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THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF DETERRENCE

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. EINHORN: Good morning. Welcome. Welcome to Brookings. Thank you very much for joining us. My name is Bob Einhorn of the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. This is a session on the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the problem of deterrence, especially extended deterrence.

Japan has traditionally relied heavily on the U.S.-Japan security alliance, and the U.S. extended deterrent for its security. In recent years, however, the Japan security environment has become much more challenging.

North Korea's nuclear armed missile pose a direct threat to the Japanese islands, and when the North Koreans acquire the capability to strike U.S. cities with nuclear weapons, and that may be relatively soon, U.S. allies may wonder whether the United States will still come to their defense in the event of North Korean aggression.

China is modernizing and increasing its nuclear arsenal, it's seeking to tilt the balance of conventional military power in its favor in the Western Pacific, and it's undermining -- it's seeking to undermine U.S. power projection capabilities in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific, and it's acting much more assertively in East Asia in the last several years.

In recent years Japan and the U.S. have worked together very closely to strengthen their combined deterrence and defense capabilities. Prime Minister Abe has sought to strengthen Japan's Self-Defense Forces and relax some of the restrictions on the use of those forces. The U.S. has cooperated with Japan to enhance its missile defenses, and its conventional strike capabilities.

The recently released Trump administration 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stress the importance of extended deterrence, both in Europe as well as in Northeast Asia, both to deter potential adversaries as well as to reassure America's friends.

In addition to underlining the continuing role of the U.S. nuclear triad, and now a modernized, upgraded U.S. triad, and enhancing extended deterrence, the 2018 NPR proposed two supplemental nuclear capabilities that the Trump administration believes could strengthen deterrence in Northeast Asia; a low-yield, sea-launched ballistic missile, and a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile.

The NPR made clear that a key goal of strengthening extended deterrence was to reduce incentives of our North East Asian allies, Japan and South Korea, to acquire their own indigenous nuclear weapons capabilities. And interestingly after the release of the Trump NPR, actually a day after the release, Japan expressed its strong support for the NPR. Foreign Minister Tarō Kōno came out with a very strong statement of endorsement of the NPR.

This morning, at this session, we will focus on what the United States and Japan are doing to cope with today's more challenging security environment, including their efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent.

And to help us understand these challenges, we are very fortunate, this morning, to have four experts, two Japanese, two Americans, with vast experience in alliance defense and deterrence issues.

The session will be on the record, it's a public event, it will be on the record. I understand there are some journalists here, and that's great for all the publicity you can give to this event. You have the bios of

our four speakers in the handout you got at the entryway, so I won't go into great length.

But we are fortunate to have Professor Narushige Michishita from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. We have Elaine Bunn, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy; General Noboru Yamaguchi, who is a retired three-star former commanding general, ground research and development command of Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force; and Eric Heginbotham, principal research scientist, Center for International Studies at MIT.

We welcome you all. I will ask each of the panelists to come up to the podium and speak for around 10 minutes, and then I'll invite them up to the front here. I will, as moderator, ask a few questions, and then we'll open it up to our audience. So, with that, you have the floor.

DR. MICHISHITA: Thank you very much Mr. Einhorn, for the kind introduction. Thank you very much, everybody, for coming.

Today I'm going to say four things. One, is that North Korea's nuclear and missile development is making it difficult to defend South Korea, not Japan. Two, the United States and Japan are providing together the extended deterrence to South Korea against North Korea, and North Korea hates it. Three, China has started to play a great power game of neutralizing South Korea. And lastly, the United States, South Korea and Japan must start working more closely together on defense.

In November of last year North Korea fired its longest range intercontinental ballistic missile, ICBM, named Hwasong or Mars, like in planet Mars; North Koreans like planets, 15, in the lofty trajectory. If launched in a range-maximizing trajectory the missile would have flown some 8,000 miles. North Korea can now hit different targets with different missiles. Its Scud missiles can hit South Korea, not only can hit Japan, Hwasong 12 can hit Guam, Hwasong 14 can hit Hawaii and Alaska, Hwasong 15 can hit Los Angeles, New York and Washington, D.C. In September last year, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear tests, which achieved the explosion yield of about 160 kilotons, a big jump from about 12 kilotons in the previous test. Some of observers argue that defending Japan is becoming difficult as a result. However, this is not really true. What is becoming more difficult is the defense of South Korea. Such a misunderstanding arises when one attempts to make sense of the issue without taking into account the regional political strategic context.

Today I will bring aerial studies by Ken and attempt to identify some of the important implications of North Korea's nuclear and missile development on the issue of deterrence.

Why does North Korea threaten South Korea instead of Japan? First, North Korea's archenemy is South Korea and not the United States or Japan. South Korea is the only country which has the ability and willingness to absorb North Korea and unify the Korean Peninsula.

North and South Korea have been competing to become the legitimate leader of a unified Korean nation since 1948. As you can see on the screen, North Korea attempted to achieve this goal by resorting to brute-force in 1950, and when it failed it attempted to destabilize South Korea with guerrilla attacks in the 1960s, and with terrorist attacks in the 1980s. If you are interested in the history please read my book entitled *North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns*.

By the early 1990s, however, it became clear that South Korea has prevailed in the inter-Korean competition. South Korea had become a democracy with a booming economy while North Korea had become a state sponsor of terrorism — this the comparison of North and South — with its economy in

shambles.

The Cold War had ended and the Soviet-led Communist Bloc had collapsed. As a practical matter, South Korea had beaten North Korea by technical knockout. Unfortunately, the North Korean leaders, instead of accepting South Korea's victory, decided to carry on fighting outside the ring.

Today the only competitive edge that North Korea has over South Korea is nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. The only way for North Korea to keep competing with South Korea, therefore, is by making the best use of these capabilities.

The fundamental goal that the North Korean leaders have is to prevent South Korea from absorbing their country, keep South Korea on the defensive and undermine South Korea's position whenever possible.

Second, North Korea has acquired capabilities to attack the United States and Japan only because these two countries are committed to the defense of South Korea. The U.S. is South Korea's ally, treaty ally, and maintains more than 20,000 troops on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. and South Korea have developed a war plan, new war plan called OPLAN 5015, which includes preemptive, deep-strike option.

Japan is making significant contributions to the defense of South Korea, at least in two ways: by being prepared to offer operating bases for the U.S. forces in Korean contingencies, and by making it possible for the Japanese armed forces, the Self-Defense Force, to support the U.S. military operations for the defense of South Korea.

If there is a war on the Korean Peninsula the U.S. would use many operating bases in Japan, there are many, Japan has spent about $18 billion on missile defense systems which we bought from the U.S., so please tell President Trump, which protects not only Japanese citizens but also U.S. military personnel and bases.

Japanese ground Self-Defense Force is trained to protect U.S. bases against enemy special operation forces. Japan is also prepared to provide support to the U.S. forces fighting for South Korea.

In 1997 the United States and Japan agreed that Japan Self-Defense Force would provide non-combat support to the U.S. forces in the situations in areas surrounding Japan or SIASJ, S-I-A-S-J, which, in all practical purposes were accorded term for Korean contingencies. In 2014 the Japanese Government reinterpreted the Constitution making it possible for Japan to start exercising the right of collective self-defense.

Based on this change that new security legislation was enacted in the Japanese diet in 2015 enabling the Japanese Defense Force to, at least legally, provide combat support to the U.S. forces fighting for South Korea.

It could now shoot down North Korea's ballistic missiles aimed at Guam or Hawaii, conduct anti-submarine warfare to protect U.S. Naval Forces, and sweep mines in the waters near a North Korean coast, in preparation for U.S. amphibious landing operations.

North Korea is not interested in attacking the U.S. or Japan for the sake of attacking them. In fact, the leaders in Pyongyang have worked very hard since the end of the Cold War to normalize relations with the U.S. and Japan, though unsuccessfully.

North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles exist to drive a wedge between South Korea on the one hand, and the United States and Japan on the other, in order to make life difficult for South Korea.

Third, and finally, China's apparent decision to start playing a great power -- geopolitical game on the Korean Peninsula has made it difficult for South Korea, the U.S. and Japan to work more closely together on defense.

South Korea's economy is heavily dependent on its trade relationship with China. About 12 percent of South Korea's national revenue comes from its export to China. China is taking advantage of this by the linking economic issues with security issues. Faced with massive pressure from China South Korea has tacitly pledged to China that it would not allow the U.S. to deploy additional missile defense assets in South Korea, that it would not allow -- sorry -- it would not become part of the U.S.-led missile defense system, and that it would not allow the U.S.-ROK Japan Security Cooperation to drop into a tripartite alliance.

Although it is not realistic to turn the U.S.-ROK Japan Security Cooperation into a tripartite alliance mechanism anyway, China is definitely making it difficult for South Korea to work more closely with the United States and Japan. China does not have to help South Korea, but it must stop preventing South Korea from defending itself.

