December 28, 2018

The Honorable Alex M. Azar  The Honorable Steven Mnuchin
Secretary                        Secretary
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services  U.S. Department of the Treasury
200 Independence Avenue SW        1500 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington DC, 20201             Washington DC, 20220

The Honorable R. Alexander Acosta
Secretary
U.S. Department of Labor
200 Constitution Avenue NW
Washington DC, 20210

Dear Secretary Azar, Secretary Mnuchin, and Secretary Acosta:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your October 29, 2018 proposed rule, Health Reimbursement Arrangements and Other Account-Based Group Health Plans (REG-136724-17). We are scholars at the Brookings Institution who study issues related to private health insurance and have published analyses of this proposed rule that examine its impact on insurance markets, employers, workers, and Marketplaces. (Please note that the views expressed in this letter are our own and do not necessarily reflect the views of officers, trustees, or other staff members of the Brookings Institution.) In the attached analyses, we offer our assessment of the proposed rule and make recommendations to the departments. We summarize our recommendations below.

We commend your staffs for a thoughtful and well-written preamble in an especially complex area of federal policy. However, we have significant concerns about the substance of the departments’ proposal. Specifically, we believe the negative effects of this proposed rule, particularly the increase in individual market premiums and the attendant fiscal costs, are likely to outweigh the benefits to employers and their workers, and we also have significant legal concerns. Therefore, we recommend that the
departments finalize neither their proposal to create an individual-market-integrated HRA nor their proposal to create an excepted benefits HRA.

If the departments do move forward, it is imperative to limit employers’ ability to selectively move their sicker workers into the individual market. As described more fully in the attached, we have examined the impact of allowing employers to selectively shift sicker workers to the individual market, and conclude that it would lead to very large increases in individual market premiums. Under some scenarios, individual market premiums would almost double.

To prevent this outcome, the departments should:

- Maintain the prohibition on purchasing short-term plans via an individual-market-integrated HRA.
- Maintain the prohibition on purchasing individual market plans via an excepted benefit HRA.
- Maintain the prohibition on offering a traditional health plan alongside an individual-market-integrated HRA.
- Continue to require employers to verify that individuals enrolled in an individual-market-integrated HRA are actually enrolled in individual market insurance coverage.
- Not expand the list of factors employers can use when defining the classes of employees to which they offer an individual-market-integrated HRA.
- Allow employers to combine factors to define classes only in circumstances where the resulting group would be of a sufficient size, such as containing at least 10 percent of the employer’s workforce or at least 100 employees.
- Apply controlled-group aggregation rules when determining when entities with common ownership are considered a single employer to prevent employers from circumventing these rules through reorganization.
- Modify the regulation to take into account all the relevant facts and circumstances in determining whether the HRA offer was targeted towards sicker workers. That is, rather than treating an offer based on the eight permitted characteristics as permissible in all cases, specify that use of the eight characteristics would be evidence of a neutral intent, but would not insulate an employer if there was other evidence of targeting.

We also recommend that the departments should:

- Strengthen the notice requirements and apply them uniformly to not only individual-market-integrated HRAs, but also to excepted benefits HRAs, the HRAs authorized under prior regulations, and all other kinds of employer payment arrangements that could be confused by employees.
- Delay the effective date of the proposed rule until at least the 2021 calendar year to allow all actors, especially State-based Marketplaces, time to prepare.
• Provide additional time for states and other stakeholders to assess the proposal and provide comments.

A more detailed discussion of each of these issues appears in the attached analyses, which we submit for consideration as part of the rulemaking record.

In addition, we have identified a number of gaps in the regulatory impact analysis of the individual-market-integrated HRA portion of the proposal, which we believe the departments should address in a final rule. The appendix to this letter describes these concerns in detail. To summarize, the impact analysis in the final rule should:

• Better model variation in expected claims risk across employers.
• Take account of variation in individual market risk mix across areas.
• Account for employers’ ability to make different HRA offers to different groups of employees, even as circumscribed by the safeguards in the proposal.
• Directly model coverage choices for all people below 200 percent and above 400 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL).
• Account for increases in hassle costs under individual-market-integrated HRAs.

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment. If we can provide any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

Christen Linke Young, Fellow, USC-Brookings Schaeffer Initiative for Health Policy
Matthew Fiedler, Fellow, USC-Brookings Schaeffer Initiative for Health Policy
Jason A. Levitis, Nonresident Fellow, USC-Brookings Schaeffer Initiative for Health Policy

Attachments:

Appendix: Discussion of Regulatory Impact Analysis


Appendix: Discussion of the Regulatory Impact Analysis

Based on our review of the Regulatory Impact Analysis of the individual-market-integrated HRA portion of the proposed rule, we believe the final impact analysis should:

- **Better model variation in expected claims risk across employers:** In the proposed rule, the departments state that Treasury constructed expected claims risk for the simulated people in its microsimulation model in two steps. First, Treasury estimated expected claims at the individual level for each person in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Household Component. Second, Treasury statistically matched these estimates onto the population of individuals in Treasury’s model, which was drawn from tax data.

  The shortcoming of this approach is that it cannot capture the tendency of sicker workers to work alongside other sicker workers and healthier workers to work alongside other healthier workers, except to the extent that clustering is captured by data elements used in the matching procedure. While the departments do not describe what data elements are used in the matching procedure, they presumably do not include health status since those data are not available on the tax records used to create the model population.

  Failing to allow for firm-level clustering in health status likely leads the departments to understate the variation in average expected claims risk across employers. This, in turn, likely leads the departments to understate both the number of employers who would drop a traditional health plan in favor of an individual-market-integrated HRA and the adverse effect of those transitions on the individual market risk pool. Thus, this issue has the potential to substantially change the results of the departments’ analysis.

  The departments could address this shortcoming by obtaining a health care claims database that contains information on how workers are grouped together into firms (like the Marketscan database the departments cite elsewhere in their analysis). That database could be used to implement a new statistical matching procedure that preserves within-firm correlation in health status. Alternatively, the departments could use this database to directly estimate the amount of variation in average expected claims risk across employers and make an ad hoc adjustment to the existing matching procedure designed to ensure that it produces an appropriate degree of cross-employer variation.

- **Take account of variation in individual market risk mix across areas:** Data on individual and small group market risk scores published by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services suggest that the relative risk mix of the individual and group markets varies considerably across
geographic areas. In areas with relatively healthy individual market risk pools, many more employers are likely to find it attractive to drop a traditional health plan in favor of individual-market-integrated HRA, and those transitions are likely to have a larger effect on the individual market risk pool.

The departments, however, present a purely national analysis. This obviously obscures this variation in the proposal’s effects across geographic areas. Conducting a national analysis may also cause the departments to understate the overall national effect of the policy to the extent that the effect of the departments’ proposal varies non-linearly with the baseline risk mix in the individual market, which is plausible.

The departments could remedy this shortcoming of their analysis by doing multiple versions of their analysis, each assuming a different baseline individual market risk mix. The results of these analyses would illustrate how the effect of the departments’ proposal would vary across geographic areas. They could also then construct their national estimates by averaging across these multiple scenarios, which should ensure that the departments’ national estimates appropriately reflect the consequences of variation in baseline individual market risk mix across geographic areas.

- **Account for employers’ ability to make different HRA offers to different groups of employees:** The departments assume that employers would make a single firm-wide decision about whether to offer an individual-market-integrated HRA. However, under the proposed rule, employers would have the ability and incentive to make finer-grained decisions about who they offer HRAs, and we expect that they would do so in practice. The first attached analysis notes several specific vulnerabilities to selective shifting under the proposed rule, including the degree to which the various factors for determining which workers are “similarly situated” can be combined, the lack of a minimum size for the resulting classes, and the lack of a requirement that firms be considered at the controlled-group level.

We expect that firms would use this flexibility to offer HRAs to subgroups of their workforce that are relatively sick. Accounting for this behavior would likely magnify the negative impacts of the proposed rule on the individual market premiums. This flexibility might also increase the extent to which employers not currently offering any coverage elect to offer HRAs under the proposed rule since it would allow them to better target those offers to subgroups of their

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1 The methodological appendix to the attached analysis by Fiedler describes how these data can be used to estimate the portion of the difference in average risk between the individual and small group markets that cannot be accounted for by factors that can be rated for in the individual market (primarily age). Looking across the states that use the Healthcare.gov enrollment platform, this analysis suggests that the 20th percentile state has an individual market risk pool that is 10 percent sicker than its small group market risk pool (after accounting for ratable differences in age mix), while the 80th percentile state has an individual market risk pool that is 25 percent sicker than its small group risk pool (again, after accounting for ratable differences in age mix).
employees that are ineligible for Marketplace subsidies. Accounting for this behavior might increase coverage gains under the proposed rule and somewhat mitigate the proposal’s adverse effects on the individual market, while also increasing its fiscal cost.

- **Directly model coverage choices for all people below 200 percent and above 400 percent of the FPL:** The departments state that they place two ad hoc constraints on their microsimulation analysis. They assume: (1) no one below 200 percent of the FPL who receives a premium tax credit at baseline becomes uninsured because their employer adopts an individual-market-integrated HRA; and (2) no one above 400 percent of the FPL enrolled in a traditional health plan at baseline becomes uninsured because their employer adopts an individual-market-integrated HRA. The departments justify these constraints (primarily) on the grounds that employers will structure their HRA offers so as to avoid coverage losses in these groups and that their other assumptions about employers’ responses to the proposal do not capture this behavior.

The departments’ approach has two shortcomings. First, it is unclear that all firms will structure their HRAs this way in practice. With respect to people below 200 percent of the FPL, entirely avoiding coverage losses would require employers to offer relatively small HRAs in order to avoid rendering these employees ineligible for generous Marketplace subsidies. But offering small HRAs would force higher-income employees to receive more of their compensation in a taxable form, which may make this choice unattractive to employers. With respect to people above 400 percent of the FPL, avoiding coverage losses would generally require employers to vary HRA contributions by age so as to prevent older employees’ cost of coverage from significantly rising. As discussed in detail in the first attached analysis, it is plausible that some employers will vary HRA contributions in this way, but it is also plausible that some employers will not.

Second, these HRA design choices have implications for employees outside the two groups directly affected by the constraints. For example, setting a low HRA contribution to ensure low-income workers remain eligible for Marketplace subsidies would likely also reduce take-up of the HRA among higher-income workers. Similarly, employers that elected to set higher HRA contributions for older workers would presumably also elect to contribute less for younger workers, which would reduce enrollment among younger workers. Thus, simply constraining coverage decisions in these two groups is unlikely to generate internally consistent set of coverage and fiscal outcomes.

In light of the shortcomings of the departments’ current approach, we recommend that the departments remove these constraints from their modeling and instead directly model any aspects of employer behavior that the departments believe are not captured in their base assumptions about employer responses to the proposal. We suspect that an approach like this one would tend to reduce the departments’ estimate of the coverage gains under the proposed rule (and
potentially the fiscal cost as well), although it is difficult to be certain of this without access to Treasury’s microsimulation model.

- **Account for increases in hassle costs under individual-market-integrated HRAs:** Enrolling in coverage via an individual-market-integrated HRA is likely to be more difficult than enrolling in a traditional health plan. To enroll in individual market coverage via an HRA, employees may often need to shop for coverage on their own outside the marketplace, pay for that coverage themselves, and then seek reimbursement from the employer. By contrast, under a traditional health plan, employees generally select a plan off of a small menu of options presented by their employer and pay for their portion of the premium via an automatic salary deduction.

