THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
CENTER FOR EAST ASIA POLICY STUDIES

THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY: AN EXAMINATION OF TOKYO AND WASHINGTON

The Brookings Institution
Falk Auditorium
December 7, 2017
Washington, D.C.

[Transcript prepared from an audio recording]

* * * * *

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
706 Duke Street, Suite 100
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190

Panelists:

RICHARD C. BUSH, Moderator
Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Center for East Asia Policy Studies
The Brookings Institution

YOSHIHIDE SOEYA
Professor of Political Science and Faculty of Law
Keio University

TARUN CHHABRA
Fellow, Project on International Order and Strategy
The Brookings Institution

CHIKAKO UEKI
Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies
Waseda University

THOMAS WRIGHT
Senior Fellow and Director, Center on the United States and Europe
The Brookings Institution

P R O C E E D I N G S

DR. BUSH: Good morning. My name is Richard Bush. I'm the director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies here at Brookings. And it's my pleasure to invite you to our event this morning on "The Politics of Foreign Policy," with specific respect to Japan and the United States.

This is one of a series of programs that we have had over the last few years that bear on matters concerning the U.S.-Japan alliance, and how to ensure its effectiveness, as it tries to protect peace and security in East Asia and the world; obviously, if domestic political support for an alliance is lacking it will be a lot harder for the allies to act in concert towards their stated goals.

And I think it's fair to say that support for this particular alliance has gone up and down over the years, and the political situation in each country has varied. We've got used to a lot of discontinuity in the leadership of Japan. One prime minister every year; and now Prime Minister Abe is breaking records, because of the length of his time as prime minister. The United States has had a major discontinuity starting January 20th this year, and so there's a lot to talk about. To do so we have two Brookings scholars to talk about the United States, and two scholars from Japan to talk about their country.

The four are: Yoshihide Soeya, who is professor of political science at Keio University; Tom Wright, who is director of Brookings Center on U.S. and Europe, a senior fellow, and also the leader of the project on International Order and Strategy; Chikako Ueki who is a professor at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda University; and then finally, Tarun Chhabra who is a fellow here in the Foreign Policy program, working on the Project of International Order and Strategy. We will hear from our presenters in that order. They'll talk for 10 to 15 minutes, then the five of us will have a conversation for a few minutes, and then we'll bring the audience into the conversation. So, to start, Soeya San, please?

DR. SOEYA: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I read somewhere recently that some place stopped using the term "ladies and gentlemen" for reasons which I may not elaborate, but naturally it came out from my mind, because I'm half-sleepy, sorry. It's midnight, midnight in Japan, but I'll try my best to awake myself.

I'm talking about Japanese security policies, in the context of the recently-installed new security legislation. And I think I'm known in Japan and somewhere else as somebody who is basically critical about Prime Minister Abe's initiative on this, but as a scholar I would like to emphasize that that's because of my analysis of the policy, rather than anything else, let alone personal or anything of that sort. And in order to -- once again, as a result of analysis that I'd like to present, implications could be a bit critical about the current development of the security policies. And in order to make that point clear, allow me to get to basics, which should be familiar to many of you, but put those basics in a certain context, would be hopefully, something new, or something, which you don't necessarily hear often in the Washington community from a Japanese interlocutor.

And this is the most basic thing, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. And "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

So, it's not surprising that many of our Constitution experts have long read this Article 9 prohibiting both U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and the existence of self-defense forces, as a purely legal argument. But of course in reality the government has continued to reread this Article, and in the 1950s the initial rereading of this led to the establishment of self-defense forces. And a key phrase is the first line of the second paragraph, "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph", which is "renouncing war and the threat of use of force as a means of settling international disputes." So, if it's not

as a means of settling international disputes, Japan can maintain military forces. That's a long-established, basic reinterpretation of this Article 9. Sorry about these basics.

So, this is why our government has long refrained from getting into the domain of collective self defense, let alone collective security under the U.N. Charter, because those domains are considered to exceed the limits as a result of rereading of this Article 9. So, these are the basics, so the basis of the current security legislation. The legislation for peace and security consisted of 10 revisions of the existing laws, and an installment of one new law, and to make this complex thing simple, domains where these 10 revisions and one new law meant something could be categorizing to three areas of security policies.

And one is the situation threatening Japan's survival, so this is the most controversial area, where the right of collective self-defense comes into question. And second, is the so-called important influence of the situations, so this is the expansion of situations surrounding Japan, revision of the guidelines in the '90s. And the third domain has to do with Japanese more active participation in international peacekeeping operations.

And from my point of view, the second area and the third domain, of course there are, you know, several problems, so depending on where you stand, but basically these are, I think even myself would be supportive of these new areas of Japanese activeness. So, the central question remains as to the first domain which is, in Japanese we call it (speaking in Japanese) situations, you know, so existential crisis, situations threatening Japan's survival. And so as a result of this new law, three conditions of the use of force for self-defense have been changed, as to the first condition. So, the black parts are traditional, kind of three conditions. When an armed attack against Japan occurs, and secondly, when there is no other appropriate means available to repeal the attack. And third, use of force should be limited to the minimum extent necessary.

And the second, and the third conditions remain the same, but as to the first condition this red part was added as a result of the new security legislation. That is, "When an armed attack against a foreign country," I think the U.S. is not necessarily the single country mentioned here. Generally, "When an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, and as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness." The American people should be familiar with the last part.

And so this red part implies the exercise of the right of collective self-defense which exceeds, I mean domains of Japan's traditionally-held self-defense for -- strictly for self-defense purposes. But this collective self-defense, politically speaking, in our domestic context, is a result of a series of compromises on the part of, particularly Prime Minister Abe, and other politicians who associate themselves closely with the prime minister.

And of course it's a dream for our leader to revise the Constitution, and it's not secret, he has stated, you know, privately and officially in a very explicit way, and the revision of the Constitution is important almost like as a symbolism, and the departure from the post-war regime, I think, tells of what this essentially, maybe not that ideological but, you know, this kind of symbolic sort of agenda to get out of the post-war regime.

So the initial thing which Prime Minister Abe sort of floated as an idea to the political world, and the general public was changing Article 96 of the Constitution, and Article 96 of the Constitution says, "Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House."

And the proposal was to change this “two-thirds or more” to “a majority”, so lower the barrier in proposing constitutionary vision in the Diet. But this proposal has turned out to be so unpopular in the general public, even the Sankei Shimbun affiliated sort of public opinion polls. The result was negative views prevailed over positive views for this proposal.

So after that, Prime Minister Abe stopped talking about this, and came the collective security issue. So, in this sequence, collective security as a domestic political agenda originates from his desire to the post-war Constitution, and to sort of reset the occupation regime, so to speak.

So this is, again, the repetition of the red part, the right of collective self-defense, but the trick here was, this was done without touching the Article 9. So, this has to be explained to the general public. This still remains within the domain which Article 9 permits. "And when an armed attack is against a foreign country that in a close relationship with Japan occurs, and as a result threatens Japan's survival," so this is critical, "As a result threatens Japan's survival, and poses a clear danger to blah-blah-blah."

So, this has to do with Japan's own security and the existence, so which is regarded as legitimate in the spirit of Article 9. So, as a result of this constitutional interpretation, this domain, where Japan, you know, sort of got into by making it constitutional to exercise the right of collective self-defense, can be said as satisfying only half of the full right of collective self-defense as justified by the United Nations. So, Japan does not exercise the right of collective self-defense in areas which goes beyond the cases where Japan's survival is threatened. So, I sometimes talk to the listeners, audience and students, half-jokingly and half-seriously, in terms of the logic. If Mexico attacks the United States, would that pose a danger of Japanese security or existence? Of course it's up to the interpretation of the incumbent government, but maybe not. So, this is the point that I wanted to highlight, in the context of U.N. Charter, Article 51, the right of collective self defense is recognized as a legitimate right of a sovereign nation, by the U.N. Charter 51. "Nothing in the current charter shall impair the inherent right of the individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. So, the right of collective self-defense is an internationalist, I mean, right.

So this is a sort of interim measure in the stages and areas where the U.N. would not function on the basis of its Charter. So, this right is an internationalist right, not domestic, nationalist right, but Japan had to justify this in the name of defense of Japan, again, because of Article 9. And so, that's a legal sort of context in which this could be interpreted. And again, if you put this in a post-war context of evolution of Japanese security policies, this was almost as if, déjà vu, we are watching déjà vu, which is expansion of Japan's security policy that realize as a result of reinterpreting Article 9, reinterpreting the sort of, realm of which Article 9 would allow. And the first, first case was in the '50s, self-defense force laws and defense agency law were enacted in 1954, without changing Article 9, so as a result political argument and the move to revise the Constitution subsided substantially.

Japan could have a self-defense force military without changing Article 9. Before this, this was rather a logical and rational argument that in order for Japan to have the military, Article 9 needs to be changed. That was almost common sense, before this, among many politicians. And that Japan managed to have established a self-defense force without changing Article 9, so argument for changing Article 9 naturally subsided after that.

