

# **The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism**

## **Supplementary Online Appendix**

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### **Abstract**

This supplementary online appendix consists of three parts. First, we provide summary statistics, additional sensitivity checks and further evidence. Second, we provide details and sources on the data covering regional output and unemployment, trust, beliefs, attitudes and voting statistics. Third, we provide the classification of non-mainstream political parties' political orientation (far-right, radical-left, populist, Eurosceptic and separatist) for all countries.

## **1. Summary Statistics, Additional Sensitivity Checks, and Further Evidence**

### **1.1 Summary Statistics**

Appendix Table 1 reports the summary statistics at the individual level for all variables that we use from the ESS distinguishing between the pre-crisis period (2000-08) and the post-crisis period (2009-14). Panel A looks at all questions on general trust, trust in national and supranational institutions, party identification, ideological position on the left-right scale and beliefs on the European unification issue whereas in panel B we focus on attitudes to immigration.

### **1.2 Additional Sensitivity Checks**

Appendix Table 2 looks at the relationship between employment rates and voting for anti-establishment parties. Panel A reports panel OLS estimates with region fixed effects. Panel B reports difference-in-differences estimates. In contrast to Table 4, the specifications now include a dummy that takes on the value of one for core countries (Austria, France, Norway, Sweden) and zero for the periphery countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, Slovakia). When we allow for differential time trends in the core and the periphery, we obtain smaller estimates which are still statistically significant. Panel B results also hold true when we add country-group-specific time effects.

Appendix Table 3 looks at the first stage relationship between unemployment and the lagged share of construction in regional value added. Similarly to Table 5, we run panel specifications with region fixed effects year dummies (in columns (1)-(2)) and country-group-specific year effects (in (3)-(4)). However, we now use lagged values of construction and other industry shares. The results are similar to the baseline estimates; the coefficient on the lagged share of construction is negative and statistically significant.

Appendix Table 4 reports the estimates for the change in regional unemployment before and after the crisis period. The independent variable is the pre-crisis share of construction. Unlike Panel B of Table 5 of the paper, instead of using the 2004-2007 mean of construction we use the pre-crisis share of construction in 2003 as well as in 2007 as a robustness check. Coefficients are somewhat smaller when we employ the pre-crisis share of construction in 2007, but retain statistical significance.

Appendix Table 5 presents the regressions of the change in regional unemployment before and after the crisis on the pre-crisis share of construction in regional value added. In Panel A we use the 2007 value, while in Panel B we use the mean over 2004-2007. In column (1) we

take the difference in regional unemployment over the period 2016-2008; in column (2) over 2015-2008; in column (3) over 2014-2008; in column (4) over 2013-2008; and in column (5) over 2012-2008. The share of construction in regional value added enters with a positive and statistically significant in all specifications (except for (1)) implying that a large pre-crisis construction share is associated with rises in unemployment post 2008.

Appendix Table 6 looks at the relationship between voting patterns for non-mainstream parties and turnout with the shares in regional value added of construction, agriculture (incl. forestry, fishing, and mining), trade, government, and finance, with manufacturing serving as the omitted category. The coefficient at the construction share is negative; implying that relatively high specialization in construction, a labor intensive sector, associated with lower unemployment is related to smaller vote share of non-mainstream parties. The coefficient is significant for all types of non-mainstream parties, except for the case of far right parties in panel B, where we control for general period time fixed effects. The relationship between voting for anti-establishment parties and other sectoral shares is insignificant, showing that is construction rather than specialization in agriculture, services on manufacturing that is related to voting for non-mainstream parties.

Appendix Table 7 reports 2SLS difference specifications that combine the “reduced-form” estimates (in Appendix Table 6) with the first stage estimates (in Appendix Table 5). The specifications in Panels A and B are similar, though Panel B includes four macro-region dummies for the North, South, Centre and East to account for differential trends across Europe and other hard-to-observe factors. In all specifications, unemployment (instrumented by the share of construction in regional value added) has a statistically significant effect on anti-establishment, populist and radical left vote and a non-significant impact on the vote for the far-right.

Appendix Table 8 looks at the correlation between construction and corruption. The table gives cross-sectional estimates, associating self-reported incidents of corruption (in columns (1), (3), (4), and (6)) and corruption perceptions (in column (2) and (5)) with the share of construction in regional value added in 2003/2004, using data from the 2nd wave of the ESS (unfortunately these data are not available post crisis). We find no significant correlation between share of construction and any measure of corruption.

Appendix Table 9 performs additional identification tests in a two-stage least-squares framework. The first-stage relates regional lagged unemployment to the lagged share of construction in regional value added. The reported second-stage links voting for anti-

establishment parties to the component of regional unemployment explained by construction's share in regional value added. In Appendix Table 9 we control for lagged share of regional population with completed tertiary education (in columns (1)-(3)), while in columns (4)-(6) we add a dummy variable that takes the value of one for regions experiencing positive net migration inflows in the previous years. [For both variables we use data from Eurostat.] These are useful specifications as construction may affect voting via attracting immigrants (who usually work in construction) or via shaping regional education. The first-stage fit is strong (F-stats around 33 to 44), suggesting that the relationship between construction and unemployment is present, even when we condition on net migration and education. The 2SLS coefficient on lag unemployment is positive in all columns, implying that the component of regional unemployment explained by construction is a significant correlate of voting for non-mainstream parties, even conditional on migration and education that do not seem to matter.

Appendix Table 10 presents 2SLS estimates, where we control for the share of ESS respondents, who are citizens of the country (Panel A) or were born in the country (in Panel B). We do so to assuage concerns that the link between anti-establishment vote and construction does not operate via unemployment, but rather by immigration. Sadly, ESS data on respondents' place of birth and citizenship are available for just eight countries. The 2SLS coefficient on regional unemployment retains its economic and statistical significance and is not affected much by the inclusion of these variables.

Appendix Table 11 reports "reduced-form" difference specifications, linking changes in trust and beliefs over the crisis to the pre-crisis share of construction in regional value added. In line with the baseline results, we obtain negative and significant coefficients mainly for the variables that measure trust towards national and European institutions; this is especially so when we look between 2012 and 2008.

Appendix Table 12 reports 2SLS panel fixed-effects specifications associating general and political trust and political beliefs on the component of regional unemployment explained by construction share. To isolate the impact of construction, in all specifications we control for the share of agriculture, services, and manufacturing in regional value added. The first-stage fit continues to be strong (F-stat 19.22). The estimates show that there is a link between construction, unemployment and distrust towards politicians. In contrast the correlation between construction-driven swings in unemployment and general trust is muted and does not always pass significance confidence levels. There is also a link between unemployment and how close respondents feel to political parties, the European parliament and their satisfaction with the functioning of democracy,

Appendix Table 13 reports 2SLS panel fixed-effects specifications using the share of construction in regional value added as an instrument for regional unemployment that in turn is linked to beliefs about immigrants. The 2SLS coefficients are negative across all specifications, hinting that high unemployment rates may be related to anti-immigration sentiment. Yet the estimates are small and noisy. The coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero when we examine respondents' views on immigrants role in cultural life or when we look at questions on whether immigrants should be allowed in the country (columns (1)-(3)). Only when we look at people's views on immigrants' role in the economy (in column (4)), the coefficient passes standard significance levels.

**Appendix Table 1. Summary Statistics at the Individual Level**

	<b>Pre Crisis Period (2002-2008)</b>				<b>Post Crisis Period (2010-2014)</b>			
	Obs. (1)	mean (2)	median (3)	St. Dev. (4)	Obs. (5)	mean (6)	median (7)	St. Dev. (8)
<b>Panel A. General and Political Trust and Political Attitudes. European Social Survey</b>								
Trust Other People	145041	0.50	0.50	0.246	105126	0.50	0.50	0.242
People Fair	144295	0.56	0.60	0.233	104790	0.56	0.60	0.226
People Helpful	144835	0.48	0.50	0.236	104979	0.49	0.50	0.229
Trust Country's Parliament	141110	0.45	0.50	0.248	102816	0.42	0.40	0.261
Trust Politicians	142630	0.36	0.40	0.233	103632	0.34	0.30	0.241
Trust Legal System	141629	0.51	0.50	0.259	102898	0.50	0.50	0.268
Trust Police	143773	0.59	0.60	0.250	104321	0.60	0.60	0.250
Satisfaction with Working of Democracy	139597	0.53	0.50	0.244	102094	0.52	0.50	0.255
Trust in European Parliament	127410	0.46	0.50	0.239	96507	0.43	0.50	0.246
Trust in the United Nations	130161	0.53	0.50	0.247	95753	0.51	0.50	0.252
Placement on Left-Right Scale	126163	0.50	0.50	0.215	92572	0.51	0.50	0.220
Feel Close to a Particular Party	142492	0.51	1.00	0.500	103424	0.48	0.00	0.500
European Unification Go Further	102091	0.53	0.50	0.261	60512	0.50	0.50	0.263
<b>Panel B. Beliefs on Immigration. European Social Survey</b>								
Allow Immigrants of Same Race	140779	0.59	0.67	0.285	102431	0.61	0.67	0.290
Allow Immigrants of Different Race	140560	0.50	0.67	0.292	102365	0.52	0.67	0.299
Allow Immigrants from Poorer Countries	140231	0.49	0.33	0.295	102143	0.48	0.33	0.308
Immigrants are Good for Economy	138013	0.49	0.50	0.240	101497	0.48	0.50	0.244
Immigrants Improve Cultural Life	138218	0.55	0.50	0.247	101444	0.55	0.50	0.251
Immigrants Make Country a Better Place	138290	0.48	0.50	0.226	101037	0.49	0.50	0.230

The Table reports summary statistics (mean, median, and standard deviation) for the main trust-related, political beliefs, and attitudes towards immigration variables employed in the empirical analysis distinguishing between the pre-crisis period (2002-2008) and the post-crisis period (2010-2014) at the individual level. Data come from the European Social Surveys (2002-2014). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable sources and definitions.

**Appendix Table 2.**  
**Employment/Population and Voting for Anti-Establishment Parties at NUTS3 Level**  
**Panel Fixed-Effects OLS Estimates. 2000-2017**

	Anti- Establishment Parties (All Types) (1)	Radical Left Parties (2)	Far- Right Parties (3)	Populist Parties (4)	Eurosceptic Parties (5)	Participation Rate (6)
<b>Panel A. Panel Fixed-Effects with Core-Periphery Specific Period (4-year) Time Constants</b>						
Employment/Population	-0.8588*** (0.2051)	0.5679*** (0.1551)	-0.0352 (0.2245)	0.9090*** (0.1804)	-0.7662** (0.2782)	0.0283 (0.1552)
standardized "beta"	-0.303	-0.391	-0.016	-0.341	-0.272	-0.022
adj. R square	0.374	0.398	0.167	0.483	0.303	0.370
within R-square	0.376	0.401	0.171	0.485	0.306	0.373
Observations	1675	1675	1675	1675	1675	1632
<b>Panel B. OLS Difference Specifications with Core-Periphery Constants Post-Crisis Average [2017-2009] - Pre-Crisis Average [2001-2008]</b>						
Difference Employment/Population	-0.7007** (0.2599)	-0.3923** (0.1714)	0.0400 (0.2069)	-0.7730** (0.3133)	-0.5264* (0.2715)	-0.1477 (0.1343)
standardized "beta"	-0.238	-0.184	0.024	-0.252	-0.169	-0.109
adj. R square	0.119	0.294	-0.005	0.067	0.04	0.527
Countries	11	11	11	11	11	11
Observations/Regions	355	355	355	355	355	355

The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects OLS estimates (Panel A) and cross-sectional OLS estimates where the main variables are expressed in differences (Panel B). Panel A include NUTS3 constants (coefficients not reported) and core-periphery-specific period constants (not reported), corresponding to 2000-2004 (period 1), 2005-2008 (period 2), 2009-2012 (period 3), and 2013-2017 (period 4). In Panel B the dependent variable is the change in the voting before and after the crisis across EU NUTS-3 regions. The independent variable is the change in regional employment over total population before and after the crisis. For both the dependent and independent variable, we first take mean values over the period 2009-2017 [post-crisis] and over the period 2000-2008 [pre-crisis] and then take the difference. The difference specifications include a dummy that takes on the value of one for core countries (Austria, France, Norway, Sweden) and zero for the periphery countries (Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, Slovakia). Regional employment data come from Cambridge Econometrics, who use Eurostat data. Information on voting comes from various country-specific databases and the classification of parties' orientation is mostly based on the Chappell Hill Expert Survey. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

**Appendix Table 3. Lagged Construction Share and Unemployment  
Panel Region Fixed-Effects OLS Estimates**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lagged Share of Construction	-1.5463*** (0.2587)	-1.0430*** (0.2095)	-0.8012*** (0.2726)	-0.6848*** (0.2417)
adj. R square	0.387	0.531	0.578	0.635
within R-square	0.390	0.534	0.586	0.643
Countries	24	24	24	24
Regions	222	221	222	221
Observations	3194	3184	3194	3184
Region Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	No	No
Country-Group Year Fixed-Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Other Industrial Shares	No	Yes	No	Yes

The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects OLS examining the within-region correlation between unemployment and the one-year lagged share of construction in regional value added. The dependent variable is regional unemployment. The main independent variable is the lagged share of construction in regional value added. Columns (1)-(2) include year fixed-effects and columns (3)-(4) include country-group year fixed-effects (constants not reported). Columns (2) and (4) include as controls the lagged share in regional value added of agriculture (incl. fishing, forestry and mining), trade, finance, and government services (coefficients not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.



