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THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. MANDAVILLE: All right. Well, good morning, everybody. I think we are going to go ahead and get started. I want to thank you all for choosing to start your day with us here.

My name is Peter Mandaville. I'm a Professor of International Affairs at the Schar School of Policy and Government and George Mason University. I'm also Nonresident Senior Fellow here at Brookings, with the Center for Middle East Policy.

And on behalf of the Center for Middle East Policy here at Brookings, and also our partner this morning, the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs at Georgetown University, I'd like to formally welcome you here today.

The topic today is one that I know is on the minds of many of you, it's a topic and an issue around which there have been many developments in recent years. We are going to be talking about: the future of political Islam.

The broad backdrop for this discussion, I think dates back to a series of very dramatic shifts in the terrain of Islam and politics, primarily in the Middle East that we've seen since the Arab uprisings of some seven years ago now. And, you know, one of the main stories there is of course the, seeming, precipitous rise of the political prominence of Islamist parties and movements in the Middle East, those groups, seemingly being the primary benefactors of those dramatic political changes in the region.

But then very quickly the seemingly, also quick fall of these groups; I think perhaps most dramatically illustrated by the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. So, I think one of the standard narratives or story lines that we are going to

be looking at this morning is this idea that Islamist parties ascended very quickly in political prominence after the Arab Spring, and then very quickly diminished in terms of their influence.

Second, is the fact that the question of support for Islamist parties, like the Muslim Brotherhood and others of that ilk, has itself of course become a major point of contention in the geopolitics of the Middle East today, where we have a number of countries such as Turkey and Qatar, seemingly, more supportive of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.

And then a set of other nations namely, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt forming something of an anti-MB access; so, rather than just the question of whether these groups are rising and falling in influence, we have this kind of broader geopolitical context around them.

And then finally, the kind of social fact that I think challenges the standard story that these groups, you know, rose very quickly and then fell very quickly, is the fact that according to public opinion polling in many countries around the Arab world Islamist parties still continue to enjoy relatively significant levels of support in society,

Indeed, in a number of countries such as Morocco, the largest party in the governing coalition is of Islamist orientation. In Jordan the largest opposition bloc in that country's parliament is Islamist, and these groups continue to be prominent political players in other countries around the region. So, there's no simple narrative in which Islamism can be figured as a spent political force.

So, this is the kind of broad backdrop against which our discussion will be occurring this morning. And I'm thrilled that I'm joined up here on the stage

by two absolutely superb scholars who have, themselves, devoted their professional lives to the study of political Islam to engage me in conversation.

I'll introduce them both briefly. You have full bios of each of them in the information packets that you picked up front. Immediately to my left Jocelyne Cesari is a senior fellow at the Berkeley Center at Georgetown, and also a professor of religion and politics at Birmingham University in the U.K. In addition, she teaches at Harvard University where she directs an Interfaculty Program there, on Islam and the West.

To Jocelyn's left, is Shadi Hamid, who's a senior fellow here at the Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, where he helps to anchor the project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. And previously Shadi was the director of research out at the Brookings Doha Center.

So, very briefly, the format this morning: I'm going to pose a broad opening question to each of our panelists to give them a sense, or give them an opportunity to give us a kind of a slightly more extended overview of how they see the question of political Islam today, and this then will be followed by a conversation between the three of us.

We have a very high quotient of political Islam "nerdom" concentrated up here, and so if allowed to go unfettered this would go all morning long, into the afternoon, and deep into the night. So, in order to make sure that that doesn't happen when we reach to about the 10:30 mark we are going to pivot, and turn to you, in order to bring your questions and comments into the discussion. So, that's essentially our format this morning.

So Jocelyne, let me start with you, if I may. You know, the standard

analytical line on political Islam, in the scholarly literature as well as in the sort of policy discussion, has tended to take very specific groups and movements, and just kind of analyze their evolution and their reaction to various events in world regions, or the discussion has been kind of shaped and organized by debates around questions like: whether Islamism and Democracy are compatible, whether Islam is compatible with the modern nation-state, is Islam compatible with modernity?

But you have a new book that's just come out called, *What is Political Islam* that --

MS. CESARI: I'm going to do my promotion. (Laughter)

MR. MANDAVILLE: -- that approaches this question from a rather different vantage point. So, I wonder if I can invite you to tell us a little bit about the way in which you approach this question in the book.

MS. CESARI: Yes. Thank you, Peter. The book is actually the outcome of a research that I started almost 10 years ago looking at the status of State and Islam relationship in Egypt, in Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Tunisia, and I started the book just before the so-called Arab Spring.

And this book came out, it's called, *The Awakening of Muslim Democracy*, and I realized that there were lots of misunderstandings about -- the position that came from this book was, oh, you are not focusing anymore on the political party, you are focusing on the action of the state vis-à-vis the political party.

And so I felt the need to expand a little more. It's not about state policy vis-à-vis Islam, it's a broader ground than that, and the last motivation came from the ISIS discussion. I don't know if you remember a couple of years ago there was a discussion triggered by an article in *The Atlantic Monthly* where a Professor

of Islamic Studies said, that ISIS was Islamic, and so it triggered lots of reaction with two sides.

The political scientist, more or less saying, no, this has nothing to do with Islam, and the specialist of Islam, which I think it's the first time they came so strongly in the public space saying, you know, there are elements in it that touch on Islamic religion. And then it was a dead end because there was no real common ground.

And so you cannot disqualify the Islamic dimension of claims from (inaudible) al-Qaeda, but you cannot at the same time say that this represents the Islamic tradition. So what does it mean, clearly? So, my goal in this new book is to tease out from the previous research and expanding on it, showing that political Islam is a new form of governmentality, and when I use the term it is not about state policy, it is about a political culture, and the distinction that is helpful here is ideology and culture.

And what happened at the end of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of nation-state that was actually built by secular leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Bourguiba, Kemal Atatürk, actually all of them, even when they declared themselves secular, did something that is nationalizing Islam, but again it goes beyond the state of operating or controlling all Islamic institution. It was an attempt to include Islam in the building of a new nation.

And this is important to understand because we take the nation-state as a granted unit nation-state. What happened in the Muslim world is that the state came before the nation, and so in the engineering of the nation the Islamic dimension was key. So, what the secular leaders did everywhere was to create a

connection that did not exist before between Islamic belonging and national belonging.

It's not about the belief, it is not about, you know, the piety of people, it is about the stance that, I am a Muslim, and I am a legitimate member of this political community. Otherwise, how do you explain that in secular country like Turkey, Alevis have problems, and not because of Islamist, but because of the vision that the being the Turkish Muslim is the cornerstone of the national identity. It happened everywhere the only countries that do not create what I call this particular form of governmentality which is hegemonic Islam.

It means that there is a sense shared by all secular, and Islamist, that it is right to be a citizen and belong, and be a Muslim. It doesn't mean you have to pray five times a day, actually most people don't, it doesn't mean you have to respect all the proscription. It is about the sense of, what is the right community, and this is the process of modernization, and again this goes against all the perceived idea that there with no modernization, no reform.

Most of the Muslim claims in politics come from reform movement, not from the tradition itself. So, these two entities together will create, indeed, this cultural ground on which then it's indeed a second wave where you will see rising political parties with an Islamic agenda, because none of them really challenge the Islamic belonging, and the national belonging.

What do they ask for? An Islamic State. Why do they ask for an Islamic State? Because deep down it's agreed then that Islamic belonging, nation-state belonging goes together, but they will not ask for something that the secular initially didn't envision, which is, it is not Islamic enough, and it goes with attempting

to introduce more proscriptions that that make Islam a regulator of public space.

And then the fight is on the behaving, even if you look at the ISIS attempt, it was a strong attempt to codify and regulate the behavior of people in the public space which, again, if we think that this is the Islamic tradition we are mistaken, but we cannot take at face value what the actors are saying.

