THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
FALK AUDITORIUM

FALLING APART?
THE POLITICS OF NEW START AND STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION

Washington, D.C.
Monday, January 7, 2019

PARTICIPANTS:

Moderator:

FRANK A. ROSE
Senior Fellow, Security and Strategy
The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

MADELYN R. CREEDON
Former Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

JOHN R. HARVEY
Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs
U.S. Department of Defense

REBECCA HERSMAN
Director, Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI)
Center for Strategic International Studies

MATTHEW KROENIG
Associate Professor, Georgetown University
Deputy Director, Scowcroft Center, Atlantic Council

BRIAN McKEON
Senior Director
Penn Biden Center

* * * * *
MR. ROSE: Well, good afternoon, and welcome to the Brookings Institution. My name is Frank Rose and I'm a Senior Fellow here in the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings. We're delighted to have such a large audience for our topic today, the politics of the START treaty and the strategic nuclear modernization. This is the first in a series of public events Brookings plans to host on the future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy over the next year. So I look forward to seeing you at our future events.

Now, by the end of the Obama Administration a very fragile bipartisan consensus had emerged between congress and the Executive Branch over nuclear policy. Under this “fragile consensus” the Obama Administration and congress agreed that the United States would modernize its strategic nuclear deterrents, but would also support effective and verifiable strategic nuclear arms control agreements, like New START. That said, regardless of your views on arms control and strategic modernization, I think there's broad agreement that that fragile consensus may be “falling apart”.

There are a number of factors that are probably contributing to this. Some experts believe the costs associated with strategic modernization are just unaffordable. Other experts believe that Russia's violation of arms control agreements, like the INF Treaty, have raised serious questions about the efficacy of the U.S. remaining in the New START Treaty. Other experts believe that the current modernization program is far in excess of what is necessary to maintain effective deterrents. And some experts believe that the Trump Administration's approach to arms control is undermining the consensus.

In our discussion today, I'd like to explore three broad questions. First, what was specifically agreed to back in 2010 with regards to New START and strategic modernization. Second, what is the current state of the debate during the Trump Administration? And, third, what steps need to be taken to maintain a level of bipartisan consensus on arms control and strategic modernization that is politically sustainable over
the long-term.

We have an excellent group of experts to help us answer these questions. First, on my left, we have Brian McKeon, who is currently a Senior Director at the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement. Brian served previously as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Executive Secretary for the National Security Council, Deputy National Security Advisor to Vice President Biden, and was also the longtime Chief Democratic Counsel on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Next, we have Madelyn Creedon who currently serves as a Nonresident Fellow here at Brookings. I think Madelyn has had held just about every job in the nuclear security business, including Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security, assistant Secretary of defense for Global Strategic Affairs, and was the longtime Democratic professional staff lead on the Senate Strategic Forces Subcommittee, where she handed nuclear policy and program issues.

Next, we have John Harvey, who currently consults for a number of organizations, including the Defense Science Board, the Institute for Defense Analysis, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. John previously served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Programs, Director of Policy and Planning at the National Nuclear Security Administration, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Missile Defense Policy. And I actually worked for John for about five days at the end of the Clinton Administration.

Next, we have Rebecca Hersman, who currently serves as the Director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic International Studies. Rebecca previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for combating weapons of mass destruction policy, a Senior Researcher at National Defense University, and like me, a former professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee.

And last, but not least, we have Matt Kroenig, who currently serves as an
Associate Professor at Georgetown University and Deputy Director of the Scowcroft Center at the Atlantic Council. Matt worked previously in the Strategy Office in the Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is the author of six books. I can barely get a blog out, this guy has gotten six books out, which is quite amazing. He currently consults for a range of government entities.

Bottom line, these panelists really know the nuclear security business. I've had the pleasure, I think, of working with all of them in various capacities throughout my career. I think, Madelyn, we're on the fifth or sixth iteration right now.

So why don't we begin the questioning by focusing on that first question, what was actually agreed to back in 2010 with regards to New START and strategic modernization? And let's begin the discussion with Brian. Brian, on top of the many other positions you've held, you were the Obama Administration's lead person for getting the New START Treaty through the senate. If there's anyone in this town who knows what was agreed to and what was not agreed to with regards to New START and strategic modernization, it's you. Therefore, I was wondering if you could just take a few minutes to outline for the audience your perspective of what the Obama Administration agreed to to obtain senate approval to the New START Treaty?

So, Brian?

MR. McKEON: Thank you, Frank. I'm surely not the only person in this town, or even in this room, who knows what happened. I see at least one other person who worked on the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee at the time, and I think Madelyn was on the Armed Services Committee, so they can correct me where I misspeak.

First, I would say what you said about a "fragile consensus" is probably the right term. We can argue about whether there was even a consensus. All the democrats voted for the New START Treaty, but only about 12 or 13 republican senators did, and that was about a quarter of the republican caucus at the time I think, if I have my math right. And half of those republicans are no longer in the United States Senate. So big chunks of the
republican caucus were opposed to the Treaty for various reasons. And so if there's a consensus of conjoining arms control with nuclear modernization, you had a big chunk of members of the senate who were not on board with that, at least as expressed by their vote against the Treaty.

I'd say a few things about the details of what was agreed to. First, the backdrop was a couple of things. One, the report of the Strategic Posture Commission that had been chaired by former Secretaries of Defense Schlesinger and Perry, which detailed a lot of issues but focused in some detail on the erosion of the health of the production facilities in the National Nuclear Security Administration at Oak Ridge and Los Alamos. So there was a recognition of investment needed there.

When the Obama Administration came in it found -- and I don't mean to make this a partisan statement -- but it found that under President Bush there had been underinvestment in the nuclear weapons complex. And previous senior officials in the NNSA who worked for President Bush said that openly to me and to other people. So President Obama came in and committed to a fairly substantial increase in the NNSA weapons budget, even before the New START Treaty was signed. And then there was great interest and pressure from members of the senate, particularly in the republican caucus, to see a greater manifestation of that commitment and even add to the initial commitment.

The other thing I'd say, before again the Treaty was signed, public expressions of senior officials, the vice president, Secretary Gates, recognizing the linkage between the need to modernize the NNSA complex and arms control. And the vice president said that in a speech at NDU. He had an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal where he made the argument that in order to achieve the president's vision of lower nuclear weapons in the stockpile we needed to have some assurance that we had a sustainable infrastructure that could maintain the stockpile safely.

So then in the conversations and negotiations between the senate and the
White House and the Administration, there were a number of commitments made. Senator Kyl in particular was kind of the point person. He asked for updated budget projections for the NNSA budget. We had already provided one in the spring of 2010 that had been legislated in the Defense Authorization Bill. He asked that it be updated in the fall of 2010. We did that, we added several billion more to a 10 year commitment. And then some of these commitments were essentially codified in the senate's document, by which it gives advice and consent to a treaty, which is called the Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification. And the senate asked the president in advance of exchanging the instrument of ratification with the Russian Federation to certify to the senate certain of these commitments. So he put pen to paper and said I intend to do thus and such.

I would say most of the conversation was about the NNSA weapons complex and the need to invest in it. There was discussion in the reports that went to the congress and in the president's certification about the nuclear triad. The president had already committed in the Nuclear Posture Review that had come out in the spring of 2010 to continue the triad. And a report that went to the congress said we intend to pursue the following efforts to recapitalize the triad. But that was not as imminent as the NNSA weapons programs.

And so we can have an argument about what was the political commitment long-term to what the triad should look like. As I say, most of the focus was on the weapons, less on the triad, but there obviously that was part of it.

