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CAN THE U.S. SENATE BE SAVED?

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. GALSTON: Well, let me try to call this full house to order if I may.

Welcome to Brookings. My name is Bill Galston. I'm a senior fellow here in Governance Studies. Thanks so much for coming, and welcome also to the people who are watching this event live on C-SPAN.

Today's topic is "The Past, the Present, and Possible Future of the U.S. Senate." The occasion of this discussion is the publication of Ira Shapiro's second book on the Senate, this one entitled "Broken: Can the Senate Save Itself and the Country?" Those of you who read his first book on the Senate will know how passionately he reveres the Senate as an institution and will not be surprised to learn how distressed he is by what he describes as its precipitous decline.

This topic could not be more timely. We are just days from the expiration of yet another short-term continuing budget resolution, and perhaps even more pertinently, from a promised open Senate debate on U.S. immigration policy. Will the promise be kept? And if it is, will today's Senate be up to the job of an open deliberation on the most burning domestic question, which is more than domestic in its implications, facing the country?

When it comes to the study of American political institutions, there are two kinds of scholars. Type one, people who have been trained in academia, wonderfully trained in academia in many cases, and who study American political institutions using the tools, the concepts, the categories, the empirical techniques of political science. And we, here at Brookings, are committed to the proposition. There is much to be learned about American political institutions through the practice of that trade.

But there is a second way of studying American political institutions, the scholar practitioner or the practitioner scholar. And Ira Shapiro is the latter. He began his government career -- I'll let the number out of the bag -- just a little shy of 50 years ago, as an intern to the late, great Republican Senator, Jacob Javits. Among, and I underscore the word "among" the other steps in his

distinguished practitioner career, he served as legislative legal counsel to the great environmentalist, Senator Gaylord Nelson. He served as counsel to the master of the Senate rulebook, Majority Leader Robert Byrd; as chief of staff to Senator Jay Rockefeller; and in addition to his Senate service, he has occupied senior positions in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative during the Clinton administration. And if memory serves, attained ambassadorial rank in one of those positions. His first book on the Senate was published in 2012. An updated version with a new preface by the authority appeared recently. And for fans of popular culture, his first book on the Senate appeared on Frank Underwood's desk during Season Two of House of Cards.

So let me now tell you what's going to transpire in the next hour and 25 minutes. For about 25 of those minutes, Ira will present the main themes of his book. We'll then hear about 10 minutes of commentary from Brookings congressional expert, Molly Reynolds, a fellow in our Governance Studies program. She is the authority of the Brookings book, "Exceptions to the Rule: The Politics of Filibuster Limitation in the U.S. Senate", which will indicate why she is the perfect commentator for this book. After Molly delivers her commentary, we'll all convene on the stage for about 15 or 20 minutes of moderated conversation, after which for the last half hour it will be your turn, questions from the floor, and responses from these two wonderful scholars.

As always, please quiet yourself cell phones, but that doesn't mean turning them off necessarily, and it certainly doesn't mean that you can't use them. For those interested in tweeting about this event, its hashtag is -- and there it is #USSenate.

And without any further preliminaries, on with the show. Ira, the podium is yours.

MR. SHAPIRO: I couldn't have a more generous introduction than the one Bill Galston gave me. I thank Bill for not only that introduction, but for organizing this event, for moderating this event. I don't have enough time to go into Bill's various credentials so I won't, except to say that no one else is a political theorist and philosopher, a policy analyst, a teacher and a scholar, and has served at the highest levels of government. And so we all get a great deal of

wisdom from Bill always, and particularly, I have never missed his weekly Wall Street Journal column.

I'm glad to be here with Molly Reynolds. I don't know Molly that well, but her important book is very well timed, as you will hear from her comments. And given my loose mastery of the Senate rules, I've decided to defer to Molly on the whole rules question.

Bill did make one point that's a little sensitive. For a couple of years, I've been planning to advertise my book, the new addition of my old book, by using the reference to House of Cards. Somehow, that doesn't look as good as it used to.

I wasn't sure that this panel would draw such a good audience, and it's wonderful to see a spattering of old friends, and it's wonderful to see a lot of people who I don't know.

Donald Trump's extraordinary and dangerous presidency so dominates our landscape that it's sometimes hard to focus on anything else, and that's particularly true now with the crisis at hand as the Trump White House and the House Judiciary Committee are on one side and the FBI, the Justice Department, important institutions are under attack. We wait to see whether the president may force the resignation or fire people -- Special Counsel Muller, FBI Director Christopher Wray, Rod Rosenstein. So I thank you for taking the time to come to a panel that doesn't have Trump's name in it.

As Bill said, I had a long Senate career and a deep attachment to it. It was a place that sparked my original commitment to public service, and it has been an important part of my life now for almost a half a century. There were people that served longer than I did. I was there 12 years actually working when I went back, and people have served longer and they've done more. But I had an unusual tenure because I spent five years in the Democratic Senate of the late '70s, and then six years in the Republican Senate. And then one more year when it flipped back. So I've seen the majority and I've seen the minority. I've dealt with a lot of different issues. And so I think I have possibly something to offer on this subject at least.

So the first book I wrote I started writing in 2008. I was depressed about the long

decline of the Senate. So I started writing the book at a time when the exciting presidential campaign involving Barack Obama, John McCain, Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, one of the great, exciting campaigns of all time. And I was writing the book hoping that while I wrote it I would call attention to what the Senate had been and what it potentially could be. And I wanted to try to write the book hoping I could help somehow reverse the decline.

But at the same time, I was counting on the presidential election. We'd have a new president at a time of possible hope and change. And so I thought maybe the election would help. By the time I completed the book, obviously, the reverse was the case. The Senate was deeply mired in partisan gridlock. The narrative of my book ended in 1980, but I wrote an epilogue to try to explain what had happened after 1980. And that epilogue of the first book kind of became the launch pad of this book.

And I want to say one thing that I do think is important. I undertook to write this book in the fall of 2016 when I was absolutely sure Hillary Clinton would be elected president and couldn't govern unless the Senate changed. This book wasn't a response to Donald Trump. This was about the fact that the Senate had failed for so long and it had destabilized our political system in my opinion.

So let me give you the gist of my argument and then we'll try to unpack it, sort of my elevator speech.