So, that's why we introduce this long story, so if I have to finish there on a nutshell. If we want to understand the role of Islam in politics, we have to take it in these two aspects. It's part of a political culture, so we have to look at what do people have learned, and have been socialized in, in terms of what is to be a Muslim, what is to be a citizen, and you'll be very surprised how much of it is ingrained by the secular education.

And most of majority in Muslim countries have done this job, the exception are Senegal, Indonesia, and Lebanon which is a sort of sectarian democracy, otherwise the diversity of religion, including the diversity into Islam, has not been acknowledged anywhere, and interestingly some of these countries are democracy.

So, I want to show you just a couple of slides, because we take the debate, and I understand why is it so tempting to say, you know, this is Islam. So, you see, these are the statistics on political violence, and everybody acknowledged that Muslim-majority country are coming on top. So, it's very easy, and that's why a lot of people still think that the clash of civilization is a good explanation for this phenomenon.

What I have done, that I could not show you here, is to operationalize this vision of -- this conception of hegemonic Islam, and to apply it to database, and

what you see emerging is that the state religion relationship is key to explain the tendency to political violence, and also socialist hostility in society.

It is not Islam as such, it is a sort of culture that can indeed deeply decline into different ideological positions, that is at the core of political Islam; and interestingly if you look at Buddhism in Sri Lanka, it's exactly the same thing. That's why people don't understand, why is -- Buddhism is a religion of peace and love. You know, why we do we have warriors, monk warriors? If you listen to their discourse, they're saying exactly that. You can only be a Buddhist if you want to be a national.

So, what does it mean concretely? I'm not a policymaker, and I can appreciate the challenge to channel this kind of approach into policymaking, but I think we are at a stage where we realize that politics, 90 percent of it is communication, right. And we have examples every day of that.

So, if we get this what does it mean? I think from the Western point of view, we have a few things that we cannot keep saying. First, that Islam needs reform. The political Islam I'm talking about is the outcome of reform. What we need is a more learned and informed population, including non-Muslim of what is Islam.

And it goes for the policymakers themselves. And we should not be, and I put myself in it, because I'm a political scientist to start with, we should not be intimidated by looking at what religion means in different context, because it's key to understand how people behave.

So, let's finish with Islamic reform. First, Muslims in two-thirds of the -- of countries do not understand what this means, because they have been

agitating the question of Islam, and modernity, and reform since 1798 when Bonaparte went to Egypt, with not only military but also scholars. This is a starting point. So, when we come out and said, oh, we need to reform Islam, this is a debate that had been going on for two centuries, one.

And second, we should also be aware that Muslim democracy can be possible, it doesn't mean that we have to apologize, or to be apologetic on all dimensions, but we have to be very clear on when and how religion plays a role in a democratization process.

And there are four elements we can evaluate, first is free, and fair election. Are Islamic parties against it or for it? As Peter just mentioned, most of them now have accepted that free and fair election needs something to work with. Then we have separation of the powers, do they work with that or not? The third dimension is the rule of law. Do people accept the rule of law? And the fourth dimension is all questions of human rights, civil rights and, you know, from my own review, most of the Islamic parties today are fighting on this element, with which concerns a body of women, most of it, and the freedom of speech.

So, what does it mean, if you want free and fair election, if you accept separation of power, but you are still fighting on right of sexual minority, or women's body? This is the fight of lots of democracy, including ours today. So, we should not put everything in one package, and that's the problem I'm having with Islamic reforms, Islamic modernization, and Islam is incompatible with democracy.

It depends where. Where do you put your spotlight? And that's, that's my only; I would say token, part of this presentation, vis-à-vis policymaker. Because this is not easy to do, you need political courage, but it's more a practical

approach to what I try to do in this book. Thank you.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Great! Thank you very much, Jocelyne. I think your approach, very usefully, kind of turns on its head, the conventional wisdom that defines the analytical and even scholarly frame around this issue.

So Shadi, I wanted to turn to you now. You know, you've produced over the last few years a series of books that that have, you know, one in Islamic exceptionalism, looked at the very unique nature of the relationship between Islam and politics, kind of historically, and the connection of that to kind of present developments.

You've done a book on Islamist parties specifically, that also kind of challenges some of the discussion around participation and moderation, that's going to define the academic literature. But, you know, you and Will McCants also did an edited book recently that does kind of look very much at how specific groups and movements in particular countries have responded to the developments of, you know, the Arab Spring and afterwards.

So, I just wanted to start by kind of asking you how you kind of currently think about the kind of landscape around political Islam in the Middle East.

MR. HAMID: Yes. Thank you, Peter. So, I'll start with an anecdote that has sort of stuck with me, and so I was talking to a mid-level Muslim Brotherhood official in 2010, and I tell this story a lot because I think it's really important, and it conveys something that I think we in the West don't always fully grasp.

We were talking about why people join the Brotherhood. And a lot of people have their own conversion story of how they came to be a part of this

movement. From a scholarly perspective we often focus on sort of structural factors like, you know, economic issues, rural/urban migration, being pissed off at America, things like that.

And all those things matter, of course, but he said but then he told me, well Shadi, for some people it's simpler than that, and some people joined the Muslim Brotherhood because they want to get into heaven. And I thought this was a nice way of putting it.

And so basically the idea there is that if you want to be a better Muslim it's good to be part of a movement or an organization that pressures you, or pushes you to be more strict in your observance, and sort of encourage the bonds of community among, so to speak, your brothers. And so if you're a better Muslim what happens then? You have a better chance of getting into heaven.

And that's not to say that people -- so if you're joining a protest as a Muslim Brotherhood member, or if you're voting for a member of parliament, those are obviously political things and you must -- you presumably will have views about that candidate, or about that protest, and what that protest is calling for, but underlying that is a deeper motivation, that in the end you are serving God.

You are not just doing this for the sake of it, and there is an idea that you will get more good deeds and that this will help you in the Day of Judgment. And, you know, I mentioned this, and I emphasize this because I think that, you know, when I was in graduate school, I presume also, when you guys were in graduate school, we didn't really talk a lot about paradise, or the Day of Judgment, and what that could mean for individual members of Islamist movements.

And we might say, I think, and a lot of people would say here in the

U.S. or in Europe, well, that's an irrational impulse. You know, over the years I've really come to the conclusion that that's actually the most rational impulse of all.

If your starting assumption is that there is something called heaven, and that heaven is eternal, what could be more rational than trying to plan ahead for what will ultimately be your eternity? That seems like a very logical step to take. Anyway so this sort of gets at, I think, the very complex interaction between what we call religion and what we call politics.

And I've sort of gotten, I moved -- I think a lot of us have moved beyond this idea of saying that, okay, they are being driven by religion, versus they are being driven by politics or power, as if these two things are separate, and in the year that I've been spending interviewing and hanging out with Islamists in various parts of the world; and if I ask them: why do you do what you do?

They would never say is it because of -- and the follow-up would be: is it because of religion or is it because of politics? They wouldn't understand the question, that question doesn't make sense to them? And why would it? It's a sort of, you know, it's a post-enlightenment, if you will, construction to say that there is something called the sacred and something called the profane.

Even the way we talk about religion as a category, and politics as a category, that is sort of -- that relies on an ideological premise. We are products of a classical liberal society, at least most of us are, and we are products of enlightenment thought, so we have been conditioned to think of things in these separate categories.

They aren't separate, and we see every day in the Middle East how religion and politics are endlessly intertwined in very complex ways.