**Appendix Table 4.**  
**Pre-Crisis Construction Share and Unemployment Dynamics during the Crisis**  
**OLS Estimates**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Panel A. Industrial Share in 2007</b>				
Pre-Crisis Share of Construction [2007]	0.9694** (0.4100)	1.0764** (0.4545)	0.5647** (0.2601)	0.5381** (0.2506)
adj. R square	0.176	0.239	0.586	0.613
<b>Panel B. Industrial Share in 2003</b>				
Pre-Crisis Share of Construction [2003]	1.3830*** (0.3266)	1.6568*** (0.3289)	0.6299* (0.3040)	0.5888** (0.2177)
adj. R square	0.309	0.379	0.581	0.631
Countries	22	22	22	22
Observations/Regions	212	211	212	211
Country-Group Constants	No	No	Yes	Yes
Other Industrial Shares	No	Yes	No	Yes

The table reports cross-sectional OLS estimates. In both panels the dependent variable is the change in regional unemployment before and after the crisis across EU NUTS-2 regions. We first take mean values over the period 2009-2017 [post-crisis] and over the period 2000-2008 [pre-crisis] and then take the difference. The main independent variable is the share of construction in regional value added before the crisis. In Panel A we use the 2007 shares. In Panel B we use the 2002 shares. Columns (3)-(4) include country-group constants (not reported). Columns (2) and (4) include as controls the pre-crisis (in Panel A in 2007 and in Panel B in 2002) share in regional value added of agriculture (incl. fishing, forestry and mining), trade, finance, and government services (coefficients not reported). The The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

**Appendix Table 5. Pre-Crisis Construction and Unemployment Dynamics during the Crisis  
OLS specifications**

Difference	<u>2016-2008</u>	<u>2015-2008</u>	<u>2014-2008</u>	<u>2013-2008</u>	<u>2012-2008</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<b>Panel A. Industrial Share in 2007</b>					
Pre-Crisis Share of Construction [2007]	0.2725 (0.1711)	0.4040** (0.1757)	0.4691** (0.1975)	0.6129** (0.2544)	0.6371** (0.2573)
adj. R square	0.617	0.654	0.695	0.687	0.639
<b>Panel B. Industrial Share in 2004-2007</b>					
Pre-Crisis Share of Construction [2004-2007]	0.2515 (0.1609)	0.4158** (0.1698)	0.5231*** (0.1837)	0.7186*** (0.2360)	0.7678*** (0.2318)
adj. R square	0.619	0.657	0.698	0.694	0.652
Countries	22	22	22	22	22
Observations/Regions	211	211	211	211	211
Country-Group Constants	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Industrial Shares	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

The table reports cross-sectional OLS estimates. In both panels the dependent variable is the change in regional unemployment before and after the crisis across EU NUTS-2 regions. In column (1) we take the difference in regional unemployment over the period 2016-2008; in column (2) over 2015-2008; in column (3) over 2014-2008; in column (4) over 2013-2008; and in column (5) over 2012-2008. The main independent variable is the share of construction in regional value added before the crisis. In Panel A we use the 2007 shares. In Panel B we use the average over 2004-2007. All specifications (in both panels) include country-group constants (not reported) and the pre-crisis (in Panel A in 2007 and in Panel B the mean 2004-2007) share in regional value added of agriculture (incl. fishing, forestry and mining), trade, finance, and government services (coefficients not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

**Appendix Table 6. Industrial Regional Composition and Voting for Anti-Establishment Parties  
"Reduced-Form" Estimates. 2000-2017**

	Anti- Establishment Parties (All Types)	Radical Left Parties	Far-Right Parties	Populist Parties	Eurosceptic Parties	Participation Rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>Panel A. General Year Fixed-Effects</b>						
Construction Share	-3.1553*** (0.6141)	1.0336*** (0.2806)	-1.4884** (0.6619)	3.3080*** (0.6336)	-1.8059** (0.6794)	0.6649 (0.6417)
Agriculture (Forestry & Mining) Share	-0.2673 (0.4166)	0.0629 (0.2028)	0.6742 (0.4259)	-0.0696 (0.4561)	0.1568 (0.3769)	1.0756*** (0.3022)
Trade and Commerce Share	-0.7104* (0.3982)	-0.4554* (0.2204)	-0.0741 (0.3334)	-0.6257* (0.3324)	-0.39 (0.4573)	-0.2278 (0.3051)
Government Services Share	-1.2500** (0.5891)	-0.533 (0.3910)	-0.3012 (0.4774)	-0.5731 (0.4641)	-0.6151 (0.4736)	0.613 (0.3798)
Finance Share	-0.3754 (0.7794)	-0.0879 (0.4868)	-0.1583 (0.4407)	0.2146 (0.5971)	0.1821 (0.5852)	0.4589 (0.3035)
adj. R square	0.430	0.413	0.214	0.528	0.444	0.387
within R-square	0.444	0.427	0.232	0.539	0.457	0.402
<b>Panel B. General Period (4-year) Time Fixed-Effects</b>						
Construction Share	-3.2516*** (0.6666)	1.5645*** (0.5158)	-1.1512 (0.7183)	2.8657*** (0.6361)	-2.2157*** (0.5967)	0.657 (0.6562)
Agriculture (Forestry & Mining) Share	-0.3061 (0.6330)	-0.4315 (0.4165)	0.9757* (0.5607)	0.1357 (0.4636)	0.2497 (0.3259)	1.5578** (0.6585)
Trade and Commerce Share	-0.5406 (0.6897)	-0.3862 (0.3619)	-0.107 (0.5688)	-0.6486 (0.6653)	-0.6396 (0.7036)	0.0387 (0.4152)
Government Services Share	-0.7747 (0.5177)	-0.3028 (0.3570)	-0.0553 (0.4619)	-0.1198 (0.5810)	-0.1522 (0.4898)	0.2749 (0.3362)
Finance Share	-0.0735 (0.7696)	0.0644 (0.4875)	-0.1677 (0.4665)	0.4771 (0.6543)	0.1367 (0.7894)	0.383 (0.3970)
adj. R square	0.296	0.173	0.149	0.370	0.358	0.219
within R-square	0.302	0.181	0.157	0.376	0.364	0.227

**Panel C. Country-Group Period (4-year) Time Fixed-Effects**

Construction Share	-4.1464*** (0.9468)	-2.0822** (0.8454)	1.5043*** (0.5156)	3.4315*** (0.7516)	-2.4819*** (0.6273)	0.2727 (0.5914)
Agriculture (Forestry & Mining) Share	-0.8068 (0.9573)	-1.0836** (0.4760)	1.0244 (0.6337)	-0.2607 (0.6906)	0.1463 (0.5518)	1.2686*** (0.4497)
Trade and Commerce Share	-1.1392* (0.6642)	-0.6658* (0.3426)	-0.2224 (0.4567)	-1.0109 (0.6787)	-1.1997* (0.6771)	-0.1155 (0.3690)
Government Services Share	-0.52 (0.3845)	-0.368 (0.2270)	0.1036 (0.2864)	-0.028 (0.3870)	-0.1722 (0.4103)	0.2498 (0.3220)
Finance Share	0.3219 (0.7241)	0.3357 (0.4181)	0.3007 (0.3721)	0.8739 (0.7296)	-0.0287 (0.7810)	0.1986 (0.3645)
adj. R square	0.360	0.300	0.297	0.408	0.449	0.321
within R-square	0.373	0.314	0.311	0.420	0.460	0.336
Countries	24	24	24	24	24	23
Regions	216	216	216	216	216	214
Observations	846	846	846	846	846	803

The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects OLS estimates, associating voting for non-mainstream parties (and electoral turnout) with the share of the main sectors in regional value added. All specifications include NUTS2 constants (coefficients not reported). Panel A includes year constants (not reported). Panel B includes four period constants (not reported), corresponding to 2000-2004 (period 1), 2005-2008 (period 2), 2009-2012 (period 3), and 2013-2017 (period 4). Panel C includes country-group specific period effects (constants not reported), allowing the four period constants to differ across for main European regions (North, South, East, and Centre). Industrial share data come from Eurostat. Information on voting comes from various country-specific databases and the classification of parties' orientation is mostly based on the Chappell Hill Expert Survey. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

**Appendix Table 7. Unemployment and Voting for Anti-Establishment Parties Before and After the Crisis**

**2SLS Difference Specifications.**

**Post-Crisis Average [2017-2013] - Pre-Crisis Average [2004-2008]**

	Anti-Establishment Parties (All Types) (1)	Radical Left Parties (2)	Far-Right Parties (3)	Populist Parties (4)	Eurosceptic Parties (5)	Participation Rate (6)
<b>Panel A. General Constant</b>						
Difference Unemployment	1.8470*** (0.3550)	1.9050*** (0.4016)	-0.3383 (0.2731)	2.0642*** (0.4079)	1.2731*** (0.4238)	-0.3545** (0.1781)
Cragg Donald F-Stat	102.63	102.63	102.63	102.63	102.63	106.98
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat	19.83	19.83	19.83	19.83	19.83	29.12
<b>Panel B. Country-Group Constants</b>						
Difference Unemployment	3.2507*** (0.8908)	2.3164*** (0.8414)	0.0517 (0.5738)	3.5536*** (0.9804)	1.2127 (0.9139)	-0.1586 (0.4126)
Cragg Donald F-Stat	35.10	35.10	35.10	35.10	35.10	38.31
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat	11.60	11.60	11.60	11.60	11.60	16.03
Countries	207	207	207	207	207	179
Regions	22	22	22	22	22	19

The table reports cross-sectional 2SLS (two-stage-least-squares) estimates. The first-stage associates changes in regional unemployment before and after the crisis with the pre-crisis share of construction in regional value added. The second-stage associates changes in voting for non-mainstream political parties (and turnout) to “instrumented” by the pre-crisis construction share changes in regional unemployment. The post-crisis values for voting and unemployment are averages over 2013-2017 and the pre-crisis values are averages over 2004-2008. Panel A includes also a constant term (not reported). Panel B includes four macro-region constants for the North, South, Centre and East (not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

**Appendix Table 8.**  
**Construction and Self-Reported Corruption and Views on Corruption**  
**Cross-Sectional Estimates in 2003/2004**

	Public Official Asked Favor/Bribe past 5 years (1)	Public Official Asking Favor/Bribe is Wrong (2)	Respondent Offered Favor/Bribe last 5 years (3)	Public Official Asked Favor/Bribe past 5 years (4)	Public Official Asking Favor/Bribe is Wrong (5)	Respondent Offered Favor/Bribe past 5 years (6)
Construction Share	0.1651 (0.2603)	0.0592 (0.2655)	0.0871 (0.1316)	0.107 (0.1776)	0.1777 (0.2930)	0.0576 (0.1436)
adjusted R-square	0.01	-0.006	0.003	0.402	0.384	0.164
mean dependent variable	0.011	0.883***	0.004	0.014	0.868***	0.001
Country Fixed-Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations/Regions	147	147	147	147	147	147
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18

