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PAKISTAN, AMERICA, AND EXTREMISM: THE PATH AHEAD

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. O'HANLON: Good morning, everyone. And welcome to Brookings. I'm Mike O'Hanlon with the Foreign Policy program. As is my colleague, Bruce Riedel on the other end.

And we are thrilled to be doing a book launch today and a broader discussion of U.S. policy towards Pakistan with our colleague from the Global Economy and Development program, where she is a nonresident senior fellow, Madiha Afzal. And she's has written a remarkable book, as I think many of you suspect, since you're here to discuss it with us, "Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State."

During the time that she wrote this book, she was also teaching at the University of Maryland, she'll be teaching at SAIS as well in the fall, and has been with us, as I say, at Brookings for a number of years. So, it's a very proud day for Brookings.

Also a subject that Bruce Riedel has written a book about, and so I think we are really well positioned a very good conversation on one of the most pressing matters in American foreign policy. We all know where we stand today, with the Trump administration recently having suspended aid to Pakistan, ongoing concerns about Pakistan's role in supporting, or at least condoning extremism, and the Afghan Taliban from their territory, which gives us huge problems and threats to our forces, and threat to the mission in Afghanistan.

But much more broadly, we know that U.S., concerns about Pakistan extend to its nuclear program, to its relationship with India, to the very cohesion of a country that's essentially tied with Brazil for being the fifth most populous in the world, had more than 200 million people by current estimates.

And as Bruce Riedel has often pointed out, the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, at least until recent years, when North Korea is giving it a run for the money, perhaps, on that front. And still, arguably, one of the top two or three most dangerous countries on earth, and yet a country that Madiha insists, we must not give up on.

And so, what we would like to do with the discussion today, before we turn to your

questions in the second-half, is begin with my disclosing a few questions to Madiha to draw out some of the main themes in her book. And then we'll involve Bruce as well in talking about any observations he has on those matters, but especially looking forward to policy choices for the United States.

And what I'd like to do with the opening questions, is really get at two broad sets of questions that are central to Madiha's book, and one is understanding Pakistan as a country, its history, and its relationship with the United States. So, that's sort of the historical basket of questions.

But then also, where the book really begins and targets its main emphasis, is Pakistani attitudes towards extremism today, and towards more broad foreign policy concerns, and what's driving those. And what are the underlying concerns within the Pakistani State, what are the underlying drivers within Pakistani society, our politics, civil military relations, education that really create the kinds of attitudes that we now see?

And so, if it's okay, Madiha, I'll begin with the historical questions, even though as I say, and as you know well, your book really begins with a lot of the polling data, and trying to explain that, but I thought I would just ask you first to tell us a little bit about how you think of Pakistan, you know, in its history.

A country that's now just over 70 years old, that of course was split off from India, or split itself off from India, and the aftermath of the Raj. I just wondered; just how you would explain to us, your conception of Pakistan as a country, and how we should think of it. As a Muslim country, or simply as a strategic kind of way to India, counter-weight to India, you know, the origins of Pakistan, and then its main self-identity?

MS. AFZAL: Thank you. So, Pakistan became independent, became a country in 1947, and it was to have a country for the Muslims of the subcontinent, that it was created. But in order to rally these Muslims, to the west of India, and to the east of what is now India, which is now Bangladesh, the notion of Islam in danger was often invoked, and so what became this country for the Muslims of the subcontinent very quickly, after its birth, became an Islamic country.

So, in its day-to-day workings, you know, you could miss the focus on Islam, because

people go around in a relatively secular fashion in terms of the workings of the government, the workings of the military, but the two pillars that really seem to underlie the Pakistani State, are one of Islam, a nationalism that is derived from religion. And then a nationalism that is derived in opposition to India, because Pakistan is fearful of its much larger neighbor, India; and has really defined itself, as facing an existential threat from India.

So, what that has done, has set up a dominant military that has dominated over Pakistan civilian government for the last 70 years. I mean Pakistan is alternated between civilian and military rule for the last 70 years, but the military has really been the dominant thread, and even now as a civilian government is ruling the country, the military is in charge, really, of foreign and security policy.

So those two, sort of, pillars have really defined all the strategic decisions that Pakistan has taken. I mean, many of its decisions look ideological, but really are strategic in service to that narrative.

MR. O'HANLON: And I think you, you know, you've drawn on the book really well, just as you alluded in your opening response to me, that the character of this Islamic Republic is not strictly in the sense of piety and daily life, and Jinnah, himself the Founder, was not even all that religious. Right? And so it was partly about religion, but partially about identify politics, and creating some sense of being distinct from India.

Do you think that this was unbalanced, done in a way that sort of worked for Pakistan? Or did it create then, some themes and some political tensions or currents that then led to problems as the State evolved?

MS. AFZAL: So, you're absolutely right. I mean it was done in service of politics, right. So, you know, Pakistan sort of stamped down its ethnicities and its provincial sort of identities to create this notion of a country that was Islamic. And in doing so it led to -- almost all of Pakistan's problems can really be traced to this ideological narrative.

So, we can look at the notion of Jihad that its military uses, it uses it in its fight with India, and it uses it -- sort of, it uses it in its, you know, the conventional wars it's fought with India, but it also

uses it in terms of the Kashmiri Jihadist that the elements in the military have at least fostered and cultivated. And those are, again, because this sort of notion of religion that it relies on.

It uses it in sort of the narrative it has on terrorist groups, that the Taliban cannot really be our enemies because they are our brothers, they are like us, and it blames attacks as conspiracies that come from India, rather attacks that have come from -- you know, from Pakistani citizens who are, sort of, are staging an insurgency against the Pakistani State.

Even its involvement in the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets, and sort of the training of Mujahideen was because of this narrative. Pakistan's then General Zia, wanted to have -- wanted to sort of put his weight behind those Jihadist that were sort of the most extreme, because they were a counter to what he saw as a threatening Pashtun nationalism that was developing.