A couple other things I'll mention. I do very much agree with Jocelyne on this idea of political Islam or Islamism as being something quite modern, and this is really worth highlighting, because I think oftentimes in the media discourse in this country, we think about Islamism as something that is harkening back to a long time ago to, let's say, the 7th Century; 7th Century Arabia. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Islamism is the ultimate Modernist Movement, everything about it is modern, and modernist in orientation, and just to obviate this sort of easy way of looking at this is, the word Islamism didn't exist, and couldn't have existed five centuries ago, if we go to the Medieval Era, first of all there wasn't really a word for it, and there didn't have to be a word for it.

We only need the term Islamism in the 20th Century. So, basically in the pre-modern era Islam was the overarching premise, it provided the moral, legal and religious architecture that imbued everything. No one questioned that. It didn't matter whether you were practicing or not, Islam mattered, and Islam played a role in governance, and politics.

There wasn't anything called secular, there weren't secular individuals, there weren't secular movements, that only comes later obviously, and Islamism only makes sense in opposition to something which is not Islamism.

So, in the modern era when you have the rise of these secular ideologies, then some Muslims feel threatened by that and they want to assert their Islamic identity in a very self-conscious manner. So, that's the part about Islamism that I think makes it distinctive, it's very self-conscious and even-mannered, if you will, it's something that you have to sort of be conscious of.

So, if someone is an ordinary Muslim in Egypt and they believe that Islamic law should be the law of the land in some fashion that -- that some aspects of Islamic law should be implemented, we wouldn't call that person Islamist unless they self-consciously orient themselves in the political sphere around those ideas.

And it's interesting that, you know, when Islamism emerges in the first half of the 20th Century, there's some really interesting phrases that Islamists always use. They talk about the Islamic Project, the *mashrue Islamic*. Why do they use this word "mashrue" project? Because for them Islam is something to be applied, because it has been lost, if it hadn't been lost there wouldn't have had to be this effort to apply it.

I'll close up on just a couple things, I'll put out there for conversation, and just try to fast-forward a little bit to where we are now. So, Islamism I think has -- its "failed," and I use failed in quotation marks, because as Peter said, and as I think we all think, Islamism still matters, and it will matter for the rest of our lives. There's no way to eliminate it. It represents something deep in these societies, you can't get rid of it, but you can certainly try and you'll fail in the process.

But I do, think and this gets to what Jocelyne is talking about in regards to the state, and maybe I have a little bit of a different perspective on this, but I do think the state -- I do think the nation-state corrupted -- not Islam but although you could make an argument for that -- but the nation-state corrupted Islamism.

And I think we corrupted Islamism in a way, so we Western scholars -- do you know what we were telling Islamists for much of the '90s and 2000s? We were telling them, hey, get on board with elections, form political parties, de-

emphasize all the Islamists things about you, but come to terms with the nation-state, embrace the nation-state.

And do you know what, I would say that many mainstream Islamist movements followed -- they didn't follow it just because of us, I mean, like I don't want to overstate our influence, but they also followed that advice for reasons that were intrinsic to their own societies, they kind of became obsessed with elections.

And this is a complaint and a critique that you hear from younger members of, say, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, where they feel the conservative old guard, first of all is very uncreative in its thinking, but also it became very much about the state is the locust of power, and this was the tragedy of the Morsi period of the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power. They saw that, and everyone in Egypt saw the presidency as the prize.

And then what did you do? So, you see state power through elections, legitimately, democratically, and then you use state power to reshape and refashion the broader society. The state becomes an instrument for the broader Islamization of society. But we can debate whether that order is really the way it's supposed to be. In the pre-modern era, the state wasn't seen in this fashion because the state wasn't bloated, powerful, all-encompassing, imbuing everything, the state in this sense, is a modern construction.

So, I think there are more questions within the Islamist movements about, hey, is this state-centric approach the way to go? And there are some young, Muslim Brotherhood members, many of them in exile, in places like Istanbul, who are starting to ask these questions, and I've noticed a kind of interesting thing, that whether it's Islamists or what I would call -- not to define what this new group

might be -- but I would call them Neo-Islamists or even some Conservative Muslims in the West who are questioning the state-centric approach, and sort of embracing some libertarian ideas.

And one former Muslim Brotherhood member put it to me like this: weak state, strong society. And I think that a lot of people in the U.S. might sympathize with that view, and I've been noticing some really interesting parallels between what I might call sort of Orthodox Christian thinkers in the U.S., some of whom are talking about forming intentional communities in the U.S. away from centers of power to kind of preserve their religious traditions,

And they're using a -- so these Orthodox Christians are reminding me of what some of these young Islamists and Neo-Islamists are saying, and even on Twitter they are starting to talk to each other, not to get into all that, that but I do think there are some new currents that are emerging and they're quite interesting.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Great! Thanks so much, Shadi, and Jocelyne, both of you. Let me move now to, in a sense, ask for your assistance, both of you, with a sort of existential angst that I tend to face when I try to answer basic questions. Like, what is Islamism? What is political Islam? What's going on around those issues today?

You know, I've been teaching classes on political Islam for it for 20 years now, and when I first started I had in my mind a very clear sense of what the class was about, and I knew who "they" they would be -- the Islamists were. And I think most of us who sort of came up through graduate school in the 1990s, you know, where the term Islamism tended to refer to a fairly discreetly-defined subset of political and social movements, we knew what the subject matter was.

In the intervening years, however, we've seen a series of developments from, for example, the loss of monopoly on the part of conventionally-defined Islamist movements, their loss of monopoly in the public sphere as other groups and figures have risen up claiming to articulate some particular way of being Islamic, and being engaged in a social project. You used the term "project" Shadi, right?

So, these new kinds of Islamic actors, you know, that are competing alongside the groups that we've known as the Islamists. You know, and then you have the whole debate about post Islamism associated with scholars like Eva Hua, for example, who have argued that even as religiosity in the Muslim world has appeared to increase, we've seen a trend towards greater privatization, so that people are more interested in individual piety as a sort of focus, rather than the need to connect their religiosity to some kind of social or political project.

And then on top of that, you know, as there's greater public awareness and discussion here in the United States about these issues, given events in the world, there's just increasing, broadening vagueness and indeterminacy in what the term Islamism refers to, right.

We are using that term to describe everything from ISIS and al-Qaeda, to the party of Justice and Democracy in Morocco, to the Fethullah Gülen Movement, there's such a broad range of entities with very different histories, very different orientations, very different goals, that we are all trying to sort of capture under this one term.

So, I guess the thing that I want to kind of ask you to help me with is, you know, when one is asking the question, what should one be focusing on today

in order to understand the kind of current developments around political Islam and Islamism? Where in your mind is the main storyline? What should we be focusing on?

MS. CESARI: Can I?

MR. MANDAVILLE: Please.

MS. CESARI: I think the first point would be not to assimilate Islamism and political Islam. I think it's a strategic mistake. What I saw is actually all forms of religious nationalism that you find in most of Muslim-majority countries, is political Islam. The moment you associate your religious affiliation with your national and civic affiliation, even if you are not a Muslim Brother, this is a political statement.

And again, we need to broaden out the understanding of politics. Politics is not about competing for election only, in this sense I'm going to -- Aristotle said that, so on political, man is political animal, meaning we cannot live without the community, so we have to look at political Islam in this sense of what is the religious dimension of the political community and building.

And it's a very different question just to look at the moderation or inclusion of Islamic political party, because this is the first distinction to make. The second one is between social movement and political party. Yes political parties fail; it's the fate of all political parties.

Political Islam as a social movement, or in this case Islamism as a social movement, because if you consider religious nationalism, once where you're political Islam, and there are the different ways of doing it. So, the civil reform of Senegal versus the hegemonic form of Egypt, for example.

This is for everybody, even the one who claims themselves secular. When you are Islamist, which is, indeed, I think an agenda which is more, not contesting the state as a major unit, but the capacity of the state to expand religious proscription. So, it's more about not the belonging here, but the behaving.

