THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

THE 2018 AMERICAN FAMILY SURVEY: ATTITUDES TOWARD #METOO, ECONOMIC ANXIETY, IMMIGRATION, AND MORE

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Introduction:

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Presentation of Survey Findings:

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Panelists:

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PROCEDINGS

MR. REEVES: Good morning, everybody. My name is Richard Reeves. I'm a senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution and co-director of the Center on Children and Families. Thank you for joining us for the launch of this year's American Family Survey.

I'd like to say a special thanks to those of you who are here in the room, who have braved the cold weather to actually be with us physically. Also welcome to those I know there's many who are watching online. Thank you to you for joining us, too, although I estimate 20 percent of you are still in bed watching this with your laptop. Nonetheless, you're still welcome to join us.

Whether you're in bed or in the room, you can follow us along using the hashtag #FamilySurvey. And if you are watching online and would like to ask a question to the panelists or to the presenters, please use that hashtag and I'll be following it as we go through the morning so that I can pass your question on.

As I mentioned a senior fellow here. I'm also an advisor to the American Family Survey. There are advisors to the survey from a number of institutions, including Brookings and the American Enterprise Institute. We, therefore, alternate the launch between Brookings and AEI. This year is Brookings' turn to host the launch. Our room is not as nice as the AEI room, but our cookies are much better. (Laughter)

The survey is a partnership between the Deseret News and Brigham Young University, and so before the presentation of this year's findings and then the panel discussion, please join me in welcoming Doug Wilks, who's the editor of Deseret News, to get things started. Doug, please join us. (Applause)

MR. WILKS: Thank you, Richard. I appreciate that. It's a pleasure to be here. I flew in a couple days ago from the mountains of the West, out in Utah. I might say the Deseret News was established in 1850 by the great Salt Lake. And prior to
becoming a state, the region was called the Deseret. And for a long time they thought that Utah would be named Deseret, but Congress didn’t like that name, so it was named after the Ute Indian tribe. But nevertheless, the name of that area endures with the *Deseret News*, and we’re very pleased to be here.

We support the principles of the First Amendment: the freedom of speech, the freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and the right to gather in the public square to express those views. And that’s foundational to what we try to do as a principled media.

Within that is a key concern for the family as a central unit of society. And over the years, as we’ve seen many changes culturally and within the family structure, we’ve wanted to find a way to measure just what is happening to the family because, in many respects, as the family goes, society goes. And we see that happening around the world.

We didn’t want it just to be a group of journalists in a room having that conversation, so we did reach out to Brookings and to the American Enterprise Institute. And we found experts at Brigham Young University with Chris Karpowitz and Jeremy Pope, co-directors of the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy at BYU. So four years ago, we began that process.

Allison Pond, my colleague, is here. She was deeply involved in creating that. And we ask baseline questions and we do different things to try and weigh what is happening with the American family.

Among the findings over the years is that people consistently say that their own marriage is a happy marriage, but everyone else is in trouble. (Laughter) And the interesting thing is each year that’s been a fairly consistent finding. Now, given our current political climate and the various election results, we see that that perhaps was foretelling of tribalism and some of the differences as people kind of become entrenched
in their world, but maybe think the rest of it is in trouble. So there’s some interesting findings there which we hope to continue to explore in the coming years.

Nevertheless, we’ve also discovered the overwhelmingly we have more in common with each other through families than perhaps we previously realized, whether it’s Republican or Democrat or other demographics. We see that people still want to be at a dinner table and have a conversation and that many of their choices, even social choices, come from that basic unit of the family in all its forms. So it is a fundamental principle we feel worth preserving. In fact, as a journalist, where we might be watchdogs on government, we also feel the need to be watchdogs for the American family. And we think that is a unique role that Deseret News can play.

My colleagues, Boyd Matheson and Allison Pond, at the Deseret News, we were having dinner the other night and we spoke again of this concept of human flourishing and what does it take to flourish. And I think the American Family Survey and the great work of my colleagues show some of the things that we can pull together to do that.

One final note before I turn the time over to our presenters is that one statistic that also has been consistent over the years and this year, 44 percent of families surveyed had felt some sort of economic stress during the past year. So even though we’ve had 10 years of economic strength, the numbers seem to bear out things are going well, boy, 44 percent say, no, we’re still struggling, we’re still stressful. And that’s an interesting thing because it puts pressure on families. We see the fertility rate changing. There are many, many things that journalists don’t quite go after, but, with the help of our colleagues, we’ve been able to study. And so I hope you find that enjoyable today.

With that, let me thank you again on behalf of the Deseret News for being here. You can read many of our stories at deseretnews.com today, and they’ll be on there, as well as reports on the past four years. So I encourage you to take some
time to look at what our journalists have done on that and other journalists who have also taken a look at these findings.

Let me know introduce Chris Karpowitz and Jeremy Pope. As I mentioned, they’re co-directors of the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy at BYU. They’ve become friends. They’re quite a tandem and a tag team. And please, if you’ll welcome them, and they’ll present their findings. (Applause)

MR. KARPOWITZ: Thank you very much, Doug. My name’s Chris Karpowitz. And as Doug says, with Jeremy, we do form a tag team of sorts and we are really delighted to be here.

This is the fourth year that we have conducted the American Family Survey. It was first conducted in 2015. It’s a national survey of 3,000 adults with characteristics meant to mirror those of the general population. We need to also thank our partners are YouGov, who helped to field the survey.

And each year, the survey includes a core of questions about the health of American families as well as some additional modules that go into different issues in greater detail. And we’ll talk a little bit about what those modules are.

As Doug indicated, one of the consistent findings we’ve had over the past four years is that people are fundamentally optimistic about their own families, but much less so about the state of the American family in general. And that finding was one of the core findings of our first year and it really hasn’t changed over the past four years.

In the midst of the Trump administration we’ve also been interested in connection between family experiences and political attitudes. When we talk about support for Trump, political scientists have made a great deal of educational differences in support for Trump, but we also find family differences. The marriage gap is as big or bigger than the education gap when it comes to support for Trump. And so we think that that’s worth some additional discussion and some additional analysis, as well.
One of the things that we did this year that was unique and new to this year was to ask about different identities that respondents to the survey may hold. And we asked about a whole host of identities: religious, racial, partisan, career identities, community identities. We also asked about their identities as spouses if that was appropriate or as parents if they had children. And as political scientists we talk a great deal about partisan identity, but it turns out that on our list, at least the list of identities we asked about, that was the least likely to be important to our respondents. And so identities as parents and spouse seem to be much more important to a much larger percentage of our respondents.

We can also break that down a little bit more and look at identity by race and ethnicity. And not surprisingly, racial and ethnic identities are more important to black and Hispanic respondents than they are to white respondents. But we also found that black and Hispanic respondents were more invested in parental and spousal identities than were white respondents, which we think is interesting and also worth some additional discussion.

Each year in the American Family Survey we’ve asked what are the most important issues facing families, and we give our respondents a list of 12 curated items that we’ve then categorized into 3 different categories: economics, culture, and family structure. And we do find some partisan differences in those views of what the most important problem facing families might be. Democrats tend to focus more on economic concerns and Republicans more on cultural concerns.

Both groups are highly concerned about what we’re calling family structure, although much of that is high, high levels of agreement about the idea that other people should discipline their children more effectively. (Laughter) And so you might set aside that family structure finding just for a moment; know that it’s primarily driven by that and, again, widespread agreement that other people need to do a better
job.

We have found over the course of four years increasing concern on the part of all respondents about economic challenges facing families and some decreasing concern about cultural issues. And so despite those partisan differences that I’m showing here, we also are seeing change over time. And as Doug indicated, we think this is really interesting in a time of economic recovery, or at least some indicators of economic recovery, Americans continue to be particularly concerned about the financial stresses that face families.

When we asked new this year about whether respondents had felt concern in the past year about paying some certain kinds of bills, from the utilities to rent, to food, childcare, other kinds of bills, and what we find is consistently families with children at home express greater financial worry, greater worry about meeting those monthly bills. When we asked whether or not they’d actually experienced an economic crisis, families with children at home also were more likely to experience that economic crisis, one kind of economic crisis in the past year.

Among those without children we asked, well, what are the most important factors in your decision to have children? And the cost of raising a child was the most important factor raised by our respondents, both men and women. And so we think that despite the economic news that we see in the newspaper, American families are still feeling the pinch of economic concern and the cost of raising children.

I mentioned that each year we have put together a set of modules. This year we focused on things like the proper sequence of relationships and relationship milestones. We talked about teens and technology, and also a long module about sexual harassment and consent, immigration, and some policy issues. So we’ll just go briefly through this.

Let me first talk about relationship sequence. We asked our respondents
to tell us in their most recent relationship the order in which certain milestones -- having sex, cohabiting, getting married, having a child -- occurred. And we also then asked -- so we randomly asked half of the sample that question. The other half of the sample was randomly assigned to be asked what’s the ideal order for those things to occur? And one of the things that we find is that there’s a difference between Americans’ ideal ordering of these milestones and what actually occurs.