The table reports cross-sectional estimates, associating self-reported incidents of corruption (in columns (1), (3), (4), and (6)) and corruption perceptions (in column (2) and (5)) with the share of construction in regional value added in 2003/2004, using data from the 2nd round of the European Social Surveys. Industrial share data come from Eurostat. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

**Appendix Table 9. Further Identification Tests**  
**Construction, Unemployment and Voting for Anti-Establishment Parties**  
**Panel 2SLS Estimates with Country-Group Time Effects**

	Anti-Establishment Parties (All Types)	Populist Parties	Eurosceptic Parties	Anti-Establishment Parties (All Types)	Populist Parties	Eurosceptic Parties
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Lag Unemployment	3.7622*** (0.6589)	3.3207*** (0.6521)	1.7450*** (0.6597)	4.0707*** (0.8207)	3.6043*** (0.7936)	1.9513*** (0.7177)
Lag College Attainment	0.0057 (0.0066)	0.0017 (0.0062)	0.0025 (0.0041)			
Lag Net Migration Indicator				0.0409 (0.0265)	0.0397 (0.0246)	0.0268 (0.0173)
Kleibergen-Paap F- Stat	33.35	33.35	33.35	43.97	43.97	43.97
Other Industrial Shares	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Countries	22	22	22	23	23	23
Regions	202	202	202	203	203	203
Observations	831	831	831	833	833	833

The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects 2SLS (two-stage-least-squares) estimates. The first-stage associates regional lagged unemployment with the lagged share of construction in regional value added. The second-stage associates voting for non-mainstream political parties (and turnout) to “instrumented” by the construction share regional unemployment. All specifications include NUTS2 constants (coefficients not reported) and country-group specific period effects (constants not reported), allowing the four period constants to differ across for main European regions (North, South, East, and Centre). All specifications include as controls the lagged share in regional value added of agriculture (incl. fishing, forestry and mining), trade, finance, and government services (coefficients not reported). Columns (1)-(3) control for lagged share of regional population with completed tertiary education. Columns (4)-(6) control for an indicator that takes the value of one for regions that experience positive migration inflows in the previous year. Information on voting comes from various country-specific databases and the classification of parties’ orientation is mostly based on the Chappell Hill Expert Survey. Industrial share, unemployment, migration, and educational attainment data come from Eurostat. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

**Appendix Table 10. Further Identification Tests  
Construction, Unemployment and Voting for Anti-Establishment Parties  
Panel 2SLS Estimates with General Time Effects**

	Anti-Establishment Parties (All Types)	Radical Left Parties	Far- Right Parties	Populist Parties	Eurosceptic Parties	Participation Rate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>Panel A. Controlling for Share of ESS Respondents being Citizens</b>						
Lagged Unemployment	1.4413* (0.8207)	0.8538* (0.4856)	0.0691 (0.3031)	1.3149* (0.6892)	0.7713 (0.5202)	-0.3939 (0.3046)
Lagged Citizen Share	0.08 (0.3525)	0.1304 (0.2229)	-0.1962 (0.1506)	0.2799 (0.3056)	-0.0533 (0.1960)	0.1191 (0.1094)
Cragg Donald F-Stat	139.77	139.77	139.77	139.77	139.77	147.58
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat	34.77	34.77	34.77	34.77	34.77	40.35
<b>Panel B. Controlling for Share of ESS Respondents Born in the Country</b>						
Lagged Unemployment	1.4391* (0.8394)	0.8630* (0.4982)	0.0613 (0.3073)	1.3204* (0.7052)	0.76 (0.5245)	-0.3799 (0.3018)
Lagged Born in Country Share	(0.0053) (0.2466)	(0.0943) (0.1401)	(0.1018) (0.0719)	(0.1070) (0.1807)	(0.0893) (0.1671)	0.1344** (0.0572)
Cragg Donald F-Stat	136.901	136.901	136.901	136.901	136.901	141.472
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat	35.95	35.95	35.95	35.95	35.95	38.38
Regions	74	74	74	74	74	62
Countries	8	8	8	8	8	7
Observations	207	207	207	207	207	183

The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects 2SLS (two-stage-least-squares) estimates. The first-stage associates regional lagged unemployment with the lagged share of construction in regional value added. The second-stage associates voting for non-mainstream political parties (and turnout) to “instrumented” by the construction share regional unemployment. All specifications include NUTS2 constants (coefficients not reported) and general period (electoral-cycle, 4-year) effects (constants not reported). Panel A controls for the one-year lagged share of European Social Survey respondents who are citizens of a country. Panel B controls for the one-year lagged share of European Social Survey respondents who were born in the country. Information on voting comes from various country-specific databases and the classification of parties’ orientation is mostly based on the Chappell Hill Expert Survey. Industrial share, unemployment, migration, and educational attainment data come from Eurostat. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.



**Appendix Table 11.**  
**Precrisis Construction and General and Political Trust, and Political Beliefs before and after the Economic Crisis**  
**"Reduced-Form" Estimates in Differences**

	General Trust	People Fair	People Helpful	Trust Parliament	Trust Politicians	Trust Legal System	Trust Police	Trust Eur. Parliament	Trust UN	Satisf. Democ	Left-Right Orientat.	Feel Close to a Party	Further Unification
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
<b>Panel A. 2012-2008</b>													
Constr. Share	-0.1826 (0.2309)	0.1909 (0.2613)	-0.0848 (0.1921)	1.1993*** (0.3784)	1.2908*** (0.3720)	0.8278** (0.3283)	-0.3723 (0.2680)	-0.4949* (0.2700)	-0.0211 (0.2981)	-1.2380* (0.6493)	0.1849 (0.1511)	0.1557 (0.3117)	0.3659 (0.6667)
adj. R square	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.45	0.47	0.26	0.12	0.27	0.04	0.50	0.02	0.08	0.20
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs.	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132	132
<b>Panel B. 2014-2008</b>													
Constr. Share	0.5292*** (0.1596)	0.5355*** (0.1623)	0.6389** (0.2895)	1.6069*** (0.4459)	1.5080*** (0.4359)	0.7857** (0.2996)	-0.3883 (0.2841)	-1.2437** (0.4459)	0.8932** (0.3458)	1.3645*** (0.4571)	0.5082** (0.1945)	-0.8861 (0.6581)	-0.2852 (0.4602)
adj. R square	0.10	0.05	0.09	0.37	0.31	0.12	0.04	0.27	0.03	0.41	0.05	0.04	0.13
Countries	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Obs.	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121

The table reports cross-sectional OLS estimates, illustrating the “reduced-form” association between changes in general trust, trust towards institutions, and political beliefs during the crisis and the pre-crisis share of construction in regional value added. The dependent variable is the change in the various trust-beliefs measures over the period 2012-2008 in Panel A and over the period 2014-2008 in Panel B. The independent variable is the share of construction in regional value added before the crisis, averaged over 2004-2007. All specifications (in both panels) include four macro-region constants for the North, South, Centre and East (not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

**Appendix Table 12. Unemployment, General and Political Trust, and Political Beliefs  
Panel Fixed-Effects 2SLS Estimates. 2000-2014**

	General Trust	People Fair	People Helpful	Trust Parliament	Trust Politicians	Trust Legal System	Trust Police	Trust Eur. Parliament	Trust UN	Satisf. Democ	Left- Right Orientat.	Feel Close to a Party	Further Unificati on
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
<b>Panel A. General ESS Round (Time) Fixed-Effects</b>													
Unemployment	-0.2733**	-0.1054	-0.1284	-1.1681***	-0.9898***	-0.5752**	-0.014	-0.9509***	-0.4013*	-1.4095***	-0.1162	-1.0183	0.042
	(0.1338)	(0.0654)	(0.0914)	(0.3668)	(0.2688)	(0.2510)	(0.2052)	(0.3515)	(0.2428)	(0.3761)	(0.1434)	(0.6608)	(0.2493)
Kleibergen- Paap F-Stat	20.13	20.13	20.13	20.13	20.13	20.13	20.13	20.13	20.13	20.13	20.13	20.13	44.72
<b>Panel B. Country-Group ESS Round (Time) Fixed-Effects</b>													
Unemployment	-0.1895	-0.1581	-0.049	-0.5801	-0.4504*	-0.17	0.0666	-0.7830**	-0.332	-1.0022***	-0.0389	1.3066**	-0.0119
	(0.1858)	(0.1546)	(0.1468)	(0.3685)	(0.2606)	(0.2585)	(0.2407)	(0.3917)	(0.2616)	(0.3325)	(0.1218)	(0.5239)	(0.2647)
Kleibergen- Paap F-Stat	19.22	19.22	19.22	19.22	19.22	19.22	19.22	19.22	19.22	19.22	19.22	19.22	22.46
Industrial Shares	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Countries	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	20
Observations	975	975	975	975	975	975	975	975	975	975	975	975	656

The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects 2SLS (two-stage-least-squares) estimates. The first-stage associates regional unemployment with the share of construction in regional value added. The second-stage associates general trust, trust towards institutions, and political attitudes to “instrumented” by the construction share regional unemployment. All specifications include NUTS2 constants (coefficients not reported). All specifications condition on the pre-crisis share in regional value added of agriculture, trade, finance, and government services (using mean values over 2004-2007). Panel A includes year constants (not reported). Panel B includes country-group year fixed effects (constants not reported), allowing the year constants to differ across for main European regions (North, South, East, and Centre). Regional unemployment data and data on sectoral shares come from Eurostat. Information on trust and beliefs come from the European Social Surveys (ESS). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

**Appendix Table 13. Unemployment and Beliefs on Immigration  
Panel Fixed-Effects 2SLS Estimates. 2000-2014**

	Allow Immigrants			Immigrants' Role		
	Majority Race/Ethnic Group	Different Race/Ethnic Group	Poor Non- EU Countries	Economy	Cultural Life	Country Better/Worse
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>Panel A. General ESS Round (Time) Fixed-Effects</b>						
Unemployment	-0.0519 (0.3310)	-0.28 (0.3238)	-0.3363 (0.3727)	-0.6062** (0.2549)	-0.0969 (0.1871)	-0.1262 (0.1948)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat	20.13	20.13	20.13	20.13	20.13	20.13
<b>Panel B. Country-Group ESS Round (Time) Fixed-Effects</b>						
Unemployment	-0.1737 (0.3949)	-0.3128 (0.3520)	-0.4814 (0.3827)	-0.5049 (0.3417)	-0.2533 (0.2557)	-0.0587 (0.2390)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat	19.22	19.22	19.22	19.22	19.22	19.22
Industrial Shares Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Countries	22	22	22	22	22	22
Regions	175	175	175	175	175	175
Observations	975	975	975	975	975	975

The table reports panel (region) fixed-effects 2SLS (two-stage-least-squares) estimates. The first-stage associates regional unemployment with the share of construction in regional value added. The second-stage associates beliefs towards immigration to “instrumented” by the construction share regional unemployment. All specifications include NUTS2 constants (coefficients not reported). All specifications condition on the pre-crisis share in regional value added of agriculture, trade, finance, and government services (using mean values over 2004-2007). Panel A includes year constants (not reported). Panel B includes country-group year fixed effects (constants not reported), allowing the year constants to differ across for main European regions (North, South, East, and Centre). Regional unemployment data and data on sectoral shares come from Eurostat. Information on attitudes and beliefs towards immigration come from the European Social Surveys (ESS). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

## 2. Data Sources and Variable Definitions

For our analysis we combine three main datasets:

- (i) Regional unemployment, output statistics by industry and variables measuring regional population, demographics, migration flows and education. Data come from Eurostat and from Cambridge Econometrics (that in turn process, update and clean Eurostat data);
- (ii) Voting data. These data come from country-specific electoral archives that are then matched to political parties' political orientation (using Chapel Hill Expert Survey and other sources) between 2000 and June 2017;
- (iii) Individual-level data on trust, attitudes and beliefs from the European Social Survey (ESS), conducted biennially, from 2000 till 2014.


In this section we discuss the data, provide definitions of the variables, and present summary statistics and descriptive evidence.

### 2.1. Regional Unemployment, Value Added Statistics and Region-Level Controls (Eurostat)


#### *Regional unemployment*

We use total unemployment rate for individuals aged between 15 and 74 years from the regional labor market statistics database of Eurostat (LFS annual series, `lfst_r_lfu3rt`). We match the 226 NUTS2 European regions of the electoral data and the (mostly overlapping) 186 European regions of the ESS data for a period ranging between 2000 and 2016.