North Korea's growing nuclear and missile capabilities are slowly undermining the credibility of extended deterrence that the U.S.-Japan alliance generates for South Korea. With the longer-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons, North Korea can now intimidate the U.S. and Japan by saying, "if you help South Korea we would attack you with nuclear weapons." Or, by asking the question such as: "would you be willing to sacrifice Washington, New York and Tokyo for Seoul?"

With North Korea's WMD programs rapidly making progress, the credibility of deterrence against North Korea's aggression would wane unless the U.S., South Korea and Japan start working more closely together.

Let me talk about future scenarios now. Despite these difficulties the credibility of deterrence against North Korea's major armed attacks against South Korea remains high. If North Korea undertakes an all-out attack, the U.S. and South Korea would invoke their war plan which would involve aggressive counteroffensive actions, even North Korea would not be able to come out with impunity in such a scenario.

What worries me most in the short run, is North Korea's limited military strikes against South Korea. With a nuclear North Korea armed with ICBM, security experts believe that stability-instability paradox is emerging on the Korean Peninsula.

If North Korea has the capacity to attack Guam, Hawaii and the U.S. mainland with nuclear weapons, that would create a situation of mutual deterrence, and increase stability at the strategic level. This is a good news because there will be a much lower likelihood of full-scale war. A situation like that, however, makes it easier for North Korea to engage in limited military action on the expectation that there is no chance of it escalating into a major war.

For example, North Korea fires 10 long-range artillery shells into the vicinity of Seoul, the South Korean military would retaliate by firing 30 shelves back into North Korea. However, with the threat of nuclear attack hanging in the air, Washington and Tokyo might ask Seoul not to further escalate the

situation, resulting in a ceasefire.

Tightly integrated in a global market, South Korea's country risk premium would shoot up as a result, possibly causing a capital flight. As an isolated state on the other side -- the other hand, North Korea would be largely unaffected. This would put South Korea in a very difficult position.

Finally, there is another possible scenario, which I am concerned about in the long run, which is neutralization of South Korea. If North Korea succeeds in convincing the South Koreans that its nuclear and missile capabilities have undermined the credibility of extended deterrence that the U.S. and Japan provide, the only option left to South Korea might be to turn to China.

If South Korea is neutralized and starts leaning toward China, that would be a strategic nightmare for the U.S., Japan, and of course, South Korea itself.

Being the 10th largest spender on defense and the 11th largest economy in the world as of 2016, South Korea carries a significant strategic weight. If South Korea leans to a China regional balance of power would shift to the disadvantage of the U.S. and Japan.

South Korea would also suffer even with the U.S. and Japan's backing, South Korea has proved to be extremely vulnerable to China's pressure. If the credibility of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and the security commitments of the U.S.-Japan Alliance to South Korea are undermined, South Korea would not be able to resist China's pressure.

To me, this is the most important reason why the United States and Japan must remain committed to the security of South Korea. In order to maintain credible deterrence against North Korea's aggression and to fend off China's pressure to neutralize South Korea, the U.S., South Korea and Japan must work more closely together on missile defense, information sharing, contingency planning and other issues going forward. Thank you very much. (Applause)

MS. BUNN: Good morning. And I want to say thanks to Bob Einhorn, to Brookings, and especially to Maeve Whelan-Wuest for inviting me to participate in what I think is a very important discussion on an important topic.

We have on our panel two Japanese security experts, and I do very much appreciate the fact that Michi put the topic into the broader regional context. And we have an American regional expert, so my perspective today will not be as a regional expert, but as someone who has worked deterrence and extended deterrence issues for most of my career.

My perceptions are based on my time in government dealing with the Japanese, particularly on nuclear issues. From my first visits to Japan discussing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty Negotiations in 1982, to the last four years of the Obama administration when I served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, and in that role co-chaired many meetings with allies consulting on deterrence issues, and including the extended deterrence dialogues with Japan.

I think the essence of all Alliance deterrence discussions can be boiled down to dialogues addressing: who are we worried about? What are we worried about their doing? And together, what can we do about it? How do we deter it? What is it that you will do, what will we do, what will we do together?

Only a part of that is extended deterrence, that is what we do for somebody else, and only a smaller part still of that is about extended nuclear deterrence, small part but a very important part. On the "who are we worried about," my perception of Japan's perception of the threat is that North Korea is an immediate nuclear threat to Japan, not surprising, as Michi just mentioned, North Korea's sixth nuclear test, missile tests by the dozens over the last several years.

And a North Korean rhetoric threatening Japan, particularly, if they get involved in something on the Korean Peninsula, or even support U.S. forces which are based in Japan.

Running neck-and-neck with North Korea is China, with its more assertive actions particularly in the South China Sea, which then Japan is concerned about what they might do in the East China Sea, and the Senkaku. With China-Japan seems to focus more on gray areas, stability and stability paradox, with China the nuclear threat is more recessed but still important. And Russia seems to be a distant third in Japan's threat perceptions.

If I'm wrong about that I would ask my Japanese colleagues to correct me.

With regard to consultations, with Japan we began official dialogue specifically on deterrence. Of course we'd had alliance discussions on many issues over many years but the discussion specifically on deterrence began only in 2010, and Japan I think was more than ready for them. That's no surprise for an ally who lives in a dangerous neighborhood, and wants to know more and more about how the U.S. thinks about deterrence, about planning, about how the U.S. might respond in various scenarios, both low end and high end to threats to that ally.

I have seen a marked increase in the desire on the part of Japanese officials to be involved in discussions on deterrence. Even 10 to 15 years ago I would say, it was difficult to find more than a handful of officials in Tokyo who were comfortable discussing nuclear deterrence issues, nuclear disarmament issues, yes, but nuclear deterrence issues there was a reticence about it.

Now, I would say Japanese are among the most sophisticated and nuanced of all allies on nuclear deterrence theory and doctrine and policy. Since the 2010 NPR, there have been dozens of multi-day, in-depth discussions with the Japanese, at least at least a couple of times a year, rotating between the U.S. and Japan, including many what-if scenario-based discussions, or tabletop exercises, call them what you will.

As well as visits to facilities for intercontinental ballistic missiles, U.S. bomber bases, visits to Bangor where our Pacific submarines that carry ballistic missiles are based, with all of us going on those ballistic missile submarines, so that Japanese officials could see, feel and touch the ultimate guarantors of their security.

It's one thing to talk about everything in the U.S. arsenal is part of your extended nuclear deterrence, it's another thing to have it, see it concretely, you know the deep pedal tone, as Brody would put it. We've also in the dialogues visited other types of facilities, U.S. nuclear laboratories for instance, strategic command, U.S. missile defense sites.

And then we also visit defense sites in Japan that contribute to alliance conventional and missile defense capabilities, because of course deterrence is not just nuclear. In fact, in November -- the nuclear part though is particularly important because that is something that the U.S., uniquely, brings to the Alliance.

In November of 2016, an SSBN pulled into Guam for the first time in a couple of decades with Japanese military and civilian officials going aboard that as well. And I would, add thanks for the regional context; the South Koreans also came aboard the next day as well, that strategic submarine in Guam.

Part of that was to make this force more visible in the region. Obviously, submarines are survivable because they don't -- you don't always know where they are, but sometimes I think it's worse particularly for insurance reasons, it's important for allies to know that they are always there.

The extended deterrence dialogues continue with Japan, and I understand there was a meeting this week that was in Japan. Of course there are pluses and minuses to this deeper discussion and understanding on an ally's part, of deterrence writ large, and extended nuclear deterrents specifically.

I think it's right that we can no longer say to allies in Northeast Asia, in essence, don't you worry your pretty little heads about it, we'll just take care of it. However, with sophistication, and nuance, and knowledge, really that deep understanding on deterrence issues, comes the realization that deterrence is never guaranteed. It's a goal, it's not a strategy, it's difficult to know in any given situation, with any given actor, exactly what will deter and what will, instead, spur the very actions that you're trying to deter.

And that the mix of tools for deterrence and the implementation of both day-to-day and crisis deterrence is just not cut and dried. It's not a formula. This is not a mechanical problem, a mathematical, there are human beings involved. So, that may or may not be assuring to Japan, but there's no going back. I mean, I think it's important for the U.S. and Japan to continue to exercise together, to plan, to discuss how to deter, and if necessary how to respond to adversary nuclear use, because sticking one's head in the ground about it, doesn't make it less likely, in fact it probably makes it more likely.

I want to talk for a minute about nuclear capabilities to back up extended nuclear deterrence. I guess my point here is that the precise composition of the U.S. arsenal will change over time, but the commitment remains.

I'd say to the Japanese, don't hang your hat on a specific capability; don't put too much emphasis on any one weapon or platform. At one time it seems the Japanese saw the sea-launch cruise missile as their deterrent. I guess because it could be in the region on attack subs, on ships, but without being on land, which of course would be problematic for Japan.

Then President Bush in 1991 ended the day-to-day routine deployment of the sea launch cruise missile, the SLCM, on ships and attack subs, but kept them for contingency deployment. Then another change 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S. decided to eliminate the capability for surface ships, but retained the capability to put them back on attack submarines in contingencies.

