THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

TRUMP-DRIVEN POLARIZATION REFLECTS
DIVERGENT VIEWS OF AMERICA’S FUTURE

FINDINGS FROM THE 2018 AMERICAN VALUES SURVEY

Washington, D.C.
Monday, October 29, 2018

Presentation of Survey Results:

ROBERT P. JONES
Chief Executive Officer
PRRI

Panel:

KARLYN BOWMAN
Senior Fellow
American Enterprise Institute

E.J. DIONNE, JR.
W. Averell Harriman Chair and Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

WILLIAM A. GALSTON
Ezra K. Zilkha Chair and Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

ASMA KHALID
Political Reporter
NPR

JANELLE WONG
Professor of American Studies
University of Maryland

* * * * *
PROCEDINGS

MR. DIONNE: I want to welcome everybody here today. I’m E.J. Dionne with the Brookings Institution.

Before we begin I’d just like to invite everyone to participate in a moment of silence for the people of the Tree of Life Synagogue, for those who were killed, for their families, for other members of the congregation, and for openness and fellowship in our country.

(Moment of silence)

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very much. I want to welcome you all here today. This is now I think a longstanding Brookings PRRI tradition, our annual presentation of the American Values Survey. And we have been very grateful at Brookings for this now long-term partnership with PRRI. And I think you will find that today’s survey, the survey that Robbie will be presenting in a moment, is extraordinarily relevant not simply to the election that’s going to happen in a week, but to many of the issues that we have been talking about rather urgently for the last week. And I salute Robbie and his colleagues for the work they have done.

Just to give you a run of the show, Robbie will come up and do one of his patented PowerPoints. I do some day want to go to the Robert P. Jones Graduate School in PowerPoints. I learned that after all the numbers were put in it required six hours of animation. And then Robbie adds animation all his own, so we’re very grateful for that. (Laughter)

I do want to begin with thank-yous so that they don’t get lost at the end of the line. We want to thank Carnegie and our friend Geri Mannion, who’s been a very generous supporter of this project over the years. Here at Brookings, Lisa Sablich, Leti Davalos, Clara Hendrickson, and Amber Herrle. And I want to thank also all the participants in the panel, who’ll be introduced later.
I also want to shout out Dan Cox, who couldn’t be here today, but has been a partner on these surveys for a very, very long time.

Robbie is the perfect person to have started a place like PRRI. He is the CEO of PRRI. He is a leading commentator on religion values in public life. He is the author of *The End of White Christian America*, now in paperback. For those of you who have not read it, it’s now at a convenient price and it’s still as good as it was when it was first published.

Robbie holds a Ph.D. in religion from Emory University, where he specialized in the sociology of religion politics and religious ethics. He holds an MDiv from Southwest Baptist Theological Seminary, so he could lead us in prayer if he chose to. Data-rich prayer would be an intriguing concept. And he has a degree in math and computing science from Mississippi College.

He was selected in 2016 by Emory University’s Graduate Division of Religion as the Distinguished Alumnus of the Year. I had the great job to be at Emory earlier this year and I can tell you that Robbie is deeply loved and admired at his alma mater, and he’s loved and admired by us. Welcome, Robbie Jones. (Applause)

MR. JONES: Well, thanks, everyone. It’s always an honor to stand here and present the findings of the survey. It is one of our favorite projects to work on all year because we get to work with E.J. and Bill and the Brookings Institution team, where we get to sit and think hard about what’s going on, what’s driving politics, and try to get a little bit beyond just the top-line numbers of who’s voting for whom, but trying to understand what’s really going on and why we’re seeing the patterns that we’re seeing.

This is the ninth year that we have been here at Brookings. This is the ninth annual American Values Survey. Next year, stay tuned, it’ll be number 10, God willing and the creek don’t rise as we would back home. But we’re thrilled to be here.

I want to say a quick thank you to the PRRI team. As you see in the
report, it covers a lot of ground. I'm only going to cover a little sliver of it here and, hopefully, we'll open it up a little more when we get to the discussion and Q&A session. But I want to just say a quick shout-out to the PRRI team, to Dan, Rob, Molly, Alex, and Maxine; and the research team, making sure all the I's were dotted, the percent sign's in the right spot; for Jioni, Doug, and David, and our communications team for making sure everyone knew about the event today and knows about the main findings; and Sheridan, Loretto, and Aevon, who help us make sure all of our trains run on time and that we are here when we're supposed to be here and that everything's organized. So thank you to the PRRI team.

And with that, I'm going to jump in here to the findings for the 2018 American Values Survey. I'm going to start with the elections.

So in our survey we're showing a 9 point Democratic advantage in the generic ballot among registered voters. There's a number of divides, but the one I want to highlight here is the gender divide here that is quite substantial as you can see on the generic ballots. So men favoring again by about 9 points, but women really flip the other way. We're looking at a 26 point Democratic advantage among women in the country.

And I should say one of the things I think the theme of our findings here are just divides. I mean, we're going to see huge divides along the lines of race and party and gender. So this is just kind of one among many.

So we also asked about what was driving the election here and issue priorities. This is right at the front of your report if you want to follow along here, but Issues by Party. So the gray in the middle are all Americans, and we did this little distance chart thing for each of these. The red dot represents Republicans, the blue dot represents Democrats, and here we ask people to give us their first and second priority. So they could give us one and then we asked them a second time to give us their second priority. We added them together and this is where we ended up.
And basically what you’ll see here is that there are a cluster of issues out here in the red on the right that Republicans say are the most important issues, that is the economy, immigration, and national security. These are the ones that kind of skate out here far to the right. After that is kind of healthcare, but it's really these three that skate out here.

If you look at to the right on Democrats, the blue dots, you’ll see it’s a different set of issues. Right? It is the cost of healthcare, the growing gap between the rich and the poor.

And then there’s this cluster in the middle, the economy, gun policy, and racial inequality. One thing you’ll note here is there’s very little overlap between Democrats and Republicans on their issue priorities. So it’s not just that we’re kind of fighting over what to do about a particular issue, we’re even fighting over which issues we should ever be arguing over in the first place.

So one of the other things we asked in the survey is who is likely to vote? And these are the people who report to us. Now, this is all self-report I should caveat here. Said they’re absolutely certain to vote in the midterm elections, among all Americans it’s 54 percent. These are white women and white men, so white women, 51 percent; white men, 63 percent.

But here’s a little bit of a surprise. This is African-American women and African-American men. So we’re seeing actually African-American women on par with white men saying they’re absolutely certain to vote in the election.

And here are Latino voters, both women and men significantly lower than either whites or African Americans. But this dynamic of African-American women and white men here is notable and if this turned out to be true, this would be quite significant that African-American women turned out at this high rate if it turns out to be true on Election Day.
We had a new question. We don’t have any trend data on this because it’s a new one, but we asked people to estimate how many of their friends were going to be voting here. And I’m giving you just now the people who said -- it allowed you to say a number of things: all of them, most of them, some of them, none of them. This is just the top category, people who are saying all of my friends are going to vote in the midterm elections. Only about 1 in 10 Americans say this. Again, I’ll give you the same categories. Here white women/white men, about 1 in 10, looked like the national average, saying that all of my friends are going to vote in the midterm elections.


Here are the numbers for Latina women and Latino men, as well. So there’s a gender gap among Latinos here, as well.

Now, we’ll see how this translates as a predictor. This is the first time we’ve asked the question in this way, but it’s notable, I think, that in both cases you see African-American women standing out as more energized and saying that their friends are energized in the election.

We also asked a series of questions, this election seeing a record number of women candidates and other underrepresented groups are beginning to run at higher rates than in the past. So we asked Americans what they thought about whether it would make the country better if more people from underrepresented groups ran here. So I’ll give you first some -- I’ll give you Democratic and Republican numbers because again here they’re really different attitudes on this.

So these are Republican numbers. So fairly low, only 26 percent say having more women would make things in the country better; people from racial and ethnic minority groups; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender people; non-religious people,
people from non-Christian religious groups. However, Republicans are convinced very strongly that people from the working class, more people from working class backgrounds would make things in the country better.

But now just kind of pay attention to this pattern, I’m going to throw up the Democratic numbers here. They’re going to look significantly different. So here are sort of just the bottom half here. LGBT people, non-religious people, people from non-Christian religious groups, sort of around 4 in 10 for those groups. But for people from working class backgrounds there’s actually -- you should pay attention to that top row. It’s one of the few places you’re going to see Democrats and Republicans agreeing on anything. But then women, it’s nearly 3 to 1 on women here and about the same, nearly 3 to 1 about more people from racial and ethnic minority groups in the country. So big, big partisan disagreements about the impact of more people from underrepresented groups.

So the next section I’m going to talk about a number of slides that give you picture of views about President Trump. And so we asked a number of questions here. Do you wish President Trump’s speech and behavior were more consistent with previous presidents? Do you agree or disagree, President Trump has damaged the dignity of the presidency, he has not used his authority to pardon appropriately, or he has encouraged white supremacist groups?

So I’ll first give you again the Republican numbers here. And notably, we have nearly 6 in 10 Republicans saying they wish President Trump’s speech and behavior were more consistent with previous presidents. About 4 in 10 actually say that President Trump has damaged the dignity of the presidency, but very few are worried about how he’s using his pardoning authority and very few saying he’s encouraged white supremacist groups.

But let me show you all Americans on this question. So this is all
Americans, including Republicans, here. Nearly 7 in 10 wishing his speech and behavior were different; 7 in 10 damaged the dignity of the presidency, 6 in 10 not used his authority to pardon appropriately, and finally a majority who say President Trump has encouraged white supremacist groups.

Now, I’m going to pause right there on this number and I’m going to break it down, but one thing to note is that this question was a three-way question. So we didn’t just say yes/no. The options on this question were: he has encouraged white supremacists, he has discouraged white supremacist groups, or he has had no impact on white supremacist groups. So even with a three-way question we ended up with a majority of Americans saying that President Trump has encouraged -- his decisions and behavior have encouraged white supremacist groups.

So I’m going to break this down a little bit here. And so if I look at religious groups on this -- I’m sorry, this is the dignity of the presidency. I’ll come back to the other one in a minute. Damages the dignity of the president, again 7 in 10 saying yes. But here what we find is that white evangelicals stand alone. They’re a little bit divided, but most of them say, no, he has not damaged the dignity of the presidency. But look how different they are than the rest of the religious landscape on this question. Right? So they really are outliers in terms of -- two-thirds or more of every other major religious group in the country says that Trump has damaged the dignity of the presidency. White evangelical Protestants, a little divided, but the majority saying they disagree with that statement.