We all know that the crisis in American democracy didn't start when Donald Trump became president or when he came down the escalator in Trump Tower. Our political system has been like the proverbial frog on boiling water, slowly dying as the temperature rises. The Senate is ground zero for that failure, the political institution that has failed us the longest and the worst, going back 25 years at least. At its best, the Senate served in Walter Mondale's great phrase, "As our nation's mediator." It was the place where the competing interests of the two parties and all the diverse interests of our country came together to be reconciled through negotiation and legislation

and principled compromise. It was in Lin-Manuel Miranda Hamilton's words, "the place where it happened."

When the Senate could no longer perform that role, when it succumbs to partisanship, rather than overcoming it, the American people lost confidence, and ultimately turned to an outsider. Donald Trump would not have become president if he wasn't a unique celebrity. But he also became president because of the justifiable feeling in the country that Washington was failing.

Now, obviously, I'm painting with a broad brush. In a longer discussion, we would talk about the issues that attracted Donald Trump's voters -- globalization and technology, certainly immigration. But today we're talking about the performance of the government, and when we're talking about that, the Trump presidency is the result of the polarization gridlock and dysfunction. But the failure of the Senate is the cause. Moreover, the Senate reached a new low at precisely the moment that we need it to be at its best because we have an inexperienced, and potentially authoritarian president.

So that's why my talk is entitled "the other threat to our democracy." And the failure of the Senate, for the failure of the Senate, one man bares disproportionate responsibility. It's no accident that the Senate's accelerating downward spiral coincides absolutely with Mitch McConnell's time as leader. I recognize that's a harsh statement. It may not even be intuitively obvious. Historians always debate the question, how much of this is the individual actions as opposed to the greater forces that are at work? And certainly, many factors have contributed to the deterioration of our country and the politics of our country. The ideological chasm between the parties has grown -- the role of money in politics, particularly since Citizens United; the impact of the 24/7 cable TV; gerrymandered districts; people picking their own news sources. In fact, their own facts.

In America, over the last 30 years, our politics have been uniquely undermined by the combination of the permanent campaign where there's never time for governing, only preparing for the next election. And the politics of personal destruction where some superb political minds devote

their time and their talent to poll testing what message and what votes can destroy their opponents and then designing the campaign ads to do so. So there's a lot wrong with our politics.

Now, Senator McConnell's defenders would say he's just a very skilled politician who has adopted to the reality and reflects the realities of today's politics. In fact, one of his best friends, the late Senator Bob Bennett of Utah, praised him in 2010 for understanding exactly what happened to the Senate from Dole to McConnell. Now, think about that for a moment -- he understood exactly what happened from Dole to McConnell. In other words, it's a partisan time; we need a partisan leader. There's no time for a statesman like Bob Dole.

The argument doesn't wash for me. Many people, even senators, get away with the claim that they were victims of their times or merely following orders. But Senator McConnell has earned a substantial place in American political history. Six terms in the Senate. Almost 12 years as Minority and Majority Leader. Mitch McConnell doesn't reflect America's political climate; he has shaped it.

Now, my view of the Senate, obviously, is that Senate leaders really mater. They really matter. Looking back over the history of the modern Senate, we find occasions when leaders put their indelible mark not only on the Senate, but on the politics and the government of the time. Of course, the most famous example is LBJ, "Master of the Senate," Lyndon Johnson, Robert Caro's "Master of the Senate." And LBJ did an extraordinary job of dragging the Senate into the 20th century. It was a reactionary institution before LBJ, and he made a great difference with his incredible force of nature, his incredible energy. He used all the power he could to overcome what the Senate had been before, because before LBJ, the Senate was dominated by southern committee chairmen, and it was described as the only place where the South did not lose the Civil War. The South's unending revenge upon the North for Gettysburg. So Johnson did everything he could, and Caro's book describes it, how he got the first Civil Rights Act through, a modest measure but it was the first.

Johnson wore out his welcome in the Senate quickly, actually. People got tired of his overbearing nature. They were tired of him. When he accepted the vice presidency -- John Kennedy offered it to him -- people were surprised. Johnson thought it was actually the only way to ever become president for a southerner, but he also knew his days in the Senate had passed. Lewis Gould, the political historian wrote, "For the Senate, Lyndon Johnson was a noisy summer storm that rattled the windows of the upper chamber and then moved on, leaving few traces of his passing. He seemed a towering figure at the time, but his essential vision about the Senate limited his impact," which is an interesting thought.

To understand the Senate, what it was, what it's capable of, what we've lost, you have to go back to what I've called "The Last Great Senate of the '60s and the '70s." And I now call it by a better name, Mansfield's Senate. Mike Mansfield, a professor of Ancient History, was perhaps the most unlikely Senate Majority Leader. Although widely respected for his intelligence, his honesty, his intellect, and knowledge of the world, Mansfield had no desire to be the majority leader. When John Kennedy became president, the president-elect asked Mansfield to be the majority leader, and Mansfield didn't want the job. But he exceeded to Kennedy's request. But Mansfield made it clear he would be a different leader. He had a different personality. He believed in a democratic, small D, Senate, where all the senators were adults and they were all equal. He believed in the Golden Rule and acted accordingly. And under his leadership, all the senators had responsibility. Everett Dirksen and others didn't think it could work. It can't work without a strong Senate leader after Johnson, and pretty quickly, the Senate bogged down. Mansfield was under so much criticism he prepared a speech announcing, explaining his concept of the Senate leadership. And he made the announcement on November 22, 1963. He never gave it. It was put in the congressional record.

But Mansfield then demonstrated his leadership by helping to get the Civil Rights Act of '64 through. Lyndon Johnson, who knew something about the Senate, called Mansfield downtown and said, basically, you've got to break the southern filibuster by wearing them out because Richard

Russell is old and Allen Ellender has cancer. And Mansfield said I'm not going to do it that way. And so he told them how he was going to do it, and they had a two month debate, and he never did anything like that. And they went on from that. They passed the '64 act, and then they went on from that to the greatest period of productivity.

Mansfield created a Senate based on trust and mutual respect. Bipartisanship was second nature. We all knew that that's the way the Senate worked. The senators would battle over important issues and then strike their compromises and go out to dinner together. Mansfield's Senate was extended by Robert Byrd and Howard Baker for another eight years.

The air is filled with talk about Watergate, understandably. If you look back, the great senators, they were there for Watergate. Mansfield launched the Watergate Committee with the unanimous vote of the Senate two months after Richard Nixon got 49 states. Robert Byrd and Howard Baker played similar positive roles in Watergate, but Mansfield, Byrd, Baker, these people were great senators during Watergate because they were great senators all the time. They didn't change from year to year. It didn't matter who the president was or whether they were in the majority or the minority.

