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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. KIRIŞCI: Good morning to you all. Thank you for joining us this morning for our panel on “Refugee Integration and the Global Compact for Refugees: Lessons from Turkey.” I'm Kemal Kirişci, the director of the Turkey Project at the Center for United States and Europe.

These days the attention of the media is on what's going on in the northwestern corner of Syria. We don't intend to go into that, but at the same time, I think the issue of the Syrian refugees in Turkey, but also in the frontline states, countries remain a focus of attention. And we also need to bear in mind that the 5.4 million refugees, Syrian refugees who are in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey mostly, and some in Iraq and Egypt, only constitute about a quarter of the refugees around the world.

There is protracted refugee crisis in the world at the moment. One striking aspect of this protracted refugee crisis is that most of the refugees tend to be in urban centers and in city contexts. This is most visible in Turkey more than 90 percent, actually 93 and 94 percent of the 3.4 registered Syrian refugees, are in urban centers. Only a small minority remains in about 24, 25 refugee camps. To add to the 3.4 million refugees, there is another half-a-million refugees of different nationalities in Turkey are waiting to be processed by the state authorities and the UNHCR. So, Turkey is providing protection to more than four million refugees.

In the context of the Turkish experience, we are also going to focus on the efforts of the international community to put together this Global Compact for Refugees. Its origins go back to the U.N. Summit on Refugees and Migrants that was held in September 2016. What is interesting about the declaration that was adopted at that summit is the focus that is put on enhancing refugee resilience, that's the technical term they use, what in effect means, encouraging host countries to give refugees access to their labor market, so that they

can acquire a degree of independence.

A second principle, or a goal is to improve social cohesion in the host countries, because as a very recent International Crisis Group Report on the Turkey case shows there is a lot of compassion fatigue as well as tension between local communities and refugees, and the declaration aims to address this issue by emphasizing the importance of encouraging social cohesion.

And then what I like the most about the declaration, is this notion of a whole of society approach, meaning the international community when lending their support they ought to go beyond just refugees, but lend support to the communities that are hosting them and encourage the increase of their resilience, the communities' resilience to handle and host the refugees.

One major reason why we thought we ought to have this event, is not only I will be introducing the panelists that we had the opportunity to host Murat Erdoğan, my friend and colleague, it's also that the process that has been put into place to arrive to this Compact, and that Ferris will be elaborating briefly on it, it lacks two voices.

One voice is the voice of municipalities, cities that host most of these refugees, there is some progress being made on it. And my friend and colleague, Jessica Brandt, who is with us, together with her colleague, Lucy Earle, just put out a brief on this with some really solid, interesting recommendation on what could be done in the remaining time before the Compact is concluded and adopted, there's some copies of it available at the desk right outside the hall.

The voice of MENA countries, meaning the voice of those countries, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, is missing in this exercise, or is not receiving the attention that it deserves. And we hope, with this discussion today, we may we may contribute constructively to that exercise there.

I would like to start by introducing to you Professor Murat Erdoğan. I know this is a classic line, but we are really lucky to have him we with us today because he has enormous field experience, and when I say enormous field experience, I mean experience with civil society in Turkey, both local civil society, as well as international and non-governmental organizations. He has a lot of experience with local governments. Jessica will like to hear to hear that. He has actually published a report on what local governments around Istanbul where more than half-a-million of the refugees are located, have been trying to do, and what are some of the challenges.

But one reason, particular reason why we're lucky to have him, is that he has completed a major survey, public opinion survey of both Turkish, the Turkish public but also refugees, and how they perceive each other, and how they look at the situation they are in. And that survey, the Turkish version is published, the English summary is available, but there will be a fully-fledged book coming out of it.

Then we also have Izza Leghtas with us. Izza is a good friend, a good colleague, a senior advocate at the Refugees International focusing on Europe, but particularly Turkey. She, too, has field experience in Turkey, has been there a number of times, has published reports based on their on her experiences. But she also has a background addressing these issues to do with refugee human rights, with the Human Rights Watch, as well as Amnesty International. And what I like the most is that she has also worked with the Court of European Justice, and does have a solid legal grounding. And you'll hear about it.

And then I have my good friend, colleague, Beth Ferris. She is right now a research professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Services, the Institute for the Study of International Migration.

We are really fortunate, you know, Murat knows the Turkey field, Izza knows

the Turkey field but the broader legal context, and I think Beth must be one of those few people that have really deep, a deep experience and feel for the international context, and she was a senior advisor to the United Nations secretary-general, who prepared the Summit in September 2016. And I know she's been working very closely with the U.N. in putting this, the Global Compact for Refugees together.

Having made these introductory remarks, I would like to start with Murat. The integration of refugees, Murat, is an issue, particularly of deep concern to Europe. European countries, especially Germany, rightly, is very concerned about it, and the element of integration is very much embedded in the European Union, Turkey migration deal that was struck in 2016.

What I sense in this integration debate in Europe, and also implicit in the deal, is this kind of assumption that that because Syrian refugees are overwhelmingly Muslims they are more likely to be integrated smoothly into the societies where the majority predominantly are Muslims. Is this really the case? What is your survey telling us about the integration challenges that a country like Turkey is facing with Syrian refugees?

MR. ERDOĞAN: Thank you very much for the invitation, first of all. And integration is very complicated, and then I have a lot of experience about the Turks in European countries, and Diaspora politics, and the integration problems; and as a director of migration and political research at Hacettepe University, where we have concentrated on the Diaspora politics, and then, of course, the integration issue.

It is not an easy thing, as you know, in Germany after the unification of both German sides, they have also integration problems. I mean the West-East, et cetera. And in Turkey with Syrians, the main problem is the decision of the government. Actually, our government doesn't want to make any integration policy because it is not only a humanitarian problem but also the political problem. And the number of the Syrian refugees is really too

big, and now the recent number, the registered number is 3.4 million.

And it is very difficult to accept that they stay in Turkey forever, and then we should make integration policy, because of that, and for the government, and for the officials it is very difficult to accept and then create integration policies.

And then in social field, I mean the Turkish society and then Syrian society it was the image actually, they are coming from our neighbor's country, and then they are Muslim, and then Sunni of course, and it's also a big advantage for the easily, integration policy.

But in our story have other figures, and then it is also for us surprising. The Turkish society wants to help the Syrian refugees, and they gave out a lot of effort, but they don't want to share their future with Syrians, and the reaction of the citizenship, was also a part of this issue.

Erdoğan is a very important leader, and then he is also leading for this process, instead of that, his policy for the citizenship has changed, and now only 38,000 Syrian refugees get Turkish citizenship, now we have the second attempt, and then maybe we will have, have about 50,000 more.