And as one of those tasked at the time with reassuring Japan about the changes in the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review I recall our making a big deal of the fact that we could put them back on attack subs, and a contingency, so they'll still be there.

Then the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review you came along and decided to eliminate that capability as well. And so then I found myself saying to the Japanese that everything in our nuclear arsenal was as part of your extended nuclear deterrence capabilities, which is true, but it does say: be careful how you assure your allies.

Now, fast forward to the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, as Bob said in his introduction, it is back, the SLCM is back, or at least a consideration of it with studies to follow on the best ways to develop and deploy it.

But we should not oversell that to the Japanese, it looks to be -- the bringing back the studies on the sea launch cruise missile, appear to be in the Nuclear Posture Review, primarily leveraged for trying to get Russia to come back into compliance with the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, which the U.S. found them to be in violation of in 2014.

So I guess, in conclusion, I would say in dealing with the situations that both Japan and the U.S. worry about, I think we just need to make sure that the Alliance has a mix of tools, some of those tools are diplomatic, economic, such as sanctions, as well as military capabilities, non-nuclear: air, land, maritime forces for strike and for defense, as well as U.S. nuclear weapons as that deep pedal tone and the ultimate insurance policy. And then continue to sustain the alliance structures and institutions, dialogues, exercises, et cetera.

There are many other topics that we can -- that I could talk about, but we can talk about in Q&A, but I am so eager to hear what Noboru Yamaguchi has to say, that I think I'll sit down now. (Applause)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL YAMAGUCHI: Good morning. My name is Noboru Yamaguchi. I'm really glad to be here to talk about extremely timely issues. And also I'd like to thank Dr. Bob Einhorn, and Brookings, and as well as Richard Bush who invited me to this occasion.

And I'd like to, not to answer questions, but rather, I'll throw a couple of questions, like throwing stones to the pond, into the pond and to stimulate the discussion.

First of all, I am wondering what are we discussing, and whom do we want to deter, from doing what, by what kind of means? This is exactly what Elaine, at the beginning of her remarks said, it's a sort of a complicated issue. If you look at Northeast Asia, we have Russia, we have China, we have North Korea, and we have terrorist groups in Southeast Asia.

So, whom are we deterring from doing what? It's one of the biggest questions at least, meaning to start thinking of. And besides, one of the things -- no, deterring is not a good word, but we would like to deter China from going bankruptcy, that is a big difference between the Soviet case. You know, we didn't care about Soviet bankruptcy at all, but if we look at China, if China sneezes, some of the other countries may catch a cold, such kind of complex.

A friend of mine used to call China as a frenemy, and how we deter China, from what? That is one of the good questions. If we look at conventional military activities, this is exactly what the Russians and Chinese Air Forces are doing.

And last year, now the historical record was established by JASDF, launching more than 1,000 scrambled missions to deal with Chinese and Russian aircraft, out of which 851 times were for Chinese aircraft.

The red lines are Chinese aircraft, the orange lines are Russians. Even though the frequency of Russian aircraft is lower than Chinese, the ocean aircraft flight pattern is much more aggressive to Japan. But believe me, they behave, Russian aircraft -- Russian Air Force pilots do behave.

So, my colleague, a fighter pilot are going on a scrambled mission do not have any -- too much fear about Russian aircraft, they do behave.

In the meantime, according to friends of mine in JASDF, Chinese fighter pilots are less educated. So, they feel, my friends flying F-15s in East China Sea fear more from Chinese aircraft. We have to establish some more -- something, some rule between Air Forces. So, in that case we want to deter China, and Chinese the Air Force from going too wild.

And as to North Korea of course, missile programs and nuclear programs are a serious concern for Japan, and our goal is obvious. Our goal according to U.N. Resolution 1718, North Korea must abandon its nuclear and missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. This is our goal in common, unanimously supported by all the country of member states of the United Nations in 2006.

To me, in order to achieve this goal everything should be utilized, including military options, but I'm not excluding dialogue as well. Measures to achieve the goal must include all carrots and sticks, dialogues, incentive, sanctions, military options to include flexible deterrent options, and other military operations. Everything should be should be utilized for achieving this purpose.

Although a couple of issues that we -- I have in mind when I think about deterrence for the future, particularly extended deterrence by the United States, well, deterrence provided by U.S.-Japan or U.S.-Korea Alliance. But I want to a little bit -- go a little bit further than that. Elaine, knows quite well, that I have been saying the same thing, we need to have a broader definition of deterrence, or prevention of use of nuclear weapons, prevention of war.

We used to focus on the center. This is from left peace-time shaping effort, and deterring effort before the war, and if war begins we need to respond; and from the top, nuclear offensive and conventional nuclear forces, secondary conventional offensive force, and defensive force, and other measures, non-military measures.

If we look at the deterrence in the past, particularly against, one against the Soviet Union, almost totally dependent on offensive nuclear capability to scare Soviet Union not to do something stupid against us, but now we are a having different kind of possible adversaries, and a different kind of security or strategic environment.

So, not only nuclear offensive -- offensive forces, conventional offensive and conventional defensive military forces should be utilized for a wider definition of deterrence, as well as confidence-building measures, engagement or sanction policies, and international legal framework, like MPT, MTCR, CWC, and so on.

So, all the issues, all that means that should be utilized for future deterrence, and if we look at the extended deterrence by the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Japan can play some role and, you know, we are concerned about Chinese anti-access/area denial capabilities.

But if Japan has a modest but robust capability to protect the Islands chain, you know, archipelagic defense, that then Japan's own defense capability will provide Japan's own anti-access/area denial capabilities. And that may help the U.S. forces when they deploy to this area. Or, that may help us to prevent some adversaries to do something violent against us.

So, even Japanese defense capability can contribute to our efforts to make that extended deterrence,

and when we think about conventional offensive capabilities, the U.S. demonstrated last year, both in April, early April, the U.S. launched 60 Tomahawks against Syrian Air Force, out of which 59 hit exactly -- exact targets at the same time.

And a couple of days later, the U.S. tested what we call a MOAB, a Massive Ordnance Air Blast in Afghanistan. I felt like those two events, and what Kim Jong-un should learn very much.

And finally, I'd like to touch upon a couple of -- a couple of issues and problems, particularly regarding North Korea, or the Korean Peninsula. We would like to see non-nuclear Peninsula; now of course that we have to illuminate nuclear program of North Korea, and we don't want to, say, want war on the peninsula, and we don't want to see chaotic situation in Korean Peninsula, particularly in North Korea.

But nowadays I feel like there's also -- those three issues may have somehow different priorities, even Chinese. Chinese and Japanese of course, and Americans are leaning towards, to put more emphasis on non-nuclear part.

And the bad news: more advanced nuclear and missile programs by North Korea, and North Korea's political and economic stability is questioned, and lack of trust among relevant parties. For instance, Japan and Korea are not necessarily the most trusted partners.

And good news, there are a couple good news. The closest threat perception on DPRK, and now because of longer range of ICBMs the American threat perception about North Korean nuclear programs and Japanese perception about nuclear programs are getting closer.

And U.S. seriousness is shown by the administration, and China's attitude, obviously changed to add harder on North Korea. And one of the best news of all is conventional military capability of ROK and the United States, much better, much more advanced than those of early 1990s, when we had the first-ever North Korea nuclear crisis.

And fortunately, Japan, perhaps China has both, two major countries who have self-confident leaders, I hope U.S. has the same thing, and I think Mr. Trump is self-confident. Thank you very much. (Applause)

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Good morning. And thanks to Richard, Bob and Brookings for having us all out. Those were terrific insightful talks, and I'm feeling especially challenged since our Japanese participants were more eloquent and better speakers in English than I will be.

I faced a bit of a dilemma in preparing for this, and that the strategic ground was covered, and the American side was also covered in ways that I could not pursue. So, just to confuse you I will give an overview of Japan's public discussion on extended deterrence, or really more accurately, what I, as an outsider, find striking about that discussion in Japan.

The discussion is evolving very quickly, but I do want to review the bidding and just remind ourselves, go back for a moment and consider the broader landscape in Japan. There are as many positions in Japan on extended nuclear deterrents, as there are in the U.S. on most security issues, one could break Japanese thinking into three broad camps or categories.The first would be pacifist or anti-nuclear positions, that want Tokyo to disavow extended nuclear deterrence, legalize the three non-nuclear principles, and throw Tokyo's weight behind global zero, or global disarmament.

The three non-nuclear principles of course commit Tokyo to disavow -- I'm sorry -- to disavow the possession manufacturer introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. But it's not legally binding on the government.

Without doubt, pacifist sentiment has declined markedly over time, particularly in the Diet with the collapse of leftist parties, but it's not an entirely spent force, and at the popular level it continues to serve as a powerful constraint.

At the other end of the spectrum, our nationalists or guallist who distrust the U.S. security guarantee, and advocate an autonomous nuclear capability. This group has gained some ground, and includes some high-profile figures like Tamogami Toshio, a retired Air Force Chief of Staff and a prominent right-wing figure, who I think is now under suspended sentence for campaign irregularities, but nevertheless is a force out there.