So let's look at the Senate's decline for one minute. And my framework is this -- there was a long decline of the Senate that started probably 25 years ago, somewhere late '80s, early '90s, you can see it. And there's a long decline. And then all of a second there's a second stage of decline. And this decline goes like this and then like that. And the "that" coincides with the arrivals of Harry Reid on the democratic side, and Mitch McConnell on the republican side. They inherited a Senate that was in gradual, but unmistakable decline. They had the experience. They had the obligation. They had the opportunity to address that decline and rebuild the Senate. Instead, they became in the words of journalist Stephen Collinson, the "terrible twins of dysfunction," both using arcane procedures to slow and throttle the promise of the others' rule. Their supporters would argue about which one was worse, never which one was better. Under their leadership, the long decline

accelerated precipitously. Their joint legacy would be a broken Senate, but the responsibility was by no means equal. Obviously, not since Reid retired, but not while he was there either.

So let me turn to Senator McConnell for a moment. I believe there's a tendency to misunderstand him, even after all this time. He's been there so long he has to be an institutionalist, really. Just a tough partisan, quite conservative, but moderate relative to the madness that's infected the Republican Party since Newt Gingrich. I see him quite differently than that. I regard him as the premier political strategist and tactician of our era and perhaps the toughest negotiator. Unfortunately, he's used that power and his political skills solely as a partisan, never as the leader of the Senate, which requires collaboration with the other leaders and the party.

We'll get into the discussion but let me just give you two quick examples. In 2008, the metastasizing subprime mortgage crisis brought down Lehman Brothers and triggered a financial crisis. Henry Paulson, Ben Bernanke, Timothy Geithner went to Capitol Hill to meet with the leaders. If we don't act now, Bernanke told them, we won't have an economy by Monday. McConnell plays a very strong role. He steps up immediately. He understands the urgency of it. He helps the Senate get the legislation prepared. When the House, with its feckless performance, rejects the legislation, McConnell goes to the Senate floor and guarantees the Senate will come through. And they do come through, and then the House reverses themselves and we get the TARP legislation which was sorely needed. He takes pride in it, as he should.

Three months later, January 2009, nothing has changed except there's a new president, Barack Obama. The crisis has spread from Wall Street to Main Street. And only government action can make up for an economy that's lost three-quarters of a million jobs. McConnell is against anything. There's a new president. He's more worried about the president's approval ratings than he is about the jobs or the people that are losing. He opposes it. He tries to defeat it. Thanks to Collins, Snow, and Arlen Specter, the Senate gets done and the recovery goes ahead. I cannot conceive of another Senate leader that would behave that way.

Last example for the moment. Six years of adamant obstruction to Obama, and then he finally becomes majority leader. January 2015, the Senate changes over night. The legislation starts moving forward. It's the most productive year in a long time. What happened? Nothing, except the principle obstructionist became a constructive force for one year. It lasted one year and one month. One year and one month. And then in February 2016, Justice Scalia dies. Senator McConnell says, we're not considering any nominee of Barack Obama, and all of a sudden, we plunge back into bitterness.

In 2017, with a republican president, Senator McConnell has violated every pledge that he ever made to the Senate about how it would work. There is no precedent for the way the healthcare legislation was handled. So you'll recall no process, no hearings, and no committee action. When he pulled it down the first time, he said he'd go on to tax reform, we were done with healthcare. He comes back with another two weeks later. Does it a third time. His word in those issues was just not accurate.

Reporting on Senator McConnell's notable speech in 2014, when he describes the way that he was going to run the Senate if he ever gets to lead it, Jonathan Weisman of the New York Times wrote, "McConnell portrayed Reid's Senate 'as a post-apocalyptic wasteland ruled by a dictatorial autocrat despised by allies and foes alike.'" It's a great turn of phrase. Weisman must have been looking into a crystal ball because he perfectly captured the Senate four years later, McConnell's Senate.

Now, I will say in conclusion, I recognize I've offered a bleak picture, a second threat to democracy. Wasn't Trump enough? Yet, perhaps ironically, I find myself still relatively optimistic. That is, relative to everyone else. And the reason I say it is I believe that many of the senators up there on both sides of the aisle, know what the Senate is supposed to be, hate the institution they're serving in now. They will, at some point rise to change it. They will, if confronted with the constitutional crisis we may face, I think we will see the familiar faces step up and some unexpected

heroes.

So in our country, the shared and disbursed power in our political system, and the diverse nature of our country, guarantees that legislating will always be difficult. But it should not be impossible. The lubricant in the system is good faith engagement, a commitment to work hard to explore the possibilities of common ground. That's good faith engagement every year. Not one year out of 10 years. Not when the leader feels like engaging. We need people who don't make everything a partisan political calculation. And I'm putting my faith in the future in people that actually will be putting country first.

I'll stop. I've used my time. I've used two minutes more of my time. And we'll have the discussion. Thank you.

(Applause)

MS. REYNOLDS: Good morning, everyone.

First of all, I want to thank Bill and Ira for inviting me to be here today and to provide some thoughts on Ira's book.

As someone who recently wrote a book on the Senate of my own, I know how both rewarding and frustrating it can be to spend as much time as Ira has mulling over the institution, and I'm so glad to have gotten a chance to read the book, Ira, and to speak a little bit about it today.

For those of you who haven't had a chance to read Ira's book, I recommend it. It's a rich, detail-oriented look at many of the challenges that the Senate has faced in its efforts to legislate, to confirm nominees, and to conduct oversight over the past 40-odd years, and how its members have risen, or more often not risen, to those challenges. It's rare that you find a piece of writing that discusses everything from the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, to the Clinton impeachment, and Ira manages to pull that off and more in this book.

So in Bill's opening remarks, he said that there are sort of two kinds of people who study the Senate. He said Ira is of one model, and I am of the other. And I think that that's going to

come across in my remarks today. And what I'd like to do is spend some time reflecting on a few pieces of Ira's argument, use them as a jumping-off point for some additional thoughts of my own about what I see as the primary drivers of the contemporary Senate's dysfunction. And then towards the end I'll turn to some key areas that I think we need to focus on if the Senate is going to go in a different direction going forward.