Being offered an individual-market-integrated HRA may also complicate employees’ ability to determine their eligibility for Marketplace subsidies and to make related decisions about whether to accept the employer’s offer. As explained in our first analysis, employees offered such an HRA may be confused about which variety of HRA they are offered and how that offer affects their eligibility for Marketplace subsidies, which may make it more difficult to navigate the Marketplace application process.

It has been well-established in the context of retirement benefits that small increases in hassle costs can have large effects on enrollment decisions, and it is likely that hassle costs would have similar effects in the context of health benefits. The departments state that their analysis does not account for these types of increases in hassle costs. However, they could have significant effects on outcomes under the proposed rule. First, to the extent that employers take account of these burdens on their employees, it may make them less likely to adopt individual-market-integrated HRAs, thereby muting the overall effects of the proposal. Second, at firms that do set up individual-market-integrated HRAs, hassle costs would likely reduce take-up of individual market coverage, likely particularly among relatively healthy individuals. These changes would tend to reduce insurance coverage and increase individual market premiums (although they could also reduce federal costs to the extent that the increased revenue from lower HRA enrollment outweighs the increase in premium tax credit costs due to higher premiums).

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2 Under the assumptions adopted by the administration’s regulatory impact analysis, all employees offered individual-market-integrated HRAs will have the option to pay for their share of the premium with pre-tax dollars through a salary reduction agreement. As explained in the proposed rule, such an arrangement requires employees to purchase coverage outside the marketplace.

Evaluating the Administration's Health Reimbursement Arrangement Proposal

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This report is available online at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/evaluating-the-administrations-health-reimbursement-arrangement-proposal
EDITOR'S NOTE

This white paper is part of the USC-Brookings Schaeffer Initiative for Health Policy, which is a partnership between the Center for Health Policy at Brookings and the USC Schaeffer Center for Health Policy & Economics. The Initiative aims to inform the national health care debate with rigorous, evidence-based analysis leading to practical recommendations using the collaborative strengths of USC and Brookings.

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Introduction

On October 29, 2018, the Departments of Labor, the Treasury, and Health and Human Services jointly published a proposed rule that would loosen the rules governing Health Reimbursement Arrangements (HRAs) and other account-based health benefits that employers offer to their employees (Departments 2018). The most important provision of the proposal is to allow employers to use pre-tax dollars to subsidize their employees’ purchase of health insurance in the individual market.

This new option would likely be particularly appealing to large employers with sicker workforces. These employers’ cost of offering a traditional health plan reflects their workers’ above-average health care needs, so subsidizing community-rated individual market coverage could allow them to offer similar coverage at lower cost. Similarly, large employers of all varieties would have an incentive to shift just their sicker workers into the individual market; the departments do propose safeguards that would limit this type of worker-level shifting, but likely not eliminate it.

While these shifts would generate savings that would be shared between employers and their workers, the influx of sicker workers into the individual market would increase premiums, thereby increasing subsidy costs for the federal government and premiums for unsubsidized enrollees. These changes in employer coverage arrangements would also create winners and losers within firms to the extent that firms do not make offsetting changes to their compensation structures, with younger and higher-income workers generally benefiting at the expense of older and lower-income workers. The proliferation of HRAs could also make it hard for consumers to understand their options and comply with the various sets of rules, while imposing new administrative burdens on the Marketplaces.

In our view, the negative effects of allowing firms to subsidize the purchase of individual market coverage, particularly the increase in individual market premiums and the attendant fiscal costs, are likely to outweigh the benefits to employers and their workers. Furthermore, there is reason to doubt that the departments’ proposal is legally permissible. We therefore recommend that the departments

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1 The proposed rule also applies to reimbursement arrangements authorized under IRS Revenue Ruling 61-146 (IRS 1961), which are similar to HRAs. For convenience, this paper uses “HRAs” to encompass both types of arrangements. In addition, on November 19, 2018, the Treasury Department and the IRS released guidance (IRS 2018) addressing the interaction between the proposed regulations and other provisions such as the employer mandate. This guidance is also addressed in this paper.

2 Throughout, we use the term “large employer” to refer to employers eligible to purchase coverage through the large group market. In most states, the large group market serves employers with more than 50 employees, while smaller employers are served by the small group market. A minority of states set that threshold at 100 employees, rather than 50 employees. The large and small group markets are subject to significantly different rules; notably, the small group market is community-rated, while the large group market is not. Having 50 employees is also generally the cut-off for being subject to the ACA’s employer shared responsibility provision, though there are small differences in how the line is drawn for the two purposes.
not finalize this proposal. We also recommend that the departments decline to finalize their proposal to create a separate type of HRA that could be used to purchase short-term, limited-duration coverage. This proposal could allow employers to shift costs from their healthier workers onto their sicker workers and raises its own legal concerns.

If the departments nevertheless move ahead, it is imperative that they retain and strengthen the features of the proposed rule that limit employers’ ability to selectively move their sicker workers into the individual market. Failure to retain those provisions could greatly magnify the negative effects of the proposed rule. The departments should also strengthen requirements that employers offering HRAs inform their workers about how that offer affects their eligibility for the premium tax credit.

The remainder of this analysis discusses these points in greater detail. The first section provides background on the rules governing HRAs, and the second section summarizes the departments’ proposed rule. The third section examines the effects of the proposal to allow HRAs to be used to purchase individual market coverage, while the fourth section examines the departments’ excepted benefits HRA proposal. The fifth section discusses compliance and administrative challenges created by the rule as a whole, and the sixth section examines legal concerns the proposals raise. We close by providing our overall assessment and making recommendations for the final rule.

**Background on HRAs**

Under long-standing tax law, employer-provided health benefits are generally excluded from income for federal and state tax purposes. Most employers offer health benefits to their workers by setting up a traditional health plan that pays medical claims. However, some employers prefer to offer an account-based benefit that employees can use to pay their own health-related expenses like premiums, copays, and direct payments for medical services. For example, since 2002, the IRS has recognized HRAs as a tax-preferred account-based health benefit. Like other types of employer-provided health benefits, HRAs are a considered group health plan under federal health law.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) placed a number of requirements on all group health plans. The new rules include requirements that plans cover preventive services without cost-sharing and that plans refrain from imposing annual or lifetime dollar limits on core health benefits; this set of ACA requirements is commonly referred to as the “market reforms.” Account-based arrangements like HRAs are typically not able to meet these standards: such arrangements inherently include an annual dollar limit on the amount reimbursed, and even if HRA dollars can be used to pay for preventive services, the “coverage” is limited to the value of the account. Thus, HRAs and other similar arrangements are generally prohibited under the ACA.

However, beginning in 2010, the departments issued guidance and regulations creating limited exceptions to this prohibition. Under those rules, an HRA could be deemed to comply with ACA
requirements if it were “integrated”—that is, provided together—with certain health plans that met those requirements. Initially, HRAs could be integrated only with traditional health plans offered by the employer (Departments 2010). This rule recognized that two group health plans provided together are functionally equivalent to a single group health plan that satisfies the ACA requirements. Later guidance permitted the employer to offer an HRA that could be used to pay for expenses in Tricare or Medicare, but only as long as the employer continued to offer traditional coverage that satisfied the market reforms (IRS 2015).\(^3\) Integration was not permitted with individual market coverage, largely for the policy and legal reasons discussed in the remainder of this analysis.

Congress created a limited exception to this general policy in 2016 as part of the 21st Century Cures Act. Congress created a new account-based health benefit similar to an HRA called a Qualified Small Employer Health Reimbursement Arrangement, or QSEHRA. QSEHRAs allow employers with fewer than 50 full-time employees to provide tax-preferred subsidies to employees to purchase individual market coverage. Larger employers are not eligible to create QSEHRAs.

**Overview of the Administration’s Proposed Policy Changes**

In their proposed rule, the departments propose creating two new kinds of HRAs not permitted under current policy:

- **Individual-market-integrated HRA:** The departments propose permitting HRAs that can be integrated with individual market coverage, but only if certain conditions are met. Specifically, a firm can offer an HRA that can be integrated with individual market coverage if it offers such an HRA to all similarly situated workers, if those workers are not offered a traditional health plan, and if the firm verifies that only employees who actually enroll in individual market coverage receive the HRA dollars. This provision is likely to have the most significant effects in practice.

- **Excepted benefit HRA:** The departments also propose a second type of HRA that will be considered an “excepted benefit.” Excepted benefits are exempt from the ACA requirements discussed above, so these HRAs do not need to be “integrated” with other coverage. Excepted benefit HRAs are capped at $1,800 and can be used for only a limited set of purposes, not including purchase of individual market coverage or traditional group coverage (except COBRA coverage). Notably, however, they can be used to pay premiums for short-term plans.

\(^3\) The departments took one additional step to address an unusual fact pattern. In a 2015 rule (Departments, 2015), they created a special type of HRA for very small employers that also wanted to offer an HRA benefit to individuals enrolled in Medicare. Very small employers (with fewer than 20 employers) are the only group that is permitted to decline to offer coverage to individuals eligible for Medicare. Thus, the departments created a conforming type of HRA that those employers could use for their Medicare-eligible workers.
Further, in contrast to individual-market-integrated HRAs, which can be offered only to employees that are not offered a traditional health plan, excepted benefit HRAs can be offered only to employees that are offered a traditional health plan (regardless of whether or not they enroll in that plan).

The proposed rule also makes conforming changes to other ACA rules. Of note, it specifies the circumstances under which an individual-market-integrated HRA is considered an “affordable” offer of employer coverage that renders an individual ineligible for the premium tax credit. Under the proposal, an individual-market-integrated HRA would be considered an affordable offer of coverage if it allowed an individual to purchase the lowest-cost individual market silver plan for less than a specific percent of their household income (9.86% in 2019). In addition, it allows individuals newly offered an individual-market-integrated HRA a special enrollment period to purchase individual market coverage.

Finally, the proposed rule promises future guidance about how the proposed regulations interact with other provisions, including the employer shared responsibility provision (also known as the employer mandate) and compensation-based non-discrimination rules. On November 19, the Treasury Department and the IRS took a preliminary step on the additional guidance, releasing a Notice describing the approaches they intend to take (IRS 2018).

**Effects of the Individual-Market-Integrated HRA Proposal**

We first consider the effects of the individual-market-integrated HRA proposal, which would likely have the farthest-reaching effects. Many large employers with sicker workforces would find it attractive to set up individual-market-integrated HRAs in order to access community-rated individual market premiums. These shifts would generally benefit the firms involved but will likely increase individual market premiums and federal costs. This provision would also create winners and losers within firms to the extent that firms do not make offsetting changes to their compensation structures, with younger and higher-income workers generally gaining at the expense of older and lower-income workers. This section analyzes these effects in detail, and a later section discusses compliance and administrative challenges that the combination of the individual-market-integrated HRA and excepted benefit HRA proposals may create for consumers and state-based Marketplaces.