From an objective standpoint, even most advocates of that autonomous position admit the public is not ready. In a survey by the think tank Genron, in December 2017, only 12 percent of Japanese were in favor of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons, whereas 69 percent were opposed.

The third group is International Relations or security realists, these individuals who now dominate the defense discussion, view extended nuclear deterrence as Japan's only realistic option.

In addition to political constraints they advance in a number of other compelling arguments against producing a Japanese nuclear weapon. From a technical perspective, they observe that Japan lacks size and strategic depth and this would complicate the construction of a survivable nuclear force.

A second objection is expense given the lack of strategic depth, and many see ballistic missile submarines as Japan's only option if it did pursue nuclear capabilities.

By my back-of-the-envelope calculations, the lifecycle cost of a submarine-based deterrent might be in the in the order of 5 to $8 billion dollars per year for the 30 or 40-year lifetime of those systems.

That could consume something on the order of 10 to 15 percent of Japan's defense budget, depending on how you project that over time, over that period. And at the same time building weapons would undermine the NPT, the global non-proliferation effort, and invite criticism of Japan.

Perhaps most importantly, it might also signal a loss of faith or confidence in the U.S. security guarantee, and negatively impact U.S. support for the Alliance. Realists, therefore, look to buttress extended deterrence rather than replace it. Most agree that Japan should make itself an indispensable ally of the United States, and integrate its military capabilities to the extent possible.

Integration will assure U.S. involvement in any conflict, in part, by making U.S. forces a target that cannot be differentiated from Japanese forces. And Japan's increased defense contribution will, in this view, also give Japan a greater say in Alliance decision-making to include decision-making on nuclear issues.

On those grounds, realists championed the 1997 and 2015 guidelines on U.S.-Japan security cooperation, as well as the Military Legislation passed in 2015.

All of these committed Japan to a larger role in regional security and the further integration of U.S.

and Japanese military forces. Assuming that Japan does have a --have more scope to make its voice heard, and I think it does: what does Japan want from the United States in terms of extended deterrence?

On this question, a fairly clear pattern I think is evident. In 2009 the Congressional Commission on Strategic Posture of the United States invited input the Japanese Foreign Ministry. At the time it was rumored that the Japanese group expressed concern about the forthcoming elimination of TLAM/N, the Navy's nuclear cruise missile.

Foreign Minister Okada then smoothed things over by denying that Japan was worried about specific capabilities. But according to a report last week, by the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Japanese position actually went beyond what was reported at the time.

Mr. Akiba Takayo reportedly submitted a statement that called for the United States to maintain nuclear weapons capabilities that were flexible, credible, prompt, discriminating, stealthy and sufficient to dissuade. In other words, he appealed for the United States to keep tactical nuclear weapons as well as robust, overall, nuclear forces.

In the same statement he suggested the United States should place nuclear deterrence at the core of U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Mr. Akiba does not appear to have been an outlier in the discussion. He's recently been promoted to the most senior bureaucratic post within the Foreign Ministry; he's been an instrumental figure in the extended -- in the discussion of extended deterrence.

Last month Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō said, as Michishita observed, that he greatly appreciates the Trump administration's new Nuclear Posture Review. The two key changes; or at least two key changes in that document, were first, the increased emphasis on nuclear weapons as a means to deter not just nuclear war, but also conventional conflict as well.

And second, the commitment to develop a range of low-yield, or tactical nuclear weapons. There was some surprise at Kōno's support for the NPR, since he's generally regarded as a moderate on foreign policy and a liberal on domestic issues. But Kōno has frequently taken realist positions, and his support is quite consistent with the views of many others.

The Former Ambassador to the United Nations, Satoh Yukio, published a book about extended deterrence last year, also falls into a similar category. He argues against both an autonomous capability, and the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to Japan, but in his book he links the control or prevention of conventional conflict including gray zone conflict to the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

The concept of seamlessness is central to the logic, both of Satoh and to many government statements, indeed it appears in almost all recent government statements on defense and deterrence. In this case seamlessness is both lateral and across the alliance, and vertical from non-lethal up to nuclear.

Japanese diplomacy on gray zone conflict is backed by the Coast Guard, and the policing of disputed areas. The Coast Guard, in turn, is backed by the self-defense forces in a manner that should be seamless. Once the military is engaged the U.S. alliance is active, Satoh cites the 2015 Guidelines on Defense Cooperation, that the alliance should be “seamless, robust, flexible and effective”. And he links the seamlessness and synergy of the alliance back to the nuclear commitment, which is also made explicit in the 2015 guidelines.

In the interest of time, I'll not talk about the question of deploying U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan,

except to make just two statements. First, there's now some increased discussion of it, Ishibashi Gador, the Former Defense Minister, said that it should at least be under discussion.

Second, that possibility, the possibility of deploying U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan still takes a distant second to the discussion of U.S. Force structure and declaratory policy.

I will say, in many documents there's a clear differentiation, as we've seen from our Japanese speakers and, as Elaine pointed out, between the nature of the Japanese and Chinese threat. Nevertheless, the prescription seems to be -- seems to have been quite consistent or similar over time.

The same points that I just mentioned about seamlessness and the ties between conventional and nuclear deterrents, were initially made in response to China or in the context of China, and especially the gray zone challenge, then applied later to Korea. In the minute that I have left I can't really go into much detail on the differences, but I do believe the differences between the two cases are enormous, at least from the perspective of American interests.

China is a nuclear-armed major power with continental scale, and a survival -- and great resilience as a state. It has a no-first-use policy and a modest but survivable nuclear force. If war did occur, it would have no reason to strike first, assuming that the U.S. were not trying to effect regime change, or using conventional weapons to destroy China's nuclear systems.

The U.S., for its part, still enjoys a number of advantages in conventional warfare, and has little reason to initiate nuclear war, or to push for regime change in China. Hence, even in the context of a high-intensity, conventional conflict, which itself is a low probability event both sides would probably look to limit the scope in important ways, as much as they did in Korea in 1951.

To be sure, there's always a risk of miscalculation and escalation, but in the Chinese -- in the China-U.S. context there's a reason that our dialogue with them falls under the heading of strategic stability, and that it places great emphasis on escalation control.

I'm not an expert on North Korea affairs, Bob is, and many others of you in the room are, but since I promised a contrast, I would characterize North Korea as a highly unpredictable one-man State, and it's a very different case. Yes, Kim Jong-un has little reason to undertake some kind of bolt-from-the-blue attack on the South, much less a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear first-strike.

And yes, the nuclear program is intended as a backstop for regime security, but we have very little idea about how Kim defines regime security. It's not entirely fanciful, as our other speakers have pointed out, to imagine that he might use crises to drive more wedges between the ROK and the United States, or that he might provoke nuclear crises, or actual small-scale conflict to drive third-country nationals from Korea and damage the South Korean economy.

Under these circumstances, the logic of a tactical U.S. capability might be somewhat more compelling. We might not want this capability for a deliberate first strike against North Korea, but we might want it under certain circumstances. For example, if blood had been spilled nuclear forces in the north had been moved, and we believed that nuclear use might be innocent -- might be imminent.

Today we might think we could launch a -- launch some kind of preemptive or preventive war-using conventional forces, but under the context, or in the context of an actual crisis or military conflict, that may be much harder to pursue.

Sugio Takahashi at NIDS has made this case about extended nuclear deterrence with regard to North Korea, so this is not a developed argument for or against tactical nuclear weapons, just an observation that important circumstances with regard to China and North Korea differ, and North Korea may edge us, or nudge us to a different place than we've been for the last 25 years, with important consequences for strategic relations with China and others. And I will leave it there. Thank you. (Applause)

MR. EINHORN: Well, thank you very much. Those were excellent presentations. Covered a lot of ground, and I'm going to ask a few questions, and then we will open it up to the audience. And I would ask the panelists to try to respond as succinctly as you can, so we can get a lot of Qs and A-s in place.

The first question: Is the likelihood that North Korea will soon have the ability to hold U.S. cities at risk with nuclear-armed missiles; is that a game-changer? Are you concerned about the decoupling of the U.S. extended deterrent? Recall that during the Cold War the United States, you know, threatened to come to the aid of our NATO allies even though the Soviet Union at that time had thousands and thousands of weapons that could strike the United States, multiples of what North Korea had, and yet the NATO allies never really seemed to lose faith in the credibility of the U.S. deterrent.

So, I ask the question again. Is the acquisition of a North Korean nuclear armed capability against the continental United States a game-changer? Elaine, do you want to start?

MS. BUNN: Okay. I think it depends on which game and from whose perspective, as to whether or not a North Korean ICBM would be a game changer. You know, if you are looking at whose perspective. Is it North Korea's? They may think that they can, by holding the U.S. at risk, make us back off from coming to the defense of our allies. I don't think that's true.

