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Congolese Perspectives on the December Election:

MODERATOR: MICHAEL E. O'HANLON
Senior Fellow and Director of Research, Foreign Policy
The Brookings Institution

MVEMBA DIZOLELE
Lecturer, Johns Hopkins SAIS

LAURA KUPE
Counsel, Committee on Homeland Security
U.S. House of Representatives

MULALA JOSEPH NGURAMO
Private Consultant

TOM PERRIELLO
Former U.S. Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes and Congo-Kinshasa
U.S. Department of State

U.S. and International Policy Options Towards DRC:

MODERATOR: MICHAEL E. O'HANLON
Senior Fellow and Director of Research, Foreign Policy
The Brookings Institution

MVEMBA DIZOLELE
Lecturer, Johns Hopkins SAIS

SASHA LEZHNEV
Deputy Director of Policy, The Enough Project

KRISTIN McKIE
Assistant Professor of Government and African Studies
St. Lawrence University

JOHN G. TOMASZEWSKI
Regional Director, Africa
International Republican Institute

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ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 600
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. O'HANLON: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to Brookings. It's an exciting day to talk about the Democratic Republic of Congo and we are very glad to have you here. Thank you for braving the snow and the cold. I'm Michael O'Hanlon with the Foreign Policy program, former Peace Corps volunteer in Kikwit and we have a panel to begin the discussion of Congolese and Congolese Americans including my good friend Laura, also a Kikwit origin person, even more authentically than I.

But we begin the panel and then we also have on this panel in addition to Laura Kupe who's a former Obama administration official as well we then have Mvemba Dizolele who is a professor at Johns Hopkins University, Congolese, Congolese American and a full-time scholar on this subject as well as a long-standing practitioner in election observations in Congo. He has seen a lot. He has got a multitude of thoughts to share with us today. And then finally one of his former students, one of my former colleagues, the only Congolese graduate of the U.S. military academy to date that I'm aware of, my friend Mulala Nguramo who also is Congolese American and continues to be passionate about his country and I think that is safe to say for all of our panelists and for everyone here in the room.

So here is how we are going to proceed in the next two hours. We also are joined remotely by Tom Perriello, the honorable Tom Perriello, former congressman from Virginia and also as many of you will know the former special envoy in the Obama administration for the Great Lakes region. And what I'm going to ask Tom to do in just a minute is begin us off with a few of his own thoughts and reflections just to frame the conversation for this first panel which will then primarily be at least in the early phases, a discussion by Congolese about what they've just witnessed in their country and how they feel about it, how they view this moment in history, how they think about the options and the opportunities and the potential pitfalls before us. And we thought that was the best way to really begin this important conversation.

In the second hour, we will have a different panel which will be primarily American analysts and practitioners in Africa, people with long standing experience in democracy promotion in election observation and we have some of that kind of expertise on this panel too. But I'll save the introductions for them for later.

So without further ado, I just want to say one more word by way of framing. I think you all know why we are here. You wouldn't be in this room if you didn't understand that eight days ago Congo inaugurated a new president, Felix Tshisekedi, the son of a long standing activist and dissident and advocate for democratic change, Etienne Tshisekedi who had passed away just a short time before. And the election of course was a surprise in many ways. Very few people consider it to have been fair but also very few people actually predicted it would even happen or that it would not be completely rigged in favor to the preferred candidate of the previous president Joseph Kabila. And as things turned out, Kabila's presumed preferred candidate did not win the election.

And so as a person who has watched Congo for a long time like many of you, I don't know whether to be excited or scared, happy or unhappy or maybe a little bit of all of the above. And I'm not quite sure what his moments portends for Congo's future or for the future more generally of democracy in Africa. Is this a step forward? Is this a step back? Is it way too soon to know? Those are the topics and questions before us today.

I'll admit, I'll put my one personal opinion on the table. I'm 51 percent happy and 49 percent scared and unhappy. So I'm a slightly glass more than half full because I never really thought elections would happen. I thought they would be delayed indefinitely or perhaps be accompanied by violence or perhaps be accompanied and produce the outcome that I feared most which was a completely rigged election in favor of the preferred Kabila candidate. It may have been a rigged election but it wasn't apparently his top choice.

And this comes after -- I will say one more word of framing. We all know that Congo has never previously had a successful peaceful transfer of power and that make this moment if nothing else auspicious and potentially an opportunity. We know that after

decades of mistreatment and brutality by -- at the hands of the Belgians and a very unhappy colonial experience that in my judgment was among the worst that any African country experienced on the continent and certainly the world did not leave Congo with the raw materials for success a little over a half a century ago when it became independent, we then saw a tortured period when Zaire was often the focal point of great power and super power competition and Cold War proxy conflict that didn't help matters much.

We the outside world didn't leave Congo with a great running start towards any kind of a successful future and that is part of why I'm choosing to frame today's situation as at least somewhat hopeful compared to where we have been and where we might have expected things to be at this juncture. Enough framing from me.

Tom if you are still on the line, I wanted to invite you please to say whatever you want to say by way of framing the moment you see us at with DRC and again, thank you for joining us. The honorable Tom Perriello over to you.

MR. PERRIELLO: Thank you very much for this conversation and for having me even if it's in this awkward way of looming behind the panelists. (Laughter) If it's all right with you I would actually really love to hear from the panelists first and then maybe add some comments at the end of that to hear from Congolese and Congolese American experts and then maybe try to reply to that if that works?

MR. O'HANLON: Let's do it. Okay. So Laura and then the same question to everyone. And just look forward to your opening assessment of where we are and feel free to be as personal or as passionate or as emotional or as analytical as you want to be. Put it in historical terms, put it in personal terms. I just want to hear how the three of you are feeling about where your country of origin is today. And please, thank you for joining us.

MS. KUPE: Thank you, so much, Mike. Good morning, everybody. So I'm going to speak through the personal lens. So I'm sad to be frank with you because I felt like this was a great opportunity to support the Congolese people in their desire to, you know, elect the head of their country. And I felt like this was a missed opportunity and that the

international community chose stability in, you know, quotation marks for an opportunity for the Congolese people to really have their will heard. And especially also being American, as a country that touts, you know, wanting to stand for democracy and justice, I just felt like this was a missed opportunity especially given the fact that a lot of the Congolese population is young and I just felt like we left them hanging in that regard.

So I know Mike provided the overview in terms of the analytical discussion in terms of the fact that there were elections but I felt like this was a missed opportunity and I think especially as someone who is in the diaspora, I know that the world could move on and say, yes, the elections happened, at least it as peaceful. But I just remember 2011 where this happened as well and the world moved on but its people like my parents that still have to pay for funerals and the lack of healthcare and have to pay for people's education.

So I also think people forget, you know, people like my parents and us on the stage and the diaspora who carry especially the economic burden at times especially when the international community leaves the, I mean, my opinion has left the Congolese people behind. And so I think it's interesting to think about the future in terms of how can people like myself or us on stage think about the future going forward in terms of how we can support our friends and family who may not have that support from their government.

MR. O'HANLON: So before we go to Mvemba, I just want to ask one quick follow up. Are you suggesting that in addition to your disappointment you think the United States should have fought harder the idea of inaugurating Felix Tshisekedi as president, that we should have tried to disavow that electoral outcome and there was a missed opportunity here just in recent weeks?

MS. KUPE: I think so. Because now taking my, you know, more analytical hat on, when it comes to Venezuela we have a totally different rhetoric and so it is interesting where we in Venezuela we see the international community actually trying to recognize the main opposition leader. So it shows that there are, that is an example of where the international community has chosen to at least challenge the current head of a

government so it's interesting to think about why Venezuela and not in the Congo where there is evidence suggesting that the person who now has been inaugurated as president did not win the election.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. And the professor, over to you please. By the way the professor is from the coastal region so we've got from Boma to Goma to Kikwit we have got a wide representation geographically and otherwise on the panel. My friend, over to you.

MR. DIZOLELE: Thank you very much, Mike. It's a pleasure to be here. Thank you for coming. I think the, this was supposed to a historical moment for the DRC. In many ways it still is but it is also a moment that has not particularly brought everybody together. It has been surprisingly a moment of division all of a sudden. On one level we saw tremendous, a tremendous convergence of various forces, right. So the Congolese came together against the capital regime of which they were very tired, they don't want anything to do with Shadary, that was very clear.

And the international community supported the Congolese in this effort. So they accompanied them, the U.S. embassy did a lot of things. The EU, NGO's in the U.S. supported civil society and political parties in that struggle. I think the problem started when the results start coming in and that we all saw that something was off. We knew this, I mean, that was not a surprise. I mean, there were irregularities, we all had seen Corneille Nangaa give his spiel in Washington, D.C. And I think at that moment the Congolese were expecting the world to stand with them in terms of at this bringing transparency into the process.

We had been very flexible, the world that is with Kabila to say the least in the name of stability, stability, stability. And of course we know Congo is not stable today. It is no more stable than it was in 2001. And in fact, Congo has entered a zone which I will call a turbulent zone in the sense that we are more -- we have more instability now. So the conflict that had been traditionally nested in the eastern corridor of the (inaudible) have since

moved. We have conflict in northern Katanga. We have conflict in the Kasai and these are the armed conflict. Then we have unarmed conflict like civil disobedience in Kinshasa, in Bakongo, in Ecuador, people aren't happy. And any time anything can explode in that sense.

So what could have been done? I think we saw the leaks from (inaudible) data, we saw the leak from CENI and other observation. The African Union was skeptical of the results. Sadec was skeptical of the results. So then what gave? I think we just didn't fight for -- with the Congolese. On the Congolese side, it's a bit strange to see the cynicism of the international community. Because you hear more now, you know, when you deal with diplomats it's always interesting. They're very nice people. They work hard so we acknowledge that. But they also tell you things like behind closed doors we have been pushing for this and pushing for that. In which case you don't know if they're doing it or not doing it because you can only judge them by the result. Right.

And then so we saw the contorted statement from the state department for instance where, you know, up to that point the state department was very clear, they issued some very strong statement about we are not going to support, we are not going to tolerate fraud, we -- Congress pushed for sanctions for those people who derail fraud. I will encourage fraud. But then we saw welcome the certification of this thing. I think it doesn't help.

If I'm Felix Tshisekedi, I have to know that I'm starting on the wrong footing because half the population does not believe I won. So it is not helping Congo, it is not helping anyone. If your part is in Felix then you really believe he should be given a chance. If you are not, you're saying this is not who we fought for. We didn't fight for Felix or anybody who won to go into correlation with Kabila against the people. So this will all come back to the diplomats. A lot of diplomats want to see Congolese in the street. But why do they have to do go the streets when they're showing you that they actually believe in the process. They have seen enough violence. Now they just want the ballot to count.

So we should have fought a little more and, I mean, if the court had gone through all the data and waited for the AU delegation or any other pressure point and said we reviewed everything and Felix won, okay, that would have been fine. But it was this rush to certifying things that were very questionable and I think that is problematic for the Congolese, for the world engagement in Congo and for President Tshisekedi himself. He will never be seen as legitimate. It is going to be problematic.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. And, Mulala, over to you, my friend.