So here’s the slide I was referring to here about whether President Trump’s decisions and behavior have encouraged white supremacist groups in the country. Give you these by race. So you see huge differences here by black Americans, Hispanic Americans, and white Americans. About 7 in 10 both of African Americans and Latinos say that they agree with the statement; only 45 percent of whites.
However, if you look underneath there's a big education gap among white voters or white Americans on this question. In fact, there's 20 points. Those with a 4-year college degree, about 6 in 10 agree with this statement. White non-college Americans, only about 4 in 10 agree with this statement.

We've been asking a question periodically, as well, ever since President Trump's inauguration about impeachment. This is something that's come up. And we have found that actually this has ticked up, but you'll see it's a very partisan shift over time. So when we first asked right around the inauguration it was 58 percent of Democrats said that he should be impeached or removed from office. That's up to 77 percent in our latest survey. Independents have gone from 27/44. And Republicans have really remained fairly flat. It's still only about 1 in 10 Republicans who agree with this statement here. So that's kind of where we are. The country as a whole is right here around 45 percent, the country as a whole, on this question.

I mentioned African-American women earlier and if you want to know one of the things that's maybe driving their activism you can look at this chart here, that 78 percent, 8 in 10, African-American women say that President Trump should be impeached and removed from office. So we kind of sorted people by race and gender here. Hispanic women are next, then black men, Hispanic men, and then white women, and then look at white men way over here. They're only 30 percent of white men agree with this statement, so that's nearly 60 points different than African-American women open the other hand, or nearly 50 points spread on this question. And here's the other side just so you can see the contrast on the other side.

We've also asked this question about Trump's job approval. President Trump famously said during the campaign that he could walk down Madison Avenue and shoot someone in broad daylight and -- Fifth Avenue, sorry, let me get right. Fifth Avenue, yes, Fifth Avenue and shoot someone in broad daylight and it would be fine.
And we find that there is some portion of his base that might agree with him on this statement.

So here I'll give you the disapproval side. So what it basically is we asked people whether they approved of President Trump’s job performance. And then we asked a follow-up question that said is there anything he could do to cause you either to lose your support or to gain your support?

So this is the disapproved side. Now, among those who disapproved of Trump, they’re pretty locked in. Nearly 8 in 10 say there’s nothing he could do to gain their support. About 22 percent says they could imagine that there’s something he could do. That number has jumped by 12 points over the last 2 years, so it’s really hardened up on that side.

On the other side we did a similar exercise. Among those who approve of Trump we asked if there’s anything that they could do to lose their support. Thirty-five percent of those who approve of Trump say, no, there’s virtually nothing he could do to lose our support. And about two-thirds say, yes, I could imagine there’s something he could do to lose our support. And this is actually down, but only by a couple of points on this side, so really the changes have been on the other side. It looked fairly consistent with this a couple of years ago. But this number of 35 percent are the ones who are maybe with Trump on that statement.

Now, despite all of this and some kind of misgivings of Republicans about President Trump’s behavior in office, even significant numbers saying that he has maybe disgraced the dignity of the office, President Trump is in a really solid position in terms of who want him to be the nominee. So if we look among Republicans and those Independents who lean Republican and we say look ahead to 2020, would you rather have Trump or another Republican nominee, so even asking about another Republican nominee, it’s 2 to 1 saying I would rather have Trump as the nominee going forward.
And then these other groups are going to be groups among Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents, so kind of base groups. But here’s Republican or leaning women, it’s 60/40, so a little bit less likely, but still solidly 60/40 prefer Trump. White evangelical Protestants it’s 70/30 essentially would prefer Trump. Among men it’s about the same, 70/30. And white non-college it’s three-quarters/one-quarter say that they would prefer Trump over any other Republican candidate heading into 2020.

So that’s where we are in the election and Trump. There’s a couple of slides on some of the flashpoints here. Immigration, the #MeToo movement, and race relations, and then I will wrap it up.

So the first one here, we’re seeing massive partisan divides on a range of issues around immigration. So from left to right, Muslim travel ban, temporarily preventing people from some majority Muslim majority countries from entering the U.S.; the second one building a wall; passing a law that places stricter limits on the number of legal immigration coming to the U.S.; preventing refugees from coming to the U.S.; and this policy of family separation over here on the right. But in all of these policies you’ll notice the massive, massive partisan divides on these questions.

So the first one, preventing people from coming from some majority Muslim countries, 52 percentage points gap between Republicans and Democrats on that question. One of Trump’s signature policies, building a wall, we’re looking at a 61 percentage point gap between Democrats and Republicans on that question.

On the question of legal immigration, we’re still looking at 40+ points on that question. On refugees, again looking at 40 percentage point differences between the two parties.

And even on a question there’s kind of more agreement, lower support overall, but even here on the question of whether separating the children from their parents and charging the parents as criminals when they enter the country is a correct
policy, we have a majority of Republicans, but only 10 percent of Democrats. So again, a 40+ point percentage gap even on a question where there’s like lower support.

So this is kind of the polarized environment that we find ourselves in. And the notable thing about this is that it has gotten bigger just over the last couple of years. Some of you been coming a couple of years, you’ve seen a couple of those questions before. And the gaps were big, but they’ve been getting bigger.

So here just over the last two years are Democrats on three of these questions that we could track back. Basic stability here. There has been some uptick on the question about temporarily preventing people from some majority Muslim countries among Democrats, but the other ones are fairly stable.

But among Republicans we’re seeing an uptick on all three of these questions. So 12 points on the Muslim travel ban, 7 points on building a wall, and another 7 points on passing a law to prevent refugees from entering the U.S. So basically the divides are getting kind of harder and bigger as we -- just over the last couple of years.

One other place that we can see this, we along with Brookings, and E.J. and Bill have been asking this question since 2013 -- 2012 actually, and we have trend going all the way. There’s been this question about what we should do about the 11 or 12 million immigrants we have living in the country illegally has been very, very stable despite all the political ups and downs over the last number of years until the last two years. So if we ran this all the way back it’d be very, very stable and then we’re seeing this shift.

So Democrats, look, this is about as stable as you get over the last couple of years. They’re like tabletop solid. But among Republicans we’re seeing this shift, right, particularly on this option about whether immigrants in the country illegally should be allowed to become citizens provided they meet certain requirements. We had
two years ago a majority of Republicans saying, yes, that was their preferred policy option. It’s now dropped to 39 percent.

The middle option of allowing permanent legal residency has shifted a little bit, but you’ll see the bigger shift has been on deportation. So 2 years ago, only 28 percent of Republicans said their preferred policy option was identifying and deporting immigrants who are in the country illegally. That number today is 42 percentage points and their policy preferences have essentially flipped on this particularly question while Democrats have remained largely stable.

If we look at some issues that are around race we see a similar kind of thing going on. I’m going to give you two different ways of looking at this.

One is just a question of who faces discrimination in the country. Now, this is something you wouldn’t really expect to see a lot of shift on in terms of opinion, but we are seeing really different Republican and Democratic opinions on this measure. And this is a fairly recent phenomenon. If we take it further back we don’t see this kind of divide, but today less than half of Republicans say that blacks face a lot of discrimination in the country compared to nearly all of the Democrats, 90 percent of Democrats who agree on this question.

This becomes even starker if you put up this question, whether whites face a lot of discrimination in the country. Right? And what you’ll see is among Republicans it’s dead even, right, that there are as many Republicans who say blacks face a lot of discrimination as there are whites who face a lot of discrimination. And you can see the numbers among Independents and Democrats here fall off on this question of whether whites face a lot of discrimination in the country or not. So really a different world, right, when you’re kind of looking at race relations and what’s going on in the country in terms of discrimination.

Another question that I think is kind of a bellwether question is a question
that's at the heart of the Black Lives Matter movement tied up to the NFL and players kneeling, whether or not recent killings of African-American men by police are isolated incidents or are part of a broader pattern of how police treat African Americans. That was the two options on the question.

So all Americans are basically divided a bit on this question, but look at the partisan slide here. Right? It's again 50 percentage points between Republicans and Democrats on this question of whether they're isolated incidents or part of a broader pattern. And you'll see it's virtually a mirror image. Nearly three-quarters of Democrats say it is part of a broader pattern of how African Americans are treated by police. Three-quarters of Republicans say, no, these are isolated incidents that have nothing to do with one another.

You can see the same divide in the religious landscape. So again, here's the kind of all American numbers on the left. And what you'll see is that the same kind of racial vision runs through the American religious landscape. So white Christian groups overwhelmingly saying these are isolated incidents. Non-white Christian groups and the religiously unaffiliated, on the other hand, much less likely to say that, much more likely to say these are part of a broader pattern.

And I'm often stunned when I do these charts like this and I see white evangelical Protestants on one polar opposite end and African-American Protestants on the other end because these two groups actually share a lot in terms of their theological beliefs, their beliefs in the Bible. And it really is the lens of race that kind of refracts those theological commitments and behaviors into really nearly mirror opposite directions on questions around race.

We also asked some questions around the #MeToo movement and sexual assault. And what we found here is we had a four-part question about the impact of the #MeToo movement, whether it's helped address sexual harassment and assault,
not made much difference, or whether people haven’t heard of it, so middle options are this, option on the other end is led to the unfair treatment of men. And here I’ve kind of broken out partisans by gender here. And you can see on the first thing whether it’s helped, Democratic women, two-thirds; Democratic men about 6 in 10. So some differences, but mostly agreement. And then Republican women and Republican men kind of falling off on the other side.

You can see not a lot of difference on the hasn’t made much difference. Notably, Republican women, a quarter of them, say they haven’t heard of the #MeToo movement, so that’s notable. And then this one down here, 38 percent of Republican men say it’s led to the unfair treatment of men. Right? More Republican men say that than to say it’s helped address sexual harassment and assault in the workplace. So, again, these kind of very different worldviews on account of race, gender, you know, seeing very different things.

And white evangelicals, we also asked about how well churches were handling sexual harassment and assault questions. Among the public, 62 percent said they’re not handling it that well. And among most religious groups they’re in agreement with that. African-American Protestants are basically divided on the question, but white evangelical Protestants stick out as the only group where there’s a solid majority, 60 percent, saying that churches are handling these issues well. Every other group, you know, Catholics are here 6 in 10 saying not handling it well; 60/40 among Catholics.