Our allies, whether it's Japan or South Korea, they may worry that that would be the case. Again, I don't think it's true. And then when you talk about in the U.S., whose perspective? Is it U.S. security experts? I think they would agree with you, that is, the U.S. has long been at risk from ICBMs and SOBMs. I mean Russia and China have far more of those capabilities than North Korea can ever hope to have, and the U.S. has still fulfilled its commitments to allies.

And also, in addition to that, I think the U.S. is working very hard not to be at risk from North Korea. If you just look at the fact that our missile defense program has for -- over multiple administrations have been focused on our homeland missile defense, national missile defense mission has been focused on, specifically, North Korea capabilities.

And so, yes, mixed test record, but we have been working hard to improve that the last -- nine months ago was the successful test against an intercontinental range missile.

So, in both cases, both if we were at risk I think we would still uphold our commitments if we -- and we are trying hard not to be at risk from North Korea, which should be reassuring to allies.

I would know that it probably doesn't help some of the public discussion and political discussion in the U.S. when we say: that's the line, we cannot accept an ICBM targeting the -- that can target the U.S. from North Korea, that I could understand if that makes allies wonder. If that means we could accept a risk to them but not to the U.S., but then I remind them that we have, for a long time, been concerned about threats to them as well. I mean that's the reason for the cooperation with Japan, which is more advanced than with any ally on missile defense.

MR. EINHORN: Who else will? General?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL YAMAGUCHI: Yes. As to the question about game-changer, if it is a game-changer, this is scary to Japan, and that means if North Korea reaches the capability to launch nuclear warhead to the Continental United States, and then us is going to negotiate with North Korea, that may provide the other countries much incentive to go nuclear and ICBM.

If even a small country, if I have a nuclear weapon with a range reaching United States, I can be equal negotiator with the United States. The hundreds of new newcomers in nuclear wars may come. That is a nightmare.

As to the decoupling question, I don't agree with the decoupling argument, but rather coupling, now this is a coupling phenomena, because if the U.S. is totally safe from North Korea's nuclear weapons while allies are not safe, that may cause the decoupling. But now threat perceptions of the U.S. about North Korea's nuclear weapons, and threat perceptions of us are getting closer that means we can say we are coupling.

And we know that, that may be a remaining question on whether the hydrogen bomb is small enough to mount on the ICBM warhead, or the ICBM has enough capability to survive at the reentry phase, which is very extremely high temperature. And we don't know yet, but we know that if that is the case of northern or a shorter-range missile, they can carry a 500-kilogram warhead at the expense of range. That means those missile have been able to reach Japan, South Korea, and China and Russia.

DR. MICHISHITA: I think when we talk about this we have to kind of bring -- break this discussion down into wartime scenario and peacetime scenario. I'm a little more worried about peacetime consequences of nuclear ICBM, because in wartime North Korea would be able to -- might, you know, threaten the U.S. from helping South Korea, or pretty threatened by, in order to prevent the U.S. from helping South Korea. But I mean, you know, if ever North Korea actually used nuclear weapons against the U.S., you know, they would know what would happen, right.

So, I mean the credibility of nuclear deterrence against the U.S. would not be high, so it's good news. But peacetime, it's like -- you know, serves as an important psychological and political symbol, right? And it is this question that you ask, that itself is in a way scary, because some people think that it might become a game-changer.

That means the U.S. might not be able to remain committed to the defense of South Korea anymore, right, or to the defense of Japan. So, and given the fact that isolationism in this country is on the rise, if combined, if these things are combined it can cut -- you know, it can bring the situation in a very negative way.

So, I mean it can cut both ways, certainly, if you think this is a game-changer you might be encouraged to do more to enhance your deterrence and defense capabilities, but at the same time you might decide, you know, the American people might say, well, why do we have to remain committed to the defense of South Korea, Japan, when we are threatened? So, there are more concerned about political consequences, rather than strategic military consequences.

MR. EINHORN: Eric, do you want to --

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Yes. Just briefly on just a few points. First of all, the ICBMs are

obviously an issue, but the acquisition of a survivable second-strike capability also changes the picture for the United States. I've forgotten the figure, but it's at least 100,000 American citizens in South Korea at any one time, maybe twice that, as well as a very large number in Japan of course.

So, you know, that poses in a conflict then, direct threats to the United States even without an ICBM. The ICBM, you know, is on top of that. The second point is just, this case differs a lot from the Soviet case, I think, in that the Soviet Union, I think, despite some miscalculations, proved itself over time to be risk averse. Not only is North Korea risk accepting, but it manipulates risk fairly consciously.

The closer analogy may be China, you know, a number of people have said, well, we accepted the risk that Mao, with a nuclear weapon could be deterred. Why wouldn't we do the same with North Korea? I would say the difference there is that even by the time Mao died, which was some 12 years after China first tested a nuclear weapon, China had no capability to hit the United States. It had an extraordinarily small nuclear force. It didn't gain that capability until, I believe, in the 1990s or early 2000s.

And then, third and last point is just that, I think we also have to be concerned maybe about second-order effects of a nuclear capability and, again, not restricted to the ICBM. But if Kim Jong-un does, in fact, manipulate crises, and manipulate nuclear crises, to drive a wedge or to harm the economy of South Korea that, you know, I think, as Michishita has said very eloquently, will have an impact, or could very likely have an impact on South Korea's position.

And that, in turn, I think could influence the debate in the United States where we already have populists on the one hand calling for less activism overseas, and a number of academics, outside of the Washington area, calling for an offshore balancing strategy.

MR. EINHORN: Thank you. You know, extended deterrence has both a software component and a hardware component. Among its software components are regular, high-level reaffirmations by the United States, of commitment, joint military exercises. This Extended Deterrence Committee that convenes periodically, but another component I want to ask about is whether Japan has an interest in NATO type consultative or burden-sharing arrangements.

Every once in a while you see indications of that, I'd like to hear Japanese thinking about that as well as the American response about the appropriateness of replicating some aspects of NATO deterrence arrangements. And then on that -- that's one question.

On the hardware side, what is most important to Japan in terms of augmenting hardware? A number of the panelists spoke about the low-yield, sea-launched ballistic missile, the resurrection of a nuclear version of a sea-launch cruise missile, but there are other things, missile defense and the extensive cooperation between the U.S. and Japan on missile defense, or on Japanese thinking about a conventional strike capability, primarily against North Korea.

So, two questions: one about a NATO type extended deterrence arrangements, is there interest in Japan? And second, what are the hardware fixes that could augment extended deterrence? Who wants to take the first swipe, General?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL YAMAGUCHI: It's a set of really interesting questions, and hard to answer. As to NATO type arrangements, if that is closer, that means closer alliance, I would argue that we need to go that way. But if that is -- that means that sort of nuclear sharing, share trigger sort of thing,

I am not so sure that Japanese are happy about doing so. Of course the deterrence provided by U.S. nuclear and conventional capability is important for Japan.

But I don't know whether NATO type of arrangement may become just one-fits-all kind of arrangement. As to NATO burden sharing, you know, burden sharing has always been the program between U.S. and Japan too, but if you look at the defense expenditure from late 1980s to early 1990s, our older countries, including the U.S., France and Germany, decreased defense budget drastically at the end of the Cold War, with only one exception, Japan. Japan kept increasing the defense budget as the GDP grew up until the day of collapse of the bubble economy.

So, we have also accumulated assets of our offense, for contributing to the Alliance. The second question is hardware that is really the hard question. In Japan there are a number of arguments that are going on. One is a long-range strike capabilities, a conventional one, and a second, you know, the Aegis Ashore, the defensive capability against ballistic missile.

And both are important. Also, we are talking about amphibious capabilities too. And I tend to think that they are not free, they are not cheap at all. So, we may have to put priority, which is more important than others, and that kind of argument, discussion has not been seen in the recent years.

Everybody said, this is important; and others say, oh, yes I agree, and this is important. And again others say, I agree. And then I don't want to see bankruptcy in the Japanese defense budget.

MR. EINHORN: Yes?

DR. MICHISHITA: With regard to a NATO type consultation process, I don't think it's a good idea at this point because, you know, there is such a -- you know, a nuclear issue is such an emotional issue in Japan, so Japanese politicians would be discouraged from saying, yes, in any situations to use nuclear weapons, and public opinion would not support such a decision, on the part of the Japanese Prime Minister to say, yes.

So, that would decrease the likelihood of our combined nuclear forces to be used. That means the credibility of such a use would be lower that would undermine the nuclear deterrence. If and when, you know, expertise, understanding of nuclear strategy or security affairs, at large, in Japan will be enhanced, and improve.

And if there is a situation created where Japanese people, as well as policymakers, politicians can engage in an unemotional -- I mean in nuclear discussions in a highly sophisticated, unemotional manner, then might that might be the time when we might start -- might want to start talking about that kind of arrangement.