MR. NGURAMO: Yes so thank you so much. And at first I would agree with Mvemba and (inaudible) and thank you so much for the invitation. Well, I'll try to put it in two ways. First of all, I think the election provided such a worry of concerns in terms of like many people wish we could have a transparency and a credible process so that people will not have to worry about the legitimacy of the president which quite frankly can impose a serious problem down the road. Yes.

Like today you see protests already like in Kikwit and Kinshasa, you know, even Goma. And until now their local commission has not published all the results so that people can dissipate on account of doubt in terms of the legitimacy of the election of the president.

The other point is quite frankly I feel really optimistic and very proud of what the Congolese people did. Like look what happened barely for example in Motembo these people were excluded and all but they organized the only elections and I think they largely expressed the dispelling desire of the people in the country to have democracy and the freedom.

Regardless of whether the election was rigged or not but what makes me very optimistic is this desire people to have the election in their country to have democracy. And quite frankly, regardless of what happened I see this momentum keep growing in the country that will always keep politicians on track to do the right things particularly if they don't deliver in terms of socioeconomic program. You know, this is a country where we have

a lot of young people, they have a lot of expectations. They want to have jobs, they want to have opportunities, they want to move ahead, you know, they want to be part of the global community.

So quite frankly, regardless of everything happened but what really make me very optimistic is this strong desire for the young people to be part of the political process, to hold their leaders accountable, you know, and if they don't respond to their needs they go into the street and ask them for the result. And there regardless of quite frankly I think I see a bright future ahead.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Tom, is this a good moment for you to come in and share your views and reactions?

MR. PERRIELLO: Sure. Thank you so much for all that wisdom. All of which I will basically want to echo. I think, you know, in terms of looking forward, we don't know what the outcome is going to be and really an enormous amount does rest on Felix Tshisekedi. Does he prove the skeptics wrong that he is ready to start a new chapter, rein in anti-corruption efforts, give people a voice or is he in fact just someone who is going to continue Kabila both directly and indirectly?

So in terms of looking forward, I think, you know, we don't yet know. But let's be absolutely clear about what just happened. And what just happened was the Congolese people did everything that they were asked to do by the international community. They did it with unbelievable courage. They did it against the odds. They did it in a completely rigged political environment. The Catholic bishops did everything they were asked to do. The diplomatic community is constantly saying why don't you show leadership? You are the only legitimate body out there. They went and put their credibility on the line. They put their standing in the country on the line.

And the result was incredible which was a peaceful election across the country as was just mentioned even in places where the government was trying to prevent voting from happening. People simply went in and took over the voting booths and because

they were so eager to express their opinion and start a new chapter. The results were not just a small victory but they were an overwhelming victory. An overwhelming defeat certainly in President Kabila's camp and I say that as someone who actual until a month before the election expected that Tshisekedi would be the biggest vote getting and that people should unite around that but this was a very different campaign.

We literally had a whistle blower walk out of the CENI with a digital file showing the polling place by polling place numbers of a 35 percent victory for Fayulu over the next closest candidate. And what we saw from the region and from the west was crickets. After saying to the Congolese you guys need to show the leadership, it's your country but we'll be there with you, there was relative essence when that happened.

I think diplomatically the biggest mistake was the period between the initial results and the CENI announcing the results. I even got some grief for some Tweets that I sent during that period but at that point, all of the numbers were clear and when I talked to diplomats in the region and in the west, they said what we need to wait for the CENI numbers. I said do you have any reason to believe that CENI will produce real numbers? They said no, we know they will be false numbers. I said so what is it that you're waiting for in that period?

So this is where the soft bigotry I would say of sort of a new colonialism comes in both from the region and the west which is people saying well, you know Congo, you know how things work in Congo. And the question is, is that really how they work there or is that how we enable them to work by failing to stand up for democracy and the rule of law when people are doing so.

Now I want to just end the observations on the positive note. I think because civil societies showed up in such a big way, because citizens showed up in such a big way and because the church I think stood with those values, there is an enormous amount of reason to believe the future of the DRC is going to be defined more by that space than not. I think Felix Tshisekedi given his family's tradition in the opposition has every

reason to try to rule in a way that builds his legitimacy and credibility with those folks who were in the streets and helped to ensure that some form of alternans happen.

So I think there are a lot of lessons here but I really do think it's rare to have seen that clear of a case of people standing up against the odds and then having the international community essentially turn a blind eye to those results in ways that I think too often diplomacy we think is about solving problems but more often it's about shifting or avoiding blame for you as an individual or as a country.

That being said, again I think that if you had said a year ago that there would be a peaceful election, that Kabila would not stand and that his candidate would not be declared the victor, those are very few people would have thought that we would be in that space. So those would be some initial observations.

MR. O'HANLON: Tom, that's great, thank you. I think I'm going to go straight to the audience now because we have a lot of expertise and energy and, you know, people who care about Congo and know Congo in the room. I'm going to just put my question as one in a litany that the panel can then address.

My question of course is where do we go from here? And we have already heard some people touch on this. I think most people are suggesting we should try to work with Tshisekedi in some way. What that means however, for U.S. policy options is something we will talk about in various formulations with this panel and the next one. So that's my question for everybody but please don't answer yet. Let's collect a few more questions and thoughts from the crowd.

Let's please, one request because we have a full house and only a half hour for this panel, lets please have this question be brief if you could and any comment keep very short. I wall welcome comments if they are very brief. And please wait for a microphone and introduce yourself. We will take about four questions before we come back to the panel as well as tom. We will go with the gentleman here in the fourth row and then the one right behind him after that.

QUESTIONER: Good morning. My name is Bernard Jones with (inaudible) Risk Management Group. Thank you for your comments. My question is we know the challenges that are happening in Congo. Can you give us one positive takeaway as far was economic opportunities for public private partnerships you may see under the new president?

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. And then the gentleman right behind you please.

QUESTIONER: And good morning, Roger Murray with Akin Gump. Excuse me. I represent Martin Fayulu and Moise Katumbi. Question for the panel is how do we raise the bar for next time? Our strategy well in recent months was pretty simple, try to raise the bar. We didn't realize quite how low it was.

And then second question if I can, what limitations does Felix face given the, you know, majority of the presidential majority in the assembly?

MR. O'HANLON: And again we are not going to ask everybody to respond to each question so please be thinking of which ones you are most going to want to speak to yourself. We will stay up front with the gentleman over here in the fourth row.

QUESTIONER: Hi. I'm Archie from the Belgian Embassy. I just had a question, how do you think the relations will evolve with Belgium and with the European Union as well?

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. We will take one more in this round from the woman right here in the fourth row.

QUESTIONER: Hi, my name is -- should I stand up? I'm -- my name is Grace Collins and I was approached to help Felix. And I was invited to the inauguration. I was not able to go on such short notice but I noticed that, I mean, it's a step forward to me because the reality is the man has been in power for so long and he has 350 Kabila people in the Congress. So I think it's a step forward to at least be realistic of the change of power. You can't just go from dictatorship to purist human rights things. It's just -- it's too

engrained in all the other previous presidencies and different relationships.

MR. O'HANLON: And I'll see we can take --

QUESTIONER: So my question is --

MR. O'HANLON: Oh you have a question, okay, go ahead. Go ahead.

QUESTIONER: So my question is the state department has now supported and I just think that the international community should be supportive of him.

MR. O'HANLON: Okay. And I will take one more since that was more comment than question. We are going to stay in the front for, we will go here in the second row. And that's fine, I like comments too. Didn't mean it --

QUESTIONER: My name is J.T. Stanley and looking forward to the next election, kind of the big question is will Kabila run and if he goes ahead and grabs power what does that mean for Congo and if that is kind of too far to see in advance, what factors should we be looking for in sort of predicting violence when the next election comes around?

MR. O'HANLON: By the way, the entire second panel is here so please, second panel, listen to the questions. We may not get to all of them right especially the ones that are forward looking for U.S. policy, we may wind up coming back to them in the second panel but with that said, feel free to address any and all of the questions you like but ideally one or two per panelist starting with Laura.

MS. KUPE: Sure. So in terms of economic opportunities, I feel like the Inga project is an opportunity for economic development and interest in terms of the United States or and other because again, everyone talks about the potential of the hydroelectric power of the Inga project and I feel like that could be an opportunity that could bring folks from the private sector and the government together especially given that the Inga dam has the potential to potentially power the whole well, sub-Saharan Africa. So I think that is a great opportunity especially for folks who want to look into energy and again touch on many segments or points in terms of an area where you could find a number of collaborators.

In terms of, I -- the person from the Belgian Embassy, so you mentioned in

terms of Belgium and the European Union going forward. In that regard, I think there, there should be a greater discussion about Congo and Europe's inter connectedness. Again Belgium wouldn't be where it is today if it wasn't for the Congo and I think in some elements there should be greater discussions around economic partnerships and job opportunities especially because the Belgium also has a big diaspora community where folks have been educated in Belgium as well. So I think there is a lot of opportunities for collaboration and then also I believe (inaudible) dad is the first Congolese Belgian mayor so I think there are opportunities for a dialogue to happen especially with that growing community. And also talk about the bad but also opportunities to make improvements.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Mvemba.

MR. DIZOLELE: On the economic opportunity question, nothing is going to happen. I mean, Congo is full of opportunities, full of potential. But if there is no rule of law, if there is no transparency in the way things are run, would you invest in Congo? So the challenge there for Felix Tshisekedi is to show that he wants to create that space. That space has not been there. Who invest in Congo? Adventurers, right.

So a few years ago Kabila was asking, was talking to a group of investors and he told them you should have the spirit of adventurism of Andrew Morton Stanley and come to Congo. (Laughter) And I think that's how he has approached business over the last 18 years. So we get either a few multinationals who get everything, loot everything out of the country or you have another cast of characters who are for quick money but nothing that trickles down to the people.

That's why Congo is among the fast-growing economies, the fastest growing economies in Africa, in the world as far as the IMF and the World Bank is concerned but there is no job creation, there is nothing else. Right. And so you will not go to Congo unless there is that climate, that environment that has been cleared. So that is one of the challenges for Felix Tshisekedi. His father used to say (inaudible) meaning the people comes first. And that means you have to deliver for the welfare of the people.

You cannot do that if you don't create jobs. You cannot do that if all your resources are being looted out and the revenues are not going to the national treasury and they find their way to Panama or to other off shored. So I don't see an upside to that unless President Tshisekedi starts showing us that he is willing to put the change in place. And so far it is hard to say. It has been only a week or so.

The European Union has to take itself seriously. I mean, I think the challenge is we, you know, Tom was mentioning the low, you know, the bigotry of low expectations and we have seen that for the last 20 years. We just will not be expecting much of the Congolese and we are trying to feed them things they don't need. You know, like what humanitarian, humanitarian, humanitarian. Congo is not a humanitarian crisis. It has never been. Congo is a political crisis. And the Congolese are working to solve the crisis.