MR. ROSE: Great. Thanks very much, Brian. I think it's really important. There's a lot of discussion about the triad, so thanks so much for clarifying that.

Madelyn, you were the lead staffer on the senate Armed Services Committee responsible for New START and strategic modernization. Indeed, I believe the senate Armed Services Committee held something like 10 hearings on New START. Could you take a few minutes and provide your perspectives on the interplay between New START and strategic modernization during the senate's consideration of New START?
MS. CREEDON: Well, obviously, there were a lot of issues that the senate was looking at in the context of ratification of New START. The Obama Administration, as Brian noted, inherited on the nuclear weapons complex side -- although obviously it was a much bigger issue than just a nuclear weapons complex -- but the Obama Administration had really inherited a complex that was underfunded, particularly in the manufacturing side. During the previous years most of the focus and attention had really been on the science side. So ever since the development of the stockpile stewardship and the last nuclear test the emphasis really was focusing on how to maintain the stockpile without nuclear weapons testing. And that proved to be very successful, but the price of that in essence was the manufacturing side really didn't get funded. So on the manufacturing side a lot of the Manhattan era buildings were still there, a lot of the buildings were very old, they were falling down, there were way too many of them. And NNSA, DOE, was really struggling on just the maintenance of these buildings, let alone trying to replace them.

So as the New START Treaty came to the floor the things that had preceded it really were pretty clear about both the Obama Administration's commitment to the triad. So the ongoing work on the Ohio Class replacement -- which is now the Columbia Class, but didn't have a name then -- was ongoing, it was supported. The ongoing efforts to have a new bomber were being studied at the time, with the recognition that there had to be long-range strike options, including support for a heavy bomber. And also there was a commitment to keep the Minuteman-III ICBM in place until 2030. And, again, a commitment to study as to what the future of the ICBMs looked like.

The other thing that made it very clear about not only the state of affairs of the NNSA infrastructure, but in some respects the state of affairs of the Air Force as well had been -- all of the work that had been done by the Air Force that was pretty much coming to fruition in 2008 and 2009, where the Air Force was examining itself in the aftermath of flying the air launch cruise missiles from Minot to Barksdale. So there was a lot going on that had really been looking at the overall sort of health of the nuclear weapons enterprise. And that
included the Schlesinger Commission, it included the Air Force itself. And there was really a
consensus that it was not in great shape across the board.

So in both the Prague speech, which really was in many respects kind of the
beginning of the whole debate on New START, Obama made it very clear that he was going
to seek a new treaty, but he also made it very clear in his speech that maintaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent was a key element of this. And then all of that gets
carried forward into the studies that go on in the administration in 2009, culminating in the
NPR in 2010, which really lays out all of this in great detail.

And then in the budget request that the Obama Administration submitted for
fiscal year 2011 for the National Nuclear Security Administration, which was submitted in
February of ’10, so before the START Treaty is sent up, was a pretty substantial increase in
the weapons activities at NNSA. It was a 9.8 percent increase in the weapons activity. So
that was the biggest increase that the weapons activities at NNSA had seen in a very long
time. So in many respects, Obama embraced the fact that this was an enterprise that
needed help and made a commitment to modernization.

Now, one of the big things that I think sometimes we lose sight of is the
commitment to modernization on the infrastructure was a large driver in the effort to
downsize the total numbers of warheads in the stockpile because part of the warheads in the
stockpile were the hedge weapons, and there was a pretty large hedge -- so weapons not
deployed -- but there was a pretty large hedge because there was a lot of uncertainty about
whether or not NNSA could really maintain the warheads, and of course, the delivery
systems were getting old as well. So there was a really large hedge. And having a better
infrastructure was going to help reduce the total stockpile numbers and also the hedge.

So I think I’ll leave it there for the moment.

MR. ROSE: Great. Madelyn, let me just ask you a quick follow up question.
And it really deals with the politics of ratification. I’d be interested in your thoughts on how
important New START was in bringing democratic senators on board for the modernization
and, vice versa, how important modernization was with bringing on the necessary republican votes? Not all, as Brian outlined, but the necessary votes to get a senate advice and consent. So can you say a little bit about that?

MS. CREEDON: New START was very important certainly for the democrats because it was going to continue the longstanding effort on arms control. Because, remember, at this point in time the START Treaty had expired and it was going to be the first time that there wasn't going to be any sort of an arms control treaty. And this was important not only for the total numbers, to make sure that there were caps on things -- and in many respects the caps were more important than drawing down at some level -- but so there was no increase, but all the other things that this Treaty provided that were going to get lost in the absence of START were hugely important. So things like the transparency and the declarations and the intelligence value, all of these were hugely important to understanding the long-term relationship with Russia and improving strategic stability. So all of those issues were hugely important to the democrats.

The modernization, particularly of the complex, was something that I think was also at some level realized, but it was a package. I mean I don't think there were any two ways about it, it was definitely a package.

MR. ROSE: Thanks very much, Madelyn.

John, you played an important role in the development of the 2010 nuclear posture review. I believe you were working for Ash Carter, who was the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics at the time. You know, based on your experiences, what's your perspective as to kind of what was agreed to in the context of New START and strategic modernization?

MR. HARVEY: Well, these two folks on my right have basically laid it out, but let me just add a couple of points. And, by the way, for those of you with arthritic knees who are standing back there, there are some seats up front. I thought I'd make you aware of that.
I served in the NNSA during two terms of Bush 2. And by the middle of the second term I would say that we were in basically a nuclear wasteland. Our nuclear systems were aging out, there was a bipartisan consensus out there, but the consensus resisted sustainment and modernization. It wasn't in support of sustainment and modernization of our deterrent. Several programs that we advanced that we thought were prudent, advanced concepts, the RRW program, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, and the modern pit facility that many of you may recall, which was designed to recapitalize our pit production capabilities at Los Alamos. All of those programs went down in flames. We were in pretty bad shape.

Towards the end of the second term, Bob Gates, who was Secretary of Defense for Bush 2 at that time, carried over into Obama 1, basically gave a speech, I was there, where he said if we don't fix this we're going to have to go back to nuclear testing, which was a fairly austere statement. The administration had done a great NPR in the early days, with Keith Payne and Steve Cambone and Elaine Bunn putting together a store, a post Cold War picture of what our nuclear posture should be, that hung together. But by the end of 2001 most of the focus in the administration and defense area was on the war on terrorism, as many of you remember. The administration was focused on the war on terrorism, nuclear sustainment fell by the wayside.

This is what faced Mr. Obama when he came in 2009. And he turned that around with the help of some advice from a congresswoman from California, Ellen Tauscher, and with the Strategic Posture Commission, the Perry Schlesinger Commission, that she put together, that she impaneled to basically do what I consider to be the first draft of the Obama NPR. Tauscher said -- I'm going to quote her -- "our strategic posture should place the stewardship of our nuclear arsenal, our nonproliferation programs, our missile defenses, and the international arms control regime into one comprehensive strategy that protects the American people". And Mr. Obama basically took this to heart and in fact hired her as his Under Secretary to focus on these efforts.
This led to the Prague speech where we have what I call the yin and yang of modernization and arms control, which says over the long-term we'd like to move in a direction of getting rid of these things, but that may take longer than my lifetime, or several of your lifetimes. And so until those conditions are met that we could eliminate, we're going to maintain the safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. And that message got a little bit mixed up by some of his folks and some of the folks from outside the administration to mean that we're going to move to the elimination in five years. That was never the case.