And then you have lots of practice, but you have also, and that's what will not disappear, because it's very much embedded in this culture, the social movement, meaning women (inaudible) to a great number of it, and a new generation that considers Islam as a major element of the social interaction.

And it's not privatized, and in this one, this is not going to disappear. And I think it's the most challenging aspect of it from a secular mind, indeed, trying to project outside the evolution of religion in Western democracies. Although I would say I come from Europe, and this is really a big discrepancy. But if you're in America, it should not be such a big discrepancy, honestly, because religion is part of social life.

It may be separated institutionally, but it's very much part of social life, and again there are different forms of these social movements. You don't have one only.

And just to finish on one thing, because this is where we have a little disagreement. I think that the state did, I would not use the term corrupt, but the state the nation-state did dramatically change Islam, in the sense that at least in Muslim-majority country, even the clerics they think religiously in this framework.

And if you hear about Sharia as state law, this is a big gap with the Islamic tradition before the state. If you see the questions that are emerging around the public space and what is acceptable or not, even in the most secular state you

have limitation of freedom of speech based on the insult to religion. The only country that has removed all this aspect is Tunisia in its most recent constitution, thank you, are under the Islamist regime.

So, you see, what are we talking about here? So, ideology, culture, political party versus social movement, and it was a mistake of the Brothers in Egypt to project themselves as only a political party, that's why most feel so lost for the reason you mentioned, but also the moment you are a political party, you are party now, so nobody will agree with you.

If you're a social movement you have a much broader base, and you are not seen as looking for election. But in my opinion, this is as much political, but in the police sense of the term, in the community to which I belong, and it's a very different approach.

MR. HAMID: So, I would say -- let me be careful how I phrase this, and please don't take this the wrong way, not you, but the audience. So, I think that -- I would say that, in a sense, I mean, all Islam. and even apolitical Islam is political in effect, but I'm not just saying, I'm not making a broad statement about how everything in the world is political, because I don't think Christianity is quite the same, and as you can -- so I wrote a book called *Islamic Exceptionalism*, and the argument is sort of in the title, that I do think Islam is exceptional, not just in any way, but in how it relates to law, politics and governance, that Islam is uniquely resistant to secularization, that Islam won't and can't follow the same course as Christianity.

And I don't, and also to be clear, I don't think that's a problem. I don't think religions have to be privatized, or have to be secularized. Then what's the

point of having different religions? I mean the whole point of Islam is that it's different than other religions, otherwise, what would be the point of being Muslim.

But to kind of take this a little bit -- you know, so what Jocelyne said about the pre-modern era, and how conceptions of law in the state of change, I would maybe take that a step further and say, Islam wasn't designed for the nation-state, and I'm using the passive voice here, because it doesn't matter whether you believe if it's from God or it's not.

So, if the Quran is from God -- then let's not go into that -- (Laughter) And actually, but either way Islam was revealed and at a specific moment of time, whether you think it was divine or not it was revealed to a group of people in 7th Century Arabia, that was their context. So, naturally the Quran is going to speak more to a pre-modern context.

You know, if God revealed a different book, let's say, in modern New York City, it would not be exactly the same as the Quran, even from a Muslim perspective. I think that's a very difficult argument to make. It would be a different revelation, hypothetically of course. I don't want to get in trouble or anything. So, you know, anyway but you know where I'm going here -- but I mean throw --

MR. MANDAVILLE: Very carefully.

MR. HAMID: But I think -- so to answer your question a little bit more specifically, I don't use the phrase political Islam as much as I use the term Islamism or Islamist, because I think, as Jocelyne said, and that's sort of what I was getting to, Islam has become politicized everywhere by the state, whether it's a secular state or a non-secular state, it doesn't matter.

And this is the real tragedy of the modern -- the modern Muslim

majority state, is that the state controls religion, even in the most secular states, whether it's Turkey under Atatürk, or with the wonderful, moderate Islam we are going to have under MBS. Whatever kind of Islam you're talking about, it's all state-controlled and state-centric, except for a couple of the examples that Jocelyne mentioned, I don't know anything about Senegal, but presumably Senegal is a wonderful place for partly this reason. So, I think that -- but I do think Islamism and Islamist is something very specific.

So Islamists are those who believe that Islam and Islamic law should play a central role in public life, that's part one of my definition. Part two, and this is drawing from Michael Cook, that Islamists are those who orient themselves around the political project of making Islam central in public and political life. And that's clear enough I think.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Okay. I want to ask each of you one last question before we turn to the audience, so we will be going to you soon so please start thinking of your questions. And I want to take us straight to the title of this whole session, *The Future of Political Islam*, and I'd like you to each put on your hat that's kind of more of a kind of conventional analyst of regional developments.

And given the kind of landscape that I outlined at the beginning of our session this morning; the kind of place of particular groups and movements currently in specific countries, in the Middle East, this broader regional geopolitical divide around Islamism, and some evidence of the ongoing support that these groups have, within societies around the region. How do you see the future of Islamist movements, and political parties going forward, say, five to ten years?

MS. CESARI: I would say that it depends a lot on the socio political

development of the country. I mean, it cannot dissociated from -- and we are not talking about Islam is incompatible or compatible with democracy. What we are seeing is the deficit of, you know, free, and fair elections, and separation of power and rule of law, in most of the so-called secular countries.

So, you what do you -- what is actually lessons show something, is that Islamist party can move the -- can push the envelope in this direction a tiny bit, you know. There was lots of hope in Turkey in this respect, that has been lost since then, but Tunisia is a good example. The problem is that the examples that are favorable to this expansion to a political development, based on Islamists, are usually tiny countries you were half-joking, I think, on Senegal.

You know, I mean people don't look at these examples, and that's, I think, part of also our deficit of having the broader view. We cannot keep assimilating when we are Western observers, Islam and the Middle East. I know it's very tempting for multiple reasons, but if you think of the shift today most of Islam and Muslims are in the Southeast Region.

And this debate about civil Islam, about the role of Islam, the very state and society, are very vibrant over there. What I'm witnessing is that, Middle Eastern intellectual Islamists are not creating connection with this discourse. So, everybody tend to reinvent this discussion, while there are potential for creating the broader kind of platform and exchange.

And why I'm saying that, is because it has been proven in the past, the Transnational Movement can influence local debate. One example, Morocco and the Moudawana, which was a reform a few years ago now, of the civil law in favor of greater equality between men and women.

How did this happen? Not only with the good heart of the King, it happened because the Transnational Movement of Islamist Feminism find support and grounding in Morocco and empowered the women there.

So, what I'm trying to say here, is that if we want to look at the connection between Islam and political development, we have to look at a very specific triangulation between, what is a state, the political institutionally existing relationship of power in the country, and how is this moving toward democracy or not. And what are the influences of transnational movement?

And I think that so problem is some of the most efficient transnational movements are not automatically favorable to this development of Islam, democracy and social progress. And this I would also make the distinction, they are modernists too, but they are not modernists in the sense that they do not want progress, they do not want greater inclusiveness. Some transnational movements are, others are not, but they are all modern. For me modernist is about endorsing the project of modernity with a tendency toward greater equality.

And I'm not sure that -- for example, ISIS is modern, I mean if you look at the way that they use the technology, the way they think, they are modern, they're far from modernists, and I think this is something also to keep in mind here, because we turned again to assimilate the two terms.

MR. HAMID: So, before I get to, Peter, your question just to comment on this. I don't think, I don't think it's right to -- I personally would argue that it's the mainstream Islamists, at least, are very much modernist. I don't think they are just a modern --

MS. CESARI: Yeah --

MR. HAMID: No, no, but I'm -- modernist in the sense -- so I also don't really -- I'm a critic of the kind of, the arc of history bends towards justice, liberal, determinism, and so any time I hear the word "progress" I get a little bit nervous.