Let's solve that crisis, everything else will fall in place. The UN will be out of Congo because the Congolese can build an army. They're capable of fighting, they've been doing it for the last 20 years. So it is not like they cannot fight. And they can fight this time to protect their own country. Let's bring in government that is legitimate so they can put transparency in governance. So until those things are in place, we -- I don't see any change and as far as how do we go from dictatorship to democracy, we have not, you know, Congo has been in this limbo. It is not full dictatorship, it is not full democracy. You know this is why the Congolese civil society is so vibrant. They do things. That's why Kabila fell to stay around as president. So the things that are happening, we don't expect the new president to be perfect but we expect him to start delivering on civil liberties.

Again on transparency and management, pay your civil servants. Pay your military. Fire generals who are problematic. Those are the things that work in any country. Congo is no different. I think our standards should be the same in judging Congo. They should be the same in judging Felix Tshisekedi as they were when judging Kabila or in judging any other leader.

If the international community had been more engaged and pushed for transparency in the result, then will have questioned Kabila's majority in parliament. Because we caved in, now we cannot question that. So we have actually condoned a situation that is going to be worse or Felix Tshisekedi.

MR. O'HANLON: It's interesting. Good point. Mulala.

MR. NGURAMO: Yes, thank you. (inaudible) with Cooper and Mvemba. I'll just take the question of limitation of Felix just to build on your comment. First of all, let's understand the power structure today in the DRC. Felix Tshisekedi won the election but he does not control the parliament where the prime minister will come from. And I think more likely the FCC, the Kabila camp will control the senate where more likely Kabila rumors saying he might come back as a president of the senate which means that again as your question was the future of Kabila why not? Maybe tomorrow you might see him president of the senate and they might replace Tshisekedi and he come back again. So you see the problem.

In addition to that, having a prime minister who comes from the Kabila camp can be a serious problem for Felix Tshisekedi. Most of the decision it's actually the prime minister run the government. Even if Tshisekedi might want senate, you know, to do something (inaudible) deliver to the people along those lines but I see a situation where the people from the FCC side might be blocking him. And that actually might create some kind of political paralysis in the country and Felix will be unable to deliver to the not only socioeconomic problem of the country but also to respond to other issues, you know, such as securing the eastern part of the DRC. You see Yumbi, the killings in Yumbi and then the humanitarian crisis as well in the country.

So and quite frankly I have to be honest, we have a political (inaudible) in Congo. And if possible Felix Tshisekedi should call everybody, call Maurice, call Moise, call (inaudible), call all these guys to talk about the issue and find a way how to get out of this situation. Because otherwise I don't see quite frankly how we will be able to govern the

country. And let me put it this way.

Imagine we have an election but you take this big (inaudible) in Europe that are able to go back. Think about for a minute. So we have this huge problem. Okay. And my view, as long as this (inaudible) outside of the country, we will still have a political crisis in the country. The, perhaps the major of the credibility and transparency (inaudible) or the willingness of Felix Tshisekedi to bring the country toward the rule of low-quality governors he has, he must be able to bring this guy in the country, create a political environment where everybody would be part of the process and they rebuild this country again.

Otherwise, quite frankly I really doubt as Mvemba said here before, he will be able to deliver economic side because people come to invest in the DRC they must feel confident of the situation. Can they invest their money and then get it back? And quite frankly right now the county is in a very serious, you know, crisis to do that.

Even beyond that, the economy is in a very, in tenable shape. If you -- I don't know if you read it yesterday, the treasury of the country is empty. So the people who come to help the country, the IMF and international community, all kind of things. And right now I don't see a (inaudible) environment quite frankly where people who come in and, you know, help the economy of the country and then deliver job and quite frankly if Felix does not do that, I am seeing protests and strikes and perhaps in six or seven months which quite frankly can paralyze the whole country.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Tom, any comments you would like to offer at this time?

MR. PERRIELLO: Sure. To start with where you started, Michael, I think that the question of whether we should be working with Felix Tshisekedi of course it's yes. He is the president of the country. I happen to think he is a good man that made a very bad deal but he has got to make a decision right now about whether he actually considers himself president of the DRC or does he consider himself sort of Kabila's partner? And the fact of the matter is he has that title and can exert an enormous amount of leadership from

that position and I think if he decides to make a five year commitment to the things that have been mentioned here, to restoring the constitution, restoring the plurality of political space where the DRC was genuinely a leader in the region for many years instead of in the sense of having lots of media outlets, lots of parties, having opposition around, that sort of thing.

Second on the investments. Kabila always ruled from a position of weakness and so he had to keep the regions weak against each other, keep the militias out there in order to kind of be seen as the only one who could hold it together. Tshisekedi is obviously coming in from weakness in many ways because of the disputes about the results and other things, but he can lead in a strong way.

On the investments what I always heard from companies inside and out is we are making the kind of investments you would make if you think about a two year or three-year time horizon because we don't know if there might be war or the economy falling apart. They're not making the kind of investments for a 20- or 30-year return where you see the transformational on investments in infrastructure that Laura and others have mentioned.

If President Tshisekedi wants to bring in the conditions as the professor mentioned like the rule of law and restoring confidence in that, you will see the unbelievable potential we all know that is there start to develop. But if instead it's the old coalition politics of trying to be just strong enough to survive, then essentially we have cost the DRC thought I think weak diplomacy and false promises a generation of economic development. So I think that that opportunity exists.

I think that President Tshisekedi based on this own experience and his family's experience still does have the moral credibility if his actions speak to that tradition to bring in a real era of reform and change that is so clearly what the people of Congo wanted. You could get into Fayulu, Tshisekedi, what was clear was people wanted to reject the past and start something new. And I think if people do not see something that suggests a new chapter but a continuation of the old they will see that very much as doing so against the will of the Congolese people. So that's part about raising that bar for next time.

I certainly think President Tshisekedi could prove to be a transformational leader if he wants to step into that role and understand the full power of that position and I think as the last speaker mentioned, it is important that not only did the international community in the region fail to stand by the presidential results that came out but paid almost no attention to the parliamentary results. And understanding in the DRC the significance of the parliament was something I think again that was a missed opportunity here in this space.

So certainly all of us who care about the DRC and people of Congo should be working with the president, working with the people to try to make this a new era and again given that very few people a year ago would have been predicting that we would be in the situation of a new president without major violence and disruption we do want to see if the glass is not half full or 49 percent, your statistics, maybe it's quarter full but let's make the most of that and see how we can build again on the courage of the Congolese people and their commitment to their own constitution into that space.

MR. O'HANLON: Fantastic.

MR. DIZOLELE: Can I --

MR. O'HANLON: Yes, please.

MR. DIZOLELE: So a couple things. To go back to (inaudible) question about how do we raise the bar? I think one is to start sanctioning the people who contribute to the fraud. That legislation has been talked about in Congress quite a bit now. We have a lot of communicates from various Congress people. I think the credibility of the U.S. Congress is on the line in Congo. The embassy is one thing. The Congress can at least pay attention to what Congress says. And so if the Congress doesn't follow true of that, that's set kind of the next expectation for the cycle, the electoral cycle is the start.

What happened to Nangaa, what happened to his team? Did we sanction them? Did we do anything about that? So the next person who comes, whether they for Tshisekedi, we don't know what CENI will look like. They may do the same thing because

that is the way things have tended to work in the past. So I think that is one way we can start raising the bar just like we have high expectations and this can work in Congo. The voters are doing it. Why can't the institutions do it and their backers?

And then this economic thing is very important because that is where the jobs, that's where employment, that's where the welfare of the people lies and just imagine that there were 15,000 candidates for the parliament which is about 500 seats for one coalition, from one Kabila's coalition, the FCC. So that tells us that there is no other job that so everybody wants to be an MP of one kind or another. (Laughter) You know, what makes it that you have 15,000 people from one coalition for 500 seats. Something is off. And that's what we need to resolve. Some of us don't want to be in politics, the people are doctors, the people go back and work. They just want that space. We see this in Ghana, big diaspora our return. We saw this even in places like Rwanda, big diaspora. If you create the environment, Congo will not need so much foreign aid because the Congolese will go back. And they can help their own country.

MR. O'HANLON: Excellent.

MR. NGURAMO: (inaudible)

MR. O'HANLON: And really quickly because I want to have time for a second round of questions.

MR. NGURAMO: Okay, absolutely. First, I really support Mvemba. Quite frankly we need to sanction the people who are part of this electoral fraud because it's no good for democracy and the future of this country. But also, keeps the policy (inaudible) of movement. I think they play a huge role to block Kabila, to break the Congolese constitution, to seek a third term. But even through his candidate.

So my biggest concern as we are coming from, we are moving forward as the special envoy said would Felix Tshisekedi be a transformation leader? I really hope so. Because we will really need that so that perhaps five years from now we don't go back again because it gets worse. A rigged election can just go along with it you know what I mean?

So we need to stop this what seems to be like a behavior of 2006, 2011, 2018, people rig the election to think it is normal. That's not a future.

MR. O'HANLON: Okay. Thank you. So we have time for a second round for this panel and Tom, before we switch to the second, we will start with the gentleman in the far back please, Adam. Thank you.

QUESTIONER: Good morning. My name is (inaudible) from the German embassy. I want to know what does this election mean for Congo neighbors such as Uganda and Rwanda? Are we going to see joint effort in fighting militias, low resistance army and Rwanda (inaudible).

MR. O'HANLON: Great, thank you. Good question. Woman here in the blue shirt please.

QUESTIONER: Good morning. My name is (inaudible) and I'm also a Congolese national. I had a question with regards to what happens with the opposition now. As you know Fayulu and Lamuka is going to be holding a meeting tomorrow. What do you think will happen and what would be your recommendations for his team moving forward?

MR. O'HANLON: Yes, a couple more before we come back. Right across here to the left, the woman in the brown sweater, Adam. No a couple rows back.

QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. My name is Jennifer Limksa with the International Republic Institute. I think I is clear from what you have said and overall that the U.S.'s and most of the international community's chief priority throughout this electoral cycle was to secure stability in DRC and the wider region rather than encouraging or supporting a truly democratic process and outcome.

I would be interested in hearing Mvemba or anyone else on the panel expanding a bit on the potential ways in which this current situation may actually contribute to an increasingly unstable DRC and region and what some recommendations would be at this point for the international community given the situation we are in moving forward to avoid any pitfalls and to try to improve the situation.

MR. O'HANLON: And I'll just take one more and then we are going to come back to the panel and wrap up. So I'm going to stay in the back, the gentleman way over there by the side. Yes, please.

QUESTIONER: Good morning, Alex Sanchez, (inaudible) defense. Quick question, what do you think will be the future of MONUSCO? (inaudible) on March 31 he has 16,000 troops. We know many will be renewed but how should we be transformed if at all, thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: Excellent. So why don't we start with Mvemba because you had one question directed to you personally but then we will -- and also this will be the final round for this panel so any final thoughts you want to weave in but we have about maybe two or three minutes for each panelist please.

MR. DIZOLELE: Yes. So to Jennifer's question, legitimacy is the key here, right. So Kabila had problem with legitimacy for 18 years. We saw that delivered. When you're illegitimate and unless you start feeling that you become insecure that's what you have legitimate regimes. And when you become insecure you start doing things that you're not supposed to do, arresting people, doing all kind of things and so this will give if President Tshisekedi doesn't move quickly to put order for instance in terms of civil liberties or for the police with the army to clear the DOD, the Department of Defense, ministry of defense and put the right people and starting building the right military that Congo needs, then militias will continue to be involved in because they will not see any reason to change to the eastern corridor will continue to be unstable.

