ON GRAND STRATEGY:
A CONVERSATION WITH JOHN LEWIS GADDIS

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Introduction:

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MR. WRIGHT: Great. Good morning. Welcome, everyone. My name is Tom Wright. I'm a senior fellow here at Brookings in the project on International Order & Strategy and director for the Center for U.S. and Europe, and we're delighted today to be gathered to discuss John Lewis Gaddis' latest book.

John Lewis Gaddis is, as everyone knows here, I think, the Robert A. Lovett professor of military and naval history at Yale University. He has had enormous influence over generations of students and scholars over the last several decades through his work in the Cold War, including a magisterial biography a few years ago of George Kennan.

He cofounded the program of Grand Strategy at Yale, which I think has really been a stellar fixture in terms of helping think about foreign policy, grand strategy. And his latest book, *On Grand Strategy*, is a book about the classics and their relation to strategy and to foreign policy.

To discuss his book, and we're joined by Mara Karlin, who is a non-resident senior fellow of security and strategy here at Brookings and an associate professor of practice at Johns Hopkins SAIS, and my colleague, Bob Kagan, who is the Stephen & Barbara Friedman senior fellow at the Project on International Order and Strategy, and also the author of the forthcoming book, *The Jungle Grows Back*, which I think will be out in August of September of this year, which is on the fate of the international order and U.S. foreign policy.

So what I'll further do, we'll ask them to come to the stage, and I would also like to close by thanking Giordana Delaney who is our intern here at the Project for International Order and Strategy, and this is her last day at Brookings before the summer. So we'd like to thank her for working this event and on her -- and all her other events for the last few months.

So please, could you join us here on the stage and we will commence the
program. Thank you. John, I think you're -- are you going to speak first and then --

MR. GADDIS: I think you go first and then --

MR. WRIGHT: Yes. You go first, and then once you're finished, then Bob and Mara will come up and then we'll have a discussion. Thank you very much.

MR. GADDIS: Well, thanks very much and thanks to everyone for coming out this morning. It's a pleasure to be back, as always, at Brookings.

I thought I would just say a few words about how this book came to be. It's kind of an accidental book in some ways -- and how it evolved. I know it kind of surprised me as it was coming along.

But when the Kennan book came out, which was in 2011, I decided that would be the last book. That was book number 10. It did okay. And I felt -- and when people said what is the next book going to be, I said there isn't going to be one. I'm going to quit while I'm ahead, and that was it. Then they said, oh, you can't do that, and people became very passionate about this to the point that I felt I had to invent a cover story for them.

So the cover story was I was going to write on foxes and hedgehogs, and I would point to whoever was giving me trouble and I'd say, it's just for you. It's just for you, Warren. Foxes and hedgehogs. You know?

And that got me by for a while, except that I then got interested in foxes and hedgehogs. Where did this distinction come from in the first place? You know? The ancient Greeks.

How did it resurface in the modern era? Isaiah Berlin. What did Isaiah Berlin mean by foxes and hedgehogs? He meant, of course, the classic definition of this. The fox knows many things.

The hedgehog knows only one big thing. But Berlin popularized this weirdly in a very abstract article on Tolstoy published in 1953, and the concept at that point went viral and has become a fixture of academic discussion, seminar discussions, maybe psychiatric
therapy, as far as I know. I don't know. People trying to identify themselves or work out for themselves -- are they a fox or are they a hedgehog? And which should you be? So I got more and more interested in this, as well.

Then in a completely unrelated string, I had a problem with one of my colleagues in the grand strategy course at Yale, because for years, my colleague, Charlie Hill, was given to waiting for just the moment in seminar and then announcing very portentously, F. Scott Fitzgerald said that the sign of a first rate intelligence is the ability to hold opposing ideas in the mind at the same time, while retaining the ability to function. And then he would stop, just like that.

And his students would say, Professor Hill, what do you mean? He wouldn't say anything. Charlie's colleagues, Paul Kennedy and I, Charlie, what do you mean? He wouldn't tell us. You know?

So he would just hold this thing suspended like some kind of dark cloud over the seminar and remain in that position for years. So I felt the obligation to try to work out for myself what this idea might mean. And I got interested in the idea that maybe I could combine the foxes and the hedgehogs with the two opposing ideas in the mind at the same time.

Could it be that one can be both the fox and the hedgehog? Berlin himself later said he did not think that this was impossible. He did not believe that humanity was divided irrevocably into these categories.

So could it be that one could be both? And if so, how would one be both, because obviously, you would need to be a fox at some times and you would need to be a hedgehog at other times, and what would be the criteria for choosing between these things?

So this is what basically led to the book. I got to watching my students as they would leave the class and noticed that as they left the class, they were, without even realizing it, foxes and hedgehogs because they left the class looking at their cell phones, of
course, which were attached to their; you know?

So that was setting up some hedgehog-like destination toward which they were attending. But at the same time, with fox-like agility, they avoided running into each other or to walls or to other professors as they were looking. I thought that's very interesting. How do they do this?

And then, why can't this be done at higher levels? Why at higher levels does this skill somehow deteriorate? And that basically is what led to the book. The book is an effort to trace that question through a series of classical case studies which actually began with Herodotus which we have never taught in the Yale Grand Strategy class, but I've always liked the opening scene of Xerxes the King of Kings at the Hellespont overlooking the great army that is just about to cross into Greece on the pontoon bridges that he has built, and so on.

And I thought that would make a very good opening for the book, a cinematic scene. I am married to a director, so I think in these terms how to be or how to try to be dramatic. And that then led to a series of case studies which compromised the book -- the book consists of. So there are about 10 or so coming up through Franklin D. Roosevelt and World War II. Why stop there?

Well, the answer is those other 10 books that are out there, all of which in one way or another deal with the Cold War. Somebody counted yesterday and said -- reminded me, you actually have six books that have Cold War in the title. I thought, that's terrible. That shows a real lack of imagination (Laughter).

So I thought for once, I'm going to try to write something that has nothing whatever to do with the Cold War, and so I stopped in World War II. However, the more I got to thinking about this, the more I thought that there is a kind of paradox here, because the urge to be timely, the urge to relate what you're saying to current events actually often has the effect of making your book untimely as time passes.
That is, next year or next decade or next century or forever, it's going to be bound by whatever the current preoccupations that were bothering you at the time were; whatever your lessons are, if you've applied them to current events.