Why? I mean someone can be modernist without buying into the project of progress, but putting them but putting all that aside, I do think that ISIS, but is modern so I do agree with you on that, so on some of the takeaways, going forward, so my major take away from the last seven eight years like the Arab Spring and post-Arab Spring period, is that extreme levels of repression are very effective.

So, it's not that repression works, it's that extreme repression works. And I hate to say that, and I wish it wasn't the case but, you know, I don't really see a path forward in Egypt anytime soon. I do think the Sisi Regime, or at least what it represents is quite durable, for a number of reasons which we don't have to go into right now. So, I think that in a country like Egypt, Islamists are stuck, the most they can do is really wait.

And to be fair, they are comfortable waiting, because they don't see history -- they don't they don't view history in electoral cycles and, you know, there are so many times I'm in conversations with the Brotherhood folks, and they've made comments like, you know, like really, the long game is very long, you know. So, you know, in the end if it doesn't work out in the next five to ten years, what about the next 50 years, the next 100 years.

So, even the way -- I do think there are differences in how products of Western liberalism, like myself, how I view time, and how Islamists view time. And I notice that when we are talking about time, it's sort of hard to talk about,

because time is something that seems very precise and numerical, but they're operating on a different timeline than I am, I think, for the most part.

And I would also, you know, just going forward, at some point we are going to have to revisit these discussions of what happens when Islamists participate in elections, and win elections, we are going to have this whole conversation again in 10 years, or 15 years, and redo it all.

And it was the same thing after Algeria in 1992, when the military stepped in and ended what could have been at least an interesting, interesting and probably chaotic experiment with democracy that would have told us a lot, and helped the Middle East, at least try some of these different models out. But instead we had a civil war that took 200,000 lives, and we sort of had to postpone this conversation to 2011, and then we had what we had.

And now we have to postpone this conversation, we'll have to revisit it in probably 20 years, and it's just, it's really irritating and annoying that we can't move forward in terms of our policy debate. And, you know, what we are sort of reduced to advocating with, you know, Trump folks, or Trump supporters, or whatever when it comes to Islamism, we have to really go back to the basics.

We are not talking about the more complex aspects of this, it's like, is the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization? So really, really like the bare basics, and that's really unfortunate because we shouldn't be having a debate like that, because the answer to the question is obvious, so I think that, that's sort of where we are at right now.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Okay. Thanks so much, Shadi. So, you've had the Master Class from these two, and we want to turn to you now. So, could I just

ask that when you speak, if you just briefly tell us first who you are, and as much as possible, please feel free to phrase any speeches that you feel inclined to make in the form of a question. So, Jenny, I saw your hand go up first, so we'll go to you.

QUESTIONER: Good morning. Thank you for your brilliant --

MR. MANDAVILLE: There's a microphone rapidly approaching.

QUESTIONER: Thank you so much for this brilliant conversation. I guess my question is, and I think that both of you have sort of reached this question indirectly is, Islamism exists outside state structures, so it doesn't need state institutions to thrive, it's about social movements, it's about all the ambiguity of Arab societies. So, I guess I think that there is sort of a false question about the existence of the nation-state. Because I think the future of Islamism will exist outside the state, because that's its more powerful position, as we have seen over the last 30 years. So, how do you see some of these movements, and I'm speaking particularly in the Arab world, sort of existing and thriving outside state structures?

But the nation-state is bankrupt, as everyone agrees, so that's almost an irrelevant question at this point. But how do you see them as social movements, and representing all the ambiguity that they do in Arab societies thriving over the next, say, 20 years, given the fact that they don't need to be to perform in a state sort of structural environment, or even as political parties as you've both pointed out? Thank you.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Great. Let me take one more question; sir, down in the front here.

MR. CORNELL: Hi. Thanks very much for the presentations. I'm Phillip Cornell from the Atlantic Council. My question is really, what is the real

difference between political Islam or Islamism, and the kind of religious or cultural identity-based popular ideologies that have driven and underpinned populist political movements around the world and through history?

And the corollary would really be, how can you differentiate the rise of political Islam with the rise of populism worldwide, with all of its very global underpinnings, like technology media, social media, and stuff like that? Thanks.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Thank you. Do either of you want to respond to either or both of those?

MS. CESARI: Yes.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Jocelyne?

MS. CESARI: Actually it's the question on the nation-state and its limit, it's a very pertinent question, in the sense that I would not say that the state is not irrelevant anymore, we have been saying that for 30 years since globalization, but it's there, and it remains the only legitimate (inaudible) to do international politics. Otherwise, you cannot even explain Daesh, for example.

I mean why create a state, you know? So, the two are not incompatible but what -- and each one is a chapter of the book. What I'm saying is actually, the people who have transnational vision are still thinking on the political community in which religion plays a role. In other words, the connection between religious belonging, and political belonging that was made by the state, the nation-state, not the state of the institution that's why I insist a lot on political culture, on what I don't know, so this term, habitus, the thing we never question, the thing that we have absorbed.

It's about, I am a Muslim, and I am a legitimate member of this

political community, while we have done the opposite exercise in the West. We have disconnected as much as we could, the political and the religious belonging. So, this connection exists beyond the nation-state.

Now, how do you -- the ummah, the ummah is a perfect example. This I want to state because, you know, even the clerics, they say the ummah is a community of all Muslim believers, historically it's not. If I were in Greek Orthodox in Istanbul, under the Ottoman Empire, I am part of the ummah.

So that's exactly, this change of ummah as a sort of community of all Muslims comes from Pan-Islamist, which is a political project. So, you don't need the framework of a territory to have this kind of connection made, and I think this is very important to take into account because, again, that's why I think the nation-state has also changed Islam.

I have never heard any cleric, and I'm happy to be contradicted, that has raised this historical aspect of the ummah, and the ummah was multicultural, multilinguistic, and multireligious, it doesn't mean it was secular, but it's very far from the ummah which is homogenized, and which is like a national project that others tried to build.

So, this is something that really, for me, instead of showing that the -- the state institution may have failed, by the religious and political culture of it, are far from having failed. Maybe you want to go for --

MR. HAMID: Sure, sure.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Shadi, you've been working on populism a lot, so maybe you want to (crosstalk)?

MR. HAMID: Yes, yes, sure. Just one quick note on the first

question very quickly is that I -- and maybe this is what you're getting at, Jocelyne, with the Indonesian case, but I don't think it's a mistake that in the three countries that are most democratic, and most pluralist, out of the large Muslim majority countries, and the three countries where Islamists are less obsessed with the state, are the three countries that have more implementation of Sharia on the local level than anywhere in the Middle East.

What are those three countries? South and Southeast Asia, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, that's why those three countries are very interesting cases, Islamists don't have to rule or govern for Islamic law to be implemented, in fact not to go into too much detail, but actually ostensibly secular parties have participated in the implementation of Sharia on the local level in various regions of, say, Indonesia. So, that's just worth keeping in mind.

Phillip, on your question, so it's funny, because I remember the first time I saw -- I watched a Donald Trump rally on television, and it was late 2015, and I have to be honest, it was unscripted, no notes, a whole hour, just him doing the whole thing, and I had never seen something like this before. It was new to me then. And I remember being absolutely mesmerized.

I'm like, whoa. But it reminded me of something, Trump reminded me of the Middle East. And the debates that we started having because of Trump and the debates that we are having now as a country, and with all of our crisis of liberalism. You know, what's the future of liberalism? Why did it liberalism fail? Did it fail? And we were having similar debates when I was living in the Middle East during the Arab Spring.