Other people in the street, remember we always see Congo in armed conflict. There is the other conflict which is non-armed conflict. This is the civil right movement, the youth moment. The government sees them as danger so they are also part of the conflict. They get arrested, they get killed. So we will continue to see that as long as people continue see Felix Tshisekedi as not fully legitimate.

People will challenge him on that ground and that's ground enough to do

that. And this goes also to the question Alex just posed. The future of MONUSCO will depend on what President Tshisekedi does with security. So if he does well then it gives ground for the Congolese to ask for MONUSCO exit. It doesn't happen overnight but we can say over 10 years they need to exit. But you have to show parallelly that you are doing things that will convince the international community that the time has come. So those are my two thoughts.

MR. O'HANLON: Great. Joseph, over to you and then we still come back to Laura.

MR. NGURAMO: Absolutely. I agree with Professor Mvemba here. I will just try to wrap up the question of labor and its stability together because they are tied into legitimacy problem. The perception that election will (inaudible) quite frankly is a serious problem and I sincerely hope that President Felix Tshisekedi will do provide effort to make sure people trust, you know, provide credibility and the transparency into the presidency so people can trust what is happening.

Otherwise I see even (inaudible) movement in country contesting the presidency of the president because they feel he was not even elected, you know. And that's why the way (inaudible) to public all the result by voting center so people can really -- people need to have they have the trust and the confidence of the president. That's the key here. So that people can feel safe, you know, in the quiet, in the country. And it's directly, you know, affect the regional country.

For example, if, you know, you see contests (inaudible) the country and you will see humanitarian crisis in the country, you know, and usually people spill over the border and Angola, you know. Chad, the Congo (inaudible), Rwanda, Burundi, all these issues so I think regional countries should be concerned, you know, what has happened in the DRC so that this issue or perception of legitimacy that won't become a huge problem down the road.

I'll address the issue of MONUSCO. I think we need MONUSCO in the DRC. Yes, the country is not ready yet. Yes. You mentioned (inaudible) we still have to

reform the Congolese army to enforce the rule of law and provide a quantity governance so that people can live in a civil environment and I think MONUSCO still remains a key actor to this issue particularly eastern part of the DRC where people have been killed in mainly this area. Motembo, you go Yumbi as well. You go into Kasai which is a similar problem. So I just hope, you know, you know, Monique kind of lesson learned of the past so that they can make some progress as we are moving forward.

It's hard to give any kind of advice to Martin. I think he knows what he is doing but I sincerely hope he play a huge role in terms of continued supporting, you know, this ideal of democracy in the DRC which the countries need very much. Particularly as this election happened, you know, we should not go back. We should continue on the path of promoting and enforcing Congolese democracy which is very important for the future of this country.

MR. O'HANLON: Before giving the floor to Laura and then Tom to finish up, let me make one brief point myself on the UN mission. This is the only topic where I have tried to sometimes weigh in on the debate in Congo, otherwise I'm too out of date having not been back in 35 years.

But in my work as a military analyst here at Brookings, one thing I have been struck by in recent years is the U.S. Army's ability to create a new concept called a Security Force Assistance Brigade which has been applied now in Afghanistan, obviously it has got a mixed result there but it's a good concept and it really tries to optimize our presence in a given foreign country as it tries to build up its own military.

I would suggest that with a new president in Kinshasa, we consider offering a modest number of U.S. forces in that kind of capacity as part of the UN mission to think about the next phase, trying to have that mission work its way out of a job by working with the Congolese military to try to help reform and improve its skill set by being out there in the field with it in these small advisory teams. So I would like to reintroduce that idea for the broader debate. But, Laura and then Tom over to you for your thoughts please.

MS. KUPE: Sure. So again I agree with everything that Mulala and Mvemba said because I think the biggest thing is if there is no legitimacy again it will hamper the new president going forward. But I would like to talk about the aspect in terms of the pitfalls or instability. I think one area is the young people again because they, especially when you look at groups like La Lucha, they are very active on Twitter. I am millennial so I follow everything via Twitter but I think there is a lot of energy there and again if the new president doesn't, you know, listen to the issues impacting young people like job creation or the fact that again, they've invested so much time in trying to have the elections being held, then if that energy is not harnessed that again is a missed opportunity.

And again it could be like it's been eluded a huge underbelly if it is not addressed could explode and like we have all mentioned could lead to greater instability. And then one aspect in terms of the way forward is I have shared with Mike that I'm part of a group of Congolese American millennials that is trying to think of creative ways, trying to navigate this environment because as we know this problem is not going to get solved tomorrow and there are deep political and regional issues that we won't solve today.

But at least there are areas like philanthropy or healthcare education where folks who are interested in Congo or in the diaspora could collaborate to make day to day impact because again like Mulala mentioned, the treasury is empty but people need jobs and they need to feed their children. So we have organized an event in September 14 at Columbia Law School to have a summit where we can bring these types of ideas together especially in those areas that we've, that I've mentioned because those are areas that we think we could have a direct impact and its way to think forward and think of the future because again, as you've mentioned the challenges are very great but there are opportunities to be creative and innovative.

MR. O'HANLON: Excellent, thank you. And former Special Envoy Perriello again thank you for joining us today. Over to you for your thoughts at this juncture and any last concluding operations you want to offer.

MR. PERRIELLO: Sure. First, when most countries talk about caring about stability, they don't actually really mean that they care about stability. They just don't want so much instability that they might get blamed for it. So as long as it is not on the front page A1 and somehow that particular country or their diplomats could be blamed for it that's really often what is happening. And I think was a clear case of being okay with instability in the DRC for an extended period of time.

It would have been difficult to put all of the diplomatic levers of the recording in play to actually make sure that the credible result played through. The stability impacts of that would have been enormous. The notion of this being a rule of law, moving into an anti-corruption era. In fact one of the reasons a lot of the outside countries weren't that excited about Fayulu was that he hasn't played their game, he hasn't spent a lot of time in their capital. He was seen as someone who was genuine kind of reformer in the streets. So I think we really don't get the stability argument right particularly with any sort of medium to long term basis.

I think the MONUSCO question really comes back to this broader debate about President Tshisekedi making a decision of what his political calculus is. For the last few years Kabila and MONUSCO have had a deal where Kabila needs MONUSCO to be in the country but he doesn't want them to be able to do anything. MONUSCO wants to stay in the country and therefore does not want to admit that they have no ability to actually solve and of the problems they've been asked to solve.

Tshisekedi as a president should set the goal and the goal and he, it's his call not mine, but something like look, we are going to defeat the armed groups within the next three years. And I am going to work jointly with MONUSCO and, you know, again I'm not a military expert but whatever it is and say as a president we are setting this goal and we are going to hold MONUSCO accountable to it but also give them the capacities to do it.

If like Kabila he decides that he wants them there because it's such an important part of stimulus for the economy but doesn't want them to actually solve these

problems because that may change some of the political realities in the region, then we are still in the same political calculus.

There are two things just to end on. One, I really do think that the international community in the region owe the Vatican and the Catholic bishops an apology. The extent to which they asked this group and called on this group to lead risked a great deal and then when that organization was trying to make sure that the peoples voice was respected, I think the silence when there were critiques talking about they've become partisan or taking side so other thing was really a particularly shameful moment not just for how this played out but that is a resource of legitimacy that is needed for the ongoing much longer effort pushed for strong civil society and human rights.

And this is where I will end. I still remember back in 2015 meeting with some youth groups in Kinshasa and having them say something that has been ringing in my ears for the last couple weeks. They said we do not actually think anyone who is going to get elected this time is going to make that much of a difference but alternans itself is going to be the key that makes us believe it's worth trying for the next election cycle, maybe running ourselves in the next election cycle. I don't think we are quite past that inflection point because of how this played out but we could be with the efforts that Laura and others mentioned, this could be the moment that was not the turning point that all, you know, the heavens opened and all rule of law came down but there was a meaningful enough change that gave people enough hope to stay with this project of building the next generation of leadership that thinks very differently.

So I do think that there is a lot here to draw on from hope even though that there are some serious frustrations along the way. So I'm honored to be part of this panel and to continue to see where all of us in whatever capacity can be part of that writing that next chapter and next generation that doesn't happen overnight at the DRC.

MR. O'HANLON: Fantastic, Tom. Before I ask you to join me in thanking panel one, I just want to explain we are now going to swap out. We are not really going to

have a break because we are trying to keep this moving and we only have until 12. So if you need to stand up and stretch, feel free and Mvemba and I are going to remain and we are going to otherwise change and bring in some other additional experts and keep up the conversation going. So please join me now in thanking panel one. (Applause)

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Dan. We're now being joined by, again, Panel 2, so Mvemba and I would like to welcome our colleagues, starting with Kristin McKie from St. Lawrence University, who has joined us here at Brookings before in various events with the Africa Security Initiative. And she's an expert on democratic governance and political transition with largely a focus on this part of Africa, so delighted to have her expertise.

Sasha Lezhnev is at the Enough Project, where he has been instrumental in calling attention to the need for better monitoring and better discipline in how the international community handles the mineral trade, especially from war zones such as in Eastern Congo, trying to avoid the kind of corruption and the kind of cycles of exploitation, corruption, and violence that have afflicted countries like DRC. And again, glad to welcome him back to Brookings. He was part of a panel in the fall where we had actually invited Felix Tshisekedi, who could not make it as it turned, but we tried to have a good conversation without him. And now President Tshisekedi wound up visiting us later at Brookings privately, but we weren't able to have another public event.

And John Tomaszewski from IRI, International Republican Institute. J.T. as he's best known, who runs their Africa program there, also joining us again for another conversation on this subject. J.T.'s expertise is really continent-wide, but with particular background in Kenya, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Egypt, although he's passionate about DRC and I've heard him speak eloquently, again, on that topic. So I have no doubt we'll get a lot of insight from all of these panelists.

And I'm just going to launch right in and not frame another big question, but just ask them to pick up the conversation where it left off. They've all told me that they pretty

much have thoughts based on what they heard from Laura and others in Panel 1. And so we'll just work down the row, see where we stand, and then get you involved again for the final half-hour or so.

So Kristin, thank you for joining us and over to you as to where you think we are in Congo, how we should view this step, and also our options going forward.

MS. McKIE: Definitely. Thank you all for sticking with us for the second hour. And thank you for having me back, Mike.

Yeah, I think the first panelists gave us a lot of food for thought and so I think I want to build on some of what they had said. And I think the question that I have been focusing on is what room does Tshisekedi have for maneuver in the situation where he finds himself now? And I'm of two minds.

I think he has a lot of room for maneuver symbolically and in terms of really trying to shape sort of the dialogue and the tone going forward because of his opposition party being the opposition party for so long. I think he has, and, of course, his father before, you know, really has that sort of symbolic power, which can be quite forceful.