Ideally, on average, Americans think that marriage, cohabiting, and sex should occur at about the same time with children coming later. And we can see here that that’s not the actual order of events for most. It’s sex first and then cohabiting and marriage at about the same time, and children third.

There are also some interesting partisan and racial differences that might not have been expected. One of the things we see is that white Democrats sort of stand out as being unusual in the ideal ordering. They’re the only group for which the ideal ordering matches the actual ordering. For both Republicans and black Democrats -- there are some black Republicans in this same, as well, but not enough to really say much confidently about -- their ideal orderings are different. They hold to a more traditional notion of the ideal ordering of these relationship milestones.

I mentioned that we talked about teens and technology. And as with the most important issues facing families, we also asked the parents of teenagers -- and we had about 500 parents of teenagers in this sample -- what are the most important issues facing their teens today? And the most common response to that, they can choose up to 4 from this curated list of 16 items, the most common response was overuse of technology with bullying coming in second. And we thought this was notable that technology and bullying came in ahead of other potential concerns that have been the source of a great deal of discussion in the past, like access to drugs and alcohol or dating, relationships, and sex. It was really technology and bullying.
There are some partisan differences here. Again, Democrats are more concerned than Republicans about bullying. Republicans are more concerned than Democrats about the effect of family breakup and divorce. And so we think this idea of tracking how are parents of teenagers thinking about the issues and challenges facing their teens is, again, worth more discussion.

We followed up on this concern about technology by asking parents of teens to estimate how much time their teens spent on social media or playing video games. And there are some gender differences. Parents see girls as spending more time on social media and boys spending more time on video games. But parents estimated that their children, whether boys or girls, are spending a significant amount of time each week; that parents estimated that their teen sons spent on average total about 24 hours each week playing video games and they estimated that their teen girls were spending about the same amount, about 24 hours each week, on social media.

So with that, I'll turn it over to Jeremy to talk about the really hard stuff.

(Laughter)

MR. POPE: It's only occurring to me now, as Chris says that, to note that Chris got to talk about a range of things, including some healthy relationships and other stuff like that, and now I get to talk about unhealthy things, including illegal things occasionally.

We have shown you a number of different charts and graphs, but I just want to start with some bullet points because I think the next two or three bullet points tell you most of what you need to know about this subject. Let me see if I can make this slide thing work. I should have practiced. Okay, I can't make it work. All right, well, I'll just stick with all those bullet points then.

Forty-three percent of all respondents had experienced some kind of inappropriate activity in the area of sexual harassment. But I think the most important
thing to keep in mind here, and it structures the rest of what I’m going to talk about on this subject, is the gender difference because in that 43 percent, it’s 28 percent of men. So really 3 in 10 men feel like they’ve experienced something like this whereas about 6 in 10 women feel like they have experienced something like this. And that distinction is crucial to everything else that we saw in the survey. So it’s just a baseline fact that women experience this more, report it more, and, therefore, think about it, more, and I think also as you’re going to see, have more stringent standards for sexual harassment than men do, perhaps to my own gender’s detriment.

Among the 58 percent of women that had experienced this we asked about some specific venues. And I will point out that about 23 percent of them felt that they had experienced it at work and 15 percent felt that they had experienced it from a specific figure in authority over them either at school or at work. So it’s pretty pervasive and it doesn’t necessarily happen to everyone all the time, but this was a question that was asked about their entire lives. It is something that everyone sees in their lives.

Now, we asked a range of different activities, such as asking someone to go to lunch or asking for a drink or some activities that are more logically and sort of obviously sexual harassment, at least in my opinion, although there’s a range of views about this. And so as you’ll see there, we’ve arrayed them on this graph in order of how likely people were to say that this activity was always sexual harassment. That’s the way we presented it. You can cut the data in some different ways.

Obviously I should say here asking to go for lunch in the right context certainly could constitute sexual harassment in a particular situation. But we asked about these things in general terms and this is how people responded.

People do draw distinctions. Most people, in fact very few people, think that simply asking to go for lunch or to a drink is always sexual harassment. But you see a bit of jump when you get to things like sexual jokes, placing a hand on a back, looking
at private parts, all the way up to persisting in unwanted attention. And as you’ll see there in the graph we’ve drawn a distinction between male and female respondents. Men are in blue and women are in gold.

And women say that these activities are sexual harassment or always sexual harassment at much higher rates than men do. In fact, I’d like to point out that men, the only time they get to a majority of men that say that this always counts as sexual harassment is in persisting in unwanted activity. Even asking for sexual favors or looking at private parts or sexual jokes, those don’t get to majorities for men.

Now, we did an experiment on the survey to try to get at people’s attitudes about this relative to which gender was engaged in the activity. So in this particular chart here what we’ve done is we’ve broken it out by men versus women and also who was engaged in the activity. Was it a man doing this to a woman, so a man asking to go for a drink to a woman, or a woman asking a man; or perhaps a man asking for sexual favors or a woman doing the same thing?

What we found is that people are more concerned about men doing these things to women than they are women doing these things to men, a kind of inconsistency, if you will, in people’s attitudes about this subject. Women are more consistent than men are, although you see the same pattern of women being inconsistent no matter what the activity is. We’ve only shown you the most significant and serious activities here in this graph, but there is that pattern that persists all the way through the data.

And one other thing that we looked at in this area is consent. What is required to get consent? And one of the things that -- this is we’re at college campuses, it’s been a subject in the news in a number of ways. What we found was that women are more likely to believe that consent needs to be verbal than men do. Now I hasten to add that it’s not the case that men don’t believe in consent, but they are much or only
somewhat, depending on the situation, more willing to accept nonverbal consent in any kind of sexual situation than women are, frankly.

These are the two most significant areas in this: having sex and intimate touching. But you see the basic pattern actually holding through the rest of the data, as well.

Well, let’s talk about just a few other things before we turn it over to the panel. We looked at immigration because that is a policy that’s in the news and it affects a lot of families. And we asked the question a little bit differently because interested in family. We asked which family members should be permitted into the United States or should you be able to sponsor for asylum or to come to the United States in some way?

And you see here a partisan difference. We’ve arrayed it by the popularity, I suppose, I’m not sure what other word I should use there, of the family relationship: children, spouses, and then to a slightly lesser degree parents. These are agreed upon by both political parties, both Democrats and Republicans think you should be able to do that, although spouse is right at 50 percent, so it’s on the median.

As you can see, it falls off faster for Republicans. Republicans tend not to think that siblings or grandparents or extended family should be sponsored, although even a minority of Democrats actually when you get to something like aunt or uncle, niece or nephew, or cousin, they also -- only a minority of Democrats tend to think that you should be able to sponsor these groups. In one way this shows the partisan gap; in another way it also shows there is perhaps more agreement on this subject than some coverage might lead people to think.

Now, I mentioned asylum requests before. I want to talk briefly about that. We did ask a series of questions, such as if a family applies for asylum what should happen to the parents and children? Should they be kept together or separated? And then subsequently asked, well, if you said kept together, what should happen to the
family? If you said separated, what should happen to the family?

    Now, this creates sort of a series of four policy options: The family can either be kept together and let into the country; the family can be kept together or held and in a detention facility; the family can be separated and children can be sent off to foster care or to live with family and friends that may be living in the United States; or children can be separated and be kept in a detention facility. Now, I'll start with that last option first.

    About 1 in 10 people ended up through our series of questions picking that. It's a relatively low number. There is a firm policy point here that people prefer families to be together. I know it is 11 percent, although I would just point as a political scientist who does a lot of surveys 10 percent of the public will say virtually anything, that aliens run the government, that Donald Trump is respectful to women, or whatever. (Laughter) There are many topics that you can get 10 percent of the public to say.

    So the real question, I think, from the point of view of the public is not should families be kept together or not, but more with those top two bars what should be done? Should they be allowed into the country? Should they be held together in a detention facility? There is more of a split there. And though we don’t show it in the graph, there is a partisan split that’s somewhat predictable that we can talk about I guess in the Q&A if we need to.

    A couple of last slides on this. We also looked at the tax cuts the Republican Congress and President Trump passed and signed last year. We did not find, I would say, an enormous amount that I think was new on the subject, but we did find that they’re just uniformly not particularly popular, especially in the following sense.

    We asked who would these tax cuts help? And we gave a number of options: corporations, wealthy individuals, small business, middle income, low income, and most significantly for our purposes your family. It turns out that only about a third or
maybe just a bit more of people think that the tax cuts will help their family. What they tend to think is that the tax cuts are going to help wealthy individuals, large corporations, or something like that.

The only demographic difference that I think was really significant to talk about here was that women on average did tend to think that this was even less helpful to them. Only about 30 percent thought that it would help their family.

One last point, and this is a complicated one which we probably would need more time for to fully talk about, and that’s policy. Chris and I are political scientists and so we’re familiar with the idea of partisan splits and looking at how Democrats differ from Republicans. But one of the things this survey allows us to do is to look at issues that are a little bit off the beaten path and to point out how our family experience and family situation affects our views.