We focus on unemployment rather than on output as the latter is conceptually a less clean measure of the social costs of the crisis. Moreover, regional GDP contains non-negligible measurement error. Appendix Figures 1a-1b reveal the strong negative relationship between unemployment and log GDP per capita at the NUTS 2 level of geographical aggregation (`nama_10_pc` series at current prices, PPP per capita) in levels, controlling for region and time fixed effects (Figure 1a), and in difference-in-differences specification (Figure 1b). Regional GDP per capita and regional unemployment are highly correlated both in levels and in differences. The few outliers correspond to regions in former transition economies.



**Appendix Figure 1a**



**Appendix Figure 1b**

### ***Gross value added by sector***

We use Eurostat’s regional data for gross value added at basic prices for the following six broad sectors: agriculture, construction, finance, industry, trade (wholesale and retail) and government (classification of economic activities: NACE Rev.2). The data cover 217 regions in 25 countries (we do not have the data on Switzerland), over the period 2000-2015 (though there are gaps in the initial years and in 2015). The Data Appendix Table III below provides details on coverage.

### ***Employment Rate***

In our attempt to account for unobservable time-invariant features, we run regressions at the finer NUTS 3 geographical level. We compute the employment rate for each country as the ratio of total employment over total population from the Cambridge Econometrics’ European Regional Database, which contains annual observations for the period 1980-2014. Coverage is for the EU28 and Norway. We focus on an 11-country sample<sup>1</sup> where we have managed to match the economic data with the voting data for 363 NUTS 3 European regions for a period ranging between 2000 and 2014. We use total population in an attempt to proxy active population given than the latter is unavailable at the NUTS 3 level.

### ***Net Migration Flows***

We use net migration flow data from Eurostat database, series CNMIGRAT. Net migration is defined as the difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants from a

<sup>1</sup> These countries (number of regions) are: Austria (35), Bulgaria (28), Czech Republic (14), Greece (51), Spain (59), France (100), Hungary (20), Ireland (8), Norway (19), Sweden (21), Slovakia (8).

given region during the year. Net migration takes negative values when the number of emigrants exceeds the number of immigrants. *Net migration including statistical adjustment* (as it is referred in the Eurostat database) is a general estimation of the net migration, based on the difference between population change and natural change between two dates. In different countries net migration including statistical adjustment may, besides the difference between inward and outward migration, cover other changes in the population figures between 1 January for two consecutive years which cannot be attributed to births, deaths, immigration or emigration.

### ***Educational Attainment Statistics***

We use regional educational statistics from Eurostat. The classification of educational activities is based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). There are eight ISCED 2011 categories. Level 0 – Less than primary education; Level 1 – Primary education; Level 2 – Lower secondary education; Level 3 – Upper secondary education; Level 4 – Post-secondary non-tertiary education; Level 5 – Short-cycle tertiary education; Level 6 – Bachelor’s or equivalent level; Level 7 – Master’s or equivalent level; Level 8 – Doctoral or equivalent level. We use the following series:

- Less than secondary. Series ED0-2. It is the share of the population with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education.
- Secondary. Series ED3-4. It is the share of population that has completed upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education
- Secondary and tertiary. Series ED3-8. It is the share of population with upper secondary, post-secondary non-tertiary and tertiary education;
- Tertiary. Series ED5-8. It is the share of the population percentage that has successfully completed tertiary education.

### **2.2. Voting Statistics. Country-Specific Databases**


We collect voting data from country-specific electoral archives for all general elections between 2000 and June 2017. For France – the only presidential republic in our dataset – we compile the presidential election results instead. Appendix Table IV gives a complete list of national elections by country. Data cover Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

For most parties' political orientation we rely on the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES). CHES provides parties' main political positions (family name) which we use as the basis for our classification. CHES also reports additional parties' orientation and position measures, such as parties' positioning on European integration, ideology and various policy issues. The first CHES survey was conducted in 1999, with subsequent waves in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. The coverage expanded from 14 Western European countries in 1999 to 24 current or prospective EU members in 2006 to 31 countries in 2014, followed by a notable increase in the number of national parties from 143 to 268. Iceland is not covered, while Norway and Switzerland are recent additions; although we can observe the corresponding parties' general stance on European integration, EU policies, general left/right, economic left/right, and social left/right, we lack information on their main political position. CHES database is incomplete, as it does not report information on small and new parties. We complement the characterization of CHES with online resources that include membership or affiliation with international and EU party associations and self-identification (on party's own websites).


Using the CHES dataset and web resources, we identify the following four types of anti-establishment parties: (i) far-right, often nationalistic, parties; (ii) radical-left parties; (iii) populist parties, and (iv) Eurosceptic and separatist parties. The Data Appendix Tables V.a-V.z below provide the list of all parties that we identify as anti-establishment, along with their classification into far-right, radical-left, populist and Eurosceptic/separatist ones.

After matching the electoral data with the parties' political orientation we calculate the vote shares of parties with anti-establishment orientation at each election for each NUTS2 region. Turnout is defined as the percentage of voters over the registered electorate adjusted for the percentage of blank and invalid votes at each election round.


Appendix Figures 2a-2d give a histogram of the evolution of voting shares for all four types of anti-establishment parties before and after the crisis.




**Appendix Figure 2a**



**Appendix Figure 2b**



**Appendix Figure 2c**




**Appendix Figure 2d**


The main part of the analysis is carried out across 226 NUTS 2 European regions (Data Appendix Table I). Additionally, to control for unobservable time-invariant features, we also carry part of the analysis across 363 NUTS 3 level European regions in 11 countries; namely Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, France, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and Slovakia (see Data Appendix Table I and Appendix Figures 3a-3f). Appendix Figure 3a gives the association between post and pre crisis changes in employment rates with the post-pre crisis change in the voting share of all four types of anti-establishment parties. There is a clear negative association. European regions that experienced a relatively large drop in employment rates experienced a relatively higher increase of anti-establishment voting share. The influence of all four anti-establishment parties has increased, though not at the same rate. This pattern mostly comes from the European periphery, though the country sample is small. Appendix Figures 3b-




3e give the scatterplots associating changes in employment rates before and after the crisis to the voting share of each type of anti-establishment party vote. In line with the baseline estimates (at NUTS 2), there is a stronger association between employment rates and voting for populist and to a lesser extent radical-left, far-right and Eurosceptic/separatist parties. The relationship between the change in employment rates and the change in voting participation in Figure 3f is also weak, in line with the baseline estimates in the paper.




Appendix Figure 3a




Appendix Figure 3b




Appendix Figure 3c



**Appendix Figure 3d**



**Appendix Figure 3e**



**Appendix Figure 3f**

### 2.3. Trust, Attitudes and Beliefs (European Social Survey)

We use data on trust, beliefs and attitudes from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS consists of biennial cross-sectional surveys, covering 32 nations. We exclude Israel, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. We also drop Croatia and Lithuania (no surveys before the crisis) and Luxembourg (no surveys in the post-crisis period). We also omit Finland due to a change in the classification of the NUTS2 regions. The ESS sample covers 186 NUTS2 regions in 24 countries (The Data Appendix Table II provides details. There have been seven ESS rounds, in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014. The panel is not balanced, as the ESS has not been carried in all countries for all waves. For each ESS round we tabulate regional averages of the following variables.

### ***General trust***

We use the following question: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a scale of zero to ten how much you trust people. Zero means you can’t be too careful, and ten means that most people can be trusted.’

### ***People are fair***

This is the response to the following question: ‘Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? Please tell me on a scale of zero to ten whether you think people are fair. Zero means that most people try to take advantage of you if they get the chance, and ten means that most people try to be fair.’

### ***People are helpful***

This is the response to the following question: ‘Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? Please tell me on a scale of zero to ten whether you think people are helpful. Zero means that people are mostly looking out for themselves and ten means that people try to be helpful most of the time.’

### ***Trust in country’s parliament/legal system/police/politicians/political parties, the European Parliament/the United Nations***

This is the response to the following question: ‘Please tell me on a scale of zero to ten how much you personally trust each of the following institutions. Zero means you do not trust an institution at all, and ten means you have complete trust. How much do you personally trust [the name of the institution]?’

### ***Satisfaction with democracy***

This is the response to the following question: ‘And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [the name of the country]? Zero means you are extremely dissatisfied, and ten means you are extremely satisfied.’

### ***Placement on the left-right scale***

This is a response to the following question: ‘In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you place yourself on this scale, where zero means the left and ten means the right?’

### ***Feeling close to a particular party***

This is a response to the following question: ‘Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties? One means “Yes” and two means “No”.’

### ***Future of European unification***

This is a response to the following question: ‘Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Please tell me on a scale of zero to ten what number on that scale best describes your position? Zero means unification has already gone too far, and ten means unification should go further.’

### ***Allow people of the same race or ethnic group as majority/a different race or ethnic group from majority / from the poorer countries outside Europe, to come and live here***

This is a response to the following question: ‘Would you allow many/few immigrants from the following groups to come and live in the country? One means that you would allow many to come and live here and four means that you would allow none.’

### ***Immigration good/bad for economy***

This is a response to the following question: ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for [the name of the country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries? Zero means that it is bad for the economy and ten means it is good for the economy.’

### ***Immigration undermines/enriches cultural life***

This is a response to the following question: ‘Would you say that [the name of the country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? Zero means that the cultural life undermined and ten means that cultural life enriched.’

### ***Immigration makes country worse/better place to live***

This is a response to the following question: ‘Is [the name of the country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? Zero means it is made a worse place to live and ten means it is made a better place to live.’

### ***Individual characteristics***

In addition, we collect answers to questions relevant to the socio-demographic profile of the respondents that we subsequently use as controls for the analysis at the individual level. These include: **gender**; **age**; **marital status** (legally married, in a legally registered civil union, cohabiting legally recognised, cohabiting not legally recognised and legally separated); **religion** (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Other Christian denomination, Jewish, Islamic, Eastern religions and Other non-Christian religions), **education** (different education levels in accordance with the ISCED classification system), and **occupation** (51 occupation types following the International Standard Classification of Occupations: ISCO-88 and ISCO-08).

## ***Corruption***

We also tabulate the following variables that are available for the 2004 ESS round:

- (i) Frequency of public official asking for a bribe. This is a response to the following question: ‘How often, if ever, has a public official asked you for a favour or a bribe in return for a service? One means never and five means five times or more’.
- (ii) Severity a public official asking for a bribe. This is a response to the following question: ‘How wrong, if at all, do you consider the following ways of behaving to be? How wrong is a public official asking someone for a favour or bribe in return for their services? One means “not wrong at all” and four means “seriously wrong”’.
- (iii) Frequency of offering a bribe to public official. This is a response to the following question: ‘How often, if ever, have you offered a favour or bribe to a public official in return for their services? One means never and five means five times or more’

***Sample.*** Our sample covers the following European NUTS Regions.

Abruzzo, Agderog Rogaland, Åland, Alentejo, Algarve, Alsace, Ammochostos, Anatoliki Makedonia-Thraki, Andalucía, Aquitaine, Aragón, Área Metropolitana de Lisboa, Attiki, Auvergne, Baden-Württemberg, Basilicata, Basse-Normandie, Bassin Parisien, Bayern, Berlin, Border-Midlandand Western, Bourgogne, Brandenburg, Bratislavskýkraj, Bremen, Bretagne, Bucuresti-Ilfov, Burgenland (AT), Calabria, Campania, Canarias (ES), Cantabria, Castillay León, Castilla-la Mancha, Cataluña, Centre(FR), Centre-Est (FR), Centro (PT), Centru, Ceuta, Champagne-Ardenne, Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta (ES), Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla (ES), Comunidad Foral de Navarra, Comunidad Valenciana, Comunidad de Madrid, Corse, Dolnoslaskie, Drenthe, Dytiki Ellada, Dytiki Makedonia, Dél-Alföld, Dél-Dunántúl, East Midlands (UK), East of England, Emilia-Romagna, Espace Mittelland, Est(FR), Észak-Alföld, Észak-Magyarország, Extremadura, Flevoland, Franche-Comté, Friesland (NL), Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Galicia, Gelderland, Groningen, Guadeloupe, Guyane, Hamburg, Haute-Normandie, Hedmarkog Oppland, Helsinki-Uusimaa, Hessen, Hovedstaden, Iceland, Île de France, Illes Balears, Ionia Nisia, Ipeiros, Jihovýchod, Jihozápad, Kentriki Makedonia, Kriti, Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Kärnten, Közép-Dunántúl, Közép-Magyarország, La Rioja, La Réunion, Languedoc-Roussillon, Larnaka, Lazio, Lefkosia, Lemesos, Liguria, Limburg (NL), Limousin, Lombardia, London, Lorraine, Lubelskie, Lubuskie, Luxembourg, Łódzkie, Malopolskie, Marche, Martinique, Mayotte, Mazowieckie, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Melilla, Mellersta Norrland, Midi-Pyrénées, Midtjylland, Molise, Moravskoslezsko, Méditerranée, Niedersachsen,