But I also think institutionally he is very constrained. As we've heard, the National Assembly, he will not have nearly a majority there. And as one of the other panelists mentioned, President Kabila, the constitution was altered earlier, I think last year, to say that former presidents will now have a permanent seat in the Senate. And it is likely that he will be Senate president and, therefore, be able to still control things like security and mining contracts. And so that will be certainly a big challenge in terms of, you know, Tshisekedi really being able to have his agenda move forward policy-wide and legally and whatnot.

And so I think the other question for Tshisekedi is can he pull together the opposition? So clearly there was a split in the opposition back in November when the opposition had at first gotten behind one single candidate and then the very next day he sort of broke from that, that coalition. But I think if he is going to have that symbolic power it's

not just going to be rallying his base, but it's also uniting the broader opposition. And so the question is can he and Katumbi and John-Pierre Bemba and also Fayulu's camp, you know, can they come together? Can they be that sort of force against the FCC coalition?

Because I think if they are able to do that you might see some MPs in the FCC coalition start to defect. And this has certainly happened in other contexts. And so I think there are ways that chosen successors can outmaneuver their predecessor. We've see this in Angola, right, where the new presidents were being able to outmaneuver some of the really entrenched dos Santos regime that I think no one assumed that that would happen. And so I think he has some space, but as some of the panelists said earlier, he'll have to really be I think dedicated to that and smart how he uses that because Kabila certainly does hold a lot of the sort of patronage power, the levers in the official National Assembly, the Senate.

And I think another question, too, is who will be able to control CENI going forward for the next election? I think that's certainly a big question. Can Tshisekedi gather control or gather sort of influence in that body? So that would be something to look forward to, as well.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Sasha?

MR. LEZHNEV: Great. Thanks a lot, Mike, for organizing this panel once again on Congo. And I considered declining because the last person who declined the Congo panel became president. (Laughter) So, I thought, gee, maybe if I decline this one I'll have some really good luck. I don't plan on running anywhere, but anyways.

Yeah, thanks a lot to those on the first panel. I mean, I certainly agree that this is an important step. It's not one that anyone expected. We sort of had our different scenarios laid out and this was not one of them. And, you know, I think it's an important historic transition. However, I would not use the word "democratic" because according to the leaked electoral results and the CENCO observation missions that the person who won got 19 percent of the vote compared with 58 percent or 59 percent that Fayulu got. And then, of

course, what happened in Parliament, as well.

So I think first and foremost there need to be consequences for that. We can't ignore this and just move forward with this process and engaging the president. Of course we need to engage him, but there need to be serious consequences. The United States has undermining democracy as one of the prongs in the sanctions' regime and the Executive Order. The U.S. made a number of statements saying that -- you know, highlighting that aspect and that actors will be held accountable. And so I think that that really needs to take place regardless of whether we engage the government or not, which we clearly are.

I think beyond that it's really important for the U.S., European Union, the African Union, neighboring African states to really shift lenses to address this kleptocratic state that has taken over Congo for the last several decades really. That has worked very well for certain elites and increasingly so under the Kabila regime, as well as the foreign roles in that. It's not just the Congolese elites who are profiting from various corruption that's happening. It's, you know, various external financial facilitators and supporting the Congolese efforts to reform that system to really combat corruption to create much more accountability. And frankly, the United States and Europe have -- and we talked about this on the previous panel -- a lot of actual leverage to use to push for those reforms and empower and leverage the reforms that the Congolese are pushing for.

So I think that there should be two kind of main goals to U.S. policy in particular. One is to help create accountability for financial and human rights crimes. That really has never been the case. It just started with sanctions against Dan Gertler and his network, but really very little consequence for the kind of mass theft that has happened in Congo for decade.

And secondly, to use the financial leverage that we have to push for some key transparency reforms that great Congolese civil society organizations have pushed for, for many years. So I'll just give a couple of examples.

Getting the state-owned companies, Gécamines for example, to publish their annual financial audits. Global Witness and the Carter Center documented that \$750 million went missing over a 3-year period from Gécamines, and no one's ever been held accountable for that. And Gécamines, although they started a nice campaign last year against the international NGOs, never actually published any of the data to disprove that.

Secondly, requiring extractive contracts to be published and subcontracts. We know from bloodhound journalists, let's put it that way, that there's been a lot of corruption in subcontracts and contracts. And yet the Congolese government has not followed through in its policy, supposedly, of publishing those. The China contract, \$6 billion, has also not been published.

Thirdly, the establish a real criminal accountability mechanism. Congolese civil society groups, hundreds of them, called for what they called mixed chambers a couple of years ago. And the Congolese justice minister at the time said, yes, great idea, and then nothing happened. So, you know, that's an example of an initiative that really needs to be followed up to address the crimes highlighted, for example, in the U.N. Mapping Report, to address the kinds of crimes that the U.N. group of experts has pointed out and others: strengthening the extractive transparency initiative; establishing a new IMF program in Congo to help address issues at the Central Bank; and pushing for banking reform. We in our investigative initiative essentially have highlighted a number of corruption issues at banks.

So how can the U.S. and Europe and the African Union do that? Obviously, it's not up to them to make those reforms, but we can leverage the Congolese efforts to do that either by the new President Tshisekedi or Congolese civil society efforts by putting corrupt actors on sanctions lists and the companies and the networks that they control.

By issuing anti-money laundering measures such as those under the PATRIOT Act 311 and 314(a) that can really stop the proceeds of corruption from coming through to our banks because the reality is people are transacting in U.S. dollars and euros

and they're sending their money to our banks and to their correspondents.

And lastly, to prosecute those where there is U.S. jurisdiction for corruption. So there's a U.S. DOJ investigation right now into Glencore and reportedly companies controlled by Dan Gertler. That should not stop now that there's a new president. Actually that needs to continue and those prosecutions should go forward, so that there are some clear boundaries.

And that, I think, can empower Tshisekedi to say, well, look, the international community sanctioned so-and-so. I can't have him as my minister. You know, I'll never be able to get investors, as someone highlighted. You know, so-and-so was Dan Gertler's business partner. There's no way we can put him forward as our mining minister. We need to have someone else so that we have real credibility here.

So I'll stop it there.

MR. O'HANLON: That's excellent, thank you. J.T., welcome and look forward to your thoughts, please.

MR. TOMASZEWSKI: Thank you. Sure. So I work for the International Republican Institute. We're not a member of the Republican Party, so in case you're wondering. We let Democrats still work for us. (Laughter)

But we're part of the National Endowment for Democracy family and there is -- that family really represents in many ways the pride and the power of the U.S. system. I mean, you're talking about the National Democratic Institute, the National Republican Institute represents the two-party system. Center for International Private Enterprise represents the value of the private sector in a democracy, and certainly the Solidarity Center in organized labor.

And in our work, collectively as institutions and certainly as IRI in Africa, we see a lot of elections. I'm leaving in just a few days for Nigeria's February 16th vote. We also watched very closely what happened in Zimbabwe.

We were on the ground in DRC. We were actually accredited. They said

no Americans were accredited. We were accredited. We didn't see too many polling sites because we didn't have a lot of ability to get out. But I think when you look at what we saw on the ground and seeing the issue of credibility, and that's what we're really trying to assess when we got into an election is -- and by the way, it's not just Election Day. It's looking at things months out. Looking at the application of a legal framework, the way in which the electoral process is being carried out in accordance with the law, whether or not constitutional provisions are allowing people to participate in a process that is said to be democratic.

And then when you go through this process and then you see on the back end of it voting day, and we have been critical in the past that some of the multilaterals, like the AU or SADC, who may so narrowly view some of these things, some of these elections and say, ah, Election Day was smooth, things look okay, let's move on. We saw SADC do a little bit of that in the Zimbabwe elections.

When you see the process go on and you get to the other side, which these days in Africa, the transmission of results, the results tallying process, the announcement of results -- we saw that in Kenya, we saw issues in Zimbabwe, now we're seeing it in DRC; I predict we'll see something in Nigeria similar to this -- you see a trend. So what that means is when we watch and we see elections take place in a country like DRC and we're working with democrats, small D, on the continent and encouraging them and trying to help them either through strengthening institutions, working within civil society, or even helping candidates to try to compete in what is often a lopsided political landscape, it's very discouraging to see an election come out that way and then to see the international community yet again apply double standards. I think the example of Venezuela was put out.

But there was an opportunity there to perhaps prolong this a little bit longer and see if we could get some more data to look at. Was this a credible process or at least, if it wasn't a credible process, was what the CENI put out there the true expression of the world of Congolese people? That may have helped, even if it was a fabricated process, this

president as he goes into now governing.

And I point you to what's going on in Zimbabwe today. I really have to. When you look at the way those elections occurred, yeah, Election Day was great. I was in Harare, peaceful, people voted, people were ecstatic, they were expressing their democratic right. But the months leading up to that vote and what happened after that vote were crucial and impacted the credibility of Emmerson Mnangagwa as he took power. And how we're seeing in that country, once an economic crisis came forward, now a break apart of a number of political sort of institutions, including the ZANU-PF.

We could see the same thing in Congo. Why? Because when you put an elected leader who does not have that credibility forward, it's very hard for them to do their job. It's very hard for them to enact reforms. Tshisekedi has promised a great deal of things to the Congolese people if you look at his platform, if you look at his public statements. We'll all be watching the La Lucha Facie meter to see how he delivers on these promises. But he has a very, very steep hill to climb.

Now, what's the options for U.S. policy? Well, certainly calling the election democratic, calling it an election, you know, probably doesn't help because certainly as I go into Nigeria and if there are problems there, Nigerians will turn to me and say, but you people, you said this Congolese election was democratic. Are you going to apply the same standards to our election? As people who are working on the front lines and promoting democracy and supporting that, trying to counter the rise of Russia, China, and other authoritarian models in Africa, it is a very difficult thing to do.

So the U.S. policy, yeah, you have to support Tshisekedi now. You have to invest in building institutions. You have to create the Congolese presidency to not be the be-all and end-all to the running of the government and the country; that you have to have these thousands of newly elected legislators, these provincial leaders, these local elections that will eventually happen, we hope will happen, that have never happened, that we now hear from the CENI that has very little credibility, but they're going to hold.

Can we make improvements? Can the U.S. push for those improvements? Can we help? If not foster a very strong, credible leader at the top, let's see what we can do at the bottom of the process. And there are a lot of opportunities there that are going to come up in the months ahead for the U.S. to do the right thing; to hold Tshisekedi to his word, to his promises; to call human rights abuses when they occur on both sides; and certainly, support some of these thousands of newly elected leaders in the country.

MR. O'HANLON: Fantastic. Mvemba, do you want to comment here? And then we're going to go to you. I've got one more question for later, but I'd rather get the audience back involved, as well, so I'll hold off. But please.

MR. DIZOLELE: Thank you. I just want to add to the entire spectrum that has been presented here, SSR, security sector reform, is key. The fellow from the Belgian embassy, this is where the EU can be useful here.

The Congolese government, the outgoing government, likes to talk about sovereignty. They only talk about sovereignty when they're being pressured to do something that is important. And the international community, EU has gone along with them. I think in the case of the U.S., we have the Leahy vetting legislation in this country. Felix is interested in working with the U.S., so there is room now that we will help you restructure the military. These are certain things that you need to do and we will be stern with these things.