So for Ira, as you heard, much of the blame for what's happened in the Senate rests at the feet of Senate leadership. Indeed, there's a point in the book where he says that the Senate's inability to overcome partisanship is "first and foremost, a profound failure of Senate leaders." And there are certainly choices that leaders make about how to run the Senate, how to use Senate rules and procedure, that have contributed significantly to the environment in which we find ourselves. But what I want to do is think about the environment that those leaders have found themselves in.

So first of all, over the period on which Ira focuses, there have been really major changes in the electoral landscape of American politics. Ira spends a little time discussing the degree to which we've seen the disappearance of moderate republicans and of conservative democrats, which has made bipartisan compromise much harder to achieve.

Just one data point to illustrate this. If we turn to sort of political scientists, workhorse measure for measuring members of Congress's ideology, the distance between the most conservative democrat in the Senate and the most liberal republican in the Senate has basically doubled since 1980. So to the extent that major legislation does ever still get done in the Senate, it continues to be on a bipartisan basis, but it's much harder to build those coalitions in times of polarized parties. So Senate leaders are heading into a legislative environment where the ideological positions make it much more difficult to work collaboratively regardless of the tactics they use.

The electoral experience of individual senators has also become more attached to national political forces, decreasing their individual incentives to work with members of the opposite party. One illustrative data point on this. 2016 was the first time since the advent of the popular

election of senators in the early 20th century that in every state where there was a Senate election, the party that won the Senate seat also won that state's electoral votes in the presidential race. Voters, in other words, are not splitting their tickets at the same rate they once were, which means that senators have less of an incentive to try to formulate the kind of independent brand that would involve working across party lines.

For me, perhaps the biggest electoral difference though is the increase in partisan competition for control of the chambers in Congress since about 1980. There's a really wonderful book by political scientist, Frances Lee, that documents this, and she talks about how the period between the early 1950s and the early 1980s was dominated in Congress by the democrats. The party controlled both chambers, and republicans did not have a reasonable expectation that they would take control after the next election.

Since about 1980, however, majority control of the Senate has been more or less up for grabs each election cycle. So because of this heightened competition, both parties in the Senate have an incentive to engage in more messaging activities over legislating. Those help them win elections. And this is especially true for minority parties who have little incentive to make their majority party opponents look like capable legislators.

This emphasis on messaging and the potential shifts in party control also means that there can be more value in putting bills on the floor that are intended to fail. So especially under divided government, a majority party might think it's worthwhile to write a piece of legislation that it knows won't become law in order to signal to its voters and its interest group allies what it would do if it had more power after the next election. A great example of this is the bill that would have repealed large parts of the Affordable Care Act that President Obama vetoed in early 2016. Republicans knew it was going to get vetoed, but they wanted to be able to keep the issue active as a campaign topic during the 2016 election.

Beyond these changing electoral circumstances, we've also seen growing incentives

from outside the chamber, for senators inside the chamber, to exploit all of their individual procedural rights to try and achieve political goals. My Brookings colleague, Sarah Binder, and her coauthor, Steve Smith, made this argument in a book about the Senate filibuster from the late '90s, so this isn't a new argument. But they suggest that once interest group allies and other external audiences began rewarding senators for using obstructive tactics in the chamber, senators responded to that incentive.

So here, we might think about Senator Ted Cruz's decision to engineer a government shutdown in 2013 over the Affordable Care Act. That use of Cruz's procedural rights helped build his national reputation. When senators believe there is political value in using all of their procedural tools, they are more likely to do so at the expense of bipartisan legislative work.

So when Ira, in his book, for example, discusses the problem presented to Senate leaders by Jesse Helms, that is that he was willing to pursue an individual agenda, that's the sort of behavior that's incentivized for lots of senators today.

These broader political circumstances have also made it more difficult for senators of both parties to unite as a counterbalance to executive power. So in the early 1970s, we saw several high-profile pieces of legislation, things like the Congressional Budget Act and the measure that created the Senate Intelligence Committee to oversee some Executive branch activities. We saw those pass with large bipartisan majorities in part because senators of both parties saw a reason to work together to increase the Legislative branch's power at the expense of the Executive branch.

As the president has become an increasingly polarizing figure in American politics, however, and I don't just mean you current president, I mean, the presidency as an institution, it can be more difficult to build support for an issue on institutional grounds. Even matters that might be ripe for cross-partisan coalitions can be harder to get done if the president is too closely identified with them.

So my favorite example of this actually comes from the House, but I'm still going to

talk about it today. So in 2015, when President Obama was lobbying Congress on trade promotion authority, it was reported that someone on the staff of Representative Paul Ryan, who was then the chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, called the White House to ask that Obama stop asking Congress to give him trade promotion authority. Ryan didn't want republicans to think they were granting Obama anything special. Merely identifying the issue with the president was making it harder to build a legislative coalition.

So given all that context, I want to turn now to a few thoughts on what it would take to fix the Senate. And here, I think, the most fundamental question to ask is do individual senators really want to regain more power over the process? And if they got that power, would they actually use it to do the hard work of legislating? There are all sorts of things individual senators could do to try and signal their objection to how the institution is working, especially in the majority party in a narrowly divided Senate like the one we have today. The most extreme version of this would be something like what we saw Senator John McCain do on republicans' healthcare bill last summer, which is to vote against a major piece of legislation for reasons that at least publicly he claimed were about the process.

Senators could object to unanimous consent requests. They could work together in committee to stall, though probably not ultimately prevent nominations from coming to the floor, et cetera. The point is, if senators wanted to try and send a signal to their leaders that they don't like the way the chamber is working, they have tools to do that.

The issue for me is that by and large, I think senators don't necessarily care as much about changing the way the Senate works as they do about getting policy done that is as close to their own preferences as they can get. So take here the experience from last year involving both the Tax Bill and the Healthcare Bill. Both pieces of legislation moved through the Senate on a quick, party-line process with little deliberation. If senators had truly objected to that leadership-driven process, they could have threatened to withhold their votes until they got what they wanted.

So let's assume for a second that senators generally would prefer a chamber that operates in a more open and deliberative way. What would that actually look like?

So one major challenge in implementing a more deliberate Senate is getting senators to believe that any initial efforts to generate more opportunities for collaboration won't just disappear at the first sign of trouble.