That actually limits their applicabilities, so I thought it would actually be useful just to stop at a much earlier stage with the hope of trying to identify a few timeless patterns in history that can be drawn from the classics and would take very seriously this proposition, which is there is some reason why cultures across time and space keep coming back to the classics.

There is some reason why different people in different ages and of very different persuasions nonetheless find relevance in these old books. And it seems to me that the best guarantee of future relevance for anyone who is trying to write something that might last would be to rely on something that has lasted through the past and draw lessons from that.

That in a way has always been the philosophy grand strategy course. We've always taken classics seriously. We've tried to find relevance to current issues, but nonetheless, we see that as the intellectual foundation of our program, and I felt the urge before completely leaving this earth or leaving Yale or whatever, leaving --

MR. KAGAN: It's the same thing.

MR. GADDIS: Same thing. Yeah, it is about the same thing (Laughter).

You're right. Just to write down my own sense of what teaching this course has taught me, and that's really, Bob, where this book comes from. So I'm hoping that that will serve as just a guide to how the book came to be, and then we could talk about what it says. Does that make sense?

MR. KAGAN: Yes.

MR. GADDIS: Okay. Great.

(Pause)
MR. KAGAN: Well, thank you so much, John. I'll talk while people get mic’d up here. You know, for those of you who have been following Professor Gaddis' work over the decades, it's an amazing collection, and I personally don't hold it against you that you have Cold War in six titles (Laughter). The books are all interesting, fascinating and influential.

I want to make sure we hold up this book. This book is also fascinating, and I think going to be influential, if it isn't already. John tells me that he's already got corporate interests in looking at what grand strategy means, and I think that anyone who reads this book will see that there are -- there is application beyond foreign policy, beyond what we think of traditionally as grand strategy, but sort of affects the way we can think about our own daily lives and our decision, or whether we're business leaders or what have you.

So if you haven't already gotten a book and read it, I strongly recommend it. It's a delightful read. It covers the huge expanse of knowledge and history and is a real testament to all of the things that John has been doing for years.

So we'll just have a conversation about the topics that John raises or whatever else comes to our mind, and Mara, why don't you -- do you want to kick us off?

MS. KARLIN: Sure. It's really a treat to be here. Of course, to be with someone whose works I have read ad infinitum, so it is good fun.

This was a terrific book to read, not least because I have a practitioner's mindset, and so I kept kind of pausing, looking up and saying, yes, why don't we do that more, which I hope you take as a pretty strong endorsement --

MR. GADDIS: I do.

MS. KARLIN: -- of the work.

I'll note two things that particularly hit me hard. One is this idea about how do we think; right, which we often don't spend time rigorously kind of thinking through. Instead, it's let learn the substance; right? Let's get smart on xxx topic or y topic.
And I think what John does so masterfully here is he gives you all of these different pieces that help inform how do you think? Are you thinking about your priorities? What about opportunity costs or choices? To what extent are you seeing patterns or how are you planning on friction occurring? And that's pretty compelling.

The other piece that I really found notable was this idea of who's doing the thinking. You know? That one has to really know one's self and recognize that as you become increasingly someone who is in the sort of bucket of having to be a serious grand strategist, you have certain challenges that inevitably inform who you are.

So there's a great line in here from Kissinger about how one's kind of intellectual capabilities hit their pick before they reach these positions. I've always thought this is really just one gets stupider the more senior they get. I think Kissinger was a little bit more diplomatic, perhaps, than I was.

But other points you see infused throughout this work. This notion that common sense is like oxygen; the more senior you get, the less of it you have. This issue that your ability to differentiate between right and wrong absolutely becomes tougher the more senior one gets. And also, that one's determination goes down and hesitancy goes up, because you understand generally just how poor your options are.

So this notion of kind of how one thinks and who is doing the thinking, I think, is really beautifully tracked throughout this book. I'll just wrap with one final piece.

You know, to read this book, one has to really walk away and say, look, to be a good grand strategist I have to figure out where I've been, where I am and where I'm going. It all sounds really obvious, perhaps not that hard to do the first two.

And yet, we're sitting in Washington. We're sitting in a place where the country has been at work for 17 years and we haven't had, arguably, many of those hard conversations. That diagnosis of where we are and what that means. There is a line in here about Athens, and it says Athens defeated itself in the end because it bore debts more easily
than questions about the purposes of its wars. What a striking phrase, particularly as we are sitting here in 2018.

QUESTIONER: So just to -- I know that you -- and I not only understand why you didn't want to go past 1945, but I think there's a lot of truth to that. It is very dangerous to try to make timeless points by focusing in on the things that you're most concerned about at the moment.

But I do, therefore, nevertheless, want to drag you into the Cold War --

MR. GADDIS: Thank you.

QUESTIONER: -- a topic that you know better than anyone alive, and ask about -- and think about applying your sort of -- the lessons of this book to thinking about the Cold War, because it seems to me, and you can correct every mistake I'm about to make.

It seems to me that the Cold War was fought based on a very hedgehog principle which was laid out by Kennan in his long telegram and article, which was basically if we can just contain Soviet expansion, ultimately, the inherent contradictions of Soviet existence, Soviet society will either force the Soviets to mellow or they will collapse on those contradictions.

And I think if you jump from the beginning of the Cold War to the end of the Cold War, that's pretty much what happened. And that -- therefore, that one big key insight, that big hedgehog idea which the United States stuck to more or less with many variations along the way, and no one's written more about those variations than you have.

But nevertheless, Reagan was in a certain sense, fulfilling the original idea.

However, along the way, there were numerous catastrophes. There was the Vietnam War. The Korean War was not a great success, even though we sort of look back more fondly on it than I think people did at the time.

There were obviously excesses. There was McCarthyism. There was almost a nuclear confrontation, et cetera, et cetera. And at any moment during the Cold War,
if you had asked most people how is this working out, a very large number at any given -- in any decade of that period would have said this is a disaster. We’re going to get ourselves killed. We’re going to get blown up in a nuclear war, or from another side, we’re going to be undermined. We’re going to be overstretched.

Your colleague, Paul Kennedy, a good friend of ours wrote in 1987 that the United States had just as much chance of going under as a result of imperial overstretch as the Soviets did.

So you know, which is the bigger truth: The ultimate success or the series of errors along the way? And the reason I ask that, and I'll just -- I'll end on this question. How do you know whether you’re better off being more foxy or more hedgehoggy at any given moment? Because I think you people would say, well the authors of NSCE 68 were too hedgehoggy and not foxy enough.