In the past, Ersek knew that things were not working in DRC, but we continue giving money. I mean, billions of dollars have gone into security sector reform in DRC. And over 20 years, there's still no army that is adequate and professional and all that. The U.S. was engaged in training one battalion. As soon as the Minova crisis happened, the U.S. pulled out. I think we should not be that skittish. I mean, armies commit violence, that's what they're for. So we don't withdraw from helping them. We continue to work with them so they don't do the negative stuff, the abuses that we would not want them to do.

So I think on the SSR level we have another opportunity now to really force

Felix and say if you're going to be president -- the Ministry of Defense is a regalian function in DRC, so it belongs to the presidency. He might not control the Parliament, but he should be able to put order in DOD, the Ministry of Defense anyway. And there's room there for both the EU and the U.S. to engage.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Okay, so let's go back to you. We'll do again three or four questions at a time. We'll start back with my friend Scott and then we'll work forward.

MR. MORGAN: Good morning. Scott Morgan of Red Eagle Enterprises. I do security and threat analysis.

President Tshisekedi has already announced plans to ask the international community for assistance to deal with the militias in the East. How does that look in your viewpoint?

And the second question is for Sasha. I've heard you mention all of the available sanctions that are available that could be used. I was wondering what you thought about using the Magnitsky sanctions against some of the perpetrators in the DRC, as well. Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: Okay. And it looks like another hand in the far back row. Yes, please.

SPEAKER: Hi, my name is Christian and I'm from South Kivu. I go to GW Law.

I'm wondering, just to pick back on the last question or the last segment, you mentioned bringing U.S. intervention, military intervention into the Congo. Obviously, there's a big security issue with regards to rebel groups from different regions, different countries, and from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and South Sudan, all in the Congo right now. And I'm wondering what kind of intervention are you looking to have the U.S. engage in in the country.

Obviously, there's a lot of regional instability that needs to be worried about.

And so a lot of implication goes on into are you looking to, you know, carpet bomb these leaders or these rebel groups? Are you looking to -- and what are the implications of Russia and China and their involvement in the region now that they seem to be more engaged?

MR. O'HANLON: I'll clarify what I meant in just a second. (Laughter) It wasn't that.

So let's see, who else in the back might want to get involved and then we'll keep working our way forward. Anybody else? We've got a hand up here in the front. Thank you, sir.

MR. KANE: Hi, my name is Bob Kane. I would like to know, it's just a question, would you tell us what do you think about the future of Opposition DRC? Because Kabila should be one of the devils, but (inaudible) that most of the people in Congo, the ones that were calling like opponents of Kabila regime, are just corrupt.

MR. O'HANLON: Okay. And then do we have a final hand or should we come back to panel now?

Okay, so we'll now respond and we'll go through this round. If anybody else gets questions, we'll have a second round. And I've got one more for the panel, as well, before we would wrap up, but we've got still a half-hour to go.

Let me just clarify, so what I was talking about with a security force assistance brigade, this is not a combat unit per se. It may begin as a combat unit, but then it is transformed. And the Army has actually been building a couple of these now, where the idea is to go out in the field in groups of 15, 20, 25 people and work at the tactical level with a unit that might need help with planning and training and structuring its own units.

So what I'm suggesting is, if the opportunity presents itself within the broader overall U.N. mission that continues to be necessary, and I agree with Mulala from the first panel and others that it still is necessary, but it has to get better. It has to also think about a time horizon by which it would work itself out of a job ultimately. I'm not suggesting we put an artificial constraint. I like Tom Perriello's three-year goal, but I think Tom would

probably agree with me that that should be a goal, not an absolute requirement and it's probably going to take longer than that.

My suggestion is unless the Congolese military begins to get better in the field -- and there was also a suggestion earlier that perhaps President Tshisekedi needs to replace some of his field commanders and look for more, in some cases, more competent people who are more effective in the field. That whole process could benefit from a few, maybe up to a few dozen American teams that are in small numbers out there in the field to work not just at national training centers, but in the tactical locations in the East, and help people conduct their operations most effectively through mentoring, through advice, through training. They can protect themselves, but otherwise they are not combat units per se.

That's the concept that I was suggesting we consider applying to the DRC and the U.N. mission there.

But let me now work down the panel with whatever comments you'd want to make or answers in response to the various questions.

MS. McKIE: So certainly most of the questions were about sort of regional security concerns and I'll let other people who have more expertise in that speak to that. But I think one more -- if I might sort of indulge myself and you in just another related point to what was brought up earlier among the panelists, I think what's been interesting for me is to look at the very quick change in the international response. Right?

The initial response was one of being skeptical about the results. You know, SDAC and the AAU and the EU and the U.S., you know, questioning the results, saying let's delay the announcement of who's going to be president. And then very quickly once the Constitutional Court made their ruling it was a very quick sort of 180 turnaround that we -- I think J.T. was saying that the State Department practically said we welcome the new president or had this sort of very big change in language.

And to me I think we can think about that as -- or explain that by thinking about, well, who were those initial condemnations of the process sort of geared towards?

And I really think it was actually geared toward the Constitutional Court judges and giving them sort of the space and latitude, if they wanted to find the results not credible, giving them sort of international backing to do that, just like we saw in Kenya the previous year.

And then I think when the court did not sort of take that leeway that was maybe provided and, you know, ruled in favor of the results, not even going to a recount, that's when you all of a sudden saw then the international community very quickly change. I think that was kind of an interesting dynamic to watch play out between a known institution in the Congo, right, and sort of respecting their legitimacy as an institution, not wanting to question that because legitimacy of the courts is also a very big question, just like the legitimacy of the Executive. So I think that's interesting to sort of look at as we think about the international community and the reactions that we're putting out.

MR. O'HANLON: That's great, thank you. Sasha.

MR. LEZHNEV: I think that we need to step back for a second and give a realistic assessment of where the new government stands. Right? You know, look at the photos from the inauguration. Kabila and Tshisekedi really, you know, joking and laughing and hugging each other. I mean, this is not a real transfer of power yet. I mean, the reality -- and we've never seen any protests from any of the 80+ Kabila companies and the people who control them, anything like that. Right? So all these people are feeling right now that, okay, like, you know, basically we made some sort of a deal and we're going to be here for some time to come and we're seeing no real signals from Tshisekedi that he's really going to uproot them and change this equation.

And so, you know, we can talk about all the new things that we'd love President Tshisekedi to do, but the reality is that he's highly, highly constrained. Kabila controls the legislature, as we've talked about. He has such a strong network in the military. I would say that he really controls that. Obviously, he amended the Constitutional Court a few months ago and clearly has a very, very strong network in the judiciary. And, you know, we're told from recent news that he's basically holding a veto power over many of the

various appointments in the Executive even. So he's actually a very strong player in this equation.

And so the U.S. can say, well, you know, we really want to push for X reform, for example, you know, we'd like to see some military reforms and some people reshuffled, and he's going to be like, uh, how do I do that? You know, these networks are really in there. So that's where I think we get back to the leverage and the sanctions and the money laundering measures and the financial piece of things that if the U.S. pushes for some of those reforms and backs it up to say, well, actually we're going to so-and-so general, we're going to sanction so-and-so head of bank, et cetera, then I think we can finally see some actual reforms because they're backed by something strong.

These people don't, you know, only just buy farms in the Congo, although they have, although some Congolese people have burned them down, as we've seen, Beni for example. But they also launder their money in South Africa, Europe, here, et cetera, and through various international companies.

So to get to your question, Scott, as a longwinded answer, we need both the Executive Order on Congo which talks about undermining democratic institutions, but also, of course, the global Magnitsky, which is really the U.S. tool not just in Congo, but elsewhere to combat corruption. And so we would certainly hope that the next round of GLOMAG designations would include some key individuals and their companies that have been involved in corruption to leverage those kind of reforms.

MR. O'HANLON: Excellent. Mvemba.

MR. DIZOLELE: I'll just address the future of the opposition. J.T. mentioned the platform of Felix Tshisekedi. Felix has made a lot of statements. And the last one that really raised a flag for us Congolese is when he said Kabila is his strategic partner all of a sudden and that in the spirit reconciliation -- I mean, it was as if he won and forget everyone else, just my arrangement with Kabila. Well, the struggle has been a struggle of everyone. You know, UDPS may be 38 years old, but there are many other groups that

have been fighting the system before UDPS: the civil society groups, the advocacy groups.

So whether there will be reconciliation or not, that's something that the Parliament should be involved in, the people should be involved in, civil society, and so on. So you cannot just make deals and make pronouncements and say now we're moving forward.

And why is that important for the opposition? Well, the opposition has lost people. People have been killed in the streets. The youth movements have lost people. Advocacy groups have lost people. UDPS has lost people. So when he makes a statement like this what does that mean for the opposition? Does it mean you're going to work the same way it was with Kabila because now we're all friends, we are democratic partners? Or does it mean we will punish people who need to be punished so we can continue expanding that political space and opening it further so people can join that space to continue looking for better?

He's come from the opposition, but we have known people who have come from the opposition who become worse when they get to power. So we hope that will not be the case for him. We hope that the ranks of UDPS will be the first ones to go after him and protesting when that doesn't happen.

As far as the other side of it, I think other groups like IRI, a group like NDI, and other groups in Europe that have been engaging the opposition should continue engaging them and continually insisting on the opening of that space, but also giving skillsets. I think one challenge in the Opposition DRC, or elsewhere really, it's one thing to protect, it's another thing to organize in terms of where you can be effective in Parliament.

Opposition is not just in the streets. Opposition should be -- in the DRC there's this space actually where most of the laws in DRC come either from civil society or from the opposition. The Kabila majority is not known for conceiving laws and pushing them through. It's the opposition and civil society that push that. So there's a lot of room for -- there's a lot of future for opposition in DRC.

MR. TOMASZEWSKI: I've been going back and forth with a lot of my Kenyan friends who are in Jubilee government. They're very proud to have Uhuru Kenyatta attend the inauguration. Their view is, listen, the court spoke, you Westerners, you people, you must respect institutions.

And I think Mvemba makes a good point: the institutions exist, but they require a great deal of capacity building. If we're going to talk about what the U.S. can do, it is to look at those institutions and seeing however imperfect this leader is, providing him with some room to do something that is not driven out of the presidential palace, but can be done by others within the government and other institutions.

And that starts with the CENI. That starts with a highly corrupt, very opaque, and unanswerable CENI chair, who needs to be held accountable for violating several clauses of the electoral law, the constitution, and who has a lot of questions to answer about procurements and other things.

Then looking at things like the judiciary; I think political parties is another piece in this. I'm not saying create more. I mean, what are we at, 700 now? I think that's the last number. I mean, we always think it's ridiculous that Nigeria has 91 committees in its National Assembly, but 700 political parties is a new big number in Africa that we look at and we say something -- you know, there's a need for some reform there. But there are things on its books.

I mean, Congo has good laws, by the way. They have a good electoral law. They have people who are there to enforce those laws, so it's working with them to do that. There's political party financing that can be applied that's never applied. You can have these local elections.