Mr. Obama aggressively pursued a New START Treaty and gave support to the ratification of CBTB, which was never going to happen, but he put his statements behind that. He engaged with the Russians on non strategic nuclear forces and got basically a cold shoulder. And even in the last year of his term he did a mini NPR, which basically addressed some of the questions earlier on to see if we should make any changes. They addressed no first use, they addressed the long-range standoff weapon, the cruise missile, and they addressed other things. And his final decision was not to make any changes, that we were okay where we were, particularly in light of Russian activities, but he aggressively funded modernization.

And I want to say here's where I came in and played my little role in this. Bob Gates in mid 2009, well before the NPR was completed, went to Ash and said I'm worried about the NNSA program. I don't think they can achieve what they need to achieve for us, for us the customer, the Department of Defense customer, with the funding they have. And so I want you to figure out a way to get them some funds. And Ash came to me and he said, make this happen. Gates wanted to bump up the NNSA's funds; he was wanting to decrement the DOD top line, the DOD funding, in order to achieve this. And during a period of time in late 2009 and into 2010 we had discussions with Tom D'Agostino over at NNSA, Bob Hale, who was the CFO for the Department of Defense, and figuring out a transfer, which resulted in the FY '11-'15 transfer of about $6 billion from the Department of Defense to the Department of Energy. And this occurred sort of in April-May. The MOU
was signed between the two Departments in April or May of 2010 and next what happened was that we started to move into the ratification debate.

And this was supposed to be a one-time transfer. In the latter part of 2010, as a result of discussions that Brian referred to, and can go into a lot more deeply than I can, with Kyl and others, a deal was made, that's not enough. The $5.7-6 billion was not enough. We wanted to add more and also we wanted to add more in out years as well. And this resulted in basically a second MOU. And this was I considered the part of the deal that was needed in order for Kyl to allow republican senators -- to agree to release republican senators to vote for the New START Treaty, even though he didn't.

And three things happened. One, we got New START ratified. But this transfer of fund eventually blew up because NNSA's assessment of their programs and how much they were going to cost were well underfunded. So the money that we provided them from the Department of Defense really was not enough to do the job even then.

MR. ROSE: John, can I actually ask a follow up question?

MR. HARVEY: Sure.

MR. ROSE: You mentioned kind of the deal. You've been very supportive of the Trump Administration's proposal for new low yield capabilities. Now, I don't want to get into a debate right now, we can do that in the Q&A about whether that's a good thing or a bad thing. I think there are pros and cons on both sides. But my question for you is, are these new low yield capabilities part of the consensus that was agreed to back in 2010?

MR. HARVEY: There was never any discussion about this in 2010. But that's basically -- the advantage of having this transfer was that it was able to -- I believe directly resulted in providing the condition to enable START 2 to be ratified. The downside is it created tensions between the Departments.

MR. ROSE: Yeah. Great. Thanks very much, John.

Rebecca, Matt, you were not actively engaged in the discussion on New START, but you're active observers of nuclear issues. DO you have anything to add to what
Brian, Madelyn, and John had to say?

MS. HERSMAN: I'll just offer a couple of comments. You know, it's interesting actually hearing the reflection back and realizing a number of years have passed and we all sort of recall history a little differently, or our history starts at different points. And I think all the other previous panelists have talked about the fact that history here actually started going back into the Bush Administration much earlier where the legacy both on the arms control side and on the sustaining our nuclear forces and the atrophy and the neglect that had occurred during that Administration both were significant factors that kind of drove the political process. So I think that's important.

But I'm going to step back and just make one comment that I think is important. When I was preparing for this I got hung up on the consensus word. I thought it was interesting that Brian mentioned that. And I've used it, I've talked about the fragile consensus. But I'm wondering if that's really a mistake, because actually there is no consensus. I'm not sure we ever had consensus. We definitively -- I don't think we have it now. I'm not sure we actually need consensus to do what we need to do.

Consensus generally refers to a widely accepted or universal agreement. And as this is laid out, we never had universal agreement. That has not really existed. What we did have was a compromise-based bipartisan coalition, and that compromise-based bipartisan coalition had these two elements that had to hang together. It included arms control, it included modernization. And by modernization we don't mean new fancy things. In fact it was a very limited modernization to sustain at an appropriate and healthy level. Those key elements, the importance of having a bipartisan coalition that will support both, and recognize they're both there, that's essential.

And the second thing I would say is it is fragile. Whether it's a consensus or a coalition or a compromise, it is extremely fragile. And the metaphor I usually use is we've been playing a game of Jenga. So we built this up, you know, the Jenga tower was built, and they describe very much how it was sort of built and put together. And, in reality, ever
since different parties have been pulling out a block of that Jenga game. And this is where I think some things that have occurred more recently are very important. You might support or not support low yield capabilities. Either way, I believe they do represent a block coming out of that Jenga game. I think aspects of things we've been doing on INF and some of the ways in which that's been handled in recent months represents another withdrawal of a Jenga block. So now we have a situation where we're going to have this -- we've had now this change of control in the house and others on the other side want their turn at pulling some blocks. The problem is we don't know which block is going to be the one that brings that tower done, and once it's down, building it back up again is going to be very difficult.

So I think we need to be very cautious.

MR. ROSE: Oh, that's great, because that led into my next question, the current state of the debate. And, you know, Matt, you have been watching this very, very closely, what's your assessment as to where the current debate is? That's the first question, but I have a follow up question for you.

Now, obviously, you are not a member of the Trump Administration, but in your public statements you have generally been supportive of their approach to nuclear modernization and arms control and nonproliferation. That said, critics of this administration would argue that they have a hostile approach to arms control. Late last year we saw a number of letters from senior republican members of congress really calling into question the effectiveness of New START.

So my question to you, in addition to your views on the state of the debate, are there some things that this administration and republicans in congress can do to reassure their critics that they are not hostile to arms control?

The floor is yours, Matt.

MR. KROENIG: Great. Thanks, Frank, and thanks for organizing this event.

So I agree with you and Rebecca, and I think the rest of the panel, that
there is a bipartisan consensus or coalition, if you want to term that, supporting both arms control and strategic modernization. But it is a fragile one, as people have pointed out. In the current debate I think there are three factors that people point to as possible risks to this consensus -- the Trump Administration, as you point out, democrats in the house, and Russia, I think is an important one we can't overlook. So I just want to briefly comment on each of those.

So first I don't think the Trump Administration is hostile to arms control. The Nuclear Posture Review says very clearly that they're supportive of arms control given that it advances American security interests and that we have a partner that we can rely upon for those agreements. And so the Trump Administration has made some moves in the Nuclear Posture Review that some have criticized -- low yield nuclear weapons, pulling out of INF. But when this deal was made in 2010 I don't think anybody believed that American nuclear strategy and posture could be locked into place forever, regardless of the circumstances. I think there was an understanding that U.S. nuclear strategy and posture would have to adapt based on circumstances. And the security environment has changed quite a bit over the past eight years. And so I see these that the Trump Administration has made as reasonable adaptations to the security environment, to the threat of Russian nuclear de-escalation strikes. And as you pointed out, there is quite a bit of bipartisan consensus for some of these things. John Harvey, Jim Miller, other democrats, have supported low yield nuclear weapons.

When it comes to New START, first New START is safe until 2021. The real question is about extension. I suspect that the Trump Administration will be interested in extending New START, in part because even though we have done some good things to fund our nuclear infrastructure it's still in fairly poor shape overall I would say. And if we get into an arms race with the Russians in the short-term, the Russians will win. And so that's not something I think we want to do right now.

And, in fact, I think 2021 could be an opportunity for negotiating potentially
something bigger. For a long time, since 2010 at least, we've been talking about Russia's non strategic nuclear weapons and the problem that that poses. So I think 2021 might be an opportunity to broaden the discussion on New START extension and on Russia's non strategic weapons.