So I’ll wrap with this last slide here. And those of you who have been here before you’ve seen one version of this. In this survey we asked a question about looking backwards and we asked a question about looking forward. And we found remarkably similar answers even asking the question two different ways.

The first question we asked was one you may have seen we asked last year and actually in 2016, as well. Since the 1950s, American culture and way of life has
mostly changed for the better or has it changed for the worse? And again, if I put two partisans up here you'll see they're virtually mirror images of each other with Republicans, two-thirds of them nearly, saying things have changed for the worse and 6 in 10 Democrats saying things have changed for the better. So that's if we kind of look back to the 1950s. And this may give you some sense of why that last work in Trump's campaign slogan had some power, right? Make America great again. This is kind of a harkening back thing.

But we also asked a question looking forward. And the survey said, look, in 2045, the Census predicts the country will become majority non-white. Do you think this will be mostly a positive development or a negative development? And we see very, very similar reactions to that demographic change going forward, as well, with Republicans 6 in 10 saying this would be a mostly negative thing for the country and Democrats 8 in 10, very strongly embracing the changes and saying, no, this would be a mostly positive thing for the country.

So I'm going to wrap it there with these huge divides. And I think part of our discussion will be, you know, the very, very important and fundamental question of like where do we go from here?

So with that, I will welcome up all the panelists. (Applause)

MR. GALSTON: Well, as always, Robbie's gotten us off to a flying start. Whenever you do your PowerPoint, I'm reminded of that old James Bond theme song, "Nobody Does It Better." (Laughter)

I'm Bill Galston, a senior fellow in Governance Studies here at Brookings. And along with E.J., we are really thrilled with the longevity of this partnership, how much we here at Brookings have learned from from it. And we're also absolutely delighted to have a wonderful panel of commentators.

I'm going to introduce them very briefly because you have extended bios
in the order in which they’ll present their opening commentaries. I’ll then give you a brief sketch of how the rest of our time together is going to go. And then we’ll be off and flying.

Our first commentator is Janelle Wong, who is professor of American Studies and a core faculty member in the Asian American Studies Program at the University of Maryland, where I had the pleasure of teaching for the better part of two decades. And suffice it to say that Janelle is one of the premier scholars of Asian American politics and the Asian American experience in the country today.

Another one of my favorite people whose work I’ve tracked for a long time is Asma Khalid, who is a leading member of the NPR political team, but she did a bunch of stuff before then, including reporting on my favorite crook, James “Whitey” Bulger. (Laughter) Those of you who know --

SPEAKER: He’s a great crook.

MR. GALSTON: Yeah. Those of you who know anything about the distinguished Bulger family of Massachusetts will know exactly what I’m talking about.

SPEAKER: He did root for the right baseball team.

MR. GALSTON: Absolutely. And he’s rooting at it from the right place.

(Laughter)

And finally, a veteran of these panels who needs no introduction and, therefore, will get almost none, Karlyn Bowman of the American Enterprise Institute, who has studied trends in American Public Opinion for -- I’ll suppressed the number of decades, so let me simply say decades. And whose sobriety and balance of judgment is unparalleled, so we’re always very pleased to have you with us.

How is this going to work? Well, Janelle, Asma, and Karlyn will each have five to seven minutes for some opening remarks. Then E.J. and I will co-moderate a panel discussion. And then the last half-hour or so will be given over to questions from you. And, of course, Robbie does not have to sit here like a potted palm in the course of
the panel discussion. He will be a full member of the discussion. And if he isn’t, I’ll drag him into it.

MR. DIONNE: Should the hashtag, if anybody’s Tweeting -- I’m really sorry, we had it up there earlier. Yeah, oh, there it is, #AVS2018. If anybody wants to Tweet out the brilliant comments of a brilliant panel, please do. (Laughter)

MR. GALSTON: Absolutely. So, without further ado, Janelle, the floor is yours.

MS. WONG: Thank you so much and thank you to Brookings and especially to PRRI for inviting me here to serve on this wonderful panel. Thank you so much to Dr. Robbie Jones for not only the incredible work, but also I’m part of a new fellows program at PRRI and this is part of the pleasure of being a fellow.

I’m going to focus on two striking findings that I drew from the report. I just completed a book on immigration and white evangelicals, and I had read Robbie’s book and was thinking as I wrote my own book, well, white evangelicals are kind of flat-lining or declining in the population. And Asian American and Latino immigrants are really the only source of growth in evangelical America. So we might see this real turn toward a more moderate view towards immigration among white evangelicals. That was my prediction.

And then the 2016 election happened and I rewrote the whole book. (Laughter) The book is really about how white evangelicals maintain political powerful in the face of massive demographic change and we see much of that trend here in the findings. So I think to understand white evangelicals in the U.S., we really -- there’s no doubt now, we have to look beyond the kind of hot-button traditional religious issues of abortion and same-sex marriage. When you look at the report that’s a very low priority for Republicans and for I would guess also white evangelicals.

The real key to understanding white evangelicals is they’re kind of anti-
immigrant attitudes and fear of demographic change. And so they're the group that's most conservative on the travel ban. They are also the most conservative on family separation, which for many people is a moral issue. They are also the only religious group to contend that immigrants threaten American values. And so it's really this potent mix of nativism and racial anxiety and white Christian nationalism that underlies many of the other policy attitudes that you see presented in this report.

So why do they stick with Trump? Because Trump's immigration agenda is the white evangelical immigration agenda. And I think that has become very clear.

White evangelicals, also, it's both where is this anti-immigrant kind of motivation coming from? I think it really comes that sense of discrimination. So when we look at the report, about 50 percent of whites in general feel like whites -- or white Republicans feel that whites face discrimination. And if you look at white evangelicals, survey after survey shows that white evangelicals are even more -- it's like that racial anxiety on steroids. And so white evangelicals I would guess would be more around like 60 percent would say that they face as much discrimination as other groups.

Another key kind of flashpoint I think in this survey or something that I think really stands out is this looking at the divides along race and immigrant -- towards attitudes towards immigration. I think we miss in our kind of general discussion that one of the most pro-immigrant groups in America, in the U.S. today, are black Americans. And this has often gotten lost because many times people focus on this idea of economic competition between blacks and especially Latino immigrants. But what you see here is that this doesn't -- even if there are sometimes surveys that show that blacks are sometimes the group that voices the most sense of competition with Latino immigrants, it does not translate into anti-immigrant attitudes, it does not translate into restrictions on immigration.

So when you look at these data it's really interesting to see that in term
of opposing laws to prevent refugees and also just general attitudes about the value of immigration to the U.S., blacks look like one of the most progressive groups. And this is especially striking to me because I study Asian Americans. Asian Americans are the only group in the U.S., only major racial group, that’s majority immigrant. So we know about 40 percent of Latinos are immigrants, blacks it’s like about 8 percent, and yet Asian Americans sometimes are more conservative across the board on these immigration issues than black Americans. And I think that’s a really important overlooked dynamic in the U.S. today.

So I’ll just close by saying partisanship is certainly a major divide here, but the patterns that I’m talking about suggest that partisanship is not the only influence. So past analyses I’ve done on both white evangelicals and also on black attitudes towards immigration show that even when you control for partisanship, you still find these same distinctions in the population.

And so these differences just don’t go away completely and can’t be explained only through partisanship. It’s really this I think more complex, but really important connection between both party identification and racial identification. And I’ll leave my remarks at that.

MS. KHALID: Great, thank you. And I just want to echo what Janelle had to say. Thank you all so much. I think as a journalist who’s looked a lot at voters and demographics, the work that you all do at PRRI is incredibly valuable and I know that we depend on it. So thank you so much for inviting me.

I want to focus again on two key findings. One overlaps a little bit actually with what Janelle was just describing around race in particular, and the other takes a look at the economy.

So I think my major sort of key takeaway from the report is that Donald Trump has had a major influence on the Republican Party as we know it today. I covered
the 2016 election and like many of my colleagues in the profession I think there were a lot of questions about the extent to which Donald Trump was an aberration from the Republican Party’s traditional trajectory or the extent to which he was really changing the party as a whole. It seems like overall sentiments suggest that he has had a major influence on the party as a whole, and I think immigration is a key kind of case in point of that.

Another example I would just give from my own reporting anecdotally is we spent a lot of time over the summer reaching out to Republican base voters, traveled the country speaking out to evangelical voters, traditional sort of college-educated Republican conservatives, white working-class voters. And in total talked to around 50 to 60 base Republican voters and only met one person who had since changed their opinion on Donald Trump, which to me suggests this idea of buyer’s remorse within the traditional base of the Republican Party is perhaps not an entirely accurate narrative.

So on that note of how he’s influenced the party, I think one key way is around white identity politics. And we saw some of this I think in the immediate takeaways right after the 2016 election around immigration. If you look at the exit polls from the 2016 election you’ll see that about two-thirds of Republicans said at that point that immigration was a major factor in their vote. I believe it was only around a third of Democrats made the same sort of calculation in their vote.

What that means to me and what’s really interesting is there was a lot of I think prognosticating before 2016 that Donald Trump’s rhetoric around immigrants would particularly galvanize the Latino community. We did not see a huge uptick in turnout. And on the opposite side, we actually see that as a motivating factor. It seems to have motivated Republicans more than it motivated Democrats.

And I think if we look at just the first page of the issue priorities here in this report, that also confirms that idea. Right? We see that immigration was about, what
was it, 36 percent of Republicans say that it was a leading issue for them. And I think this is exactly why we’re seeing the President at this moment in time kind of re-pivot the conversation you could argue away from the very strong, healthy economy and towards the impending caravan coming the U.S.-Mexico border. It’s really in sync with galvanizing a certain part of his base.

And I think the other way in which we see this, so one way is immigration, but the other way that I would say undoubtedly we saw this is in the degree to which certain people view discrimination, others do not. Right? And this is something Janelle talked about, as well. But overall, I mean, there’s just huge disparities and it’s not just around police shootings. It’s around who’s receiving discrimination, around kneeling for the National Anthem. I mean, we’ve seen this in survey after survey that arguably, when you look at racial issues in particular, there’s a drastic divide within the Republican and the Democrat Party, which really leads me to think that that is arguably one of the most compelling fissures I think within our party politics at this point in time. It’s not sort of the old thinking around the economy or even perhaps healthcare that many candidates have been focusing on this election cycle.

The other key point, though, to me that I want to bring up is the economy because I have spent a lot of time in the last I would say year or so looking at the economy as a driving factor for voters, particularly because by many metrics the economy’s doing very well right now. And the President likes to talk about that a lot and yet we haven’t seen, when you look at the generic ballot, the Republican Party seeing the benefits of a healthy economy.