Lippman thought that Kennan’s original containment strategy was unattainable, given the limits that you talk about. So that seems to me to be the hard part at any given moment, and as we look forward, what guidance can we have about how to think about these things?

MR. GADDIS: Okay. Let me just take that one first, because I think it's a fascinating question.

I would come back -- something I don't really say in this book -- I've said this in other books -- things look different from inside from what they look like from outside. I actually used to begin my cohort history course by quoting Marx. Inside of a dog, it's too dark to see. It was actually Groucho who said that (Laughter).

But outside of a dog, you can see the whole picture better; you know? And it seems to me, yes, as we look back at the Cold War from outside of it, we can see that there was a pretty consistent strain of containment all the way through, and we could say yes, that was a hedgehog-like principle. And we can certainly say that the principle was held onto
more adroitly and more wisely than the hedgehog-like principles on the other side, which were mostly ideologically based, you know, for sure.

But inside the dog, while the conflict was going on, it didn't look anything like that way, and people who remember that era will remember how fragile the faith in democracy was in the Cold War. Kennan himself wrote a book about this; that the problem with democracies is that they're all over the place. They were thinking about too many different things, responding to too many different interests, and they can't focus on things. And that was Kennan's own take on it which he largely retained through his life.

I actually had very interesting arguments with him in the Reagan years, because I would go and say, George, look, Reagan is implementing your strategy. And he's - no he's not, he said. It's impossible. He could not be (Laughter). You know, he got furious about this.

And he could never quite come to grips with this idea. So it's the difference from looking at something from the standpoint of history and looking at something from the way that it looks within. And that's why I think the hedgehog-fox thing is interesting, because it looked so different at the time.

And the whole attitude of the Marxist-Leninist all the way through the 20th century, until they imploded, was that they had found the key to understanding history; the science of history. And they would -- their success was predetermined in this regard. And a great number of people on this side of the conflict actually believed him.

So I think that it's -- the hedgehog-fox thing is a valuable way to get into it. But I think it's also dangerous to get too hung up into it. Berlin meant it only just as a starting point for discussion, and I think that's the way that I've tried to use it, as well.

To say that there are fast and hard rules for when you should be foxy and when you should be hedgehoggy, I think you have to judge each situation individually. But that's what state craft is supposed to be, is the ability to judge each crisis individually; not to
respond, to formulate to mathematical equations, to intellectual categories or so, but to be able to judge each situation on its own merits.

MS. KARLIN: What if you don't have a Pericles or a Lincoln or a -- you know, any of the other -- the Machiavelli -- the tremendous thinkers? You have this great scene about Lincoln and how he manages to be both fox and hedgehogs.

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MS. KARLIN: Right? It's just masterful. What if you don't have that?

MR. GADDIS: Well, just think about where Lincoln came from. He had one year of formal education. He's about as implausible a leader, and if you think about intellectual categories, as you can possibly imagine.

So to me, it's very reassuring where he came from because of where he got to, and the fact that in the American system, somebody who came from where he did was able to be, as I call him, the greatest of the presidents for all kinds of reasons. I think it does raise a lot of questions about training and about education and about how we try to equip young people for these positions of responsibility.

And I think that in itself is a fox-hedgehog problem because academic disciplines are self-contained hedgehogs and very rarely, really, to think in inter-disciplinary terms, and students, particularly undergraduate are often caught between these warring disciplines with very little guidance for them to make their own way. And we have tried to resist that in our course at Yale which has been relentlessly undisciplinary or anti-discipline in that regard.

MS. KARLIN: Mm-hmm.

MR. GADDIS: Generalists -- we've tried to train generalists and be proud of this, but that's rare within the academy. So I think that this is a problem, for sure. I sometimes think, and my students sometimes say wouldn't it be better if we just didn't go to school at all. Look at Lincoln and look how well he did (Laughter). And I say, politely, Lincoln
was a genius, and I don't know whether you are yet or not (Laughter).

MR. KAGAN: But you know, you think about someone like Herbert Hoover.

If you could model a president's preparation for a job --

MR. GADDIS: Uh-huh. Yeah.

MR. KAGAN: I mean, think about all the things that Hoover had done or --

(Simultaneous discussion)

MR. GADDIS: Or Wilson.

MR. KAGAN: Well, Wilson you could argue was -- you know, spent too much time in the academy, you know, which is always a deadly thing when it comes to strategy, as you know, John.

MR. GADDIS: Yes (Laughter).

MR. KAGAN: But Hoover had been a practitioner --

MR. GADDIS: Yes.

MR. KAGAN: -- at very great levels, and you know, when he found himself president, he was unable to do anything, either domestically or in foreign policy that was right. Now I think what you would say is, and this gets back to -- you know, on the continuum of those of us who work in think tanks and say, well, if you would only push this button and that button, you'd get the policy. If that's one end, then Tolstoy is the other, and you're just at the mercy of larger forces.

MR. GADDIS: Yeah.

MR. KAGAN: I must say, I find myself often heading in the Tolstoy direction. And in the case of Hoover, you could say that it wouldn't matter how brilliant you were. The forces that were at work --

MR. GADDIS: Yeah. Right.

MR. KAGAN: -- in terms of the American public opinion, the experiences of the previous years, nothing you -- no amount of genius could have gotten us out of that
situation.

MR. GADDIS: Except one day, and his name was FDR. And that's a very interesting contrast between the two of them, you know, because FDR, to his own subordinates and certainly to many of the press who were covering him, looked like a total amateur; looked like someone who had no clue of what was going on. I'm switching back and forth.

Walter Lippman was someone who regarded FDR in that way. It was said of Roosevelt he had a fly paper mind. Whatever flew in the window and attached to it, you know, he went for it. But look what he did. He got us out of the Depression. He prepared for war. He came to the rescue of Europe in a very key way, and at the same time arranged to have somebody else do all of the fighting or almost all of the fighting that was done, for sure. And so we'd come out of it with minimal cost.

And just on the sides, he's managing another global war in the Pacific. Both are brought to conclusion within about three months of each other with a national economy that is now twice the size of what it was when the war began, and an atomic bomb on the side.

And my former student, Hal Brands who just works up the road has said of this, that's got to be a grand strategy. I can't imagine what a grand strategy would look like if not something like that. So start with that and then work backward and you get there. It's a fascinating exercise.