So, in some sense all of Pakistan's have really derived from this narrative, and if we think of the Islamization of the country in terms of its laws that has occurred, and that, you know, both civilian and the military have, you know, had fostered, those have led to some of the big problems in terms of the Blasphemy law, in terms of the anti-Ahmadi laws, and I can go into these in further detail, that have really fostered a sense of intolerance in the entire population.

MR. O'HANLON: So, a couple more questions on history, and then I'll ask Bruce to comment, and then we'll move into the contemporary debate. But when you look at Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, three huge countries, one of them huger than the others, but all sharing a common origin in a sense, certainly sharing a part of the world, do you think that Pakistan has been the most troubled and least successful of three? That's a pretty big question, a pretty broad question, maybe not useful, but I'm still curious as to -- I know in your book you lament a lot of the directions that Pakistan has taken, without giving up on the country.

But I wonder if some of these issues, some of these concerns that you've been talking about have put Pakistan in an even more complicated place than its neighbors. Or is it really the state of development in South Asia, you know, the extreme amount of poverty, the huge numbers of people, the unhappy and quick, and of the British rule, that really explain why all three of these countries still have big

challenges? So, I guess I'm curious as to whether you think that Pakistan in a more perilous place than the other giants of South Asia.

MS. AFZAL: I mean, I think it is certainly in a more perilous place than the other giants, but I think there's still -- there's a way it can get on a different path. So, economically Pakistan is doing okay. Pakistan has, you know, there are issues with access to education, quality of education, health care, but all three countries have these issues. Pakistan has lagged behind both India and Bangladesh in more recent years in terms of, sort of, the kind of development indicators, but the economy, otherwise, is doing well.

I think where the real problems lies, is how it sees itself, and how the world sees it, and the world kind of sees this country of 200 million as the sort of villain, you know, a failing state, or an almost-failing state that is sort of to be blamed for the problems of the West, and the problems that it's cased its citizens.

And I think, you know, while there are elements of truth in that, Pakistan can very well actually take the good it's got, its economic vibrancy, the fact that it's now doing well in terms of its Democratic Government Bill. You know, in recent months we've seen that falter as well, and really derive sort of this positive nationalism.

If you look at India, India has a positive vision of itself, Bangladesh is a secular country that actually separated from Pakistan, from West Pakistan, it was sort of a United Pakistan in 1971, and really defined itself as completely separate from Pakistan. Pakistan has remained stuck in the rut that really, in 1947, was its sort of basest, kind of, the instincts were, you know, a fear of India.

And so, you know, it's a sort of a need to unify the disparate country, and so it's remained stuck in that, but it can actually -- and that has been really what has led to the extremism, and the problem with how the world sees it, but if it still gets on a different path, there's a lot of good in the country that can actually enable it to redefine itself.

MR. O'HANLON: So, one more question from me, and then I wanted to just ask Bruce to reflect on the history and the character of Pakistan as he wishes as well, in whatever way, Bruce, that's

useful to you. I'd love to hear your thoughts on all of these issues.

But I want to go back now to the history of U.S.-Pakistani relations, and get a couple of the antecedents for our subsequent discussion on the table from that period as well. And just ask you to comment on the origins of the problems.

As I see it, there are at least three big, you know, historical events, or differences of worldview that helped produce this, and I'm informed by reading Bruce on a number of topics, including how, in 1962, when he, Bruce wrote a great book about the India-China faceoff that we helped, to some extent, damp down, things weren't necessarily so bad, but as you got into the '65, and then especially the '71 War, in which Pakistan in that second war was divided in two.

Maybe by its own fault, but still other people in its mind were guilty as well, the United States did not come to Pakistan's aid military even though we had alliances with Pakistan. So, that in Pakistani eyes was sort of an original sin, as I understand it. Then of course, after the 1980 successful defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, where we collaborated, we left them holding the bag, in a way that Secretary of Defense Gates, has said was one of sort of least noble things we've done as a country in our modern history.

And then of course there's the nuclear weapons issue, and our desire and our need to push back vary hard against Pakistan, proliferating nuclear weapons, even though in Pakistani minds it was probably, in their view, a necessary alternative to a U.S. alliance that didn't really deliver when they needed it to.

So, I just wanted you to comment on anything else you would add to that list. Was one or two of those -- was one of those events, or were two of those events more important than others? And how would you describe sort of the underlying causes of the bad state of U.S.-Pakistani relations, which as we know have now really been a constant throughout the 21st century, maybe some slight ups and downs, but your polling data shows that things have been pretty bad in Pakistani minds this whole century. So, how did we get here?

MS. AFZAL: Yes. I think the events you've pointed to, you know, Pakistan and the U.S.

started out on a very sound footing, you know, the U.S. was one of the first allies Pakistan had, and Pakistanis often like to invoke the good relationship of the 1960s. 1971 played a role. Pakistan saw the U.S. as not having come to its aid, even in its text books, the U.S. has mentioned very little, but 1971 is called out.

So, the three sort of events that are called out, are 1971 that the U.S. did not come to Pakistan's aid, and it's sort of considered a betrayal, the post-Soviet-Afghan War abandonment, as Pakistan sees it, was considered a betrayal. And Pakistan considers itself as having been left with, you know, all the Afghan refugees that came in and Pakistan considers, you know, have caused problems for the country, as well as the returning Mujahideen who then morphed to become the insurgence that attacked the Pakistani State itself in the late 2000s.

And so in many Pakistanis' minds, there is this direct link between U.S. sort of interference in the region, and the insurgency and the terrorism that strikes Pakistan itself, and so when the rhetoric sort of blames Pakistan for the terrorism that strikes the rest of the world, Pakistanis will often point to the fact that they blame the U.S. for the terrorism that strikes Pakistan.