And the second case would be the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, achieved by the Kishi government, and the motivation of Kishi was clearly, so-called nationalism, and he wanted to achieve so-called equal partnership with the United States by revising the 1951 original Security Treaty, which Shigeru Yoshida signed with the United States.

So, to the extent Japan achieved, you know, equality, there's no such thing for any country, but rhetorically. To the extent Japan achieves, you know, equality with the U.S., Japan's autonomy will be expanded. So, that was the logic of the Security Treaty Revision, led by Kishi, and the motivation was clearly nationalism. But as a result, if you look at a bird-eye-view, a more macro view, as a result of the revision, alliance setup became more consolidated and institutionalized. And if you would like to use the term Japan's dependence on the U.S., Japan's dependence on the U.S. became more explicit and more institutionalized as a result of the revision of the treaty. And this treaty of course is a current security

treaty which Japan and the U.S. has.

And Abe's case of right of collective self-defense was realized by complying with the logic of Article 9, and as a result, U.S.-Japan alliance was strengthened, these are nothing but post-war regimes, basic post-war regimes. And so the drive which came out of the motivation of getting out of the post-war regime ended up strengthening the post-war regime, so to speak; so this is what I mean by déjà vu. And in that sense this is not really new.

And my final point has to do with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, revised by Kishi in 1960. And the key clauses are Article VI and V. And Article VI says, "For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the U.S. is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan." And it is often called The Far Eastern Clause, but it basically justifies American military presence in Japan in the name of defense of Japan, as well as security of East Asia. And Article V, "Each party recognizes that an attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and security, and declares that it would have to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes."

So, this is a red part in that the territories under the administration of Japan is because of the Article 9; but this is often called as U.S. commitment to defending Japan, which is not entirely wrong of course, but the essence of this clause is collective self-defense. And this point becomes obvious if you compare this to Article IV of this treaty, "Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area, on any of the parties in it would be dangerous to its own peace and security," and declare that it would have to meet the -- So, the only difference, substantial difference has to do with this red part. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in the territories under the administration of Japan, in ANZUS Treaty in the Pacific area. So, this is clearly collective self-defense between Australia and the United States; and in case of Japan, in the territories under the administration of Japan because of Article 9. So, this is essentially a clause about collective self-defense, on the basis of U.N. Charter 51.

And if I come to this point, I have to say something which nobody in Japan is arguing about. I haven't heard of anybody saying the same thing. That is, as a result of changing the right of collective self-defense, this red part should be rewritten, theoretically speaking, because now Japan security legislation has gone beyond the area. I mean, under the territory -- in the territories under the administration of Japan. So, Japan can now exercise the right in existential crisis, which goes beyond the Japanese territories under the administration of Japan, but none of us is making this point, and this is a dangerous point to state explicitly, because I don't think both Washington and Tokyo can handle this issue.

So, I hope President Trump would not notice it, and if he starts -- if he notices it, and if he starts to present this question to the Japanese government, now, you know, you can help us, not only in crisis in Japanese territories, but beyond if it has, you know, implications for your country. And the Korean Peninsula is clearly such a contingency. And the South China Sea, I'm not sure. Once again, it's up to the decision by the incumbent government. So, the domain where Japan can exercise the right of collective self-defense used to be limited to the territories under the administration of Japan, but now it has gone beyond, legally speaking, legally speaking. But there is no preparation for this as long as I look at it.

So, I have to come to the conclusion that this right of collective self-defense became an important agenda, because of the original intention or risk to revise the Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, but was not necessarily considered in a realistic kind of military and strategic context of the region. So, here, the real question is, if the current Japanese government, or future governments are determined to put this new right into practice, if it needs to be? And the clearest case would be Korean Peninsula, clearly, if something happens in the Korean Peninsula. But legally speaking, Japanese prime minister can order self-defense forces to be deployed, but we haven't done any preparation, and I see no indication that we are

getting into that domain. So, realizing this was an end goal in itself, domestically speaking, domestically speaking, that's one conclusion of mine. But if you look at the implications for the security policy, it's not a big deal, you know, almost all sovereign nations in the world have -- is exercising this right. You know, Australia has been fighting almost all American wars , right, from the Korean War to the Gulf War.

So, it's not a big deal, as a security policy, and we have not reached this full exercise of the right yet, you know, only half of it at most, maybe less than half. And it's a big help for the U.S. strategy, and security of Korea, because a country which is in close relations with Japan, South Korea is clearly, and so if something happens to South Korea, I think, again, legally speaking, our government and leader can order self-defense forces to deploy by defining the situation as an existence of crisis for Japanese security, and the foundation of the security cooperation with East Asian countries, and the international peace cooperation.

So many of us, you know, who are selling this policy to the world community, I think are basically talking about these external dimensions, and these are not wrong, these are not wrong, as a security policy, I mean, I think these are the sort of positive implications of the New Security Bill. But if you look at domestic context there are lots of inconsistencies, lots of inconsistencies, motivations are inward-looking basically, as I said, but the implications are maybe international, and our leaders often use internationalist rhetoric to justify these internally-motivated changes in security policies. So, this is a fundamental gap, a fundamental gap.

So, why does the public support this Abe agenda? I think threat perception of China and North Korea plays a big role in the perceptions of the people. And as a background, history friction with China and Korea also is, I think, a very important, sort of, a factor when public, you know, believes these changes are beneficial for Japan in an ever-worsening security environment in East Asia.

But Article IV and the Alliance Regime, it works almost as an invisible hand. So, motivations which exist beyond this framework premised on Constitution and the alliance with the U.S., are almost always brought back into this box, which is what I meant by *déjà vu*, from the '50s. So, a sense of nationalism, you know, a sense of achieving autonomy, you know, those factors make politics complex, decision-making process complex, but eventually outcome will fall within these parameters. That's what we have seen in the post-war evolution of Japanese security policies.

So that's what I mean by invisible hand. And behind this, why this has been so robust, of course history of war, which is no more so fundamental, we cannot get out of this -- you know, legacies so easily. And Japan's post-war culture, pacifism, anti-militarism of course still plays a big role, but I think more importantly, as a result of these ideologically motivated agenda are becoming prominent. This leads to the division of Japanese politics and even nationalism between the so-called right and left. So, Japan may look harmonious compared to the U.S., but I think just like President Trump is dividing America, I think Abe's agenda is dividing Japan. And so as a result, again, in the domestic context, Abe's agenda is a little bit astray and in confusion, I think. And the war history and the Constitution are two sides of the same coin. So, if you want to change the Constitution, you have to do something about the war history. And I think that's the only way, you know, Japan can come to actually revising Article 9.

As a personal view, you know, I think we need to revise Article IV in one way or another, but on the basis of future oriented strategy rather than driven by a sense of sort of trauma about the occupation, or post-war history. And so dealing with these two sides of the coin, I think is a truly national agenda for Japan as we move into future. But I don't think this has been dealt very well, and strategically under the current leadership. And that's what I mean by, sort of inconsistencies in the domestic context. So this is gap between how these policies are viewed outside of Japan, and what's happening inside Japan domestically and otherwise. I mean, this is a fundamental barrier to the progress of Prime Minister Abe's agenda, I think. So, it's not easy to come to changing Article 9, and my bet is, it's going to take more time. Two-thirds majority supporting the Constitution is one thing, and two-thirds majority agreeing on

specific proposal of changing the Constitution is totally another. And two-thirds majority in support of the Constitution I think means we have finally, get to the start line of what would be a long-term process of debating what it ought to be in the future.

So, I'll finish here. I'm sorry I have extended a little bit maybe -- more than a little bit, but I hope we will get into lively discussions after this. Thank you very much. (Applause)

DR. WRIGHT: Thank you. Should I just close this? Thank you. And thank you for those remarks, I learned a lot. And thank you, Richard, for the invitation to speak with you all here this morning. My name is Tom Wright. I enjoyed going to Japan for the last few years, and I think the role of domestic politics I think is incredibly important. So I want to talk mainly about the U.S. side, and look forward then to the conversation, but I'd just like to make four points. And the first really is on how important it is to actually get the support of the American people for foreign policy and for national security policy, particularly in the Asia-Pacific. And I'm reminded of a story after World War II, in sort late-1945, after the war was won in Europe and in the Pacific, and the United States Congress had a proposal to it, to provide a loan on pretty favorably terms to Great Britain. So, Britain was America's ally in the war, it was in pretty desperate economic shape after it.

The U.S. was asked to provide a loan of significantly higher interest rates than normal, so it would make a profit on the enterprise, and it was incredibly controversial. Congress was deeply opposed to it, there was huge resistance. The feeling was: why should the British be coming to the U.S. to be bailed out? They should sort of deal this on their own.

And Truman wanted to have a robust American engagement in Europe, and he made a positive case for it, but it completely fell flash. And it was only when the threat of communism really emerged in 1946 that they were able to scare the living daylights out of people, and actually get the loan through.

And remember that this is actually a loan that would have financially benefited the taxpayers, not one that was a giveaway or a gift. And what I think that shows, and when you look later on, the late 1940s, these incredible debates that took place about the alliance structure, and mainly in Europe, but also in Asia, about the Marshall Plan which was also incredibly controversial at the time.