MR. KAGAN: It is, especially if you consider that, you know, I mean, now you have to add to that story, though, his ineffectiveness for at least the first seven or eight years of his presidency when he was not able to buck public opinion on foreign policy, and we don't know what would have happened with the economy, had we not wound up in world war. So I'm a huge believer in FDR's genius, especially as a war -- and I think he did what he could do politically.
MR. GADDIS: Yeah, exactly. That was not ineffectiveness. That was just prudence.

MR. KAGAN: But I don't know if the -- you know, if the Japanese don't attack Pearl Harbor -- I don't know what ends up happening. You know? And they didn't have to do that. And again, we're back to the contingent --

MR. GADDIS: We are. Always.

MR. KAGAN: -- facts of history. Right (Laughter)?


MR. KAGAN: But anyway, do you want to jump in and --

MS. KARLIN: Sure. There's one other thing that I'd welcome your thoughts on, and part of this is just being animated by the Revolutionary War. I was at Yorktown over the weekend with my students --

MR. GADDIS: Yep.

MS. KARLIN: -- although I played King George, III, which doesn't turn out so hot. And you have this section in here where you talk about prioritization and you're talking about the founders of our country. And effectively, they chose to save the state and let others save the soul.

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MS. KARLIN: And I find that to be a really compelling and disturbing notion, you know, this idea that if you go and fight with the revolution, you get some money and you get a slave to help inspire people to fight.

Can you walk us through a little bit how one thinks about prioritization?

MR. GADDIS: Sure. What I meant by saving the state is creating the state in the first place; creating the union in the first place. And postponing the saving of the soul, what I meant was the toleration of slavery that was implicit in the Declaration of Independence and explicit in the Constitution.
And of course, the reason for this, you know, is I think, fairly well understood. There would not have been a unified Declaration of Independence by 13 colonies or a federal Constitution if either of those documents had actually provided for the abolition of slavery. There might have been two separate American states. There might have been 13 separate American states.

But this was the compromise that was uneasily reached in the 1770s and the 1780s. I say in the book that the founders just postponed to another generation the saving of the nation's soul, because they first had to have a nation. You can't save its soul before you - unless you have a nation to begin with. And so that was an example of this.

What this really illustrates is something that Machiavelli talked about in Berlin as refined this. It's the notion of the impossibility of having all good things. They are not simultaneously possible. Reconciling all contradictions can never be done as Machiavelli suggested and Berlin claimed very explicitly, and there is something in trying to reconcile all contradictions, because the force that must be needed, a resistance that one would encounter, you would almost have to become a dictator to reconcile all contradictions.

And if you read Berlin's great essays on two concepts of liberty, that's his definition of a totalitarian is someone who tries to reconcile all contradictions. His definition of a libertarian is someone who tolerates contradictions; someone who understands that while these are very difficult choices, you can't have everything at once. You have to make some choices as to what you do now and what you do later.

And that is statecraft, it seems to me. That is politics. And there is no clearer example than what the founding fathers went through, with the understanding that eventually, the slavery issue would have to be addressed. But it would not be their generation that could do it. It would be the sons and grandsons of the founders who did do it.

But again, I'll go back to FDR and look at how we came out of World War II with so few causalities. It's because we turned so much over to the Soviet Union. And think
about the price of that for Europe to be divided for four decades or so.

How would you make that trade-off? Would it have been better for the United States to come in and launch World War I like trench warfare attacks bleeding itself white or multi-color or whatever, just as the World War I states had been coming out much weaker, or was it better to rely on the Russians to sustain them? Even though the moral compromise here was -- it was odious, as well.

And one of the fascinating things is that Isaiah Berlin himself was in Washington at that point as a war correspondent for the foreign office reporting on just this attitude on the part of the new dealers in World War II. He pictures them as cold, realistic cynics because of this.

This is not the usual picture that you get, but that's what he was reporting back to London because he saw this choice. He however, did not question the choice, but then he later wrote some of the greatest essays on liberty that have ever been written as, I think, a reflection of seeing that choice up close.

MS. KARLIN: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: I mean, the whole issue of the declaration and the slavery issue and the Civil War really is to me is sort of -- confounds notions of national interest --

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: -- or the interest of the state, because no one would say -- I mean, I think that if you were a pragmatic person -- and there were many historians, as you know, for a long period after the Civil War who thought the Civil War was unnecessary; that Lincoln had, you know, caused a conflict that should have been handled other ways.

And it's hard to think of something that is less in the interest of the nation --

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: -- than a civil war that kills over half a million people -- you know, a secession crisis.
MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: And most sort of -- your average establishment person in Washington in the 1850s would have said you have to avoid this war at all costs, even if you are making the compromise.

So at the end of the day, it is not in a way, the prudent judgment to pursue a course which you have every reason to believe is going to lead to the worst possible outcome for a nation.

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: And yet, that is exactly what Lincoln and the Republican party ultimately did.

MR. GADDIS: Unless you are a particularly far-sighted leader, because it seems to me that what Lincoln was really saying is that if he appeased the south, then the north would secede out of operation and it was -- the union was -- this issue was just too difficult for agreement.

So one way or another, you were going to have dual states in North America, or maybe multiple states in North America. And he certainly expected that if the south seceded, he said at one point, if you allow one secession, how many other secessions will there be from the secession, and so on and so forth, back and forth.

What struck me about Lincoln, and I hadn't realized the importance of this until I worked on this book, is how deep his vision of a continental republic was. So we normally think of this in terms of manifest destiny, 1848 and all of this, and Lincoln, of course, was a critic of the Mexican war, famously.

But at the time of the Civil War, what he's looking toward is the importance of holding this country together, and he wants to do it almost in Marxian terms. He is thinking about the economic industrial base, and he's thinking about how it could be used to win a civil war, but then, what could be done with it in decades to come.
He was thinking ahead to the 20th century. He talks about it in a couple of his speeches. He's thinking about how the United States, if it holds itself together, can be the -- famously, the last best hope of mankind. And what he meant was that it would have the capability to rescue mankind or other parts of mankind, maybe across the ocean.

It's almost as if he anticipates the three rescues of the 20th century. You know? And I was surprised at how deep that strain of thought is in him. And so I think he would have said that this is a risk that has to be taken at this point.

It's a risk in which he felt a good deal of confidence, because he's thinking in economic industrial terms, you know, about our capabilities, but he's also thinking very, very deeply about the need to bolster those with the moral force of being the last, best hope. It's a remarkable performance.