In the survey, and you can look at the report for much more detail on this, we asked a number of trade-off questions about local issues. Would you rather spend more money on roads or schools? There are a number of other trade-offs we gave people in the survey. I just want to give this as an example.

As you can see there, we’ve grouped in the bars Democrats on the left and Republicans on the right. There is a partisan difference here. But I think an interesting thing to note is that your family experience actually makes quite a bit of difference. Even though Democrats generally want to spend more on schools and Republicans are more likely to choose roads, whether or not you’re single or you don’t have children or whether you’re married or you do have children makes a pretty significant difference inside of both parties as to how you feel about this issue. And one of the reasons that Chris and I have done this project and push this is to try to get people in our own discipline of political science to think more about the importance of family and how it affects politics.
Let me just put that slide up. This is the bullet point sort of summarizing some of the key things. I'm just going to make two points and we'll turn it over to the panel.

There are lots of things that we see in the survey consistently. They've already been talked about by others. I'm going to focus on some things we've learned this year that are special.

One is that identity matters a lot and this connects to a lesson that we've seen a lot, which is that your experience matters a great deal. You have a different experience in life if you're a woman than if you are a man. You have a different experience based on race and other factors, as well. And this needs to be considered as we think about politics and policy.

Along the lines of those identity factors I want to just also point out that women, their experience is quite different vis-à-vis sexual harassment. And so any account of policy should take that into consideration.

We talked a little bit today about threats to the family and we didn't ask the question about sort of is sexual harassment a threat to your family, but I think certainly both the economic and issues and also the sexual harassment issues are threats that people see in their lives. And they connect to the identities that we all have and we experience them in different ways because of those identities.

So we thank you for your time. We hope this survey garners a lot of attention, both in our own discipline and in the policy world, to get people thinking about how family connects to politics and policy. Thank you very much. (Applause)

MR. REEVES: Thank you, Jeremy and Chris. I'd like to invite our panel to join us up on stage now. As they're taking their seats, I will introduce our panel. Each panelist will offer a brief response to the survey. There's obviously so much there that they can't give a full response to it. Then I'll moderate a brief discussion among the
panel and then it’ll be over to you both in the room and online.

As you’re looking at the panel from your left to right, which is the order that our panelists will speak in, I’ll briefly introduce them. So on your far left, next to me, is Marcy Carlson. She’s a professor of sociology and director of the Center for Demography and Ecology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Her recent work has been focused on union formation, fertility, parenting, and child well-being. And I should say that she is an advisor to the American Family Survey.

In the middle, Brad Wilcox, who’s director of the National Marriage Project at UVA. He’s a visiting scholar at AEI next door and a senior fellow at the Institute for Family Studies. His work primarily focuses on the quality and stability of American family life and he’s also an advisor to the survey.

And then on your far right, my colleague Randy Akee. He’s a David M. Rubenstein fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings. He’s on loan to us here at Brookings from UCLA where he’s a professor in the Department of Public Policy and American Indian Studies. His current research focuses primarily on income inequality and immobility by race and ethnicity.

So with that, I’m going to invite Marcy to kick us off, go along the panel, and see where we end up. Marcy, welcome.

MS. CARLSON: Thank you very much. I’m delighted to be here and I want to congratulate the authors of a terrific report that I think provides a lot of new information about families in the U.S.

(Interruption; microphone problem)

MS. CARLSON: Okay, great. Let me just say I’m delighted to be here. I really congratulate the authors for what I think is a really important new study that sheds light on what’s happening in U.S. families. And thanks to Brookings for hosting.

Just a couple of reflections. I think part of what this study shows is really
the enduring value and salience that families play in American life, especially in terms of marriage. I think it’s really striking that strong majorities believe that marriage makes families and children better off and is really needed to create strong families. And, in fact, few believe that marriage is old-fashioned and out-of-date. Very few people endorsed that idea, as well as the fact that it’s a burden more than a benefit. Very few people believe that. And so marriage is something that people aspire to, really hope to experience themselves, and many people hold on to once they’ve entered marriage.

At the same time, we have a pretty persistent socioeconomic gradient in marriage and that also comes out very clearly in this study. So as the study notes, wealthier or higher income Americans tend to raise their children within the context of marriage. So just a couple of examples, if you look at people that are middle-aged, ages 45 to 54, 76 percent of those with $80,000 of income or higher are married compared to only 33 percent of those with less than $40,000 of income.

And a similar gradient comes when we look at education. So people with college degrees are much more likely to be married than those with a high school education or less.

And so I think this is interesting and important and it really points to a double advantage for parents and kids who have resources, economic resources, and then often have family stability to go along with that. And so I think that raises questions and concerns about sort of going forward what does that mean in terms of inequality in American life?

MR. REEVES: I think we’re going to switch to a handheld mic for you, Marcy. I was on a panel once with Germaine Greer, the well-known feminist writer, and she made the strong argument that these kinds of microphones are fundamentally sexist. (Laughter)

MS. CARLSON: I would agree.
MR. REEVES: They tend to presume a certain wardrobe.

MS. CARLSON: Wardrobe, exactly. I guess I didn’t wear the right tie here.

MR. REEVES: And that’s always stuck with me and I think Germaine was right. I’m not going to be thanked by our IT people for making this point, but -- it’s not in the survey. New social survey, are these mics sexist?

MS. CARLSON: Does this count against my time? (Laughter)

MR. REEVES: No, no. No, no, your time’s still there. Don’t worry. Don’t worry.

MS. CARLSON: Okay, great. So just to continue, so I think the socioeconomic gradient in marriage is important. And then I think this point about that most people think that their own marriages are in pretty good shape and other people’s are less so, I think that’s a really striking finding. Right? But it actually goes in the right direction because we would rather have people feel good about what they’re experiencing in their own family life and a bit concerned about kind of the more amorphous patterns that they see out there. So I think it does bring both some sense of othering that we have in American society, but also a sense that people are doing all right and feel all right about what’s going on in their own families. And I think that would be better than opposite, right, that people are worried about what they’re experiencing, but sort of hope or think things are going well more out there.

So I think the ongoing value and importance of marriage I think just really comes out in this study and is something that those with the most resources that could afford perhaps not to be married or not to have kids, but then they’re actually choosing marriage. And I think that points to a stability of the family as an institution and especially marriage.

I guess my second point would be at the same time the study really
shows the economic concerns about raising children. So nearly three-quarters of those who have children at home had worried about paying at least one bill in the last year. And that’s a very striking fraction, right, when we think about the families trying to raise children and doing that in the context of economic stress or economic anxiety.

And I think this concern is also being picked up by the next generation. Because if you look at those who are ages 18 to 29, who do not have children, the reason that they’re most likely to say that they are concerned about having children is the cost of raising a child. Right? And so if we think about how economics translates into the next generation I think that could be part of why we’ve seen these persistent declines in fertility. And perhaps the U.S. is going to look more like Europe in the future as we have fewer and fewer kids. We’ve historically been close to replacement level fertility and that’s no longer the case. We’re down to about I think 1.8 kids per union or per woman.

And then I think related to that when the survey talked to childless women ages 18 to 49, fully one-third, 32 percent, report that they did not want to have children. And so it makes you wonder about sort of where are we going as a society in terms of we value our families, people tend to feel good about their families, parental identity and partner identities are strong, and yet some people are saying they’re not necessarily going to choose that in the future. And it’s lower among men; it was about 22 percent of men.

And just one additional point. I think it was very striking that when you look at family activities there doesn’t seem to be a big difference in terms of the demographics of what people are doing. And so as a family demographer I think a lot of characteristics that we think about -- age and race and education and partisan identity -- affect the kinds of families people may have. And yet perhaps when people are in families there’s a lot of similarity about what they do. And I think understanding more about kind of family structure in the context of family processes that may kind of be more
similar I think is an important point and something to look at for the future.

So I will stop there and I will hand it over to my colleague, Brad.

MR. REEVES: Thank you, Marcy. Thank you for being so gracious about our technical issues.

Brad, what struck you about the survey?

MR. WILCOX: Well, you know, I wanted to kind of underline this morning some striking connections in the survey between marriage and partisanship. And I should say as a conservative these connections lead me not feeling triumphant, but rather kind of sad. And I’ll talk about why that’s case now.

But before I get started I just want to acknowledge that my wife growing up appreciated a Jesuit priest at her local church who was kind of known for making three clear, cogent, and quick points in his homilies. But I’ve got to confess this morning that I’m going to be not following his advice and his approach. I’ll be giving you, hopefully, four clear, cogent, and quick points this morning about the links, again, between partisanship and marriage in the American Family Survey.

So the first thing that I want to mention is that it turns out that today on a day -- surprise, surprise -- where Trump is yet again dominating the headlines, that there is a real marriage gap in support for Trump, which was mentioned earlier. But if you kind of look at this survey closely what it tells us is that we focused a lot on things like education and gender and looking at sort of the Trump phenomenon, but the marriage gap is about as large as the gender and education gaps. And it’s particularly the case for men.