And I think nuclear weapons program, you're exactly right, is sort of the third. I think the parity with India, Pakistan has always wanted parity with India, and that is, you know, it's much smaller than India, but it has always felt this need to be equal, that actually defines why it has engaged in cultivating militants that fight India, because its regular army could not defeat India. And that also explains why it cultivated a nuclear weapon.

And so when the U.S. has, you know, in the late-'90s, in 1998 when President Clinton imposed sanctions on Pakistan for testing a nuclear weapons at Chagai-I in Balochistan, Pakistanis really considered that as a matter of huge pride, because they retaliated against India's testing of the weapon. And they sort of take it as, again, another form of American betrayal, that the U.S. imposed sanctions on it, even though India tested its weapon first.

So, the real sort of narratives that float around in the view of Pakistanis and these are abetted by Pakistan's politicians who, you know, obviously use anti-Americanism for political gain. The

two sort of narratives that float around are (a) that the U.S. is out to sort of impinge on Pakistan's sovereignty, and it's sort of bully that betrays Pakistan.

And then the second narrative is, really and "us" versus "them" argument. That, you know, and so I have, in my interviews, students said to me, they can't see a Muslim country doing well, they can't see Islam rising. And so those are the two narratives that float around in the Pakistani imagination.

MR. O'HANLON: So, Bruce, I wanted to ask you to comment on any of this that you like. Just a quick reminder for those in the crowd who don't know Bruce well, that he was on the National Security Council staff in the late-'90s, when the very tense cargo crisis erupted, and helped deal with that with President Clinton. He came to Brookings about, I think, 11 years ago, and has written a number of books including *Deadly Embrace*, on the U.S.-Pakistani relationship.

And finally he took a couple months off from Brookings in 2009, and coordinated President Obama's first strategy towards the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. So, a multitude of credentials to speak to this question, and I'd love to hear your thoughts.

MR. RIEDEL: Sure. But first of all, this book and what you've just said, articulates very clearly the narrative of Pakistan. Pakistan is the anti-India country, and it sees itself as under existential threat, and paranoids don't always start with enemies, but in times they produce enemies. And as a consequence it is not unreasonable to sit in Islamabad or Rawalpindi today, and see India as an existential threat. And the Modi Government, it's even easier to see that existential threat there.

I'm struck in thinking of the history of Pakistan that in addition to the peculiarities of its narrative, it's also been an incredibly unlucky country. And I'll give you a couple examples. The Founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Jinnah, was not a religious fanatic. The *Time Magazine* in 1945, or so, awarded him the Best Dressed Man in the World, because apparently, and I think this is exaggerated; he never wore the same tie twice. He liked his whisky with dinner. You know, to put this man as the Founder of a Muslim country was a political trick that he had accomplished.

Unfortunately, he died almost as soon as Pakistan existed. And, you know, imagine the

history of the United States, if George Washington had died a year after the Battle of Yorktown and never become President. There are other examples. Zia-ul-Haq definitely tilted Pakistani history much more in the direction from radical Islam. He was also something of an accident of history.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto picked him to be a Chief of Military Staff because he thought he was a doddering idiot, which he could completely control. And he actually addressed him in Cabinet meetings as my "monkey general". Of course, some of us will say: well, gee isn't that suspiciously like another official today, using nicknames? (Laughter)

But it's been very unlucky, and we can go on to a number of other examples of it. The U.S. relationship with Pakistan has been like a ride at an amusement park, with incredible highs and incredible lows.

And I'll just illustrate that with one example. The first George Bush administration, H.W. came into office in 1989, he really wanted to improve relations with Pakistan. His first State Dinner was for Benazir Bhutto that was supposed to set a positive trend towards encouraging democracy in Pakistan. By the time he left office, four years later, he was on the verge of doing what no administration has ever done, which is labeling Pakistan: a patron state sponsor of terrorism.

The works were in the way, the bureaucracy was set up to do that, and only the fact that he didn't win the election in November of 1992 probably prevented this further development or this deterioration U.S.-Pakistani relations. So, the combination of a country with a narrative which is more negative than it is positive, unfortunately, a dysfunctional relationship with the United States that's like being on a rollercoaster has produced the current environment that we are in today.

MR. O'HANLON: Just one quick follow up. Thank you, Bruce. What was the terrorism that was the issue in the early-'90s, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other anti-India groups?

MR. RIEDEL: Mostly anti-India groups. Zia-ul-Haq took our money and our guns to support the Mujahideen, and began giving them more and more to various Kashmiri groups and in 1989/1991 period, violence in Kashmir spiked very high. I don't want to give the Indians a pass on this, their response to this kind of unrest was to deploy half-a-million soldiers into Kashmir to squash it, which

of course only produced more unrest.

But by 1992 the evidence of ISI support for these groups was very, very compelling. And I don't know whether at the end of the day Bush would have pulled the trigger, but he'd warned the Pakistanis, in writing, that it was coming.

MR. O'HANLON: Just one quick follow up on the history for each of you, and then I will move on to just ask you about the survey data and the state of public opinion in Pakistan today. As I listened to you both, and read you both, I'm struck that of course there were problems at the creation of Pakistan, and losing Jinnah early was certainly one of them, and potentially Jinnah's own cynical use of the religion card was another one of them.

But I also hear you both say that things got a lot worse somewhere around into the '70s and the '80s both with the Indo-Pakistani war of '71, but then of course the Afghan war, Zia's effects on politics and society.

So, I guess, to what extent has Pakistan sort of, to the extent it's a troubled State, has it sort of just been on a gradual decline over the years? Or to what extent were there sort of two big problems? One, the way in which it was created, and then secondly what happened in the '70s and early '80s? In other words, I guess another way to phrase it, were things still, sort of, okay in the '50s and '60s, and if we had just gotten a couple more breaks and built on what was good then, we might be in a much different place today?

Or, was there just inevitability about this continuing to slide based on the way the State was created, based on the troubled state of civil-military relations, the military coups that happened even in the early years, et cetera. You see what I'm drawing at?