MR. KAGAN: But again, I think this is the conundrum. I mean, I think this is important, and that's why I think the book is important. This is the conundrum that we faced over and over again.

MR. GADDIS: Yeah.

MR. KAGAN: We don't live reading history backwards. We live moving forward.

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: Lincoln was making an assertion. He couldn't prove --

MR. GADDIS: Of course.

MR. KAGAN: -- what would happen if we didn't act similarly.

MR. GADDIS: No.

MR. KAGAN: Roosevelt, in the late '30s, begins arguing that if we let Germany and Japan conquer Europe and Asia, we will be living in a prison. They'll be feeding us through the prison bars, was his line.

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.
MR. KAGAN: But he couldn't prove what was going to happen --
MR. GADDIS: Of course.
MR. KAGAN: -- and in fact, he never did prove what was going to happen because we didn't let it happen.
MR. GADDIS: Yes.
MR. KAGAN: And at each stage, you can say like so where -- now we're sitting where we are today. And so some of us, and a very, very, very, very, very small number of us argue that we need to preserve the position that the United States has had in the world, because if we don't, the following horrible things may happen, but we can't prove that they're going to happen --
MR. GADDIS: Of course.
MR. KAGAN: -- and right now, I would say we're not persuading anybody --
MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.
MR. KAGAN: -- that the downside outweighs -- you know, the downside of not doing anything is intolerable compared to the known costs --
MR. GADDIS: Yes.
MR. KAGAN: -- of doing something.
MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.
MR. KAGAN: And you can think of other times in our history. We had mentioned the times where it sort of worked out. You can think of other times in our history when it didn't work out or it needn't work out. And I guess that sort of -- as I -- you know, as you look ahead, you know, how do you know and how do you persuade?
MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.
MR. KAGAN: Because that is the problem that we're having right now.
MS. KARLIN: And to add to that, if I might?
MR. GADDIS: Yes.
MS. KARLIN: I mean, this is the challenge also, we have, looking back at the last 70 years where you have a cohort of people very loudly saying the value-based rules base of international order is one that has actually quite selfishly been very good for America.

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MS. KARLIN: And others have said -- effectively say, wow, look at this thing, look at that thing, et cetera. And so trying to prove the negative of the things that didn't happen, let alone getting into the future.

I mean, it seems as though one is kind of losing on both sides, a la Kissinger's great quote. You know? You warned me but didn't persuade me.

MR. GADDIS: I think what's a problem -- what is a test for any democracy is when its leaders are unable to prove -- to convince, not prove -- nobody can ever prove anything, but when its leaders are unable to persuade its own people that sacrifices are worth making.

Lincoln did that brilliantly in the Civil War. Roosevelt did it brilliantly and successfully in World War II. It was not done for Vietnam. Johnson -- Kennedy-Johnson were never able to make a credible argument that that -- that those lives were worth losing in that cause. And on a smaller scale, I think there's been difficult in our more recent wars as well, in making that argument.

I think part of leadership is persuasion. Part of leadership is being able to prove -- not to prove. I keep using the word prove because you pushed me into it, but I don't believe in proofs.

MR. KAGAN: I like pushing you as much as possible, John.

MR. GADDIS: I know you do. (Laughter) Persuade. And this element of persuasion is a test for leadership, because I do think that there is a lot of common sense out there in the country. I do think people are capable of asking, why are we doing this? Yes, maybe something has worked for the last 70 years, but what's it doing to us now and what
are we losing by this?

We were talking this morning about this fundamental change in the American consciousness that has taken place in the last quarter century or so, so that Americans no longer look forward with confidence to the possibility that their kids will do better than they do. In fact, there is a great loss of confidence in that proposition, and that is immensely significant. And I think it's worth our time and effort to try to figure out how that confidence got lost somewhere and to think about the relevance of this, too.

So how much of this is tied up with the burdens of international leadership, about which both of you have spoken and written? How much of it has other causes? I don't know the answer to these things, but I just hope that we will ask those questions, because I think all of this is part of grand strategy.

MS. KARLIN: Mm-hmm. And generationally, as you no doubt, I suspect, see with your students, and if you look up any of the polling that's come out over the last year, this is a very live issue, particularly for the under 30 crowd --

MR. GADDIS: Oh, yeah.

MS. KARLIN: -- for whom Iraq and Afghanistan animate their -- you know, much of their kind of consciousness. They don't see either as perhaps, a spectacular success and think, well, maybe use of military force isn't terribly positive, and indeed, why don't we let others just kind of take the reins?

MR. KAGAN: Which is exactly what happened after World War I. I mean, the reason we were so reluctant to do anything about Europe was we had decided as a people that World War I had been a disaster, although it took a while to convince them that that -- it wasn't obviously a disaster (Laughter), but that was where they came.

And then it was very much that whole generation. That's why people like Kingman Brewster were a part of America first. It was the experience of World War I and the disillusionment that followed. And some of that, I think, is beyond leadership to necessarily
deal with.

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: There were just some moods that I think it's extremely difficult to get out of.

Well, I'm sure you all have lots of other questions, and this is a good time to turn to you. All I could just ask is if you have a question, please just state your name and make it an actual question (Laughter). As close as you feel that you're capable of that.

(Pause)

MR. KAGAN: Otherwise, we're just going to keep talking. Yes, sir.

(Discussion off the record)

MR. DUCKWORTH: Thank you. First of all, thank you to all three for coming here today to talk to us. My name is Ross Duckworth. I'm retired from the United States Marine Corps and I'm a defense consultant working in Europe.

I wonder if the three of you would expound a little bit on why it was necessary to fight the war for states' rights. I'm one of those people that wonders if it simply wasn't done, wouldn't the south come back? They couldn't survive. They had no idea. Why would it necessary for Lincoln to do what he did and act in that way? Thank you.

MR. GADDIS: Well, I can tell you what Lincoln was worried about was that the south would indeed, not come back if they seceded, because Lincoln was thinking about the international situation and Lincoln was thinking about the British, French, European reliance on cotton exports from the south, and was thinking that the Europeans might well intervene in the Civil War on the side of the south, and suddenly, you would have European colonies in North America again.

And so he had no confidence that the south would, indeed, find its way back. So that's my answer. You know, it was -- that was what -- you know, it was very much an international dimension to the Civil War in that regard.
MS. KARLIN: Mm-hmm. I might just --

MR. KAGAN: It was a -- I'm sorry. Go ahead.