So take for example, and Ira talked a little bit before about the Senate in 2015 -- this is an example from early in that year. So Majority Leader McConnell allowed an open amendment process on the Keystone XL Pipeline Bill, which was the first major pieces of legislation consider in the Senate after republicans had retaken control of the chamber in the 2014 elections. Senators filed nearly 300 amendments to that bill, perhaps in part because they weren't sure how long the chance to offer amendments freely was going to last.

So in short, the Senate needs to find a way to convince its members that any particular change in practice is going to stick. That's harder said than done.

Because I hate to leave things on a pessimistic note, I will note that there are still bright spots of potential cross-party collaboration in the Senate, and for me, the major challenge is whether senators are willing to use the tools available to them to force leaders to respect their work.

So I'll stop there. I'll invite Bill and Ira to come back to the stage, and we'll have some discussion and then turn it to all of you.

(Applause)

MR. GALSTON: Well, thanks to Ira and Molly for two really clear, forceful presentations.

And I have a very long list of questions. I'm not going to be able to get to all of them. But I think in fairness, I should give Ira a minute or two to respond to what I take to be Molly's principal thesis. And that is, as between the impact of leadership on the one hand and on the other, changes in the environment that affect both the relationship between the two parties in the Senate

and the incentives of individual senators to behave in a certain manner, she is more impressed by the impact of the latter two than you are and less impressed by the impact of the first. And I wondered how you responded to that.

MR. SHAPIRO: Well, first, I should say I don't think you could have a better responder or commenter than Molly. And I think her book, which has come out too recently for me to have read it fully, is going to be very important in people's thinking about the Senate.

I certainly agree with some of the points that Molly is making. I think every point she makes is actually correct. Nonetheless, there are still leaders who bring people together and try to solve certain problems, and there are leaders that don't, who decide that the Senate should work a different way. I have said in my book in the last chapter, I point out that the Senate rules have not been looked at in a comprehensive way since 1979. When Senators Reid and McConnell came in as leaders, they might have said, this place isn't working too well. What can we do to think about it? Do we really believe that these filibusters should not be real; they should simply be people indicating that they won't give unanimous consent? Do we really think holds should be not temporary courtesies but permanent? There are a lot of things that could have been addressed, and indeed, should have been addressed. And they should have been addressed when somebody said; we're not going to change the rules this week to benefit us. What would it look like if we had new rules two or four years from now? So I think the connection -- that Molly makes important points, and I think that real leaders could actually address some of those points and incentives.

But the other thing I will say, having been in the Senate during changes from democratic control, to republican control, to democratic control, I saw the Senate go on functioning. I saw the Senate go on functioning because the democrats had good leaders, the republicans had good leaders, and they all worked together. So that's how the two things relate in my mind.

MS. REYNOLDS: The one thing that I will say in response to Ira's response to me is that when we think about this question of rule change or procedure change, first of all, I applaud you

for thinking about the degree to which we need to look further down the process, if you will, and think about will the -- will a procedure change benefit us now versus in the future? I think one of the major challenges for me to think about is how do you get -- how do you actually build a coalition of individual senators to move from the current procedural situation to a different procedural situation? And when you have senators who have come to use the procedures that are available now to enhance their reputations, how do you convince them that it's in their interest to change to a new set of procedures in the future?

MR. SHAPIRO: Actually, I'll respond just briefly, which is to say one reason I believe you can do it is that I think most of the senators, 75 or 80 of them, hate the institution they're in now. They can't stop talking about how much they hate the institution they're in. They know that the Senate should work differently. They have in their mind what the Senate is supposed to be. So I do think there's a positive constituency for that change.

I think I took some solace in the emergence of the Common Sense Coalition by Susan Collins, led by Collins and Joe Manchin, which obviously was just responding to the recent government shutdown but may have lasting value.

MR. GALSTON: Let me now invite the two of you to take an even broader historical view, if such a thing is imaginable. Ira, you and I are both quintessential Baby Boomers, and I think it's becoming clearer and clearer to us as we swim upstream towards old age, that we were privileged to grow up and live in extraordinary times. You know, extraordinary economic times, extraordinary political times, extraordinary times for the role of the United States in the world. And a question that I ask myself all the time, and will now address to you, is are we taking the exception for the rule? Are we taking as a baseline an extraordinary period in the history of the country that created an environment in which the kind of desirable Senate behavior that you describe was more possible than it was before or since? I note the fact that you, yourself, described the Senate before Lyndon Johnson grabbed it by the throat as a "reactionary institution." That doesn't sound like a very great

institution to me. So there was a before as well as an after. And to what extent is it perhaps an analytical mistake to assume that what was possible under the most favorable circumstances remains possible now?

MR. SHAPIRO: That's why he's Bill Galston.

It's a great question, and I have thought about it. I said in my first book that the Senate I was describing from 1963 to 1980 was a Senate that was different than any that had come before or any that had come since. So I agree with that.

But you have to at least have in your mind a model or a vision of how the Senate could work. And then you look at certain aspects of it and see whether they could still apply. So you have to make sort of a -- we can't replicate those times, Bill. I completely agree with that. The men -- and they were all men at that time -- the men who served there were unusual men. It was an unusual period of time for the United States. Having said that, you've got to decide, would you like to have a Senate that worked on a more bipartisan basis or are we going toward a majoritarian institution? Do you want a Senate where leaders work together or where they don't work together? Is it going to be more like the House? I mean, there's all kinds of questions. I take the point that it's completely different and you still have to model off something.

MS. REYNOLDS: Yes. So I think the political scientists often refer to the period that you're describing as the "Textbook Congress," though I think increasingly we've come to ask whether similarly that's the right way to think about it. And I am someone of a different generation. I am inclined to think that really that period was an aberration. And certainly, since the early 1980s, as I was saying earlier, the rise in political competition for particularly control of the Senate I think has come to profoundly affect the environment in which the Senate works. Part of what made it possible for there to be bipartisan and collaborative legislating in the middle part of the 20th century was the persistence of both southern democrats and northern republicans. And we've seen both of those groups largely disappear, and I think that part of what led to the demise of the southern democrats

are social changes to which we would not object. And so just kind of thinking about what has changed more broadly in the United States and what that's meant for the way the Senate works.

MR. GALSTON: Ira, I'm now going to share with you the single piece of your book that I found most shocking. And it's not going to be anything that you've talked about up to now.

And this is -- I'm going to take all of us back to the fall of 2002, when it was very, very clear that the country and the Senate faced the most momentous decision that a country can face. Do we go to war or not?