**Overall Effects on Employer Coverage Arrangements and the Individual Market**

The effects of this proposal depend crucially on how many and what types of employers are likely to find it attractive to subsidize the purchase of individual market coverage. This depends, in turn, on why employers might find subsidizing the purchase of individual market coverage via an HRA more attractive than the coverage options they would have in the absence of the departments’ proposal.
The departments and other proponents of allowing employers to subsidize the purchase of individual market coverage commonly identify three potential advantages this approach might have to employers (Departments 2018; Barkett 2018), each of which are discussed below. We are skeptical, however, that any of these considerations would actually play a particularly large role in employer decision making in practice:

- **Lower administrative burden**: Some argue that subsidizing the purchase of individual market coverage may be administratively simpler for employers than offering a traditional health plan. However, these savings seem likely to be small in practice, if they exist at all. While employers would no longer need to select a health plan to offer, they would need to create a new apparatus to verify employees’ eligibility for reimbursement and disburse those amounts. And employers would continue to need to make a range of challenging benefit design decisions, like how much to contribute to the HRA for different types of workers and which workers should be eligible to participate. Moreover, offering health benefits via the individual market creates new administrative burdens for workers, who must now select and enroll in a suitable plan. Workers are likely to force employers to take some account of those costs in practice.

- **Greater employee choice**: Another advantage sometimes ascribed to this way of sponsoring health benefits is that it allows employers to offer enrollees a choice among different types of plans and choose one that meets their needs. Offering greater choice may be valuable to employees, and it is true that the individual market offers a choice of multiple insurers and a large number of plans in most of the country (Fehr, Cox, and Levitt 2018). However, employers already can and do offer multiple traditional health plan options to their employees either directly or via so-called private exchanges, so the ability to offer the choice of multiple options is not an advantage of individual-market-integrated HRAs in particular. Moreover, it is notable that the share of employers providing coverage through private exchanges remains relatively small (Accenture 2016), which suggests that the ability to offer employees choice may not have much value in practice.

- **Ability to offer health benefits on a “defined contribution” basis**: A final suggested advantage is that offering an individual-market-integrated HRA would allow employers to take a “defined contribution” approach to offering health benefits in which they specify a fixed dollar amount they will contribute and allow enrollees to choose how to use that fixed contribution. But firms that offer multiple traditional health plan options, either on their own or via a private exchange, can already take this approach, so whatever the merits of this benefit design, it is not a reason to set up an individual-market-integrated HRA in particular.

Rather, the main attraction of offering an individual-market-integrated HRA would likely be that individual market premiums are community-rated, meaning that they do not vary based on health status. Today, large employers’ only options to provide coverage are to self-insure or to purchase
experience-rated coverage from an insurer; under either of these options, large employers with sicker enrolled populations pay more to obtain coverage and bear higher costs to cover their sicker workers than their healthy ones. For this reason, large employers could realize large benefits from offloading sicker workers into the individual market via an HRA. (Small employers would have no incentive to undertake this type of shifting since small group market premiums are community-rated.) This shifting could happen either at the individual level, with a firm’s sicker workers moving to the individual market while healthier workers remain in a traditional health plan, or at the firm level, with firms with sicker-than-average workforces moving all their employees to the individual market.

The departments make clear that they are aware of the risk that expanded use of HRAs could cause an influx of sicker workers into the individual market, particularly if firms are able to encourage only sicker workers to enroll in individual market coverage. The departments’ proposal includes two types of safeguards that aim to prevent this type of shifting:

- **Preventing employers from offering individual market HRAs selectively to sicker workers:** The most direct way in which employers might steer only their sicker workers into individual market coverage would be by offering individual-market-integrated HRAs solely to those workers. To prevent firms from doing so, the rule requires individual-market-integrated HRAs be offered to entire classes of workers (rather than to specific workers). However, the rule allows employers to delineate classes based on any combination of a relatively broad set of worker characteristics: (1) full-time employment; (2) part-time employment; (3) seasonal employment; (4) membership in a collective bargaining unit; (5) not having satisfied a waiting period for coverage eligibility; (6) not having attained age 25; (7) being a non-resident alien; and (8) rating area of employment. In addition, firms with common ownership would be treated as separate firms in applying these rules; this is in contrast to the common practice of requiring firms with common ownership to be treated as a single “controlled group” for purposes of provisions related to firm size and segmentation, given the ease with which firms can spin off wholly owned subsidiaries.4

- **Preventing workers from choosing between individual market and other coverage:** Another way employers might steer sicker workers into the individual market would be to offer workers a choice between individual market coverage and a traditional health plan that is designed to be unattractive to sicker workers. To prevent this behavior, the

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4 For example, controlled-group aggregation rules apply with respect to the compensation-based nondiscrimination rules under Code section 105(h), the retiree benefit rules under Code section 401 and subsequent sections, the ACA’s employer shared responsibility provision under Code section 4890H, the health insurer fee under ACA section 9010, the small employer health insurance tax credit under Code section 45R, and the pharmaceutical manufacturer fee under ACA section 9008.
proposed rule permits employers to offer an individual-market-integrated HRA only to employees who are not offered a traditional health plan.

The departments also bar other arrangements that might result in sicker workers opting for individual market coverage and healthier workers opting for other coverage. Most importantly, the proposed rule bars funds from an individual-market-integrated HRA from being used to purchase short-term plans, an option that may appeal to many healthier workers and be completely unavailable to sicker workers. The departments also note that allowing an individual-market-integrated HRA to be used to purchase short-term plans would raise legal concerns, given that short-term plans do not necessarily satisfy the ACA requirements regarding annual and lifetime limits and preventive services. However, the departments solicit comment on relaxing this restriction.

Similarly, the employer must verify individual market enrollment before making dollars available in the HRA, preventing healthier workers from simply using the amounts in the HRA to pay directly for health care services without purchasing individual market coverage.

While these safeguards are important, they are likely insufficient to fully protect the individual market risk pool. First, despite the proposed requirement that an individual-market-integrated HRA be offered to all similarly situated workers, employers have broad flexibility to decide what workers are “similarly situated.” In particular, they can use any combination of the permitted characteristics, which would create opportunities for employers to target HRAs to high-cost classes of workers. For example, these rules may allow a mid-size employer with a single high-cost worker or family to direct that worker to the individual market by subdividing its workforce using the allowed characteristics. Further, there is nothing to restrain risk-based targeting in cases where sicker workers are naturally congregated in one geographic area or class. This type of risk is potentially greatest in states where rating areas cover a relatively small geographic area, as it allows the finest-grained sorting of individuals into classes.\(^5\)

Second, the structure of the rule does nothing to prevent firm-level shifting. As discussed above, firms with a sicker-than-average workforce would likely find an individual-market-integrated HRA attractive, because it would allow them to shift the cost of covering their workforce to the community-rated individual market risk pool. By contrast, healthier-than-average firms would prefer traditional coverage priced based on their own risk. Importantly, the risks to the individual market from this type of behavior are greatest in states that today have a relatively robust and low-premium individual market – because the gulf between the community-rated individual market and the experience-rated

\(^5\) Rating areas across the country vary widely in size. In Florida, for example, each county generally constitutes its own rating area – generating some very small rating areas in rural communities. By contrast, in many other states, rating areas encompass entire metropolitan areas, with non-metropolitan parts of the state all grouped together into a single rating area.
premiums of a sicker-than-average firm are greatest, leaving more relatively unhealthy firms in the range where they benefit from shifting.

Allowing HRAs to be used to purchase individual market coverage could have a countervailing benefit for the individual market. Some firms that are not currently providing coverage – leaving workers to seek coverage in the individual market – may be enticed to set up individual-market-integrated HRAs in order to allow those purchases to be made with pre-tax dollars. It is plausible that the sicker workers at these firms are typically purchasing individual market coverage today, while healthier workers are less likely to do so. To the extent offering the HRA increases individual market enrollment among these firms’ healthier workers, this could improve the individual market risk pool.

In the economic impact analysis included with the proposed rule, the departments estimate that the individual-market-integrated HRA proposal would increase individual market premiums by “less than 1 percent” in the long run, while reducing the number of uninsured by 800,000 by 2028, at a cost of $6 billion in that year. These estimates are likely too optimistic, for several reasons.

First, the departments simply assume that the safeguards included in the proposed rule will entirely prevent employers from selectively moving their sicker workers into the individual market, which, as discussed, is likely overly optimistic. Second, the departments’ analysis does not appear to account for the substantial variation in individual market risk mix across areas, which would cause the departments to understate the degree of firm-level shifting. Third, the departments’ analysis may understate the variation in health status across employers’ workforces because it does not appear to account for the full set of factors driving that variation, which would also lead the departments to understate the degree of firm-level shifting under the proposed rule. Finally, it is unclear whether the departments have accounted for the possibility that enrolling in coverage via an individual-market-integrated HRA may be more difficult than enrolling in a traditional health plan, which could cause the departments to overstate the coverage gains under the proposed rule.

We also note that the fact that employers have shown little interest in QSEHRAs is not evidence that employers would be similarly uninterested in individual-market-integrated HRAs. First, QSEHRAs are only available to small employers. Small employers already have access to the community-rated small group market, so gaining access to community-rated coverage via the individual market is not particularly valuable. By contrast, individual-market-integrated HRAs would be available to large employers who currently cannot access community-rated coverage any other way. Second, the rules governing interactions between QSEHRAs and the premium tax credit are far less favorable to employers than the rules that apply under traditional health plans and the rules that would apply to
individual-market-integrated HRAs. These two factors are likely why CBO and JCT expected QSEHRAs to have negligible deficit impact (CBO 2016).

**Distributional Effects Across Different Groups of Employees**

The changes in how some employers structure their health benefits spurred by the individual-market-integrated HRA would also create winners and losers among those employers’ workers to the extent employers do not make offsetting changes to their compensation structures. In general, older and lower-income workers would be most likely to be left worse off, while younger and higher-income workers would be most likely to benefit.

**Redistribution Across Age Groups.** Firms that transition from offering a traditional health plan to offering an HRA could shift costs from younger to older workers. Currently, health plans are generally structured so that employees’ cost to enroll does not vary by age. Because individual market premiums are generally age-rated, with premiums for older enrollees up to three times the premium for younger enrollees, achieving the same outcome under an individual-market-integrated HRA would require employers to contribute more to the HRA of their older workers than they do for their younger ones. Employers offering account-based benefits like HRAs and Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs) have traditionally been barred from varying their contributions in this way. However, the proposed rule and the supplementary notice promise changes that would allow employers to vary HRA contributions to account for age-based premium variation, but they do not require it.

There are reasons that employers switching from a traditional benefit to an individual-market-integrated HRA may seek to hold their older workers harmless. As noted above, employers generally hold employee contributions to traditional health plans constant across age groups, and this approach implicitly requires employers to contribute more to the coverage of older workers since the cost of covering older workers is generally higher than the cost for younger workers. Employers may have arrived at this structure because it is the optimal strategy for attracting and retaining workers of different ages. In addition, larger employers may wish to ensure that their older workers have

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6 In particular, if coverage through a QSEHRA is deemed “unaffordable” and the employee becomes eligible for the premium tax credit, the employee’s premium tax credit is reduced by the amount of the QSEHRA contribution. In contrast, if coverage is deemed unaffordable to an employee under a traditional health plan or an individual-market-integrated HRA, the employee generally receives the full premium tax credit.