Politics during the Arab Spring it wasn't about policy, no one cared

about economic policy, because everyone had the same thing: unemployment is bad, let's fight poverty, boring, whatever. But what everyone was talking about was the nature of identity, what did it mean to be Egyptian, and how did that affect your relationship with your own state? Could you recognize yourself in your own government?

So, when you saw Mohamed Morsi, of the Brotherhood, and his wife who wore hijab. So, she's the first -- she's the First Lady of Egypt in 2013, and a lot of secular elites looked at that and said, I can't understand my country if she represents, on the international stage, our country.

So, similar in some ways to how I think a lot of us liberal elites view Trump, we don't -- is that what America is? So, it's interesting that, and also the tensions between liberalism and democracy and I start -- I first started working on that set of issues as it related to the Middle East. That's where, you know, more democracy doesn't mean more liberalism. Here, I'm talking about what we associate with the classical liberal tradition, not liberalism in the American left political sense.

And here, for the first time in America, but this is also applicable throughout Europe, you know, democracy and liberalism are pulling apart. They don't go together, and they don't have to go together, and maybe they shouldn't go together. So, it's it sort of interesting to me how America is catching up to the Middle East.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Jenny, one thing I would add in response to your question, is that I would expect to see a sort of retrenchment within the movements, as distinct from the political parties in a lot of these groups in the

coming years, because I think the availability of political power presented them with a conundrum, that they did not figure out how to address, which is the fact that once they were in power and were responsible for doing things, and fixing things, and getting stuff done, they had an electorate that was expecting them to solve, for example, massive socio-economic contradictions.

And they just didn't have the policy imagination, or capacity, or experience to do that, and precisely the things that tended to define them as Islamist, i.e. putting more religion into public life, or moving towards Sharia law, were precisely the things that the electorate was least interested in. So, there was just enormous exposure to risk and, you know, this is something that confronted the FJP incredibly starkly.

And Mohamed Morsi I think has singularly failed to rise to that moment, and I think that was a cautionary tale to a lot of these movements. And so I would expect to, you know, for a broad trend, I would expect to see a sort of return to an emphasis on the movement, and then a discussion within the movement maybe about the idea that you don't need to set up specific political parties tied to Islamist movements, but more the idea that members of the movements could potentially vote for different political parties, depending on what their positions and policies are.

MR. HAMID: So, Peter, one thing I'll just mention on that. So, one idea that comes up I think more in my conversations with certain Brotherhood members in exile, was this idea of -- you know, it's a very difficult one, the relationship between a religious movement and a political party.

And, you know, should they be separate? Should they be

intertwined, and so on? And one possibility that comes from one faction of the Brotherhood in Egypt, because the Egyptian Brotherhood is going through an unprecedented split which hasn't gotten much attention in the Western media, but it's really, I think it's really important, but this idea of, could you have one religious movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, and then members of the Brotherhood would be free to -- not to choose any party they want, but they could form different Islamist parties that reflect the Brotherhood school of thought.

And that sounds very nice and pluralistic and all of that, but there will be a real problem there because depending on the electoral system, you could have a situation where in a single district two members of the Brotherhood, are competing against each other for the same seat. How does that affect the internal cohesion of the movement?

MS. CESARI: I would say, this would be the kiss of death for any kind -- and I would not call them a religious movement, it is a social movement, and in this sense I prefer the term civil, that is used by Kanushi , for example, rather than Islamist, or Islamic, or religious.

It is a group, again, that doesn't address the population through the belief angle, or religious practice angle. They really try to address social challenge, and if we know that even if you don't have a member -- if you're not a member they will take into account your need or at the grassroots level. So, I would not really call them a religious movement.

MR. HAMID: But to be a member of the Brotherhood, it's really, a lot of it is about strict religious practice, I mean if we are talking about --

MS. CESARI: In terms of leadership.

MR. HAMID: No, no, the members. To become a member and to advance in the tiered system of the Brotherhood is very much about religion.

MS. CESARI: It is about studying and indeed practice, but the relationship to the population is not about the religion, as such. Again, and I think it goes from this idea that religion has some kind of specificity vis-à-vis social. I think what they are doing is we are acting here as citizen, and animated by a religious belief, but it is not about convincing people about belief.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Let me bring some more --

MR. HAMID: Yes.

MS. CESARI: And so I think it's very important to make the difference.

MR. HAMID: Let me get that now. Yes. So, ma'am, here in the front; and then Kamran; and then, ma'am, you in the front as well, so --

MS. YOON: Yang-Ro Yoon, Foundation for Empowerment. As a Development Economist, I'm now working on the issues of the integration of the immigrants in Korea, Europe, and America. So, as a practitioner I'm asking a very, very practical question, you are talking about the nature of identity, and you are talking about religious belonging, and the political belonging which is beyond the nation-state. What I'm talking about is the inter-nation beyond the nation-state.

For example, I was in Germany, and I observed very, very carefully, the problem is that when there was a German election many issues affect the Muslim-Germans, especially Turkish Germans, and others. But they were not very much interested in those issues in the German election, but we know that what (inaudible) did, and these Turkish, and I'm not -- I should not really stand out only

Turkish, but Turkish-Germans are so much interested in the Turkish election, and how you can try to send a (inaudible), all these things.

So, is this really beyond the nation-state? And the deal is this, a political Muslim -- political Islamization in those countries are affecting these European other policies as well. So, this has been a concern. A very urgent question, as a Korean I'm not I'm not too urgent, but this is my question that, you know, like what kind of impact over the political Islam had their own, their own -- their citizens of the origin in other countries?

My second very brief question is that you have been talking about it is not only Muslim -- I mean it's not only Islam, yes Buddhism and others, I mean the Christianity are all religion and they've had war. But one different thing is, that I would like to say, in the 14th Century in Korea condition is -- Buddhist rarely fought, so conditions to one. But the difference between the Christianity, and the Buddhism, and the Muslim, and I have not really saw the person who is ignorant, mostly say that Buddhism and Christianity never really said you have to have a jihad.

You know, look you really don't get involved in politics, in other politics like a Siddhartha. But you know, Islam is very special for me that, you know, like from the beginning it really went over jihad, and the (inaudible) is -- the successors became, you know, whatever the religious leader, whether Shi'a, who are showing the way. Thank you very much

MR. MANDAVILLE: Let's take Kamran's question as well while we are right here.

MR. BOKHARI: Kamran Bokhari, the Center for Global Policy and

author of political Islam in the age of democratization. So, thank you so much, this is very insightful. I have so many questions, but I'll limit it to two. Number one, is Islamism a subset of political Islam? Why, because number one political Islam spends, going back in history, if we take the starting point of the revelation, and as you said Islamism is a modern phenomenon.

Secondly, those whom we call secular leaders from their point of view, they're not -- their political programs, the Gamal Abdel Nassers of the world, the Atatürks, the Jinnahs, they never said that we are leaving Islam to adopt this democracy, or liberalism, however they framed it in their time period, or socialism as in the case of Nasser.

Number two -- that was the first question. Number two is, are the lines between the categories of what we call Muslims because of increasing religiosity blurring with the category of Islamists?

MS. CESARI: Yes. I would like to address both because the question, is Islam different from confusion is, Buddhist. The position is, religion is multiple call, you are presenting Buddhism as a separation, I mentioned the Buddhism in Sri Lanka. They are like the Jihadist, they don't use the term Jihadist, but they do the same thing.

So, even in terms of rejecting the diversity of the population, so I would say that we have to take as a basic starting point, religions are multivocal, you can use them in different ways. So, you have to contextualize it, and the contextualization is politic, not in the sense of extremism, or election, it is about how -- again think, how do I define my political community, it can be local, it doesn't have to be national; and what is the role of religion in it?