But the last two weeks we discussed in Turkey another issue, because of the Afrin Operation in the region. I once said that we made this operation not only for the terrorism, but also the refugees, they should go back, and then we will send them back.

Of course, this mentality and this concept will make more difficult to make an integration policy. As I said, it is a governmental part, and an institutional part, but in social context, it will be also not easy. Traditionally, the Arabs and the Turks see each other, not always the same one actually.

We have a survey, we ask very simple question: are we similar culturally? Similar to the Syrians, Turkey societies say no, 80 percent; that is too much actually. It was

four years ago 70 percent, now 80 percent. And it is also very interesting, well significantly, if we ask this question in the border cities, even their relatives, and then the relationship is very, very intensive, et cetera, they said that we are not similar, the percentage, it is more than 82 percent.

It is strange of course, but it is a reaction of the Turkish society. It's clear, we are very similar, culturally very similar, but it shows us how big is the reaction in the society in Turkey; it will be not easy for the government, an integrated policy is an acceptance for the staying of the refugees.

It is also very hard for governments because our refugee policy is a part of the Syrian policy, and the government doesn't want to accept, they will stay in Turkey forever, and then it will be also for the political discussion, not good for the government, because of that we ignore that they stay in Turkey. As a migration expert, I have no thoughts for that. They will stay in Turkey forever, it does not depend on the war in Syria, and the other, they are more than seven years in Turkey.

We have in Turkey daily, more than 306 new babies, Syrian babies, they are born in Turkey. And they work already in Turkey, more than one million Syrians work in Turkey as a cheap worker. They have houses; they have also their shops, et cetera. And one very important issue, Turkish government didn't make any settlement program, and they choose, their place their self, and they are in all Turkey, not only in the border region, but also in Istanbul, in Trakya, in Black Sea Region, et cetera, in all parts of the Turkey.

It is not easy to collect them, and then send them back. It is of course not realistic, and for them, they are in our survey, we can also see that; they are also almost happy in Turkey. I mean 50 percent at least they are happy to be in Turkey, and the situation in Syria is also very complicated, nobody knows how long does it take, the war, and then instability in the region, et cetera; and we have more than enough reason that they prefer to

stay in Turkey. They have actually no other chance.

In our survey, we say always, the social acceptance level in Turkey is extremely high till now. That's very important. But is it sustainable? It is the problem actually, and we ignore the problem. We have more than about 3.4 million Syrians plus, and about 500,000 non-Syrian refugees.

Don't forget, we had only 58,000 refugees in 2011, only 58,000, and now we are talking about 4 million, but in the reaction in the society, in the political field, it is also not too much. I mean the society ignore the problem actually, it is also, may be good for the refugees, but for a comprehensive strategy, for a plan it's very difficult. And as I said, because of the last development in the region, and the new discourse of Erdoğan, and then government, it will be a very negative effect for the integration policy in Turkey, because it is --

MR. KIRIŞCI: If I may interrupt, Murat? In the one or two minutes --

MR. ERDOĞAN: Mm-hmm.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Why? Why? Why are you finding those results in your survey that suggests local people see this huge distance between themselves and the Syrian refugees? Are they sensing competition, or are they uncomfortable with the demand on public services? What's driving it?

MR. ERDOĞAN: Especially in border cities, of course the public services, it's more difficult than before for the local people. It is very normal. In Kilis, for example, their population is 110,000, and then now they have 130,000 refugees in the same city. And then we have a very centralistic system, and its politics is, traditionally, very weak in Turkey, and they have also no money for the refugees, they have money only for the citizens.

And then it makes it also difficult to give them services, and then it brings also reactions. And it is, actually it is not that, we have a tradition for the migration in Turkey.

We get always the humanity -- human mobility in Anatolia, but the number of the Syrians is really very huge, and we cannot realize that they stay in Turkey forever.

And then secondly, I think it's the cultural things, it is from Ottoman Empire. We have also a distance to the Arabs, it is also a reality in Turkey, we cannot also ignore this reality.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks, Murat. We'll come back to you again. Izza, I think this is the right moment to address an issue that you cover in your report, which is access to livelihood, and I sense that there's a relationship between those public opinion survey results, and the issue of access to the labor market. What do you see happening in Turkey? Were you able to detect some developments that you could consider to be positive in terms of assisting, helping the resilience of refugees? And then maybe what are some of the challenges; if you could share your observations with us on that?

MS. LEGHTAS: Yes. Sure. So, in a report that we published in December on access to employment for refugees in Turkey, and the title is “I'm Only Looking for My Rights,” and that's because the refugees feel that this is a right, basically, that it's nothing more that they are asking, but it's still something they can't access.

And so, I'll start by saying -- by talking a bit about, I think what's not working, what the main challenges are. So, like Kemal was saying, there were three, at least 3.4 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, three-, four-, 500,000 Afghan refugees, Iranians, other nationalities. And so these people are in Turkey, they're not getting -- some get some financial assistance, and including from the EU, but it's not enough, so, people work, they have to work.

But the conditions that they work in are extremely difficult, so the majority work in the informal sector, this is not something that's foreign to the Turkish workers too, I mean this is a big phenomenon in Turkey as well, but really the experience of refugees in

Turkey, generally speaking, is working in sectors such as construction, textiles, you know, services; for example, restaurants, other types of services, and in very precarious conditions, but also very badly paid.

So, paid very low wages for very long hours, people told us they were working 12 hours, 14 hours, and then really it's up to the employer if they say: oh, it's not enough, you have to stay longer, and they're not being paid for the extra time. Also, very vulnerable in the sense that, you know, being dismissed like that without any notice, accidents at work where they wouldn't get their wages for that time, and then so they don't have any social security coverage.

And something that was very common in what people were saying was that it was really hard for them even to get their salaries, even the low wages that they were supposed to get, it was really hard. The employers, if they didn't feel like it they didn't pay them. And then they'd say: what are you going to do; you're going to go to the police? You're not working with a permit.

And to the extent that even, there's an Afghan woman that we met who was talking about her daughter who's actually a teenager, and she was saying that she works -- she earns half of what her Turkish co-workers would earn. But she said, you know, fortunately she receives her salary. So, it's kind of like a luxury, a bonus if you actually get paid.

So, we saw many people who had left the jobs, they weren't getting paid, but they were still chasing the employer to get their wages. Another problem is, like this example of the teenager, is child labor. So, about 40 percent of Syrian children in Turkey don't go to school, and one of the factors is that their parents just don't earn enough.

And so then children, you know, work as well. There's also a factor that employers, we heard this a lot, especially in textiles, they actually like to employ children

because they don't have to pay them as much. So this is very much a reality, and in families we were given this figure, like, pretty much in every family there's at least one person working and, you know, often this involves children as well.