7 The Treasury notice provides a safe harbor under the compensation-based non-discrimination rules for cases where “the maximum dollar amount made available to employees who are members of a particular class of employees increases in accordance with the increases in the price of an individual health insurance coverage policy in the relevant individual insurance market based on the ages of the employees who are members of that class of employees” (IRS 2018 (emphasis added)). The guidance does not specify what it means for the HRA amounts to increase “in accordance” with the premium based on age. For example, if the ratio of the HRAs were limited to the ratio of premiums based on age, then this would generally not be sufficient to hold older workers harmless. For purposes of this paper, we assume that the safe harbor will permit HRA amounts be set in the even larger ratios necessary to hold older workers harmless.
“affordable” offers of insurance coverage in order to avoid liability under the employer shared responsibility provisions. Both rationales apply with roughly equal force in the HRA context as in the context of a traditional health plan, which could lead employers to seek to hold employees’ cost of enrollment constant by age when transitioning to an HRA.

However, it seems likely that some firms, particularly smaller firms not subject to the employer shared responsibility requirement, will not vary HRA contributions by age sufficiently to insulate older workers from increased premiums. Brokers marketing QSEHRAs tend to emphasize flat contributions, even though QSEHRA contributions also may be varied by age (Take Command Health).

Indeed, there are at least two differences between individual-market-integrated HRAs and traditional health plans that may lead employers to treat older and younger workers differently in the two settings:

- While it is administratively simpler to charge employees a uniform premium to enroll in traditional coverage, this dynamic is flipped with an HRA. Under the HRA, it is simpler to provide a flat HRA contribution than to customize contributions to ensure that older and younger workers pay the same amount for coverage. This factor may be particularly important to the extent employers switching to HRAs are motivated by avoiding the administrative cost of offering a traditional health plan, although vendors selling HRA products could simplify the age smoothing for employers to a significant degree.

- Employee perceptions of fairness, which arguably encourage employers to hold employee contributions constant by age in traditional health plans, may have the opposite effect in the context of an HRA. For a traditional health plan, the employee contribution is highly visible, so holding it constant may seem like the fairest approach. (Similarly, the actual cost of coverage by age is completely opaque to the individual and may not even be computed by the employer.) By contrast, HRAs make the employer contribution visible and hide the employee’s share, so holding the employer contribution constant may seem fairer to employees in the context of an HRA. Indeed, HRA contributions would need to vary widely by age to hold older workers harmless. Allowing an older worker to purchase coverage for the same amount as a younger worker would generally require the ratio of their HRA amounts to be larger than the ratio of their unsubsidized premiums. For example, if a silver plan costs $4,000 for a 21-year-old and $12,000 for a 64-year old, allowing each to purchase the plan for $2,000 would require an HRA of $2,000 for the 21-year-old and $10,000 for the 65-year-old, a ratio of 5:1. Making such large discrepancies salient—even if it merely reproduces what was previously happening under the traditional health plan—may create significant resentment among younger workers.

It is important to note that, even if older workers do end up contributing more to their coverage and younger workers less at firms providing coverage through individual-market-integrated HRAs, those
changes could be offset in whole or in part by changes in wages for different classes of workers. Whether and how quickly those changes in wages would occur is uncertain, however. And even if changes in wages could hold the age profile of total compensation constant, changes in the cost of enrolling in coverage by age would still likely reshape the age profile of enrollment.

**Redistribution Across Income Groups.** Firms that transition from offering no coverage to offering an HRA could make their low-income workers worse off while making their high-income workers better off because of interactions with the premium tax credit (PTC) and cost-sharing reductions (CSRs). Under the proposal, low- and moderate-income workers at firms that elect to provide a sufficiently generous HRA contribution would lose access to these subsidies, even where the HRA contribution is substantially less generous than the subsidies. The benefit of using pre-tax dollars to pay individual market premiums would typically fall short of offsetting this loss, in part because these workers generally have low marginal tax rates and so receive less benefit from compensation being tax-free. Conversely, employees with incomes over 400 percent of the poverty level are already subsidy-ineligible and generally benefit more from being permitted to pay for individual market premiums at least in part with pre-tax dollars.

Thus, to the extent firms that would otherwise not offer coverage begin doing so with an individual-market-integrated HRA, it could benefit higher-income employees at the expense of lower-income employees. Over time, it is likely that wages for different groups of workers at these firms would adjust to offset the loss of the PTC, at least to some extent, or that low-income workers would leave for firms that do not offer coverage in order to retain access to the PTC. But there is nevertheless some risk of adverse distributional impacts, especially in the short term.

**Effects of the Excepted Benefit HRA Proposal**

The proposed excepted benefit HRAs are generally likely to have smaller effects than the individual-market-integrated HRAs because they cannot be used to purchase individual market coverage and, thus, are unlikely to have significant effects on that market. Like the individual-market-integrated HRA, however, this proposal may have some distributional impacts, specifically shifting costs from younger and healthier workers to older and sicker workers.

Notably, some firms may wish to shift costs from their healthier to their sicker workers to the extent they believe that the benefits of improved recruiting and retention among younger and healthier workers will outweigh the corresponding costs among older and sicker workers. Firms have some options to achieve such a cost shift today, like offering a relatively stingy traditional health plan health benefit designed to appeal to their healthier workers at a low premium and offering a more generous plan designed to appeal to their sicker workers at a higher premium. But the excepted benefit HRA
may provide a particularly effective means of doing so because it can be used to provide access to underwritten coverage that is particularly unattractive (and frequently unavailable) to sicker workers.

In particular, under the proposal, the excepted benefits HRA would be offered to workers that are also offered traditional coverage, but employees would not be required to enroll in such coverage in order to receive the HRA. As a result, younger and healthier workers may find it attractive to decline employer sponsored coverage, and instead use HRA funds to obtain a short-term limited -duration product that is underwritten and does not offer full benefits, or to use HRA funds to pay incurred medical expenses directly. This would leave disproportionately older and sicker workers in the traditional employer plan – driving up per capita costs for that coverage. Employers could respond to that change by increasing their per capita contribution, or by shifting those costs to the older and sicker workers that remain in such coverage, although they would be limited to some degree in doing so by the risk of incurring penalties under the ACA’s employer mandate.

**Compliance and Administrative Challenges**

In addition to the policy impacts discussed above of each of the new proposed HRA varieties, the two of them together would create compliance and administrative challenges for consumers and state-based Marketplaces. These challenges stem from how the new HRAs would interact with existing marketplace subsidies. In addition, the new special enrollment period for employees newly offered individual-market-integrated HRAs will pose additional challenges for Marketplaces.

*Proliferation of HRA Varieties May Be Confusing for Employees.* Creating two new varieties of HRAs on top of those that already exist, each of which affects consumers’ eligibility for the premium tax credit in different ways, has the potential to create confusion for employees. If this proposal is finalized, there will be four different types of benefits referred to as HRAs that employees could receive – an HRA integrated with group or other coverage under the pre-2018 rules, an individual-market-integrated HRA, an excepted benefits HRA, and a QSEHRA.

Each HRA flavor affects eligibility for the PTC and other tax benefits in different ways, so it is crucial that employees understand which one they are offered and the attendant rules. Specifically, each variety requires a different calculation to determine whether it is considered an affordable offer of employer coverage, and each has different implications depending on that determination. For example, an individual-market-integrated HRA is considered unaffordable based on integration with the lowest-cost silver plan – a different standard from all the others. If the combination is deemed unaffordable, the employee will need to purchase coverage through the Marketplace to receive PTC. But if the combination is deemed affordable, the employee will generally need to purchase coverage off-Marketplace so she can pay for her share of the premium with pre-tax dollars – again, a rule that applies to none of the other types of HRAs.
Employees offered an individual market-integrated-HRA will receive a notice explaining the relevant rules under the proposal, just as those offered a QSEHRA do today. But those receiving the other varieties of HRAs will not. We expect it will be extremely difficult for individual consumers – and even professional assisters – to correctly identify what type of HRA an individual is offered and how that affects their options. Mistaking one flavor for another or misunderstanding the rules could lead consumers to miss out on subsidies for which they are eligible or receive subsidies for which they are ineligible and may be required to repay.

Employers could mitigate some of this confusion by working with specialized agents and brokers to facilitate individual decisions, and we would expect significant employer-facilitated broker involvement if the proposal is finalized. Nonetheless, some employees might still be left to navigate this environment on their own. And even with professional assistance, there will be circumstances where the employer and employee interest diverge (such as when it is in a worker’s interest to decline and HRA and receive PTC, exposing her employer to potential penalties under the employer mandate) so that a broker partnering with the employer may not be well situated to advise the individual. This confusion might be exacerbated by the recent deep cuts (Keith 2018) in Marketplace navigator funding.

Administrative Impact on State-Based Marketplaces. Making APTC eligibility determinations requires the Marketplaces to collect accurate information about employment-related benefits an applicant is offered and then to apply the relevant eligibility rule. To do this, the Marketplace asks a series of detailed questions and embeds the various rules into their eligibility logic. The rules are extensive, complicated, and interconnected – and making even small changes that seem logically discrete requires expensive and time-consuming testing throughout the eligibility system. Incorporating the new HRAs in time for the open enrollment period beginning in the fall of 2019 is likely infeasible.

Similarly, special enrollment period eligibility rules are embedded in the Marketplace architecture; adding an additional eligibility category requires expensive and time-consuming software modifications.

Legal Concerns

Beyond the policy concerns outlined above, we believe that the proposed regulations raise significant legal concerns. We address concerns related to the individual-market-integrated HRA and excepted benefit HRA in turn.

Individual-Market-Integrated HRA

We are concerned that deeming an individual-market-integrated HRA to satisfy the market reforms may exceed the departments authority under the statute. As discussed earlier, the ACA applies the
market reforms to all types of group health plans (other than excepted benefits), and HRAs standing alone clearly violate the market reforms because they inherently have annual limits and don’t provide the required coverage of preventive services.

The departments created the concept of integration through rulemaking to authorize HRAs in a narrow set of circumstances where they are linked to the employer’s traditional health plan. In particular, as noted above, the departments concluded that an HRA could be integrated with the employer’s own traditional health plan. In that circumstance, the departments determined that the employer’s underlying health plan and the HRA could plausibly be considered a single benefit package that together satisfied the market reforms. The traditional plan and the HRA had different features and were formally considered separate group health plans for tax and fiduciary purposes, but from the perspective of the individual employee they were a joint package. Importantly, no one is harmed by allowing the HRA to be integrated with a traditional plan.

In later years, the departments cautiously extended this logic to allow these HRAs to pay for expenses associated with certain analogous benefits, namely, Tricare and Medicare, so long as the employer also offered a traditional health plan with which the HRA could be integrated. Tricare and Medicare provide the same sort of comprehensive coverage as a traditional employer health plan, and they are limited to workers with specific personal circumstances that will generally make the underlying health plan unnecessary. As when an employee is enrolled in an HRA alongside a traditional health plan, no one is harmed when an HRA pays for expenses associated with Tricare and Medicare.

The departments were, however, careful not to extend integration into the individual market. A central goal of the ACA is to create an individual market where healthy and sick individuals without access to employer-sponsored health insurance pool their risk. As noted above, creating a porous boundary between the group and individual markets creates a significant risk of putting upward pressure on individual market premiums. Unlike when HRAs pay for expenses associated with a traditional employer plan or with Tricare and Medicare, integration with the individual market does create potential harm – and that harm goes to one of the core purposes of the ACA. Creating not just winners but also losers greatly weakens the departments’ authority to create this additional relief from the statute’s general prohibition on HRAs. Thus, the departments had previously concluded that they should not and could not permit HRAs to be integrated with an individual market health plan. Reversing course and permitting individual market integration does not seem to be consistent with the statute.