So the majority of both college educated and less educated men support Trump whereas a clear minority of college educated and even less educated men who are unmarried would support Trump. So I think we need to be thinking more about what’s the connection here between marriage and political partisanship even when it
comes to the support of a man who’s obviously not been sort of living or walking the walk when it comes to marriage.

The second point I want to make here is that probably many of you have kind of heard about sort of the red families versus blue families thesis put forward by Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, a thesis that sort of suggests that kind of ironically blue families are actually doing better when it comes to kind of the practice of American family life. And this was articulated by Nicholas Kristof, for instance, in the \textit{New York Times} a while back when he said that, “Conservatives thunder about family values, but don’t practice them.” And then he added, “Liberals who practice the values that conservatives preach” when it comes to sort of living family life.

Now, there’s only one problem, though, with this sort of newer thesis that they have offered and it’s somewhat taken up with the media and that is at least when it comes to the sort of individual and household levels it’s not true. Okay. And this survey underlines a variety of ways in which Republicans and conservatives are more likely to be married to sort of being married in a new drama fashion and also to attach importance to marriage.

So, for instance, we see that Republicans are 17 percentage points more likely to be married than Democrats. The conservatives are 9 percentage points less likely to report that their relationship is in trouble compared to liberals. And that Republicans are 21 percentage points more likely to say “being married” is “essential” to living a fulfilling life.

So, again, my point here is that there is a connection for a variety of reason that we can talk about maybe in the Q&A between partisanship and marriage. And not just family structure here, but also family process. And I think we need to think more about why that’s the case. But, again, I want to underline from sort of my perspective, I wish there was no partisan divide in marital status and in the quality of
marriage, as well.

A third related point is that there’s been a lot of talk about the marriage divide in America. And we’ve been speaking about it primarily in terms of class, that it’s about the college educated, more affluent Americans versus the less educated, more working class and poor Americas. And this point was just made by my colleague Professor Carlson. And that’s true. In this survey it’s true. But it’s not the whole truth.

We need to think about this divide in terms of three C’s: cash, culture, and community. And yes, cash matters. Education and income matter when it comes to marriage and family and family structure and family process in America. But it’s also the case that certain kinds of cultural values, certain kinds of cultural aspirations, norms, etcetera, also matter, as do being a part of or not a part of a particular kind of community.

And this survey indicates that, for instance, the partisan gap in marriage is, as I said before, 17 percentage points. Well, the sort of education gap in marriage is 17 percentage points. So they’re roughly equivalent and yet we hear a lot more about the economic part of the story again than we hear about the ways in which culture and community are also structuring the marriage divide in America. So this survey helps us I think to see that there are a variety of things going into this marriage divide, but one of those things is either partisanship or the kinds of things that partisanship is signaling in terms, again, of culture and community.

And then the final point that I want to make here, the fourth point, is that this sort of Republican story I’m telling here about Republicans being more married and more happily married and more stably married makes me a little suspicious of the idea -- or skeptical I should say of the idea that the reason the upper middle class is succeeding at marriage is because they are more egalitarian than the working class. And this is an idea that’s been, particularly by Richard Reeves in *The Atlantic*, for instance, as well as by Cahn and Carbone.
But the fact that Republicans have kind of a comparative advantage when it comes to marriage and when it comes to the quality and stability of the marriage leads me to think perhaps it's really not about egalitarianism per se, but perhaps it's about the way in which some Americans are more likely to engender a strong connection or commitment on the part of men to their families. And insofar as particularly probably more religious Republicans, but also more secular progressive Americans are succeeding in doing that. That is what is perhaps driving some of these trends, not whether or not a couple is embracing a formal 50-50 model approach to family life.

Let me just conclude then, again, by saying that we are seeing in this survey, as in other research, that there is a kind of partisan divide when it comes to marriage in America. And I sincerely wish that this was not the case, but it is, at least in 2018, the case that there is this partisan divide and sort of the structure and character of American family life.

MR. REEVES: Thank you, Brad. Randall.

MR. AKEE: So thanks again. I’m going to focus a little bit more on some of the race outcomes and stratification that exist in the data because I think it’s fascinating. As someone who uses a lot of administrative data that’s very quantitative in nature, this is quantitative, but it provides a rich look at a number of qualitative aspects that I think is useful for not just political scientists, but also economists and others who build hypotheses. And this, I think there are some very interesting things and I'll mention three of them, like the Jesuits say, points that I think are useful inputs for a bunch of research and hypotheses.

But just to the point that you raise, which I thought was really interesting, about the marriage divide across partisanship, I think one of the useful things in the data is that one can do -- you can stratify the results by age. Because my understanding of the way Republicans versus Democrats, Democrats tend to skew young. And so that
might be explaining the 17 percentage points differences. So I think that’s something we
can do quite -- useful and see whether or not that difference persists accounting for the
age difference in the people’s partisan identities.

MR. REEVES: Randy, you got to keep the mic close to you.

MR. AKEE: Sorry. All right. So Figure 5 is a very interesting figure that
you guys weren’t able to show -- or I think you did show it up there. It was fascinating.
And that’s a figure, and I’ll tell you about it, it asked, “How important are the following
things to your own personal identity?” And they showed it. And if you remember, there
was this stark difference by race.

MR. REEVES: Do you want me to pull it up?

MR. AKEE: You don’t have to. I think it’s fine. So I’ll tell you to go look
at it. Write it down, it’s Figure 5. And what’s really striking to me is that blacks report
race is important to them 5 times as much as whites, so it’s almost 50 percent while for
whites it’s 10 percent. Hispanics reported twice as much as whites, it’s almost 20 percent
for them and 10 percent for them. So I found that fascinating.

And the thing that I really wanted to unpack there was, well, how much of
this is reinforced by society? How much of this is individually determined? And I thought
it’s a great beginning place and I could think of follow-up questions that future surveys
could ask. How much of this is imposed by society on you? How much of this is sort of
your own sense of this? The question doesn’t get at that currently, but it’s fascinating to
see this stark difference across race and ethnic groups there.

The second thing that I also found, and this I don’t think you were able to
present in this presentation, is Table 11, Family Stressors. Again, we can look
quantitatively at data, you know, who’s arrested by race, who gets affected by job loss,
and those sorts of things, and it’s very impersonal. Here we’re able to sort of look at it at
a much more personal level because people are responding themselves. It’s not just a
And why I raise this is because we can look at it by race within the household. And what they find there I think is also incredibly striking. So for white families 16 percent report that they had an immediate family die. For black and Hispanic it’s much higher, it’s 25 percent and 20 percent, respectively.

Another family stressor was laid off or had a spouse or partner laid off. For white families only 8 percent report affirmative in that. However, for black and Hispanic it’s 12 and 11 percent.

So these are two of the biggest family stressors -- losing your job, losing one’s life -- and these are just, again, the stark differences across race groups, I think are incredibly fascinating. We knew this to some extent, but this just reinforces things we knew and I think should double our efforts for understanding why that is the case. So I think there’s all this great fodder for really neat research here.

The last thing I’ll talk about, which, again, I thought is incredibly interesting, is Table 15, what families identify as essential for leading a fulfilling life. And here, again, I’ll come to what others have mentioned and I think both of the presenters had mentioned earlier, as well.

There’s actually more agreement than disagreement across race, and that’s something that I found particularly interesting with regard to a rewarding job, education, and making a good living. So these three sorts of economic activities resoundingly across white, black, and Hispanic have essentially the same percentage points. They’re all in the 60s to 70 percentage points. So across the scope of race and ethnicity, having a rewarding job, getting a good education, and making a good living matter across race groups.

There are differences, of course, across race and ethnic groups, and that’s actually shown in their table there of there’s differences in being married, having
kids, or participating in religious communities. So there are dimensions along which ethnic and racial groups differ, but there are important ones where we are all aligned. And I found that really interesting, so thank you.

MR. REEVES: Thank you. Thank you, Randy. Thank you to all the panelists for their comments. I should say that there may well be some questions about the survey itself, and Jeremy and Chris are very happy to jump up with a microphone in answer to either the panelists or to you. So if there are questions about the survey itself, then I hope we can accommodate them.

The plan now is I’m just going to moderate a brief discussion among the panelists, responding to some of their comments and drawing out some themes before opening up to the floor.

It seems to me just listening to the panelists and thinking about the survey that you can tell a sort of unifying story. Oh, look how similar we are in many of these areas. Or you can tell a look at the differences story, a kind of differentiation story, which is look at the differences as something that Brad highlighted. And, of course, both are true and the panelists I think have chosen to emphasize some of the areas of unity versus different.

Let’s dig in on a couple of things that have been mentioned. This issue about marriage and, in particular, I think both Marcy and Brad talked about the marriage gap. And the fact that everyone likes marriage as a general idea, but it may well be they have different aspirations for marriage or they think differently about marriage, which might lead to some of these different kind of partisan results.

