy the United States when pressured for a contribution. Intervention decisions in the post–Cold War era, by contrast, reflect a partial transforma-
tion in both countries toward more acceptance of military interventions, although this path is erratic rather than linear. The chapter also shows that legitimacy debates in Germany and Japan focus on different issues. Following a seminal Federal Constitutional Court ruling in 1994, German debates ceased to focus on legal legitimacy questions, turning instead to moral issues. In Japan, by contrast, questions about the constitutional legitimacy of military interventions continue to prevail in public debates.

Chapter 5 turns to German and Japanese arms export policies. Decisionmakers may rely on arms exports to influence international security dynamics without direct military intervention. The chapter finds that German and Japanese arms export policies differed quite strongly already during the Cold War, with the former emerging as a major arms exporter by the end of the Cold War and the latter adhering to a highly restrictive policy that came close to an export ban. The analysis highlights how external and internal factors combined to set the two countries on different paths. The chapter furthermore observes that both Germany’s and Japan’s policymakers have sought to loosen arms export restrictions in recent years, arguing that their objective is to positively influence international security dynamics. Nevertheless, decisionmakers in both countries tend to evade debates about the legitimacy of arms exports or comprehensive explanations about objectives. Given that no parliamentary approval is necessary for export decisions, there is much less pressure to engage in these debates than in the case of direct military interventions.

The conclusion (chapter 6) summarizes key findings and draws inferences about both countries’ policy evolution. Overall, we find that the two countries’ trajectories, despite sharing some continuities and similarities, especially in the perpetuation of their evolving but still strong anti-militarist political cultures, often exhibit characteristically different, strongly path-dependent patterns and fluctuations. We conclude that Germany has achieved a somewhat more autonomous position within its still fundamentally multilateralist approach, whereas Japan, if anything, is more wedded to, and dependent on, its bilateral military alliance with the United States. Based on this conclusion, we hypothesize various alternative medium-term scenarios facing the two nations.