We also note that unlike most other circumstances where integration is allowed, in the case of the individual market HRA, the employer would no longer be offering a traditional health plan to their workers. This is a major shift: to-date, integration has only been permitted when the employer offers a group health plan that satisfies the market reforms, consistent with the justification that the HRA is considered to satisfy the market reforms because the employer’s broader package of coverage satisfies
those rules. The individual-market-integrated HRA would be the first time employers would be permitted to have compliance with annual limit and preventive services requirement based solely on the benefits provided by another entity. The ACA does not include any basis for the departments to make this choice.

Further, had Congress intended to allow employers to help employees buy coverage in the individual market, it would have done so directly. Indeed, as noted above, in 2016 Congress created QSEHRAs, which allow certain small employers to offer a benefit that is similar to the individual-market-integrated HRAs. In creating the QSEHRA option, Congress placed careful limits on which employers could use these products and how they had to do so. If the underlying ACA requirements allowed for the individual-market-integrated HRAs, there would have been no reason for Congress to enact separate legislation, and Congress’s efforts to limit who could have access to these products would be unnecessary.

In addition, we note that the proposed rule allows integration with grandfathered health plans, even though they need not satisfy the market reforms. It is simply illogical to conclude that an HRA complies with, e.g., the preventive services requirement because it is used to purchase another plan that does not comply with the preventive services requirement. The departments explain that this will be a relatively rare circumstance, but that does not provide grounds for their conclusion.

Finally, the departments request comments on whether the final rule should allow an HRA to be integrated with a short-term health insurance. Allowing integration with short-term plans would place even further strain on the concept of integration. First, like grandfathered plans, short-term plans are not themselves subject to the market reforms. Even if a particular short-term plan did cover preventive services and refrain from imposing annual and lifetime limits, the fact that the issuer has voluntarily chosen to design their product in this way does not give enrollees the same protections as if their plan that had a regulatory obligation to comply because there is no enforcement apparatus or private right of action. But even more importantly, allowing a group health plan to be considered “integrated” with a short-term product – which is permitted to discriminate based on health status – would conflict with the core requirement that group health plans may not discriminate based on health status. The departments may not have it both ways: if the HRA and the integrated product are to be considered as a single unit for purposes of assessing compliance with some of the standards that apply to group health plans, then a medically underwritten short-term plan cannot be part of that unit.

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8 The only other case where integration is allowed in the absence of a compliant plan offered to the employee by the employer is the “special rule” for very small employers that are permitted to make an unusual arrangement for Medicare-eligible employees. And even in that case, the employer is required to provide a compliant plan to their non-Medicare-eligible workers.
Excepted Benefits HRA

We also believe that the creation of a new excepted benefit HRA that can be used to pay premiums for broader insurance benefits may not be permissible under the authority granted to the departments.

Federal law gives the departments authority to define “excepted benefits” that are exempt from many of the substantive requirements applicable to health coverage, including the annual limit and preventive services standards. The proposal designates the excepted benefit HRA as a “limited excepted benefit” – one of the statutory categories. But the departments’ ability to designate new kinds of limited excepted benefits is carefully circumscribed in statute; this category is defined as consisting of dental and vision coverage, long-term care benefits, and “such other similar, limited benefits as are specified in regulation.” The departments have previously used this grant of authority to define “other similar” benefits to specify that certain health flexible spending arrangements, employee assistance programs, and wrap-around coverage are excepted benefits.

It is difficult to understand how the excepted benefit HRA, as defined in the proposal, can be considered a “limited excepted benefit.” Neither dental and vision coverage nor long-term care benefits provide a scope of coverage approaching traditional major medical coverage. By contrast, short-term plans – which excepted benefit HRAs could be used to purchase – are permitted to cover the full range of health care services and can provide benefits similar to traditional insurance (though exactly what benefits they provide and the degree of access for people with pre-existing conditions is not regulated). They are not similar to narrowly-scoped benefits like vision, dental, and long-term care.

Nor do excepted benefit HRAs look like the benefits that have previously been defined as limited excepted benefits by the departments – all of which are insurance-like benefits with very limited scope or account-based benefits that can be used only for very limited purposes. For example, health FSAs are limited to paying out of pocket expenses. Employee Assistance Programs are only considered an excepted benefit if they do not provide “significant benefits in the nature of medical care.” The wrap-around benefit is only excepted if it is designed to offer benefits that go beyond individual market coverage, in much the same way that dental and vision benefits supplement a traditional health plan. In all of these cases, there is a clear boundary that distinguishes the excepted benefit from the types of items and services covered in a traditional health plan; short-term plans have none of those inherent limits.

Classifying premium payments as “limited” when the benefit itself is not effectively eliminates the boundary Congress intended to set. Such an approach would allow employers to circumvent the statute and effectively offer these benefits in ways not otherwise permitted.

This argument is buttressed by the fact that federal law expressly treats short-term limited-duration as not an excepted benefit. Congress did specify that short-term limited-duration coverage was to be treated differently than other types of insurance – but it did so by saying that the coverage would not
be considered part of the individual market, not by adding it as a category of excepted benefits. Allowing premium payments for this type of coverage to become an excepted benefit does not comport with Congress’s choice to classify this type of coverage in a different way.

Further, creating a special tax benefit for short-term plans is inconsistent with the structure of the ACA. The ACA expressly disfavors short-term coverage as compared to other kinds of insurance and makes it ineligible for the premium tax credit. As the preamble to the proposed rule notes, this is part of the ACA’s general approach of requiring coverage to be adequate and creating a single community-rated risk pool. Thus, the departments’ attempt to create a new tax preference for this coverage should be regarded with skepticism.

**Overall Assessment and Recommendations for the Final Rule**

Based on the policy and legal analysis presented above, we have a number of recommendations for the final rule. We first discuss our recommendations for the individual-market-integrated and excepted benefit HRAs. We close with several cross-cutting recommendations.

**Individual-Market-Integrated HRA**

The departments’ individual-market-integrated HRA proposal would benefit some while imposing costs on others. Large employers with sicker workforces would clearly benefit from the ability to access community-rated premiums in the individual market, and this would often allow those employers to offer coverage to their workers on better terms and could induce some such employers to begin offering coverage. However, as discussed above, these benefits would come at a cost. Notably, individual market premiums would rise, imposing costs for unsubsidized enrollees in the individual market. The federal deficit would also increase due both to higher premium tax credit outlays and, potentially, increased revenue losses attributable to the tax exclusion for employer-provided insurance coverage.

Providing an overall assessment of the policy’s effects is challenging both because there is uncertainty about the magnitude of these different effects and because it is not immediately clear how the costs and benefits for different groups should be weighed against each other. Nevertheless, we make our best effort in what follows.

If one relied solely on the departments’ regulatory impact analysis, then this proposal appears potentially defensible: the departments predict that the proposal would lead to an increase in insurance coverage of 800,000 by 2028, an increase in the federal deficit of $6 billion in the same year, and only a slight increase in individual market premiums. The implied increase in federal costs per additional person covered is not unreasonably large and is, for example, broadly similar to that associated with policies that increase the generosity of the premium tax credit (Eibner and Liu 2017). Additionally, the HRA policy would improve risk-sharing by relieving employers with very sick
workforces of the accompanying health care spending burdens. (On the other hand, as we discussed earlier, this policy could also shift costs from higher-income workers onto lower-income workers in some instances, which we view as cause for concern.)

However, as discussed earlier, we believe that the departments’ estimates of the proposal’s effects on individual market premiums and the federal budget (and possibly insurance coverage as well) are likely too optimistic. Thus, the overall set of tradeoffs presented by this proposal is likely less attractive, potentially substantially less attractive, than the departments’ analysis would suggest.

Moreover, we are inclined to place a particularly heavy weight on the possibility that the proposal could have negative effects on the individual market risk pool. The market currently is in the process of adjusting to a series of relatively significant policy changes, notably the repeal of the individual mandate penalty and the liberalization of rules related to short-term plans. To date, these policy changes have spurred higher premiums, but not significant insurer exists or other disruption. There is a possibility that will change in the years to come, however, if insurers turn out to have underestimated the effect of these changes. In that environment, we view injecting an additional source of downside risk as unwise.

Taken together, these considerations lead us to conclude that the individual-market-integrated HRA proposal would likely do more harm than good. We also note that, as discussed in the last section, there are real questions about whether the departments’ proposed approach is consistent with the relevant statutes. In light of these policy and legal concerns, we make the following recommendations:

- **Recommendation #1**: The departments should decline to finalize the proposal to create an individual-market-integrated HRA and should instead maintain the status quo.

- **Recommendation #2**: If the departments nevertheless elect to finalize this proposal, they should retain and strengthen the provisions of the proposed rule that keep employers from shifting only their sicker workers into the individual market. Allowing this type of shifting would greatly magnify the increase in individual market premiums under the proposal, which would in turn substantially increase the proposal’s fiscal costs and wipe out much of the potential benefit to large employers with sicker workforces. This is clearly undesirable.

Specifically, if the departments move forward, we urge them to:

- Maintain the prohibition on purchasing short-term plans via an individual-market-integrated HRA. As we noted earlier, relaxing this prohibition would also raise significant legal concerns.

- Maintain the prohibition on offering a traditional health plan alongside an individual-market-integrated HRA and continue to require employers to verify that individuals
enrolled in an individual-market-integrated HRA are actually enrolled in individual market insurance coverage.

- Make it more difficult for employers to selectively offer individual-market-integrated HRAs to subgroups of their workers that have greater health care needs. To this end, the departments should:
  - Not expand the list of factors employers can use when defining the classes of employees to which they offer an individual-market-integrated HRA.
  - Allow employers to combine factors to define classes only in circumstances where the resulting group would be of a sufficient size, such as containing at least 10 percent of the employer’s workforce or at least 100 employees.
  - Apply controlled-group aggregation rules when determining when entities with common ownership are considered a single employer to prevent employers from circumventing these rules through reorganization.
  - Modify the regulation to take into account all the relevant facts and circumstances in determining whether the HRA offer was targeted towards sicker workers. That is, rather than treating an offer based on the eight permitted characteristics as permissible in all cases, they should instead specify that use of the eight characteristics would be evidence of a neutral intent, but would not insulate an employer if there was other evidence of targeting.

**Excepted Benefit HRA**

We believe that the main effect of this proposal would be to give some employers a tool to shift costs away from their healthier workers and toward their sicker workers, a shift we view as clearly undesirable. Additionally, as discussed above, we believe that the departments’ proposal to create an excepted benefit HRA is likely not legally permissible. In light of these policy and legal concerns, we make the following recommendations:

- **Recommendation #3:** The departments should not finalize the excepted benefit HRA proposal and should instead maintain the status quo.

- **Recommendation #4:** If the departments do move forward with the excepted benefit HRA proposal, they should not allow the excepted benefit HRA to be used to purchase individual market coverage. Allowing workers a choice between short-term plans and individual market coverage via the excepted benefit HRA would raise essentially the same concerns as allowing that choice in the context of the individual-market-integrated HRA. It would also further
undermine any claim that the benefit was a “limited excepted benefit” – since individual market plans are of course a comprehensive coverage option that contains no limiting features.