Democrats in the house, Adam Smith and some others, have questioned the need for these low yield nuclear weapons. That's a debate we can have. I think it's the right move. But that's a debate we can have. But they've also called into question the need for the triad, and I think that is removing a pretty fundamental piece of the Jenga block, to use Rebecca's metaphor. The triad has had support from both democratic administrations for decades. And so I hope that Adam Smith, when he's making these statements, is just playing to his political base. I hope he's not serious about trying to kill funding for the triad.

You know, now that President Trump has seemed to question some of the relationships with allies, many democrats have found support for this rules based international order and the importance of supporting allies. And I would just remind everyone the importance of U.S. nuclear weapons to the U.S. rules based international order. Very important for assuring our allies and providing stability in Europe and Asia.

So, final issue is Russia. And you need a partner for arms control. Russia violated INF and so I think the Trump Administration to withdraw from INF was prudent given the circumstances. We're the only country on earth constrained by this Treaty. But it raises real questions about Russia, whether Russia is willing to comply with New START going forward. I suspect that they will be, but you never know given their behavior on other arms control agreements.

Final issue is I do worry a little bit about whether Russia may be seeking to achieve some kind of strategic superiority while maintaining compliance with New START. It's expanding its non strategic nuclear arsenal, it's building new strategic capabilities that aren't covered in New START, this nuclear powered nuclear cruise missile and nuclear torpedo submarine drone. And by pulling out of INF this gives Russia the ability to increase
the number of warheads it can allocate to North America. It can use INF range systems to hold at risk targets in Europe and Asia, potentially freeing up strategic systems for North America. And so I think this is an issue that's not getting enough attention and that we all need to study going forward. But for now I think there is a fragile consensus.

MR. ROSE: Great. Thanks very much, Matt.

Brian, Madelyn, John, anything you would like to add on the current state of the debate?

MR. McKEON: The only thing I'd say is I'd be a little skeptical about asserting without qualification that this administration favors arms control. The National Security Advisor, Mr. Bolton, makes no secret that he finds arms control distasteful and I would not be surprised if he would not seek an extension of the New START Treaty by whatever means would suit him. And -- how do I say this -- the administration has policy statements that it issues in documents and then it has policies that are uttered by the President, and those are not always the same. So the statements in the NPR are only as enduring as the President's statement of today.

MR. ROSE: Yes, Madelyn.

MS. CREEDON: So one of the things I want to touch on, and it's a bit down in the weeds, but I think it gets to this fundamental heart of the whole debate about consensus or agreement and what happened and who got what for what, that really tends to be the basis of all these discussions. However one views the history of the New START debate, certainly by the end of 2013, early 2014 the notion that the republicans in the senate have pressured the Obama Administration to provide substantial additional funding in order to get New START was well embedded in the republican mantra. It shows up in some republican -- at least at that point, it shows up in several Republican National Committee statements, that this was the deal.

But one of the interesting things in that is this other parallel developing mantra that said that the Obama Administration had failed to live up to its commitments.
And the irony in all of this is that actually the Obama Administration did live up to its funding commitments and the additional funding was provided in the FY '12 FYNSP -- that's the NNSA's future year nuclear security program -- and those out years were extraordinarily high compared to where things were. The problem was congress didn't live up to that deal. And when you go back and you really do this chasing of the numbers thing, all of that commitment from DOD to transfer top line, it didn't matter because it basically never happened.

In the fiscal year '12 the president's budget request for NNSA, which was the budget request that the administration had bumped up by about $600 million for that year based on all of the conversations that had occurred and the DOD commitment, that budget request was $7.6 billion. By the time it got appropriated there was already $400 million missing, it was $7.2 billion. And by the time you get into now the FY '13 FYNSP, right, so one year later, the numbers for the out years are down substantially because we're now getting into this world of sequestration and Budget Control Acts. And so by the time you get to '14 and the FY '14 budget, which is when the Republican National Committee starts to say that the Obama Administration has not lived up to its commitments because the congress hadn't appropriated for years what was requested based on where the Obama numbers were, by the time you get to '14, NNSA is $2 billion under what Obama had committed.

And so now you've got this situation where the infrastructure is even getting worse because NNSA didn't have the money that it thought it was going to get under the deal, so now you've got congress even undercutting the deal that it made.

Anyway, this situation goes on for a number of years where you finally then start to get the appropriations being provided at the level of the Obama Administration request. Doesn't really kick in until about FY '16. And so these are the reasons that you saw a lot of consternation at the end of the Obama Administration that I know wasn't well received. When you even had the Secretary of Energy saying there's not enough money to
be able to do the things that we intended to do, and GAO comes out with a report that says there's not enough money to do the things that is laid out in the stockpile stewardship and management program.

So the irony in all of this is with all of the additional money that the Trump Administration has put in, and whether you agree with the low yield or not, or the low yield should be funded or not, the ultimate irony here is that Trump actually has gone back and sort of continued what Obama had put in place in terms of funding for the infrastructure at NNSA, all of which is really quite ironic.

MR. ROSE: Thanks, Madelyn. John, anything to add?

MR. HARVEY: Nothing to add.

MR. ROSE: Great. Well, before we turn the floor over to the audience for question, I wanted to ask one last question, and that's about the future. Now, there are a lot of views out there, you know, keep the triad, do away with the triad, continue arms control, do away with arms control. But my fundamental question is this, what steps need to be taken to maintain a level of bipartisan consensus on arms control and strategic modernization that is politically sustainable over the long-term? Most of these programs that we have talked about are going to go through this administration, next administration, and the administration beyond that. So you're going to have to have some type of consensus or agreement to sustain these programs over the long-term.

So why don't we start with Madelyn, go down, and then end with Brian.

So, Madelyn, what's your view as to what steps need to be taken to maintain a long-term politically sustainable consensus?

MS. CREEDON: Well, certainly, on the physical side, the triad, I think the numbers of each of the elements of the delivery systems, you know, needs a good robust debate every once in a while. The other thing is that the infrastructure funding for NNSA needs to continue and the life extension programs need to continue. Where I think there is going to be a lot of debate comes in what is the capability size, the capacity size really, of
that NNSA infrastructure. And that gets into a debate that I think has to happen, and that really is how has the world changed since 2009 and 2010 and what are those requirements going forward for the capacity piece at NNSA, for the total stockpile numbers, for the hedge numbers, and where the actual numbers under the triad should be.

So if they’re all at New START levels, I think there’s a pretty good consensus that that’s about right. The debate comes about what happens after New START. And I think that’s where there’s just a huge amount of work to be done because if the administration decides not to extend New START, then I think it’s kind of Katy bar the door, because I think it’s going to be a free for all.

MR. ROSE: John?

MR. HARVEY: I think the most important thing for maintaining consensus in the future is basically the two committees, the senate Armed Services and the house Armed Services. In the past Senator McCain and Senator Reed have worked amazingly well together with great contributions from staff, with bipartisanship from Donnelly and others on the -- Deb Fischer and others on the Strategic Forces Subcommittees, the staff have worked together hand in hand in lock step to advance Mr. Obama’s modernization program and now the continuation of it under Mr. Trump. And I think that’s been remarkable because most of - - there’s going to be a lot of turnover on the Hill, there’s a lot of young staffers coming who have not thought about nuclear weapons ever. Probably the members outside of the Armed Services Committees probably think about it a couple of hours a month. So they’re going to be relying on their committees, and how the committees evolve is going to be very important. And I think on the senate side we’re going to lose folks like Graham and Scott from South Carolina. Senator Kyl, who is very highly trusted by the republicans on thinking about nuclear weapons, he going, but we’ve got to look at who is coming in -- Kevin Cramer from North Dakota has an ICBM base in his area, in his state, and others.