Niederösterreich, Noord-Brabant, Noord-Holland, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Nord-Est (RO), Nord-Norge, Nord-Vest, Nordjylland, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Nordwestschweiz, Norra Mellansverige, Norte, North East (UK), North West (UK), Northern Ireland (UK), Northern and Eastern Finland, Notio Aigaio, Nyugat-Dunántúl, Oberösterreich, Opolskie, Osloog Akershus, Östra Mellansverige, Ostschweiz, Ouest (FR), Overijssel, Övre Norrland, Pafos, Pays de la Loire, País Vasco, Peloponnisos, Picardie, Piemonte, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, Poitou-Charentes, Pomorskie, Praha, Principado de Asturias, Prov. Antwerpen, Prov. Brabant Wallon, Prov. Hainaut, Prov. Limburg (BE), Prov. Luxembourg (BE), Prov. Namur, Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen, Prov. Vlaams-Brabant, Prov. West-Vlaanderen, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, Provincia Autonoma di Trento, Puglia, Região Autónoma da Madeira (PT), Región de Murcia, Rheinland-Pfalz, Rhône-Alpes, Région de Bruxelles, Région Lémanique, Région Wallonne, Saarland, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Salzburg, Sardegna, Schleswig-Holstein, Scotland, Severentsentralen, Severoiztochen, Severovýchod, Severozapaden, Severozápad, Sicilia, Sjælland, Slaskie, Smålandmedöarna, South East (UK), South West (UK), Southern Finland, Southern and Eastern, Steiermark, Sterea Ellada, Stockholm, Stredné Slovensko, Strední Čechy, Strední Morava, Sud-Muntenia, Sud-Est, Sud-Ouest (FR), Sud-Vest Oltenia, Swietokrzyskie, Syddanmark, Sydsverige, Sør-Østlandet, Thessalia, Thüringen, Ticino, Tirol, Toscana, Trøndelag, Umbria, Utrecht, Veneto, Vest, Vestlandet, Vlaams Gewest, Vorarlberg, Voreio Aigaio, Vzhodna Slovenija, Västsverige, Východné Slovensko, Wales, Warminsko-Mazurskie, West Midlands (UK), Western Finland, Wielkopolskie, Wien, Yorkshire and The Humber, Yugoiztochen, Yugozapaden, Yuzhentsentralen, Zachodniopomorskie, Zahodna Slovenija, Zeeland, Zentralschweiz, Zuid-Holland, Západné Slovensko, Zürich.

### **3. Country-specific tables with party classifications**

In Appendix Tables V.a-V.z, we provide information on political parties' orientation using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and online resources (which in turn follows Hix and Lord (1997)). Given that the Chapel Hill Expert Survey does not cover all parties we classified the rest according to information available at their platforms from their websites. We distinguish among four (not mutually exclusive) aspects of anti-establishment politics (see Appendix Table VI): (i) Far-right and nationalistic, parties; (ii) Radical-left parties; (iii) Populist parties; and (iv) Eurosceptic and separatist parties.

## Data Appendix Tables

**Data Appendix Table I. Electoral Data: Number of NUTS Regions by Country**

**Voting data: Countries and number of available NUTS regions by election year**

Country	Number of NUTS1 Regions	Number of NUTS2 Regions	Number of NUTS3 Regions
Austria	1	9	35
Belgium	1	9	
Bulgaria	1	6	28
Cyprus	1	1	
Czech Republic	1	8	14
Denmark	1		
Estonia	1	1	
Finland	1	5	
France	1	27	98
Germany	16		
Greece	1	13	51
Hungary	1	7	20
Ireland	1	2	8
Iceland	1	1	
Italy	1	19	
Netherlands	1	12	
Norway	1	7	19
Poland	1	16	
Portugal	1	6	
Romania	1	8	
Spain	1	19	52
Sweden	1	8	21
Switzerland	1	7	
Slovakia	1	4	8
Slovenia	1	2	
United Kingdom	12		

Data Appendix Table I. details the number of available NUTS regions per country by election year. As a general rule, the analysis is carried at the NUTS2 level, with the exception of Germany and UK, for the analysis of which we employ 16 and 12 regions at the NUTS1 level.

**Data Appendix Table II. ESS Data: Number of Regions by Country**

**Countries and number of NUTS regions by wave (ESS)**

Country	Wave	No of NUTS 2 matched to Unemployment data	Remarks	No of NUTS Used
Austria	1,2,3,7	9,9,9,9		9
Belgium	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	3,3,3,3,3,3,3		3
Bulgaria	3,4,5,6	6,6,6,6		6
Cyprus	3,4,5,6	1,1,1,1		1
Czech Republic	1,2,4,5,6,7	8,8,8,8,8,8		8
Denmark	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	5,5,5,5,5,5,5		5
Estonia	2,3,4,5,6,7	1,1,1,1,1,1		1
Finland	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	0,0,0,0,0,0,0	NUTS classification issue	0
France	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	8,8,8,8,8,8,8		8
Germany	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	16,16,16,16,16,16,16		16
Greece	1,2,4,5	13,13,(8),13	dropped wave 4	13
Hungary	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	7,7,7,7,7,7,7		7
Ireland	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	2,2,2,2,2,2,2		2
Iceland	2,6	1,1		1
Italy	1,6	17, 17	dropped ITC2, ITD1, ITD2	17
Netherlands	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	12,12,12,12,12,12,12		12
Norway	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	7,7,7,7,7,7,7		7
Poland	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	16,16,16,16,16,16,16		16
Portugal	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	5,5,5,5,5,5,5		5
Romania	-	-		-
Spain	1,2,3,4,5,6	16,16,16,16,16,16,16	dropped ES53, ES63, ES64	16
Sweden	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	8,8,8,8,8,8,8		8
Switzerland	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	(5),7,7,7,7,7,7	dropped wave 1	7
Slovakia	2,3,4,5,6	4,4,4,4,4		4
Slovenia	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	2,2,2,2,2,2,2		2
United Kingdom	1,2,3,4,5,6,7	12,12,12,12,12,12,12		12
<b>Sum</b>				<b>186</b>

Data Appendix Table II. details the number of available NUTS regions per country by ESS Round. The analysis is carried at the NUTS2 level. The mapping of the regions with Total Unemployment data from Eurostat yields 183 NUTS regions in 24 countries (Romania is absent in ESS Rounds 1-7 while Finland cannot be consistently mapped having undergone a change in the country's regional classification during our sample period). For the purposes of the analysis we drop ESS Round 4 for Greece, ESS Round 1 for Switzerland and three NUTS regions of Italy ITC2 (Valle d'Aosta), ITD1 (South Tyrol) and ITD2 (Trento) in order to keep the number of regions constant per country.



### Data Appendix Table III. Number of Regions by Country

#### Gross Value Added shares: Countries and number of NUTS regions

Country	Number of NUTS1 Regions	Number of NUTS2 Regions	Number of NUTS3 Regions
Austria	1	9	35
Belgium	1	12	44
Bulgaria	1	6	28
Cyprus	1	1	1
Czech Republic	1	8	14
Denmark	1	1	11
Estonia	1	1	5
Finland	1	1	19
France	1	27	101
Germany	1	16	402
Greece	1	12	52
Hungary	1	7	20
Ireland	1	2	8
Iceland	1	1	-
Italy	1	19	110
Netherlands	1	12	40
Norway	1	7	19
Poland	1	16	72
Portugal	1	6	25
Romania	1	8	42
Spain	1	19	59
Sweden	1	8	21
Switzerland	-	-	-
Slovakia	1	4	8
Slovenia	1	2	12
United Kingdom	1	12	173
<b>Sum</b>			1321

Data Appendix Table III. details the number of NUTS regions per country for which there is availability of Gross Value Added (GVA) by Industry, sourced from Eurostat.

## Data Appendix Table IV. List of National Elections

### National Elections by country

Country	Elections
Austria	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2002, 2006, 2008 and 2013.
Belgium	General/federal elections that took place in 2003, 2007, 2010 and 2014.
Bulgaria	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014 and 2017.
Cyprus	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016.
Czech Republic	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2013.
Denmark	Parliamentary (Folketing) elections that took place in 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011 and 2015.
Estonia	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015.
Finland	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015.
France	Presidential elections that took place in 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017.
Germany	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2002, 2005, 2009 and 2013.
Greece	Parliamentary election that took place in 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012 (May), 2012 (Jun), 2015 (Jan) and 2015 (Sep).
Hungary	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014.
Ireland	General elections that took place in 2002, 2007, 2011 and 2016.
Iceland	Parliamentary (Upper House) elections that took place in 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2016.
Italy	General elections that took place in 2001, 2006, 2008 and 2013.
Netherlands	General elections that took place in 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012 and 2017.
Norway	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013.
Poland	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011 and 2015.
Portugal	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011 and 2015.
Romania	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016.
Spain	General elections that took place in 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015 and 2016.
Sweden	General elections that took place in 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014.
Switzerland	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015.
Slovakia	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012 and 2016.
Slovenia	Parliamentary elections that took place in 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2014.
United Kingdom	General Election that took place in 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017.

Data Appendix Table IV., details the year and the type of National Elections, by country, that we take into account for the analysis of voting outcomes.

**Data Appendix Table V.a Classification of anti-establishment parties: Austria**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Austria**

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
Freedom Party of Austria	FPO	1	1	0	1	1	Right-wing populism; National conservatism; Anti-immigration; Euroscepticism; German nationalism; National liberalism; Right-wing to Far-right	rad right
Alliance for the Future of Austria	BZO	1	1	0	1	1	Economic liberalism; Social conservatism; Right-wing populism; Euroscepticism; Center-right to Right-wing	rad right
Communist Party of Austria	KPO	1	0	1	0	0	Communism; Eurocommunism; Left-wing to Far-left	-
Hans-Peter Martin's List	MARTIN	1	0	0	0	1	Anti-corruption politics; Pro-transparency; Euroscepticism	no family
Team Stronach	FRANK	1	0	0	1	1	Euroscepticism; Populism; Economic liberalism	no family

Data Appendix Table V.a, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Austria, between 2000 and 2013, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.b Classification of anti-establishment parties: Belgium**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Belgium**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Party Abbrev.</b>	<b>Anti-Establishment</b>	<b>Far Right</b>	<b>Rad. Left</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Eurosceptic/Separatist</b>	<b>Internet Resources</b>	<b>Chapel Hill</b>
Flemish Bloc	VB	1	1	0	1	1	Flemish nationalism; Separatism; Euroscepticism; Right-wing populism; Far-right	rad right
Flemish Interest	VB	1	1	0	1	1	Flemish nationalism; Right-wing populism; Separatism; National conservatism; Economic liberalism; Euroscepticism; Right-wing to far-right	rad right
National Front	FN	1	1	0	1	1	Nationalism; Far-right; Populism; Euroscepticism	rad right
New Flemish Alliance	NVA	1	0	0	0	1	Flemish nationalism; Regionalism; Separatism; Conservatism; Liberal conservatism; Centre-right	regionalist
People's Union - ID21	VU-ID21	1	0	0	0	1	Flemish nationalism Federalism	regionalist
Popular Party	PP	1	1	0	1	1	National conservatism; Belgian unionism; Right-wing populism; Economic liberalism; Euroscepticism; Right-wing to far-right	conservative
Socialist Party. Different - Spirit	SPA_Spirit	1	0	0	0	1	Coalition between Socialist Party Different and Spirit. Spirit was moderately nationalistic, separatist; regionalist	socialist; libera
Workers' Party of Belgium (PTB)	PTB / PVDA	1	0	1	0	0	Communism; Marxism; Marxism-Leninism; Socialism; Far-left	rad left