On page 79 of your book, you talk about the National Intelligence Estimate, a lengthy analysis that was used to support the proposition that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, certainly chemical and biological, and was pressing hard to reconstitute his nuclear arsenal. It was a long, important document, and you report that out of the 100 senators, precisely six availed themselves of the opportunity to read that document. I was shocked, because that had nothing to do with partisanship, polarization, leadership. It had to do with the sense of individual responsibility on behalf of the senators who knew they were going to have to vote on that. So I wondered, what was your reaction to that episode? And what did you take away from it?

MR. SHAPIRO: I was appalled by it. And it's important -- thanks for reminding me, Bill -- because it is important to not focus on only one thing. I would say that there's been sort of a secular decline of the Senate over time, and people and committees not quite doing the job the way they should. So I was appalled by that.

The other points I made in that section were to cite the very powerful arguments that were made by Senators Kennedy, Levin and Byrd, against the rush to war, as opposed to the people who seemed to want, and sadly I would blame the democrats, for the sentiment that we've got to get this behind us and move on to talking about the economy or healthcare. I found it to be a terrible abdication. And that's why I spent some time illustrating how much -- what Byrd said and what some of the others said.

MR. GALSTON: I think it's an interesting counterpoint to the other arguments because it does suggest to me -- let me back up for a second.

I find it difficult to believe that an earlier sentence, with such an issue at stake, that senators, whatever their position, would not have availed themselves of the opportunity to become as fully informed as possible about a decision that in my judgment turned out to be the pivotal decision for the United States in the 21st century up to now because it has colored everything foreign and domestic that happened since. And it was a decision undertaken with fully half of the democratic senators in support.

MR. SHAPIRO: Well, I agree. I agree. And I think that what it reflects, it reflected the tenor of the times. After 9/11, there was a tendency to sort of support the president, even when the president and the vice president and the team changed the mission and broadened the war to try to go to Iraq. It was the tenor of the times, and it is an unfortunate reflection of what had happened. The senators we call the great senators, Jackson and Fulbright disagreed on everything but they would have read the intelligence report.

MR. SHAPIRO: They did their homework.

MR. GALSTON: I'll do it from here.

There's a half an hour, as I promised, for questions from the floor and responses from our panelists. Okay. I'll just do it from here.

And I have just a couple of requests. That's an understated noun for what I actually have in mind. First of all, do identify yourself by name as you're recognized. If there's an institutional affiliation that you think is relevant, please state that. And then state a question. There are many opportunities for giving speeches; this is not one of them.

Yes, and there is a roving microphone. I see a woman with her hand up right there.

MS. STERN: Thank you, Bill. It's Paula Stern. Congratulations, Ira, on your book. And thank you for your presentations, both of you.

My question is about the abhorrent issue that was raised. Was the period in which Ira and I worked together with Bill on the Hill in the '70s an aberration? The Vietnam War, Civil Rights, the protests. This was a period of the greatest activity, and yet -- and congressional assertiveness vis-à-vis the White House, and yet we also had Nixon being called the "imperial president." So my question really to you is to go back to this discussion. You think it's maybe the Baby Boomers that explain the aberration. I'm wondering if there's something more systematic so that we can go back to that period of congressional assertiveness and responsibility taking.

MS. REYNOLDS: So I will say consistent with one of the things that I mentioned in my opening remarks is that I think that period involved a willingness by Congress to try for institutional reasons to reassert power for itself vis-à-vis the Executive branch. And I don't think it's unconnected actually from the expectation that democrats would just be in the majority for a long time. I think that given that expectation it was a little bit safer for some republicans to work with democrats on these questions of, you know, I do a lot of work on the congressional budget process, so thinking about the Budget Act and the willingness of the parties to work together to stand up to what they had seen as an overreach by the Executive branch.

MR. SHAPIRO: Yeah. I guess my perspective on it would be that the congressional reassertion of authority was a reaction to the imperial presidency and the imperial presidency as manifested by the Vietnam War, but not just the Vietnam War. The sense that President Johnson had overreached and made a mistake in Vietnam and the Senate wanted to make up for that, as did the House, and that President Nixon was overreaching in other ways, including the budget. And so Congress reasserted itself. Now, from my standpoint, it would be a nice time for Congress if it had the independence and any bipartisanship, to be reasserting itself given the fact that we have the Trump presidency. You know, and yet, it hasn't worked out that way as yet. And so the question will be, what happens when the crisis really hits?

MR. GALSTON: Next, question, please?

I see a hand all the way in the back on the row -- the gentleman on the row there.

MR. CHECCO: Thank you very much. It's an interesting conversations. It's Larry Checco, Checco Communications.

I'd like, to your point, Ira, leadership, and Molly, to your point, environment, what happens when de facto leaders like Flake, Corker, McCain end up leaving the Senate, and Hatch as well? But, you know, I think that they're a check on this current president. What happens when they leave? Do you have any visions for the future for the Senate?

MS. REYNOLDS: I mean, what I would say is that when we think about -- so one of the things that I asked us to do in my opening remarks was to think about the role of individual senators, not just leaders, in trying to rebuild a Senate that works. And so for me it is troubling to see senators who are willing to try to assert some power for themselves and the institution to retire, but it's equally troubling for me to see them only be more willing to do that after they've announced that they are leaving the chamber. And so I think the fact that you just listed for us three republican senators -- Senators Flake, McCain, and Corker, two of whom have announced that they are not running for reelection, including Bob Corker, in a seat that I don't think anyone really thought was going to be trouble for him. The Flake situation was a little different because he is facing a primary challenge from the right and a strong democratic challenge in the general. But I think it's concerning to think about the degree to which reasserting authority within the chamber and using the chamber to reassert the authority vis-à-vis the Executive branch is something that at this moment we are associating with members of the Republican Party who are not seeking reelection.

MR. SHAPIRO: Well, I've thought about that a lot. And I guess I would say the following. The individual senators that we think about as showing some degree of independence -- McCain, Corker, Flake -- I would add Susan Collins. And I would add Lamar Alexander. There are different models, right? Collins thinks for a long time about whether to run for Maine. She decides -- for governor of Maine. She decides to stay. Alexander leaves the Senate leadership in 2012

because, although McConnell is his friend, he doesn't like the way the Senate is functioning and he goes off and tries to legislate day after day with Patty Murray of Washington. It actually can be done. Flake, if anyone hasn't read Senator Flake's book, you really should. It's one of the great books every written in terms of what people should think about politics. Corker, I don't know Bob Corker from a hole in the wall. I guarantee you that anyone who talks to Bob Corker who knows him would say he's leaving because he hates the way the Senate works. He has resented the leadership of the Senate since he got to the Senate. They have stifled everything he has tried to do.