And again, I go back to this issue, to build democratic culture you have to give people access to something. But if you're electing MPs in a way that's not transparent, that you didn't actually vote for that person, that person doesn't really represent you, then you have a challenge accessing that person.

So looking at let's find some of those democratic champions on the ground, let's work with the youth. Let's work with civil society. Let's get them to engage. Because you're right, Mvemba, the street is not the way in a system like this where you're transitioning and you're trying to move something forward. Without that, you're going to continue to have these major setbacks when it comes time for people to make hard choices.

I would just put one big plug in. I think we're always trying to wonder how do we invest in elections to make elections better on the continent? I would say the domestic observer groups did a heroic job, while imperfect in many ways, from a technical level, a political level, and other levels. That they were there, they were present. They delivered fairly good and reliable information. And an investment in that and working with civil society to strengthen that will also help to ensure that elections in Congo at least have a stronger watchful eye in the process.

We're thinking right now about how we'll do this in Ethiopia. We've never had a -- they hadn't had democratic elections there in a long time. Even building that from the ground will be a massive undertaking that will require several elections to finally get a group that's skilled enough to do this. I think we have some groups that can be invested in so that as this process goes forward, the next election will be forced to be better.

MR. O'HANLON: I think this comparative perspective is really helpful, both for drawing lessons, but also realizing how whatever happens in one country will reverberate and echo elsewhere. So I have a couple of questions before going back to the audience for one last round, and starting with maybe J.T. and Kristin, but they're about this broader question of linkages across countries.

And one, when we think about the relationship between Tshisekedi and Kabila, I can't help think about Medvedev and Putin. And it leads me to the question -- of course, Medvedev served one term and then Putin came back. And Putin not only came back, he came back and he changed the constitution to allow for longer terms and it smacks of Kagame without the virtues of Kagame.

But the question is, should there be a stronger international norm in favor of two terms lifetime, the lifetime limit, rather than two consecutive terms? I realize it's not our job to write everybody else's constitution, but should we try to use our influence, our assistance, our sanctions, our economic blessings and investment opportunities, and everything we have in sort of terms of soft power and economic power to try to push for a norm that two terms lifetime is enough? And that's one big question which people may or may not want to comment on.

The other, I'm also struck -- one of the reasons why I'm 51 percent optimistic is, you know, again, I just still can't quite believe we got this good of an outcome as bad as it is. And, you know, I lived in Zaire '82 to '84, and all the rest of us have watched this country suffer for decades. And I did not predict as good of a last year with a new leader who is the scion of a great dissident and human rights and civil society campaigner in Congo's history being president. So it's a bigger opportunity than I expected.

Which makes me ask, even though I hear all the critiques of how a rigged election can't be a good thing and it reverberates in other countries, do we need to also think about how do you incentivize the Kabilas of the world to step down? And my guess is that Kabila was petrified of the lead candidate, Fayulu, winning because he had said publicly I believe that he would have prosecuted crimes that he uncovered. There was certainly an expectation that Kabila and his cronies would have been in the spotlight.

Now, we might say that's appropriate, but Kabila's not going to feel that way, if he has anything to say about it. And somehow he sort of did an unsavory deal here, but he did a deal that got a better guy in power. And apparently, there might have been an agreement that there would not be prosecution and maybe even a Medvedev-Putin kind of thing down the road; we'll find out.

So to discourage that, my second big question, should there be a norm that basically when Kabilas of the world are facing the possibility of elections, that they get some degree of immunity? Maybe not complete immunity, you don't want to allow them to just go

out and commit mass murder with absolutely no consequences, but some degree of limitations on what kind of retribution might be focused on them and their close circles after they step down from power. Because in the absence of that it seems to me you'd need a miracle to get even as good of an outcome as we've gotten in DRC.

And J.T., I know you've thought about this and Kristin, so I could start with you two and then anybody else who wants to weigh in, as well.

MR. TOMASZEWSKI: Well, I can't hear Sasha's answer on that one.

(Laughter)

I will just say this, I mean, listen, this very small, wonderful country that was a major example and helped our work extraordinarily across many African countries as The Gambia, right? You have this election, this guy Yahya Jammeh gets tossed out at the ballot box in a process where Gambians vote with marbles. It wasn't as complicated or electronic voter machines. It was a simple process and a good one and the ones the Gambians like. They like that process.

But as this transition went on, initially Jammeh comes out and says I accept the results, everything's good. And then someone starts saying things like, yeah, we should put him in the ICC. We should deal with him. And then all of a sudden he's like, whoa, wait a minute, you know. And then we know the rest of the story with ECOWAS and everything, and then finally he goes away.

But even until today, the Gambians are going through this process of trying to reconcile this issue of what to do with Jammeh. Right? Don't push too hard, but also this reconciliation commission that they've gone through and the investigations, you know, it'll go on for a long time and no one will ever be fully happy.

I think when you talk about the issue of immunity for leaders, it's really up to the people in that country to come together and be allowed the space to come up with a process that works for them. I remember speaking with someone in one of the Gambian ministries at the time that this reconciliation process -- in the Justice Ministry. And he said to

me, well, you know, the Americans and the Europeans, they want us to go through this commission in the Sierra Leone model. We'll just do it, this is what they want, but we think we could just handle this by ourselves. We don't need all these models. We'll do it our way.

So it's important that also that when we're putting those norms and standards out there, that we're trying to be as inclusive and encouraging as possible to bring those voices to bear.

I think the other issue links to this issue of two term limits. I think there are a lot of Africans in the crowd and certainly who will watch this video and say, well, what about your members of Congress and your senators? These ones need terms limits, too, in your country. I think that's also up to the people.

And frankly, putting that in a constitution doesn't actually fix the problem à la Kabila, à la a number of other people. You'll either not follow it or you'll find a way around it or you'll engineer an electoral victory that will give you what you want. So it is about broader reform efforts.

There can be an encouragement that there needs to be term limits. Certainly, as the U.S., we can talk about the benefits of that, whether or not you like the current and former president and how that goes. But I think that certainly is to talk about.

I think in our work when we talk about democracy around the world, we actually don't go into a country and say the Americans are great, look at our -- no, actually we say we've screwed up a lot, let's talk about all these things. There's something dangerous here. Maybe you should think about this. How can we help you? Right?

So there's a conversation that I think has to take place, but we also have to be credible when we go to the table and have that conversation. Right? If we call an election and say the word "democracy" or "democratic" in a statement about an election that smacked of serious credibility issues, it creates a problem for us. Right? And then when we are talking about these issues we have to work through that and it makes an even more difficult conversation.

And then finally, I think the issue is there are positives in this election. You had a historic transfer of power. You had more polling units than in the last election. You had a voter roll that had more data. It did have somewhat of a biometric process. The evil electronic voting machines turned out to be not so evil. But certainly, the full benefit of them have not been realized and a lot of questions should be asked about their integrity. There are positives that come out of this election and we should focus on these, as well.

MR. O'HANLON: Great, thank you. Kristin, over to you and then Sasha and Mvemba.

MS. McKIE: Yeah, I think J.T. brings up great points about having these blanket prescriptions about two-term limits, full stop, and immunity. You know, it's hard to make those blanket statements because I think context is specific and, like you said, with sort of the will of the citizens of those countries.

And I think, too, with the immunity question because that is something I've thought about it, I think certainly it can be a pragmatic tool to, like Mike said, encourage leaders to step down. But I think the problem with that is that it's not just the leader, you know, the president that we're talking about, that's really entrenched in power. It's his or her network. Right? It's his or her -- you know, the whole apparatus. And so giving just the leader immunity really doesn't get us that far because his network below him or her are always going to be pushing that leader to stay in power. Even if you would be granted immunity, what would happen to all of us? What would happen to those sort of pitching (inaudible) numbers? What would happen to the whole sort of ruling coalition? And so I think the immunity pledges are sort of a little bit shallow in terms of that aspect.

MR. O'HANLON: And by the way, just a quick aside as we go to Sasha, that's one of the reasons I thought the peace process or the U.N. process in Syria had no chance. Assad, first of all, wanted to win the war and maybe he now has, but, secondly, he wasn't going to desert the rest of his cronies and take exile in Russia for himself and leave his Alawite people to be slaughtered at the ends of, as he saw it, of a group that might come

in after.

MR. TOMASZEWSKI: Just one quick point. I would also argue how has Mugabe leaving Zimbabwe changed Zimbabwe's democratic fate? I mean, there are -- have we gotten something better or not? I think the Zimbabweans would have some serious opinions about that.

MR. O'HANLON: Great. Sasha.

MR. LEZHNEV: Yeah, I mean, I think the incentive part is relevant, but, you know, I think that actually there have been a lot of behind-the-scenes efforts on that on Congo and a lot of diplomats spend a lot of time thinking about that. I know there were a lot of active talks of putting it in possibly Tanzania or that kind of thing. I think that, you know, what you said, Kristin, about his network, I mean, really according to the analysis that I've heard is that actually in the family he's not the strongest one; that there are stronger members of the family who control more companies and who actually are pushing him to do X, Y, and Z. And so the immunity for him, you know, probably is a lot less relevant.

I think that actually the more relevant part of this is the disincentive. I don't think that nearly the amount of disincentives in terms of like whether his companies would be allowed to continue to operate, whether they would be on sanctions lists, whether they would be able to open bank accounts globally, whether people would trade with them, et cetera, I think that that is actually -- we just scratched the surface on some of those pressures in the last couple of years, but not nearly enough pressure to actually change that equation.

I think that if there were some very serious disincentives, at least from the international side, that we could see perhaps him being interested in some of those incentives. But I don't think we saw any real interest. I think there were actually some real options on the table for him quietly through some African diplomacy and so forth, but no interest in taking them.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Professor Dizolele.

MR. DIZOLELE: I just think with country by country, like J.T. was saying,

but in the case of Kabila, I mean, nobody got more time to negotiate his own exit and we still failed at this. (Laughter) I mean, the guy stayed two years over. And the problem is the longer he waited, the more crimes were committed. You know, we had mass graves appear. So it was like he was -- he had the rope and he continued tying the noose himself.

This is not an irresolvable -- I mean, we have people like Jerry Rawlings, we have other people who stepped down, but they step down on their terms. They're facing the situation, they step down. So I think this is part of -- a little bit of the challenge with Kabila because, A, his supporters think his situation is so unique, and he has come to believe that and people outside also have come to believe that when, in fact, the situation is not unique.

The situation became more and more like Babo in Côte d'Ivoire because the longer you wait, the less you have room to negotiate and then events catch up with you. And I think in the Kabila case that's the situation.

So if the people had not taken to the streets, Kabila would still be there. He was not thinking about any exit. In fact, we saw that he tried to force somebody on the people. So I'm not sure if any of that stuff would have worked. In that sense I think I'm more closer to what Sasha is saying. What are the levers that we can use to push this guy? Because he was just not coming to the table. In fact, he's still not wanting to come to the table.

MR. O'HANLON: Right, right.

MR. DIZOLELE: He wants to stick around in the Parliament. So somewhere, I don't know if he himself or people around him, think they can play out everybody else or outrun everybody, out play them, but everybody can see him coming, and I think he doesn't realize that, so.