On the democratic side, we lose Donnelly, which is huge. McCaskill and Nelson on Armed Services and get Duckworth, Manchin from West Virginia, who is probably
pretty solid because he comes from a state where he is somewhere needs to be reflective of the support for the defense department, and Jones from Alabama, will be the incoming folks as I understand it. And how those folks work together, how they interact. On the house side it's a little bit more unclear because we don't know quite who's coming in. We know Smith is there. I don't know if Thornberry will stay. Generally they have not worked together as well as the senate Armed Services Committee in moving forward and bipartisanship, but we'll have to see.

I think Adam Smith's remark at the Ploughshares event, the pep rally I call it, anti nuke pep rally, I think are going to have to be moderated by the fact that he is going to be constrained by the folks both within his committee, the Coopers and others, and the folks on Armed Services, who basically want to sustain this effort.

Third thing I think should happen is that I think Mr. Trump needs to put together a couple of pieces that demonstrably advance the arms control agenda and that would mean -- I don't think he necessarily should extend it right now, but he should use New START extension as an incentive for continued strong support for modernization. And the second thing he should do is put together a package, whether the Russians are going to agree with it or not, put together a package, put together a story on non strategic nuclear forces, the great disparity, and why we should be thinking about that as the next steps in making the world safer.

MR. ROSE: Thank you very much, John. Rebecca?

MS. HERSMAN: So I think in order to kind of rebuild -- and, again, I don't think a consensus is achievable, but I do think we need a coalition and I think that coalition will need to be rebuilt. And I think there's three key elements to that. I think first is a recognition that we have to have a balanced approach between modernization and arms control. We are not going to proceed effectively without that. And, therefore compromise is going to be needed on all sides. So I think that includes a very strong statement to try to advance at least the extension of New START. I think it also includes, in particular, some
regrouping on how we’re approaching the INF issue and hopefully some clarity on that.

Again, deep concerns about what the Russians have done in terms of non compliance, but also concerns frankly with how the whole issue has been handled, that has allowed far too much of the blame to fall our direction. We can do some things about that. We could make statements, the administration could make some statements in terms of not seeking to develop or deploy non compliant capabilities regardless of our status. We can say we object, but we’re not going to seek to employ those capabilities. We could help ourselves a lot by getting our basic INF stories straight and making it less confusing about are we doing this because of Asia, are we doing this because of Europe, we’re going to deploy, we’re not, we want this, we don’t. Just so much confusion. Let’s just focus on the non compliance problem and make clear that we’re not seeking additional capabilities in that regard.

The second big area is we need to do a better job. Instead of seeing modernization and arms control as sort of yin and yang of these, to actually recognize they work together. They are critically important together. Arms control puts some bounds on what our overall numbers look like with the size of the arsenals, and helps to manage things down. That’s very important. It also gives us great insight into what the Russians are doing, which helps us to posture and prepare correctly. That’s critically important. But, similarly, the overall diversity in our posture, to include the three legs of the triad, are what give us the flexibility to not get into a parity trap. So if New START goes away, that posture gives us the ability to adjust without having to kind of over worry about exact parity in numbers and elsewhere. So it allows us to flex.

The other thing I would say in that, speaking to that interrelationship between the two, is when we look at those capabilities as we’re developing them, especially in GBSD, we need to be clear that our ground based strategic deterrent, as well as the others, but this is the one that will get the attention, needs to have an approach that is flexible going forward, whether numbers go up or numbers go down, that we’re not sort of
locked into numbers so that it can withstand reductions that we would all favor if they're possible in the future.

The third thing is we need to have a much more honest conversation about resources. That has become among the more disingenuous aspects of this overall debate. What actually can save money, what can't save money, but also as I think the previous panelists have talked about, how important it is to not just find ourselves back into the situation where we in the Bush Administration, where in fact we did not have the appropriate stewardship even over our nuclear weapons program because of these resourcing challenges. We don't want to find ourselves back there. So I think if we do that.

And the final thing we need to do is we need to be better listeners. Those of us who generally support or think we're part of the consensus or that coalition, that whole group needs to listen to both sides of the debate more carefully and be more attentive to not being as dismissive inside this very polarized community.

MR. ROSE: Great. Rebecca, thanks so much. You know, made a really important point, and that is you should not view arms control and strategic modernization/deterrents as mutually exclusive. I think you're absolutely right, they have to work together. And it reminds me of a quote by Harry Truman, which he said in the late 1940s, he said the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are two halves of the same walnut. You need both of these pieces to ensure security in Europe. And I think that's a really good point that you made.

Matt?

MR. KROENIG: Well, just on that point, one of the arguments the Trump Administration has made for the low yield capabilities is that these could be a bargaining chip for negotiations with the Russians if they're willing to discuss their non strategic nuclear weapons and stop their destabilizing behavior.

So I would just again reiterate the importance of the consensus or the coalition. This modernization is going to require decades, so it's going to require bipartisan
support on the Hill for many years. You can't do that with just one party. And, in fact, some of my friends in the administration argue that they see three priorities of U.S. nuclear strategy. First is deterring enemies, second is assuring allies, and third is maintaining consensus on the Hill, because it is so important to the modernization programs.

In terms of what we need to do to sustain the consensus, I think both sides need to be somewhat flexible and understand that we need to adapt with changing circumstances. You know, the world wasn't going to freeze in 2010, and so I think there is a core of an agreement of strategic arms control in exchange for modernization, but that there might be changes that need to be made at the margins. And I think Madelyn pointed out how during the Obama Administration there were -- because of sequester and other things, that some of the programs were delayed. Many republicans were unhappy with that, but it didn't lead to fundamental undermining of this consensus. And, similarly now, I think the Trump Administration is making some reasonable changes at the margins based on changes in Russia's nuclear strategy and posture, including low yield nuclear weapons. And I would hope the other side would also recognize that there is the need to adapt and make some changes at the margins as international security environment and conditions change.

MR. ROSE: Great. Thanks, Matt.

Brian, last word?

MR. McKEON: I don't have a lot to add. I think Rebecca summed it up pretty well. I think the one thing I would say that would be particularly helpful would be if this Administration would embrace a New START extension at some point before the end of its term. If there is a different president that comes into office in 2021 that president will have about two weeks to make a decision on a New START extension, so that really puts that person in a tight spot. But for the interests of the country and our own security, there's lots of good reasons to do it. The Russians are ahead of us in recapitalizing their nuclear triad; we have the next 15 years of the recapitalization of the nuclear triad. Something is going to go wrong, over budget, or off schedule, and having the assurance of both the lower numbers
but also the inspections and the verification regime of the New START Treaty will be important to us because if the Treaty limits come off in 2021 and we are having troubles with our recapitalization program, that's not a good situation to be in and I don't think anybody in the United States military would be happy about that, nor should anybody in congress be excited about that.

MR. ROSE: Great. Thank you, Brian. And thanks to all of our panelists. Now we have about 30 minutes for questions and answers. A couple of requests that I have is, one, you identify yourself and your affiliation, second, you ask a question, and, third, you keep your questions/statements brief.

We have some microphones going around. I'll take about three questions, we'll try to do three rounds, and we'll go from there. So I've got one here, first here.