MS. KARLIN: I was just going to add -- you know, I might add, he was also probably a little bit informed of the Revolutionary War, which hadn't been that -- you know, it had been relatively recent, and effectively, we want it, not least, thanks to the French.

So I think building on John's important point, why wouldn't some other power get involved and use this as a way to weaken us?

MR. KAGAN: And the other element which I think played a critical role, because if you go back to the critical decision that Lincoln had to make when he was presented with what was known as the Crittenden Compromise and the issue that Lincoln vetoed was not even something like that fugitive slave -- reinstating the fugitive slave law.

It was the right of slavery to expand into new territory. That was the thing that he vetoed, because the south had already been -- had a project beginning in the 1840s which led to the Mexican American War of moving into the Caribbean, moving southward and colonizing and expanding slave territory that way.

If there had been no war, the south would definitely have done that. So the south would have taken Cuba. The south would have taken other Caribbean islands. And we all wanted to -- want to say that -- I mean, the implicit point is that slavery would have failed as an institution economically, therefore, they would have had to come back.

I think Lincoln's thought, and I think correctly, was that we didn't know that that -- you didn't know that that was necessarily going to happen. Sure, you might say that the slave economy was left sort of productive ultimately than the industrial economy that was developing in the north, but if the south managed to extend itself throughout the hemisphere, it would have been in a pretty powerful position.

And so I just think it's wrong to assume, and Lincoln was right to deny the argument that eventually the south could never make it. Yes, sir?
Hang on. Could you just identify yourself and do the whole rigmarole here?

MR. BECKER: Eddie Becker.

It's interesting what you said, because I mean, shortly after the Civil War, the United States as a whole invades Cuba and the Philippines and gets into an extended war then. Do you feel better about that war (Laughter)?

MR. GADDIS: I feel much better about that war with regard to Cuba. I mean, maybe you think it would have been better if Cuba had been a slave state owned by the south. By the way, it wasn't right after. It was some 30 years later.

But you know, if the question is was the south going to survive, do I think that we would have been better off if the south had made it? You know, one of the -- Hitler said that one of the great tragedies of the human race was the fact that the south didn't secede. And I think he's right.

If the south had, in fact, not failed, and in that, that there had been no Civil War, the prospect of the United States becoming the great, in a way, totalitarian state in the world was much greater than I think we imagined. So history changed that way.

(Simultaneous discussion)
MR. KAGAN: And I don't know. If you want to compare the war in the Philippines to that issue, I would say I regret that we fought in the Philippines, but as a magnitude, I think they're very different.

MR. GADDIS: I'm so happy to be staying out of this particular debate (Laughter).

MR. KAGAN: Yes, ma'am. Right here.

MS. KARLIN: You inspire lots of questions, and that's good.

MS. GRASSENY: Hello. My name is Jessica Grasseny and my question is for you, Dr. Gaddis.

MR. GADDIS: Okay.
MS. GRASSENY: In your book, it specifically -- when you talk about your definition of grand strategy, it's rather broad and it differs for many in that it doesn't mention security. And I was just curious if you could elaborate on your thought process and how you came to that definition.

MR. GADDIS: Sure.

MS. GRASSENY: Thank you.

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm. I do take a very broad definition of grand strategy. In fact, I would say it's exceedingly broad. I say in the book that grand strategy deals with the universal tragedy, the universal fact of life that aspirations can be whatever you want them to be. They are infinite.

But capabilities can never be infinite. Capabilities are always finite. And so how you navigate that asymmetry is, in fact, grand strategy. Maybe it's happening at the level national statesmanship and so on, and this would be an obvious problem that any statesman would have to deal with, the balance between the hopes for the nation and what it can actually accomplish.

But it seems to me at very much the other end of the scale, a young person has to navigate that same asymmetry between aspirations and capabilities; just deciding what courses to take, deciding what to major in, deciding who to fall in love with. All of these things are grand issues. It depends just on your point of view.

And I think some of the principles in understanding grand strategy, understanding the navigation of that asymmetry are really very much transferrable across scale, and it seems to me that the study of the classics, particularly if you supplement with reliance on some classical, timeless novels and plays -- supplement it with Shakespeare, supplement it with Tolstoy, supplement it with George Elliott, you gain some sense of how others in the past have navigated that asymmetry.

It doesn't mean there's a formula for doing this. It doesn't mean that the
situations in which you have to do that navigation in the future of your own life are somehow going to be exactly the same as someone else's in the past. But I think it's a little bit like, and I use this metaphor with my students; I think it's a little bit like coaching.

Coaches draw on the wisdom of and lure and legend and history and rules of the game. Training prepares you to play the game. But the game itself is unpredictable. The game itself is always going to be unique and can never be totally predicted.

Nonetheless, no one would say that you will play the game better if you are not trained at all, if you are a total amateur. And so I think that's the analogy that we ought to put grand strategy into. I think that works at the level of students, but it seems to me that it also works at the level of statecraft. It also works at the level of military training.

Clausewitz talks about something very much like this on war. Planning is very valuable, but the first thing you do when the conflict occurs is to throw the plans out the window and look at the distinctive characteristics of the situation. And I think statecraft requires something like that, as well.

MR. KAGAN: All the way in the back. Sorry to make you run up and down there. Oh no, you've got two microphones. On the right side. Yeah. Yes?

MR. PLISKIN: Hi. My name is Rich Pliskin. I have a question. Do you suppose that there's a relationship between the fact that we seem to have fewer and less effective leaders, and yet, more means of communication and persuasion? Is there a relationship or is this coincidental or am I wrong in assuming we don't have persuasive leaders?

MR. GADDIS: I don't see why you say we don't have persuasive leaders. I can think of one who's been remarkably persuasive in the last couple of years. So you may not like the persuasion or the direction, but there is. Persuasiveness he's got, whether he can keep it or not is another question.

But how he got there and what he was appealing to is a fascinating question,
still, it seems to me, not well understood. But it deserves attention, for sure.

MR. KAGAN: Yes, sir.

MR. SWEELEY: Hello. My name is Jake Sweeley. I'm a graduate student at the Elliott School of International Affairs. And my graduate is for Dr. Gaddis or whoever wants to field it.

You mentioned that persuasion, of course, is important to leadership. However, also accepting contradiction is. And yet, at least in analytic philosophy, contradiction is the least persuasive thing there is. So how do you reconcile those two facts, especially you know, when we're in an age where it seems as if in foreign policy, we have to rely on some contradictions, like say supporting undemocratic regimes in the pursuit of, you know, greater democracy?