And one major reason for that is that when you look at midterm elections as a whole, the economy has largely become, I would argue, a proxy for partisanship. And this survey I think confirms that to some degree, but we’ve seen this in a lot of places where Republicans suggest the economy’s a very important issue. But beyond that you
can look at surveys from October I think it was of 2016, right before the election, there were a large number of Democrats at that point feeling like the economy was doing well. Republicans were on the reverse. They did not feel like the economy was doing well. Flip that to a few months after the 2016 election, and a large number of Republicans thought the economy was doing very well and a large number of Democrats thought the economy was not doing well.

So this is all to say that I think overall, you know, it’s difficult to talk about the economy as something that we’re dealing with a sort of objective set of facts. Because, you know, we can talk about consumer confidence or the stock market and these I would say somewhat unanimously agreed upon metrics that many economists would use, but the health of those metrics is not something that I find unanimous agreement upon when you talk to voters of how they’re actually feeling about the economy.

And, look, we can get I think a little deeper into the actual health of the economy and I don’t want to dismiss that. There are, I think, very real concerns that many people feel now around sort of stagnant wage growth. But what I find interesting is that the economy between October of 2016 and you could argue the spring of 2017 did not dramatically change. And yet we see the priorities around it changing.

So all of this is to say today the President just released a new midterm campaign ad. I don’t know if anyone has seen it yet, but it is all around the health of the economy. And it’s a sort of message that he’s trying to send, which is if you do not vote Republican this midterm cycle, the gains of the economy are in peril. But what we seem to see and I think that this report also confirms is that that’s not a real right indicator of what’s motivating voters this election cycle. It seems to be, I would argue, much more indications around immigration or racial identity politics.

So I want to just leave it there and I will pass it off to Karlyn.
MS. BOWMAN: Thank you. And Robbie, thank you for inviting me to be part of this panel again. I’ve always enjoyed it.

The polling business has changed a lot since I’ve been watching it over the last 40 years at AEI. Polls are largely driven by crisis and scandal these days and PRRI work is such an exception to that. Robbie tries to dig down into things that are really important to understand what makes this complex public tick.

I’m going to jump around and touch on a number of different issues that haven’t been mentioned thus far, things I found in the poll that were very interesting. And because I’m sort of a dilettante of data, I thought that would be an appropriate role.

MR. DIONNE: Dilettante is not the right word. (Laughter)

MS. BOWMAN: Well, anyway, I do jump around in a lot of data. Robbie began with a generic ballot question and looking at the gender gap. I think there’s a lot of misinformation about the gender gap out there. I looked at it in the past elections and I think if the polls are correct it’s clearly going to be much larger in this election than it has been in the past. It was in the House contest in 2014 it was 20 points. It was 16 points in 2010. It was 35 percentage points in this survey.

But it’s important to remember that it’s not the size of the gender gap. It’s directionality and turnout that really matter. Bob Dole and Ronald Reagan had exactly the same sized gender gap. One won, the other lost. So, again, be careful in interpreting the gender gap numbers.

I want to touch a little on impeachment. In the slide that Robbie showed 47 percent in this poll favored impeaching the President and removing him from office and 51 percent were opposed. The number I thought was particularly interesting was the growth among Democrats, 77 percent who favored impeachment. And though Nancy Pelosi has said many times that this isn’t at the top of her list if the Democrats regain control and if she’s still the Speaker, I think that 77 percent is going to be hard to ignore.
The PRRI results are very much in line with other surveys on impeachment when the question is worded in this particular way. But a question asked by Quinnipiac gives us a slightly different impression. And Quinnipiac has asked this question six times since January and it sets it up differently: If the Democratic Party wins control of the House of Representatives, would you like to see them begin the process to impeach the President or not? In this question, their latest question from August, 36 percent, not that different from 40 percent in most of the other polls, would like the Democrats to begin proceedings, but 58 percent nationally would not.

I want to touch on a question in this survey on socialism because we’re hearing a great deal about it today and I think this is a question that Bill had a hand in writing. And I’m very delighted that they asked it. And here’s the question: When asked which of two statements better describes socialism, 54 percent in this survey said a system in which government provides citizens with health insurance, retirement support, and access to free higher education; and 43 percent chose a system where government controls key parts of the economy, such as utilities, transportation, communities, and banks. Democrats see socialism as providing citizens with services while Republicans in the poll were more likely than Democrats to say it is about government control of the economy.

In 1949, Gallup asked an open-ended question and they asked people what their understanding of socialism was. In that year, 34 percent mentioned government ownership or control, followed by 12 percent who mentioned equality or redistribution. Gallup just updated this question and the top response was equality or redistribution, 23 percent, followed by government ownership at 17 percent. In both 1949 and 2018, lots of people didn’t have an opinion.

In Gallup’s broader question about socialism asked four times since 2010, around 35 percent have had a positive opinion of socialism while around 55
percent have had a negative opinion. The Fox News poll, however, has seen an uptick in
the proportions saying it would be a good thing to move away from capitalism and
towards socialism from 23 percent in 2010 to 36 percent in 2018. Young people and
Democrats are more positive than older people and Republicans.

In Gallup’s questions from the 1940s and the 1950s, no more than 2
percent ever indicated that they identified as a socialist or that they would vote for a
socialist. In Gallup’s 2015 question, 47 percent said they would be willing to vote for a
hypothetical well-qualified socialist candidate while 50 percent would not.

I want to touch on the Mueller investigation because the poll included a
question about Robert Mueller. And in this poll, in most polls, positive opinions of Robert
Mueller outweigh negative opinions, but there’s growing evidence in the polls of a fatigue
factor with the Russia investigation. To see him regarded more unfavorably in this poll,
45 percent, than favorably, 39 percent, I think may be an indication of that fatigue factor.

A few pollsters have included the Russia investigation in their questions
about issue importance in 2018. And the investigation tends to rank very low, but
Democrats and Republicans see it very differently. In the latest CNN poll it ranked
second to last in terms of an issue that would be extremely or very important to voters
when they cast their votes, but the partisan gap was a chasm. Eighteen percent of
Republicans and 79 percent of Democrats said it would be extremely or very important to
their vote.

Feminism, I just wanted to touch on that. In the new poll 51 percent said
that the feminist movement accurately reflects the view of most women while 47 percent
said it did not. But what interests me about that is in most polls you still don’t get above
35 to 36 percent of Americans describing themselves as feminists. Again, one set of
attitudes toward another.

And finally, handling harassment. This I thought was really interesting.
There was only one group to get majority approval on handling the issue of sexual harassment and assault, and that was American business. You don’t see that very often, good marks for business in public opinion polls. The majority said that the political parties, churches and places of worship, colleges and universities were not handling these issues well.

I want to touch on the point that Janelle made about white evangelicals. And I think when we think about this group overall it’s important to point out that white evangelicals in the 2016 exit poll were 27 percent of the electorate. That’s exactly what the share of all minorities combined was. So you get a sense of the size of these groups are very important.

On immigration, I mean, clearly there are very deep partisan divides, as the slides showed us. But I think as Bill has so eloquently pointed out in several columns, large majorities of Americans agree on the kinds of immigration reform they want. They want a generous resolution of the Dreamers’ situation, tighter border security, stricter enforcement, and a path to citizenship for people who are here illegally. And that’s why I think you see in Robbie’s question that 60-odd percent continually favoring a path to citizenship for people who are here illegally.

I wanted to end on a positive note about something I found in this survey and another survey that PRRI had done this summer. And in the poll -- and this is not the positive note -- nearly three-quarters of Americans say there’s a lot of discrimination against blacks in American society. Given that sentiment I thought it was extremely encouraging to see the results from another PRRI poll this summer on impediments to voting.

PRRI asked people whether they or anyone in their household had experienced any of six different things they last time they tried to vote. More than 85 percent of Americans said none of the six things had happened to them or anyone in their
family. The differences between whites, blacks, and Hispanics were small. Ten percent of blacks, 11 percent of Hispanics, and 5 percent of whites said that they or someone in their household had been told that their name was not on a list even though they knew they were registered. Seven percent of blacks, 9 percent of Hispanics, and 4 percent of whites said they were harassed or bothered while they tried to vote. Nine percent of both blacks and Hispanics and 3 percent of whites said that they were told that they did not have the correct ID.

While I think all of us would agree that even those small numbers are too high, the fact that around 90 percent on each of these questions said that this had not happened to them or to anyone in their family I thought was very encouraging. So I'll stop there.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very much. Thank you for excellent presentations down the line.

I'm going to just highlight three things to throw at the panel to comment on. And I'd like Robbie to start both in response to all of the comments so far and then anyone else who is interested in this. I want to call attention to saliency of issues on two particular issues.

One is guns, that historically the gun issue has been more important to conservatives and Republicans. It has tended to be seen as helping Republicans. It's really striking in this poll that Democrats are more likely to mention guns and gun policy as a major issue, 25 percent of Dems to 14 percent of Republicans. I think it's going to be fascinating a week from tomorrow to see how that issue plays. And I'm wondering if this reflects a change that's taken place since the mobilization particularly after the shootings at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High and the extraordinary activism of the students there.

The poll shows why President Trump talks about the caravan so much.
Again, the saliency on the immigration issue, 36 percent of Republicans, only 18 percent of Democrats mentioned the immigration issue. I think that tells us a great deal about what's happening.

I'd love commentary on the socialism question, which is really fascinating results. Essentially Democrats are inclined to see socialism as social democracy and Republicans are inclined to see socialism as Soviet state control. And I think this may demystify a lot of the other polls we've had on this, why young people are much more positive towards socialism. They're not thinking of the Soviet model. They're actually -- this description in the survey is really the Bernie Sanders description of socialism, which is actually closer to social democracy.

The last thing that really hit me hard about this survey, and it may be because of events of the last week in particular and also because I just read a fascinating new book by John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck, I mentioned it in my column today, Identity Crisis. It really is striking, one way to put it, which they argue, is the extent to which the Republicans have become a white identity party. If you want to put it less sharply than that, the gaps between the parties on these issues are staggering. And I just want to sort of repeat three numbers that were very striking.

Seventy-six percent of Republicans feel that America needs to be protected from foreign influence; only 30 percent of Democrats. Seventy-three percent of Democrats, as Robbie underscored, say the recent killings of young African Americans are part of a pattern; only 22 percent of Republicans; 73 to 22. And I thought this one was remarkable, particularly remarkable, 90 percent of Republicans said that athletes should have to stand for the National Anthem; only 22 percent of Democrats. It's really striking how much racially inflected issues affect the country.