MR. O'HANLON: Great, thank you. Okay, so we have time for one or two more questions and a final lightning round and then we'll wrap up and then, again, thank you and wish you well for the weekend. But start here with the front row and is there anybody else, also, who has a final question? Okay, so we'll have these two and then we'll

come back, starting with J.T., working down to finish up.

MR. LANDE: Steve Lande, Manchester Trade. And those who know me, know I'm a trade guy. I also worked for Jason Kenney's campaign, but I hate to tell you, compared to how much money Mr. Katumbi has spent on the election, we spend very little.

I'm very surprised about the one-sided nature of this whole discussion because there are arguments on the other side and I haven't heard one of them and so on. The fact of the matter is that 66 percent of the time they had the decision in Geneva that ended up choosing as the candidate Mr. Fayulu, the fact of the matter is that there was an overwhelming majority in favor of Felix. And if you put Felix and Vital Kamerhe together, you had 66 percent disappeared. The fact during the election at least for somebody who did not seem to -- did very poorly at the polls, he certainly was able to draw the large crowds. And his crowds were even larger than Martin Fayulu's crowds and so on.

Yet at the end of the day there's an announcement made not that Fayulu got -- not that Shadary got X-amount of votes, but that Felix got only 4 percent more than that. That's ridiculous. He has the biggest party, he has all the support. He had 77 percent of the -- 66 percent of the beginning of the vote.

What is Katumbi doing with all his money? How is it being spent? How did the NYU poll that first came out and identified Felix and Victor with 66 percent of the vote, how did that suddenly change and the guy that I think had 7 percent in the beginning -- I don't want to misquote me, but it was 14 -- how did he go all the way up to 50 percent?

My real objection is that not one is really doing an analysis, so starting from the basis that one electoral alleged leak resulted in all kinds of projections and what the result was going to be, and nobody talks about Mr. Katumbi's own interest. And the worst thing of the whole discussion, in my view, is that in the United States we had three interesting elections. In my youth Mr. Kennedy certainly stole the election from Mr. Nixon because of what happened in Chicago with the father and the bootlegging.

MR. O'HANLON: Why don't we -- I know --

MR. LANDE: No, trust me, let me make the point quickly. Trust me. Please trust me, I'll make my point in one second.

MR. O'HANLON: You're weakening your case.

MR. LANDE: No, just trust me.

MR. O'HANLON: You had an interesting question.

MR. LANDE: Excuse me, people have made the point that Mr. Fayulu has a right to object to the election. Mr. Nixon, horrible guy, he said I'll accept the election. When Mr. Gore lost, he said I'll accept the election. People are talking about two terms being great. Thank god we didn't elect Wendell Willkie as president. And who's happier to have Mr. Trump than the person they beat?

The point I want to make here is very simple and that is that you're all bringing to yourself your prejudice. You decided that somehow Mr. Fayulu won the election and you do not give a balanced approach. Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: This gentleman here and then we'll wrap up.

MR. STANLEY: Thank you. My name is J.T. Stanley. Thank you guys for your work.

It was brought up multiple ways in which you could go ahead and improve Congo, like sanction regimes such as your colleague John Prendergast has talked about at the U.N., things like the Security Force Assistance Brigade. But it seems that the issue isn't so much having the right tools, but the will to use them. I mean, for instance, we've used Green Berets to go ahead and pursue the LRA with Ugandans in the past. And like the Security Force Assistance Brigade is essentially a knock-off of Green Berets. Like we've used these sanction regimes before on like North Korea. The issue is there is not a political will in the U.S. to go ahead and actually execute, or the international community, not so much a lack of the tools.

So my question, especially for us in the audience here, is how do we go ahead and incentivize our own government to actually go ahead and use the tools that you

guys have gone ahead and talked about? Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. So J.T., you want to start? We'll just have a final answer and/or concluding comment, one or two minutes per person, please.

MR. TOMASZEWSKI: I don't support Felix Tshisekedi. I don't support Martin Fayulu. I don't support Kabila. We looked at electoral process. I work in 17 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. I have a unique job in Washington, D.C. I can look at 17 countries at once and see how these different processes play out.

This was not a credible process. It wasn't a credible process and I can talk to you afterwards about the multiple violations to the constitutional articles. I could talk to you about the electoral law. I can talk to you about the way the process was conducted. All right?

What we're dealing with here is a problem that will not just have an effect on the Congolese people, but will have a reverberating trend throughout the continent, right, if you can steal an election and manipulate an election in such a way. And I'm not saying Tshisekedi stole the election. I'm saying that the election process was not credible. The will of the Congolese people who stood on line for hours, by the way, and the electronic voting machines didn't work, so then like by 3:00 they didn't vote yet and then a bunch of them had to leave. The problem is that these people did not have the ability to express their will.

You also have 1.25 million people who still have not voted for president, who would have, if you looked at the demographics and you looked at the numbers, would have probably gone for Fayulu. And then if you look at the margin of victory, right, 600-and-some-thousand, that really calls into question if these people had voted what would have happened?

So there's a lot of questions. And questions should be talked about, questions that I think help the Congolese people to figure out how to make elections better in the future. And that's what my interest is here, not to promote one candidate or another.

MR. O'HANLON: Great, thanks. Mvemba.

MR. DIZOLELE: Yeah, I think the point that Mr. Lande raises are valid, but I think the challenge, this is the part -- on our panel I talked about a division, that this thing had become a divisive experience, is because Felix Tshisekedi supporters assume that everybody who questioned the process is questioning everything about Felix. But it's not about Felix. That's not the point. The point is about the process and the process was not good.

And I think UDPS also added more to the suspicion talking about the U.S. in the same way the Trump administration, the Trump people, were talking about Russia and Russia and Russia. And Russia is not going away because that was part of the pronouncement, Russia find emails, Russia do this.

The same what happened with the Tshisekedi crowd. They started talking about negotiation with Kabila while people are waiting for the -- and they said we are very confident we will win. What gives you the confidence that you will win when the issue on one level was my crowd is bigger, my frou-frou is bigger, all that stuff.

MR. O'HANLON: You pay for that crowd.

MR. DIZOLELE: But eventually we will find it in the numbers and the transparency. So once CENCO and the leaks from CENI start coming out, as an analyst, for instance, I'll be curious to see the UDPS numbers. UDPS has not produced their numbers. I don't know what they're doing with them. I would like to see CENI's numbers. UDPS should insist that CENI puts its numbers out. We might not believe in the numbers, but we will have them to start doing a comparison.

So I think in that sense there's some element there. I don't think -- this is actually on the social media it's crazy because when people ask a basic question, UDPS people just attack everybody assuming that somehow, no, everybody's Congolese, people want the country to move forward. People want the next president to succeed, not to fail. But we're not going just to accept it as an analyst, speaking for myself, to accept this because Tshisekedi said. There was too many things that were not right.

His pronouncement himself. Sasha was just talking cozying up to Kabila, saying is he our strategic partner. Since when? You know, it's those kinds of issues that create these clouds around. He's president now. He can now insist on CENI to release those numbers. He's not doing that and I think that's a problem.

People want to believe there was some credibility to it, but nobody has that in this case, not on his side. And I think this is -- since you are in touch with him, this is something that needs to be hammered to them. It's like we're going to work with what we have. As an analyst that's what we do, we work with what we have. We don't think about what you guys discuss in the back door or whatever. No, it doesn't work that way. We can only analyze what we have.

So whether it comes across as bias or not, that is -- I can see that. We all have biases either because of what we do or whatever, but it also behooves them to push the CENI and themselves to publish their numbers so we can compare.

MR. O'HANLON: Sasha.

MR. LEZHNEV: Like J.T. highlighted, we also don't support any particular candidate or party, but we did see the analysis published from the leaked data from the CENCO. Also, there's a great analysis by Pierre Engelbert in African Arguments, if you haven't read that, who said that based on the data that was released or leaked there was a 0.0 percent chance that Mr. Tshisekedi was actually elected by the Congolese people. And of course, the *Financial Times* article which said that there was huge electoral fraud that took place.

So I think that, you know, my point is that there needs to be some accountability for that and, particularly the United States, that has this issue of undermining democratic institutions and have made a number of threats along those lines to hold people accountable. This is the time to do so now even though there is a new president and we are going forward to work with them.

J.T., thank you for highlighting your point. Yes, indeed, we do have these

tools and the United States does use them on Russia and North Korea, on countering terrorism, on stopping drug trafficking, et cetera. Look at what we're doing on Venezuela right now, for example. But there are a couple major gaps here.

I think one is actual capacity to gather the information. Let's face it, all the United States' intel assets are not being funneled towards Congo; that, you know, we are putting them towards countering ISIS, et cetera, et cetera, Iran, you name it. And so that's why we set up The Sentry as an investigative initiative to say, okay, look, we're actually going to have a team of investigators and whistleblowers go around and gather the actual granular data on how the corruption is happening and how this violates various statutes. And so, therefore, here, Treasury Department, here's what you can do with that. But the Treasury Department needs to do more of that.

And Congress, as the flip side of that, needs to help resource them to say actually we really care about these issues. We're not just going to -- of course, we're not going to ignore our national security priorities, but let's put a little bit more money on Africa, so that we can investigate those things and do some of the things that you highlighted.

I think the idea of some sort of a security assistance program that would help effectively counter groups like the FDLR is a great one, and this may be a good time. I would wait a couple of months to see sort of where President Tshisekedi's going to shake up the military so that it's not the same corrupt military actors. The last one, by the way, was found distributing arms and ammunition to the rebel groups, so we don't want people like that to work on it, but to do that.

And then, you know, to build the political will, this is where Congress comes in. There was a great bill last year that many of us helped work on, as well, called the Congo Democracy and Accountability Act. And that should be reintroduced and would help empower the administration. Thanks.

MR. O'HANLON: Excellent, thank you. And Kristin for the last word.

MS. McKIE: Oh, absolutely. Yeah, I think the hard part in Congo right now

is we don't know the real results. We have competing results, probably both of them are not fully correct. And the problem is that the process that was laid out for how to count the results, make them public, you know, there was no transparency. The rules were not necessarily followed, and that's the problem. That's, I think, what the court was asked to do, to say the process was not followed, we need to step back, you know, do a recount. But we're not given the chance to do that.

And I think in Kenya that was what happened, right? The rules were not followed in the election and the court stepped in and said we need to look at this more closely.

And so I think going forward that's where we need to focus. Right? Having processes followed, having clear rules, and then having accountability when the rules are not followed, so that we can know the true results. Because pre-election polling, as we all found out in 2016 in the U.S., you know, is not worth the paper it's written on. And so, right, we need the true results and we don't have them yet.

MR. O'HANLON: I'll also just finish with one additional final note, which is I don't think I heard anyone on either panel suggest that we should not try to work with President Tshisekedi. And I don't think I heard anyone suggest that he doesn't have the potential to be an important leader in DRC.

So I will finish with those two important points. I want to thank Mulala and Laura, as well as this panel, and Tom, and all of you for being here. Please join me in the applause. (Applause)

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