MR. GADDIS: I think it requires understanding that politics and political leadership is inherently a messy business. It is not like pure philosophical or even mathematical logic. It's a very different animal in the process, and you're never going to get completely satisfactory solutions to anything.

Now, that's a real problem. Saint Augustine wrestled with this, what was owed to Caesar and what was owed to God, and worked himself into a complete methodological paralysis, it seems to me, trying to explain why bad things happen to good people. You know?

Machiavelli comes along and he says, oh, the answer is very simple. God does not wish to do everything. Some things are left to us, and that leaves a lot of room for contradictions there. And this is the beginning of Berlin's great essay on the increments or ability of good things; the impossibility of having every good thing; the need to make these kinds of choices that I've been talking about difficult, though they always are.

But the question that you're implying is what kind of temperament tolerates contradiction better. And I think that's a fascinating question. I think that there are -- the kind
of heavy-handed that he's trying to explain everything characteristic, for example, of Saint Augustine does not tolerate contradictions very well. And I mean, paralysis can result. Demoralization can result, you know, all of this.

I think of Philip II, the great king of Spain who sent the armada up the English Channel and viewed every defeat as reflecting God's will, but how if he was fighting in the cause of God, could be defeating him. You know?

And in the end, Philip decided that God had caved in and only had remained true. This is what this led to, you know, contrasting with the great queen, contrasting with the temperament of Elizabeth the First. It's a huge contrast. Jeffrey Parker has written about this.

Her regime, everything about it was riddled with contradictions, you know, not least her gender, not least her virginity used as an element of statecraft and politics, not least the combination of liberation and repression that was characteristic of her regime, not least even her sense of fun and humor which she had, and that sense may well be why Shakespeare prospered and survived under her regime. She would have had to have had some sense of humor, I think, in this case.

So totally different from Philip II. Temperament is very important, I think. And I'd go on to argue that this matter of temperament, being relaxed about controlling authority, being able to delegate authority particularly, really is a fundamental element of resilience, and arguing it made a huge difference in the colonization of the New World, because these little peanut colonies along the coast of North America are administered in such a relaxed way that the locals developed self-reliance of a kind that was never developed in the greater -- far greater and more impressive Spanish colonies to the south.

And it was a difference in administrative style; none of the likeness that would allow delegation of authority in the Spanish system for whatever reason, distraction, lightness, in commonness, whatever in the British system. A great deal of this resilience was
allowed to grow up and develop, which later became self-reliance.

So I'm very intrigued. I don't want to write a book lightness of being. Somebody has already written a novel on this (Laughter). But I think lightness of being is a very interesting concept to think about in terms of leadership, because without a certain degree of lightness, it does seem to me leadership can really wear you down. Think about the difference between Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt in that regard.

So temperament is important and all I do is -- in the book is suggest this without working out just how to do it, but what we should do about it, or if anything can be done about it. But I'm intrigued with the notion, nonetheless.

MR. KAGAN: Yes, sir. Way in the back.

SPEAKER: Thanks for this opportunity. I wonder if Professor Gaddis can share your thoughts on the two hot topics right now in this town. One is U.S.-China relations. There is so much tension between these two countries, trade, economic, also military, and some would argue that there would be cultural mentality behind Washington's thinking towards Beijing.

And the other topic is about North Korea. And is there any grand strategy behind Kim Jung Un's, let's say, grand shift to denuclearization of his country to a modern or well prospering country to a normal country that he has hoped to. So if there are any grand strategies moves -- behind those moves. Thanks.

MR. GADDIS: I think the answer to the second question is -- in fact, I know the answer to the second question is I don't know. (Laughter) I can see elements of a grand strategy in what Ken is doing, but to what extent we are -- I and others are imposing (inaudible) where it doesn't exist or to what extent it has existed all along, time will tell, it seems to me. And that's the best I can do.

On China, it seems to me that there is really kind of ambiguity in American thinking about China. Just about what is our objective; what kind of China would best suit our
interests, keeping in mind that what kind of China is not a choice that it really falls to us to make. The Chinese will themselves, decide this issue, as they always have.

So how can we best accommodate to whatever China becomes, becomes, it seems to me a significant issue for us. But this all circles back to what the fundamental objective in the world is for the Americans these days.

Is it the promotion of democracy as we have always said in one strain of American (inaudible), or is it the acceptance of a balance of power among different kinds of states, some democratic, some less the democratic, some autocratic, which is another strain that has always been there in American foreign policy.

And I think at the moment, we are quite unclear on that point, and I think it would help us intellectually in thinking through these issues if we were just to think more deeply, at least for a moment, on where it is we're trying to go and what it is that we are trying to do in this regard.

MS. KARLIN: At a minimum, we've made progress on the diagnosis. I mean, I think if you were sitting in Washington 10 years ago, there was some more serious and meaningful debate on what the Chinese strategic vision was. In the last few years, that has shifted, particularly post the 19th party Congress.

I think actually, China's strategy is much more clear, and there is less debate in terms of diagnosis. The question, therefore, is what is your prescription?

MR. KAGAN: Professor?

MR. GADDIS: Sir?

MR. KAGAN: Which do you prefer? (Laughter) Which do you recommend? I mean, the way I would put it is we have had a policy really, since 1945 of denying other great powers insofar as we're capable of it --

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: -- a sphere of influence. We've not really accept -- even
though we lived with a balance of power with the Soviet Union, we never really accepted it as a state that we wanted to be continuous.

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: We have generally supported what -- without saying we support democracy everywhere, because clearly we haven't, but we generally have supported a liberal world order which China has been a kind of outlier in, especially recently, even though it partakes in it.

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: So if the choice is staying with that or moving to what Henry Kissinger suggests, which is a sphere of influence world in which countries of different types get to have their sphere of influence, and we sort of have ours, which of those strategies do you favor?

MR. GADDIS: Well, I would first suggest going back to the fundamental difference between aspirations and capabilities. That's where any such question should start. What are our aspirations? Yes, they lie in the area of democracy and always have.

We have an ideology that in some ways is just as consistent as the Marxist-Leninist states used to have, as well. That is there. However, our capabilities for implementing that vision of the world have always fallen short of a total success, and no doubt they will continue to fall short, and particularly as the relative power of balance between China and America changes, it seems to me they fall even shorter.