Cross-Cutting Recommendations

If the departments move ahead with one or both of the HRA proposals in the proposed rule, that will, as we discussed earlier, create compliance and administrative burdens for consumers and state-based Marketplaces. The only way the departments are likely to be able to fully address these concerns is to decline to create the two new types of HRAs envisioned in the proposed rule. However, the departments may be able to mitigate these concerns to some degree as follows:

- Recommendation #5: To help consumers navigate the new environment, we encourage the departments to strengthen the notice requirements and apply them uniformly to not only individual-market-integrated HRAs, but also to excepted benefits HRAs, the HRAs authorized under prior regulations, and all other kinds of employer payment arrangements that could be confused by employees.

- Recommendation #6: To allow all actors sufficient time to adjust to the new rules, particularly state-based Marketplaces that will need to make changes to their procedures for assessing enrollee eligibility for subsidies and special enrollment periods, we recommend delaying the effective date of the proposed rule until at least the 2021 calendar year.

Finally, the effects of this proposal are unusually difficult to predict given the inherent difficulties in predicting employers’ responses and the extent to which employer responses may vary across geographic areas. Indeed, the departments’ own regulatory impact analysis describes the proposal’s effects as “highly uncertain.” Furthermore, as discussed above, the departments’ analysis does not adequately account for several factors that would play an important role in determining the proposal’s effects in practice. In light of these uncertainties, we make the following recommendation:

- Recommendation #7: The departments should provide additional time for states and other stakeholders to assess the proposal and provide comments. The departments should also improve their own regulatory impact analysis by accounting for: variation in health status across employers driven by factors beyond those currently included in the departments’ modeling; variation in individual market risk mix across geographic areas; the likelihood that employers would, under some circumstances, be able to shift sicker subsets of their workforces into the individual market despite the provisions of the proposal intended to prevent such behavior; and the likelihood that individuals enrolling in individual market coverage via an HRA will incur greater hassle costs than those enrolling in a traditional health plan.
References


In late October, the Trump Administration released a proposed rule that would permit employers to subsidize their employees’ purchase of individual market health insurance coverage via health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs). Under current law and regulations, employers are generally barred from subsidizing individual market coverage on behalf of their employees, whether using pre-tax or post-tax dollars, although small employers are eligible for a limited exception from this rule.

As Christen Linke Young, Jason Levitis, and I discuss in a recent analysis of the proposed rule, this change would have wide ranging effects. Notably, many large employers with sicker workforces would find it attractive to subsidize individual market coverage via an HRA.\[1\] Today, these employers’ only options for providing coverage to their workers are to purchase experienced-rated coverage on the large group market or to self-insure. Thus, access to community-rated individual market products could allow these employers to provide coverage at considerably lower cost. However, the resulting changes in coverage arrangements would likely increase individual market premiums and the federal deficit.

While the Administration’s proposal in its current from would mostly result in the type of firm-level shifting described above, employers would also have an incentive to selectively shift their sicker workers into the individual market while arranging to cover their healthier workers in some other way.\[2\] The proposed rule includes several provisions
designed to prevent this behavior: it bars employers from offering this type of HRA side-by-side with a traditional health plan; it requires employers to offer this type of HRA on the same terms to all similarly situated employees; and it bars employers from using this type of HRA to subsidize short-term, limited duration coverage. While these safeguards would likely be largely effective (although they can and should be strengthened), the proposed rule solicits comments on eliminating or weakening them.

This analysis examines how eliminating one or more of these safeguards would affect individual market premiums. I estimate that, absent these safeguards, the Administration’s HRA proposal would cause very large increases in individual market premiums, although the precise magnitude of those increases is uncertain. In a conservative scenario in which only 10 percent of employers elected to use HRAs to shift sicker workers into the individual market, individual market premiums would rise by 16 percent or more. If all employers took this approach, individual market premiums would almost double. These effects are so large because the group market is so much larger than the individual market, which means that even moderate amounts of worker-level shifting can substantially alter the individual market’s risk mix.

The remainder of this analysis proceeds as follows. I first briefly summarize the Administration’s proposal and its main effects, drawing heavily on the analysis co-authored with my Brookings colleagues referenced above. I then examine the consequences of relaxing or eliminating the safeguards against worker-level shifting that were included in the proposed rule and present quantitative estimates of the effects of a version of the Administration’s HRA proposal that lacked one or more of these safeguards.

**Overview of the Proposed Rule**

An HRA is a mechanism by which an employer can pay for certain health care expenses incurred by its employees on a pre-tax basis. Currently, employers are generally prohibited from subsidizing an employee’s purchase of individual market coverage, whether through an HRA or other mechanisms. (In 2016, Congress created a limited exception to this rule
for employers with fewer than 50 full-time-equivalent employees.) The proposed rule would permit HRAs that can be used to pay premiums for individual market coverage under certain conditions discussed below.\(^3\)

Under the proposed rule, this new option would likely appeal primarily to large employers with sicker workforces. When offering a traditional health plan, large employers must either self-insure or purchase coverage in the large group market, where premiums are typically experience-rated; either way, the cost of providing coverage reflects the health status of their employees. By contrast, individual market premiums are community-rated, meaning they do not vary by health status. Offering an HRA that can be used to purchase individual market coverage could therefore allow employers with sicker workforces to offer similar coverage at much lower cost. (The small group market, like the individual market, is community-rated, so the proposed rule would create no such benefits for small employers.)

These incentives would likely drive large employers with sicker workforces to make two types of changes. First, some employers would drop their traditional health plans and instead subsidize the purchase of individual market coverage via an HRA; this type of shifting would generally worsen the individual market risk pool. Second, some employers that do not currently offer health benefits might be induced to begin offering an HRA; this type of shifting could benefit the individual market risk pool to the extent that these employers’ sicker workers are already enrolled in the individual market. On net, as my colleagues and I discuss in detail, it appears likely that these shifts would increase individual market premiums and federal costs, although it is possible that overall insurance coverage would increase as well.

**Safeguards Against Worker-Level Shifting of Sicker Workers into the Individual Market**

While the Administration’s proposal as currently constructed would primarily drive the type of firm-level shifting described above, employers—including those with healthier workforces—would also have an incentive to engage in worker-level shifting: providing their sicker workers with individual market coverage via an HRA while arranging to cover
their healthier workers under either a traditional health plan (in the case of large employers) or short-term, limited-duration coverage. Because the individual market is community-rated, while these other coverage options are not, this approach could allow employers to obtain coverage for their sicker workers at far lower cost without increasing the cost of covering their healthier workers, thereby reducing their overall cost of delivering health benefits. However, this type of health-status-based sorting would lead to substantial increases in individual market premiums, particularly given the large size of the group market relative to the individual market.

At a high level, employers could seek to achieve this sorting in two main ways. First, they could selectively offer individual market coverage to their sicker employees. Second, they could offer workers a choice between individual market coverage and other coverage, but structure that choice so as to encourage sicker workers to choose individual market coverage and healthier workers to choose the other coverage.

The Administration’s proposal includes three main provisions designed to prevent employers from selectively shifting sicker workers into the individual market. Specifically, the proposed rule: bars employers from offering the same worker a choice between this type of HRA and a traditional health plan; requires employers offering this type of HRA to offer it on the same terms to all similarly situated employees; and bars this type of HRA from being used to subsidize short-term, limited duration coverage.

These safeguards would likely be fairly effective in preventing worker-level shifting of sicker workers into the individual market, although my colleagues and I have several recommendations for how they could be strengthened. However, the proposed rule solicits comment on removing these safeguards. Removing any of these safeguards would likely cause a large influx of workers into the individual market, but the precise mechanism by which this would occur would depend on which were eliminated:

- **Allowing an HRA to be offered side-by-side with a traditional health plan:**
  Offering workers a choice between individual market coverage subsidized via an HRA and a traditional health plan could facilitate sorting by health status. In this scenario, the employer could design its traditional health plan to be unappealing to its sicker workers, thereby encouraging those workers to decline it in favor of individual market.
coverage. Large employers have substantial flexibility in designing traditional health plans, so they could make these plans unappealing to sicker workers in a number of ways. They could, for example, require high cost sharing for services associated with certain high-cost chronic conditions. Another strategy would be to offer a traditional health plan that imposes high overall cost-sharing requirements, but low cost-sharing for routine care commonly used by relatively healthy workers. Employers could also selectively promote the HRA to sicker workers or otherwise encourage sicker enrollees to select the HRA option.

- **Eliminating the requirement to offer an HRA on the same terms to all “similarly situated” employees:** Employers could also selectively shift sicker workers into the individual market by only offering this type of HRA to sicker workers. Even under the proposed rule, employers would have some ability to target HRAs to sicker workers due to the large number of factors employers can use in defining what groups of workers are considered “similarly situated,” as my colleagues and I have discussed. If the list of factors was expanded, this would allow even finer-grained targeting. If these requirements were removed entirely, nearly complete sorting would likely be possible.

- **Allowing subsidization of short-term coverage via the same HRA:** If the same HRA could be used to subsidize either individual market coverage or short-term coverage, then workers’ own financial incentives would lead them to sort themselves across the two types of coverage by health status. Because short-term coverage is underwritten, sicker workers would either face high premiums or be completely unable to obtain it, so they would generally opt for individual market coverage. By contrast, healthier workers would typically be able to purchase lower-cost coverage in the short-term market and so would generally obtain their coverage there.

**Methodology for Simulating the HRA Proposal Without Safeguards Against Worker-Level Shifting**

I now turn to simulating the effects of a version of the Administration’s HRA proposal that lacked one or more of these safeguards against worker-level shifting. This section provides an overview of my methodology; the methodological appendix provides the full technical
details. The overall effects of this version of the HRA policy would depend on two main factors: (1) how many and what types of workers end up enrolled in individual market coverage at firms that seek to use HRAs to steer their sicker workers into the individual market; and (2) how many firms elect to use HRAs in this way. I consider each in turn.

Focusing first on worker-level enrollment patterns at firms that seek to use HRAs to shift sicker workers into the individual market, I assume that a worker would end up enrolled in individual market coverage if that coverage was less expensive than (equivalent) coverage priced based on that worker’s own expected claims risk. Equivalently, I assume that people who are sicker than the individual market average (adjusting for age rating) end up enrolled in individual market coverage, while those who are healthier than the individual market average (adjusting for age rating) end up enrolled in other coverage. As discussed above, if the new type of HRA could be used to subsidize short-term coverage in addition to individual market coverage, then workers’ own choices would bring about this sorting. In policy scenarios where this type of HRA could be offered side-by-side with a traditional health plan or the requirement to offer HRAs on the same terms to all similarly situated employees were eliminated, employers would seek to bring about this sorting through their decisions about how to structure their traditional health plans or whom to offer HRAs.

In the real world, the sorting of enrollees between individual market and other coverage might be less precise than implied by this assumption because enrollment decisions might depend on factors that are not included in this simple decision rule. For example, in the policy scenario where this type of HRA could be used to purchase short-term coverage, some relatively healthy people might opt for individual market coverage even when short-term coverage would be less expensive because they wished to avoid the hassle costs associated with the underwriting process. Alternatively, some relatively sick enrollees might opt for short-term coverage (if it were available to them) despite being charged a relatively high premium because they want coverage with a broad network of providers and such coverage is unavailable in the individual market. As a crude way of capturing these and many other possible types of frictions, I report results from simulations in
which the price of individual market coverage is perceived to be 25 percent higher than it actually is for the purposes of enrollment decisions, as well as simulations in which the price of individual market coverage is perceived to be 25 percent lower.