And look, I need to add one thing to put my comments in context, because my comments are a harsh criticism of the current leader, Mitch McConnell. I didn't come to that with any great enthusiasm. I came to that by studying the situation. I don't believe in singling out individuals for blame. I think that he's played an extraordinarily destructive role. And the thing I wanted to basically say about it is because we have the Trump presidency, almost everything else looks like some modification or some version of politics as normal, usual politics. And I'm suggesting that McConnell's leadership of the Senate is not. That it crossed way across the line. It's not politics as usual. It's not the Senate the way it's supposed to work. It's destructive to the institution.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. I now see a sea of hands in response to that. I see this gentleman here. I see other hands in the back and I'll try to get to all of you.

MR. WEAZY: Thank you. My name is Mike Weazy.

I wonder if the Senate can be changed for the better in the current media environment. In the good old days that you've talked about in the '70s, which maybe weren't such good old days, deals could be struck by senators without fear that they would be immediately attacked on FOX or MSNBC, that Twitter feeds would not fill up with invective, that there wouldn't be countless blogs in which they were criticized and attacked in this sort of highly democratized media environment. Deals were made quietly behind closed doors and people moved ahead. What do you think is the implication of the current democratized media environment in which all voices count the

same for making the Senate a more well-functioning operation?

MS. REYNOLDS: Sure. So something I think about a lot in response to say calls to reinvigorate the committee process in either chamber, frankly, and I ask myself what would it look like for committees to have long, deliberative markups that are covered minute by minute on Twitter? And I think that's -- I don't have the answer to that question, and I don't know quite where I come down, but I do think that's a serious question that we have to think about when -- and it fits in with this broader idea of asking, you know, do individual senators want the power back? Do they want to have to deal with those kinds of consequences in the modern media environment for doing the open, deliberative work that many of them say they would like to see? And I don't know the answer, but I don't necessarily think it's a for sure yes that they would love the idea of doing this open, deliberative work in a way that has so much attention drawn to it.

MR. SHAPIRO: I think I always try to say that it's much, much more difficult to be a senator now than it was 40 years ago or 20 years ago for all the reasons particularly that you're citing. There's no doubt about it. And yet, there are always some of them who manage to do it. I said Patty Murray and Lamar Alexander. We can think of other examples. The Senate broke down entirely in 2016 over the Garland thing, and there's Alexander and Murray, grinding away, producing a major education bill, producing a major healthcare bill. It can still be done. I can't -- none of us can change the overall environment. What we can have is people who function like senators and function like Senate leaders are supposed to function. And there's no excuse for the way they're functioning now. So I take those examples, and I'd say Collins now. I'd say Carl Levin, who recently retired. There's any number of them. And my sense, and to the extent I have any relative optimism, it's that some of them, many of them actually want to function differently, although certainly, everything Molly says about the change in incentives is absolutely true.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. I'm going to take one more question from the front here and then I'm going to move back again.

MR. NEAS: Excellent presentations. I'm Ralph Neas, former chief counsel to republican senators, Edward Brooke and Dave Durenberger and the former director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and also a good friend and colleague of Ira Shapiro and Bill.

I loved the first book. I haven't read the second one, Ira. And the one disagreement we had in the first book is I thought that the 1981 to 1993 was actually an era of bipartisan cooperation, whether it was the Social Security Act, or whether it was the Tax Reform Act, or strengthening all the major civil rights laws. Now, I hear what you're saying about how to reform the Senate and get back to the senators of the '60s, '70s, and '80s. And 1994 was the line of demarcation. How can we do that without changing the structural system of our electoral politics? How do we have people not afraid of being primaried on the right or the left? Does either book get into how we get senators, republicans and democrats who want to engage and provide incentives to have them engage in timely, bipartisan compromises?

MR. SHAPIRO: Briefly, Ralph, in defense of my first book, the book cuts off in 1980. The epilogue points out that the Senate came back together and functioned through the '80s. So I, like mostly everyone else, identify a point in time that we usually identify with Newt Gingrich as part of the problem. Anyway. I think that I can't change the whole system. I support a lot of the reforms that people are working on, particularly with respect to gerrymander districts and changing that. The reason I focus on the Senate, besides the fact that's where I've spent my life, as you know, is that they don't have that same excuse, number one. Number two, there's a big cause-and-effect question here, and Bill has thought about it probably more than anybody has. Of course, we're a partisan and polarized country. So the leaders have to respond to that. And I would argue that we're a polarized country in part because of the leaders, basically, because the people have not seen anyone come together to try to solve any problems. If in 2009, the republicans had joined Obama in a bipartisan economic stimulus package, the economy would have recovered quicker and the public would have had more confidence. If in 2009, the republicans had said that healthcare proposal of his looks a lot

like the republican idea we had at the Heritage Foundation and that Governor Romney used in Massachusetts, and they could have come together on a healthcare bill, and the people would have felt better about it. So there's a cause-and-effect thing that's quite profound.

MR. GALSTON: Yes, a woman in the middle on the aisle.

MS. SHERMAN: Hi, Laurie Sherman and a former colleague of Ira's, who I adore.

MR. SHAPIRO: And now for a tough, hard-hitting question.

MS. SHERMAN: Well, I'm in total despair actually, but I've come back from an event in New Orleans with a lot of people interested in fixing democracy in the United States, which gives me some hope.

But my question, Ira, you just mentioned gerrymandering. To me, the fundamental issue is Citizens United and Campaign Finance. And I'd be interested in you both addressing if there was some way to get the big money, the dark money out of politics, would things change?

MS. REYNOLDS: So I do think that one of the reasons that, say folks like Senator Flake, who we were just discussing, has to fear a primary challenge from the right in his case, is because of the ability of big money interests to mount those kinds of campaigns. I think it's worth noting that we've also seen, to varying degrees of success, more what we might call establishment republican interests, try to counter that in the Republican Party. And so I don't think it's helped matters at all, but I'm not terribly, at this point, optimistic on a major change to campaign finance law in the near term. And so I think, as with most things that we've put on the table today, the question is how do we work within the existing set of incentives to change people's behavior?