That all of these enterprises required real effort by the Executive Branch to try to mobilize the American people, and convince them that this was incredibly important; that they should put their money, and their resources, and their effort, and their attention behind this effort because it was existential for the nation.

The happy news, I think, and this is my first point, is that today most of that infrastructure is already in place, there's really nothing like either the loan or the Marshall Plan, or the alliances that requires the type of activity on Capitol Hill, and in the country as a whole to create the infrastructure capable of dealing with the foreign policy challenges of the 21st Century.

The infrastructure that was put in place then may be outdated in its intent, but it's essentially fungible. So, the alliances were created to contain the Soviet Union, but they can be used and are being used, and have always been envisaged as much broader in scope. And so I think we are actually incredibly lucky that all of the efforts of previous generations has sort stood the test of time.

And I'm a little bit sanguine about the -- and I'll get on to the "America First" sort of view, and isolationist sentiment bubbling up -- because when you look at what the United States needs to do with Japan, or what the United States needs to do in Asia, most of it can happen, without the need for mass mobilization; freedom and navigation operations in the South China Sea don't require congressional approval.

Deepening the alliance with Japan and better relations between the President and the Prime Minister can all happen pretty much automatically. Deepening security cooperation can happen pretty

much automatically if there's the will there by the Executive Branch.

Now, of course economics I think is something of an exception in this, in that there are routinely new sort of initiatives that do require mobilization. TPP being a prime example, I mean that's required and it can run into trouble, but there's a lot on the economic side even, and that the most important part of the economic side, they are not these new initiatives, but actually the preexisting economic relationships, the deep interdependence on the investment side, already on the trade side.

And that goes on, pretty much, automatically because of things that were put in place before. So, I think we have a pretty solid base, and we should be careful not to maybe get too worried, when we see some of this isolation of sentiment bubble up, and we should remember that in our sort of present system, the status quo is actually a lot stickier, and a lot easier to uphold than radical changes to sort of impose. It's harder for politicians to fundamentally remake the relationship of the U.S. to the world, than it is to adjust and sort of adapt within the existing framework.

With that said, I do think -- and this is my second point -- we are seeing the reemergence of a political movement in the U.S. that has been dormant for some time. That is, whether we call it America First, or isolationism, or nationalism, I think it is true that since World War II there has basically been a consensus in both parties behind an internationalist foreign policy, behind defining U.S. interests as wrapped up in a healthy global system, whether we call that liberal international order, post-war order, or just U.S. primacy, or something else, that has been sort of the driving force, I think, in both parties.

It's really not since the days of Robert Taft that we've seen a more sort of nationalistic or narrowly-defined agenda in the mainstream of one of the two parties. Trump, I think that movement has been reawakened, and we will find out whether or not that is a permanent change or temporary aberration. I think a lot will be told in the elections of 2018 and 2020, but if there is a more long-term shift, I think we may see repercussions over time, because if that position wins continuous elections something will change.

I think if you look back over the last year, the effect of the "America First" position, and of Trump's view, has been quite limited. For one reason, I think above all others, which is when he was elected, he and his -- those who sort of believed in what he believes, like Steve Bannon and others, had very few, almost no people who were qualified for higher office and confirmable by the Senate, so they had nobody who could sort of implement their worldview, and they had no real plans to turn those visceral beliefs into policy.

They had a handful of people like Michael Flynn and a few others who could go into the White House, and we know how that turned out, but they did, I think, lack that capacity, and lacking that capacity they had to turn to others, particularly to the retired military who are very mainstream and quite traditionalist.

And that I think has led to continuity in U.S. foreign policy, but that could change. You know, the presidency of the United States is an incredibly powerful office, that person can, you know, reengineer it from the inside. They can figure it out over time, they can figure out the bureaucracy, they can find people, either opportunistic people who pledge to be more loyalists than the existing team, or people who do actually genuinely believe in what he believes, and might start out at a more junior level, but advanced.

And over time, they could build an "America First" position. So I think that we shouldn’t be too complacent, if you do believe in an internationalist foreign policy, you shouldn’t be too complacent from the last 10 months, and necessarily believe that because we started out with some instability, and then it became more familiar and more traditional that we aren't necessarily on a linear path.

I think the moment is quite sort of volatile, but a lot of it has to do with this expert or lead

capacity within the government on these different schools of thought. And I think it is somewhat in flux.

I think on Japan it's interesting to note that the administration, I think when President Trump came in, that he had a long history of hostility toward Japan dating back to the mid-'80s. I suspect because of sort of the role of the rising Japanese economy at the time, particularly in New York and on foreign investment into the U.S.

But the good news is that he has changed his view, I think because he views Prime Minister Abe as the Japan, and he likes Abe, and therefore he likes Japan, and I think that sort element of the President to view things highly personally, and to develop personal relationships with foreign leaders or something that Prime Minister Abe knew I think very early on, and very wisely, preceded on to go to visit President Trump during the transition, and then again shortly after he was sworn in to office.

So, I think that that sort of risk was headed off of the past a little bit. I will just say also on this second point, that it's not just Republicans that we need to sort of lock out in terms of the influence of an "America First" view.

As my colleague Bob Kagan likes to say, if you look at the last election and the major figures in it, Ted Cruz may be in the Republican side, Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton on the Democratic side, and of course President Trump, three of the four essentially wanted to do much less in the world, three of the four viewed domestic imperatives as far more important than a global role.

Hillary Clinton, I think was the outlier in that, and so we are going to find on both sides of the aisle whether or not that domestic sort of nation building at home, or domestic focus, or a more narrowly-defined sense of the national interest prevails, or whether I t will be some aversion as to the pre-2016 Consensus.

My third point is just on public opinion, because the Chicago Council, where I used to work before I came here, had a very interesting poll a few months ago, that some of you may have seen, and it was titled, What Americans Think About America First, and the Chicago Council found that basically since President Trump came on the scene as a candidate and then as President that there's been a significant shift back toward a traditional American foreign policy away from what he's been arguing.

So there's been something of a counter reaction to some of the things that he has been saying, so the percentage of Americans who say maintaining alliances is very important, rose from 40 percent in 2016, to 49 percent in 2017. Many more said it's important, that was vastly more than the number who said it was unimportant or bad.

A record number of Americans in 2017 recognized the benefits of international trade, and free trade that's significantly up from last year, and alliances in East Asia, interestingly, something of a partisan divide, 66 percent of Democrats say they believe that the alliances benefit the U.S. mainly, or both the U.S. and the allies, compared to 31 percent who say they benefit mainly the allies, or neither the U.S. nor the allies. So, that's basically 66 to 31.

For Republicans those figures are 45 percent saying they benefit the U.S. or both, and 44 percent saying they benefit mainly the allies or neither, so that's more of an even divide. So, that may be one area where there is a little bit of a gap. But overall, the support of the alliances is pretty strong.

The news for Japan is pretty good, 67 percent of Democrats say they have full confidence in Japan as an ally, 64 percent of Republicans, and 61 percent of Independents. So, those are very high numbers, and up again from the previous year.

So, I think what that shows is that the election may have been about many things, but it could have been about the fact that people didn't like Hillary Clinton, or they wanted a change in Washington, or they really liked, you know, Donald Trump's wall, or something else. But it wasn't necessarily about

foreign policy, it wasn't about alliances, and it wasn't about Russia.

And so, when the President has these strong views, there's the temptation to see it as an endorsement, and to some degree it is an endorsement of his position because he did win the election. But when you look at it, it's not necessarily that he won because of those views, and I think we do see a bit of a gap there.

Just one final observation on the polling data, one of the things the Chicago Council found that was quite interesting is there is a gap between Republicans, in general, and Trump Republicans. And Trump Republicans, which is a much smaller percentage I think -- I can't recall offhand the percentage of overall Republicans, but they do tend to tack more towards the President, sort of using "America First" and so you see a big divide within the Republican Party on that, but the overall numbers are pretty supportive.

The final point is, I do think that there are a couple of areas that could pose a problem, particularly as regards U.S. policy in Asia, and one is North Korea, and the second is sort of globalization and trade.

I was interested to read and interview with Steve Bannon in the *American Prospect* a couple of days before he left, in which he said that he would favor a deal on North Korea that would involve the withdrawal of all U.S. troops in South Korea in exchange for a freeze, right; which of course is a terrible deal, and will be a huge concession to Kim Jong-un. But I do think it speaks to the notion that if you define interests very narrowly, you only really care about homeland security, and you don't care too much about extended deterrence, or the alliances.

Now that is not the position of the Trump administration, but extended deterrence is always very difficult. It was very difficult in the Cold War, and will be very difficult in the future, because you essentially have to promise that you care as much about a foreign city, as you do about a domestic city.

And that I think will be a challenge, will be a challenge for any administration to communicate the case for that in the same way that administration during the Cold War did, and that may not be an issue necessarily this year, or next, or the year after, but if this goes on for 10, 20, 30 years, it's possible that over time there could be a risk of decoupling, and so the same type of strategic communication and clarity, is probably important to address that domestic vulnerability.