Turning to employers’ decisions, there is meaningful uncertainty regarding what share of employers would set up HRAs with the objective of shifting their sicker workers into the individual market. While the potential reduction in health benefit costs would give employers a powerful incentive to adopt this strategy, employers might reasonably fear that changing or eliminating their traditional health plans would make it harder to attract and retain workers. Indeed, depending on the precise policy scenario under consideration, setting up HRAs to achieve this type of sorting could create additional hassle costs for enrollees. Workers who are shifted into the individual market might also be displeased with the narrower networks typical of individual market products. Exactly how employers would balance these competing considerations is uncertain, so I consider scenarios in which employers accounting for 10 percent, 50 percent, or 100 percent of current enrollment in large employer coverage adopt this strategy.\[^5\] (I assume that no small employers engage in worker-level shifting, although it is likely some would in the scenario where this type of HRA could be used to purchase short-term coverage.)

To empirically implement the model sketched above, I require detailed data on the characteristics of those currently enrolled in large employer coverage. I construct a suitable sample by pooling several years of data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Household Component (MEPS-HC). In that sample, I construct a preliminary estimate of each person’s expected claims risk in the coming year based on their health care spending in the prior year, their age, and their self-reported health status. The MEPS-HC is known to understate the number of people with very high health care spending, so these estimates likely understate the number of people with very high expected health care spending. To address this problem, I adjust the preliminary estimates using estimates of variation in expected claims risk reported by Fleitas, Gowrisankaran, and Lo Sasso based on a large health care claims database.
I use an iterative method to solve for equilibrium enrollment decisions and individual market premiums. In brief, starting from current individual market premiums, I estimate the number and type of enrollees in employer coverage who would shift into the individual market. I then recompute individual market premiums based on the new enrollee pool and re-calculate which enrollees would shift into the individual market. I repeat these calculations until the resulting premium is consistent with the enrollment decisions leading to that premium. These premiums and enrollment patterns are the new equilibrium.

I note that there are at least two ways in which my approach may understate the effect of the HRA policy on individual market premiums. First, I do not model firm-level shifting into the individual market. In scenarios in which only a minority of employers engage in worker-level shifting, it is likely that some firms with sicker workforces (other than those engaged in worker-level shifting) would elect to move all of their workers into the individual market. This would likely cause individual market premiums to rise by more than I estimate here. Second, my modeling does not account for the likelihood that higher premiums would reduce enrollment among unsubsidized enrollees purchasing individual market coverage. Since those dropping individual market coverage would likely be healthier, on average, than those who remain, this too would cause individual market premiums to rise by more than I estimate here.

**Simulation Results**

Table 1 reports the estimated change in individual market premiums from implementing a version of the HRA proposal that lacked one or more of the safeguards against worker-level shifting included in the proposed rule. Across all of the scenarios examined, individual market premiums would increase substantially. Unsurprisingly, the amount individual market premiums would rise depends on how many employers set up HRAs designed to shift sicker workers into the individual market. If only 10 percent of employers set up such HRAs, then individual market premiums would rise by 16-17 percent, depending the set of assumptions used. By contrast, if nearly all large employers sought to use HRAs in this way, individual market premiums would almost double under all of assumptions examined.
Table 1: Change in Individual Market Premiums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of Large Employers Engaged in Worker-Level Shifting</th>
<th>Effect of Factors Other Than Expected Claims Risk in Determining Worker Sorting Across Coverage Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived individual market premiums 25% lower than actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 percent</td>
<td>+16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 percent</td>
<td>+55.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 percent</td>
<td>+85.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations using methodology described in the text.

Perhaps more surprising, the estimates in Table 1 show that allowing factors other than expected claims risk to influence how workers sort between the individual market and other coverage has only a modest effect of the results. There are two reasons for this. First, changes in the perceived attractiveness of individual market coverage change enrollment decisions for relatively few people. This is because average claims risk in the individual market is quite high after implementation of the HRA policy, so the level of expected claims risk where a worker (or the worker’s employer) is indifferent between individual market coverage and other coverage is well out in the tail of the distribution, where the distribution is relatively thin. Second, essentially by definition, enrollees on the margin between individual market coverage and other coverage have expected claims risk similar to the (post-policy) individual market average, so whether these enrollees are in the individual market has little effect on market average claims risk.

Table 2 shows that only a relatively small fraction of workers associated with employers engaging in worker-level shifting via an HRA would end up with individual market coverage. These shifts would nevertheless have a large effect on premiums because the
employer market is very large and because those who do shift into the individual market would have very high expected claims costs. Indeed, much of the effect on individual market premiums would occur even if the number of workers shifting into the individual market was substantially smaller than shown in these simulations, provided that the very costliest enrollees at these employers did shift into the individual market.

Table 2: Share of Enrollees Shifting to Individual Market (at Shifting Firms)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of Large Employers Engaged in Worker-Level Shifting</th>
<th>Effect of Factors Other Than Expected Claims Risk in Determining Worker Sorting Across Coverage Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived individual market premiums 25% lower than actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No adjustment (base assumption)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived individual market premium 25% higher than actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 percent</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 percent</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 percent</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations using methodology described in the text.

Finally, Table 3 quantifies the savings employers could realize by engaging in worker-level shifting. Specifically, the table reports the change in the effective price of insurance coverage experienced by employers engaged in worker-level shifting. For these purposes, I define the change in the effective price as the percent difference between the cost of the coverage its workers would obtain under the worker-level shifting strategy (whether in the individual market or elsewhere) and the cost of delivering equivalent coverage through a traditional health plan.\[6\]

Table 3: Change in Effective Price of Coverage (for Shifting Firms)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of Large Employers Engaged in Worker-Level Shifting</th>
<th>Effect of Factors Other Than Expected Claims Risk in Determining Worker Sorting Across Coverage Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived individual market premiums 25% lower than actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 percent</td>
<td>-21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 percent</td>
<td>-14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 percent</td>
<td>-11.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations using methodology described in the text.

If relatively few employers engage in worker-level shifting, then this effective price would fall by 21-23 percent, depending on the precise assumptions used. This effective price would fall by less if more employers engaged in worker-level shifting, reflecting the fact that individual market premiums would be higher. Even in these scenarios, however, engaging in worker-level shifting would reduce this effective price by 11-12 percent. The magnitude of these potential savings suggest that at least a substantial minority of firms would likely adopt this approach, despite the fact that this strategy would have some countervailing costs for employers, as discussed earlier.

**Conclusion**

Without the provisions of the proposed rule that aim to prevent employers from using HRAs to shift their sicker workers into the individual market, the Administration’s HRA proposal would lead to very large increases in individual market premiums, thereby increasing costs for individual market enrollees who are not eligible for subsidies and increasing the federal government’s costs of providing premium tax credits. Those costs would be difficult to justify; the main beneficiaries of the proposal would be large employers that already offer coverage, many of whom do not have particularly sick workforces, meaning that the proposal would be unlikely to produce substantial increases
in insurance coverage or improvements in risk sharing. While the costs of the Administration’s HRA proposal likely out weigh its benefits even its current form, these results imply that that if the Administration moves ahead, it should preserve—and strengthen—provisions intended to prevent selective shifting of sicker workers into the individual market.

Report Produced by USC-Brookings Schaeffer Initiative for Health Policy

Footnotes

1. 1

In this piece, I use the term “large employer” to refer to employers eligible to purchase coverage on the large group market. In most states, this category consists of employers with more than 50 employees. However, in a minority of states it consists of employers with more than 100 employees.

2. 2

Throughout, the term “worker” should be understood to encompass both the worker and any dependents of the worker enrolled in the employer’s plan.

3. 3

The Administration also proposes to create “excepted benefit” HRAs that can be used for certain other purposes not permitted under current regulations, including the purchase of short-term, limited duration insurance. This analysis does not address that portion of the Administration’s proposal.

4. 4

In theory, small employers, not just large employers, could implement a version of this approach in which they cover their healthier workers through a traditional health plan if they are willing to self-insure. Self-insurance has traditionally been uncommon among small employers since they are poorly positioned to bear significant claims risk. However, it is generally believed that nominally self-insured arrangements that place much less risk on employers are becoming common, which could make this a more viable strategy over the long run.

5. 5

Smaller shares might be appropriate in the policy scenario where this type of HRA can be used to subsidize short-term coverage since some states intend to bar or substantially limit employers’ ability to offer these policies. This would, in turn, reduce the number of employers for who worker-level shifting was an available strategy.

6. 6

The change in the effective price of delivering coverage similar to what the employer offered previously could be larger or smaller than the amount reported in Table 3. In particular, it is likely that the effective price of delivering coverage with a relatively broad provider network would decline by less than shown here since such coverage is often relatively expensive in the individual market (or completely unavailable). On the other hand, the effective price of delivering coverage with a narrower provider market would likely decline by more than shown here.
Methodological Appendix

This appendix describes how I estimate the effects of a version of the Administration’s HRA proposal that lacked one or more of the safeguards against worker-level shifting included in the proposed rule. The first section presents the modeling framework. The second section describes how I calibrate and solve the model. The final two sections discuss the methods used to process two of the data sources used in the calibration.

Modeling Framework

Consider two distinct populations $m \in \{E, I\}$ of size $N_m$, where population $E$ consists of people receiving coverage from a large employer (without the HRA policy) and population $I$ consists of people obtaining coverage on the individual market (without the HRA policy). A randomly drawn member of population $m$ has expected claims risk $R_m$, which is assumed to be observable to both the individual and the employer, as well as an age rating factor $A_m$ that would apply if that person enrolled in the individual market.\footnote{I assume age rating occurs in accordance with the federal default age rating curve in place for 2018 and later.} I assume that insurers offer a single plan design and that the plan’s expected cost of covering a person with claims risk expected $R_m$ is $cR_m$ for some constant $c$. I discuss the implications of this simplifying assumption below.

Prior to implementation of the HRA policy, the individual market only contains people purchasing coverage on their own. Expected plan spending is thus given by $cE[R_I]$. In equilibrium, insurers price to cover expected claims costs and thus set a base premium (i.e., the premium for a person with an age rating factor of one) of $B_{\text{pre}} = \frac{cE[R_I]}{E[A_I]}$.\footnote{I implicitly assume away administrative costs. This assumption is innocuous for the present purpose.} When solving the model, it is convenient to normalize this quantity by the expected plan liability generated by covering the large employer population. Denoting the normalized quantity by $b_{\text{pre}}$, it is straightforward to see that

$$b_{\text{pre}} \equiv \frac{B_{\text{pre}}}{cE[R_E]} = \frac{E[R_I]}{E[A_I]} = \frac{\phi}{E[A_E]},$$

(1)

where

$$\phi \equiv \frac{E[R_I]}{E[A_I]} \frac{E[R_E]}{E[A_E]}$$

is the portion of the pre-policy difference in expected claims risk between the individual and large employer markets that insurers cannot price for via age rating.