In terms of low-yield, nuclear weapons, SLCM, in terms of military -- from purely the military technical viewpoint, I think, you know, the U.S. introduction of acquisition of a low-yield nuclear weapons, would enhance the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence to Japan. And to the -- to South Korea is especially, because now we are seeing a large number of North Korean, newly-built ICBM intermediate-range ballistic missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, and short-range missiles, operated on mobile launchers.

So, if you have low-yield nuclear capabilities, that might create the capability on our part to be able to wipe out those, you know, mobile launchers, in case the intention -- of North Korea's intention to use

nuclear weapons against us become clear.

SLCM, to me, it would be too slow. Now, we are faced with no -- you know, a short-range nuclear threat, particularly against South Korea. So, you know, South Korea has already deployed more than 1,000 cruise and ballistic missiles combined, certainly conventionally armed; and is trying to increase the number of ballistic missiles rather than cruise missiles.

Why? Because by cruise missiles are simply too slow, so they are on the way to increase the basic missile capability, so, I mean, I think there are, you know, they are pretty logical, it is pretty logical. And so then the question is whether or not it is a good idea for us to use low-yield nuclear weapons deployed on SSBNs.

Logically, it would be a best option, right? Speed, it has a speed, and its credibility of use will be high because it's low-yield, and you can launch it from far away, so the platform will be safe,

However, you know, using strategic forces, nuclear forces for tactical purposes would mean -- for tactical purposes that would create a different strategic, psychological, political issues, particularly within our relationship with Russia and China.

So, you know, that I have given you a tactical, very limited assessment of whether it's a good idea or not, but we have to then start taking into account broader issues when we come to a final decision.

MR. EINHORN: Eric?

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: So that discussion of deploying tactical weapons into Japan is really just starting, and I think Professor Narushige is correct that that's, primarily, because of the domestic constraint which would be almost as great as that on an indigenous Japanese nuclear weapon, but this could change over time.

Just in terms of: would this be effective? So, the two questions here, would it be effective for deterrence? Would it be effective for assurance? In terms of assurance, what we are really talking about here are perceptions, so in this case it's the partner's perception of the adversary's perception of risks. So, there's a whole lot of perception in there, and from that perspective maybe deployment into Japan might have a calming effect on Japan. It would have probably an uncertain effect on North Korea.

But I would say the circumstances are quite different than the circumstances that we had at the height of the Cold War in the NATO case. In that case we were sprinkling nuclear weapons around to artillery battalions, and other maneuver units, around a battlefield that we anticipated would be overrun.

So, there was almost a guarantee that these things would be used. That's a very different situation than we have in Japan today. No one is expecting Honshu to be overrun by anybody's forces, and if we put them into Japan they would almost certainly be survivable.

So, again, yes maybe an impact on perception, but probably not on, really, the mechanics of deterrence. As far as Japanese equipment is concerned JASSM -- I'm sorry -- the strike option has really gained a huge momentum, and I'm expecting to see it in the next budget. In fact, I think in the proposed budget there's a study of the JASSM-ER, a U.S. cruise missile system with a range of about 1,000 kilometers.

And of course Japan is working hard on ballistic missile defenses including, I think, now a commitment to deploy the Aegis Ashore.

BMD, of course you want it, but in my view the only thing that really would influence deterrence is -- you know, are nuclear weapons themselves that the Japanese strike option, probably based on cruise missiles, those take a-half-an-hour to an hour to arrive at their target, and North Korea has mobile missiles, and it can probably hide them. Japan has very limited reconnaissance. Essentially, it wouldn't provide anything that the -- the very large stock of the U.S. cruise missiles, it doesn't.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL YAMAGUCHI: As to the long-range strike capability, I prefer that, that not because we can shoot enemy position, but rather it is good for archipelagic defense of Southwestern Island. The Southwestern Island is 1,300-kilometer long, it is long. And we cannot put all the almost 200 islands with defensive capabilities.

And that we are putting some small stations in Miyako, Ishigaki, Yonaguni, and Amami Ōshima, major -- the big islands there, but to provide them with fire support. We cannot put all the artillery pieces all on those islands, but rather, if we have 100-kilometer long cruise missile, or maybe 500 kilometers may be enough to support, support for instance, Miyako from Okinawa Main Island.

MS. BUNN: I just wanted to address the NATO-like issue. I think sometimes with Northeast Asia allies this whole NATO-like arrangement takes on something that's mystical and magical. I would say that Japan has what most NATO allies have in terms of a NATO-like arrangement. Unless you are talking about the small subset of countries that have dual-capable aircraft and U.S. bombs nuclear weapons deployed on their territory, which is a small subset.

The rest of NATO allies have consultations which are very much like what we do with the Japanese. In fact, I would say that it's, you can get into more in-depth discussions and consultations when there are two allies involved and not 28. So, in a sense it's an even deeper kind of consultation. And there are other ways that non-nuclear allies can participate in even in nuclear deterrence.

For instance, what we call, in NATO it's called SNOWCAT, Support to Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics; there has to be an acronym for everything. And that really is flying support alongside bombers. Well, both Japan and South Korean fighters have flown alongside U.S. nuclear-capable bombers in Asia, as they fly assurance missions -- deterrence and assurance missions over South Korea. The Japanese and the South Korean fighters, sort of, handoff depending on which airspace they are in, in flying support for those bombers.

MR. EINHORN: I'm going to abuse the prerogative of the Chair just one more time, and then we'll open it up to questions. And ask three short questions: one, and Eric touched on this and his remarks; but question is: how does Japan balance two critical objectives, nuclear disarmament and extended deterrence? I especially want to hear from our Japanese friends on that.

The second question: is interest in Japan growing for indigenous Japanese nuclear weapons capability? Again, Eric touched on this a bit in terms of his typology of the various interests involved. But what could be done to -- what factors would increase or decrease that interest in a Japanese nuclear weapons capability?

And third, a hobby horse of mine, I'm sorry to inflict it all on you. But I'm looking at possible outcomes for U.S. DPRK engagement on the nuclear issue. I'm very skeptical that engagement, even

with tremendous maximum pressure deployed, I'm very skeptical that North Korea is going to abandon its nuclear weapons capability completely and soon.

And so I advocate at least exploring the possibility of a phased approach to denuclearization that could start with an interim freeze on North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities. There might be a commitment to the eventual complete elimination, but that would be well down the road, and no guarantee that that would be ever achieved.

So, my question to -- especially to our Japanese friends is: what would be the reaction in Japan to that approach? To an interim freeze that could cap missile testing, nuclear testing, production of fissile, a material for nuclear weapons. So, it capped that capability, for some significant period of time, but would not eliminate it right away. What would be Japan's reaction to that? So, three questions.

DR. MICHISHITA: Actually on the way, General Yamaguchi and I were, well, was on the same plane yesterday, coming into Washington, and we were exactly discussing this issue of how to balance the two goals that we have of the nuclear disarmament, and nuclear deterrence.

Well, we might be hypocritical, in the sense that on the one hand we always call for nuclear deterrence, the disarmament and we are -- you know, regard ourselves as a one of the leaders of the world in that effort. But at the same time when the new 2018 NPR came out, which emphasized, you know, possible use of nuclear weapons, we strongly welcomed it.

So, it's like, what are we doing? Theoretically we can make sense of it by saying, for now, so the second goal is about second agenda, you know, strong, robust nuclear deterrence is a short-term goal, and the first goal is a long-term goal, which can be achieved only through the process in which, you know, we make a lot of effort to enhance deterrence, both conventional and deter -- nuclear, and make, you know, the world a better place, a more peaceful place.

So that, one day will be -- start, you know, taking care of the first goal in a more realistic manner, so then that's my -- I would say so, if I'm asked.

Second, independent, Japan's independent nuclear forces; I don't think, you know -- Eric said that 16 percent supports that?

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: It was really 20 percent.

DR. MICHISHITA: Twenty? Okay. Although, I mean, those people do not understand how costly, how difficult to introduce, deploy, how difficult it might be to coordinate, how difficult it might be for us to come up with a nuclear strategy. You know, it's a -- I was talking to a French security specialist one day, and they are complaining about two big money eaters in their defense policy.

One was RAFA, you know, French-made DuckFighter aircraft, the second was in French Independent Strategic Nuclear Forces. I mean, would we want to do the same? I don't think so. There are a lot more defense needs, conventional defense needs, and they are in fact -- in fact, Japan has a cumulative government debt of more than 200 percent of gross domestic product. We would not be able to afford the new independent nuclear forces.

Two, but, okay, there is a possibility that one day if we -- the suggestion is created, where, if for some reason the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is diminished to the point that we will

no longer be able to keep relying on it, we have to think about. But that I don't think that will come easily, because the U.S. is such a sophisticated nuclear power.

And Japan is such an important cornerstone of the U.S. policy in the Pacific. Without Japan the U.S. will not be able to remain a Pacific power, going forward.

North Korea's, the possibility of the U.S. deciding to engage in dialogue with North Korea, I think immediate reaction would be, no, not at this point, because it's just too early. You know, we are in the process of putting a maximum pressure on North Korea, so not now, but it doesn't mean to say that we will not exclude the possibility of, you know, U.S. or Japan, or even six -- you know, North Korea's Five Parties engaging in dialogue at some point.