MS. AFZAL: Mm-hmm. Yes. Absolutely!

MR. O'HANLON: Madiha?

MS. AFZAL: That's a great question. So, I really see it as (a) the problem being at the very beginning, so it was a gradual Islamization that Pakistan engaged in. If you look at its legal system, you know the Islamization began in -- it began in 1949 with the Objectives Resolution of Pakistan, but

with Pakistan's constitutions, you know, it started talking about enabling all Muslims to live their lives according to Islam, the promotion of Islamic ideals, and making the studying of the Quran compulsory, Islamic studies compulsory.

Now, none of this is necessarily bad, per se, but what it led to then was an increased influence of Islamists who pushed to get really regressive laws put into the Constitution and the Penal Code, that even Bhutto, who was secular and liberal himself, you know, declared a minority community, Ahmadis, as non-Muslim in the '70s.

So, there have been a sort of gradual decline, but the real inflection point, in my view, was when Zia came into power. So, he put in place Blasphemy laws which we are seeing the results of today, which basically criminalize any offenses against the Quran and the Prophet, to the extent that they are punishable by death. And so what that has done is it's paved the way for vigilante violence, and we've seen prominent politicians being killed on charges of blasphemy. We've seen students at universities being killed based on, you know, sort of harmless social media postings they've done, by fellow students.

And so I think, you know, Zia was an inflection point in terms of the Blasphemy laws, and also in terms of the education system. It was in the 1980s that militant Madrassas were cultivated, were put in place. Madrassas existed in Pakistan, you know, pre the 1980s as well, but those Madrassas were then used in service of the Afghan Jihad, so there was much more militancy that was sort of fostered in the Madrassas, and in Pakistan's education system.

That was made much more (a) based on religion, (b) glorifying, you know, violence in the name of religion, so actually talking about Jihad and its text books, that happened in the 1980s, and then really sort of doubling down on the enmity with India. And in some sense 1971 was probably the catalyst, because it really led Pakistan to double down on many of these things, but without Zia we might have seen a different Pakistan.

And I will say that there, you know, Pakistan's subsequent governments, both democratic and military in the 1990s, you know, the 2000s, and even now, have tried, unsuccessfully, to roll back

many of the changes that Zia put in place. And it's sort of a self-perpetuating beast in some ways right now, because for those who have argued against -- for those who have argued for reform of the Blasphemy law are named as blasphemous, and killed, you know. So, they fear for their lives. So, this has proven very difficult to roll back.

MR. O'HANLON: Bruce, do you agree with that general assessment?

MR. RIEDEL: Yes. We are actually in violent agreement on this issue. Zia was a transformative figure. I often said to my students when I taught at SAIS, if there's one book I would really like one of you to write it is the definitive biography of Zia-ul-Haq, because of the figures of the second-half of the 20th century, Zia is a figure who has gotten far too little attention, and deserves more.

One thing I would add, though, is that outside players, again, are very important in all of this. Not just the United States. If the Soviet Union had not invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve in 1979, Zia would never have been in a position to do many of the things he did. He could legitimately point to an existential threat, not just from the Soviet Union, but a pincer operation from the Soviet Union and India,

Now, to many of us that may sound like fantasies. If you're Pakistani General, this is not your fantasy, this is your everyday nightmare that you live with. And it wasn't just Pakistanis who thought that, the Carter administration, and then the Reagan administration bought into the same thesis that the Soviet invasion was a precursor, not just to taking over Kabul, because why would you want to take over Kabul? You would want it marched to the sea, and if you were going to march to the sea, who is going to march with you; the Indians.

The legacy of Zia is not just also in the laws, it's in the politicians. We often forget now, Nawaz Sharif was the creation of Zia-ul-Haq, you know his -- I wouldn't say matured -- I don't know, he's changed, he's redefined himself many a times, but he is an output of Zia.

The other outside power who has played a huge role in this, is of course the Saudis. The Saudis, Zia turned first to the King of Saudi Arabia. That was the first phone call he made the morning of December 25th, 1979. And he sent his ISI Director to Riyadh, not to Washington, because it was the

Saudis that he was looking for, and of course the Saudis were willing to provide lots and lots of money, lots and lots of advice, but it came with a price. And the price was our kind of Islam.

And that, the combination of all those things I think the Zia era is the decisive moment, unfortunately, for the development of modern Pakistan.

MR. O'HANLON: By the way on Saudi issues, if you haven't already heard or read Bruce's new book, *Kings and Presidents*, you definitely should, and Fareed Zakaria has just honored it as his favorite book of the week or month, or maybe both, maybe 2018 for that matter. I certainly recommend it very highly.

But now let's get back to, *Pakistan Under Siege* by Madiha, and I wanted to ask you, maybe just in a few minutes, to summarize some of your main findings about the state of Pakistani public opinion on violence, extremism, the United States, whatever. I'll just turn the floor over to you for a few minutes so you can work through some of those, because that's really at the core of a lot of how you begin the book. So, back over to you.

MS. AFZAL: Absolutely. So, you know, when we when we look at Pakistan, and images we see of Pakistan, you know, there are sort of, we see violent mobs on television screens, and in newspapers, you know, chanting: death to America, right? And that's sort of the -- and burning American flags, that's kind of the image that stays in our heads. But the story of Pakistanis' attitudes is sort of more nuanced and complicated than that.

So, you know, the first thing that's important to note is that the vast majority 90 percent of Pakistanis actually denounce violence against civilians in the name of Islam. They don't they don't buy into that. They are unbalanced, unfavorable towards all terrorist groups, those that strike Pakistan, as well as those that strike other countries.

So, they are unfavorable towards al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistan Taliban which attacks Pakistan itself, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba. And much of this public opinion has actually moved in the late 2000s, sort of from 2007 onwards, when Pakistan itself started getting attacked by the Pakistani Taliban.