After implementation of the HRA policy, the individual market contains both people purchasing coverage on their own and people purchasing individual market coverage via an HRA. The new equilibrium base premium in the individual market is thus given by

$$B_{\text{post}} = \frac{N_I c E[R_I] + s N_E E[W] E[R_E | W = 1]}{N_I E[A_I] + s N_E E[W] E[A_E | W = 1]},$$

where $s$ is the share of employers offering HRAs (assumed to be randomly selected from the overall population of employers), and $W$ is an indicator variable that equals one if an individual worker would enroll in the individual market if offered an HRA.\footnote{The assumption that employers offering HRAs are randomly selected from the overall population of employers is surely not precisely correct. This would likely cause my estimates to understate the adverse effects of the HRA policy on the individual market risk pool.} The numerator of this fraction is plans'
aggregate expected claims liability, while the denominator is the sum of enrollees’ age rating factors. Normalizing by the expected claims liability generated by the large employer population then yields

$$b_{\text{post}} = \frac{B_{\text{post}}}{cE[R_E]} = \frac{N_I \phi \mathbb{E}[A_I] + sN_E \mathbb{E}[W] \mathbb{E}[R_E|W=1]}{N_I \mathbb{E}[A_I] + sN_E \mathbb{E}[W] \mathbb{E}[A_E|W=1]} \quad (2)$$

Equation (2) makes clear that post-policy premiums depend importantly on how many and what types of people associated with large employers switch into the individual market. As argued in the main text, if one or more of the safeguards against worker-level sorting were eliminated, workers or their employers would sort workers between individual market coverage and alternative coverage options priced based on each worker’s own expected claims risk. I assume that workers would end up enrolled in the lower-cost option unless some “friction” kept them from doing so. That is, I assume that enrollment decisions are governed by

$$W = 1 \{ (1 + f) A_E B_{\text{post}} < cR_E \} = 1 \{ (1 + f) A_E b_{\text{post}} < \frac{R_E}{\mathbb{E}[R_E]} \}, \quad (3)$$

where $f$ is a proportional friction amount.

As discussed in the main text, the friction $f$ provides an ad hoc way of capturing a variety of factors that may affect enrollment decisions but are not directly modeled. One factor not directly accounted for in the model is the possibility that the relative price of more generous plan designs (e.g., broad-network plan designs) may be higher in the individual market due to adverse selection pressures that are not fully compensated for by risk adjustment. To the extent that more generous plan types are highly valued by enrollees who would have an incentive to leave employer coverage under the HRA policy, that could lead enrollees to be less willing to take up individual market coverage than my base behavioral assumption would imply; this tendency can be captured by a positive value for $f$. The friction $f$ may also capture differences in hassle costs between the two enrollment modes, differences in loading factors between different types of coverage, or other factors that affect enrollment decisions.

**Calibration and Solution Method**

To calibrate the distributions underlying the various (conditional) expectations involving people in employer coverage that enter equations (1), (2), and (3), I construct a sample of enrollees in large employer coverage that includes data on both age and expected claims risk. Construction of this sample is described in detail below. I calibrate $\phi$, the baseline relative claims risk of the individual and group markets, using CMS risk adjustment data and the method, processed as described in the final section. I calibrate $\mathbb{E}[A_I]$ using the age distribution of people with individual market coverage and no other coverage in the 2017 National Health Interview Survey. Since my focus is on the long-run, I set $N_I$ to 12.0 million, consistent with the Congressional Budget Office’s projections of individual market enrollment in 2028 (CBO 2018). Similarly, I set $N_E$ to approximately 135 million. This estimate is obtained by combining CBO’s projection that 154 million non-elderly people will be enrolled in employer coverage in 2028 with an estimate based on the 2016 and 2017 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component that 87.7 percent of people enrolled in employer coverage are enrolled through a large employer.

Pre-policy premiums and enrollment can be calculated directly from the calibrated parameters. I use an iterative method to solve for post-policy premiums and enrollment. Specifically, I start with
an initial value for \( b_{\text{post}} \). I use this initial value to compute \( W \) for each person in the employer sample and then compute \( \mathbb{E}[W] \), \( \mathbb{E}[R_E | W = 1] \), and \( \mathbb{E}[A_E | W = 1] \) by averaging over the sample. I use these amounts to compute a new estimate of \( b_{\text{post}} \). I repeat these steps until the estimates of \( b_{\text{post}} \) converge, which occurs quickly in practice.

The premium change under the policy can be calculated directly from the equilibrium premiums. Post-policy individual market enrollment is then given by \( N_I + s N_E \mathbb{E}[W] \). The change in effective price metric reported in the text can be calculated as

\[
\frac{(1 - \mathbb{E}[W])c \mathbb{E}[R_E | W = 0] + \mathbb{E}[W] \mathbb{E}[A_E | W = 1]b_{\text{post}} - 1}{c \mathbb{E}[R_E]}
\]

\[
= [1 - \mathbb{E}[W]] \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_E | W = 0]}{\mathbb{E}[R_E]} + \mathbb{E}[W] \mathbb{E}[A_E | W = 1]b_{\text{post}} - 1.
\]

### Construction of the Employer Sample

I construct a sample of enrollees in employer coverage by pooling the longitudinal files of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Household Component (MEPS-HC) for 2009/2010 through 2015/2016. I limit the sample to people who meet the following inclusion criteria: (1) enrolled in employer coverage during all 24 months they appear in the panel; (2) under age 65 in the second year they appear in the panel; and (3) non-missing self-reported health status in the first year they appear in the panel. I do not limit the sample to people associated with large employers since enrollee characteristics are unlikely to differ substantially between large employers and small employers. I trend all spending amounts to 2016 based on the trend in average per enrollee spending in employer-sponsored coverage, as reported in the National Health Expenditure Accounts.

I construct an estimate of expected claims risk for each member of the sample. A significant challenge in constructing a suitable estimate is that the MEPS-HC is believed to understate the number of people with very high health care spending. In light of this shortcoming of the MEPS-HC, many natural approaches to estimating expected claims risk would likely also understate the number of people with very high expected claims risk, which would likely in turn lead me to underestimate the potential effects of relaxing the safeguards included in the proposed rule.

The ideal solution to this problem would be to perform this analysis in a database of health care claims rather than the MEPS-HC, but that was not feasible on the timeline under which the proposed rule is being considered. Therefore, I instead take the following three-step approach:

- **Construct a preliminary measure of expected claims risk in the MEPS-HC:** I first construct a preliminary measure of expected claims risk for each observation by estimating the following (non-linear) regression in the MEPS-HC sample:

\[
S_2 = H \gamma + \sum_{k=1}^{5} \theta_k Y^k + \beta [1 - F_1(S_1)]^\xi + \epsilon,
\]

where \( S_t \) represents spending in an individual’s \( t^{th} \) year in the sample (normalized to have mean one), \( H \) is a vector of indicator variables for levels of self-reported health status, \( Y \) is age in years, \( F_1 \) is the cumulative distribution function of \( S_1 \), and \( \epsilon \) is an error term.

- **Calibrate the marginal distribution of \( R_E \) from other evidence:** I next calibrate the marginal distribution of \( R_E \) to match the dispersion in ACG risk scores estimated in a
database of health care claims by employees at small firms by Fleitas, Gowrisankaran, and Lo Sasso (2018), henceforth FGL. The ACG risk score, as calculated by FGL, incorporates enrollee age, prior year diagnoses, and prior year spending. The mean ACG risk score is normalized to one.

For calibration purposes, I assume that the distribution of $R_E$ takes a generalized Pareto form, which does a good job of describing the distribution of similar risk scores constructed directly in the MEPS-HC. This distribution is a three-parameter family, so I use three moments for calibration: the minimum of the distribution’s support, the mean, and the variance.

The mean is normalized to one, and I obtain the variance directly from Table 1 of FGL. FGL do not report the minimum ACG risk score in their sample, so I instead estimate a similar quantity using the MEPS-HC. Specifically, I estimate mean spending in the MEPS-HC sample among people who are: (1) under age 25; (2) have no spending in the prior year; and (3) report being in excellent health. I then divide this quantity by mean spending in the MEPS-HC sample, scaled up to reflect the percentage by which the MEPS-HC understates aggregate private health insurance spending as reported by Bernard et al. (2018). This scaling reflects the fact that the MEPS-HC understates average spending, but likely has a much more limited effect on expected spending at the bottom of the spending distribution.

• **Combine the preliminary measure and calibrated distribution:** The final step is to combine the results of the first two steps to impute a final measure of expected claims risk. Specifically, I obtain predicted values from the regression in the first step and then compute each observation’s quantile within the distribution of predicted values, which I denote by $Q$.

I then assign each observation the expected claims risk associated with the corresponding quantile of the calibrated distribution for $R_E$. That is, the final estimate of expected claims risk is $R_E = F_{R_E}^{-1}(Q)$, where $F_{R_E}$ is the calibrated distribution for $R_E$. This procedure aims to preserve the correlation between expected claims risk and enrollee age to the greatest extent possible, which is important since individual market premiums are age rated.

### Estimating the Relative Claims Risk of Individual and Group Market Enrollees

Data in CMS’ 2017 risk adjustment summary report can be used to estimate the relative claims risk of individual and small group market enrollees. Under the assumption that risk mix among small employers is similar to that among large employers, this information can be used to estimate the quantity $\phi$ that appears in equations (1) and (2).

CMS’ risk adjustment reports provide three relevant pieces of information for each state (except Massachusetts and Vermont) for both the individual and small group markets: (1) the average plan liability risk score (PLRS); (2) the average actuarial value; and (3) the average rating factor. The average rating factor corresponds almost exactly to the average age rating factor that enters $\phi$, leaving aside the small number of enrollees rated for tobacco use. Estimating the risk score components of $\phi$ is somewhat more complicated because the PLRS is a measure of expected claims liability to the insurer given the enrollee’s health conditions, plan actuarial value, and cost-sharing reduction (CSR) enrollment status. To recover a measure that solely reflects health status and thus corresponds to the measure of expected claims risk that enters $\phi$, I make two adjustments.

The first adjustment removes the effect of plan actuarial value. Following Owen (2016), I simply divide the average PLRS in each state and market by the average actuarial value in the state. The
second adjustment, which is only relevant in the individual market, removes the effects of CSR enrollment status. Specifically, I divide the average PLRS by $1 + .12v$, where $v$ is the share of a state’s individual market enrollment receiving 87 percent or 94 percent actuarial value CSRs. This adjustment accounts for the fact that CMS increases the PLRS for recipients of these CSR types by a factor of 1.12 to account for the additional utilization induced by the lower cost sharing. I estimate $v$ using CMS data on effectuated enrollment and open enrollment plan selections. Unfortunately, the plan selection data are only available for states using the HealthCare.gov enrollment platform, so my estimate of $\phi$ uses data solely for these states.

Using the method described above, I compute a separate estimates of $\phi$ for each state, and I then compute a national average by weighting these state-level estimates by individual market enrollment. This generates an estimate of $\phi = 1.16$. I multiply this estimate by a factor of 1.125 to reflect future deterioration in individual market risk mix attributable to repeal of the individual mandate and liberalization of rules related to short-term coverage, based on estimates of the effects of those policy changes from CBO (2018).

References


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4 CMS makes similar adjustments to the PLRS for certain other CSR types, but these CSR types have very low enrollment.