And finally, just on globalization, I think this is the one exception to what I said earlier in terms of the infrastructure being in place. And the thing that sort of struck me about TPP, which I supported and support, and also TTIP, and some of these other endeavors, is that if you look at the part that actually sort of concerns people about the global economy, it's not necessarily market access and regulatory alignment.

It's the fact that they were worried about automation of technologies and the impact on jobs. Or, they were worried about the Chinese mercantilist behavior, or they were worried about a wide variety of things, whether it's, you know, corporate tax avoidance, or any of these number of issues on globalization that tend to get people passionate.

And so the question will be: is it actually in our interest to be working on these very narrow agreements on increasing market access, given the amount of political capital that requires to actually get them over the line, when they may not actually succeed in ratification, in here, or in other countries? Or, is it necessary to try to work with partners and allies on these broad questions of concerns about globalization, and that is sort of shared by voters in all these countries.

And that's something, an argument that Larry Summers and some others have been making. You could of course do both, but I think that's something that's worth sort considering in terms of how to ensure a sort of domestic support behind foreign economic policy. But overall on the sort of -- in terms of

domestic politics in the U.S., I'm pretty optimistic about the ability of the Executive Branch, if they still wish, to maintain traditional foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis important allies like Japan, and sort of ride out these temporary storms. So, thank you very much. (Applause)

DR. UEKI: Okay. While we get ready, let me just thank Brookings Institution, and Dr. Richard Bush, in particular, for bringing me here to Washington, D.C., and in Chicago where he is. Richard has introduced a little earlier. There are a few cities that I am really excited in coming, and with everything that's happening in the City of Washington, is definitely on the top of the list.

Because here, I think, is a place that questions are being asked, and answers are sort of sought out. And I truly believe in the institution, democratic institution and its ability to really ask hard questions, and through the marketplace of ideas that we try to seek the best answers possible. And to me, Brookings Institution really is a realization of that principle, and therefore I am very honored today, to speak to you for about 15 minutes on the domestic politics and its implications to Japan's foreign policy.

So, with that let me start. I'm asking, Japan's role in the world, is it going to head to pacifist-isolationist, or proactive internationalist? Okay. Some of the questions that are on my mind, and of course Richard prompted me to think about these things.

So, what does the public opinion tell us about Japan's future? And the will the Abe government succeed in creating what he himself called The New Japan? And what are the drivers; so, in domestic politics and also in international relations?

So, just a quick roadmap of my talk: I would like to talk a little bit about Prime Minister Abe's agenda and efforts so far, and of course Professor Soeya has provided us with details of that already. And what are the recent developments, and public opinion trends from the surveys that are taken more recently? And I want to explore about the possible drivers of change and prospects.

Okay, so what are Prime Minister Abe's agenda so far? One definitely is to try to make Japan a normal nation with a question mark. So, he started off as Soeya sensei had said that an overall revision of the post-war regime, as it were, as a revision of the Article 9, and not just a change in the clauses, or adding the clauses he is trying to do now, but really a fundamental change in the revision. Probably it was an ideal agenda for him.

But at this point, maybe it's just any revision is what he is trying to achieve, rather than the overall fundamental revision. So, four revisions that are on the table is one, is adding SDF, self-defense force, in the Constitution, the background to this is many of the legal scholars thing that self-defense force is anti-constitutional.

So, he has been saying that, you know, he met this self-defense force officer who was asked by his son: daddy, are you doing something that is against the Constitution? And he argues that it is not right for somebody who is defending and basically, you know, spending his days and life for our country to be asked such a question. So, he wants to put the third clause in the Article 9.

But this is just an addition, and only it's sort of endorsing what many people already think, as many, many Japanese already think that self-defense force, obviously, is legitimate being. So, two, is free education, and he is saying that he wants to make education free and put that in the Constitution. And three is massive disasters, special measures, which he says, which would ensure that the Diet, even if it reaches the full term, can stay on without having a general election should there be a massive earthquake, for example.

And the fourth is an actual merger, et cetera. So, obviously the first one is the one that Prime Minister Abe is trying to do, and the second, free education is sort of a means to make the revision more acceptable by the people.

So, as a nationalist versus realist, so the agenda, and his, probably ideal goal would be a more nationalist origin as we heard from Professor Soeya. But he has been contacting his policies quite realistically, so there's a pull against being a nationalist agenda and a realist agenda. A realist being what is achievable domestically, and also the foreign policy implications of what Japan needs to do is making him a realist.

So, the two opposing thing, is one is self-defense, and the other one is proactive contribution to peace. And these are actually sort of opposite conceptions, as it were, although it's being explained together. And national interest being -- defending the national interest of Japan and defending the liberal international order. So he has been saying no nation can defend by itself, which is probably true, and he also says: the world needs Japan, therefore, Japan needs to change its laws as it did, and also change the Constitution in order to do that.

He has also talked about national crisis, meaning the North Korean missile threats, and also has been saying: it's a dangerous world out there. So, these are the messages he's been saying why these, you know, for us the security laws, bills are necessary and also revision might be necessary.

So, these are all sort of being repeated to the people, but if you realize that it has a component of being narrowly nationalist -- you know, national interest defense versus liberal intervention order defense, those are sort of two different things.

So, what are the recent developments? There was a general election in October 22nd of 2017, this year, and it was more than a-year-and-a-half away from his full term, so he has dissolved the Diet, the Parliament. And the reasons he gave, you do need a reason to dissolve the parliament, so he gave two reasons. He said it's a national crisis election, and one was North Korea, and the other one was falling birth rate, which is only 1.744 at the moment, and aging population were 27 percent of Japanese population over the age of -- sorry, 65 percent -- 65 years older make up the 27 percent of Japanese population. So, it's about that.

So, two things he said. These are national crises, he says, so therefore he dissolved the parliament to ask the people, and the government won, and it gained the seats more than the two-thirds, which is necessary to revise the Constitution, but the question is, did they really win, and in some ways the election is called, it was an own goal by the opportunity because it was fragmented.

Let me just show you this. So, two-thirds is 310 seats in the Diet, and the LDP, Liberal Democratic Party, and Komeito, it’s a Coalition Party got 313 seats, so three seats more than what is necessary. And the opportunity only got 130. So, it seems that it was a massive victory.

However, as I said, was it really a victory? So, although, seat-wise, LDP and Komeito received 313, and oppositions only 130 the actual -- the percentage of the votes that the opposition and the incumbent, the government received is 46.8 percent for the government two parties, and 53.2 for the opposition parties; so, because of the electoral system where it's easier, Japan changed its election system in the '90s, where it's a smaller electoral system which is easier -- they only have one candidate, one seat, to an electorate, so this could happen.

So although the opposition actually got more than the government did, it didn’t reflect in the seats because the oppositions were basically eating up the votes by themselves, because they were fragmented. But you could see the people actually didn’t vote for the government, per se. So, the 313 seats, it's somewhat deceptive if you were to think that the government had a really big support.

One other thing, a new party was formed during the election campaign, and it was called the Constitutional Democratic Party, it's an offspring from the DPJ, Democratic Party of Japan, and they only had 15 seats when the parliament was dissolved but gained 55 seats. This is a picture from one of their rallies in Shinjuku, and it's quite unusual for, you know, rather ordinary people together in speeches like

this. So, that's something that is happening that I wanted to share with you.

So, what are the public opinion trends? This is my take on it, and I'd to look a little bit further into this. I think the public is still adverse to the use of force beyond Japan, and although, having said that, I think the public is more willing to use force for self-defense.

More powers to the revision of Article 9, and there are no generational difference in that. So, if the people asked, do you think you need to revise the Constitution? And this is from the NHK public broadcasting polls from this year.

The red is the yes and no, and yes is the blue. So, 43 percent of the people said yes. So, although it might be a bit more than no, it's still small, and actually in 2002, 58 percent of the people said yes, probably after the September 11th maybe people thought those things were necessary, but it's now down again to 43 percent. But this is the overall revision of the Constitution.

And the people were asked: Do you think you need to revise the Article 9? And the numbers dropped considerably, only 25 percent of the respondents say that they do think that they need to revise Article 9. And this trend is young and old alike, and then for some reason the NHK doesn't give an overall, but they split up the results in men and women, so you have to see in those sort of a --

So, in the 70s -- people 70s and older, 27 percent and 13 percent, so still low, so there's some, probably a little bit more on the 60 side, but you clearly can't say that the young people are more supportive of the revision.

And this is another survey; it's a different survey from Asahi, which was conducted in March-April of this year, asking people: what are your reasons for 'no' to the revision? And 69 percent of the people said 'no', and one is Japan has to renounce the war, 54 percent; and 34 is what it would be in the total, not just amongst the people who said 'no', but the total number out of the 100 percent.

And secondly a self-defense force can operate without the revision is 29 percent. This is interesting because in some ways reinterpreting the Constitution, and the passing of those laws actually made it harder for the government, Prime Minister Abe to change the Constitution, because many feel that Japan's security is now -- and also because the prime minister has explained it that way, that it's now adequate, that there is less need for the revision because the security bill is in place, and you can actually do the collective right of self defense when it's necessary.

