



Discussion of Dell'Arricia, Rabanal and Sandri (2018)

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Summary of Dell'Arricia, Rabanal and Sandri (2018)

- Unconventional policies have worked well
 - Effective in affecting financial conditions the desired way
 - Lower interest rates, lower corporate yields, higher stock prices, weaker exchange rate
 - Effective in affecting GDP and inflation, though less confidence in assessment.
- More effective if:
 - Financial distress
 - Central bank can credibly commit to provide accommodation
- Less effective if:
 - Deflationary pressures are entrenched
- Undesired side effects have not materialized
 - Stable inflation, little impact on bank profitability, not much search for yield
 - But political scrutiny has increased
- Unconventional policies should be used again. How?



Some Additional Thoughts Based on Ubide (2017)*

- Two phases of ECB policies – active vs passive easing
- The resetting of Abenomics – inflation is an economy policy phenomenon
- How did monetary policy really work? The insurance channel of policy
- How to do it next time. A monetary policy framework for all seasons

* Ubide, Angel, (2017), *The Paradox of Risk*, Peterson Institute for International Economics

ECB: Passive vs Active Easing

- Passive: euro area monetary policy didn't really ease until mid 2012. Avoid tightening. Germany was different.
- Active: QE large and state contingent, but suboptimal – capital key, 33 percent.
- Inflation target still asymmetric – only central bank that hasn't changed framework
- Are inflation expectations anchored at target?



Japan: Inflation Is a ~~monetary~~ ~~monetary policy~~ an Economic Policy Phenomenon

- Resetting of Abenomics -> a modern version of helicopter money
- At EZLB, fiscal policy in the lead, monetary policy explicitly supports
 - Focus on $r < g$ to reduce debt overhang effect
- Explicit inflation overshooting
 - Make monetary policy support permanent -> insurance on the economic outlook
- Income policies to boost wage growth
- Yield Curve Control – when assets run out
 - A success?

Insurance Channel of Monetary Policy



- Monetary policy operates in (y, π) space and in (risk) space. Must close both gaps* -> stabilize (y, π) /risk
- In normal recessions, risk gap irrelevant.
 - Interest rates can credibly close (y, π) gap, economy self-equilibrating
 - > markets can price assets and long term investment
- After larger crisis, at EZLB, or in deflation, risk gap dominates.
 - Economic agents don't know if/how QE works, economy may not be self-equilibrating
 - > difficult to price assets or make long term investment decisions.
- Solution: provide insurance on economic outlook via strong forward guidance and policy designed to close risk gap**
 - “Whatever it takes” commitment to restore equilibrium
 - Open ended, state contingent policy with explicit forward guidance

* One could think of it as stabilizing the Macro Value at Risk

**Caballero and Simsek (2017) focus on macro prudential policy to address the risk gap

Insurance Channel of Monetary Policy

- Main channel of transmission: risk aversion/taking, not flows



A Monetary Policy Framework for All Seasons

- Opportunistic reflation
 - Increase room to cut real rates – same concept as increasing banks' capital
- Maximize growth subject to price stability
 - Hysteresis + flat PC -> divine coincidence no longer works. Avoid weak demand trap.
 - Don't trust real time Nairu estimates when labor market is in flux
- Keep large balance sheets, be ready to buy all assets
 - Increase capital
- Use cyclically adjusted forward guidance to manage risk taking
 - Adjust degree of explicitness of guidance
- Stop calling it unconventional
 - There is nothing unconventional about buying assets or forward guidance
 - Creates stigma and political attention
 - Creates bias to exit -> policy tighter than optimal

Endnotes

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