And I just wonder, Marcy, I wanted to get your response to Brad’s suggestion that there is this kind of partisan divide, that whilst everyone is in favor of marriage, Republicans are kind of better at it. I mean, I’m paraphrasing slightly. You said they have a comparative advantage in terms of marriage. And whether or not that's
your interpretation of what's there, and indeed whether or not it's helpful just to think about marriage in a singular way, because what might be driving some of these differences, you know, kind of in favor of marriage, but we mean something very different by it. So someone who's particularly liberal might have a different view about what marriage is for than someone who's very conservative. So the “why” of marriage might be as important as the “whether” of marriage. It might be just that lumping it all as marriage we're missing some of those.

But, Marcy, respond to that or to what Brad said, if you wouldn't mind. And you probably should stick with the handheld.

MS. CARLSON: Yeah, I think this is a really interesting point, right, of how much sort of culture or partisan identity driving some of these differences. I guess my response would be I think partisan identity itself is shifting a bit in America. Right? And I’m not sure that it’s such an enduring characteristic as it once was. And I think if you look at some of these differences, you know, I think the point that we need to maybe break down, partisan and how it’s intersecting with age and how it’s intersecting with education and lots of things. I guess in my read of -- with this study and the literature out there, the persistence of economic difference in marriage, not in terms of the attitudes towards marriage, but in terms of entering marriage and staying in marriage, to me it seems much more striking when you look at income differences at education differences.

And I guess I'm just not as certain that partisan identity is really driving this. I think there's a selection process, as social scientists would say, that people that get married are the ones that can most make that happen. And people say that they want economic stability and they want a high-quality relationship. And to me those -- so it's not the difference in what you say about marriage, but it's your ability to get there. And I think that's where some of these socioeconomic differences come into play. Not that there is not a partisan difference when we look at the data here. To me it just
doesn’t seem to be driving it based on what I’ve seen here and what I’ve seen in other studies.

MR. REEVES: Brad, do you want to respond to that?

MR. WILCOX: Sure. I mean, I think certainly part of the story here is about selection effects. It’s about what we see in this particular survey that Republicans are more affluent, for instance. And it’s also about the kinds of people who are Republicans today, at least who were until 2016, are generally, you know, more religious, for instance. So that could be kind of part of the story, as well.

But I do want to say that when I actually look at, for instance, data in the general social survey and look at who is stably married in America and I’m looking at age, I’m looking at race, I’m looking ethnicity, looking at college education versus being less educated, and then throwing in religiosity and partisanship, I find that religion’s a better predictor of who is stably married in America than is college, being a college graduate, what I was surprised by given all this work that we’ve been doing on the marriage divide. And partisanship in the multivariate model, it’s not as powerful as college education or race and ethnicity, but it remains an important predictor of who is stably married in America.

So I think in the academy, in the media, we tend to focus more on class, more on education and income. But I think we need to kind of expand our vision a bit and recognize, again, the ways in which it’s not just cash, it’s also culture and community. And two markers of sort of culture and community are both religion and, unfortunately, partisanship now in America.

MR. REEVES: Jeremy or Chris, do you want to weigh in on this question of the partisan divide in marriage at all?

MR. POPE: I’ve got a point I’ll make.

MR. REEVES: Yeah, that would be great. Thank you.
MR. POPE: Should I just stand here? Is that okay.

MR. REEVES: Use the mic. Yeah, that'd be great.

MR. POPE: I want to agree with Richard and then offer one dissenting point, and it would be this. I completely agree with everything you said about how getting into marriage --

MR. REEVES: You mean Brad.

MR. POPE: I'm sorry, Brad.

MR. REEVES: I got excited for a minute. (Laughter)

MR. POPE: I'll refute you later. (Laughter) I completely agree with Brad about getting into marriage has a partisan distinction to it. And I personally buy the idea that it's causal in some sense, although it's difficult to prove. However, once you get into the institution of marriage, the partisanship difference does sort of disappear.

And that's was kind of one of the things I was getting at towards the end of the part of the presentation I was talking about where if you look within the parties, your family experience makes a big difference inside of them. And what I think policymakers should probably focus on is the fact that that partisan difference does continue to exist, but once people get into it they're pretty happy with it and their marriages don't look wildly different, I wouldn't say.

MR. REEVES: Okay, thank you. Yeah, please do, yeah.

MS. CARLSON: Just one other thing to note. There are questions -- there's a lot in this survey, as you've gotten a sense thus far, right? And I think when you think about or when people are asked what's important for them in terms of -- I can't remember the exact wording, if it's marriage or partnership, they talk about shared values in parenting and in family life. And they don't actually say that partisanship is something that's important to share, right.

And so if you think about the fact that people really identify as parents
and as partners and that those identities really shape what they do and how they go about family, to me I think that unifying piece is really compelling.

MR. REEVES: Randy, I’m very happy for you to weigh in on this, but also wanted to extend your comments on the identity question. One of the things that’s striking about it is that there is -- you get this gap between, in all racial groups, your parent identity and spouse identity is more important than your race identity. But that gap is only sustained among black Americans because parent identities is so much higher than it is for white Americans.

So for black Americans race identity ranks at 46 very important, parent 61 percent, whereas for white the parent identity is 42 percent. And it’s similar, although the gap’s not as big, for spouse identity, too.

So it seems as if there are these identifiers, these markers are higher across the board for black Americans than for white Americans, which is what allows us to say that family’s still more important than race because actually black Americans rank race more highly as an identifier than white Americans rank parenting as an identifier.

MR. AKEE: I mean, I think that was some of the points that I was trying to get at, that it leads to these really natural interesting questions of where does race -- where does this characteristic of race come into forming your own identity? Is it externally imposed? Is it internally imposed? And that’s where I think the really interesting parts are there. And why is it so starkly different across the groups? That’s the question. What is it that’s driving this?

Even when you can find, as I mentioned in a couple of the other tables there, there are some differences, there are some things that people equally value across race and ethnic groups. So that, you know, from an academic’s perspective is incredibly interesting. What drives differences on cultural, societal characteristics, but similarities on some educational, employment aspirations? That is stark to me and really
fascinating.

MR. REEVES: I just want to get all of your reactions to, and then I'll probably open up, so be ready with your hands and questions, but this issue of the sequence. So my colleagues Isabel Sawhill and Ron Haskins have written a lot about the success sequence, which is graduate high school, get married before you have a kid, and work full time. And that wasn't exactly the sequence that was put up here, but there's a similar thinking behind it, which is here's the order of events. So it was sex, cohabitation, marriage, children. Sorry, I knew there was something coming next. (Laughter) Thanks.

And it's striking when you look at that chart the gap between the ideal and the real or the sense that -- and actually it wasn't as big a partisan divide around that as I thought, which is this is kind of the best way to go about things. But then this is not how a lot of people are going about things or think others are going about it.

So the question is why? Why do we think that's happening, why there's this gap? And is it economics? Is it shift in social norms? It doesn't seem as if there's a shift in social norms if people are still holding out for that? Or is it a sort of romantic, vague idea, a Hollywood idea of this is how the world goes, which has nothing to do with how people actually live? So is it cultural? Is it economic?

And then what do you take away from that gap? Because you might say, well, what we need to do is help people to live more closely to the ideal that they're professing or it could be to say in today's economy and today's world, actually that's just an outdated, overly romanticized ideal and it's making people unhappy to try and be living according to an outdated ideal. So to put it really crudely should we be shattering the illusion or should we try to help people live up to that ideal?

Brad, I'm going to start with you on this one because I suspect you have views, and then maybe Marcy and Randy can weigh in.
MR. WILCOX: Yeah, I find it interesting that there was an op-ed recently in the Washington Post sort of talking about the fact that there are these ideals about the success sequence or other kinds of things about family life and courting and whatnot, dating, you know. But the reality is much more messy in American family life. And then so the op-ed kind of concludes by saying we need to kind of embrace the messiness. Right?

But you don’t have the same mindset when it comes to sort of like we expect our politicians to abide by an ideal of not self-dealing and an ideal of not completely dissembling and holding forth from the bully pulpit with one lie after another. Right? We recognize that in the real political world politicians do fudge the facts and there is often kind of dealing below the table. But that’s not how we want things to be in Washington.

And just want to make the same thing about the family. Yeah, relationships are messy. Families are messy. Marriages are messy. We all know this. I mean, we’ve all experienced it in some way or another. But the question is do we want to kind of lift up the messiness as our aspiration or do you want to try to continue to figure out ways -- and they’re going to be somewhat new in 2018 as compared to, say, 1958 -- of helping ordinary Americans and helping our kids realize a path to a strong and stable family life.

And the reality is that as both Belle Sawhill and Ron Haskins looked at older data, and as Wendy Wang and I looked at newer data, young adults who at least get a high school degree and then work full time and then marry before having kids are much more likely to avoid poverty and much more likely to realize a middle class or upper class lifestyle and have a stable family. And this path is true not just for white, college educated kids, it’s true for African American, Latino, and young adults from lower income families. So if they follow those three steps, their odds of beating poverty and going into
the middle class are much, much higher.

So I would say we just have to figure out ways to sort of make the sequence more accessible to Americans regardless of their race or ethnicity and regardless of their class background.