So, these are some of the challenges. I will say that the opportunity -- I mean and another challenge, following up on what Murat was saying, is the social context. So, the tensions, people really struggling, even to rent an apartment, but it really goes in every aspect of their lives, because they are Syrians, sort of feeling very stigmatized, and with a system of -- I'll talk a bit about this, how they can actually be employed legally, but it's sort of very little appetite from employers also to hire them as refugees.

And then in the context of these urban refugees, living in a big city like Istanbul, where I mean there's about 500,000 -- over 500,000 registered Syrians, but we were told there are up to 900,000 or a million refugees in Istanbul, because not everyone is registered. And so it's an expensive city, so they go there because there are more job opportunities than in the southeast but at the same time, it's very expensive to rent.

The distances are big; it's a city of 14 million people, transportation they have to pay for. So, there are all sorts of challenges. What's encouraging is that Turkey does have a system for the legal employment of refugees. I mean it is something that exists, it's not automatic like we would like it to be, in the sense of not requiring a work permit, but there is a system in place since early 2016.

The problem is that it requires the employer to apply for the work permit, so this is not in the hands just of the refugee, the employer has to be willing, the employer has to pay a fee of over $130, and it's valid for a year, they also need to prove that there isn't a Turkish person that can do this job, so there are a lot of these hurdles, and also administrative, bureaucratic issues that they have to face.

And so this is why, today I mean, when we were in Turkey in October we

were given the figure of around 14,000 work permits since the beginning of 2016. It's not exactly clear what it covers, because it may be people who were renewing their work permits, so it could actually be lower than that. So, it's a pretty grim situation, but there is something to work with.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Mm-hmm. But you do, you do in the report also make references to what you nicely call innovative projects. Can you share one or two of those innovative, what they are, and in what ways they do help Syrian refugees, and in some ways also help to build bridges with the local community?

MS. LEGHTAS: Sure. Yes. I mean one thing I'll add in terms of the challenges is the language, so this is a really big problem for many refugees that don't speak the language. And so they really need -- it's not enough to have a system in place, they're going to have a law. There really needs to be, you know, extra steps and measures to support them. And so, one initiative which I found very interesting is a nonprofit organization in Istanbul that is funded and established by the Netherlands, the governments of the Netherlands.

And so this initiative basically is to try to match refugees who are looking for jobs with companies, so primarily Dutch companies that are present in Turkey and around -- in 2016 are around 700 companies, Dutch companies that had a presence in Turkey. So there's quite a lot to work with.

And so basically the idea with is to identify employers that are sympathetic, that are willing to employ refugees, either because they consider it part of their social responsibility, or because of needs, you know, that means there are -- there's a lot of unemployment in Turkey, but there's also a lot of jobs that aren't filled, and the employers that are looking for the skills.

And so what they do is, they have a database, they have refugees applying,

you know, listing what their skills are, and then they try to match them with an employer who is willing to employ them, and then they take care of, you know, the work permit process so that that's sorted. And then they give them training, and then, so coaching after they start the job.

So, I just think it really illustrates how important it is to not just have a system in place, the reality is that refugees, like I said, they don't speak -- often don't speak the language, very hard for them to get the information, they have very mixed information, not always reliable about what they have the right to, what the system is, how they can get what they have the right to.

And so these kinds of initiatives also of matching the private sector, you know, with the livelihoods of the refugees, I think is really encouraging.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks. Thanks, Izza. Beth, my request now is to build that bridge between this Turkish experience and the experience -- the efforts of the international community to put that Global Compact for refugees. What are lessons that could be carried on to that exercise, given that the voice of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan has remained somewhat meek in that exercise?

But I think before we get there, I'll try to get you to kill two birds with one stone. Could you briefly tell us, you know, remind the participants of what this exercise is about, and what are the stages? I hear a lot that we've entered the final stretch. Thanks, Beth.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Thanks. It's great to be back at Brookings. Let me say a word about these processes, because there's a lot of confusion including in the media. In September 2016, the Global Summit on Refugees and Migrants came up with the New York Declaration, unanimously approved 193 countries, making some wonderful promises. Promises to open alternative pathways for migrants and refugees, to resettle more refugees,

to adopt better conditions, to respect the rights, and so forth.

But that New York Declaration also called for the development of two new Global Compacts, one on migration and one on refugees. These are very different processes. The Global Compact on migration, which we are not talking about here, is a state-led process being negotiated between governments in New York, under the authority of the President of the General Assembly. Two skilled diplomats are leading that process, Mexico and Switzerland.

The Global Compact on Migration is a more complex process than the Global Compact on Refugees. There are more issues, there are strong tensions between protecting the rights of migrants and border control, border management, and so that is a very interesting process to watch.

The process for coming up with a Global Compact on Refugees is very different. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, was given the responsibility for developing this compact in consultation with governments, not to be negotiated, but UNHCR in the driver's seat, to consult with governments, to come up with a draft that will then be presented to the general assembly in fall 2018, and presumably adopted.

There's a lot of clear recommendations, particularly in the annex to the New York Declaration of what is to be included in that Global Compact. There will be six rounds of consultations with governments between February 13th and the middle of July, and so we can expect to have a lot of discussion of what should be included, and how far to go. The zero draft of the Global Compact on refugees is expected tomorrow, 31st of January, so it will be interesting to see how UNHCR, which is drafting that compact, you know, picks up what it has heard from governments through some of the individual consultations.

Now, when you look at the relationship between this Global Compact on refugees, and issues of integration it's kind of hard to see the relationship. The New York

Declaration makes 11 references to integration, but 9 of those are to integration of migrants. When it comes to refugees, the relevant phrase is: the reintegration of refugees when they return.

The fact is that integration in the refugee world is becoming almost a non-starter. Traditionally there have been three solutions for refugees, voluntary return, local integration or resettlement, voluntary repatriation isn't happening anywhere in large numbers, resettlement is being slashed in terms of the possibilities. And governments of host countries, for the most part, are not interested in local integration. I mean Syria, Lebanon -- sorry -- Lebanon, Jordan, even Turkey, you know, accepted refugees to arrive understanding it would be temporary.

So did the refugees, they thought it would be a few months, you know, and here it is seven years later. A lot of policies explicitly prohibiting integration: we want you to go home, therefore we are not going to make life particularly easy for you in the host countries.

Now, there are exceptions, Uganda stands out as a very generous country that has had good integration policies, but by and large, this is a trend we see everywhere. You know, how far can the Global Compact on refugees go in terms of promoting integration, when some of the frontline countries, those hosting millions of refugees, are saying no to integration? So, that's one issue to watch for.