And I'll just append a last question to Robbie, which is looking at a lot of these numbers, and I've seen other surveys -- this is to everybody, but I start with Robbie
-- there's some evidence of a change in the composition of people who are Republican. And I think it's clear that Donald Trump has -- the party was already on this path before Trump came along. He saw where the party was going, spoke for that part of the party. But now I suspect he's changed it further because there is some evidence of some defection of Republicans away from Trumpism.

So the saliency issue, the socialism issue, white identity, and are Republicans the same people as they used to be? And again, thanks as always for the survey. There are a lot of other questions on this survey that aren't even in the report that we all hope to write about and think about when we go forward.

But, Robbie, why don't you start? And I'd love other responses, including Bill's, who did insist on the socialism question. And bless you for that, Bill.

MR. JONES: All right, just a few small topics to cover. (Laughter) So I'll just say a couple things. I'm going to leave the socialism question to Bill.

But on the guns question, I do think we're seeing there the evidence of kind of youth activism and it becoming a more salient issue among Democrats in general. However, one kind of interesting thing we've been looking for all late summer, all through the fall is an uptick in the number of youth who say they're going to absolutely be certain to vote, kind of driven by some of that activism. And so far, we don't see it so much. We only see a third of young people in the survey saying that they are absolutely certain to vote compared to 81 percent of seniors. Right? So that's the generation gap on who's saying they're absolutely certain to vote.

And you can discount like those self-reported measures by at least 10 percentage points, right, the people who actually will turn up at the thing.

SPEAKER: (off mic) attendance.

MR. JONES: That's right. Right. In the last midterm election the youth turnout was about 19 percent in the last midterm. So, you know, we may see it a little bit
higher, but it looks like it's still going to be fairly low. So I think that’s important to know on the gun question. So it may have succeeded in making it an issue more salient to the party, but it hasn’t really translated, at least in our surveys, into seeing a massive uptick in youth turnout and the vote.

One reason for that may be that actually youth are not quite as convinced as older Americans are that voting is the pathway to change. And so that, I think -- we saw only about half of youth in the previous survey we did with The Atlantic saying that voting was the way to change versus three-quarters of seniors saying voting was the primary way to effect change. So that’s an interesting thing there.

The last thing on change in composition, we’ve been tracking this a little while between Democrats and Republicans. And if we use this metric of white and Christian, and we kind of mentioned a kind of white Christian nationalism that may be percolating here, and we go back about 10 years, the Republican Party was about 8 in 10 white and Christian 10 years ago. Today it’s still about 7 in 10 white and Christian.

The Democratic Party about 10 years ago was 50 percent white and Christian. Today it’s 30 percent white and Christian. So now we’ve got two parties, the Democratic Party 30 percent white and Christian, there’s a 40 percentage point gap between the two parties in terms of race and religious identity now and the gap’s getting bigger. So I think that is certainly something that we’re kind of contending with.

And I think if we look at 2012, after Romney’s loss, where Republicans themselves put out a report talking about how we need to broaden the tent, we need to reach out to Latino voters, we need to kind of think about not just becoming an old, white party. And there was kind of game plan in place and, in fact, Reince Priebus was the guy in charge of that thing. And then it pretty much got thrown into File 13 with the Trump campaign.

And so it’s a real interesting question in terms of long-term longevity
what the strategy is going to be. Because as Janelle said, what's interesting is the exit polls have white evangelicals, for example, as 26, 27 percent voters, where they've been over the last -- they've been right there over the last few presidential election cycles. But that is true at the same time that their proportion of the population has dropped from 23 percent of the population to 15 percent of the population. So they're more and more overrepresented at the ballot box and there's just only so long you can stretch like that thread right before it would break.

SPEAKER: Till death do you part.

MR. JONES: Yeah, so I'll leave it with that.

MR. DIONNE: Anything on any of these questions that anybody want to deal with? What identify means or the change in composition of the parties?

MS. BOWMAN: I might say a word about guns because this is one of the few areas where this poll differed a little from some of the other polls. I've been looking at polls in Florida and, once again, it doesn't seem that young people seem much more enthusiastic about voting than they have in the past. I expected that there would be a big difference in Florida. But nationally, it isn't clear to me that the gun issue is -- we've had four new polls in the last few weeks just looking at most important issue, and most of them show Democrats and Republicans pretty equal in terms of their concern about guns overall.

For example, the new NBC-Wall Street Journal the gun issue ranked very low, second to last, in terms of a bunch of issues that they asked about. Sixty-eight percent of Republicans said it was important and 62 percent of Democrats. On gun policy in the latest CNN poll, 73 percent of Republicans, 81 percent of Democrats. And in the new Pew poll, 68 percent overall said it would be very important. And if you look at the responses of registered voters who said they plan to support the Republican candidate, 71 percent; the Democrat candidate, 69 percent.
Looking at the caravan I, too, am not surprised that Trump is using it in just about every campaign even thus far because it seems to me in looking at the immigration data that illegal immigration and border security still probably favor the GOP. And so that's what he's doing.

MR. DIONNE: I just wanted to call attention there is a survey that came out today that Harvard University Institute of Politics -- oh, were you going to talk about that? Because I think, didn't you do a story on this?

MS. KHALID: Yeah, I'd be happy to chime in.

MR. DIONNE: Yeah. They found signs of an increase in youth participation, 40 percent of their 18- to 29-year-olds said they would definitely vote. That's up from 26 percent in the midterms 4 years ago. I'm curious.

MS. KHALID: And I was going to say, I mean, I think the Harvard Institute of Politics’ poll is a pretty good poll in that they exclusive look only at young people. And CIRCLE, which is out of Tufts University, is also exclusively looking at young people. They both have shown an uptick in enthusiasm.

I mean, we should point out the uptick in enthusiasm is still significant lower than the levels we’re seeing among seniors. But, I mean, 40 percent, even if we say, you know, 10 percent fewer young people will actually show up at the polls, hypothetically if 30 percent of young people vote, I mean, that’s monumental. That would set a record. I think the highest percentage we’ve seen since 1986 is 21 percent of young people vote in a midterm. So 30 percent would be a large increase if we saw something like that.

MR. JONES: Just one quick -- so in 2014, our numbers for youth had them at just right around the same number or actually a little bit lower. Sorry about that, around 26 percent. So we’re seeing 26 percent in 2014, 33 in this poll today. So it is up, but it’s still lower than the Harvard IOP poll, yeah.
MS. WONG: Well, I’ll just say that I think what we’re seeing here is that there really is this mismatch between the voices that are represented in the electorate versus the population more generally. And a lot of the groups that I think the Democrats are counting on, young people and also immigrants, tend to have lower rates of turnout for various reasons, mainly mobilization. So you can’t just count, the Democrats can’t just count on population growth. They need to actually go out and do some face-to-face or other kinds of mobilization.

In terms of white identity, it’s not just any kind of white identity that is mobilizing groups like white evangelicals. It is an embattled white identity. It’s a nostalgic white identity. And it’s a really fearful for the future kind of white identity. And I think that has been a really kind of potent form of mobilization.

MR. GALSTON: Well, we’ve had I think a very good, in-depth discussion of the data from which we have not strayed very far. In the remaining 20 minutes or so, I’d like to invite anybody who’s in a speculative mood to speculate about some of the implications of these findings. And I’ve made a short --

MR. DIONNE: Why don’t you set an example and be the chief first specifier, Bill? (Laughter)

MR. GALSTON: I’ve made a short list of questions that interest and trouble me and let me just plunge right in.

After Donald Trump secured the nomination of his party, I wrote a column suggesting that he had executed a remarkably successful hostile takeover. I am no longer sure that I got that right for all sorts of reasons. And whatever may have been the case two years ago, either we have mass conversation or the Stockholm Syndrome, but, at any rate, this sure looks like Donald Trump’s Republican Party now.

So here’s my question. Is the Republican Party now Trump’s party? And is this a permanent fact that is unlikely to be reversed after he passes from the
scene? Or is this simply what happens when a very strong wind blows and the reed bends, but comes back upright, so to speak, after he departs? So how momentous a shift in party politics in the United States is this?

MS. KHALID: I can chime in on one. I don’t know that this answers the question entirely. But I think, Robbie, you had mentioned after the Romney-Obama election there was a lot of soul-searching with the Republican Party. There was an autopsy written about ways to reach out to different minority groups.

I think what Donald Trump’s election has taught us is that you don’t need that strategy. And I would make the case that electorally, and many folks have sort of done the electoral math on this looking at different calculations, the Republican Party could win again in 2020 with such a similar strategy, they don’t need to convert and change the strategy. I would argue that you could win a couple of more election cycles demographically speaking with the same strategy.

Eventually, that thread will break, but I don’t think it will break in the next 4 years, possibly 8 years, someone made the case 12 years, depending on sort of the Electoral College math. That’s just my total guesstimation.

MS. BOWMAN: Yes, I think it’s Trump’s GOP now. I don’t think there’s any question about that. I think I subscribe to the strong wind thesis that you just described, Bill. I think it is Trump’s personality. If it were Mike Pence tomorrow, I think it would be Pence’s party just because partisanship is so important.

MR. DIONNE: I think your point, Bill, that’s interesting is that this -- and certainly the argument in the Identity Crisis book, is that this had already been happening in the Republican Party, this change had happened. And I think sort of two pieces of evidence.

One is when President Bush, George W. Bush, tried to pass immigration reform, it was killed primarily by his own members of his own party. They were the
primary opponents led by Attorney General Jeff Sessions when he was a senator. So that there was already this sentiment in the party visible when George W. Bush was pushing hard the other way.

Secondly, when you look at the 2012 primaries, Mitt Romney finally prevailed. But all during those primaries an enormous number of fairly marginal candidates were at various points in the lead because whatever you want to call it, the Tea Party wing of the party, the right wing of party, what became the Trump wing of the party, was desperately looking for a champion who could win.

That would suggest to me that recalibrating the party in a different direction is going to take quite a while, especially because the membership of the party tilts more and more toward older Americans who tend to hold these views. It’s almost as if someone would have to come along and create a movement to recruit some people back into the Republican Party to change it or who would inspire people to come in.

I’m curious, do you buy that or disagree, Karlyn?

MS. BOWMAN: I disagree. As I said, if it was a Rubio or a Pence, I think you’d see things switch very, very quickly.