And 12 percent said that we'll destabilize East Asia. And those who said 'yes, we need to change the Constitution, the Article 9,' which was 29 percent of the total; and 35 percent said should write the SDF explicitly, this is what the prime minister has been saying, so they agreed with him. And 'will strengthen U.S.-Japan alliance and East Asia regional stability' is 32 percent, and 'should contribute more to international peace' is 24 percent.

And also asked, 'what do think, what can the SDF do abroad?' This is, again, interesting. 92 percent, and this is the multiple choice, 92 percent said the disaster relief helping people, victims of disaster relief overseas, and 77 percent said transport Japanese in danger, 62 percent said United Nations Peacekeeping operations; 39 minesweeping, and important sea lanes here, you get a little bit strategic in security, but the first one is clearly not your geopolitical security, per se, and the second one is more saving the Japanese citizen, so not necessarily international.

Eighteen, use force to help U.N. workers and soldiers under attack; 15 said logistical support, field and weapons to U.S. forces. And four said fighting with the U.S. forces in the frontline, so the 15 said that logically, in the rural area, and only 4 percent says fighting with U.S. forces in frontline; so, still a fairly pacifist for nonuse of force, even when they think of SDF's activities abroad.

And the Cabinet Office has been asking the same questions for a long time, and what do you

think is Japan's role in the world, and the contributions to, and the biggest one is world peace through regional stability, which is 56 percent or so. And contribute to global issues like global warming and disarmament, development assistance ODA world economy.

And here, I'd like to point to this, only about 30-some percent said, contribute to spreading and protecting freedom, democracy and the rule of law. This is interesting because the reason why I say is the current government has been saying that the rule of law is extremely important for East Asia, and that Japan should be the **(inaudible; 1:06)** of this, but it seems that it's not high on the agenda of the things that people think of as a role for Japan. Even for this assistance to refugees is 30-some percent as well.

So, it seems that there are two forces that are pulling things in the opposite directions. The threats to national security, such as national missiles, and clash over the Senkaku Islands, those things clearly make the people get worried about the international environment and therefore be more accepting of maybe the need when they explained that Japan should have a new set of security laws, and also change the Constitution they are most accepting of the idea even if they are not perfectly comfortable with it, they think maybe it's inevitable.

And this will lead Japan closer to United States and increase the U.S.-Japan security cooperation, and collective right of self defense. And in some ways I think the bills are already -- the laws are in place so that even -- what the laws did was, instead of restricting Japan's actions legally, now it's up to the politics to decide what Japan should do.

Of course the footnote with that is the institution, enough institution in place for Japan to make that decision, and I argue probably not. But beyond Korean Peninsula, if Japan were to do things beyond that, maybe the revision of the Constitution is necessary, but it seems that the laws are in place so that bringing Japan closer to U.S.-Japan alliance, may not be the necessary condition to revise the Constitution.

And on the other hand, there are -- so people think that -- and you can see in Prime Minister Abe's behavior, he went to the Trump Tower before Mr. Trump was inaugurated, and really sort of embracing the United States, and therefore embracing and consolidating the alliance.

But on the one hand, and people think that that is necessary, but there are doubts about the U.S. credibility which leads to the fear of -- credibility, meaning that Mr. Trump might be more aggressive and more accepting of the use of force than the people of Japan would like. And this would lead to the fear of entrapment.

On the other hand, there is a fear of abandonment, that will U.S. really defend Japan? And from the statements that Mr. Trump made during the campaign, I think worried many Japanese for this reason. So fear of abandonment leaves Japan to think about plan B as a backup, and this would be the multilateral cooperation that is happening, and maybe increasing with Australia, India and ASEAN, and even China, and I mean U.N. would --

But the interesting thing is in order to for Japan to do this with other partners, and even with the more increased participation the U.N. does involve probably, and necessitate the revision of the Constitution, because as Soeya sansei was explaining, the Constitution doesn’t allow Japan to do things outside of self-defense. So, currently Japan doesn’t have any U.N. peacekeeping operations overseas.

Troops from South Sudan have returned, so I think it's now probably, if Japan wants to do more of this as sort of a plan B, outside of the security alliance maybe the revision might be necessary. But overall, I think there is this -- all these happening and pulling, so that results in the support for the status quo. I have to hurry up a bit.

So, what are the drivers for change, the domestic? So, Mr. Abe has managed to change the rules within the LDP, that the previous rule was that the President of the LDP, which sort of equals the prime

minister of Japan, can only do two terms of three years, so six terms maximum, but he changed it to three years -- three terms is possible, so three times three, nine years.

So, September 2018, is the end of the second -- of the three terms, the end of the sixth years, but theoretically, in the rule that he can be the President, and therefore the prime minister until September of 2021. And one of the reasons probably why he dissolved the parliament was so that he would be in a good position to consolidate the seats that he had.

However, if you ask the people, and you have to remember that Mr. Abe is still quite popular amongst the people. But do you think Abe, Prime Minister Abe should do the third term? 51.9 percent of the people are opposed, and 41.5 in favor. And this is from an FNN which is Sankei, which is a more right, conservative newspaper, TV. So, usually the public opinion polls come out favoring the incumbent and the government, but still 52 percent opposed.

So, this may precipitate change, because he, Prime Minister Abe might think that he doesn't have until 2021 to work this thing, the agenda out, but only until September 2018. But it seems that the debate within the LDP, and also with Komeito, are not really going into that direction, they are much more cautious, even within the LDP, a lot of the politicians are saying, maybe we should take a long time to discuss this, rather than doing precipitously by adding the third clause.

We'll see. So, there might be -- there is probably a drive from the prime minister, but the others are much more sort of restrained on this, partly because I think, although Mr. Abe has won greatly, his popular support may be waning, because of things, nothing to do with the constitutional security, but more to do with the domestic, and some of the handling of the scandals that happened.

Another thing that's interesting is pension, health care, these are the top agenda for the public, as always, and the pension, 25.4 percent of the public thinks that this is what should be on top of the agenda for the government to be handling. Only 2.8 percent says that the Constitution, so there is a strong incentive, well for the public to supporting this rather than the Constitution.

And the other thing domestically, is the Opposition Party which had more than the majority vote which are fragmented; could they unite or not? If they remain split, that means by default the government will be in power, and have the two-thirds majority necessary.

Internationally, North Korea and China and U.S., and President Trump would be the drivers for change; North Korea, of what it could do if it shoots a missile and if a conflict develops. Obviously that would make the people be more accepting of a change. And China, but necessarily Senkaku Islands, because I think that part is clearly a self-defense realm so that the current laws will be sufficient for Japan to defend the islands, but if it's beyond that maybe it will be legally difficult.

Approval of the rating of the U.S.-J Summit was 61 percent, so very high, so people really liked the idea of Mr. Trump and Abe shaking hands for a long time. So, that's clearly, you know, being supported, but should this change, I think that might be a driver, meaning that if Mr. Trump becomes -- if the abandonment fear becomes greater, I think that might be a debate within Japan to say that maybe we should do more to either consolidate or to seek other ways of intervening.

In conclusion, status quo bias is strong, and the Japanese people are scared of North Korean missiles, where you have China, and I suppose the U.S. alliance, but unsure of President Trump. The government of Japan has not delivered what the Japanese people want the most, which is a stable pension plan. And if you remember that Mr. Abe had to resign the first time he was in office because of this pension plan.

So, this is something that he probably has learned a lesson to kind of stay away, but this is still the biggest thing, and unfortunately it's very difficult with the given -- and it's a fortunate thing that we have, so many longevity in Japan, but it's also making it difficult to finance this.

If DOJ was able to deliver this, of course it will be much more stable, and the support of the government will be stable which would enable the prime minister to go ahead with more of the constitutional revision, but currently maybe not. One thing to remember, one concern that I have is all of this sort of assumes that it's probably is going to -- Japan is going to stay proactive pacifist -- proactive isolationist.

So in that sense, who will be the defender of the liberal international orders? We don't really see a strong drive from that, from the United States at the moment, and Japan, although, you know, the older -- the explanation that Mr. Abe gave in the world needing Japan, and it's a dangerous world and therefore we have to do this together, I don't really see domestic in without a strong drive for defending the liberal international order, which personally worries me a lot. Okay. With that, thank you very much. (Applause)

MR. CHHABRA: Hi. I'm Tarun Chhabra. I'm, like Tom, a fellow with our Project on International Order and Strategy. And I'm grateful to Richard for inviting me to join this discussion today, and to Yoshi and Chikako for their comments as well.

I'll be brief. I know that you are all probably eager for some give and take here at this point. So, I'll just start by saying that I agree with much of what Tom said, about the stickiness of what we sometimes call the international architecture here, and the core pillars of the liberal order, Chikako mentioned it as well, and in terms of the status quo bias.

I think much could be said also for the stickiness of other democratic institutions in the face of threats to them domestically, and we should talk about that more, and we should understand better why they are sticky, if we care about them and we think that they are important for our security.

But the words I agree with most that Tom articulated are: that could change. I think that the consensus could over the long-term be more fragile than we think it is, but I remain open to disagreement on it, and I hope we'll discuss that, and I think that's what the people at Brookings and many other places should be working on and researching.