Another issue to watch for in the development of this Global Compact on Refugees is the concept of responsibility-sharing, or burden-sharing, or the more generic international cooperation. You know, we are not facing a crisis of refugee numbers, 22 million refugees in the world of 7 billion people should not be a crisis. A million arriving in Europe should not be a crisis in a region with 650 million people.

But the crisis in the system is, there's no good way of sharing responsibility

so that governments of frontline countries don't feel beleaguered like they are left on their own. The extent to which the Global Compact on refugees can move us forward in terms of responsibility-sharing is certainly something to look out for.

And then finally, there's this notion you mentioned, Kemal, about the whole of society approach. How do you mobilize different actors and stakeholders, not just national governments, but municipalities? And here I would really point to Turkey's experience with a crucial role of governors, in terms of responding to refugees in their situations. The parliamentarians, civil society, the private sector, you know, it all sounds very nice to say: everybody should be working together, but how does that work in practice?

You know, how do you involve the private sector beyond urging them to provide jobs for refugees, or IDPs, or returning refugees? You know, how can their contributions be valued more, and, similarly, what roles can mayor's play? And I applaud the brief that just came out, you know, calling for those drafting and consulting on the Global Compact on refugees to consider the voices of mayor's. I suspect there's a lot more optimism there than negotiating or consulting with national level governments.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks, Beth. Whenever I listen to you I wish I was in your graduate class, and was able to take notes before, you know, what you're saying disappears out of my memory; but brilliant. Thanks a lot. And I really appreciated the way you distinguished between the Global Compact for Migrants versus the Global Compact for Refugees, and to see that one international governmental organization, the UNHCR, has been given the responsibility, I think ought to be seen as something very positive.

But then I know we mustn't count our chicken before we get there. You mentioned rightly, burden, the challenge of burden-sharing, what I like about the declaration, the New York Declaration, the emphasis it puts on how protecting refugees is a global responsibility, it's a shared responsibility.

And there I would like to turn back to you, Murat. Part and parcel of that burden-sharing, that sometimes doesn't receive the recognition that it deserves in Turkey, is the migration deal that was agreed upon between Turkey and the European Union. The impression we get from the media is that the leg of the deal that meant to control the movement of Syrian refugees towards Europe is working reasonably well, and the Europeans, though they don't mention it too much, are quite happy and comfortable with it.

But one of the other legs is that the European Union means to support the effort of Turkey to integrate or manage the refugee situation, and when the deal was struck I remember at the time, the narrative was not very positive. You know, it was made to sound like the European Union was paying protection money to Turkey, whereas, from the discussion we've had so far, there's a lot of effort that is being put into managing the Syrian refugee presence in Turkey. Obviously, as Izza has pointed out, there are difficulties, there are challenges, there are inadequacies.

But Murat, you're right there in the field. How do you see that burden-sharing part of that deal working in Turkey? What reflections can you share with us, and what more could be done?

MR. ERDOĞAN: Turkish-EU relationship is always very important, but the last five years we discussed with Europe only the refugee issue, not the other things. It's also actually very sadly for Turkish politics, and then for the link to the Western community.

I defined the agreement between Turkey and the EU, an agreement between three losers: Turkish losers, EU losers, and then also refugee losers. That is not ideal, but the main effect is the money, and money is 3 billion, as you know, for two years and then maybe we will have also 3 billion for next two years.

But it is also another discussion in Turkey, and I think this discussion brings a lot anti-Western, anti-European tendencies in Turkey, and then it brings also -- it is also an

instrument for the anti-Western politicians in Turkey. The money is important of course, till now the Turkish government said that we pay USD 30 billion. Of course, it's a discussion we cannot describe. I am sure the Turkish Government not pay 30 billion, but there are some direct costs, and then indirect costs.

The refugee costs in European Union, 15,000 per person per year; if you make a calculation, if the Syrian refugees, not in Turkey, but wherever in European Union, in Germany for example, then it will be, cost more than EUR150 billion, actually we quote this, enormous. But in Turkey the problem is, first of all the transparency, we have no idea which money, and then which sector, and then which mechanism, et cetera. It is the main problem in Turkey in all sectors, actually, it's not only for the refugees' issue.

But we make also a wrong calculation, the refugee cost is enormous, and then I am sure it is more than 50 billion, till now, for Turkey. And then the money is a part, the other risk is more -- bigger, and indeed what about the social risks, there's an economic risk, and a security risk, et cetera.

And for the burden-sharing and all together we -- the Turks maybe have always -- the first time see the reality, how weak is the burden-sharing, and then the responsibility-sharing, and then solidarity. The lack of the solidarity is the one of the biggest issue, and as Turkey we can also recognize. But what's the problem now in Turkey? We get 3 billion, but we can use only 1 billion in Turkey from the EU money, because we should also create our own projects. It's also very problematic; we cannot create easily our project because of our policy.

Till now, we didn't decide: what will we do? I mean, shall we send them back, or give them citizenship, or send them to Europe, et cetera, et cetera? We lost time, we lost money, and we lost energy of course, and then it brings also, as I said, anti-Western, and then anti-European discourse more, stronger. That's very important.

And maybe one word about the -- it's about the burden-sharing, and then Global Compact. As you know, Oxfam in Turkey, they try to bring more voice of the refugee-hosting countries is also another big issue. And then we should also give more effort for that, but the EU-Turkey relationship is now, unfortunately, based on only the refugee issue. And it brings also negative effect, and then it brings also more suspicions for the integration policy.

If the European brings money for the education, for women, for Entrepreneurship, et cetera, et cetera, then the Turks can actually come and say that: yeah, you see, they bring money to send them, or to let them all in Turkey. It is the problem in Turkey. It's a psychological problem in Turkey also.

One word also about the work permit: Okay they have the permit possibility but it cannot work, and it is not easy. We have in Turkey very high unemployment rate, more than 3.5 million Turkish citizens waiting for job places. And informality is, unfortunately, a part of the Turkish economy more than 35 percent of the Turks work informal. And for the refugees it is impossible to get formal work, a good work, decent work, it is very problematic, but it is also not sustainable. It's also a very big danger for our next future for the integration policy, because it brings also hate speech, not only among the Turks, but also the Syrians.

It will be in future a big problem. We have, as a cheap worker the Syrians in Turkey they bring maybe some contribution to the Turkish economy, but it is not sustainable, and then it is very risky, I would say.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks, Murat. My feeling has always been on the EU-Turkey Deal is the importance of the narrative that is used around it. For domestic political reasons, both sides tend to adopt a negative discourse and the losers; I like, Murat, the way you pointed out Turkey losers, EU losers, and the refugee losers, but one outcome, a product of that kind of negative narrative, at the top of the list are refugees.

It's not that the European Union is not providing funds it is providing funds,

and then the international community is providing funds. Actually these funds can be Googled, you know, it's transparent, it's open, and what's striking is that the overwhelming part of those international funds, actually come from the West. It comes from the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Europe, and a very small proportion comes from countries beyond that.