Pakistanis became unfavorable towards all militant groups. So those views changed. Pakistan is also anti-India, you know, the views are unfavorable towards India, it's also anti-U.S., so it's anti-American. But these views change, I mean the majority of Pakistanis will say they have unfavorable views of America and India, but depending on relations, you know, that that majority can go from 50 percent to 85 percent.

So, these views are not -- it's not that they're immutable, so, you know, rhetoric and action, both from the Indian side and the U.S. side will make a difference on these views. When you start peeling away the layers of looking at narratives that Pakistanis have, that's where things become much more troubled. So, you know, I've already talked about some of the narratives that Pakistanis have on the U.S., but if you start thinking about the narratives they have on the Pakistan Taliban, that attacks Pakistanis itself, even when the Pakistan Taliban has claimed an attack, Pakistanis will point to it as some sort of conspiracy theory.

They'll blame India and the U.S., you know. I'll quote a high school teacher who I interviewed in Lahore in 2013. And I asked him, you know, what do you think are the causes of terrorism in Pakistan? And he said: write down, you know, because I was taking notes -- write down CIA, Mossad, RAW, I will not say Taliban because the day we stop drone attacks, they will stop terrorism. And "we" meaning, you know, the U.S. or the Pakistani Army which he considered complicit in drone strikes.

Because they are believers of God and Prophet Mohammed, so the idea -- so there's a conspiracy theory argument that, you know, the U.S. and India are somehow related to the Taliban engaging in attacks, and there's another argument which is that the Taliban only is engaging in attacks against the Pakistani State because they want to implement Sharia and Islamic law in Pakistan. And after all that is a righteous (inaudible) and this government is sort of a non-Islamic Government.

So, there is, you know, underlying that those narratives it's kind of a latent sympathy for these groups because they're not -- they are considered to be one of them and, you know, that they're considered to be not the other. So they'll say, Muslims cannot kill other Muslims. So, there's confusion there.

I will say that on the Lashkar-e-Taiba, overall views are negative, but of any terrorist groups Pakistanis have some ambivalence, you know, that that's directed towards the Lashkar-e Taiba, because they don't fully understand what the Lashkar-e-Taiba is. You know, there's a narrative that is propagated by both, you know, Hafiz Saeed, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba at large, that it is basically a charitable organization, and it does actually engage in charity, you know.

It was sort of at the forefront of providing aid after the Kashmir Earthquake of 2005. And so Pakistanis actually ascribe these -- they ascribe sort of the positive attributes to Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which is the political arm, or the reconstituted version of Lashkar-e-Taiba, so they don't fully understand it. Regardless, they are still negative about the violence that the group propagates, but they don't quite fully understand it.

MR. O'HANLON: A quick asterisk, that's the same Saeed, as I understand it, and I've learned from Bruce over the years, who helped orchestrate the Mumbai attack of 2008, and who still walks free in the streets of Lahore today.

MS. AFZAL: Yes.

MR. O'HANLON: Is that correct on both points?

MS. AFZAL: Yes.

MR. O'HANLON: Sorry. Go on.

MS. AFZAL: Absolutely! So, with Hafiz Saeed, you know, the Pakistani Government has basically engaged in a kind of purposefully, I would say negligible prosecution. So, they'll arrest him when there's pressure, so in, you know, early 2017 he was arrested, and he was released in late 2017, and so he's able to hold rallies, et cetera. He was actually a Professor at an engineering university in Lahore before that. So, people don't quite fully comprehend that he is a terrorist.

I think the one final thing I'll say about al-Qaeda, again views are very negative about al-Qaeda, and so some of these views go back to, you know, when al-Qaeda was a bigger, you know, a bigger organization that hadn't been decimated as it has been by the Obama administration. But Pakistanis were negative on al-Qaeda's attacks against the U.S. but, you know, a sizable portion said

they still agreed with al-Qaeda's ideology.

And so there is sympathy for the ideologies, and it's not a majority of the country, but there is still sizable sympathy for the ideologies of the propaganda that these groups engage in, is able to seep through into a population.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. That was great. Let me just ask one follow up, and I think that will help lead us into the policy discussion. So, after I ask you that follow up, then I'll turn to Bruce for his broader set of views about where we go next on U.S.-Pakistan relations.

But you've got some thoughts on that in your book as well, and the one that I definitely wanted to try to tease out right now, but feel free to cover others too, in the polling you noted that sometimes the younger generation shows more sympathy for extremism, and maybe even terrorism.

MS. AFZAL: Mm-hmm.

MR. O'HANLON: And you attribute that, in large part, to the education system where you think, as I understand it, that the United States does perhaps have some leverage. And maybe if President Trump and other Americans believe we have to suspend security assistance, maybe at the same time we have to offer a vision of how economic and development cooperation could expand should Pakistan take certain modest steps to at least start pointing in the right direction. I mean, that's a question on my mind.

But I wanted you to, if you could, please explain a little bit about what the youth in Pakistan think today about these same questions: any divergence between the younger generations and the more general population? And then what does that tell us about where we need to try to help shape or influence future Pakistani policy.

MS. AFZAL: Yes. That's a great, that's a great question. So, when I looked at the polling data I, you know, sort of looked at its relationship with, you know, education, years of education, income levels, gender and another thing I looked at was age. And younger Pakistanis have more -- have worse views, essentially, on all of these dimensions, you know, so there'll be more anti-American, more anti-India, and they are less negative towards terrorist groups.

So, it makes sense because of the fact that the education system, as it exists today, was really put in place more in the 1980s, and so those generations that are schooled in the education system, from the 1980s onwards, think a certain way. So, what that implies in terms of U.S. policy towards Pakistan, I think, you know, one thing that you bring up is exactly what I would prescribe; a delinking of security and civilian assistance, so treating Pakistan's military and elements within its military that support militant groups as separate from the country.