And in my opinion, we are actually already the pre-negotiation bargaining process, in which North Korea is trying to enhance its bargaining position in future dialogue, by enhancing its nuclear and missile capabilities. And while we are trying to enhance our bargaining position by imposing more sanctions, robust sanctions, and strengthening on our defense capabilities.

So, I think that's -- and then recently, you know, even Mr. Abe, Prime Minister Abe, is kind of by -- at a kind of encouragement from the opposition party, started to say we are putting maximum pressure in order to encourage North Korea to start talking about nuclear disarmament.

MR. EINHORN: But what if they began talking about nuclear disarmament but they are -- you know, they are not prepared to get rid of their nuclear weapons. Does it make sense to fall back on a near-term freeze? That would only cap their capability for a considerable period of time, what would you Japan's reaction be to that?

DR. MICHISHITA: I think people are realistic enough to accept it, but we have to think about the timeframe. In the 1994 Agreed Framework it was a 10-year target date. You know, there was no target date in the 2007 Agreement, maybe this time around, maybe 10 years was too short for us to really make a difference in North Korea. So, maybe 20 years, 15/20 year, I don't know, and what kind of part it should be in, and what kind of phased process that we have to talk about.

And I would like to ask you to -- you know, and we have to learn lessons from past experience. For example, Agreed Framework was a poorly designed agreement, because it said until the, you know, light-water reactors were completed, construction of it was completed, we were supposed to provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil every year.

So, it was like a -- North Korea was discouraged from cooperating fully on the construction of light-water reactor. So, that was more a hazard, so there are lessons that we can learn from past experience.

MR. EINHORN: General?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL YAMAGUCHI: You know, I am comfortable with the two different things, ultimate goal of abolition of nuclear weapons, and relying upon extended deterrence, that is totally fine simply, because we have been living in that sort of paradigm for 73 years, and we have been living in a virtual non-nuclear world, never been used. The nuclear weapon, never been used. If it goes 28 years more it's going to be 100 years.

So, I would like to see, continue to see a virtual non-nuclear world. So, usable nuclear weapons kind of thing, I am not comfortable at all.

And secondly, the Japanese nuclear weapon does not help us at all. That is, and it may take time but Japan, if you think about mutually assured destruction sort of a system, that is a balance of tier, the balance of what we are losing. But also if we look at the balance of what we are losing, vis-à-vis North Korea, we have too much to lose. So, we are not fit to nuclear weapons at all.

And thirdly, the conventional wisdom says that the tactical, or the operational nuclear weapons are to compensate inferiority and conventional military balance, and compensate less precise precision munitions.

In that sense that we have precision-guided munitions, and we are in (inaudible) in terms of conventional weapons -- conventional forces, we don't have to rely on the new tactical -- the use of weapons in operational or tactical sense.

I'm wondering if the U.S. is losing its self-confidence on conventional forces. I'm not -- I don't have any doubt about that, but if we are totally superior in conventional forces, we don't have to rely on, rely on the nuclear weapons.

MR. EINHORN: I'm going to try to make good on my promise to turn it over to the audience, in the remaining time we have. So please, you know, raise your hand, and we'll get a microphone to you. Yes, this gentleman here in the front? Please identify yourself, if you could?

QUESTIONER: My name is (Inaudible), Reagan Foundation, Japan Native U.S. citizen. I'm a hundred percent for Japan going nuclear, not against. I think Japan is a grown up, no longer a teenager, so I think they had better take some initiative. I'm not saying they should break up the treaty with the U.S. No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying they should take initiative, not only because of North Korea, but because of China belligerency, they should take the leadership in the Pacific Asia. But I had two or three questions on that, but Bob took it away from me, so my question is -- just one minute.

MR. EINHORN: Just give us your best question.

QUESTIONER: Okay. That's what -- and I'm trying to do that. Can't somebody talk about the NPR, the new one that just came in, the 2018, can you guys talk about that for me? Thank you.

MR. EINHORN: Why don't we take a few questions, and then we'll answer them in a group. Yes, a question in the back, there in the middle.

QUESTIONER: Hello. My name is Evan Sankey. I work at Johns Hopkins SAIS. One of the speakers mentioned the INF Treaty, responses to Russian violations of the INF Treaty. And I was hoping you guys could talk about that a little bit more. I've heard that the Pacific Commander, Harry Harris, recently mentioned that the INF Treaty might be something of an impediment to American strategy in Asia. So, if you could respond to that, please? Thank you.

MR. EINHORN: Right here, in the front.

MS. JASPER: My name is Mila Jasper, and I'm a Journalist with the Medill News Service. My question is more about China now. And I'm just wondering if you think that China still considers North

Korea to be a buffer state, and how that would affect how you the U.S. and Japan deals with security in that region, and if that contributes to China driving a wedge between Seoul and Washington?

MR. EINHORN: Okay. Why don't we answer -- I'll ask the panelists, don't feel you have to respond to every question, or that you even have to respond at all, but you have the opportunity to address these three questioners. Who wants to who wants to start? I didn't mean to discourage you too much. But General, go ahead.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL YAMAGUCHI: Just one question about the new NPR. I have parts I like, and I have parts I don't like. But most, a favorite part is the non-proliferation part. The new Nuclear Posture Review cares about number of nuclear weapon States. It says the U.S. is minimizing the number of nuclear weapon States, and that is what I like.

But I'm a little bit frustrated about the fact that there is no little mentioning about how we reduce the number of nuclear weapon states. If U.S. is ready to elaborate how we should reduce the number of weapon states, starting with North Korea, perhaps I would be happier.

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Just a couple of points. First, to one question that wasn't raised, but the comment on indigenous capability; Japan is clearly not an adolescent or a child, you know, and I certainly hope that Japan doesn't either perceive it that way, or perceive that it's being treated that way. I do think though, from a realist perspective, there are a large number of arguments against.

I addressed the cost issue. To me the biggest concern is that this undermines the U.S.-Japan Alliance, so that there's already quite a bit of fear within the defense establishment and elsewhere about entanglement from a U.S. perspective. So, this is really, you know, the shoe is now very much on the other foot from where it was during the Cold War, and I think, you know, especially if Japan acquires a nuclear capability that is aimed at China in the context of deterring any type of conflict to include gray zone conflict. You know, I have great concerns about what that might do to the Alliance.

On the cost issue, there have been a few studies in Japan about what replacing -- the capabilities that the U.S. already provides to the Alliance would cost. They range between double and triple Japan's current defense budget, and again that's only U.S. forces deployed in theater currently, that doesn't even include U.S. forces that would flow into theater.

And if you add on to that the nuclear costs I think that, you know, this becomes quite prohibitive. And, you know, and in a last point on this, is that a lot of times a Japanese nuclear capability, or a Korean capability is regarded as sort of the end of history, the end of rivalry. This is something that stabilizes the situation and, you know, there's a debate about this.

But particularly in the Japan, in the Sino-Japan context it's hard for me to imagine China halting security competition, or the contest over contested territories with Japan, even calculated at exchange rates China's economy is two-and-a-half times Japan, and that ratio is growing. It may well seek escalation, superiority, if Japan goes nuclear, and that's a contest China can afford, and Japan really can't without the American Alliance.

So, I guess I would push back on that. You know, I understand the sentiment, but I think there are good reasons not to do it. I'm sure you have reasons of your own.

And then just on the INF Treaty, very briefly, you know, it's long been the view of many U.S.

defense planners that the U.S.-Russia INF Treaty puts the United States at a disadvantage, you know, in competition with China, in conventional competition with China.

China is not bound by it, so it has developed a very large and sophisticated force of ballistic missiles, to include intermediate-range ballistic missiles now. The U.S. can't do that, so there's been discussion -- experimentation with ways to develop, you know, parallel capabilities that don't violate the INF Treaty.

And these involve things like an air-dropped ballistic missile, if you can imagine that or, of course, some conventionally-armed submarine-launched ballistic missile. But I think, you know, we ought to keep some perspective here. Yes, the ballistic missile threat presents a certain challenge that cruise missiles might not, but China developed that capability largely because of its conventional weaknesses in other areas, so it's a compensating capability that's part of its A2AD capability.

The U.S. has many other strike means, a very large force of cruise missiles, it's got stealth systems, you know, seed capabilities, all kinds of capabilities that bring to the table the same menu of options. So, you know, I think sometimes that's discussed out of context.

MR. EINHORN: I'll just add to that, that the nuclear armed, sea-launched cruise missile has sometimes been portrayed as a bargaining chip to get the Russians to give up their ground-launched cruise missile that's in violation of the INF Treaty. I think the U.S., this planned nuclear sea-launch cruise missile has a number of functions. It's to, you know, it's to fill a perceived gap in deterrence, it's to counter and respond to the Russian violation, and to serve as a bargaining chip.