I do not see, for example, China contributing. I do not see Russia contributing. But when you look at the Turkish narrative, especially governmental narrative, it's the West that is constantly being criticized, and then it's no wonder that the West adopts a negative narrative, often driven by their own domestic politics, which is very much these days centered around anti-immigrants, xenophobia and Islamophobia, and you get trapped in this vicious circle that is not benefiting any of the parties that are, that you are referring to.

And I'll turn to Izza. But, Beth, I wonder if in the Global Compact for Refugees exercise there could be, it's just a thought that came up to my mind, an exercise where there's an effort to address this narrative issue, this discourse issue? But, Izza, in between, in between you and Beth and me, following up on Murat's remarks; how can we overcome this fear on the part of the local communities that they are taking away our jobs?

And it would not surprise me that the negative results from the Turkish public opinion survey, is mostly driven by this fear of losing jobs. And you've just heard Murat making references to how informal, how the informal sector in Turkey is very large, and in an informal sector that fear is accentuated, it's exaggerated, it grows.

What do we do? What can come up? What kinds of ideas can we come up with to mitigate that fear, and to control it?

MS. LEGHTAS: Yes, I mean, I think first of all it's a question of Education. I mean when you have so many myths about, you know, Syrians they don't want to work, they are lazy, they get loads of money from the states, they get into universities without exams. I

mean there's a lot of these just inaccurate and negative perceptions that are not, by no means limited to Turkey.

I mean there's a lot of a lot of myths that are going around in Europe, and in the States as well about who refugees are and, you know, what they want, and how -- if they are living at the cost of the states.

So, I think first of all explaining that there needs to be a strong messaging on behalf of the authorities to correct these and explain, you know, this is who refugees are, this is why they're here, they work, they have to work like any anyone else. And also bringing, you know, opportunities, basically the issue of legal employments is really key because there are a number of refugees, obviously, who have low skills, or who are more suited to this kind of informal work, but there are also people with qualifications, with university degrees, but they end up doing these jobs, and competing with less-qualified Turkish citizens, because they just don't have the opportunity to work in the field that they are most qualified for.

And so, then you get into this competition between people who are overqualified with -- you know, and then that also drives down the salaries, what I was saying that's -- that pretty much all the refugees that we've been speaking to, they earn less, they say they earn less than the Turks.

So, obviously, if you're a Turkish person, then, yeah, it's more competitive, it drives down the salaries, so it's really important to address and to listen, you know, to listen to the concerns. I think there's a concern about the lack of transparency, who is getting citizenship, why they're getting citizenship? You know, these kinds of things.

So, I think involving the local population, listening, but also informing them, and creating opportunities for people to work side by side, to live side by side, in ways that are respectful, because I think this is, again, not just a lesson for Turkey, everywhere. If you get people together it becomes a more human interaction than just kind of news and

numbers, and that I think helps, can help a lot.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Many thanks, Izza, I think you put it so vividly, what can be done and what's driving these fears, the myths and the need to educate. When with Beth, when we were in Şanlıurfa, one of the cities along the border with Syria, I remember hearing this dilemma that businesses have, where one business who wants to run the business by the book, but then the business next to it is not doing it.

And it's employing people illegally, or informally, and then the business that wants to do things correctly is beginning to lose out in the market because the other one has the competitive edge. And I think clearly, the role of regulatory bodies is very critical, and then it ties back to your point about transparency.

Beth, how do we get these ideas? Especially the one that just popped up in my mind, the notion of how could we weave into the Compact the importance of governments, particularly governments.

I don't know if Jessica would agree with me, or disagree. I have this feeling from what I read, and the conversations I hear, municipalities tend to adopt a more constructive language. We see it in the United States too; I mean there's a battle going on between the Federal Government and the cities over immigration issues. Do we still have any chance of weaving such ideas into the preparation of the Compact?

MS. FERRIS: Two points on the toxic narrative that we are living in with respect to both refugees and migrants, it makes it extraordinarily difficult to be negotiating or developing these new Global Compacts when public opinion across the board is so negative. On the other hand, it's an unprecedented opportunity to try to move the system a little bit forward.

You know, so I think we need to be very careful about our expectations that these Global Compacts aren't going to resolve all problems. But the other thing is, I wonder

how much we know about public opinion, and what contributes to it. I mean research shows pretty clearly, at least in the U.S. and Europe, that confronting myths or stereotypes by presenting evidence doesn't seem to work.

People have their minds made up. And I can cite a dozen studies showing the tremendous economic contributions of refugees, but they don't go very far. I mean how do people's attitudes change? I think political leadership is key, you know, when the messages come from the top that refugees and migrants are opportunities, that they're positive, they should be welcome, for Americans, this is who we are in terms of our national identity.

The other thing that seems to be helpful are personal contacts, when people know a refugee, when they've talked to them, when they've heard their stories, usually over things like kids in school together, rather than structured conversations, people tend to have more positive attitudes. But in some of the restrictions on freedom of movement of refugees in host countries limit those possibilities, to get to know ordinary human beings on a normal basis, which may be a contributor to public opinion.

I don't think that the Global Compacts will be able to do much more than, say, you know, call on political leaders to say positive things about refugees and migrants, maybe note the importance of public opinion, but I think it's really hard work to understand how public opinions are formed, and how they can be changed, words in the Global Compact aren't going to make a lot of difference, I don't think.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes. Thanks for the warning, Beth. And sort of injecting an element of realism for an idea that popped up to my mind at the spur of the moment, reality check is always a very useful one.

Well, thank you for the initial remarks. And I'd like to take this opportunity to involve you in the discussion, and encourage you to raise questions with the panel, make

comments. But please, first, present yourselves. The way we thought we would proceed is to have two or three initial questions and comments, and then I'll turn to the panel? The floor is yours. Yes ma'am, you have the microphone.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Do, children born to refugees in Turkey automatically become citizens?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Very good. I'll take one. Thanks. Kathleen, please?

QUESTIONER: Thanks. Just a couple of things, and this one is probably for Beth. The high commissioner for refugees seems recently to have been placing a lot more emphasis on relations with host communities and support to host communities. And I think in Murat's surveys it was pointed out that assistance that goes exclusively to refugees can inflame resentment against them. So, I wonder how you -- perhaps any of you -- but particularly, Beth, think that this kind of emphasis can be promulgated, not only through the Global Compact, but through other mechanisms. Thanks.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks, Kathleen. One more before I -- Thank you, sir.