MS. KHALID: So can I ask the question, though, because I guess the question I have is, could a Rubio or a Pence win the Electoral College? Right? I mean, I think that there were some arguments to be made that Trump was very successful in part because he brought together this coalition of somewhat -- I think some of it was base Republicans, but some of it was also a contingency of the Republican Party that had not always been activated.

MR. JONES: I’ll jump in just real quickly. I mean, one of the things I’ve written about both in my book, The End of White Christian America, and since is that I do think what Trump has done is he converted -- one way I put this is he’s converted what used to be kind of a values voters wing of the Republican Party and he broadened it into
something I've been calling the nostalgia voter wing of the Republican Party. That brought together that old kind of Christian right coalition. It pulled in the Tea Party folks, as well. We know there’s a big overlap. We did work here showing that group overlaps by about half of the kind of white evangelical group and the Tea Party group. They’re not the same, but they do overlap significantly. And then that kind of disaffected, white, working-class voter I think can fit under that rubric, as well. And I think that was one of the kind of powerful things that happened with Trump. And so I think the whole values voters thing really has been converted into a kind of nostalgia voter movement.

And then the other thing I’d say about looking ahead, our best projections show that it will be 2024 before the current demographic realities show up fully at the ballot box. So it won’t be 2020. It’ll be 2024, and that’s if things continue as they are. And that’s because for the last, you know, while now you can think about the ballot box as about a 10-year time machine that sort of takes us back demographically to where we were about 10 years ago as a country. And it kind of works forward, as well. So it’s at least two presidential election cycles away.

So in 2016, we had the country, for example, being less than a majority white and Christian demographically, but not at the ballot box. And it’ll be 2024 before that is true at the ballot box.

MR. DIONNE: Pollster advises Democratic hopefuls wait till 2024.

(Laughter) Bill, can you answer your own question? And Janelle.

MR. GALSTON: Well, actually, you know, I’m more interested in what one of our panelists has to say, but I will get to that.

MR. DIONNE: Janelle, please.

MS. WONG: Well, just quickly, one of the things that we didn’t talk about related to the report is that we’re seeing I think more opposition to legal immigration among those who were polled, something I haven’t seen at this level in my lifetime. And
so I think part of the prediction of what’s the electorate going to look like really does depend on what does immigration policy look like?

MR. GALSTON: Well, my own view is that I got it large wrong in 2016 and here’s why I think that. If you look at the way that Trump secured the nomination and then the general election, in effect he and the people around him figured out what the traditional building blocks of the Republican Party wanted most and then they devised a strategy for giving those building blocks what they wanted most.

They understood, for example, that a lot of people on the values right, particularly the evangelical right, were passionately interested in issues such as the composition of the judiciary and religious liberty as the right interprets that concept. And the administration has been sedulous, I would say, in hitting those things very hard.

What do traditional business Republicans care about the most? Tax cuts and deregulation. Check, check.

What was the Tea Party most passionate about? Repealing and replacing Obamacare and patriotism. Check, check.

And then what Trump did was to go to a portion of the electorate that had been neglected not only generally, but even by Republicans: white working-class voters who had been -- and I will use this phrase even though it may get me into trouble -- who had been bought off with a series of cultural appeals when they had legitimate economic concerns that the traditional economic policies of the Republican Party were not meeting. And he said to them, these trade treaties that establishment Republicans celebrate have been part of the process that has taken away your manufacturing jobs, which, by the way, is true. You know, as Henry Kissinger once said, it has the additional virtue of truth.

When it came to immigration the appeal was very much to what Sides, et al., call “racialized economics.” It’s not just that jobs are going away, but that other people are taking them away from you and we’re letting too many of the takers-away get
into the country.

And then he talked to a very strong sense on the part of the working class and others that the rest of the world had been taking advantage of the United States for decades. And he said, you know, all these people with their tin cups out are not going to get coins dropped into them anymore.

And so I think that what he did was to get -- in addition to buying off the traditional pieces of the Republican coalition, he gave voice to the previously voiceless who was in that coalition, and did so extremely effectively. And he put together a coalition that he could not have put together if he had been a real populist. (Laughter)

MR. DIONNE: Could I offer one amendment to that from PRRI data, which is that the Tea Party, I think, was very motivated by opposition to immigration.

MR. GALSTON: That is true.

MR. DIONNE: It was part -- I just looked back on the 2014 PRRI survey.

MR. GALSTON: No, we wrote about that at the time.

MR. DIONNE: Yeah, that the identify-and-deport position, 41 percent of Tea Partyers, Republicans, 26 percent, and non-Tea Party Republicans. So that in a sense Trump inherited that Tea Party position and made it work. That’s the only --

MR. GALSTON: That is absolutely true.

MR. JONES: Which is notable because that’s where Republicans overall are in this survey. Right? They’re where the Tea Party was in 2014.

MR. GALSTON: So we have about 10 minutes left in this segment, so let me pose -- well, we may have time for two more questions, but on the off change that we only have time for one, let me pose the big one, which is the one that Robbie put on the table at the beginning of his remarks.

This is not the most optimistic survey I’ve read recently. As a matter of fact, you know, it paints a picture of a country at an impasse. And so let me put the issue
in the starkest possible terms.

A half of the U.S. population thinks that the past half-century has been a history of progress. The other half of the population thinks just the reverse. These are not small questions that we’re posing. This is the omnibus question. Is the country on the right track? And half of the country says yes, the other half of the country says no. Each side has very deeply held reasons for believing in its position. That’s number one.

Number two, in my 72 years, with the possible exception of 1968, I cannot remember a time when the country was more in need of healing. How do we begin to move toward the healing that we so evidently need in the face of the divisions that this survey has charted and underscored? That’s not a rhetorical question. I’m not palming the ace. I genuinely don’t know, but we better think hard about this.

MR. JONES: I posed the question, didn’t I? Yeah. So I was born in 1968.

MR. GALSTON: You were under an evil star.

MR. DIONNE: Don’t make us feel bad, Robbie. (Laughter)

SPEAKER: I was reborn.

MR. JONES: Yeah. No, so I struggle with this, too. I mean, it’s disturbing, right, to say the least. And it’s especially disturbing in light of the recent events over the last week. And when you end up with a country where the general tenor is that things are fraying at the ends, I mean, you do get people who are unstable and have mental illness and it sort of pushes them over the edge. And I think we see some of that going on now, so I think we have a general tone and tenor in the country that I think is really, really difficult.

You know, we’ve asked -- it brings to mind some other questions. We asked before like whether -- old historical questions that ask whether you’d be disturbed if your son or daughter married a Democrat or a Republican. Right? And there’s questions
asked in the ’60s first and there’s single digits of people say they’d be disturbed by this. The last time this got asked was like Huffington Post-UGov that it was approach half of Democrats and Republicans saying they’d be very disturbed if their son or daughter married somebody of the opposite political party. Right? So we’re taking our partisan identities to bed with us literally, right, not just to the ballot box.

But I think it’s this -- what’s frightening to me is that it’s not just partisanship, but it’s racial identity and religious identity melded and welded onto partisanship that are pulling us in our opposite directions. And once you get that braided rope of three threads, it’s really, really hard to unravel.

So I don’t know, I’m not giving you a very positive answer, but my best diagnostic is we’re still reeling from -- I mean, the partisan divides we have today are the direct result of the Civil Rights Act in the 1960s. Right? So the parties flip identities no civil rights and we get white flight from the solid Democratic South to the solid Republican South. And these kind of racial identities are directly kind of out of that migration.

And so I think in many ways, you know, the chickens are coming home to roost on some cans we’ve kicked down the road for quite some time.

MR. GALSTON: Watch that metaphor. (Laughter)

MR. JONES: Yeah, right. And I think we really are having to face some realities that we’ve tried to finesse and the finessing I think hasn’t worked.

MR. DIONNE: Want to heal us?

MS. BOWMAN: If only. I don’t think it’s going to happen at the national level, but I’m seeing increasing evidence that it’s happening at the local level where people are being able to make common cause on all sorts of issues. And at AEI, we’ve always had these incredibly smart young research assistants who come for a couple of years and then go on to get their MPPs or their law degree. And for many years while I was at AEI, maybe for the first 20 years, they all said, well, we’re going to come back to
Washington and make things change. Now all my smart young research assistants leave after a couple of years, go get their MPA or their law degree, and they want to go back to their local communities or to somewhere near their local community because they really believe they can make a difference there and they don’t think they can make a difference in Washington.

You see the evidence of this in the Fallows book. You see it, the kind of thing David Brooks is writing about. It’s very different at the local level from what it was even in the last ’60s, according to these authors. But good things are happening and I guess I want to be optimistic, and that’s where I see reasons for optimism.

MS. KHALID: Yeah, sure. I mean, I think it’s tough, right, because I think what, Robbie, you were talking about when partisanship is tied in with race and religion, I think you look at other countries, that has never turned out well for any other country. And it didn’t use to be as linked together, I would argue, in the United States.

This is just a bit of a personal example, but I grew up in a very small town in Indiana. My family is not white and largely speaking most people that I knew growing up sort of in the suburban communities who were Asian or who were Muslim, there was a -- I mean, many of them were Republicans as well as Democrats in the ’90s. And some of the polling is kind of all over the place with the Asian American community, but we saw that even with the Hispanic community. It was not as clearly divided as it is today. It has gotten significantly worse, I would argue, in the last decade or so.

So in terms of how it becomes better, I don’t know. But what I will say is the demographic changes are really impossible to revert. And I say this often that we can stop legal immigration tomorrow, but the Census already shows that the under-age-5 population is majority minority. So if you have a child in kindergarten, your child, if that child is white, is a minority largely speaking in this country. So that is an impossible demographic change to revert back.
So that being said, I’m of the opinion that eventually when things tip, society learns. And this is what I heard from a number of people who’ve done research in California, that California was one of the first states that we saw whose demographic populations changed and we saw a lot of upheaval politically with Prop 187. The population tipped and the politics of the place changed.

Now, you could make the argument that a lot of people have left the state of California who disagreed with those demographic changes. And there’s not always a reason to think that it will lead to one way or the other. But I think at some point this is the tension that occurs before the moment when any big sort of demographic shift occurs. Once a shift occurs and people realize that it is inevitable, we all sort of have to learn to live with each other because there’s really no other alternative solution.

MS. WONG: I think these have been really great observations. On the one hand, I think power doesn’t give up easily, and so we do see a battle going on.