MR. MacDONALD: Hi, I'm Bruce MacDonald with Johns Hopkins SAIS. Thanks, Frank, for organizing this great discussion. I wanted to make a very short comment and then ask my question. My comment is I wanted to reinforce, Matt, what you said earlier about the importance of non proliferation and reassuring our allies is an important part of the whole picture. And to say that that was in the Strategic Posture Commission report, which was referenced here. That was viewed as, you know, almost a co-equal leg along with nuclear weapons and arms control.

My question is I'm glad to hear the panel has not completely given up on the idea of a consensus or that there's some kind of a coalition. My question is there's been an awful lot of tribalism and vitriolic discussion on some of these issues. It's been a decade since we had the Strategic Posture Review Commission come up under the able leadership of Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. My question now is that is it time maybe to reconvene a group of elders, men and women with great depth in the field, to reconsider and update, or change completely if they view it necessary, these same kinds of issues -- arms control, nuclear weapons, and non proliferation, to try to -- it's -- we found, even though there was a - - as a bystander in some of the internal discussions there was a lot of disagreement and
people here on the panel who provided service to that great commission, that it's still a consensus -- it was quite an achievement. Is it time to update that and to give this another look at a senior level?

MR. ROSE: Great. We've got two questions right here. Can you bring the microphone?

MR. RABINOWITZ: Thank you. I'm Dave Rabinowitz, I'm retired. And in the game of chance you win by taking the opponent's king. It seems in our most likely adversaries, Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran, this paradigm would fit. If you take out the king, the war is over. And my question is, first is this is a valid paradigm? And, second, if this is adopted as a policy how many weapons do we really need for effective deterrents?

MR. ROSE: Great. Right there.

MR. ULLMAN: I'm Harlan Ullman with the Atlantic Council and the Naval War College. This is really a question in terms of suggestion to you, Frank, for your next panel. I would argue that this history lesson is very valuable, but it's based on 20th century thinking and it's several dimensions that's lacking. The panel, if we're looking at the 21st century, the notion of deterrence is profoundly different. You're looking at cyber, you're looking at space, you're looking at all these Chinese advances and, indeed, you're looking at China. And it seems to me the first thing we need to do is examine a new conceptual basis for doing that. The idea of a commission makes sense, but commissions don't work. Very difficult for this administration to do something.

So my two questions are, first, what's missing from this debate that brings us into the 21st century not the 20th century? Because I would argue that the nuclear weapons modernization program as we have, given the other demands on the budget and the defense budget that's going to go south not north, is not going to be affordable. And, second, what sort of mechanisms do we have to make sure that we are sound, safe, and secure both in a nuclear and conventional sense in the 21st century?

MR. ROSE: Great. Thanks for those questions. So let me turn it over to
the panel. And who would like to start?

John?

MR. HARVEY: Look, I don't think we're anywhere near the state we were, Bruce, at the end of the second Bush 2 term with regard to the lack of support. The message not being conveyed and not being any support for the -- even sustaining our existing capabilities. We're nowhere near as bad as we were then. We're in a much better situation. I don't think it's the right time to impanel a new commission. I might change my mind if a year or two down the road things don't come together. I don't think we're -- with regard for the modernization program going south, I don't see it yet. We haven't had the first hearings yet for the FY '19, FY '20 budgets and FY '20 programs. So we're going to see that as it evolves in the spring. But I think it's too soon to give up on the fact that at the time just because we got 30 or 40 new democrats in that this is going to upset what I also consider to be a consensus and a fragile one on modernization.

MR. ROSE: Others? Madelyn?

MS. CREEDON: So I'm going to agree with John I think on it's not yet time for a new commission. Fundamentally, the whole key to whatever looks like a consensus, a coalition, a middle in my mind, as Brian said, really is the extension of New START. If the administration affirmatively says it's not going to extent New START, then I think that is a time when you might want a new commission because I really do think without the extension of New START, without the certainty of the caps going forward for a period of time, it's very unclear what nuclear deterrence looks like.

And, yes, to your point, absolutely, nuclear deterrence is only a small part, or a part, or maybe it's a big part, but it's certainly just a part of deterrence. And deterrence is so much more complicated now, with many, many players, with many, many more elements, but just because it's more complicated and it involves space and cyber and conventional, and a variety of other things, including things that are non military that I don't think we sufficiently take advantage of in terms of deterrence from both an economic and a
diplomatic -- so what we used to call DIME -- I mean across the board. But with that said, nuclear deterrence still plays a very important role, not only in the U.S. security but certainly for our allies under that umbrella. So you can't look at it alone, you can't look at it in isolation, but it plays a very important part in the overall deterrence. So to say that it's not affordable I think misses the point because I think really the point is what are your choices for deterrence.


MR. KROENIG: I was just going to tie Harlan and Bruce's comments together. Maybe it's not a formal high level commission that's needed, but I do think that there is some new thinking required to think about how these new technologies affect strategic stability, strategic deterrence, missile defense, directed energy, artificial intelligence, 3D printing. There are so many things coming on line that could really change the strategic balance and we need to think harder about that.

I agree on the affordability. Best estimates are 6 percent or so of the defense budget to modernize the U.S. strategic arsenal. Secretary Mattis, several past secretaries of defense, have said that nuclear deterrence is the most important mission of the Department of Defense, so 6 percent for the most important mission sounds like a reasonable proposition, a good value indeed to me.

On this question, I think you're right that leadership succession is one of the weaknesses of autocracies, one of the advantages we have over them. I'm not sure what the implications are for a nuclear strategy though. The difficulty of intelligence required to know where a leader is, to target a leader, is very difficult. So I think staying with what our nuclear strategy has been over the past few years is still the best way to go forward.

MR. ROSE: Brian?

MR. McKEON: Just on the narrow question of how many weapons do we need, I would argue the last administration put forward that we can get by with fewer strategic deployed weapons than we have. The New START Treaty has a cap of 1550,
which is an odd number. We were ready to go to 1500 but the other side was not. But after New START was done in 2012 and ‘13, the Obama Administration did a review and the president made a speech in Berlin that proposed a new round of negotiations with Russia and said we were prepared to go down by another one-third. So you could do the math. But then the invasion of Crimea and the intervention in Eastern Ukraine happened in 2014 and nothing ensured by way of negotiations.

MR. ROSE: Great. We've got the next three questions here, here, and there.

MR. COURTNEY: Thank you. Good discussion. Bill Courtney with RAND. In the case of NAFTA the President has criticized a treaty negotiated by a predecessor, sought a renegotiation, and then proclaimed the new treaty to be successful. Since the President has criticized New START, do you think this might be a model the administration will try to apply for New START?

SPEAKER: Richard Toye (phonetic 18:33:02). I was involved in the original START and the original INF some years ago under the Reagan Administration. We ended up with a very, very good in the administration team that went through all of the issues, the inter agency groups. We didn't agree, but we sure flushed them out. Here today we've talked a lot about congress and the administration writ large. I wonder if you could comment on what all of the turmoil that we read about in the administration in all of the various agencies may be doing to that underlying base of knowledge that we need to come up with good, strong, coordinated programs.

MR. ROSE: Okay, thanks.

MR. COLLINA: Tom Collina, Ploughshares Fund. Thank you, Frank, very much for having me and for having all these great panelists here. John, thanks for plugging the Ploughshares Policy Conference in November.

MR. HARVEY: The pep rally.

MR. COLLINA: Sorry you couldn't be there. We were very proud to have
Congressman Adam Smith speak at that event. He's of course now chair of house Armed Services. For those of you who didn't see his talk, it's on Ploughshares website. Again, John, thanks again for the plug.

Rebecca, I want to agree with you on your comment that there really was never a consensus on modernization and the deal. And I think the sooner we can stop using the word consensus the clearer this whole conversation will get.