MR. REEVES: The ideal can be valuable even if (inaudible).

MR. WILCOX: And we need to calibrate both into the culture and in terms of public policy ways to make that path possible.

MR. REEVES: And I think it’s true, and I can look at the surveys and you all know, that it’s certainly not true that the people who are espousing those values are the ones who are always living by it and vice versa. In fact, very often I think you’ll find, and Kathryn Edin’s work will find that even among the very disadvantaged, people who actually struggled with any of that sequence, nonetheless hold that as an ideal.

Marcy, what was your response to that sequence?

MS. CARLSON: Yeah, I think it’s a very interesting question, so what the ideals people have. And the ideals are actually very similar across a lot of groups. But if you look on Figure 14, for those who have the report, this is one place where I think the partisan difference is striking.

So for white Democrats are the one group where the ideal matches the actual. And the reason really has to do with the ordering of having first sex because everyone -- many people aspire to marriage, right, but the white Democrats are more open to the sexual activity happening first and then cohabitation and then marriage. And that’s actually the pattern that turns out to be what’s happening.

And so it seems to me it’s thinking about how are we conceiving of marriage as an institution or something to aspire to? And then what’s the reality? Right? And so I think that’s where it’s really tricky. I think people are having -- are sexually involved at about the same rate. There’s very few differences in terms of demographic or
partisan or religious background. And so I think some groups are more comfortable with that than others. And so thinking about what that gap means I think is something to wrestle with.

MR. REEVES: Thank you. Randy, do you have any comments on that?

MR. AKEE: I mean, I think what was striking to me was the Republican where essentially everything was in a line, the first three, everything except having children were supposed to happen simultaneously, so I found that striking.

MR. REEVES: And consistent with the socially conservative view, which is that you --

MR. AKEE: Well, no, no, absolutely. And then the actual practice being, you know, just a step --

MR. REEVES: A long way from that.

MR. AKEE: Exactly.

MR. REEVES: Yeah. And I think particularly you do sex, cohabitation, and then marriage, if you look at sex and marriage, the work that Scott Winship has done out of Senator Mike Lee’s office I think shows quite compelling that one of the reasons for the rise in the non-marital births in the drop off in what were called “shotgun marriages,” is that there were a significant number of people who were getting pregnant, then getting married in the past, and that that social norm has changed. But it wasn’t as if in the past people weren’t having sex before they got married. It’s just that if that resulted in pregnancy, they were getting married.

And I think we could probably say that this is not necessarily new, that there’s the ideal, but not necessarily how it always lines up.

All right. I think with that, I’m sure there’s going to be questions in the room and maybe online, as well, so I’m going to open up. Raise your hands. If you can say who you are, please make it a question or at least have a rising tone at the end of
your statement so it sounds like a question, that would be great. (Laughter)

And we’re going to start at the back. Where’s the microphone? There’s one in the back. So start right at the back, the lady on your right as you’re running forward to the mic. Thank you. And please keep them as brief as possible.

MS. PERSON: Thank you. My name is Carol Person and I have a question about the way in which the pool of 3,000 respondents was obtained.

MR. REEVES: Can you put the microphone right up to your mouth? I’m very sorry about the leaf-blower.

MS. PERSON: Sure. Is that better?

MR. REEVES: It’s the sound of American autumn or fall, I should say.

MS. PERSON: All right. I’m wondering if you know whether people in same-sex marriages were included among the 3,000. How did you assure that the racial mix and geographic mix represents our country? Were anyone who headed up single-parent families represented? And how about people who are cohabiting, but not married? In other words, how did you assure the pool really represents our country?

MR. REEVES: How sure are we it’s representative? But especially the same-sex marriage point, as well. Yeah.

MR. KARPOWITZ: Yeah, I think I can speak to that. It’s a great question. Thanks.

So first of all, we can say that cohabiting people, single people with children, same-sex relationships are all represented in this study. So we haven’t, for example, distinguished between opposite-sex and same-sex relationships in the work that we’ve presented here today, but both are included in the sample.

The sample was generated by our partners at YouGov. They have a very large sample of people who take online surveys with them. This survey was conducted online. And then they have a very technical procedure for matching back to
the American Community Survey, to the Census essentially, to ensure that we are represented -- that our sample is representative of a sample that -- representative of the United States. So we have very -- we’re very confident that this looks similar in terms of rates of education and partisanship and gender and a number of other demographic characteristics to the United States as a whole.

MR. REEVES: Thank you. Okay, the gentleman there. So keep coming forward. Yeah, there.

MR. LEHMAN: Thanks. I’m Charles Lehman. I’m with the Washington Free Beacon. So I want to go back to one of the things in the survey that didn’t get a lot of airtime with you folks and ask about it, which is the identity categories.

Part of the way that I read that was for people who are spouses or parents there’s a strong preference and then across the rest of the population inclusive of them there isn’t a lot of self-identification with any particular category. Could you speak to the identity category findings more broadly and especially what that diversion signifies?

MR. REEVES: Okay, I’m going to take one more, so we’ll take them in order. And I think, again, this may have to go back to the surveyors. We probably just bring up a chair maybe.

Just immediately to your left. The lady just to your left. Yeah, thank you.

QUESTIONER: Hi. My name is Asha from the YWCA. And this question does relate to the survey and is kind of tangential to the previous question about demographic and make-up of folks who took the survey.

What was your definition of American? And considering you’re going off of the Census and comparing to the Census, do you have any kind of understanding of if there were folks who were citizens and non-citizens taking the survey?

MR. REEVES: Oh, you’re already got one, okay.

MR. POPE: Yeah. So I’ll take the second question first and then come
back to the first one.

In terms of citizen or non-citizen, we tend not to ask that question. There is an ongoing dispute about this related to the Census right now, so I refer you to that. We didn’t actually ask anyone if they were a citizen or not. I don’t actually -- Chris is on our institutional review board at BYU, so I don’t know if we would have had trouble with that or not. So I can’t really speak to that. My strong suspicion is there are non-citizens who took it, but we can’t speak to how they would have responded.

MR. KARPOWITZ: Yeah. If you look in the Immigration section, we did ask about your interactions with non-citizens because we asked a number of questions which we weren’t able to present. We didn’t ask anyone themselves, so, I’m sorry, I can’t fully answer your question.

On the identity point, let me just tell you a quick story. When we were trying to figure out what all of the identities should be, we discovered it was hard to narrow the list down. Some of them were obvious. Obviously we wanted to do spouse and parent. That was sort of where this started. And we’re political scientists, so we wanted to do partisanship. But then after that it was kind of a difficult choice to figure out what should we ask and what shouldn’t we ask?

Chris would not let me ask are you a fan of *Lord of the Rings*. He said that was not appropriate to put on the survey. (Laughter) So we narrowed it down to the ones that we went with and our results are limited to that particular group of identities. And so it would be a mistake to generalize it too much.

Now, having said that, I think the way you characterized it -- I’m sorry, I’ve forgotten you name -- is quite accurate. People who are in marriages or people who are parents taken that deeply seriously as a part of their identity. And then also you saw that there’s a much higher racial identity for people who are not white.

Beyond that, one other thing which we did not emphasize which I will
now point out is that the group that had the least reaction to the questions tended to be men and, therefore, because of the racial difference, white men. That doesn’t mean they don’t have an identity I suppose, but they just didn’t react to these questions.

MR. REEVES: They don’t need an identity so much maybe they feel.

MR. KARPOWITZ: I don’t know.

MR. REEVES: Well, I think, Jeremy, seriously, you come and sit here because I’m sure there are going to be questions about the survey. I’ll stand. Take the mic.

MR. AKEE: Can I say one thing?

MR. REEVES: Yeah, Randy, and then I’m going to go back out to the floor.

MR. AKEE: I think the question about the citizen versus non-citizen, if it’s representative of the ACS, then it’s probably inclusive of non-citizens, as well. So if you have that, then they’re probably included in the data.

MR. REEVES: Actually we’re going to go over here. I have a question from online, and then we’ll come back to the floor, from Dustin Richards, who has used the hashtag to ask a question. And I think this was in the earlier survey, not this one, which is did you look at the family history of marriage and it’s effect on opinions; i.e., do people who come from married families or stable families have different views themselves about marriage? In other words, is there an intergenerational transmission from structure?

Oh, wow, we have to get more chairs.

MR. KARPOWITZ: I don’t need a chair, Richard. I’m find.

MR. REEVES: This is great.

MR. KARPOWITZ: So, yeah, we did not ask as much about that this year as we have in the past.
MR. REEVES: Yeah, that’s what I thought.

MR. KARPOWITZ: But in the past we’ve asked quite a number of questions about their family history, whether or not their mother was consistently married to the same person while they were growing up. And we do find, consistent with other work on this, that that seems to matter quite a bit.

MR. REEVES: That’s what I thought, yeah. Okay, fine, let’s go back out to the floor. Let’s come towards the front now. The lady here just on your right as you’re coming forward. And then the lady immediately to your left. And let’s take two, I think. Yes.