Data Appendix Table V.b, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Belgium, between 2000 and 2014, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.c Classification of anti-establishment parties: Bulgaria**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Bulgaria**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Party Abbrev.</b>	<b>Anti-Establishment</b>	<b>Far Right</b>	<b>Rad. Left</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Eurosceptic/Separatist</b>	<b>Internet Resources</b>	<b>Chapel Hill</b>
Attack	ATAKA	1	1	0	1	1	Bulgarian nationalism; Right-wing populism; Russophilia; Anti-globalism; Euroscepticism; Islamophobia; Far-right	rad right
Patriotic Front	IMRO_NFSB	1	0	0	1	1	Bulgarian nationalism; National conservatism; Social conservatism; Euroscepticism; Russophilia; Right-wing; Populism	-
Volya	WILL	1	0	0	1	1	Right-wing populism; Russophilia; Anti-corruption; Patriotism; Liberal democracy; Euroscepticism; Centre-right	-
United Patriots	UNITED_PATRIOTS	1	1	0	1	1	Bulgarian nationalism; National conservatism; Social conservatism; Right-wing populism; Protectionism; Euroscepticism; Anti-Islam; Right-wing to Far-right	-

Data Appendix Table V.c, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Bulgaria, between 2000 and 2017, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

## Data Appendix Table V.d Classification of anti-establishment parties: Cyprus

### Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Cyprus

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
Progressive Party of Working People	AKEL	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Democratic socialism; Soft euroscepticism; Left-wing	rad left
Citizens' Alliance	SYPOL	1	0	0	1	0	Left-wing populism; Social democracy; Greek Cypriot nationalism; Centre-left	-
European Party	EVROKO	1	1	0	0	0	Greek-Cypriot nationalism; Pro-Europeanism	conservative
National Popular Front	ELAM	1	1	0	1	1	Ultranationalism; Greek nationalism; Far-right; Eurosceptic	-
New Horizons	NO	1	1	0	1	0	radical right-wing; populist	-
Solidarity Movement	KA	1	1	0	0	1	National conservatism; Right-wing; Eurosceptic by affiliation	-

Data Appendix Table V.d, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Cyprus, between 2000 and 2016, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

## Data Appendix Table V.e Classification of anti-establishment parties: Czech Republic

### Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Czech Republic

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
Action of Dissatisfied Citizens	ANO	1	0	0	1	0	Big tent; Centrism; Liberalism; Populism; Syncretic politics; Centre to centre-right	no family
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	KSCM	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Marxism; Euroscepticism; Left-wing to far-left	rad left
Czech Pirate Party	CPS	1	0	0	1	0	Pirate politics; Direct democracy; Centre; Populism	-
Dawn of Direct Democracy	UPD	1	1	0	1	1	Czech nationalism; Right-wing populism; Direct democracy; Anti-immigration; Euroscepticism; Right-wing	-
Free Citizens Party	SSO	1	0	0	0	1	Classical liberalism; Right-libertarianism; Libertarian conservatism; Liberal conservatism; Hard Euroscepticism; Right-wing	-
Public Affairs	VV	1	0	0	1	0	Conservative liberalism; Direct democracy; Populism; Centre-right	liberal
Republicans of Miroslav Sladek	RMS	1	1	0	1	1	National conservatism; Austrian economics; Republicanism; Euroscepticism; Anti-immigration; Non-interventionism; Anti-Ziganism; Anti-Germanism; Czechoslovak unionism; Right-wing	-
Sovereign Party	Sovereign Party	1	0	0	1	1	Nationalism; Euroscepticism; Centre-left to Right-wing	-
Civic Democratic Party	ODS	1	0	0	0	1	Majority: Liberal conservatism; Klausism; Euroscepticism. Factions: Social conservatism; Neoconservatism; National conservatism; National liberalism; Centre-right to right-wing	conservative

Data Appendix Table V.e, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Czech Republic, between 2000 and 2013, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.f Classification of anti-establishment parties: Denmark**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Denmark**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Party Abbrev.</b>	<b>Anti-Establishment</b>	<b>Far Right</b>	<b>Rad. Left</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Eurosceptic/Separatist</b>	<b>Internet Resources</b>	<b>Chapel Hill</b>
Danish People's Party	DF	1	1	0	1	1	Danish nationalism; National conservatism; Social conservatism; Right-wing populism; Euroscepticism; Right-wing to far-right	rad right
Minority Party	MP	1	0	0	0	1	Humanism; Euroscepticism	-
Progress Party	FP	1	1	0	1	1	Right-wing populism; Anti-tax; Anti-immigration; Right-wing; Euroscepticism	rad right
Socialist People's Party	SF	1	0	1	0	1	Socialism; Popular socialism; Democratic socialism; Eco-socialism, Left wing; Partly	red left
Unity List - Red-Green	EL	1	0	1	0	1	Socialism; Eco-socialism; Anti-capitalism; Euroscepticism; Left-wing to far-left	rad left

Data Appendix Table V.f, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Denmark, between 2000 and 2015, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.



## Data Appendix Table V.g Classification of anti-establishment parties: Estonia

### Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Estonia

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
Estonian Center Party	EK	1	0	0	1	0	Centrism; Social liberalism; Populism; Centre to Centre-left	liberal
Conservative People's Party	EKRE	1	1	0	1	1	Estonian nationalism; National conservatism; Ethnopluralism; Euroscepticism; Direct democracy; Right-wing	-
Estonian Christian Democrats /	EEKD	1	0	0	0	1	Christian democracy; Euroscepticism	-
People's Union of Estonia / Estonian	ERL / EME	1	0	0	1	0	Agrarian party with populist, social democratic influences	agrarian/centre
Res Publica	ERP	1	0	0	1	0	Conservatism, Populism	conservative

Data Appendix Table V.f, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Estonia, between 2000 and 2015, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.h Classification of anti-establishment parties: Finland**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Finland**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Party Abbrev.</b>	<b>Anti-Establishment</b>	<b>Far Right</b>	<b>Rad. Left</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Eurosceptic/Separatist</b>	<b>Internet Resources</b>	<b>Chapel Hill</b>
Left Alliance	VAS	1	0	1	0	1	Democratic socialism; Eco-socialism; Left-wing; Eurosceptic by	rad left
Communist Party of Finland	SKP	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Marxism; Soft Euroscepticism; Left-wing to Far-left	-
Independence Party	IP	1	0	0	1	1	Populism; Euroscepticism; Right-wing Finnish nationalism; National conservatism; Economic nationalism;	-
Finns Party	PS	1	1	0	1	1	Social conservatism; Right-wing populism; Euroscepticism; Right-wing	rad right

Data Appendix Table V.h, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Finland, between 2000 and 2015, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

## Data Appendix Table V.i Classification of anti-establishment parties: France

### Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in France

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
National Front	FN	1	1	0	1	1	French nationalism; National conservatism; Souverainism; Protectionism; Right-wing populism; Anti-immigration; Hard Euroscepticism	rad right
Unbowed France	LFI	1	0	0	1	1	Democratic socialism; Eco-socialism; Left-wing populism; Environmentalism; Alter-globalization; Soft Euroscepticism	not available
France Arise	DLR (DLF)	1	1	0	0	1	French nationalism; National conservatism; Gaullism; Republicanism; Souverainism; Social conservatism; Euroscepticism	rad right
Popular Republican Union	UPR	1	1	0	0	1	French nationalism; Gaullism; Hard Euroscepticism; Souverainism; Right-wing to Far-right	not available
Workers' Struggle	LO	1	0	1	0	1	Trotskyism; Marxism; Leninism; Internationalism; Feminism	rad left
Solidarity and Progress	SP	1	0	0	1	1	Protectionism; Euroscepticism; Colbertism; Anti-imperialism; Conspirationism	not available
New Anticapitalist Party	LCR	1	0	1	0	1	Anti-capitalism; Democratic socialism; Eco-socialism; Alter-globalization; Anti-nationalism; Anti-racism; Progressivism; Feminism; Neo-communism; Far-left	rad left
Left Front	FG	1	0	1	1	1	Socialism; Communism. Left-wing to Far-left	not available
Workers' Party	LPT	1	0	1	0	1	Internationalism; Trotskism; Socialism; Communism; Anarcho-syndicalism; Euroscepticism	rad left
National Republican Movement	MNR	1	1	0	1	1	French nationalism; Neoconservatism; National conservatism; Social conservatism; Anti-immigration; Right-wing populism; Euroscepticism; Far-right	not available
Movement for France	MPF	1	1	0	1	1	National conservatism; Social conservatism; Souverainism; Soft euroscepticism; Right-wing	rad right
French Communist Party	PCF	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Marxism. Far-left	rad left
Independent Workers' Party	POI	1	0	1	0	1	Trotskyism; Marxism; Communism; Proletarian internationalism	red left

Data Appendix Table V.i, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in France, between 2000 and 2017, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.j Classification of anti-establishment parties: Germany**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Germany**

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
The Republicans	REP	1	1	0	1	1	German nationalism; National conservatism; Euroscepticism; Social conservatism; Populism; Right-wing	rad right
Party of Democratic Socialism	PDS	1	0	1	1	0	Democratic socialism; Left-wing populism; Left-wing to Far-left	rad left
German People's Union	DVU	1	1	0	1	1	German nationalism; Pan-Germanism; Right-wing populism; Far-right	rad right
Party of Democratic Socialism	Linkspartei/PDS	1	0	1	1	0	Democratic socialism; Left-wing populism; Left-wing to Far-left	rad left
The Left	LINKE	1	0	1	1	1	Democratic socialism; Left-wing populism; Anti-capitalism; Antimilitarism	rad left
National Democratic Party of Germany	NPD	1	1	0	1	1	Neo-Nazism; Ultranationalism; Pan-Germanism; Anti-immigration;	rad right
Party for a Rule of Law Offensive	Schill	1	1	0	1	0	Anti-globalism; Far-right populism; Right-wing populism; Conservatism; Right-wing	-
Die PARTEI	Die PARTEI	1	0	0	1	0	Satire (Political); Dadaism; Populism; Anti-Far Right	-
Alternative for Germany	AfD	1	1	0	1	1	Grassroots democracy; Wage labour; Animal welfare; Elitism with Rule of law	no family
Free Voters	FREIE	1	0	0	1	1	German nationalism; Right-wing populism; Euroscepticism	-
							Populism; Euroscepticism	-

Data Appendix Table V.j, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Germany, between 2000 and 2013, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

## Data Appendix Table V.k Classification of anti-establishment parties: Greece

### Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Greece

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Euroseptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
Coalition of the Left, of Movements and Ecology	SYN	1	0	1	0	1	Democratic socialism; Eco-socialism; Eurocommunism; Environmentalism; Feminism; Pacifism; Left wing	rad left
Communist Party of Greece	KKE	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Marxism–Leninism; Far-left	rad left
Democratic Social Movement	DIKKI	1	0	1	0	1	Socialism; Social democracy; Soft Eurosepticism; Left-wing nationalism	rad left
Coalition of the Radical Left	SYRIZA	1	0	1	1	1	Democratic socialism; Left-wing populism; Eco-socialism; Anti-capitalism; Alter-globalisation; Secularism; Soft eurosepticism	rad left
Popular Orthodox Rally	LAOS	1	1	0	1	1	Greek nationalism; Right-wing populism; Religious conservatism; Eurosepticism; Right-wing to Far-right	rad right
Independent Greeks	ANEL	1	1	0	1	1	Greek nationalism; National conservatism; Social conservatism; Right-wing populism; Eurosepticism	rad right
Popular Association – Golden Dawn	XA	1	1	0	1	1	Neo-Nazism; Ultranationalism; Metaxism; Eurosepticism; Anti-globalism; Anti-communism; Far-right	rad right
Popular Unity	LAE	1	0	1	1	1	Socialism; Eurosepticism; Left-wing populism; Left-wing to Far-left	-