So, I initially planned to offer an insider's perspective, as a Former National Security Council and Pentagon staffer, and I still will in a sense. But what I really to offer this morning is a short provocation that addresses our subject of the politics of foreign policy by, in good Brookings fashion, poking a bit at our mandate this morning.

And the description of the event that you all signed up for, indicates that we will, "Examine the role that domestic politics and public opinion have on foreign policymaking, and to discuss how recent elections have helped or hindered officials in Washington and Tokyo, as they pursue their foreign policy agendas."

So, by their agendas we could mean the agendas of the presidentially appointed heads of departments and agencies, and/or we could mean the career civil servants who staff them, and there's of course an important distinction between the two, but either way, I think we do have in mind, and the intention here was to capture the agenda of the so-called foreign policy establishment, as opposed to elected officials.

And this picture of the foreign policy establishment fielding its own foreign policy agenda, bobbing and weaving around the direction of elected officials, on some occasions at least, is to some extent a vindication of the critique, a critique that gained significant traction of the course of President Trump's rise to power, and I believe one that foreign policy professionals in democracies, especially those experiencing nationalist or populist moments, must take more seriously.

So, what is this critique about? So, let's take, for example, a piece published this week by the recently-departed Acting Director of National Intelligence, Mike Dempsey, who wrote an article in an

online blog, that many of you will know, *War on the Rocks*, highlighting his advice for, "Better national security decision-making." And he concluded the piece with the following advice, which I think nicely encapsulates the impulse that critics on the right and the left, as Tom pointed out, are calling out.

And Dempsey wrote the following, "Keep politics out of national security decision-making. Domestic political considerations have always been checked at the door of the situation room. And why is that? In simple terms it's because if domestic politics are introduced into any national security debate, they will become the backdrop to every discussion.

Indeed, there is no faster way to breed cynicism and doubt among national security professionals, especially within departments and officials serving within departments serving in harm's way; then to create the perception that a decision has more to do with domestic politics than the country's security interest. The exclusion of politics from the policy-making process is a proud tradition that must be safeguarded by everyone involved at all cost."

So, I can say with first-hand knowledge that this gentleman accurately captures a pretty sacrosanct cannon of conduct within the U.S. government's national security apparatus. Not only is it advised to check politics at the door, as Dempsey says, in order to advance a Solmonic and platonic national interest, there is a deep pride in at least posturing in doing so.

And conversely there's deep outrage when politics is perceived to be brought in, so many of you will recall the response to the White House announcement that the President's then Chief Strategist, outright lightning rod Steve Bannon, would have a seat on the Principles Committee of the White House National Security Council.

The foreign policy establishment across both parties was apoplectic, and some yes, because they lamented the elevation of Bannon's ideological impulses from the, "Internet's dark corners into the national security firmament." But the establishment objected, especially because Bannon's seat on the NSC was testament to, "Policy indiscipline."

When Bannon was later removed from the body one commentator wrote that it was, "A position Bannon never should have occupied in the first place," and the Republicans accused Trump of going even further than President Obama, who in the words of Republican strategists said, "Presided over the most politicized national security policy-making process in recent times, blurring the lines between the President's partisan political interest, and the national interest."

So, this critique has also come from the left, as two progressive historians wrote in a foreign piece in April this year, another passage here, "For too long foreign policy experts have isolated themselves from the public, confined to the coastal cities experts have failed to engage citizens where they live and work. Worse, experts typically tell the public what must be done instead of presenting options from which the public can choose, and they deny ordinary people their due as the ultimate decision-makers in a democracy. No wonder the public is showing the back of its hand refusing to take experts seriously."

So, this kind of criticism of the U.S. foreign policy establishment is actually not new. President Reagan's Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, accused the foreign policy establishment in the '80s: of conducting itself like some priestly class that alone has the knowledge, experience and wisdom to guide foreign policy.

And 40 years ago former Brookings fellows, Richard Betts and Les Gelb, similarly critiqued the foreign policy establishment in their book about the U.S. involvement in the War in Vietnam, Betts and Gelb wrote at the time, in 1979: that domestic politics is a dirty phrase in the inner sanctum of foreign policy-making.

There's an American myth that politics stops at the water's edge, that the normal play of partisan competition and dissent gives way to unity in matters of foreign policy, and this myth creates great

pressure to keep one's mouth shut to think and speak of foreign affairs as above mere politics and something sacred.

Betts' and Gelb's indictment will be recognizable to many of you, that insularity leads to bad policy because it was echoed in Bannon's critique after leaving the administration saying, "The geniuses of both parties in the foreign policy elite, left President Trump essentially The Bay of Pigs in Venezuela, the Cuban Missile Crisis in Korea, and the Vietnam War in Afghanistan all at the same time."

So, where does this leave the Trump administration? Where does the Trump administration settle out in this give and take? And I think it's a mixed picture, as Tom alluded to. So, in many respects it's the same place. In his address on Afghanistan after months of internal deliberations, the President said, "Decisions are different when you sit behind the desk in the Oval Office."

On other foreign policy questions, too, such as U.S.-Russia relations, there appears to be a striking schizophrenia between what the President has to say about the imperative of improving ties with Moscow for its own sake, versus, the much more hawkish rhetoric about Russia from senior Trump administration officials, confirmed by the Senate, that sounds a lot like the Romney Presidential campaign, circa 2012.

But in other respects, and here Tom alluded to this as well, the President seems intent on sticking to the domestic political commitments he has made in his bid for the Republican nomination. Just yesterday, of course, he made good on his commitment to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, despite the chorus of opposition from his own senior advisors, allies, and foreign policy experts around the world.

And on international trade, 2018 especially promises to be a big year as NAFTA negotiations come to a head, and potentially major White House ordered reviews focused on China will come due, and these reviews will focus on the impacts of trade and investment, on U.S. intellectual property and innovation, as well as the U.S. manufacturing and defense industrial base.

But also outside the administration there's the recognition, or at least a bet that the foreign policy concerns Trump raised are likely to endure well beyond his presidency, even if there's little confidence that Trump himself will prove capable of addressing any of these concerns.

So, popping up around Washington, are new ventures such as a project on Massachusetts Avenue, focused on what is being called A Grand Strategy for the Middle Class. Another that tours European officials around America's Heartland.

And two more, here a Brookings in fact, one focused on burden sharing in international security arrangements, such as NATO, an America's alliances in Asia. And another, with the Charles Koch Institute, that's essentially a road show of debates on the future of U.S. foreign policy, in which we are taking prominent foreign policy figures to cities around the country to debate big and basic questions about America's role in the world. That many of us, I think would have to agree have been taking for granted, for at least a generation.

So, in conclusion, these are all encouraging steps, I think, toward a more democratically responsive foreign policy, one that I personally hope sustains America's global alliances and commitments, but with more solid democratic backing. Yet, much more work needs to be done, especially on the front of bureaucratic politics, and how politics -- how policy is made in Washington.

More specifically, how future administrations can better integrate our foreign and domestic policy-making processes, a proposition that I'm confident will encounter enormous resistance in the foreign policy culture that I have described, and ironically, I think it's precisely as China and Russia energized and maybe include in their efforts to undermine the credibility of democracy itself, that it will be most tempting for our national security establishment to retreat into itself.

On the logic of George Cannon, who lamented that when it came to foreign policy democracy is akin to, "A prehistoric monster as long as this room with a brain the size of a pin." I hope that we do not. And I look forward to our discussion. (Applause)

DR. BUSH: Well, I'd like to thank each of our presenters for some really insightful presentations. I would like to thank Chikako and Yoshi for coming all this way to participate in the program; and to thank Tom for coming from the fifth floor, and Tarun for coming from the fourth floor to be with us today.

DR. WRIGHT: It was a long way.

DR. BUSH: Excuse me?

DR. WRIGHT: It is a long way.

DR. BUSH: (Laughter) I have lots of questions that I would like to ask, but I think it's unfair to you for me to occupy that time. We are running behind schedule, we'll probably go over a little bit. So, I'm going to throw it open right now and start right here. So wait for the mic, identify yourself, and try and keep your questions short.

MR. WOOD: I'm Barry Wood from RTHK in Hong Kong, although a resident here in D.C. I would like to ask our two Japanese panelists: what about China? Here is Mr. Xi, at his presentation last month saying that it's China's turn to dominate. What about Japan? Does Japan feel it can compete with China? How does it feel about the rise of China? How does it feel about perhaps the United States shifting its principal Asian partnership to China from Japan?

DR. BUSH: Okay.

DR. SOEYA: I think what's happening actually is the more Tokyo emphasizes the so-called threat of China, the more Japan becomes dependent on the U.S., leaning toward the U.S. I think that's what happening. And so that's why and how U.S. policies toward China are so important, and if he U.S. moves in the direction of accommodating China I think that concern was one of the factors which led to Prime Minister Abe's performance towards President Trump.

DR. BUSH: Chikako?

DR. UEKI: Yes. I agree. I think there is concern in Japan about threat from -- or potential problems from the rise of China, but what's interesting is that very few people see China as a near-peer competitor to the United States, and even in the policy circles, but I think definitely in the public very few people would answer that -- if you asked, you know, do you think China will overtake U.S.? I think probably of all the countries that are surveyed Japan is one of the lowest that believe in China overtaking United States.