And I bet that for any believer this is a challenge that you have to deal with, not only for Muslims, then you have different experience according to different context, so in this sense the problem of the Turks in Germany cannot be taken only through the fact that Islam is propagating jihad today. It is much more complex than that. You're absolutely right, that the loyalty of Turkey in our -- Turkish-German or German-Turk, is also to Turkey but this is for me, again, the strength of the nation-state.

It is not an affiliation to the whole ummah, it's I am German but I am also Turkish. So, again we have to be careful on how we phrase some situations, and this is also for the political discourse of it. We have to be to take a little distance with the situation and not assume the sort of exceptionalism of Islam like that, because this is not viable in the long term.

And to go back to your point, yes Islamism is a subset of political Islam, we can, people disagree with me on where you start political Islam, and I draw the line between the Empire and the nation state. Unlike what people think the Caliph is ahead of the whole, you know, territories under the rule of Islam, but not everybody has to be Muslim. And actually there is a difference in the Sharia that is the monopoly of the clerics, who are not paid, not controlled by the Caliph.

And so the Ulama manage the local communities, even in their religious diversity, not only for Muslims. So, this is an arrangement that is in some way a differentiation between what is Islam and what is politics. And at the time the Caliph has to work for that. So, the confusion between, I am a Muslim, I am a citizen, and the state takes care of it, is the nation-state.

And as for me, this is a key element to take into account. And sorry,

I just want to finish on that.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Yes, go on.

MS. CESARI: We are not paying -- because we have been brought in it, nation is framing us. I'm not saying it's a conspiracy, but it means that you have tons of surveys that show that even mental illness, problems that are deeply personal, have been changed by the nation-state, and we have to start thinking of it.

And again, not a state policy or governmental, or action of a government, how do we define ourselves as believer, citizen, locally, nationally, internationally and religion is part of it for everybody if you believe in any religion.

MR. HAMID: So, on the question about jihad. So, I actually do agree to a certain extent that, I mean, Islam obviously is quite different than Buddhism or Confucianism, and not just in some random ways, but specific ways, and I think -- I mean in the Islamic context 99.9 percent of Muslims aren't going to have any direct interaction with doctrines around jihad that.

So, it's not a big deal with the vast majority of Muslims, so that said no one can -- no one can argue as far as I'm concerned, that jihad is not unequivocally part of the Islamic legal tradition, and that it's part of the Quran. It's there, and I don't even see that as a bad thing, why wouldn't -- why wouldn't there be, and why wouldn't there be state-sanctioned just war, if you will, to make sort of that comparison.

But to kind of go a little bit deeper on that point, so because Prophet Mohammed was interested in territory, he wasn't just fighting something and wanting to be left alone, there was clearly an interest in governance, if you will. So, the only way to get territory, at least in the pre-modern era for the most part, was by

capturing territory from other people.

And for the most part people aren't, I mean, just give you their territory all the time, so you have to use the violence, but this seems so obvious to me, and I don't think it's a problem, I don't -- if Islam is a religion that's supposed to talk about all facets of life, it would be completely weird if the Quran had nothing to say about violence. That would actually make it seem less divine from a Muslim standpoint, because why isn't God speaking to these very tangible concerns that Muslims have in 7th Century Arabia.

So, of course Islam talks about violence in very specific ways, and by violence I don't mean terrorism, I mean violence, very different things, right.

But on the second question, Kamran, I would just say very quickly, and it sort of gets, how do we distinguish between Islamists and conservative Muslims? Well, first of all, you know, I don't, -- I wouldn't want to call someone Islamist unless they see themselves in that light, so part of it is self-definition.

But I think I sort of touched on this earlier that you can be someone who believes in the full implementation of Islamic law, but again if you're not organizing politically around that objective, I don't think you can call that person an Islamist.

When it comes to Jinnah, and Nasser, and other secular leaders, they care about Islam in their own way but I think the main difference is they weren't trying to Islamize society in a broader sense. Like when Nasser was thinking to himself, like, what does he want to accomplish before he leaves this world, that wasn't really high on his priority list. Where, you know, if Mohamed Morsi or other Islamist leaders who have power, they do actually care about whether people

observe certain standards of Islam in a social sense.

MR. MANDAVILLE: I think, if I may, on your point about the German case, it's a case that very nicely illustrates a point that's at the heart of the work that Jocelyne has been doing, which is the fact that ever since there was a critical mass of Turkish labor migrants in Germany from the 1960s onwards, you've had the presence in Germany of an instrument of the Turkish state more specifically, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, or the Diyanet, which, you know, is the very manifestation of what Jocelyne terms, hegemonic Islam.

Because the project of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which is often sort of caricatured as the evacuation of religion from all facets society. It was not that at all, it was about the creation and even promotion of a very particular sense of Muslimness that needed to be cultivated and patrolled by the state. So that when there were Turkish labor migrants in Germany the Diyanet needed to be there to make sure that their religious life continued to be conducted in a way that was compatible, on the assumption that they would be coming back to Turkey at some point.

Later then, I think once it was clear that they were staying the Diyanet stayed, I think in order to ensure that ideas around a more politically active conception of Islam, because by that point you also had, in Germany the Millî Görüş Movement which is, you know, the more Islamist-oriented dimension of Turkish political life.

You know, the two were competing, so in that sense the kind of transplantation of those politics, you know, I think is actually most-acutely present in the case of Germany, although there has been some presence of Islamist

movements among Muslim communities living in Europe and North America, and in fact the Pew Research Center did a study in 2010 that looked very specifically what happens when Islamic movements, of various sorts, that originated in the Muslim majority world became transplanted and reproduced in Europe and North America. That's specifically the study of it. It's a fantastic study, which I wrote. (Laughter)

So, let me do one more round of questions. Jackie did some great surreptitious hand gestures, as the others, so then why don't go to the back of the room which I feel has been neglected. So, let's get Jackie, and let me see some hands, you leaning out, and that's a very good technique, two leaning out in the aisle, I like that. And then from the very, very back, sir, in the middle, the pink shirt, kind of pink, yeah, right. So, Jackie.

MS. O'NEILL: Purple. My name is Jackie O'Neill. I'm with the Institute for Inclusive Security. And Jocelyne, you gave the example of transnational Muslim feminists having a significant impact on civil law in Morocco. We've seen examples of feminist Muslims having impact in Constitution in Tunisia, et cetera. So, I'm wondering what you see as the future of the intersection between feminism within Islam and political Islam, given that feminism is, fundamentally, about the reordering of power. So, your thoughts on -- from either of you -- or all three of you, on the either rejection or incorporation of that reordering of power within the political element of Islam? Thanks.

MR. MANDAVILLE: The man in the aisle.

MR. HU: My name is Jason Hu, from WINTOP Group, based in Phoenix, Arizona. My question is for both of the panelists, and my questions sort of a following up for Peter's question. Might be a little bit of a politically incorrect, and

so that's why Peter didn't push it. The question is, what's your opinion that Islam, as a religion, emerged within itself; their own religions reform?

I mean like Christianity we all know had a huge religious reform in their history. And like Judaism, they kept continuously reforming themselves. Even Buddhism, two years ago Dalai Lama told me that Buddhism needs to be combined to be consistent with science. So, every other religion, they're thinking about changing themselves, what do you two experts think about outlook of Islam, on this direction? Thanks.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Thank you. And then, finally, in the very back.

MR. HOWARD: Hi. My name is Steven Howard, and I work with in Defense of Christians in the Middle East. And so my question is actually pertaining to non-Muslim minorities who live in predominantly Muslim countries, and specifically really the prospects of Islamism in creating a more inclusive society for them. And just to give one very specific example, I was in Palestine for Christmas during the protest movements against the Embassy moved to Jerusalem, and I was staying with an Orthodox Christian family.

And while they are certainly not huge fans of Israel, they completely felt excluded from participation in civic society, because the opposition to the Jerusalem move, but where people were just really chanting, Al-Aqsa, Al-Aqsa, Al-Aqsa , and they are Christian, like that that isn't a religiously significant site for them.