Data Appendix Table V.k, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Greece, between 2000 and 2015, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or euroseptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.1 Classification of anti-establishment parties: Hungary**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Hungary**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Party Abbrev.</b>	<b>Anti-Establishment</b>	<b>Far Right</b>	<b>Rad. Left</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Eurosceptic/Separatist</b>	<b>Internet Resources</b>	<b>Chapel Hill</b>
Hungarian Justice and Life Party	MIEP	1	1	0	1	1	Hungarian nationalism; Social conservatism; Right-wing; Euroscepticism	-
Movement for a Better Hungary	Jobbik	1	1	0	1	1	Hungarian nationalism; Hungarian irredentism; Hungarian Turanism; National conservatism; Social conservatism; Right-wing populism; Economic nationalism; Hard Communism; Marxism–Leninism; Euroscepticism; Far-left	rad right
Workers' Party	MP	1	0	1	0	1	Hungarian nationalism; National conservatism; Social conservatism; Soft Euroscepticism; Right-wing populism; Christian democracy; Conservatism; Christian democracy; National conservatism; Hungarian nationalism; Right-wing	-
Fidesz	Fidesz	1	0	0	1	1	Coalition	conservative
Hungarian Democratic Forum	MDF	1	0	0	1	1	Coalition	conservative
Fidesz-MDF	Fidesz-MDF	1	0	0	1	1	Coalition	conservative
Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union-KDNP	Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union-KDNP	1	0	0	1	1	Coalition	-
Fidesz-KDNP-MVMP joint candidate	Fidesz-KDNP-MVMP	1	0	0	1	1	Coalition	-
MDF-Fidesz-KDNP	MDF-Fidesz-KDNP	1	0	0	1	1	Coalition	-
MIEP-Jobbik Third Way Alliance of Parties	MIEP-Jobbik	1	1	0	1	1	Coalition	-

Data Appendix Table V.1, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Hungary, between 2000 and 2014, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

## Data Appendix Table V.m Classification of anti-establishment parties: Iceland

### Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Iceland

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
Independence Party	D	1	0	0	0	1	Liberal conservatism; Economic liberalism; Euroscepticism; Centre-right to right-wing	-
Left-Green Movement	VG	1	0	0	0	1	Democratic socialism; Eco- socialism; Euroscepticism; Feminism; Pacifism; Left- wing	-
Liberal Party	FF	1	0	0	0	1	Liberalism; anti- establishment; coastal and fishermen's interests; Euroscepticism; centre-right	-
Progressive Party	FSF	1	0	0	1	1	Agrarianism; Euroscepticism; Populism; Centre-right	-
Rainbow	XJ	1	0	0	0	1	Environmentalism; Euroscepticism; Socialism; Left-wing	-
Right Green People's Party	G	1	0	0	0	1	Euroscepticism; Libertarianism	-

Data Appendix Table V.m, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Iceland, between 2000 and 2016, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.n Classification of anti-establishment parties: Ireland**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Ireland**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Party Abbrev.</b>	<b>Anti-Establishment</b>	<b>Far Right</b>	<b>Rad. Left</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Eurosceptic/Separatist</b>	<b>Internet Resources</b>	<b>Chapel Hill</b>
Sinn Fein	SF	1	0	0	1	0	Irish republicanism; Left-wing nationalism; Democratic socialism; Populist socialist; Centre-left to left-wing Democratic socialism;	regionalist
Socialist Party	SP	1	0	1	0	1	Political radicalism; Trotskyism; Euroscepticism; Left-wing to far-left Marxism–Leninism;	rad left
Workers Party	WP	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Irish republicanism; Eurosceptic by Socialism; Trotskyism;	-
People Before Profit Alliance	PBPA	1	0	1	0	1	Euroscepticism; Left-wing to far-left	rad left
United Left Alliance	ULA	1	0	1	0	1	Democratic socialism; Euroscepticism; Left-wing Trotskyism; Democratic socialism; United Ireland;	-
Socialist Workers Party	SWP	1	0	1	0	1	Euroscepticism; Far-left	-

Data Appendix Table V.n, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Ireland, between 2000 and 2016, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.



**Data Appendix Table V.o Classification of anti-establishment parties: Italy**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Italy**

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
Left Ecology Freedom / Sinistra Ecologia Liberta	SEL	1	0	0	0	1	Democratic socialism; Eco-socialism; Left-wing; Eurosceptic by affiliation	socialist
Rivoluzione Civile	RC	1	0	1	0	0	Anti-corruption; Internal factions: Communism; Green politics; Left-wing	rad left
Alleanza Nazionale	AN	1	1	0	1	1	Conservatism; National conservatism; Right-wing; Eurosceptic by affiliation	rad right
Movimento Sociale – Fiamma Tricolore	MS	1	1	0	0	1	Ultranationalism; Fascism; Third Position; Far-right; Eurosceptic by affiliation	rad right
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani	PdCI	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Left-wing; Soft Euroscepticism by affiliation	rad left
MoVimento 5 Stelle	M5S	1	0	0	1	1	Populism; Anti-establishment	
Casa delle Liberta	CdL	1	0	0	1	0	Direct democracy; E-democracy; Environmentalism; Euroscepticism; Non-interventionism; Big tent	no family
Forza Italia	FI	1	0	0	1	0	Centre-right; populist	-
Fratelli d'Italia	FdI	1	0	0	1	0	Liberal conservatism; Christian democracy; Liberalism; Populism; Centre-right	cons
Il Popolo della Liberta	PdL	1	1	0	0	1	National conservatism; Nationalism; Euroscepticism; Right-wing	cons
Italia dei Valori	IdV	1	0	0	1	0	Liberal conservatism; Christian democracy; Liberalism; Centre-right	cons
La Sinistra l'Arcobaleno	SA	1	0	1	0	0	Populism; Centrism; Anti-corruption politics	liberal
Lega Nord	LN	1	0	1	0	0	Communism; Green socialism; Democratic socialism; Left-wing	-
Movimento per l'Autonomia	MpA	1	0	0	1	1	Regionalism; Federalism; Populism; Anti-immigration; Euroscepticism; Anti-globalization; Historical, now minorities:	regionalist
Alternativa Sociale con Alessandra Mussolini	AS	1	0	0	0	1	Separatism; Padanian nationalism; Liberalism	
La Destra	LD	1	1	0	0	1	Regionalism; Autonomism; Christian democracy; Centre-right	-
							Neofascism; Nationalism; Anticommunism;	
							Conservatism; Social Right; Euroscepticism; Extreme right	-
							National conservatism; Euroscepticism; Right-wing	-

Data Appendix Table V.o, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Italy, between 2000 and 2013, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.p Classification of anti-establishment parties: Netherlands**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in the Netherlands**

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
Party for Freedom	PVV	1	1	0	1	1	Dutch nationalism; National conservatism; National liberalism; Right-wing populism; Anti-Islam; Anti-immigration; Hard Euroscepticism; Right-wing to Far-right[	rad right
Socialist Party	SP	1	0	1	1	1	Democratic socialism; Left-wing populism; Social democracy; Soft Euroscepticism; Left-wing	rad left
Christian Union	CU	1	0	0	0	1	Christian democracy; Social conservatism; Soft euroscepticism; Confessionalism; Centre to Centre-right	confessional
50 PLUS	50PLUS	1	0	0	1	0	Populism	
Reformed Political Party	SGP	1	0	0	0	1	Christian right; Social conservatism; Theocracy; Soft Euroscepticism	confessional
Forum voor Democratie	FvP	1	0	0	0	1	National conservatism; Fiscal conservatism; Souverainism; Hard Euroscepticism; Direct democracy; E-governance; E-democracy; Right-wing	-

Data Appendix Table V.p, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in the Netherlands, between 2000 and 2017, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.q Classification of anti-establishment parties: Norway**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Norway**

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
Center Party	Sp	1	0	0	0	1	Agrarianism; Decentralisation; Euroscepticism; Protectionism; Centre Christian democracy;	-
Christian Democratic Party	KrF	1	0	0	0	1	Social conservatism; Euroscepticism; Centre to centre-right Regionalism;	-
Coastal Party	Kystpartiet	1	0	0	0	1	Agrarianism; National conservatism; Euroscepticism; Centre- right	-
Progress Party	FrP	1	0	0	1	1	Conservative liberalism; Economic liberalism; Right-wing populism; National conservatism; Right-wing	-
Red Electoral Alliance	RV	1	0	1	0	1	Revolutionary socialism Marxism; Democratic socialism; Eurosceptic by affiliation; Far-left	-
Socialist Left Party	SV	1	0	0	0	1	Democratic socialism; Eco-socialism; Euroscepticism; Feminism; Left-wing	-

Data Appendix Table V.q, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Norway, between 2000 and 2013, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from various online resources.

## Data Appendix Table V.r Classification of anti-establishment parties: Poland

### Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Poland

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
Law and Justice	PiS	1	1	0	1	1	Polish nationalism; National conservatism; Social conservatism; Anti-immigration; Economic nationalism; State interventionism; Christian democracy; Right-wing populism; Centralisation; Euroscepticism; Political Catholicism; Right-wing	rad right
Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland	S	1	1	0	1	1	Polish nationalism; Populism; Agrarianism; Economic nationalism; Social conservatism; Far-right National Democracy; Polish nationalism; Social conservatism; Political Catholicism; Euroscepticism; Far-right	agrarian/centre
League of Polish Families	LPR	1	1	0	1	1	Socialism; Trotskyism; Marxism; Anti-capitalism; Far-left; Eurosceptic by affiliation	confessional
Polish Labour Party	PPP	1	0	1	0	1	Nationalistic ; National Catholicism; Euroscepticism	
Alternative Social Movement	ARS	1	0	0	0	1	conservative liberalism; libertarianism; monarchism; euroscepticism; capitalism; liberalism; libertarianism	-
Platforma Janusza Korwin-Mikke	PJKM	1	0	0	0	1	Conservatism; Christian democracy; Conservative liberalism; Soft euroscepticism; Economic liberalism; Centre-right	-
Poland Comes First	PJN	1	0	0	0	1	Conservatism; Libertarianism; Right-wing populism; Euroscepticism; Social conservatism; Libertarian conservatism; Right wing	cons
Congress of the New Right	NP	1	0	0	1	1	Conservatism; Economic liberalism; Soft euroscepticism; Centre-right	cons
Poland Together	PR	1	0	0	0	1	Libertarianism; Paleoconservatism; Hard Euroscepticism; Economic liberalism; Right-wing	-
Liberty	KORWiN	1	1	0	0	1	Right-wing populism; Direct democracy; Anti-establishment; Soft euroscepticism; Conservatism; Fiscal conservatism; Right-wing	-
Kukiz15	Kukiz15	1	0	0	1	1		-

Data Appendix Table V.r, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Poland, between 2000 and 2015, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

## Data Appendix Table V.s Classification of anti-establishment parties: Portugal

### Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Portugal

Party	Party Abbrev.	ti-Establishm	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
Bloco de Esquerda	BE	1	0	1	1	1	Democratic socialism; Feminism; Euroscepticism; Anti-capitalism; Eco-socialism; Left-wing; Eurosceptic by affiliation	rad left
CDS - Partido Popular	CDS-PP	1	0	0	1	0	Conservatism; Christian democracy; National conservatism; Populism; Centre-right to right-wing	cons
Coligacao Democratica Unitaria	PCP-PEV	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Eco-socialism; Far-left; Eurosceptic by affiliation	rad left
Partido Democratico Republicano	PDR	1	0	0	1	1	Liberalism; Social liberalism; Populism; Euroscepticism; Centre to centre-left	-
Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores Portugueses	PCTP_MRPP	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Marxism-Leninism; Maoism; Anti-revisionism; Far-left	-

Data Appendix Table V.s, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Portugal, between 2000 and 2015, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.t Classification of anti-establishment parties: Romania**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Romania**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Party Abbrev.</b>	<b>Anti-Establishment</b>	<b>Far Right</b>	<b>Rad. Left</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Eurosceptic/Separatist</b>	<b>Internet Resources</b>	<b>Chapel Hill</b>
Partidul România Mare	PRM	1	1	0	1	1	Romanian nationalism; Romanian irredentism; Right-wing populism; National conservatism; Euroscepticism; Far-right	rad right
Partidul Romania Unita	PRU	1	1	0	0	1	Nationalism; Protectionism; Extreme right	-
Alianta Noastra Romania	ANR	1	1	0	1	1	Conservative; Nationalism; right-wing	-
New Generation Party – Christian Democratic	PNG / PNGCD	1	1	0	1	0	Romanian nationalism; Right-wing populism; Christian right	-
People's Party – Dan Diaconescu	PP-DD	1	0	0	1	1	Populism; Romanian nationalism; Left-wing; Eurosceptic by affiliation	no family
Romanian National Unity Party	PUNR	1	1	0	1	0	Nationalism; extreme right	-
Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania	PPMT	1	0	0	0	1	Hungarian minority interests; Christian democracy; Autonomism; Separatist	-