MR. TAYLOR: Thank you very much to the speakers for their excellent insights. I'm Terrence Taylor from the International Council for Life Sciences. Rightly, the discussion has been focused on the intergovernmental relations, but I wonder if there any lessons from the experience in Turkey, for both international, and national , and nongovernmental organizations which can provide, you know, not only funds of course, the larger organizations, but also expertise, perhaps more focused on the management of refugees rather than the integration aspects. I'll be grateful for any comments. Thank you.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you. Murat, let's start with you with a very specific question, which I have also very much wondered: what's happening to the status of those children? And then you're welcome to address Kathleen's, as well as the final question there. Okay then I'll turn to you.

MR. ERDOĞAN: The citizenship as in Turkey, unfortunately, a lot depends on the geography, but also the other status. And soon we have till now, I mean after 2011 April till today we have more than 305,000 babies that were born in Turkey, but they have no citizenship, and they have another big problem, there are also no Syrian citizenship.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes.

MR. ERDOĞAN: They are stateless now, and it will be a big problem in future. We discuss also in Turkey, that with the political situation in Turkey it's very difficult, and very risky for the government to give them citizenship. We gave them an exceptional citizenship, but as I said, it is not more than 50,000.

The second question: if you give them the citizenship, then what about their father's, their patrons, et cetera, it will be very, very difficult, and the reaction is too hard not only from the opposition party but also advance party, and because of that they are very, very -- (Speaking in foreign language)?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes, careful.

MR. ERDOĞAN: -- careful for that. I'm sorry. And then secondly, Global Compact maybe you will say much better than me, for the non-governmental organizations and then cooperation in Turkey, it is another very big problem in Turkey now, it is difficult to be active in Turkey as an INGO, and then even as U.N. institutions in Turkey, unfortunately, the last five years we have not good experience.

They are very active but the problem is that the mentality of the INGOs and then U.N. institutions for the refugee issue, that depends on -- their mentality depends on the very poor country, and then the structure it's no more there, et cetera, it's Afghanistan involved here, or Uganda, et cetera, et cetera.

But in Turkey the government is very strong and then also the local authorities is very, very strong, I mean the governorship, et cetera, et cetera, they want to

control all of them. It is very difficult to make cooperation with the International Organization, and then secondly it is not easy region actually. We have a lot of problems, terrorism, and then the other political problems. There's ISIS and the PKK, and the others.

Then it's the security problem for Turkey, to make cooperation with international organizations, it is one of the biggest challenges for Turkish Government, and then also for the refugees. We should create another environment for the cooperation. They bring not only money, but the capacity; it's very important, very valuable. As I said, we cannot forget, in 2011 only 58,000 refugees, now more than 4 million, then we need also capacity, but it is also the same time, and political discourse.

And then secondly, the Turkish Government, and then bureaucrats is also not -- they don't want to accept to make cooperation because they see a tendency of the Western organizations to let the refugees in Turkey, that's another big barrier in Turkey.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks. Thanks, Murat. Unfortunately the last element is a very difficult one. For good or bad reasons there is a deep mistrust towards the West. I would argue part of it is a function of Turkish politics, Turkish discourse, culture, but part of it is also the manner in which the West, and especially the European Union, has handled Turkey over the decades, and in particular the accession challenge, membership to the European Union. But that's a topic for, hopefully, another occasion.

Izza, to go back to the lessons, and as well as Kathleen's point about host communities, can you reflect on it from your perspective? Because I remember one of your colleagues, the very few -- within the very few months I had arrived here, I got a chance to have a conversation with Daryl, and a colleague of his -- of hers.

And they'd just come back from Turkey, and they had made exactly the remark that Murat made, and flagged that they noticed out in the field that representatives of well-meaning international nongovernmental organizations were having that difficulty to try to

adjust moving from their experiences in countries where states may be relatively weaker, to a state like in Turkey where sometimes we feel the state is too strong.

MS. LEGHTAS: I know. I agree, and I think that was an issue that came up in Greece as well, with the arrival of a large number of refugees, and then a lot of INGOs moved from other countries, in other context into Greece. So, you know, it's not the only context in which this is happening. I mean I do think it is a difficult climate and a difficult context for NGOs to operate in, not just international NGOs, but also Turkish NGOs.

And, for example, the issue of language, which I think is really key for refugees, like we've been discussing. I mean, it's the seventh year now of the Syria crisis, and so with people still not speaking the language it's extremely problematic. But now there are more stringent requirements while NGOs were able to -- were providing Turkish lessons. You know, not necessarily in a very formal -- on a very formal basis, but a number of them had to stop doing that because the requirement has become, in 2017, that the organization has to have a protocol with the government, with the Ministry of Education, with an approved, you know, curriculum and everything.

But what this means is, it's less language is provided to the refugees, and in a context where we are talking about large numbers, large populations in big urban centers, it's really important to have these services close to the refugees. So I think this is another thing we can learn.

A city like Istanbul of 14 million, you just have to have more localized services, and especially when people are working 12 hours a day, they're not going to go and travel another hour-and-a-half to take a Turkish language lesson, so they kind of get trapped in this context, and without this communication being possible between them and the host community, I think it's very difficult.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you. Beth, how do you -- what's your experience, you

know, with respect to INGOs, IGOs, and the local governments and local communities?

MS. FERRIS: Well, first on Kathleen's question about working with the host community and refugees. You know, that's become standard good practice in non-camp situations. A lot of people still assume -- think of refugees as living in camps where services are delivered exclusively to refugees. But more and more NGOs, U.N. agencies, are realizing that to separate out refugees can cause a lot of tension with the host communities, and not meet the needs of people living there.

With respect to INGOs and local NGOs, I think Turkey has some very good strong local national NGOs that are playing a leading role in a lot of areas, and I think that we can learn from that. You know, we haven't mentioned the situation of IDPs, or internally displaced persons, I kind of half-mentioned that.

But inside Syria, there are over six million people displaced, and there at least some Turkish NGOs who have played an important role in providing some cross-border assistance to people who may be in even more vulnerable situations than refugees. Tensions sometimes between INGOs and local NGOs about money, you know, why should, you know, the government give a big NGO, an international NGO funds, which then distributes it often to local partners, or local NGOs, but always taking a part of that for its administrative costs.

So, some tension from local NGOs saying, why don't you just give us the money directly? And there are a lot of reasons why, particularly donor government would prefer to work through established international NGOs than to work with entities that they may not know nothing about, and don't want to take the risk of inadvertently funding a politically-motivated, or a worse type of organization.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes. Yes. An added element to what you just said, which sometimes is difficult to get across in Turkey, is that these big donors have to account to their

own publics, that they have to be transparent, and I personally have had great difficulties in trying to explain this to my Turkish counterparts.

It's time for another round of questions. Yes, ma'am, please, and then there, and then there, yes. Yes, you go ahead. Let's take, and then we'll come to the front.