When we, in our rhetoric, you know, when President Trump talks about Pakistan, you know, engaging in lies and deceit, it implies a whole country painted as one brush. But Pakistan's military, and elements within its military are separate, Pakistan's Democratic Government is separate, and Pakistan's people are separate, and so they should be they should be treated as such.

So, in some sense, you know, sort of the cutting off of security and military assistance is fine, and that should be considered separate from the cutting off of the civilian assistance. Civilian assistance has actually been shown to improve views towards the U.S. There was a very nice research paper that actually showed that assistance received in the wake of the 2005 earthquake, that was unconditional sort of emergency aid, improved views towards the United States by a good deal.

So, winning over hearts and minds is important, because that will actually engender change within Pakistan as well. And I also saw that the low in anti-Americanism was in 2006, post the sort of giving of aid. So, talking directly to the Pakistani people and explaining to them how -- Pakistani, you know, Pakistanis buy the line that their government feeds them which is: we don't have any safe havens, you know, the Haqqani, because that's the line that they are being fed.

But the U.S., you know, if it sort of shows Pakistan that in fact, that is not true, and shows Pakistanis that it's not true, that can be sort of an important lever. So, I'll give you an example, I think when Mullah Mansoor was killed in a drone strike in Baluchistan in 2016, that was, sort of, an embarrassment for Pakistanis, right; that the fact that he was in Baluchistan at that point in time.

I think many people did not realize that members of the Afghan Taliban were sort of roaming around Pakistan like that. And so those kinds of events, you know, the raid that killed Osama bin

Laden, those are sort of -- they've been embarrassments for Pakistan, and Pakistan will bristle at, you know, violations of its own sovereignty that took place because of that, but they also show Pakistanis that the line that the government is feeding them about, you know, no safe havens, is not true.

So, you know, maybe unilateral action, as long as, you know, no civilians are killed in the process, right, sort of successful unilateral action can actually help (a) you know, show Pakistanis the what the U.S. wants to show them, and (b) actually get the purposes of U.S. policy taken care of, right, safe havens taken out.

And I think, in the long term, making Pakistan civilian government the primary partner for cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan is essential. You know, the way the U.S. policy has worked is that, our Generals here talk to Pakistani Generals, and in fact our -- you know, the Secretary of State here will and, you know, the President will also talk to Pakistani Generals. They should really prioritize the relationship with Pakistan's democratic government, who understand, in my view, much better, the future for the country. The military is still holding on to its strategic assets as it sees them.

MR. O'HANLON: That's fantastic. So, Bruce, I just wanted to ask you to comment, to add, or amend or disagree, or whatever you'd like to do. But we've got certainly a discussion about the United States using a gentle suasion where possible to encourage Pakistan to amend things like its Blasphemy law, and we've got distinguishing between the civilian, and military elements of government, and working more with the civilian side, focusing more on economic development, and not being unwilling to take occasional unilateral military action if it really serves our interests, as long as we can do it carefully, and convincingly, and effectively. So, anything you would want to add to that agenda or modify?

MR. RIEDEL: Well, I basically agree with those three points, I think that is the route forward. What I thought it might be useful to do is to analyze a little bit of our own government for a minute, which in some ways is more difficult than analyzing Pakistan.

The Trump administration has now been in office a year, it has a policy statement about Pakistan, but as far as I can tell it doesn't have a policy to go with it, and I'll explain that a little bit more in

a minute. It also has a distinct perspective which is, it's looking at Pakistan through the prism of Afghanistan. That's understandable, we are engaged in a war in Afghanistan, we've been engaged in that war now for 17 years, and it's understandable that we would look at it,

But it's also regrettable. It's a little bit looking at policy towards the United States from, say, the standpoint of Cuba. Cuba is important, but you miss a lot of America if that's where you start from. It's also regrettable because -- and I think this goes to the very heart of the dysfunctionality of the Trump policy towards Pakistan -- because there's fundamental disagreement in this administration about Afghanistan.

And it's between the President and his Generals, literally. The President, as he said bluntly last August, thinks we ought to get out of Afghanistan. He said: my gut tells me we ought to go. And he kind of ran on that in his campaign. I say "kind of" because like most of his campaign promises it's really hard to figure out what he meant, but he talked a lot about stupid wars, and I think this was the war he was trying to talk about,

It's not an unreasonable position. In fact, *The New York Times* has advocated getting out of Afghanistan for the last five years. The President would probably find more Democrats who will support him on this issue than he would find Republicans, but he'd find a pretty broad audience. But his Generals, particularly the trifecta of Mattis, McMaster and Kelly, have persuaded him. And he says it, clearly very reluctantly, that we have to stay in Afghanistan.

Their position is not unreasonable either. If the United States ends up abandoning Afghanistan in the worst case, and the Afghan Government crumbles, it would be a very significant statement about the global Jihad. We will have appeared to have come second after the Soviets in losing Afghanistan.

Now, there's a lot of nuances in between, but I think this dysfunctionality over whether to stay in Afghanistan is very unfortunate for the Pakistan policy, because what the Generals have come up with is a policy that (a) basically stabilizes the stalemate the Afghanistan, that's all it does. A few more troops, a few changes in the Rules of Engagement, those are all good things, but they're not going to

change the dynamics of the war in Afghanistan.

What the Trump administration promised when it came into office was that it was going to change the Pakistani behavior towards Afghanistan. It was going to end the safe havens it was going to end support, ISI support for the Haqqani network, for the Quetta Shura, who was going to drive the Taliban leadership out of Pakistan for good.

That's a good -- you know, that's an end game I think we would all support, but so far all the Trump administration has come up with is this statement, that that's what it wants to do, and that Pakistani behavior is wrong-headed.

Now, also in typical Trumpian administration behavior, there's a nuanced version of this approach. For example, the August strategy which laid out in some nuance, and then there's the Twitter approach which: all Pakistanis are liars, all Pakistanis are deceitful. There's no differentiation in here.