On the other hand, I think it’s important to remember this is not a stark kind of white/non-white divide. We know that among certain groups of whites they did support -- Democratic whites don’t look like Republican whites. Non-evangelical whites, a majority did support Hillary Clinton. And so I think we’re not at a kind of impasse that is strictly racial. And I think it is important to remember that there is a coalition on the left just as there’s a coalition on the right.

MR. GALSTON: You get the last word on this, E.J.

MR. DIONNE: I was looking through the survey for areas where you might have some agreement across party lines and I was struck by a few. One is everybody wants people from working-class backgrounds thinks that having more working-class people running for office would be a good thing. And we need to bear in mind that the current working class is at least as African American/Latino, as it is white. And so there is this shared sense that there needs to be some sort of greater class
Secondly, Trump does bring us together in certain respects. It is really striking that 69 percent on both of these questions said that Trump has damaged the dignity of the presidency and that they wish that Trump’s behavior were more consistent with previous presidents. Those numbers include a lot of Republicans. That suggests that there’s a very large majority seeking a somewhat different style of leadership, even if some of those folks are going to say they approve of Trump.

On the immigration numbers, there was consensus on two things that we should take as at least somewhat heartening, that Republicans and Democrats agree that immigrants are hard-working and they agree that they have strong family values. Democrats are more pro-immigrant on those questions, but it’s still 92 percent of Democrats, 77 percent of Republicans on one; 92 and 73 on another. That tells us something.

And lastly, we were talking about this before we came in. It is true that the issue priorities are different, but large numbers of people in both parties do care a lot about the healthcare issue, which is one of the reasons why I think you’re seeing, if only through misleading advertising, a certain convergence on the healthcare issue. And an awful lot of people obviously agree that the economy is important.

So that I think that there can be no denying that your braided rope metaphor is very powerful and that these divisions are very deep. I would just point to at least a few areas where we might look and say what in these attitudes could we build on if we wanted to bring ourselves together?

MR. GALSTON: Right on schedule.

MR. DIONNE: Well done, Bill.

MR. GALSTON: We turn it over. And since there’s always geographical discrimination against the folks in the back, I’m going to start with the folks in the back. I
see two hands. There is a woman and then a gentleman right in back of her, and you will have the first two questions. Yes.

MR. DIONNE: There’s a mic coming.

MR. GALSTON: Okay, and while the mic is coming let me just say a few things about this question period. First of all, please everybody state your name.

Secondly, if there’s an institutional affiliation that you think is useful and relevant, add that.

Third, ask a question.

Fourth, be brief. Thank you.

MS. HAUSHEER: I was trying to find a way to downsize this question. My name’s Emily Hausheer and I write articles for the Odyssey Online. And I was doing a research project into the teenage involvement in the 2010 midterms because many people credit the Republican victory in 2010 with teenagers campaigning. So I did some research into what happened to these teenagers. Interestingly enough, many of them went Independent in the 2016 cycle. Making sure I have all the dates right right here. And many of them say that the Republican Party they knew in 2010 is not the Republican Party they know today. And they sided with the Democrats or Independents.

And many of them also express concerns that climate to men such as Trump, and I quote from some of the interviews I had, will result in every single political polarization from across the aisle and increasing class and racial divides across America.

MR. GALSTON: And your question is?

MS. HAUSHEER: And my question, sorry, I’ll try to condense the research. Is this reflected in any of the polls? And how will this impact the future of America and polarization?

MR. GALSTON: Thank you.

MS. HAUSHEER: Thank you.
SPEAKER: Hello. I'm Ewan Navatro from Socioanalytical Research. I have a question for the evangelical whisperers. So for Professor Wong, do you know if there’s -- you know, given your research, have you seen if there’s a difference in white evangelicals if they come from churches that are like missionary or they have done missions in Asian or Latin American countries? And even if those immigrants are actually more conservative on these particular white supremacy issues?

And then for Dr. Jones, looking about missionary work, have you seen the attitudes -- I mean, this survey certainly didn’t have that sample size, but in your -- in the AVS have you seen changes among Mormons on immigration? That also has like these kind of like big missionary contingent and they should also have similar attitudes and also leaning Republican.

MR. GALSTON: Thank you. Okay, those are the first two questions. Panel?

MS. KHALID: I can answer the first one real quick, yeah. So I’m not sure if I can explicitly answer whether or not we’ve seen a shift to the group that you were referring to from 2010 onwards. But what I can say is we have seen an overall left-leaning tilt among the young population, specifically since the year 2000.

And so one real quick example of that is that a lot of researchers have looked at the groups of people who do not historically vote, young people being key. And for a long time they thought that if more young people voted, that would not necessarily change the overall outcome of the election. You talk to those same researchers now and they feel that their research indicates that perhaps actually if more young people did participate and vote it would likely benefit the Democratic Party, and we see that in sort of poll after poll, as well as in the election results themselves.

MS. WONG: That’s for that.

MS. BOWMAN: I think it’s --
MS. WONG: Oh, go ahead.

MS. BOWMAN: I think it's also fair to say that young people are becoming more Independent generally. They've certainly moved to the left, particularly young women. But most young people are moving, if they're moving, in the Independent direction, at least right now.

MR. DIONNE: Could I just point out that some of the lower numbers on your turnout are also that this system we have is not very kind of young people voting. The registration system we have, there are a lot more obstacles to young people because they tend to move around more than others, so that has to be factored in. And that there have been elections recently in which young people actually outnumbered the baby boom generation, notably I think in '08, if I remember correctly.

But I think there's undoubtedly a shift left among the young. This generation is arguably the most progressive since the New Deal generation. It's also the most diverse generation in our country's history. And those two are not disconnected.

MR. GALSTON: Any other? Yes, Janelle, you?

MS. WONG: Well, just to answer the last question. Thanks for the question. I don't look specifically at missionary work. And the question was does missionary experience change the views of white evangelicals? But I do know that Dr. Melani McAlister has written a new book called The Kingdom of God Has No Borders, that if I read it correctly would say you would not see any kind of softening of attitudes based on that missionary experience.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. I'm now going to come forward gradually. I see a gentleman there and another one there, so please wait until the microphone reaches you. Thank you. Start over here and then shift over to the other side.

MR. BEERS: Thank you. Jim Beers. I would like to know if the number of evangelicals as a percentage of the electorate has increased over the years and if it is
a fixed definition or if it is believed to move depending upon times and events.

MR. GALSTON: Boy, have you come to the right place to ask that question. (Laughter)

Now, there’s a gentleman with his hand up over here. There he is.

SPEAKER: Thank you. I think one of the assessments from the panel was that the results, because of the divisions, were kind of discouraging. My question is, do you ever ask questions in your surveys about what people feel about the partisanship, the extreme divisions, and whether on either side or any of the constituencies there is more or less interest in trying to bridge the gaps and any willingness or interest on taking steps to try to tone things down and bring us together?

MR. GALSTON: Okay. We now have two more questions on the table.

MR. JONES: All right, I’ll jump in on the second one. So we have asked a few things. And Karlyn mentioned this book and I want to make sure we give it a good shout-out. Jim and Deb Fallows wrote a book called Our Towns: A 100,000 Mile Journey Into the Heart of America. And they basically took a small plane and they flew all over the country into small towns and just hung out with people to see how toxic -- how much of the toxic national mood had filtered down to the local communities.

And they found by and large that, as Karlyn mentioned, that people at the local level were finding ways to work together across some of these divides more, even if they were very pessimistic and cynical about the national level. So I think that there may be more vibrancy and more life-giving interactions at the local level than there are at the national level. It’s certainly worth a read.

We had some polling that we actually dubbed -- we had a question a couple weeks ago that we actually dubbed the “Jim Fallows question” because we were going to put this to the test. And sure enough, people in that survey did say that they felt like they were more optimistic about being able to work across the lines of party at the
local level than they were at the -- they'd kind of given up on the national level. Almost nobody thought that was going to happen at the national level, but fairly optimistic about their neighbors. So I think that's something, you know, maybe to take home with us.

And Karlyn, do you want to take the evangelical portion of the voters piece?

MS. BOWMAN: Oh, thank you. I actually haven't looked at how that's changed in the exit polls, but when the exit pollsters ask you that question it's you check a box if you're a white -- you check a box that says you're an evangelical Christian and they can look at whether you're white or black later. But I don't know how that number's changed over time, but I certainly agree with what Robbie had said earlier. In the population as a whole they're becoming a smaller share of voters overall.

MR. JONES: The last four presidential election cycles they've been right at 25, 26 percent.

MS. BOWMAN: Twenty-seven, yeah.

MS. KHALID: White evangelicals.

MS. BOWMAN: White evangelicals.

MR. JONES: White evangelicals, that's right. White, non-Hispanic.

MR. DIONNE: Could I say something about that? First of all, there are -- different polls have used different definitions over the years. Sometimes there's a whole battery of questions, are you a Biblical literalist, and other specifically religious questions, trying to get at a born again experience. But broadly speaking, I think there's something we always need to bear in mind when we talk about white evangelicals. That's not the only thing they are, but it's important that they are white, they are older, and they are more Southern than the rest of us. And politics in the South tends to be polarized more by race than in other parts of the country. Therefore, they are Republican and have been Republican for a long time.
Trump got a little tiny bit more than Mitt Romney, but there’s basically been no real change in the white evangelical vote really in some ways since 1980, but certainly over the last 20 years. This is a very Republican group for a whole variety of reasons, some of which are religious and some of which are not. And I think it’s something we always have to bear in mind.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. I’m now going to bring matters forward, first on this side and then on that side, so patience, everybody. I’m going to start with the woman in the corner.

SPEAKER: Thank you very much. Very interesting. I want to get back to the cultural change from the ’50s. Don’t we need a reality check that the ’50s favored white Christian males? Whether or not you wanted to work for an executive company, with Kimberly Clark, or you were looking for a job in a paper mill, it was still white Christians who got those jobs. And white Christian women in the ’50s didn’t need to work, even if they were millworkers, their husbands, because that salary was enough to support even a family with five or six kids.

MR. GALSTON: Okay, so you’re heading toward a question.

SPEAKER: So the question is, don’t we have to respect the fact that they are losing out if you’re hiring blacks, women, foreigners? Just respect it, we don’t have to cater to it, but acknowledge that there’s a reality?

MR. GALSTON: Thank you. And then there’s this gentleman here has been extremely enthusiastic in raising his hand and he deserves a reward. I’m not sure exactly the polite way of putting it, it’s the man not on the aisle.