MR. BUKOWSKI: Thanks. Alan Bukowski, the Center for American Progress.

MR. KIRIŞCI: I recognized the voice there. I don't see the face, but --

MR. BUKOWSKI: I recognized yours too. I wanted to ask Murat, you mentioned that the operation in Afrin that's being talked about in part as an opportunity to repatriate some of the refugees. I think Operation Euphrates Shield which took place in 2016-2017, to the issue of Afrin, also was talked about that way. And I think the Turkish Government had claimed that some people have been repatriated. I wonder: what are the latest numbers on repatriation to the area of Euphrates Shield? What is the potential for repatriation in Afrin, if you know it?

Also, I just wanted to ask: given your work with the Syrian refugees, to what extent is there still hope for being able to go to the West? Or, have they largely given that up based on the Turkey Agreement, and if the door is closed --

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you. Thank you very much. Yes, please, here. And then we'll come to you.

QUESTIONER: I have two quick questions. One is on education of refugee children. What are the barriers to entry to education? Turkey has an extremely high literacy rate, if I understand correctly, and you're suggesting, I think, that you have four million people whose children may or may not achieve that literacy, and they come from a country of high literacy, originally. And the second question is: has anybody done any comparisons between the success of Uganda and its contribution to its overall economy, and the integration of

refugees and migrants? Thank you.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes, please, hear.

QUESTIONER: Thank you for an excellent panel. My first question is to Beth, I think. You mentioned that the three solutions for refugees are kind of failing, and I was wondering to what extent is the asylum process mentioned in the Global Compact, and to what extent could that be a legal way forward for integrating refugees? And my second quick question, regards the EU-Turkey Deal, it seems to me that this deal kind of shifts responsibilities away from Europe and to Turkey just by giving money.

Why not use that money to fund projects and programs in Europe that has, in general, a stronger institutional framework, instead of just sending the money to Turkey where you mentioned transparency is an issue? Thank you.

MR. KIRIŞCI: There will be more of them coming, it wouldn't sell well. Beth, I think this time, why don't we start with you?

MS. FERRIS: Okay. I want to leave the question of Afrin to Murat.

MR. ERDOĞAN: Yes.

MS. FERRIS: In terms of the barriers to education, and perhaps Izza can talk further; I mean first there's language, there are concerns of parents for the safety of their children, often they need their kids to work in terms of, to contribute to income. I think that Turkey has done a pretty good job in terms of trying to make schools accessible to the refugee children, and some concerns with establishing separate Syrian-run schools, some of the political concerns around that. I'm not sure. Izza may want to add some more of the barriers there.

On the question of Uganda, and Studies on economic impact: I haven't seen any in the last year, so when the large number of refugees came. But across the board the research is pretty clear that when policies are available to support the integration of refugees

the economic impact is better, and when we talked about economic impact in terms of the cost to a country, but there are always winners.

There are some very rich Turkish companies, and Jordanian and Lebanese who've made a lot of money from the infusion of hundreds of millions of dollars of humanitarian aid. You know, wish I were an SUV dealer in Beirut, for example, in terms of the number of NGOs buying cars and renting apartments. So, we don't talk very much about the economic winners in this, maybe we ought to give more attention to that.

Asylum will definitely be mentioned in the Global Compact though, talk about the need for clear procedures, better conditions of entry, borders, et cetera. You know, asylum is another way of moving to other countries, but I think that there's not going to be, you know, a ringing endorsement from would-be refugees to take dangerous journeys to seek asylum on the borders of countries that really don't want them. That doesn't seem like a good solution, but what you'll hear a lot more of, is the need for refugee self-reliance, refugee resilience.

In a way that's saying: hey, the international community can't do this for you forever, so let's really emphasize your doing it on your own, refugee-self-reliance will be a big theme I'm sure in the country. It's politically very, very attractive; it's a nice word "self-reliance" but what it can mean is, you know, don't expect more, or indefinite humanitarian aid.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Mm-hmm. Thanks. In the only SUV point, The World Bank did a very good study in, I think, 2015 or '16 looking at the impact of the Syrian refugees on the labor market of Turkey. A very professional study, discovering how educated Turks have seen their salaries increase because of demand for their services while -- particularly women in the informal sector, suffering from competition coming from the Syrian refugees; what I haven't seen, so far, there may be one, and if anyone is aware of it please flag it to me, is a study of precisely what Beth, through a remark on SUVs, alluded to.

A lot of funds have, dare I say, flooded the Turkish economy, a lot of the humanitarian assistance, you know, from diapers, to food, to bed covers, to tents, were actually purchased in Turkey and shipped into Syria. And I do remember once hearing the complaint that even the VAT on these items are paid for, and that makes a very significant contribution to the Turkish economy.

I don't know how much of the cost that Murat made references to, is compensated for through that, but I very much, I'd be interested on seeing the results of as a study, and being shared with the public to encourage a more positive view, vis-à-vis the Syrian refugees.

Izza, I know you would have quite a bit of words to share with us on education.

MS. LEGHTAS: Mm-hmm.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Please take up the questions there?

MS. LEGHTAS: Yes. So, the number is around 40 percent of children, of Syrian children out of school in Turkey. And I think I agree with Beth, I think there's the language challenge, but I think from the people that I've met, it's easier with young children, so families where children are just starting school, it's much easier. You know, they learn the language, they start from the beginning.

You know, we've met very enthusiastic -- like one man, a Syrian man in Istanbul we met, and he said his children had just started school that year, twins. He said the classes -- the school starts at 12:30, he said at 11:00 they were ready, like, with their bags, ready. They're like, when can we go to school. You know, so very, very positive, even among Afghan families not just Syrians, but I think it becomes much harder when children are older, when they've been out of school for a long time, and that's just -- that's a challenge that needs to be tackled in a very different way.

And then there's also, yeah, the issue of their livelihood, so basically children, particularly if they're all a little bit older having to work as well to support the family. If I may on the issues that you talked --

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes, of course, you can.

MS. LEGHTAS: Yes. So, I think it's really not a question in terms of your question about why are these funds not being used in the EU, that's not the purpose, the purpose is actually to close -- to control the borders. So, it's a political, it's a very political issue, it's after 2015 when, you know, up to a million people crossed most of them from Turkey to enter the Greek Islands.

So, I don't think that's an argument. I mean the EU is spending a lot of money on border control, on cooperation with African governments to, you know; address what they call the root causes of migration, et cetera. So, it's not really an economic issue, I think a financial issue, and I think that, you know, the money, it's a lot of money, EUR3 billion, I mean, it's not what the Turkish authorities are saying that they've spent, obviously, but it's not easy to absorb these large funds. I mean EUR 3 billion in two years, now discussing maybe another 3 billion.