So, the problems that are posed by China are not necessarily the kind of military, traditionally a military threat, per se. Of course the same (inaudible) issue is great, but that's different from sort of the bigger threat of a bigger, bigger sort of a -- some something like an invasion and an attack on Japan.

So, the concern is more about the political influence that China could exercise that I think, economically and politically its influence growing is probably the bigger concern. And militarily I think trying to keep China within the island chain, not letting it go into the Pacific Ocean is important, but that's probably not shared by the public, per se, as something that is necessary to do militarily.

DR. BUSH: Tom or Tarun, do you have any comments on this question?

DR. WRIGHT: I'm happy just to wait.

DR. BUSH: Okay. Mike? Then I'll go back there.

QUESTIONER: Yes. To follow-up on Barry's question, was there much reaction in Japan when stories started appearing last spring, I guess it was or in the summer, that during the height of the island crisis back in 2014, that the Chinese had done a table -- maybe this was in McGregor's book, had done a tabletop exercise and concluded that they would lose a naval confrontation with Japan? And that the one thing the Chinese Communist Party could not survive is a military defeat by Japan.

DR. BUSH: Anybody?

DR. SOEYA: It's a comment, right?

DR. BUSH: No. It's a question, right?

QUESTIONER: Yes. The question was, was there much response to this revelation in Japan?

DR. SOEYA: I haven't heard.

DR. UEKI: I don't think so. I'm not knowledgeable of that part that and --

DR. SOEYA: But not many Japanese may believe that's the case perhaps.

DR. BUSH: Which is important -- (Laughter) The woman back there in the pink?

QUESTIONER: Hi. I'm Elizabeth Thorne, from the Asia Society Policy Institute. So, Chikako, you mentioned at the end of your speech, you posed the question of who will be the defender of the international liberal order. How do you think that Japan's continued pursuit of TPP-11 falls within that, and do you see perhaps Japan being able to take the lead on the economic front in terms of upholding those institutions? And of course that question could be answered also by other people.

DR. UEKI: I think the hope and plan is to have the TPP-11, and so when the United States may change its policies and would return back to the TPP regime, then the TPP itself will be ready to receive the United States back. So, I think maybe TPP is important for the economy of Japan, but it's also seen as a strategic tool to have a rule-based order, and where China would be a part of that, but still constrained by the rule.

So, that's the sort of more long-term scheme, so that's probably still the case, and it's seen as hopeful. So, you could say maybe international liberal order in that sense of a rule-based order in the economic realm. Yes.

DR. BUSH: But it's also consistent with your finding -- what you reported about polling that suggests that the Japanese public wants to see Japan's international role in a kind of civilian terms.

DR. UEKI: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

DR. BUSH: Not so much in security terms, which you've written about a lot.

DR. SOEYA: Yeah, I think the reason that Prime Minister Abe was very supportive of TPP originally, was because of the two things which Chikako has just mentioned, and one is, it's a boost to Abenomics, and in the domain of structure reform of Japanese economy, and the system.

And secondly, I think it's a China, a China dimension. And so originally after learning President Trump's decision, Prime Minister Abe became a little bit unenthusiastic about it. But now, I think he's promoting this with the expectation still in mind, I mean when the expectation that the U.S. would eventually come back. Maybe that would be post-Trump era, perhaps.

And I think that's what the current government is thinking and how they are approaching this issue now. But if I may, allowed to present my own personal view on this,

DR. BUSH: Please.

DR. SOEYA: I think this is a very important scheme because it doesn't have both, or either U.S.

or China. You know, so trying something by kind of countries who are breathing between the United States and China, I think has a strong merit, as East Asians, you know, think about our region by ourselves on the basis of our preferences, and what sort of East Asia -- I mean the South Americans are here but, you know, what sort of Asia-Pacific we'd like to see on our own merits.

And then on the basis of that, think of the role of the U.S. and the role of China. I think this could be an important platform to exercise such a thinking as well as, you know, actual policy negotiations. But I don't think that's how policymakers in Tokyo are perceiving this.

DR. BUSH: Okay. My colleague, Mireya Solís?

MS. SOLÍS: Thank you very much. Just a quick reaction to the comments by Tom and Tarun about the stickiness of the global economic order; maybe I'm a little too close to the subject matter, because I feel less optimistic. I can see signs of deconstruction underway. Think about NAFTA, for example, this is not just a common renegotiation; it's being carried out under the threat of withdrawal.

And it's really a question mark whether this agreement will make it through next year or not. Think about the heating of the U.S.-China friction that Tarun made reference to. I would make the case that even though some of the instruments may be familiar to us from the 1980s when Japan and the United States were having bouts of economic friction, we should not use that as a reference because the structure of the situation is different.

Japan and the United States are alliance partners, and that always provided a glue to come to an agreement. China and the United States are not in that position. And I also think about what's happening with a multilateral system, and I see that perhaps one of its most critical moments, you know, everybody referred to the Doha Round not making it. But now when we are talking about the disputes around mechanism running into serious difficulties, and there is a huge case making its way through the WTO regarding China's market economy status.

So, I am a little bit confident that the status quo is sticky as we perhaps would like it to be. And then my other very brief observation is on the path forward, you know, I very much can see them the merits of making the case that these trade agreements are politically too costly, and maybe we should just talk about other broader frameworks that talk about what to do with automation, and so forth.

I would make the case that the solutions that work for one will work for the other. And that there's a limit to what international cooperation can do, because at the end of the day, tying with the theme of a domestic politics event some of the measures that have the most impact are purely domestic, and I'm thinking of the U.S. tax bill now currently under consideration.

We don't know what the specific items will be at the end of day, but we have a good sense that perhaps superior education will be out of reach for more Americans, at a time when those skills are necessary to deal with the current technological trends, and income inequality may also take a hit. Thanks.

DR. BUSH: Response?

DR. WRIGHT: Sure. So, I agree and definitely defer to Mireya, you are the expert on TPP, but I agree with your overall point too, that I do think, as I think I said that the economic side is a bit of an exception, or it's separate than the security one. The security infrastructure I think has been very sticky, and is pretty fungible, and I think does stand to our benefit today, right, that it's in place, and the economic side has always been a little bit different.

I think U.S. leadership on the economic side has been uneven. You know, think of Richard Nixon, and plenty of other examples in the Cold War, it wasn't as, I think, continuous and as predictable as the alliances have been. And I do think for the reasons you say that, you know, there are -- that that is

beginning to fray. However, you know, there's still, as you noted, at the end the economic engagement of the U.S. in the world is much more than these trading agreements too.

And so globalization will continue maybe with a slightly different hue than before, but it's not going away anytime soon, and so that I think is an unrelenting logic that the Trump administration or anyone else would have to deal with, and the fact that they found it so difficult to operationalize protectionist measures against China, I think goes to that point too.

But I do agree though on the basic point, that I think the economic order is a bit more fragile, and the event I worry about the most is another financial crisis because, of course, the reason the last financial crisis was not as severe in its totality as 29 to 33, was because of the response. And so of the response the next time is more nationalistic and "beggar-thy-neighbor" then we could have a similar result to that which occurred in the '30s.

DR. BUSH: A question in the back, and then we'll come here, and then go there. Right there, yes.

MR. LEMON: Hi. Richard Lemon, I'm an investor, but a long-time resident of Tokyo. I was at something on Capitol Hill yesterday, where they were rolling out a report on National Industrial Policy. And one of the things that was brought up was that in fact one of the reasons that perhaps the U.S. doesn't have a National Industrial Policy was that security issues tend to take over.

For example, you can imagine if you have an issue with China you might -- on an economic side, you know, you might be more concerned about what they're going to do with Korea as opposed to worrying about the economic issues. And the question comes to: don't in fact Japan and the United States have a huge commonality of interest in areas like cyber? In areas where there are other state actors that are hacking into our private companies and stealing IP? And don't in fact, you know, is there a consensus for that kind of cooperation? Because I just see a lot more abilities for Japan and the United States to work together on many issues than otherwise.

DR. BUSH: Anybody?

DR. UEKI: I think the United States, well militarily, has a Cyber Command and has been pushing and talking with the Japanese government for Japan to increase the cyber security's aspect. And I think the two countries are working together but beyond the military, economically, I am not so -- I don't really know how much is going on in the civilian side of the cyber security, per se.

DR. BUSH: I agree with your basic point, and it's not just the United States and Japan, it's probably Korea and also the European Union, and overall are affected by the same sort of policies. There was a case a few years ago when China put forward a policy of indigenous innovation and there was a fairly sharp reaction, but there was also concerted action in sort of these, that most of the advanced countries going to China and saying, this is not consistent with our ideas about free and fair trade, and China sort of backed off. But collective action is hard, it depends on the willingness of leaders of parties with somewhat different interests to work together.

So, there's a question there, and then I'll go there, on the aisle there, right. Abigail, please?

QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. (Inaudible), I'm a senior visiting fellow with the Atlantic Council from Japan. I have one question to Professor Soeya, and one question to Professor Ueki. Professor Soeya argued that Japan and the United States might need to revise the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty given the new infrastructure in Japan.