MS. STANLEY: I’m Roberta Stanley. I’m an advocate for public K-12 education, child nutrition, and school health.

And in your discussion points the first word in the first point is “everybody,” which makes me nervous and I will tell you why. In the current iteration of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the Every Student Succeeds Act, there’s a new program called Trauma-Informed Education. So I did a survey of school board members I work with and I said why are we addressing that? And I’m talking about a suburb in Oakland County north of Detroit that is, you know, fairly high income. Oh, you have no idea how many children come to school who have trauma, whether they haven’t eaten, they’ve been beaten, or they’ve been psychologically abused.

So to say that everybody has a positive feeling toward their family is a bit of stretch. Would you please address that?

MR. REEVES: Sure, that’s a good question. It may well have been a bit of poetic license to say “everybody,” but I’ll let the panel respond because I think certainly Marcy and others were making that point.

Yes, the lady there, as well.

MS. MINOR: Rachel Minor from the Senate. I have a question about
the history of partisan within a family unit and maybe --

MR. REEVES: The history, say that again. Sorry.

MS. MINOR: The history of partisanship in a family unit. I don't know if your report speaks to that, but are you finding that with the ideal and actual sequence of relationships and in the Trump era are we more stratified in partisan views within a family unit, i.e., mom and dad are Republican, college-aged children are Democrat? A recent study by AEI has shown that people don't become more conservative with age, that it's actually something that you are cultured and develop a habit at a young age. And so I was wondering if you could speak to that.

MR. REEVES: Okay, good. So from Roberta we've got the “everybody” problem, which I definitely want Marcy to have a go at. And then from Rachel we've got the history of partisanship.

MR. POPE: Since I'm the one that said “everybody,” I'll just say, yeah, it was poetic license. It wasn't meant to be a perfectly accurate description of most people. I suppose it's a hazard of studying public opinion to try to tell people, well, here's an attitude that -- when I say “everybody,” what I actually mean is like, well, 75 percent of the population. Doesn't that count as everybody?

MR. REEVES: Right, okay.

MR. POPE: And in some technical sense I suppose that it does --

MR. REEVES: An overwhelming majority.

MR. POPE: And I should have been more responsive in that sense.

On the second question, we didn’t ask about the partisanship history here. And we do have some interesting results which we could talk about about spousal party ID, but I will say that the literature I’m aware of in political science does suggest that even though parents transmit their party ID, it might be weakening just a little bit over time. But we don't have anything in the survey on that.
Did you want to say something about it?

MR. KARPOWITZ: Yeah. So I thank you for the correction. It would be overly broad to say “everybody.” We do find that the people who are most pessimistic about family and marriages are people who are going through a family breakup, and they are very pessimistic. But then it appears that people bounce back as they -- not everyone. I wouldn’t say 100 percent, but many people as they enter into the next relationship start to feel very positive about that relationship, as well.

MR. REEVES: Let me just extend Roberta’s question and maybe ask the other three panelists to weigh in on it. There’s a danger, I think, coming away from this that there is this overly glowy view of marriage and family. I think that’s kind of what you’re speaking to because to some extent we’ve all been struck by the fact that there were very high percentages saying marriage is good, family good, my marriage good, etc. And, therefore, missing perhaps those who certainly don’t feel that way about the family because of domestic violence, those who are in abusive families, and so on.

So could you just respond perhaps to the more general point that you could easily come away from this thinking, oh, well, everybody left to right thinks that everything’s amazing with American family? But maybe, Marcy, you could take that first?

MS. CARLSON: Yeah. And I think that’s part of why my -- one of my points at the beginning was that there is a lot of economic anxieties. So the question is not about economics per se, it’s about other kind of stressors. But if you look at the table in here that asks about family stressors it’s almost a third of people report having experienced one in the recent period. Right? And those are things like losing a family member to death, divorce, infertility, a lot of things.

So there’s absolutely a lot of challenges in American families and I think those can go hand-in-hand, right? Americans value their families, then their marriages and they identify as parents and spouses, and they work hard with the families they have.
And yet there are ongoing stressors at the same time that make those challenging.

And I think one other point, I think there’s an interesting takeaway here about sort of idealized views of marriage and family and then, at the same time, a reticence to enter to some level, right, because of costs and anxieties and so forth. And yet once people enter families, I think that’s where you see pretty high level and consistent levels of commitment and intentionality and activities and so forth.

So I think it’s a complicated picture. And I think if you look at this study you actually get a lot of that nuance as you sort of take the pieces together. It’s a bit hard to simplify I think. But I think the question is absolutely right that there are some downsides, as well.

MR. REEVES: And it may be that the more idealized it becomes, the higher the barrier to entry because it has to tick so many different boxes.

Brad and Randy, do you want to respond? Are we being to Panglossian about families?

MR. AKEE: I’m good.

MR. REEVES: Okay, fine, that’s good. This gentleman here and then the gentleman in front, as well. So we’ll take them two again.

MR. CHECCO: Thank you very much. Larry Checco, senior advisor to Serve USA.

There was a lot of talk about marriage and family and all that. Not much talk about community. And one slide that really impacted me was how far down community was in terms of commitment. I think there was even more of a commitment to -- a slight more commitment to party, political party, than to community, which I think is a real problem with our country right now. We’ve evolved into a dog-eat-dog, winner-take-all kind of scenario.

But my question is -- what was my question? (Laughter) No, my
question is -- I've got it. I've got it, Richard. I've got it.

MR. REEVES: Make it short.

MR. CHECCO: Okay. My question is I did not see the breakdown between Democrats and Republicans and their commitment to community. Is there a breakdown there?

MR. POPE: Yeah, Table 15.

MR. REEVES: Let's take one more and then we'll come back. Yeah.

MR. MIZELL: Thank you. Grant Mizell from Georgetown University, fellow.

I wanted to kind of do a reattack on the race versus identity slide that you guys had put up and Dr. Akee you addressed that, and I'd love to hear a little bit more. Based on kind of that 50 percent threshold, you saw that whites didn't cross the 50 percent threshold for any identity, almost like they are an identity-less race. The Hispanic only crossed it in the family, in the parental piece. And then it seems that the black community crossed that threshold repeatedly across the board.

Does that say anything about a specific race being more likely to link themselves with an identity and then a specific race having no identity? Can you address any conclusions on that?

MR. REEVES: Okay. So actually let's do them in reverse order and we'll take the one about race. Actually, no, I'm going to change my mind. I'm going to try and pull up the slide, which would help with that. So let's do Larry's question first about family versus community.

So there's a question about the survey, whether or not there is a break, Dem-Republican break in commitment to family. But there's a broader point here, which is --

MR. CHECCO: Community.
MR. REEVES: Sorry, community. I'm sorry, I misspoke. There's a broader point here about the difference between family structure and community structure. And here you have to mention Raj Chetty’s work on how father presence predicts upward mobility for black boys for lower income backgrounds, not their own father being present, the presence of fathers in the community.

And so I think that, if you like, we can think about individuals. We can think about family structure. We can increasingly I think when you think about community structure and how all of those things interact, maybe there's a danger here that we're focusing too strongly on family structure.

QUESTIONER: (inaudible; off mic)

MR. REEVES: Okay, fine. Anyway, Brad, why don't you kick off on the community versus family.

MR. WILCOX: I think the community question is well framed because both in Raj Chetty’s work, which Richard has just mentioned, what we see is that when it comes to mobility, for instance for poor kids and poor boys, communities that have stronger social capital are more likely to be fostering mobility for poor kids. It just sort of signals the fact that I think healthy families are more likely to exist when people are kind of connected to secular, civic, religious groups within their communities.

And to go to the earlier point about there are lots of kids who are struggling, even in this affluent Detroit suburb, I think, again most families, most marriages, most kids, most parents go through tough times within their families. I think those tough times are more easily negotiated when you have a community you can kind of plug into where they can give you support, counsel, advice, maybe even some financial assistance. So, yeah, I think healthy families tend to be embedded within larger healthier communities.

MR. CHECCO: The question was the dichotomy between Republicans
and Democrats (inaudible; off mic).

MR. REEVES: This one doesn’t do that.

MR. KARPOWITZ: No, it’s Table 15.

MR. POPE: We asked two questions that could maybe get to that. One was your engagement with the community and how important that is to a fulfilling life. There’s not really a difference between Democrats and Republicans on that. I will mention in passing, Independents might be a little bit lower, but they’re a much smaller category the way we categorized it, so I wouldn’t put a great deal of weight on that.

The one was what is important to your identity? That’s not necessarily the way you phrased it. We didn’t put it up. It’s not in the slides, but I remember looking at it. And again, it was not a big difference on marriage and family.

And this gets to I think the point Brad and I were talking about earlier, if you get into being a parent or being a spouse, then you tend to be pretty committed to it, it’s really important to you. But there is a partisan difference on who gets into that club.

MR. REEVES: Okay. Randy, can you wind up?

MR. AKEE: I’ll just say real quick.

MR. REEVES: And the identity chart is now up behind you.