And not only is there no differentiation, there's a nastiness to the whole thing, which is, again, very, very Donald Trump, which naturally recoils even those Pakistanis who would agree that they want to see these things shut down, don't want to be hectored to by what they've seen, what appears to be a bully, and an Islamophobe bully on the top of that.

So, while they may have a statement that is roughly accurate, the presentation of that statement has not been helpful to their cause, and there hasn't been anything really to go with the statement, and there's been no engagement at a serious level with the Pakistani civilian leadership. Now, admittedly it's hard to do that since the Pakistani civilian leadership doesn't hold steady for very long.

But, for example, when President Trump went to Saudi Arabia last May, the Saudis made tremendous effort to make sure that Nawaz Sharif was there, that was the perfect opportunity for an initial conversation, the Americans rebuffed him completely. We've had a few cabinet-level visits to Pakistan, but they have not been a significant engagement, but we also haven't engaged our allies. NATO was supposed to be part of the war in Afghanistan. Has there been a conversation with the NATO allies about Pakistani behavior? Not that I know of; all the kinds of things that you would do if you were pursuing a policy.

So, so we've ended up a year in with a statement of policy, and very, very little policy to go with it. Now, there's lots of things they could do, we can come back to them, you've already mentioned some of them, but we don't really have a clue yet, which of these things the Trump administration intends on doing in the end.

What it has done is announced that we are cutting off aid. In many ways this is more show than it is reality too. U.S aid levels to Pakistan peaked in 2010, roughly $4.5 billion worth of aid went to Pakistan in 2010, and they've been going down ever since then.

Now, the Obama administration tried very hard through Kerry-Lugar to see if the aid program would achieve certain results, it lost faith in that, and most importantly it found Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011, and you can see the decline in the U.S. aid levels from then on. Not just because the administration is less eager to send aid, but because there's no way those people up there at the end of Pennsylvania Avenue are going to prove it anymore. Selling aid to Pakistan on The Hill would be quite a difficult test for any President, and this President's abilities to get legislation done, have not been particularly successful.

How much aid have we decided not to provide them? We can't even get a coherent answer from that from the administration. Initially it was $255 million, then it became $2 billion, I don't understand how it could go up 100 percent that quickly. But in any case, Pakistan long ago, and particularly the Pakistani Military, long ago decided that they could live without U.S. Military assistance. And they can live without U.S. military assistance, they don't need it anymore, they can find alternatives. They have friends who are quite willing to fill the gap, the Chinese the Saudis.

So here we are, a year in, we have a bullet point or a tweet, and we don't really know what they're going to do to follow it up, which of the various approaches they have in front of them. I find it astonishing. When Barack Obama gave me the task of coming up with an Af-Pak policy, he said 60 days. Well, we were done in 54 days. We didn't spend a year and still not have a solution to the problem.

MR. O'HANLON: Just one quick footnote, and then we'll go to you. I've only been to

Pakistan once in my life, it was in 2010, and I remember vividly a conversation with an ISI official, Inter-Services Intelligence, who told me that the aid we were giving then, which was the peak, was a drop in the bucket of what they needed, of what their economy really, you know, needed, or relative to the size of its economy, and now this there was a little bit of bravado in that statement, but even then they were prepared to make those kinds of arguments.

Today there's no way our aid cut could be 2 billion because the grand total is less than a billion, even if you add economic and security aid. So, I think we are talking about something between 250 million, and maybe a few hundred million, depending on where the budget winds up and, you know, we are in a continuing resolution still. But it makes you wonder if the Trump administration just took the average of 33 billion over 17 years and that became the number.

Anyway, over to you; I think I'll take three questions at a time. Please identify yourself, wait for a microphone, and please, if you could, just have one question per person. And we'll start in the front row, and then we'll go to these two rows for round number one.

QUESTIONER: Hi. My name is Mohammed from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. I had couple of questions, but I will avoid going back to the history, but talking about today. Now, as now as Bruce, you were saying, the Trump strategy is full of confusion about what to do with Pakistan, in fact, Pakistan, on the other hand, is frustrated, and is doing what it -- you know, it does usually; so where we are headed with Pakistan, with the situation in Afghanistan, with the involvement of Pakistan?

MR. O'HANLON: I've got two more questions in the sixth and seventh rows.

MR KAHN: This is Ali Kahn, from Atlantic Council. First, a brief comment on the Islamization; I wrote a book on Islam Constitution and democracy in Pakistan. I studied in 1965 that 22 scholars of highest degree presented a full Constitution; full of Islamic clauses, but it's never been accepted till then. And most of the Islamists still consider that Pakistani Constitution is un-Islamic, and the Liberalists also think that it is not Islamist. So, I don't know where we are standing, and a common Pakistani is crushed by the narratives of Islamists and Liberalists.

And I want to raise a question to both panelists, the speakers, that can you define a brief

moment in the history of Pakistan-U.S. relations where Pakistan actually stood against the national interest of the United States? Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: The gentleman here in the blue sweater.

QUESTIONER: Kumar, and I'm retired.

MR. O'HANLON: A little louder, please?

QUESTIONER: Kumar, my name is Kumar, and I'm retired. But I'm unclear on what impact China is having in shaping Pakistani policy.

MR. O'HANLON: Madiha, would you like to start with any or all of those; and then go to Bruce.

MS. AFZAL: Sure. I'll take the second question first, about the Islamization and where it stands. So, Pakistan's Constitution is not an Islamic Constitution, I never said that. It has elements within its Constitution that promote Islam, that it had in the -- that it put in place in 1956, you know, with the enabling and the repugnancy clauses.

The Repugnancy Clause essentially says that no law shall be enacted that violates the principles of Islam, and an Advisory Council -- you know, there's a Council of Islamic Ideology in Pakistan that advises the Parliament on that. So, the Parliament is a non-religious body, and an Advisory Council is advising the Parliament on that, and the Parliament need not take the advice of the Advisory Council. That's sort of the first thing.