MR. CHECCO: Thank you very much.

MR. GALSTON: I was going to pick out other distinguishing characteristics, but I thought better of it. (Laughter)

MR. CHECCO: Okay, thanks. Thank you for sparing me that. Larry
Checco, Checco Communications. This has been very enlightening as always. I’ve come to many of these.

But we talk about Democrats and we talk about Republicans. If I’m not mistaken, I think Independents are the majority. I think there’s more than 40 percent Independents and less than 30 percent of both Republicans and Democrats. Would it be interesting to ask a question next year about how people feel about these two parties, especially amongst the Independents? In other words, party versus country, power versus service. And I really think that that’s why Washington is breaking down. I think that the hinterlands believe that there’s no more service being given in this town and that’s what they’re voting people for. Thank you.

MR. GALSTON: Okay, so we now have our third tranche of two questions. Panel?

MR. DIONNE: I’ll jump in on yours. I think that we’ve gone around and around on this ‘50s question for quite a while. And someday I’d like us to do a very detailed study of why people prefer one or the other. Because to use the word “nostalgia,” which may or may not be fair, if you’re a labor Democrat, you might be nostalgic about a highly paid, unionized labor force. And that the person in that position, somebody who had a well-paying job then might look back now and say I actually was better off before -- even if there’s absolutely no immigration or other component, although we have obviously changed the composition of the country since then.

If you’re a cultural conservative you might be nostalgic about sort of, you know, a Leave It to Beaver kind of America and feel that our values have gone to hell. That ‘50s question is hitting a lot of different kinds of feelings.

What struck me, and I just throw this to Robbie to answer at some point, the positions seem to have hardened a little more since we first asked that question. And it now seems more connected to party, race, and culture than it was when we asked it
first a few years ago, which I think itself is interesting on your question.

SPEAKER: (off mic)

MR. DIONNE: Yeah, well, there’s that. I’m not sure that’s true for some people maybe, or at least there’s a perception that that’s true.

MS. BOWMAN: I’d like to see us dig down a little bit deeper in the nostalgia questions, too, because, just for example, CBS asked a question last week asking whether is the American way of life in danger of disappearing? Republicans and Democrats agreed, 61 and 64 percent, that, yes, it was in danger of disappearing. So depending on what you’re tapping when you get to that question, I think you might get different answers.

Gallup asked a question in either 1936 or ’37 about whether life was better for people in the horse-and-buggy days. And people said, in fact, it was much better. Families were stronger, all of the rest in the horse-and-buddy days. But they then asked a follow-up question, would you want to go back? (Laughter) And I’d like to see us ask that question or PRRI ask that the next time.

MR. DIONNE: Yeah, that’s excellent.

MR. GALSTON: Okay, I’m now going to shift over to this side of the room, at least temporarily. There’s a woman in the second row and then one directly behind her.

SPEAKER: Okay, a little bit of a different question.

MR. DIONNE: What was your question?

SPEAKER: (off mic) Independents.

MS. WENTWIN: Okay. Robin Wentwin. I think we all recognize that education is important and so much of this discussion was based on getting people out to vote. We can’t even get many parents and different groups into schools to prepare conferences. So have you looked in terms of polling as to who votes, why they vote?
Have they ever been brought to a polling area? Are we teaching children what the whole voting process is about in terms of getting them there?

I know there’s been a lot with, you know, Getting Out the Vote. But there are many people that won’t even go to places where they’re comfortable, let alone going to another place where they’ve never had that kind of experience. And I think we need to look at why people are voting, who’s voting, and what’s hindering others from going out and actually voting.

MR. GALSTON: Thank you. And then the woman right in back of you.

DR. POPLIN: My question actually is for you. I’m Dr. Caroline Poplin.

All right. When we talk about one-half of the country and the other half of the country you don’t need to say something about the fact that one-half of the country is still promoting and pushing division. That is not the same on both sides.

MR. DIONNE: My column is about that today, so that’ll be my answer to your question.

MR. GALSTON: The specific reference was to the answer to the final question that Robbie talked about on his survey, namely for or against progress since the 1950s. And what I said accurately is that half of the country thinks there’s been progress and half of the country thinks there’s been regress.

The people who think there’s been progress have not been shy about stating their reasons why they think we’ve made progress. The people who think we’ve gone backwards have been equally forthcoming about stating their reasons. And so it doesn’t seem to me that the question of fomenting division really applies to this question as much as it might apply to another question.

My personal view based on the trend, but also the stability of answers to this question, and this is not the first time, is that a substantial group of Americans, probably very few of whom are represented in this room, believe for reasons that are I
think intelligible that they and the country they live in are not as good and not as well off as they were 450 years ago. I think it is literally the case when you’re talking about the economy and economic growth, you can have a win-win situation.

When you’re talking about status in a society, you cannot have a win-win situation because status is a comparative good. And there’s only so much of it and that amount never expands. In the past 50 years, some people have gained status in our society and some people have lost status in our society, and they know who they are.

Okay, that’s all you’re going to hear from me. (Laughter) Now, there was another question on the table, which actually I lied, not knowingly.

But in one of my previous lives, I was the founding director of an organization that was referred to earlier in the panel, the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, CIRCLE for short, which studies youth and young adult civic life, including voting. One of the very first papers we commissioned was on ways of breaking down the barriers between young adults about to reach the age of 18 and voting.

And so one of the experiments involved in two paired sets of classrooms, which were identical demographically just about, in one of the classrooms, and this was replicated in a number of schools across the country, someone came in and taught a one-hour class on the mechanics of voting, complete with a mock polling booth that each student had the opportunity to walk up to and fiddle around with.

The impact on 18-year-old propensity to vote in the very next election after they were eligible was fantastic. Right? It was in double digits, the sort of effect you almost never see from a one-hour, one-time inoculation. And my interpretation of that, which gained some currency, is that when you’re 18, the only thing you think you can die of is embarrassment. And that, you know, the last thing you want to do is to walk into a polling place and not know what to do and have to, you know, look around to some adult
to tell you what to do.

And the fact that the process was simplified, demystified, had an enormous effect, and if that were generalized around the country, if people in local -- responsible for local voting commission sort of fanned out across a school district and did that sort of instruction on a regular basis, I think it could make a difference. I really do.

Okay.

MR. JONES: Can I jump in just real quick?

MR. GALSTON: Please.

MR. JONES: We actually have data from a survey this fall, again another one we did with The Atlantic on voter participation. And we asked young people whether they had ever been taken to the ballot box by their parents. And those people were remarkably more likely to say they’re registered to vote, to say they’re going to vote just from that experience of being drug along, you know, with their parents through the -- and having that experience.

MR. GALSTON: And you said you were going to circle back.

MR. JONES: Yes, and the Independent thing. Yeah, so Independents are really interesting. So, like you said, we have young people becoming more Independent and yet if you look at voting behavior, there are almost no Independents. Right? They’re down to single digits once you kind of get the lean end one way or the other. That group has really thinned out over time if you look people who lean hard one way or the other.

But on the partisanship question, which I think was part of it, is, you know, the Congress is at an all-time low in terms of like favorability rating, the two parties don’t rank that highly except among each other. Democrats think highly of the Democratic Party and Republicans think highly of the Republican Party. So partisanship I think is something everybody wants to overcome, and yet everybody finds themselves
pulled into the gravitational void.

SPEAKER: But it wasn’t partisanship that I was asking about, quite frankly.

MR. JONES: Yeah.

SPEAKER: I was asking about how people perceive each party, party versus country. In other words, are the Republicans looking more towards party for country to serve and vice versa? It’s power. Are they here in Washington to stay in power or are they here to serve as providers to us who pay their salaries, you know? And I think that’s where the elections can turn how people perceive these people. Are they after themselves or are they after the country? I want them after the country. I mean, I want them to look after me.

MR. DIONNE: Just two quick observations on party. There’s a lot of evidence, correct me if I’m wrong, anybody on the panel, that people who call themselves Independent, but lean toward one party or the other are often as partisan as people who are actually formally say they are in that party. And to the extent that partisanship has deepened, this is Alan Abramowitz’ work. He writes about negative partisanship. We don’t like our own party any more than we used to. We’re about the same as we were in 1978. But we really hate the other guys. And that there is a real feeling that if they win, everything in the country is going to go to hell. And besides, they’re deeply immoral and don’t care about the country and are selfish. And it’s this power of negative partisanship we see all around us.

MR. GALSTON: Yeah. A remake of Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner would feature a very different Diane. (Laughter)

Yes, I’m going to take two more questions, quick questions, quick answers, then over and out. This woman right here and the gentleman right there.

SPEAKER: My name’s Irelme. I’m a journalist. So my question is what
do you find not only from this survey, but also from previous studies that in general what are Asian Americans’ attitudes on all of those questions you just talked about in the PowerPoint? Because Asians are now taking up a fairly noticeable part of the U.S. population. I guess their opinions are very interesting to look into, but I haven’t seen it in there. Thank you.

MR. GALSTON: Thank you.

MR. HURWITZ: I want to thank the panel for a very good presentation. I’m Elliott Hurwitz. I’ve met Mr. Galston here before and I used to work for the World Bank and the intelligence community and the State Department.

Mr. Galston, I wanted to ask you about one of your questions. You mentioned employment in the manufacturing sector. There’s a lot of evidence that it’s been affected the most not by immigration, but by productivity. So I leave you with that.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. There is a question about survey data on Asian Americans on the floor. And fortunately, we have someone who can address that question.

MS. WONG: Thank you for the question. I will keep it pretty short. We have -- there’s a site called AAPIData.com and it will answer most of your questions, but just in a nutshell, Asian Americans are about 4 percent of the national electorate. We expect that to be a little bit lower probably in this midterm. They are leaning and have been for the last 15 years -- they’re a group that has been leaning heavily Democrat and has shown higher and higher levels of support for Democratic candidates.

And the issues in which they’re distinctive are not immigration and education. They are healthcare reform, so they love Obamacare. They are gun control. They are super interested in tighter gun control and in the environment. And they are very, very strong environmental voters.

MR. GALSTON: This will be a long discussion. I will say very briefly that
I am of the view that the very abrupt loss of manufacturing jobs after the year 2000 had something to do with the entrance of China into the World Trade Organization, an eventuality for which we did not plan very well.

Let me just say that my major takeaway from this panel discussion is Robbie’s indelible image of chickens roosting on the can kicked down the road. (Laughter) But please do join me in thanking this splendid panel. (Applause)
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2020