Finally, a question for Brian and Madelyn. It's my observation that part of the deal -- I'll call it that -- on New START, was obviously a continuation of arms control, a continuation of modernization, but the concept of modernization at the time is not the concept we have today, and that it changed and morphed over time. In particular, there was no commitment to a new ICBM at the time of the New START vote, and I'd like you just to tell me whether you agree with that.

Thank you.

MR. ROSE: Great. Who would like to start?

Brian?

MR. McKEON: I'm happy to take the last question first, since it's the freshest. I mean the reason I also said that most of the focus was on NNSA and not the recapitalization of the triad is you can see that the continued lack of attention to the health of the triad continued, even within the DOD. And when a couple of incidents occurred early in Secretary Hagel's tenure, he asked for some reviews, one which was an internal review led by then Assistant Secretary Creedon and wanted an external review led by a guy named Harvey, but not the guy on the panel.

MR. HARVEY: The other guy.

MR. McKEON: The other Harvey. And a former head of STRATCOM and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. And both of those found that significant neglect and support for and maintenance of the triad within the DOD. So if there had been a great deal of attention and concern about it in 2010 I think you would have seen more of a focus in the
conversation of it around New START.

On the specifics, Tom, what's in the record is there was a report, it was called the Section 1251 report. It was legislated by Senator Kyl in the Defense Authorization Bill. The initial report the administration submitted was in May of 2010. There was an update requested by Senator Kyl and others that was submitted in November of 2010. And the specifics on the triad are as follows -- I wrote this part down -- the administration said it remained commitment to sustainment and modernization of the strategic delivery systems to ensure continuing deterrent capabilities in the face of evolving challenges and technology developments. And then there were specific commitments to a new SSBN, a range of deployment options for the ICBM follow on, with an objective of defining a cost effective approach that supports continue reduction of nuclear weapons while promoting stable deterrents. Pursue the follow on heavy on bomber and replace the air launch cruise missile with the LRSO.

And so by and large the Obama Administration's program of records that the new administration inherited followed this template.

MR. ROSE: Great.

MS. CREEDON: I definitely agree with Brian. I mean at the time the decision really was to continue to look at what the options were for the ground based strategic deterrent because at that point the requirement was to keep the Minuteman-III alive at least until 2030. So the timeframe hadn't quite gotten there where a decision had to be made. But it was clear that that with a commitment to the triad there was going to be a commitment to the ICBM.

Now, sort of what happened later on obviously is this debate about should it be something new to replace the Minuteman-III, or should it be life extension of the Minuteman-III. And that was a very robust debate even within the Obama Administration. And in the end came down on the side of something new. But obviously, the Trump Administration, because we're so early in that program, could make its own determination.
But there was definitely going to be something because without a something there’s no triad. So that debate I’m sure will continue on just a little bit.

Bill, I certainly hope not. NAFTA is not the model, and I will just leave it at that, because I think it’s a good treaty, everybody is in compliance and there’s huge benefit from it. I don’t know what a new treaty would look like, I don’t know how you would make it better.

MR. McKEON: I would say on this, though, if there are just modest adjustments and a new title, I would take it. (Laugher) Because that’s what happened in NAFTA.

MS. CREEDON: Yeah, I would take it. But the beauty of New START extension is it doesn’t have to go back to the senate. And there’s a lot to be said for that.

MR. ROSE: And I would also note is if you reopen things the Russians are going to have their long list of issues that they would like included in any new treaty.

Rebecca?

MS. HERSMAN: This issue on extension I think is very important in the context of New START. The negotiators created this pressure valve in the form of an extension that could be taken with relative ease and without a revisit to either kind of political system. And given how tense things are, that is an opportunity we should probably seize, which can’t be done if you reopen the Treaty overall. So I think that that is a very important issue for where we are politically right now.

Just touching on the expertise base. I mean I do think that what Brian said earlier is important and something that we need to acknowledge, which is that there are sort of two policies that tend to occur within the current administration, that which is put out by sort of the expert community, that’s sort of best represented in the Nuclear Posture Review, and then the statements and assertions of the President, usually in Tweet format. And I think that is really a difficult issue because more than anything else, you know, there is the old phrase, these are the President’s weapons. And I think in this, almost more than
anything else, the President's statements carry enormous weight. How on earth that will be modulated in support of building and sustaining this coalition I don't know, but I think it's important to recognize that that is a real part of what is driving the current state of polarization right now.

MR. ROSE: Great. Matt, John, anything you guys would like to add?

MR. KROENIG: Well, just on William Courtney's question about negotiating a bigger, better deal, I think if there were a temptation to go in that direction, the obvious place to look would be Russian non strategic nuclear weapons, which is something we've been wanting to get a deal on for some time. And if Trump could get some kind of deal there, I think he could justifiably claim that as a win.

MR. ROSE: Great. We have time for one more round of questions, so why don't we start here.

MR. JACKSON: Alec Jackson. I'm a legislative analyst at Dynetics. My question is with regards to the newly announced Russian delivery systems and technologies, especially with regard to their hypersonic stuff -- and maybe this is a little beyond the purview of this panel, but how seriously should the U.S. be taking these given the issues that Russia has faced in fielding the T14 and the SU57 in significant and appreciable numbers? And to what degree is Russia's newfangled technology affected the discussion about further arms control treaties going forward?

Thank you.

MR. ROSE: Great. Right there and then right there.

MR. FIELDHOUSE: Thank you. Richard Fieldhouse, impact consultant, but a retired member of the gang of former congressional staffers who fought this issue with great vigor successfully years ago.

The question I wanted to ask is I've heard from some of the panelists your thoughts on what it will take or could take to help maintain what I'm going to call an agreement, not a consensus -- there's a debate there -- going forward -- the question I have
is what are the things, if you have ideas, and I think I heard extension of New START as one of the needed ingredients, to maybe the adverse is also true -- the question is are there things you see that would undo that level of agreement and cause what has been in place for 10 years roughly to collapse?

MR. ROSE: Great. Right there.

SPEAKER: Thank you. I'm (inaudible 18:43:28) with Voice of Vietnamese Americans. I'd like to come back to the strategic vision and mission. We've been talking about consensus. What you discussed, the situation with the DOD leadership and our Commander in Chief and whoever is holding the power of the nuclear weapons, it gives a -- there is a strong focus on deterrence. At this point in time, how are we, the U.S. leadership, in global credential with deterrence? And given the situation currently in Asia Pacific, Indo Asia Pacific, with India and everybody else involved, and China is involved, can you talk about China, North Korea, Iran, Russia, if they owe to the other side, where are we and do we have time to follow up with (inaudible 18:44:34) and coalition you're talking about?

MR. ROSE: And I'll take one more question. Right there. Actually, let me take two. I'll take one here and then one there.

SPEAKER: Thank you. My name is Rafael, Embassy of Brazil. I would like to hear the thoughts of the panelists on China. If the time has come to bring to the arms control debate other nuclear weapon states and, if so, what role would China play in this discussion?

Thank you.

MR. ROSE: Read my testimony before the house Foreign Affairs Committee last year. (Laughter)

Last question.

MS. ESTES: Hi, Madison Estes from the Center For Naval Analyses. We're focusing a lot on New START which is definitely, I mean, coming up here in the short-term. It's got a lot of fire alarms going off around it. But I want to ask, since we do have a
gathering of wise men and women here, what comes after New START? We were talking about striking a bigger, grander deal was mentioned and maybe moving on to non strategic nuclear weapons and Russian systems. But that's traditionally been a non starter as has ballistic missile defense for the U.S., which has been usually the next thing that's thought of on this kind of deal.