But the movement itself was so defined by religion that they didn't feel comfortable to participate, whereas if you look at other political movements in the Middle East, especially over this last century, it could be Nationalism, could be Socialism, Ba'athism, you did have our participation, and from minority

communities.

So, specifically, you know, Islamism is not going anywhere, it's very popular in many of these countries, what can it do, or can't -- I mean is it even possible for it to do a better job of incorporating these communities, and its narrative, and what it's trying to contribute to these countries? So, thank you.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Great. Thank you. So, we have Islamic feminism, we have reformation, we have Christian minorities in the Middle East.

MS. CESARI: Okay. So, let's start with feminism. I think the movements have been changing very rapidly, you know, you had it in the -- it's still there, there was a sort of split between the secular feminists and the Islamist feminists. But the new generations are really trying to overcome this simplification, and they are also trying -- again, feminism is a social movement, not only in the Muslim world, everywhere.

And that's why it's very counterproductive for any social movement to turn into a political party, because then you are on a different level. But for me a social movement is political in the sense that it's trying to do a change at the grassroots level the relationship between people, here, in this case between gender, and what happened is that, unlike what people think, most of the social movement based on Islam have been very lagging behind in terms of gender equality.

I mean it's okay to grant equality to citizen in the public space -- you know, you can vote, you they will not contest women as social actor, or political actor, most of them, we are not talking about the Salafi here, we are talking about more of the Muslim Brotherhood oriented movements. But when it comes to

equality in the marriage, in the divorce, in the custody of children, this is behind, you know, and this is something that is across movement and Muslim countries.

So, what some of these women are trying to do especially the new generation, is to pull up, not automatically an opposition, opposing is weakening, but to produce alternative approach to it, to Islam, because what the men are saying, is this is Islam, we cannot touch on this. It's okay, you can go to the university, you can even run for politics, you know, that's not a problem.

Iran is a typical case in point. Iran, the women are outnumbering the men in university, but if I can make a hypothesis, but they cannot divorce their husbands. And I have talked to lots of young Muslim women, how uncomfortable it is for them to endure the MeToo movement for exactly this kind of reason.

This is a very, very reliable point, and I think the new generation and, again, people who are in Non-Muslim or minority contexts, have a better kind of empowerment on that. So, I so I would say this will be a major shift but not right now.

On Islam and reform, Islam has been changing all the time, I mean again 1798 when Bonaparte goes to Egypt, you have a whole reform movement, and we and we talk about it. The people were going to Paris and London to learn the technique and I religion to 1876, the Ottoman Empire decriminalized homosexuality. Okay?

So, things have happened. It doesn't mean that they are still here. We had this kind of vision, and this, I agree with you, of the progress that, you know, you do all your steps forward, and then you never go backward. What we are learning everywhere, including in the West, and that's why populist is an indicator,

you can go backward.

And that's a tragedy in some way, of lots of Muslim society. There have been lots of advancement, and the time to go backward, you say, you never go exactly at the same point, there is some kind of, you know, little leap in advance.

And on the Muslim minorities, that's exactly the drama of what I was saying, of connecting Islamic belonging and national belonging. That's exactly that. They're caught, and not only the Christian Palestinian, you know, they would say, I am Muslim by nationality, and caught by religion.

They have absorbed, lots of them this kind of dilemma, so the question is, how do you disconnect the Islamic belonging and the National belonging? This is the question, and I think you mentioned it, lots of young people outside Muslim countries are trying to address this question but it's a tough one, because they are not -- not only by Muslim leaders but even though Westerners, you know.

We considered the Saudi version as the true Islam, so go and fight against that, you know. These are real issues that are beyond, you know, strategic or punctual alliance, it does change the balance of power, and how these new voices can be heard for now, nobody is even listening to them.

MR. MANDAVILLE: Shadi?

MR. HAMID: So, I agree with Jocelyne, that there has been a lot of reform but I would make a distinction between reform and, I think what you're getting at, the idea of a reformation. And here, and so you said something really interesting, I think it was that, you know, basically why can't Islam, or will Islam be like all the other religions, right?

So, again not to sort of belabor my argument but, you know, I actually sort of agree with you in the sense that I don't think Islam is going to have a reformation, but I would sort of pose the question a little bit differently. Why would Islam have a Reformation? Why does it need to have a Reformation? Why does Islam have to be like Judaism, or Christianity, or whatever?

I mean, I just don't understand the starting premise when that's raised. I know where it's coming from, but I guess I can't totally relate to it.

On the question about minorities, so I sort of don't -- this is a problem without a solution. So, Islamists are never going to be 100 percent cool with minorities, and Islamists are never going to --

MS. CESARI: (Crosstalk), I agree.

MR. HAMID: Okay. Well, I understand the question. And Islamists are never going to fully embrace at least a Western conception of what gender equality is. For them to embrace these things they would essentially have to become classical liberals. But Islamists are called Islamists because they're not classical liberals.

Islamists by definition, if they intend to continue as Islamists, will remain at least somewhat illiberal. That's the whole point of Islamism. If Islamists give that up, then there's no particular reason for them to be who they are.

MS. CESARI: I just want to make -- you are right, but for me the question is what I call the rights of the self. You are absolutely, right but I don't think it's a question of non-Muslim minorities, actually the discourse on that is more open, and inclusive in the new leaderships than we think it is. But it's about the sexuality, and the status of family, and the status of gender.

This is what distinguished, indeed, Muslim democracy from a complete secular democracy, otherwise, all the other points are indeed more -- they can be debated, nobody will agree, but you see this trend. It's what do I do with my body, this is where all Muslims are having the problem, and I have tons of surveys that show that it's also true for Muslims in the West.

And this is, again, you can differentiate between individual rights, these people are getting more and more acquainted to it, everyone in Saudi Arabia took (inaudible). But when it comes to, what do women do? What do I do with my body and my sexuality? At the interpersonal level, this is a big issue, but I would say it's an issue for lots of democratic society, I don't think -- I mean the debate we are having here, but the outcome may be different, but this is a bit -- what's happening here is more secular, the phrasing is more secular. In Muslim country it is about the role of --

MR. HAMID: But Jocelyne, isn't it fair to say that it's more of an issue in many Muslim majority context, than it is in the U.S. or European democracies? Yes, it's a problem everywhere, it will always be a problem everywhere --

MR. MANDAVILLE: And we are 11 minutes past the time.

MR. HAMID: Okay. Yeah, yeah, so I guess we'll -- I'll leave it to Peter, but that I would just sort of yeah --

MS. CESARI: No, I agree. It's a lot -- we think this is low, and this (crosstalk).

MR. MANDAVILLE: If you'll permit me just very briefly, on the point about the Reformation, please. Well, let me add this to. I actually think that Christianity is the exception rather than the rule when it comes to Reformation, in

that I don't think you've seen anything like that in any other religion, certainly we have Reformed Judaism, but the process through which it emerged historically was very different.

What was distinctive about Western Christianity, right, as distinct from the Eastern Churches is that there was a centralized point of religious authority, there was a Pope there was a central authority location against which a Reformation could take place, and that was very much the story of the Reformation.

You don't have that same centralized authority in Sunni Islam, even in Shi'a Islam, which has a little bit more like hierarchies of religious authority, there's still not a single point. And so the question of why don't you have an Islamic Reformation like you have in Christianity? Well, the religion and religious authority is just structured in a fundamentally different way.

I'm afraid that's all we have time for. But of course we will see you all, as Shadi suggests, back in 10 years when we'll have the same conversation again.

MS. CESARI: Oh, yeah. I know.

MR. MANDAVILLE: But please join me in thanking our panelists.

(Applause)

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