Data Appendix Table V.t, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Romania, between 2000 and 2016, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

## Data Appendix Table V.u Classification of anti-establishment parties: Slovakia

### Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Slovakia

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
Communist Party of Slovakia	KSS	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Marxism–Leninism; Left-wing to Far-left	rad left
True Slovak National Party	PSNS	1	1	0	1	1	Extreme; far-right; party of SNS splinters	rad right
Slovak National Party	SNS	1	1	0	1	1	Slovak nationalism; National conservatism; Social conservatism; Economic nationalism; Right-wing populism; Euroscepticism; Right-wing to Far-right	rad right
Movement for Democracy	HZD	1	0	0	0	1	Euroscepticism	no family
People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	LS_HZDS	1	0	0	1	0	National conservatism; Social conservatism; Populism; Centre	populism
Kotleba – People's Party Our Slovakia	L'SNS	1	1	0	1	1	Slovak nationalism; Authoritarianism; Neo-Fascism; Reactionarism; Right-wing populism; Neo-Nazism; National conservatism; Social conservatism; Economic nationalism; Anti-globalism; Anti-immigration; Hard Euroscepticism	-
99 Percent – Civic Voice	NNPercent	1	0	0	1	0	Populism	-
Ordinary People and Independent Personalities	OLANO	1	0	0	0	1	Conservatism; Christian democracy; Centre-right; Euroscepticism	cons
Ordinary People and Independent Personalities- New Majority	OLANO–NOVA	1	0	0	0	1	Conservatism; Christian democracy; Centre-right; Euroscepticism; Liberal conservatism	cons
We Are Family	Sme Rodina	1	0	0	1	1	Slovak nationalism; Conservatism National conservatism; Economic liberalism; Right-wing populism; Anti-immigration; Euroscepticism; Centre-right to Right-wing	-
Freedom and Solidarity	SaS	1	0	0	0	1	Liberalism; Libertarianism; Soft Euroscepticism; Centre-right	liberal

Data Appendix Table V.u, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Slovakia, between 2000 and 2016, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.v Classification of anti-establishment parties: Slovenia**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Slovenia**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Party Abbrev.</b>	<b>Anti-Establishment</b>	<b>Far Right</b>	<b>Rad. Left</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Eurosceptic/Separatist</b>	<b>Internet Resources</b>	<b>Chapel Hill</b>
Slovenian National Party	SNS	1	1	0	1	1	Slovenian nationalism; Populism; Euroscepticism; Far-right	rad right
Party Lime Tree	LIPA	1	1	0	0	1	Nationalism; Euroscepticism	-

Data Appendix Table V.v, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Slovenia, between 2000 and 2014, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.



## Data Appendix Table V.w Classification of anti-establishment parties: Spain

### Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Spain

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources	Chapel Hill
Amaiur	AMAIUR	1	0	0	0	1	Basque nationalism; Left-wing nationalism; Basque independence; Socialism; Ezker abertzalea; Left-wing	regionalist
Galician Nationalist Bloc and Coalitions	BNG	1	0	0	0	1	Galician nationalism; Socialism; Left-wing nationalism; Galician independence; Feminism; Pacifism; Euroscepticism; Left-wing	regionalist
Citizens–Party of the Citizenry	C's	1	0	0	1	0	Liberalism; Secularism; Autonomism; Pro-Europeanism; Postnationalism; Centre	liberal
Democratic Convergence of Catalonia	CDC	1	0	0	0	1	Catalan independence; Catalan nationalism; Liberalism; Conservatism; Conservative liberalism; Centrism; Social democracy (minority); Centre-right	-
Convergence and Union	CiU	1	0	0	1	1	Catalan nationalism; Centrism; Internal factions: Populism, Christian democracy, Liberalism, Conservatism, Catalan independentism, Social democracy; Centre-right	regionalist
Democracy and Freedom	DL	1	0	0	0	1	Catalan independence; Liberalism; Centre-right	-
Republican Left of Catalonia	ERC and Coalitions	1	0	0	0	1	Catalan nationalism; Catalan independence; Left-wing nationalism; Republicanism; Democratic socialism; Economic liberalism; Soft Euroscepticism; Centre-left to left-wing	regionalist
Republican Left of Catalonia–Catalonia Yes	ERC_CATSI	1	0	0	0	1	Catalan independence; Republicanism; Social democracy; Left-wing nationalism; Centre-left to left-wing	-
United Left and Coalitions	IU	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Eurocommunism; Republicanism; Environmentalism; Federalism; Left-wing; Eurosceptic by affiliation	rad left
Podemos and Coalitions	PODEMOS	1	0	1	1	1	Democratic socialism; Social democracy; Direct democracy; Left-wing populism; Left-wing; Eurosceptic by affiliation	rad left
Andalusian Party	PA	1	0	0	0	1	Social democracy; Andalusian nationalism; Regionalism; Centre-left	regionalist
Barcelona en Comú	EnComu	1	0	0	1	0	Localism; Left-wing populism; Participatory democracy; Direct democracy; Democratic socialism; Eco-socialism; Libertarian socialism; Libertarian municipalism; Anti-capitalism; Anti-globalism; Pacifism; Anti-racism; Anti-mass tourism; Left-wing	-

**Data Appendix Table V.w Classification of anti-establishment parties: Spain (cont.)**

Party	Party Abbrev.	Anti-Establishment	Far Right	Rad. Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist	Internet Resources
Republican Left of the Valencian Country	ERPV	1	0	0	0	1	Catalan nationalism Left-wing nationalism Catalan independence Republicanism Democratic socialism Països Catalans Political position Left-wing
Euskal Herria Bildu	EHBildu	1	0	1	0	1	Basque nationalism; Separatism; Left-wing nationalism (Abertzale left); Far-left
Eusko Alkartasuna	EA	1	0	0	0	1	Basque nationalism; Social democracy; Separatism; Left-wing
Initiative for Catalonia Greens–United and Alternative Left	ICV_EUiA	1	0	1	0	1	Republicanism; Federalism; Socialism; Communism; Eco-socialism; Laicism; Ecologism; Progressivism; Catalanism; Left-wing; Eurosceptic / Separatist by affiliation
Initiative for Catalonia Greens	IC_V	1	0	0	0	1	Eco-socialism; Socialism of the 21st century; Federalism; Catalan nationalism; Left-wing
United Left of Navarre	IUN_NEB	1	0	1	0	1	Socialism; Anticapitalism; Communism; Republicanism; Feminism; Federalism; Pro-Basque; Left; Soft Eurosceptism by affiliation
Més per Mallorca	MES	1	0	0	0	1	Democratic socialism; Green politics; Left-wing nationalism; Catalanism
Nafarroa Bai	NaBai	1	0	0	0	1	Basque nationalism; Progressivism; Centre to Left wing
Geroa Bai	GBai	1	0	0	0	1	Basque nationalism; Progressivism; Centre
Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain	PCPE	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Marxism-Leninism; Euroscepticism; Republicanism; Far-left
Communist Party of the Catalan People	PCPC	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Marxism-Leninism; Euroscepticism; Radical left
Platform for Catalonia	PxC	1	1	0	1	1	Euroscepticism; Social conservatism; Spanish Unionism; Populism; Anti-Islam; Catalan regionalism; Far-right
Unidos Podemos	UNIDOSPODEMOS	1	0	1	1	1	Left-wing Left-wing populism; Eurosceptic by affiliation

Data Appendix Table V.w, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Spain, between 2000 and 2016, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.x Classification of anti-establishment parties: Sweden**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Sweden**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Party Abbrev.</b>	<b>Anti-Establishment</b>	<b>Far Right</b>	<b>Rad. Left</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Eurosceptic/Separatist</b>	<b>Internet Resources</b>	<b>Chapel Hill</b>
Green Party/Environmental Party	MP	1	0	0	0	1	Green politics; Soft Euroscepticism; Centre-left	green
Left Party	V	1	0	1	0	1	Socialism; Feminism; Euroscepticism; Left-wing Swedish nationalism; Economic nationalism; Social conservatism;	rad left
Sweden Democrats	SD	1	1	0	1	1	National conservatism; Right-wing populism; Hard Euroscepticism; Ethnopluralism; Anti-immigration; Right-wing to Far-right	rad right

Data Appendix Table V.x, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Sweden, between 2000 and 2014, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.y Classification of anti-establishment parties: Switzerland**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in Switzerland**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Party Abbrev.</b>	<b>Anti-Establishment</b>	<b>Far Right</b>	<b>Rad. Left</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Eurosceptic/Separatist</b>	<b>Internet Resources</b>	<b>Chapel Hill</b>
Democratic Center Union / Swiss Peoples' Party	SVP / UDC	1	1	0	1	1	Swiss nationalism; National conservatism; Right-wing populism; Economic liberalism; Agrarianism; Isolationism; Euroscepticism	-
Federal Democratic Union	EDU / UDF	1	0	0	0	1	Christian right; National conservatism; Social conservatism; Euroscepticism	-
Freedom Party of Switzerland	FPS / PSL	1	1	0	1	0	Nationalism; Conservatism; National conservatism; Right-wing populism	-
Popular Workers Party / Swiss Labour Party	PST / PDA	1	0	1	0	1	Democratic socialism; Communism; Marxism; Eurosceptic by affiliation	-
Solidarities	S	1	0	1	0	1	Communism; Marxism–Leninism; Trotskyism; Anti-capitalism; Proletarian internationalism; Far left; Eurosceptic by affiliation	-
Ticino League	LdT	1	0	0	1	1	Right-wing populism; Euroscepticism; National conservatism; Isolationism	-

Data Appendix Table V.y, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in Switzerland, between 2000 and 2015, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table V.z Classification of anti-establishment parties: UK**

**Classification of Anti-Establishment Parties in the UK**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Party Abbrev.</b>	<b>Anti-Establishment</b>	<b>Far Right</b>	<b>Rad. Left</b>	<b>Populist</b>	<b>Eurosceptic/Separatist</b>	<b>Internet Resources</b>	<b>Chapel Hill</b>
British National Party	BNP	1	1	0	1	1	British Fascism; Right-wing populism; White nationalism; Ethnic nationalism; Ultranationalism; Euroscepticism; Far-right to extreme-right	rad right
Democratic Unionist Party	DUP	1	0	0	1	1	British nationalism; Conservatism; National conservatism; Social conservatism; British unionism; Euroscepticism; Right-wing populism	-
Plaid Cymru	PC	1	0	0	0	1	Welsh nationalism; Civic nationalism; Regionalism; Democratic socialism; Social democracy; Environmentalism; Pro-Europeanism	-
Sinn Féin	SF	1	0	0	1	1	Irish republicanism; Left-wing nationalism; Democratic socialism; Centre-left to Left-wing; Populism	-
Scottish National Party	SNP	1	0	0	0	1	Scottish nationalism; Civic nationalism; Regionalism; Social democracy; Pro-Europeanism; Centre-left	regionalist
UK Independence Party	UKIP	1	1	0	1	1	Hard Euroscepticism; Right-wing populism; Economic liberalism; British nationalism	rad right

Data Appendix Table V.z, details the classification of the anti-establishment parties that were politically active in the UK, between 2000 and 2017, as well as their further characterisation as far right, radical left, populist and/or eurosceptic/separatist. Information regarding the parties' ideology and mandate comes from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and various online resources.

**Data Appendix Table VI. Correlation of Extremist Characteristics**

**Correlation of Extremist Characteristics Controlling for Time and Region (NUTS 2) Fixed Effects**

	Far Right	Radical Left	Populist	Eurosceptic/Separatist
Far Right	1			
Radical Left	0.175	1		
Populist	0.527	0.614	1	
Eurosceptic/Separatist	0.451	0.525	0.718	1

Data Appendix Table A.VI displays the correlation coefficients between the various extremist characteristics of the political parties in our sample partialling out for time (year) and region (NUTS 2 regions) fixed effects.