But I think our capabilities to change China really have never been there in the first place, however false the illusion of that may have been for some Americans. So just that simple dichotomy would, it seems to me, tilt us towards some limitations in how far we would wish to go in making China like us, but not causing China to resemble us.

One thing we should be cognizant of and perhaps, quietly gratified about is where China is now in terms of its economic order. If we had been sitting here 70 years ago
at the time that the Chinese revolution took place and someone said within 50, 60 years, China will have ceased to become a Communist country in terms of everything that that means; will have accepted the idea of market economy, would have discovered the virtues of capitalism, would be thriving and this would be a world economic power on the capitalist market model, I think such a person would have been laughed out of the room had they said that at that point or maybe at any other point through about 1970 or possibly even later.

One thing that was achieved, and we can debate how it was achieved, we can debate who was responsible for achieving it is in this sense, a fundamental difference, a huge change in China; as big a change in China as Chinese history, I think, has ever seen in so short a period of time. And yes, it had many causes, for sure. But I think we should not under estimate its significance.

Does that automatically ensure democracy? I don't think so. That pattern is becoming evident elsewhere, as well, as a new synthesis is developing between authoritarianism and market capitalism.

But this China is a very different China from where we were seeing it go and were concerned about in the 1950s and the 1960s. And hardly anybody talks about this or reminds us of the significance of that change. So I think that should be taken into account, for sure.

MS. KARLIN: Could you apply that question to Russia, also?

MR. KAGAN: Before we -- I just want to press you, because it's a -- I don't think there are too many people who are saying we -- it's been a long time since people were saying we need to go in and change China.

MR. GADDIS: Sure. Yeah.

MR. KAGAN: The real question that we face right now is a much, sort of more strategic question, which is do we maintain all our alliances --

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.
MR. KAGAN: -- in the region. Do we maintain our military presence in the region?

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: Do we use our naval forces to maintain freedom of navigation in the South China Sea?

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: Do we keep our troops in Korea, et cetera, et cetera?

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: All of this, China regards as essentially hostile a form of containment.

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: If you accept those positions, it seems to me you're not inherently accepting a sphere of influence. You're sort of denying China its natural historical sphere of influence.

MR. GADDIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KAGAN: So I guess the, I have is then, are you in favor of maintaining this fundamental forward on-shore balancing U.S.-Pacific presence?

MR. GADDIS: I think I would say that if we are out to deny China its historical sphere of influence, we should have very good reasons for doing so, and we should be very clear to ourselves as to why we are doing it. I'm not satisfied that we are clear in the reasons why we are doing this at the present time, because it seems to me there is a shift here from the Cold War and that particular situation when what we feared was the domination of the Eurasian continent by some great Communist monolith.

That's how these off-shore obligations developed in the first place. I'm not sure we could have made the transition to the New World that's there where there is, yes, an expansionist China; yes, a much more prosperous China; yes, a much more militarily
powerful China, but also, a China that has its own interest in maintaining some freedom of access to the markets of the world, as well.

So I would like to see a little more hard thinking, Bob, on just that question: What are these commitments that are Cold War holdovers? What purpose do they serve now in a very different situation?

And I'm afraid I feel that way about NATO, also, because I'm preoccupied with the extent to which institutions take on their own rationale. And one loses sight of what their original purpose was, and I think there ought to be some mechanism for questioning institutions at some point and requiring them to state their purpose in a world that is very different from the Cold War world.

MR. KAGAN: Which leads to Russia.

MR. GADDIS: Yeah, which does.

MS. KARLIN: Yes.

MR. KAGAN: Russia.

MR. GADDIS: Okay. Well, it does lead to Russia (Laughter), and it leads to a similar question. To what extent are we prepared to accept a sphere of influence for Russia in Eastern and Central Europe, Central Asia and so on? Historically, that has in one measure or another, always been there.

And what are our capabilities for keeping it from being there now? I think that it's a somewhat different situation, because Russia is a very different country from China in terms of its strength and its economic base and all of this. But I do wonder and have wondered ever since we made the commitment to defend them how, in fact, we are going to defend the Baltic States if we have to do it.

And I wonder about any kind of alliance that requires the defense of what appear to be indefensible positions. There is a rhetorical value to this, yes, I guess, in the sense of deterrence, but what if our -- what if it is a bluff and what if the bluff is called. That's
the danger, it seems to me. Then what do we do?

   MR. KAGAN: Okay, good (Laughter). That's almost like an answer.

   MR. GADDIS: Right (Laughter). Okay.

   MR. KAGAN: Professors don't have to answer questions like that. It's only the rest of us who sit here --

   MR. GADDIS: Yeah.

   MR. KAGAN: -- and watch (inaudible) answer what our policy should be. Anyway, I think we've come to the end of our talk. If we want -- I'll do one more question.

   Yes, ma'am. Right there. Yes?

   MS. BATES: Hi. My name is Emma Bates. I'm a student across the street at SAIS. My question is about the nature of 21st century diffuse small scale threats and American response to them.

   Do you see a big hedgehog idea that -- or several? And do any of them seem like good ones to you, or is this a situation in which we need to be foxes?

   MR. GADDIS: I don't have a very good answer for that question. I don't think anybody has an answer for how those threats can be dealt with. I think we're still trying to learn how that can be dealt with. It's very much tied up to the evolution of the technology for dealing with them.

   I would add cyber threats as another big one that fits into this, in this category, and I think a great deal of learning is taking place here. It does raise the question of where do the sources of insecurity lie, and it's always very good to ask that question because I think this changes with some degree of frequency in history.

   I'd also just point out one thing, which is that the post 9/11 scenarios that we so great feared in the wake of those attacks never did happen. By that, I mean another gigantic attack on that. That never happened, and that, I think would have been considered quite remarkable if any of us had sat here in October of 2001 and said it's not going to
happen. That would not have seemed very realistic.

So I think looking at how that was brought about, looking at whether the threat was imaginary always or whether the policies -- the threat was real and the policies were effective in ways we still don't clearly understand or whatever, that's something that would be worth thinking about, as well.

I'm just struck by how often in history we lose sight of where we were in relation to where we are. And I think it is good to try to go back and recapture some of that distance that time imposes. Okay.

MR. KAGAN: Well, that was great. Thank you, Mara, for joining us, and I've got to -- hope we have all enjoyed the treat of having someone with so much knowledge and so much wisdom giving us the benefit of his time.

And again, I want to urge you to go out and purchase multiple copies of this wonderful book (Laughter), and please join me thanking Professor Gaddis for being here. (Applause)
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