MR. AKEE: So it’s in Table 15 in the report. Look at it. It’s fantastic. It’s another one of these amazing points. There’s a column on community engagement. And almost everybody across all divides, like 50 percent of respondents say that that’s important for a fulfilling life, except for those slacker Independents, who, you know, are asocial anyway. (Laughter) That’s only 37 percent. It’s ridiculous. They don’t care about anyone. But it’s amazing.

So it’s across race and ethnic groups. It’s almost consistently 50 percent, Republicans, Democrats, males, women. It’s amazing.

MR. REEVES: Isn’t that a bit of a yea-saying question, though? I just
wonder --

MR. AKEE: Some people are saying no.

MR. REEVES: How many are saying no? I mean, if you asked me that question I’d say yes, because I’d sort of feel like I want to be the kind of person that says yes. (Laughter) Whether I think actually engage in my community is another question, right?


MR. REEVES: Marcy, do you want to weigh in on either of those questions? Okay, great. I think we’ve got time for a couple more questions and a lot more hands now. So let’s go to the middle here.

Oh, I’m so sorry. I’m so sorry. We’ll do this and then we’ll go to Marcus and then the lady next to him.

So this question about race and identity from Grant, I failed to capture it, but did you capture it? Did someone capture the question because I failed in my job.

MR. KARPOWITZ: So is it the case that whites are an identity-less group? (Laughter)

MR. REEVES: That’s a great question.

MR. KARPOWITZ: It is the case that whites are less likely to say they have a large number of identities, even after we drop race out and even after we drop religion out. So for whatever reason I think this is worth a considerable amount of additional study. Whites don’t relate to that identity question in quite the same way that other racial and ethnic groups do.

MR. REEVES: Okay, great. So I’ve got right in the middle there. I’m sorry, Marcy, and then I’m going to go Marcus. Yeah, Marcy.

MS. CARLSON: Sorry, just as a sociologist, to comment on that a bit. I think when you have a group that’s been in the majority for so long, it’s not surprising that
whites don’t identify with their whiteness. And I think we could get into a whole conversation about race and how different racial and ethnic groups have been treated, but I think it’s a bit of a misconception to say that whites don’t identify with whiteness when it’s all around them and sort of the power and advantages that they have had over time. So I think it’s just we’ve got to be a little careful I think in thinking about that.

MR. REEVES: It’s super when you can see trends, as well, whether that number goes up over time. My suspicion is that it might be.

Okay, so take Marcus and then I think there was a hand near you. Yes, just -- and then when you’re done if you could pass the mic to the lady on your right.

MR. CASEY: So I’m Marcus Casey. I’m a fellow here at Brookings.

So my question was about the graph you put up real quickly about the support for different types of public goods, schools versus roads. And what I found -- I just wanted you to comment, how do you interpret that? Do you interpret that as most people view sort of school spending as more redistributive and so, therefore, Republicans are less supportive versus Democrats? Or is this a question about just general support for public goods spending where there would be a partisan divide, as well?

MR. REEVES: Is this the one the road versus school?

MR. POPE: Yeah.

MR. REEVES: Yeah, okay.

MR. POPE: I gave this as one of the examples. And we didn’t really talk in the report about how we would interpret this as a support for collective goods of some sort.

I would definitely say that my memory of the data analysis is that Democrats tend to support public goods more than Republicans do, but there are exceptions. And what we asked them to do was to look at trade-offs. And so I’m kind of gleaning this a little bit maybe in a way that I shouldn’t. Maybe I should be a little more
cautious than that because there was just a pattern of Democrats preferring certain goods to Republicans.

But what I thought was most interesting was once you drill away from the national issues, like do you like Trump, anything like that, to really bread-and-butter local things, it oftentimes has not only to do with your partisanship, but also your background, where you live. We don’t show it, but suburban, urban, rural makes an enormous difference to this.

MR. CASEY: Right. So that’s what -- so one thing that occurred in my head was that I think that a lot of people don’t really see roads necessarily a fully public good. Right? Because they use it for their private purposes, especially this regional or city versus urban divide.

MR. POPE: Yeah.

MR. CASEY: Whereas public -- you know, we talk about schools as we’re equalizing funding and things of that nature. So it would be interesting to unpack that more in a future survey.

MR. KARPOWITZ: Yeah. I’ll say one other thing. The group that loves the public good of public transportation the most are single people. We should probably put that graph and say they love public transportation.

MR. REEVES: Thank you. So we’ll take the lady there. I’m very sorry to those we didn’t get to. This is the last question and then I’m going to invite all of the panel to give a response to your question and final thoughts as we close.

MS. ANDERSON: I’m Tyler Anderson. I work at the Department of Health and Human Services.

And I am interested in the disparity between what women consider sexual harassment and what men consider sexual harassment. And I’m interested in -- I mean, I have my own ideas, but I’m interested in how the panel thinks we got to this
point. And then also, what we can do to kind of standardize, for lack of a better word, what culturally we consider as a society inappropriate and how do we consider consent verbal, nonverbal, et cetera.

MR. REEVES: Thank you. The gender differences in standards or benchmarks, I guess. I was going to ask myself whether anything stood out to you from that bit of the survey because we haven’t talked about it yet from the sexual harassment. But let me start with you, Jeremy, and then come back along the panel in the order we did before with an answer to that and any final thoughts, very briefly.

MR. POPE: On equalizing standards, I have nothing for you, partially because we didn’t ask it, partially because I think it’s an enormous topic. As you can sense, I’m willing to be flippant in a way that Chris is not because he’s sensitive, and so I’ll just say there is a whiff of men are pigs in the survey. (Laughter) And I think that’s flippant, but not inaccurate. (Laughter)

MR. REEVES: Okay. Marcy, that and any final thoughts.

MS. CARLSON: Yeah. So, I mean, I think we’re in a time of real change and real growing awareness of how women have been treated over the years. And so I would expect that these may become more synchronous over time. And so I don’t have a lot -- I mean, it’s striking. I think it’s what one would expect for a lot of different reasons and I think we’ll sort of see going forward how those might change.

And just in general I would encourage everyone to take a look at the report. There’s a lot in here and we’ve only scratched the surface, so I’ll just close by saying it’s an exciting time to be studying families and see where we go in the future.

MR. REEVES: Thank you. Brad, that point and any final points.

MR. WILCOX: Yeah, I guess one -- and this isn’t directly on your question. I do think that we’re probably moving to actually greater convergence in at least sort of public norms around what constitutes kind of both consent and harassment.
when it comes to sex. And I think that's probably in the main a good thing.

My only hesitation around this is that in response to the recent *Atlantic* cover story on declining sex for adults and young adults in general, one of the responses that emerged from that *Atlantic* story was this idea that people were saying today it would be much more difficult for them to meet someone like at work in a kind of casual way or in some kind of social network and kind of strike up a conversation with them with an eye towards make like pursuing romantic opportunities with that person for fear of being seen as engaging in sexual harassment.

So there’s kind of a delicate dance here where we need to be, on the one hand, more sensitive towards is there consent here? Is there mutual interest here on the one hand? And that’s a good thing about this #MeToo movement and it’s sort of aftermath, sort of bridging that gender divide perhaps and what’s been happening for generations.

On the other hand, I also want to try to make sure that people feel like they can be confident about expressing interest in subtle and considerate ways and people with whom they might have a potential romantic relationship or even more, of course, down the road.

And in terms of just the big picture here I just want to underline that I’m not talking about the partisan divide which may be partly about selection or is in large part about selection in a kind of triumphalist way. It’s actually more kind of -- it’s more actually in a concerned note because we know among younger adults they are more likely to lean in an Independent or Democratic direction. And my hope and my dream is that we don’t among the rising generation kind of lose sight of the value and importance of stable marriage for creating families, having kids and all that kind of stuff.

So I think one challenge today is sort of how do we rebrand, I hate to use the term, but how we rebrand marriage for younger millennial, I Gen folks who right now
are less likely to be oriented towards I think the goods that marriage has to offer?

MR. REEVES: Randy, answer or a final thought.

MR. AKEE: Yeah, I'll just give I think a stark piece of data that you mentioned. And I'll also echo what others have said, please take a look at the report. It's fantastic. There's lots of things.

One thing that I'll reiterate that you guys did mention, but I think it didn't get as much emphasis, was about the keeping parents and children together under immigration. If you look at the table, it's 83 percent of respondents believe that. It's an overwhelming majority of Americans. Everybody believes that you should keep parents and children together.

MR. REEVES: Okay, so we're going to have to close. I'm very sorry. For those -- I didn't get to you, but obviously the conversation's only just begun. Let me thank -- I just wanted to thank our panel, but did you want to say something first, Doug?

Okay, you have minus 19 seconds.

MR. WILKS: I just want to say our journalists put together a 12-page Deseret News national edition, which will be in the back and you can take that. And some of the #MeToo and other things will be there for you.

MR. REEVES: We thank the Deseret News, especially Doug and Allison; and Jeremy and Chris for their presentation; and, of course, Marcy, Brad, and Randy for joining us on this panel; and all of you for joining us both in person and online. Thank you. (Applause)
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