MR. GALSTON: Yes, I see --

MR. SHAPIRO: Let me just say --

MR. GALSTON: I'm sorry, Ira.

MR. SHAPIRO: Yeah, sorry, two things. First of all, going back to Ralph's question about being primaried, it is obviously on people's minds. I would suggest that one way to respond to

it is the way Lisa Murkowski responded to it when she lost her primary, or the way Joe Lieberman responded to it by running as an independent or a third-party candidate. They both won. Jeff Flake, who I think will have an extraordinary career in whatever he does, he could have run as an independent in Arizona. That would have been one way to respond to it.

On the money question, look, I'm given to overstatement and simplification. The Citizens United decision was the worst decision of the Supreme Court since Dred Scott. It's a very terrible decision. Notwithstanding that, both sides raised a lot of money and sometimes the candidates with less money win. And Bernie Sanders deserves enormous recognition for showing you could raise $27 million, $27 at a time. The energy that's out there in the country is going to make up for some of the money problem. But I do believe the constitutional crisis that may be coming if the president decides to fire Mueller or try to force the resignation of him through some other way, will put the republican senators to the test. Do you care more about the country or your republican donor base led by the Koch brothers? And I think at that point many people will come forward and stand up for the country.

MR. GALSTON: Let me just add a brief comment here, apropos of nothing in particular, and that is that yesterday's reforms often turn into today's problems. We are now living with the legacy of Progressive Era political reforms of which the primary system is won. And I would just put on the table as, you know, I'm a defrocked mainly college professor, so for further credit, I assigned the class the task of thinking through the compatibility of the Progressive Era primary system with today's highly polarized politics. Do the two of them fit together? I'm not so sure.

There's a gentleman back there who has had his hand up very patiently for 20 minutes and he's now about to be -- yeah. There you go.

MR. HOPPE: My name is Dave Hoppe.

Let me offer a slightly different hypothesis and then ask a question of the two of you because you both touched on it as a possible solution.

One can look at the leadership of the Senate after the 2006 elections when Senator Reid became majority leader, and see a real decline in participation in the Senate. People did not have the right to offer amendments, such that a democratic incumbent elected in 2006 -- no, 2008, excuse me -- lost his election in 2014 because he never got to offer an amendment in six years in the Senate. I would argue that there's something to look at there.

But to get to the question of whether this is a potential solution, both of you touched on the idea of how easy it is to use a filibuster in today's Senate. It's basically a Cadillac. You get a day and a half off. I'm going to filibuster this. Okay, we'll come back the day after tomorrow and do our closure vote. If, indeed, you change that and force people to work through them, at some point the peer pressure of some of the people having to spend the night there because they don't know when the next quorum call is coming is going to get them to put pressure on their colleague and say we aren't doing this anymore. We aren't doing this for a joyride. If you want to do it for a significant and real purpose, okay. But if you want to do it for a joy ride. And I understand it will make senators very uncomfortable, and staff even more uncomfortable. I've been in that position and I know how uncomfortable it can be when somebody doesn't want to be up at 2:30 in the morning. Do you think that has a possibility if you'd go back to a real filibuster and the requirement that you pull, play it out that way of starting to get us back to a regular order which you both talked about?

MR. SHAPIRO: I favor a return to the real filibuster. I favor getting rid of holds, not just sort of saying who has the hold, but I favor getting rid of holds. But I mostly favor a process of consideration by which you would produce a result that 75 senators would say those are worthwhile changes and we agree to them. I don't favor lurching from crisis to crisis the way Reid and McConnell did and then some rescue comes out that lasts for a month or two and you avoid the nuclear option. And by the way, it was never from Reid and McConnell. It was always from Schumer and Alexander and Levin and McCain. The combination of a leader-driven Senate with two leaders who hated each other was not a good combination. But I think there are changes that can be made,

but you have to enlist a lot of people in it and get broad support for it.

MS. REYNOLDS: So I think generally one thing that the Senate's current operations don't do terribly well is provide ways for people to reveal the intensity of their preferences rather than just the direction of their preferences. And so this is one example, that because, you know, because cloture has become a routine part of how the Senate works. It's not the case that it works as a way to signal how intensely a senator feels about something. And so I think more -- I'm not sure that I think making people talk all the way through a filibuster is the best way to do this, but I think more opportunities for individuals to be able to signal the intensity of their preference as opposed to just the direction of their preference would be healthy for the current Senate.

MR. SHAPIRO: Let me just add one thing since I tend to focus on leaders. I'm not so hot on the followers either. I mean, I don't think the senators should have stood by year after year giving up authority of the committees, move toward this leader-driven Senate without pushing back hard. That's the reason that the Common Sense Coalition or others, those things I think matter. The senators -- I wrote an article in 2012 saying, senators take back the Senate. You know, it's sort of up to you in the first instance, and it's up to the public in the second instance.

MR. GALSTON: Well, we have only one minute left, so let me pronounce the benediction.

As I'm sure you know, the founders of this country, in designing our political institutions, did not want a party system, did not anticipate a party system, but within six years after the establishment of the Constitution, we got a party system, and we've had a party system ever since, almost always a two-party system. And so we've been wrestling really since the mid-1790s with the question of how the institutions which were designed, which were thought through without regard to political party, how are these institutions going to function in the context of two political parties? If you go back to James Madison, the assumption is that the different flywheels of the system will check and balance one another when individual ambition is attached to what Madison

called “the place.” That is, a location within an institutional order. The assumption was that loyalty to the Senate, or the House, or whatever institution you were in, would tug against loyalty to the president and the president’s program. That’s the classic Madisonian conception. Then Woodrow Wilson came along, you know, with his palpable envy for the British parliamentary system and put on the table the idea of a more parliamentary constitutional system in the United States. And political scientists in the United States have taken up this cry from time to time. There was a famous Committee of the American Political Science Association, which produced a report called “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.” What they meant by responsible was ideological clear and distinguishable. Another case would be “Wear What You Wish For.” Because we now have in effect two homogenous parliamentary parties fighting for dominance throughout our institutions, and the Senate, perhaps, Ira, has been the major casualty of the movement away from deliberation and towards party unity and responsiveness to the institutional leader and the president if the president is of your own party.

So these are deep problems, a century old. We have Madison to blame for not anticipating the rise of political parties, and Woodrow Wilson to blame for making too much of them in his envy of the Brits. And now we have to sort these things out for ourselves in the 21st century.

Please join me in thanking Ira and Molly.

(Applause)

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