

# The Individual Health Insurance Market: Where Does it Stand and Where is it Headed?

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## **Four Questions**

**What did the Affordable Care Act do?**

**Where was the individual market entering 2017?**

**What has the Trump Administration changed?**


**What will the new market equilibrium look like?**

# What Did the Affordable Care Act Do?

## Two central changes affecting coverage:


- 1) **Medicaid expansion:** States permitted to expand Medicaid up to 138% of the poverty level
- 2) **Individual market reforms:**
  - **Regulatory changes:** Insurers barred from denying coverage/varying coverage terms based on health status. Plan designs must meet certain standards.
  - **Subsidies:** Premium tax credits up to 400% of the poverty level. Reduced cost sharing up to 250% of the poverty level.
  - **Individual mandate:** Requirement to have coverage or pay a penalty. Penalty was greater of \$695/person (half for kids) or 2.5% of household income.

# Share of People Without Health Insurance




Source: Council of Economic Advisers (2014); National Health Interview Survey.

# Individual Market Enrollment




Source: Medical Loss Ratio public use file; author's calculations.

# Trends in Marketplace Premiums and Competition



Source: Department of Health and Human Services.


# Per Member Per Month Revenue and Costs in the ACA-Compliant Individual Market



Source: CMS data; Mark Farrah Associates analysis of NAIC data; author's calculations.

Note: Claims are net of cost-sharing reduction payments.

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# Why Was Damage from Higher Premiums Limited?

## Three mitigating factors:

- **Most enrollees protected by tax credits:** 57% of ACA-compliant enrollees received tax credits in 2016
- **Enrollment only moderately sensitive to premiums:** A 10% premium increase should have translated to a roughly 7% enrollment decline among the unsubsidized
- **Marginal enrollees only moderately healthier:** People driven out by higher premiums expected to be ~30% cheaper

**Bottom line: Premium increases in 2017 should have been expected to increase claims 1-2%**

# What Might the Equilibrium Have Looked Like?

## Plausible sketch:

- **Enrollment:** ~16 million, ~60% subsidized
- **Premiums:** Similar to employer plans on average
- **Networks:** Lowest-cost plans have narrow networks, but broader networks often available
- **Insurer participation:** More uncertain. Profitability spurs some insurers to expand/re-enter, but offset by exits by less successful issuers

# Policy Shifts Under the Trump Administration

## Three largest changes:

- End of cost-sharing reduction payments
- Repeal of individual mandate
- Proposed expansion of short-term plans

## Other important changes:

- Proposed essential health benefit changes
- Shorter open enrollment period
- Reduced outreach spending
- Association health plans

# How Did Ending CSR Payments Affect the Market?

## Structure of cost-sharing reduction program:

- Insurers legally required to reduce cost sharing for silver plan enrollees < 250% of the poverty level
- Federal government reimbursed issuers until the Administration ended payments in October 2017

## In most states, insurers only raised premiums for silver plans, known as “silver loading”

- About 9 in 10 enrollees live in “silver loading” states
- About 7 in 10 enrollees live in states that confined premium increases to on-Marketplace silver plans

## Illustrative Monthly Premiums for a 27-Year-Old at 250 Percent of the Federal Poverty Level in a “Silver Loading” State

	Benchmark Silver Plan		Illustrative Gold Plan	
	w/ CSR funding	w/o CSR funding	w/ CSR funding	w/o CSR funding
<b>Total premium</b>	\$320	\$400	\$371	\$371
<b>Premium tax credit</b>	\$116	\$196	\$116	\$196
<b>Enrollee net premium</b>	\$204	\$204	\$254	\$174

# Ultimate Effects of CSR Cutoff

## Many subsidized enrollees better off

- **Two groups win: (1) people already in bronze/gold; and (2) people w/ incomes 200-400% of poverty line**
- **Around 1 in 3 Marketplace enrollees in 2017**

## Unsubsidized enrollees largely unaffected

- **Most purchase off-Marketplace or non-silver plans**
- **Unsubsidized enrollees in on-Marketplace silver can generally switch to off-Marketplace silver**

## Federal government spends more on net

# What Happens When the Mandate Ends in 2019?


## Some people, largely healthy, drop coverage

- People dropping out better off – if fully rational
- Remaining unsubsidized enrollees pay more, while providers bear greater uncompensated care

## Precise magnitude of effects uncertain

- CBO estimates 13 million fewer covered in long run, with individual market premiums rising 10%
- Surveys suggest smaller, still meaningful effects

# Uninsured Rate for People Ages 26 to 64 with Family Income > 400% of the FPL



Source: NHIS; CPS; ACS; author's calculations.



# What Would Expanding Short-Term Plans Do?

**“Short-term, limited duration” plans exempt from federal individual market rules**

- **Current definition: < 3 months, no renewals**
- **New proposal: < 12 months, renewals permitted**

**Effects of creating a parallel market:**

- **Many healthy unsubsidized shift to short-term plans**
  - **Premiums for compliant plans rise, raising costs for the sick and federal government**
  - **Short-term plans (generally) offer less coverage**
- **Some healthy uninsured purchase short-term plans**

# What is the Outlook for the Individual Market?

## Market will find a new equilibrium

- Large subsidy-eligible population anchors market
- Transition could be rocky at times, given challenges in forecasting the new risk pool

## How will the new equilibrium differ?

- Fewer covered, particularly accounting for quality
- Less pooling of risk between healthy and sick
- Lower premiums for some subsidized enrollees