But can we argue that, you know, this literature including the revision after interpretation of the Constitutional rule is a kind of (inaudible) declaration of Japan, the willingness, you know, to cooperate with the United States in terms of a collective self-defense force? So that Japan does not necessary have to bind itself by promising to the United States that we would do that. You know, not with the revision of

the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. This is the question.

And to Professor Ueki, I sense that one of the reasons that Prime Minister Abe can be close to Mr. Trump, closer to than any other leaders in the world, is that, you know, in Japan we do not see a very serious, fundamental and instinctive hatred against Mr. Trump like we see, you know, for example, the European countries or any -- So he does not have to take a political risk in doing this with Mr. Trump. So, how you can come up with a persuasive interpretation, you know, why we do not have -- we do not see this kind of hatred against Mr. Trump in Japanese society?

DR. SOEYA: Yes. I raised this point not because I'm arguing for it, and I just made a reference to this as a logical thing, and this is in a larger context in which I'll be arguing issue, which is revision of Article 9 argument have to be associated with the picture of the U.S.-Japan alliance, specifically the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

As I said Article V of the current treaty is premised on Article 9. And so if you change Article 9, logically speaking, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty should be revised.

For instance, if Japan achieves the revision whereby Japan would become a normal country in the sense that Australians, Canadians are engaged in collective security on the basis of the U.N. Security Council decision, and in the context of alliance with the U.S. engaging collective self-defense actions then, the Security Treaty needs to be changed. But my general point is, changing Article 9, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty should be debated as a set otherwise this will not become a truly strategic debate.

And as long as changing article remains as a goal in itself, I think that's the case in Japan, and that's exactly why, you know, this debate about Article 9, will not lead to the discussion of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. And so I just wanted to make this situation explicit, and so that's the purpose of myself raising this point, and arguing for, maybe theoretically I think I'm personally, you know, of the opinion that Japan should be able to exercise full right, I mean that -- it's normal, it's normal, like many countries.

But the drive should be future-oriented strategy and national profile of Japan, and this is the context which I've been arguing for Japan's so-called ‘middle power strategy.’ So, the revision of Article 9 should be premised on the future of Japan as a middle power, not as reverting to, you know, so-called great power status.

And I think that's the only way that Article 9 can be revised, but if that happens and the alliance with the United States will become much tighter, and Japan will play a larger internationalist role in the domain of peacekeeping, and so forth. And the Canadians have lost more than 150 lives in soldiers in Afghanistan, and even Germany 50. Why not Japan, is my argument.

But if I make this outside of Japan it makes perfect sense I'm sure to many, but if I say the same thing in Japan I will be categorized as further right even to Prime Minister Abe, you know. So, Chikako's opinion polls result indicate this, Japanese are not yet ready, you know, for self-defense forces engaging in international peacekeeping activities in the normal sense.

So, this is some sort of inconsistency and, you know, distorted sort of Japanese domestic context in which these issues are debated. And so my purpose as an academic in introducing this point, you know, it should be logical to think about changing Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty if we get into this domain of collective security for self defense.

I think this is perfectly a logical thing, but this doesn't happen in Japanese context. So, why that's the case, you know, I think we need to think about this more seriously, I mean Japanese would need to think about this, and politicians who are trying to lead this process.

Otherwise, this debate will never become truly a strategic debate, you know, for Japan. That's been my kind of personal view on this as an academic, but if I ever become a politician, which will never

happen, I wouldn't say this, because it doesn't work in Japanese society and public, yeah.

DR. BUSH: Chikako, do you want to address the second question?

DR. UEKI: Okay. So, why don't the Japanese people hate President Trump, was probably the question, right? And before I answer, I must make a little bit of a correction to my conclusion, I said Japan will probably maintain as a proactive pacifist, I meant to say reactive pacifist, so reactive to those things that happened but --

I think during the campaign the two things that really made the Japanese people concern was, one was Mr. Trump's argument about, that this trade war was still going on with Japan kind of a rhetoric. So, on the one hand people worried about what would be the demand from Mr. Trump once he's in office in terms of the trade and the deficit. The other one was, you know, the abandonment in the security realm, and maybe giving Japan a nuclear weapon was a good idea which signaled that extended deterrence might not be in place.

So, those two things really were worries that Japanese officials, security, foreign policy community, and even the public had. So once in office I think it was important for the government and Mr. Abe to embrace Mr. Trump. So, I think a lot of the Japanese were relieved that Mr. Trump, after all, is more understanding of Japan and U.S.-Japan relations, so it didn't really go to this, criticizing Mr. Trump, because they were worried in the beginning and relieved.

But taking a step a little bit back, I think there are two things maybe at work. One is that regardless of what Mr. Trump's personal views might be, and regardless of what the criticism in this country might be of Mr. Trump from some in media, and things that are also introduced in Japan as well, I think people in Japan do view Mr. Trump as the democratically elected President of the United States. So people might feel that it's not really in their part to criticize a leader which the American people have chosen, and through due process, and institutionally.

So that's one. The other is how much does Japan really have a strong conviction to defend you know pluralism, tolerance, diversity. Japan is a very free country, it's very diverse, even politically we even have Communist Party which has significant support. And so it's very diverse, and there's a now some local municipal governments are accepting same-sex marriage, and things.

So even in the other social realm it's becoming more diverse. But does Japan really stand firm on this, and how much cost is Japan and Japanese people willing to pay to defend this, the rights of the people? How much imagination does Japanese people have of the things -- their rights taken away from, you know, somebody they've never seen, living in Africa or some parts of the world that they've never really heard of?

You need to have some imagination of what these things mean. You're right if they are important to you they obviously should be important to the others as well. I'm not sure it's Japanese people, because it's still an island country, it's very homogenous, and the institutions are very much in place, the Japanese people didn't really fight for civil rights, they were given after the war. So, in some sense I think there's a lack of this sort of a danger or a threat, a perception of threat if something that could affect them is happening, and these ideas that came out, and the leader of the strongest, and the freest nation on the globe is represented by somebody who many Japanese don't think is --

When President Obama was in place, one of the best sellers in Japan was the transcripts and speeches, it came with a CD of all of his address at the Democratic National Convention in his honor, and the Japanese people really listened to the CD and memorized his speeches as a -- and it was a big seller, you could see it in the bookstores and things.

So, although there was no, like a strong opposition to what Mr. Trump was saying, I think there is a constituency that really welcomed President Obama, because, it''s sort of a thought, I think, to many

Japanese that it was a progress for humankind in some way.

So, I mean you know people don't hate Mr. Trump, but I think some are worried, concerned and disappointed. But it is the President that the people of America have chosen, so no really criticism that is (inaudible).

DR. BUSH: To be technical he was chosen by the majority of the Electoral College.

DR. UEKI: Yes. Yes.

DR. BUSH: The person in back who had his hand up, and this will be the last.

QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. My name is Kobayashi from Japan International Cooperation Agency headed by Dr. Kitaoka, who thinks that Japan has a stronger role to play for defending International Liberal Order, including through our international development, and I hope there's room for that.

But my question goes to Thomas and Tarun and this, in a way, relates to what Dr. Solís asked already about the stickiness. And we've seen how the greater skepticism towards multilateralism evidenced by a recent pulling out from the global compact on migration, and we are all wondering how much further the U.S. would go against multilateralism. And I wanted to ask for your insights on this topic. Thank you.

MR. CHHABRA: So, I think to start with, you know, the views on multilateralism have actually not -- generally not strayed too far from Republican foreign policy orthodoxy, right; if anything I'd say they are probably a little bit friendlier than they were during the first term of the Bush administration; if you compare Nikki Haley to John Bolton, for example. And John Bolton, as you all know, has not to date been appointed in the Trump administration, including for any sort of posts related to the United Nations, or multilaterals, more generally.

So, I think that's important to keep in mind, and there are also indications that the Secretary of State and the President himself are actually working quite closely with a number -- with the Secretary General and a number of senior U.N. envoys to address hot spots around the world in a way that many would not have expected.

But I agree with Mireya, and I think Tom too, I think we are generally in agreement that trade is the area where there is the most capacity for backsliding in a way. But I think we have to recognize that, you know, those of us who support free trade, that consensus of the foreign policy establishment, I think had really lost the argument in the United States for a long time.

And I personally was working as an Aide to the Secretary of Defense for Ash Carter when he was asked to be the Spokesperson for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and at that point I knew that it was game over. If he was going to be the one, they lost the domestic argument, and there are some, you know, there are polling data that suggest that actually the opposition to free trade is not as bad as you would think, but it's actually become more partisan now, and it suggests that people are now more in favor of free trade because the President Trump is in office.

So I think some of that move -- some of that is ephemeral. So, again, I think trade really is the outlier, and the President has been pretty, I think, consistent about that.

DR. BUSH: Well, I've kept all of you beyond the time that we promised, and so I think we should wrap up. But thank you very much for your questions.

Please join me in thanking our four outstanding panelists. (Applause)

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III
(Signature and Seal on File)
Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia
Commission No. 351998
Expires: November 30, 2020