Several weeks ago Secretary Mattis suggested that it was a bargaining chip, we'd be prepared to give it up if the Russians would stand down from there INF violation. People, a lot of people in the U.S. bureaucracy were upset with what Secretary Mattis said, because they believed that we need it to close this gap in deterrence.

The Japanese in particular are happy with the resurrection of a nuclear sea-launch cruise missile, so let's not bargain it away. Let's develop it and deploy it. So, I don't think the U.S. position is fully resolved yet.

There was a question in the back?

MS. BUNN: Can I just address the questions on the INF Treat?

MR. EINHORN: Okay.

MS. BUNN: I'm glad to see that the -- as a SAIS alum, I'm glad to see that the SAIS question on INF is getting a lot of attention. So, just to be clear, that everybody in the room understands, it is ground-launched cruise missile and ballistic missiles between 500 and 5,500 kilometers in range that are prohibited by the INF Treaty.

What the Russians have done is developed and now deployed a ground-launched cruise missile, the SSC-8 that violates that treaty. So, whether it is an impediment -- is the INF Treaty and impediment to the U.S.? Tell me, where in Asia the U.S. would or could deploy on land a ground-based cruise or ballistic missile? I don't see it. I don't see where it is, and therefore I don't think it's an impediment to us.

MR. TOKOLA: Thank you. I'm Mark Tokola, from the Korea Economic Institute. The polling shows more support in South Korea, among the South Korean public, for development of autonomous nuclear weaponry. I think it's superficial, unlikely to happen, but if they did what would that do to Japan? Would Japan be more inclined to follow suit if Korea (inaudible) its own nuclear weapons? And what it would it do to the Japanese, South Korean military relations?

MR. EINHORN: Thank you, Mark.

MS. PERLMAN: Thank you. I'm Diane Perlman, George Mason School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. You know, you mentioned that deterrence is not a guarantee, and there are situations in which it breaks down. And there's a huge body, a really profound body of work that was done mostly in the 1980s on deterrence theory, spiral theory, Jervis, Ned Lebow, Ralph K White said deterrence, if it worked -- it works if it's accompanied by drastic tension reduction.

Also people are more dangerous when they are afraid and when they're threatened, and provoked. So, this paradigm, it's kind of like a Newtonian paradigm, force -- counter-force pressure coercion doesn't have an end game, or it doesn't contain the seeds for its own resolution.

And there's also, in the field of complex analysis, there's no looking at what's the conflict of -- what's the underlying conflict about analyzing it? What do the parties want? What are legitimate goals? And also no mention of the tension reduction that was going -- yeah, that's going on now between North and South Korea, and outside-the-box strategies for transforming the conflict. It's difficult, but just reducing tension as an organizing principle, and addressing the underlying conflict.

MR. EINHORN: Thank you. So, we are we've run out of time. So, we are going to allow each of the panelists to take his or her last licks. Answer these questions, and make any concluding remarks that you will.

DR. MICHISHITA: Okay. Let me address the question that was raised by the lady in the front. So, is North Korea serving as a buffer for China? I think so. And there are actually two more reasons why North Korea can be -- might be useful for China, because, in my opinion, North Korea is like functioning as a lightning rod for China, because when -- you know, before North Korea started to make a fuss who was that -- you know, kind of what was the, which country it was, you know, in the center for what, the attention in terms of security? China.

You know, we are always talking about the South China Sea, there was a, you know, ruling by International Court of Arbitration, so China was on the spot. But when North Korea started to make fuss that, well, the attention has been diverted away, so it's useful for China. And also China, as I said -- I mean North Korea is making it hard for South Korea to solely rely on the U.S. or Japan. Therefore, South Korea is almost forced to look to China.

So, you know, North Korea is working to the benefit of China. So, therefore, we know that there is a limit to what China can do about North Korea.

However, good news is, China is putting pressure, not to the extent that would make North Korea collapse, but to the extent that -- which would make North Korea feel pretty bad pain. So, I think that's the kind of a game that China is playing, and that China is, you know, trying to strike a good balance between those two objectives, sometimes somewhat contradictory objectives. So, we keep our fingers crossed, and hope China will keep doing a good job.

MR. EINHORN: Elaine, why don't we just go down the row?

MS. BUNN: Sure. Nobody talked about the NPR underlining that cares about -- non-proliferation about the number of nuclear weapon states. I would say that extended deterrence is, among other things, a non-proliferation tool.

It's a non-proliferation tool for the states over which we do have some influence that is our allies, and the one of the reasons that I focus so much in my last job, on the dialogues with allies is because I don't want to say in 10, not tomorrow, not next year, not five years from now probably.

But in 10, 15, 20 years I don't want to have a saying: why did our allies, why did South Korea, why did Japan, why did allies feel like they need to have their own nuclear capabilities, because they didn't really believe in our extended nuclear deterrence commitment? So, as a non-proliferation tool, I think extended deterrence has a big role.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL YAMAGUCHI: Yeah. Maybe not directly related to the question, to the discussion today, but I'd like to make two points. First of all, ROK-U.S. Alliance, Japan-U.S. Alliance are mutually dependent.

For Japan, Japanese in particular, Korean Peninsula has always been the concern since 8th Century, because ROK-U.S. Alliance for the rest of -- for the 50, 60 years we never cared about threat coming through Korean Peninsula. Thanks to the young Koreans and the young Americans, that is what we need to think of.

Then secondly, deterring North Korea, North Korea from going father where using nuclear weapon is not enough. We need to compel, to sway, North Korea to give it up. I know it takes time, but if we give it up it will -- we will have very grave result in the world, if everybody here wants to go nuclear.

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Thanks. First I'll just address the question of the potential impact of a ROK nuclear weapon. You know, and I can't answer the question, but I certainly want to highlight the question. The record of cooperation, you know, even with the North Korean threat as pressing as it is between these two countries, is very, very poor.

Intelligence sharing and cooperation, logistical cooperation through an acquisition and servicing agreement, discussions of the evacuation of non-combatants; all these things have been on the table now for, you know, almost 20 years maybe, the Neo is newer, but they haven't moved very far.

The GSOMIA, an intelligence-sharing agreement was reached, and basically fell apart as soon as it was signed, there's no progress on logistics at all, and really Korea has balked on even discussion of Japanese participation in a Neo on Korean soil.

So, there's not much cooperation, there are indications over time, of some reaction between these two as a matter of fact, so originally this is primarily from the Korean side, you know, over drinks with Korean Defense officials you frequently get questions about what we are up to with Japan, and why we are encouraging Japan's rearmament.

But also when you look at what Korea actually does, there acquisitions, they seem to match, or seem to have matched Japan Aegis for Aegis, and fighter for fighter, now F35 for F-35. More recently though we see some reaction by Japan; for the first time when I went and to the Japanese Defense

Ministry, I got questions about what the Koreans were up to.

So, we are starting to see the shoe on the other foot, and we are starting to see what might be regarded as imitation, or at least coincidences on the Japanese side, renegotiation of the Civilian Nuclear Agreement with reference to Korea.

Strike is probably the best example since that came right on the heels of an agreement by the United States to permit strike systems, actually ballistic missiles in Korea with longer ranges and larger warheads.

And so I think it's a great question, of what the impact of an ROK nuclear weapon would be on Japan. Again, you know, it's hard for me to see that as the tipping point, but nevertheless that would be quite a shock, I think, to the Japanese system.

Let me just conclude, rather than by answering more questions, just with one comment. And that is that really my biggest concern here is the extent to which events in North Korea might be driving the train. We get one nuclear posture, period, and that nuclear posture is going to have significance for all of our potential rivals or, you know, potential adversaries.

So this, you know, that this is going to have an impact on strategic stability, particularly with China. So, we never talked much about China, but China really punches well below its weight in the nuclear realm. You know, whereas Russia's economy is roughly the size of Australia's, and it has 10 times the number of warheads that China maintains. So, for decades now China has really punched well below its weight; it not only has a no-first use doctrine, but its force structure has generally matched that.

There are signs of change now, but in any case I think to the extent we begin to change our rhetoric, our declaratory posture, and our force structure, particularly, to acquire tactical nuclear weapons, you know, this could have a very significant impact on China's nuclear behavior, and it's -- you know, it's meaning for our larger strategic position.

MR. EINHORN: I'll give a short answer to Mark Tokola's question. And this is very blunt, and probably glib, but in 10 years from now my prediction is that there will be two nuclear-armed States in Northeast Asia, China and North Korea. If we are very lucky over time there will only be one, China, but if because there are two, a third decides, because it can no longer rely on the extended deterrence, if a third decides, whether it's South Korea or Japan to acquire its own nuclear, there will be a fourth.

I think if South Korea acquires nuclear weapons, Japan will, if Japan acquires nuclear weapons South Korea will. So, you can look at any of those options one, two, three, or four. I'm hoping against hope that it will be one.

Anyway, with that somewhat optimistic note, let me close the session by welcoming you all, by saying how grateful we are that you came out this morning. And especially by welcoming and thanking our panelists who did a terrific job. And Maeve, thank you very much for organizing it. (Applause)

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