So I'd be curious to know what the panelists think could be possible in the next 10 years.

MR. ROSE: Great. So let me ask all the panelists to, one, respond to the appropriate question and also ask them if they have any last thoughts.

Matt, why don't we start with you and work our way down?

MR. KROENIG: Great. Well, first, on the question about Russia's investment in strategic technology, I think we have to look at the entire picture. And given Russian investments in both strategic and non strategic capabilities, new technology, like hypersonics, that's aggressive behavior, and in Georgia, Ukraine, threats to the rest of NATO, I think the entire picture is very worrisome. You're right that they've had some problems with some of their technologies, but they're making it a priority, they're putting a lot of money behind it, and I think we need to take this problem seriously.

On the question of what could undermine the consensus, I think one obvious thing is if democrats in the house are unwilling to fund modernization of the triad. That would be a major blow to the coalition.

MR. ROSE: Rebecca?

MS. HERSMAN: Thank you. I'll just touch on a couple of things. On the question of sort of what else could go wrong to further undermine consensus, one topic that was only touched briefly, I think a large wedge between the United States and either our Asian or our European alliance partners could be one of those things that really kind of derails this process. You know, I would note that when the Nuclear Posture Review came out this year it actually enjoyed pretty strong support from most of our allies and partners,
certainly not the level of objection. Contrast that with how the INF situation has unfolded, which has produced a lot of anxiety in the rest of the world in terms of our commitments. I think we really need to manage that carefully. If we find ourselves in a situation where our overall alliance system and our support for alliances is diminishing, that actually will undercut so many aspects of our broader nuclear policy in ways that I don't think we fully anticipate. So I see that as actually the unspoken potential real kind of gum in the works.

The second one would be on the future of arms control. A few things have kind of pulled together there that I think is interesting. And the reality is I don’t believe we are presently at a future moment. I don’t think the opportunity for a breakthrough is knocking today. And that's unfortunate. I mean I want to be around when someone knocks on that door again. And it will come, I believe it will come.

So what we need to do now is posture ourselves to be ready when the opportunity arises. What do we need to do in terms of partnerships, what do we need to do in terms of research, what do we need to do to invest. And I would tie that back to the commission question. Commissions only work actually if they have support and consensus behind them. They don't work if it's just a way of putting off, you know, bitter fights from the Hill and dumping them onto a commission. They just replicate. But some of these bigger really important longer-term questions about what could the future look like, that might be the type of thing, especially if we find ourselves, you know, god forbid, post 2021 in a situation where we have no arms control. I think that could become a really important place to bring that to bear.

And I'm going to tie that to one question I don't think got enough attention earlier, which was the interplay between nuclear deterrence and our investment there and what happens in that broader deterrence framework in terms of space and cyber and others. And my comment there is to say it's true, we do have more challenges to work with. I've yet to meet a cyber or a space expert or an AI expert who says, hey, you know, take stuff out of nuclear and give it to me so that I have to deal with more nuclear problems over here. That
is not what they're looking for. We have got to manage nuclear risks and they're not really going down. And that's where nuclear deterrence needs to focus, in my opinion. But we do need better tools and new forms of arms control to work in some of those areas. And we've got a lot of hard work to do there.

MR. ROSE: Thank you, Rebecca.

John?

MR. HARVEY: What's next after New START? We have to realize that, first of all, the situation with Russia has evolved dramatically since the Obama NPR. And Mr. Trump's NPR has tried to start taking that into consideration. Russia's behavior basically rejects the post Cold War security order that many of us have come to take for granted. And Mr. Putin is doing things that many of us find hard to believe. The annexation of Ukraine, the use of chemical weapons to deal with citizens overseas, the support of Syria -- egregious, egregious behavior. So we can't count on Russia being a partner for any time in the near future. That said, we were able to manage the strategic competition with folks who were arguably even worse during the Soviet Union.

What I think we need to try to do is not so much worry about numbers, I think we need to try to worry about areas of strategic stability and ways that we cannot let things spiral out of control, because there are going to be opportunities for that to happen sooner than we might think.

With regard to Asia, I think one of the great things that we achieved in the Obama Administration was a much more intensive dialogue with the ROK and with Japan regarding our assurance of our extended deterrent to them, extension of our deterrent to them, and also with regard to the sorts of things they might want to contribute to -- additional steps they might take with regard to stability in the region. I think Mr. Trump's team is taking that forward as well and I think that's encouraging.

MR. ROSE: Madelyn?

MS. CREEDON: When we think about where is arms control going and
where has it been, my view right now is that arms control is in a period of at least hibernation. I can't get to it's dead, but it's certainly in hibernation. And to get something going again I think we have to completely rethink what is arms control because obviously historically it was numbers, it was capabilities, it was limitations, and it was much more bilateral. And when we look at where Asia is going, Asia is far more complex. It clearly is where the future is, it's clearly on the rise economically. China has economic potential that Russia doesn't in this moment. And of the nine nuclear weapon states almost all of them have some degree of influence in Asia, and you can't say that, I don't think, about any other region of the world. So now is the time. And if you're going to have a commission look at anything -- and I'm not a huge fan of commissions -- but if you're going to have a commission look at anything I would probably say, okay, we need something that looks like a futures commission to really look at what are the options for strategic stability in the future, and particularly in Asia. I mean this is a region that has no history of arms control agreement, there aren't incentives for arms control agreement. You don't have anybody -- even though China is building up and they're modernizing, certainly we're not in a situation of parity, but we have lots of allies who really rely on our strategic deterrent and who want to see our strategic deterrent. And, more importantly, I think they want to see consistently in the U.S. messaging. So that to me is the future of where all of this goes in respect to numbers and arms control agreements and relationships and strategic stability.

MR. ROSE: Great. Thanks, Madelyn.

Brian, last word to you.

MR. McKEON: Since nobody has addressed the gentleman's question about China directly, other than your reference to your testimony. I think --

MR. ROSE: It's really good. (Laughter)

MR. McKEON: I'll go study it. I think traditionally both the State and Defense Departments have been interested in a strategic dialogue with the Chinese about nuclear weapons, but they have not. They have generally said we have a small number,
you have a lot more. When you get down to our level give us a call. And so many past administrations, including Obama, have probed with the Chinese about strategic stability talks and not gotten even to a meeting. And even if we had a meeting I don't think it would be very productive, it would be an exchange of talking points, but it would at least be a start.

On the question on the president and deterrence in Asia, I'll just add I guess I was surprised being in the Executive Branch after 20 years on the Hill how much time we spend assuring our allies in Europe and Asia that we still love them, still want to defend them. And now you certainly don't have that, or maybe you do coming from the career force, but you have a quite different attitude coming out of the President's mouth about the value of the alliances, which are clearly under strain. The one with Korea I think is about to hit a pretty big strain because the agreement on basing and how much the Koreans contribute to our presence I believe is expired or about to expire. The President is asking for the Koreans to pay twice as much as they've been paying, which I don't think they're inclined to do. So, you know, if they start to question the alliance and our commitment generally to their security and the extended deterrence, well, we're in quite a different world if they decide they need to pursue their own nuclear capability.

MR. ROSE: Great. Well, panelists, thank you so much for such a great and informative panel. I certainly took a lot of things away, the need for compromise, the need to listen, and the need to think beyond the next two or three years, but long-term.

So please join me in thanking the panelists for a great panel. And hopefully this will be the first of many additional events that Brookings will do on these subjects.

Thank you very much for coming.

* * * *
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the foregoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia
Commission No. 351998
Expires: November 30, 2020