So, it's one thing for the EU to be sort of: yes, well, we've paid our 3 billion. We've done our part. But it's a lot of money to absorb its procedures, its programs, its ministries that have to be accountable, et cetera. And I think that at the end of the day, it's still a lot of people, 3.5 or 7 million that we are talking about. So, there's definitely a need. There are programs of resettlement to the EU, that's a one-for-one scheme under the EU-Turkey statement, which is: for every Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian to be resettled.

They're not really applying it that way, so I think the numbers are disappointing, and that definitely, you know, the people in Turkey need help, because the

reality is, most of them are going to stay there, but there definitely needs to be more in terms of taking a number of people, to the U.S.

MR. KIRIŞCI: You know, give them some credit, the E.U., and also Germany, is funneling important funds and resources into integrating Syrian refugees, and others who came along, but then I'd also like to voice the complaints of a neighboring country, called Greece, that is a member of the European Union but is struggling with managing the very fact that -- the very fact that other EU member countries have failed to express solidarity with Greece, in respect to the relocation, they don't call it resettlement, but the Relocation Scheme, and you've seen some of the narratives, populist narratives that we are hearing coming out of Poland, Hungary, now the Czech Republic as well, this is, domestically, a very hot potato.

But on education, Murat, before I turn to you for especially the Afrin question, and as well as the other ones, there's something very interesting that links the education issue with your findings about cultural affinity. One of the massive, as far as I go, as a former Professor gains off the Turkish Republic, and the legacy of Atatürk, et cetera, is the way in which the Turkish education system is co-education, boys and girls are educated in the same classroom.

This legacy and tradition is beginning to take a dent, but that's a different issue. One challenge in the case of Syrian children is that the Syrian education system is segregated, and from reports we are hearing that Syrian families are reluctant to send their daughters to Turkish schools for this very reason. And it's a very difficult, difficult issue, in terms of finding a way out from that dilemma, although if this lasts long enough then they may -- the Turkish education system might become one where girls and boys are separated, and the challenge is resolved there.

And to add one point, very quickly, to what Izza said, is that when we look at

the statistics, and there are really good studies and reports on the education of Syrian children in Turkey, is that the enrolment rates are quite high for the very young, six, seven, eight, nine years old, and then it begins to drop as you're approaching an older -- older children. And that's a challenge that's a major challenge, and what I like the most about the younger ones, is the way in which they will, enthusiastically, offer their translation services the little children in the field. Yes, Afrin, Murat?

MR. ERDOĞAN: Before Afrin, let me say something about the education. We have in Turkey now between 5 to 17 years old Syrian children over 1 million; 1.07 million, and them for that we need at least 1,300 new schools. That is not easy actually. I think it's a big success. Now, we have about 615,000 students at these schools. It's a big success, but the quality of the education and an integration quality, it's very problematic. We have to see.

And for new students we need extra 50,000 teachers, and its costs also enormous, you can also make a calculation, at least EUR 2 billion per year, the Turkish government should stand for the Syrian children. It is not easy, and then in short term it is really very problematic, it is only the technical way. On the other side, the boys they work already in Turkey, the girls, their family they don't want to send them to school, they have also some barriers, and then they have also fear for the assimilation actually in Turkey. It's also another big topic.

But like I said the biggest problem in Turkey and we should find any solution to send them to school. For example, only in Şanlıurfa, they meet, the new schools were for Syrian children is 220, and then plan for the next two years only 14, because you cannot find an easy place to make school, it is not an easy process. And then in this region, the education is, in general, very bad, and their condition is also very bad, that is not easy challenge for all.

And then secondly, the Afrin, of course this is a very, very a new

phenomenon in Turkey. Two months ago I was in AK Party, Erdoğan's Party, in a symposium, and then we discussed: how can we integrate the Syrians into Turkey?

I mean the concept was very clear, finally, after seven years. And then we discussed about the education, work, et cetera, et cetera, but now the new discourse has changed everything. And then add on -- I mean the operation, of course the Turkish society gives support because of the terrorism, and then to fight terrorism, but not only that, they hope that also, after this operation, maybe the Syrian refugees can go back.

That is not realistic if you look at the reality in Turkey, but this course will stop all the integration process in Turkey. I have a big problem for that, and then the support from the Syrian refugees to the Afrin Operation, and the other operation in the region is also very limited. You can see the demographic figures in Turkey, the youth, I mean the Syrian youth, they are mostly men. I mean, if you look at only age group at 20-24 it is very, very strange 100 women, but 134 men, it is the balance -- I mean it is not balanced, but it is the reality.

And because of that, of course there are some groups, they were also ready to go to Syria to camps, et cetera, but it's very, very difficult, and to go back voluntarily is almost impossible, and this operation would be also helpful for Erdoğan, and his party, and then maybe also MHP, to get some vote, it's an operation actually for 2019 election.

That's also very important, not only I mean, but it will also be helpful for the Turkish Government, because the reaction of the community to the Syrians refugees is very high, and at least they have now a little bit, hope, it's very important,

And for the EU, a stigmatization of the process is a reality, unfortunately. And then burden-sharing among the EU is also a big problem. In EU, the number of the refugees, Syrian refugees, is 970,000, and then more than 515- is only in Germany. And number two is Sweden, 120,000. More than 70 percent of the refugees, they live in two countries. And of course it is very problematic also in European countries to make the

integration policy, but they have a small advantage, they know already they will stay in Germany or Sweden or the other country, and then they began immediately for the integration policy to give them language courses, et cetera, et cetera.

Of course they have, capacity, they have experience, it's also very important, but you cannot compare with the Turkish case, but it is also a really a very big problem, burden sharing also responsibility sharing in EU. I mean it is also within the EU, it's also very important

And last point, very small, about the employment. As I said to the Syrians, they work already in Turkey, but they don't create any problem for the unemployment in Turkey. It's strange but it's a reality, because they worked very cheap, and they prefer some workplaces the Turks prefer not, and it's a very classic picture.

And because of that, they can also, not problem for the ordinary Turkish people, in the next future maybe, but now we have no problem in this sense, we have no problem for the unemployment because of the Syrian refugees.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you. Thank you, Murat. We've come to the end of this panel. I hope you found it informative. As we close I would like to just highlight that this was an exercise to give the Turkish experience a voice, the cities a voice, but I noticed that in this whole exercise, sometimes the voice of Syrian refugees and their experiences, and especially their experiences within Syria themselves, somehow, need to be taken into account and incorporated.

I would like to thank Beth, thank Izza, and thank especially Murat, because I'm so impressed with the control he has over those statistics. And then he was feeling a bit nervous about English not being his first foreign language. He's a German-speaking Turkish Professor. Thanks a lot, Murat. Thanks to you, too. (Applause)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2020