The second thing is the Enabling Clause which says, you know -- which promotes Islamic ideals and has made the teaching of the Quran compulsory, so that sort of a promotion. But that's all that's in the main Constitution. It's Pakistan's Penal Code which has then instituted Blasphemy laws and the anti-Ahmadi laws which have been in service to Islamization, which have really pandered to an ever-narrowing definition of what it means to be a good Muslim, and which really go -- which sort of -- disable any, sort of, reasonable conversation that people can have about religion, because you can be classified as being offensive to Islam, and to the Quran or the Prophet, and thus be classified as being blasphemous.

But you are right in the sense that the Constitution, it's not a Sharia-based Constitution, and that's the argument of the militants and extremists, but it's not a Constitution that secular either. So, it lies somewhere in the middle, and there is there's definitely a tension there.

I think I'll take the China and the where are we headed questions, sort of, together. The China-Pakistan friendship is, you know, as Pakistan ex-Prime Minister sort of put it: higher than the highest mountains, and deeper than the deepest oceans. You know, Pakistan really considers China as sort of an all-weather friend.

And the Chinese influence in Pakistan has increased, you know, China's promised $57 billion in infrastructure and economic assistance to Pakistan. You know, there are conditions to that, Pakistanis don't want to talk about the conditions that that comes with, but that means that China has much more leverage over Pakistan. That also means that the U.S. can use China, if it wants, to exercise leverage over Pakistan. So actually, the direct leverage that America has over Pakistan has diminished because of China, but it can use China to, you know, and that that means sort of, that would require some diplomacy, exercising leverage over Pakistan.

In terms of where are we headed? I think that was a question here. In the near term I don't see this relationship improving anytime soon. Unless, you know, the Pakistani Government does -- the State does a complete flip and suddenly gives -- you know, takes out all its safe havens, and gets rid of Lashkar-e-Taiba.

The strategic incentives for the military to do so are simply not there at this point. And actually, in the short term, the rhetoric that has come out from, at least the President, has made the situation worse because Pakistanis are really bristling at, you know, being called deceitful, when they see, you know, that Pakistan has lost tens of thousands of civilians and security, you know, personnel in a war that they see as somehow being tied to the U.S.

So there's this real angst about the U.S., and I don't see the relationship improving anytime soon. I see any change as having to be, sort of, patient and incremental. And so the change really has to come with explaining, you know, as I mentioned earlier, where Pakistan can make changes,

you know, so don't focus just on Pakistan through the prism of Afghanistan. Pakistan's extremism problem needs to be tackled as a whole. Pakistan needs to realize that all of its hate speech, and all of its militant groups are a problem.

So, the U.S. should focus on that much more holistically, and for that to happen it should work much more in the long term, whether it's (a) you know, by talking to the Pakistani people, (b) by working with its civilian government.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Bruce?

MR. RIEDEL: I'll focus on the first questions as well. Where are we likely to be going? Under the best of circumstances, we have a very well developed strategy and a very coherent implementation of that strategy, this is a really, really hard problem, really hard. Coercive measures that we could use, there are few out there. Pakistan has many alternatives to the United States.

Engagement, as you've rightly put, we want to engage with the civilian leadership, well the civilian leadership is in a meltdown right now, largely because of the Generals, but also largely because of their own sloppy bookkeeping, and it may be worse than bookkeeping. Even under the best of circumstances, drawing those five lines, unilateral operations. The Obama administration chose as its priority in dealing with Afghanistan and Pakistan, not the war in Afghanistan, not engagement with Pakistan, but to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda.

And eight years later I think you can make a pretty convincing case that they succeeded, hasn't defeated them but disrupted and dismantled, and they did it through unilateral measures drones, drones and one commando raid. Theoretically, that strategy can be applied to the Taliban, it's much harder to do, it will have many, many more civilian casualties than it would against al-Qaeda but it's theoretically possible to do. Obama showed that in 2016 when he went after Mullah Mansoor.

It's unclear at this stage whether the administration is going to adopt any of these approaches. They're all out there; they're all in this debate that's going on in the administration. They seem to be reluctant to put their money down on any one of them. So, my prediction would be that if we have drift for a long period, then the President is going to come back to his gut instinct, and at some point

in 2018 or 2019, he's going to say to his Generals: okay guys, you told me to stay, you said you had a plan to fix this, well nothing has changed.

And in fact we'll probably have an election in Afghanistan which makes everything worse, and if one of the troika of Generals is gone, and given the turnover rate in this administration, I think it's more likely that all three will be gone, in two years rather than just one or two. Who he replaces them will be very important. And I would not be surprised if the United States, in the next three years of the Trump administration, decides the war in Afghanistan is a losing cause, it's time to cut our losses, and we are going to get out.

And the net result of that for Pakistan, is that Pakistan will fall off the -- they won't be on the back burner, they won't be in the fridge, they'll still be in the shopping cart left at Safeway, we are not going to be thinking about Pakistan, which is terribly unfortunate, because as I think we've tried to make clear this morning, this is a really, really important country, whether it's supporting the Haqqani network or not, and it is supporting the Haqqani network.

This is a really, really important country and we have to have a policy towards it, we need much more than simply an affirmation of the negative things that Pakistan is doing.

MR. O'HANLON: Just two quick points from me, and then we'll go to round two, and start here in just a moment, but I wanted to add a couple of things. First of all, as we think about our ability to wield influence with and on Pakistan, and we compare that with China, for example, or other countries, I'm still struck that I think we are beyond the period where the prospect of American aid can really get our way, if there ever were such a day.

China has got so much money and investing in so much infrastructure; however, the West, collectively, and this is where Bruce's earlier point about working through NATO is really important; working with NATO and Japan, Korea. The West, collectively, is essentially the consumer market of the world, and anybody who is trying to build a manufacturing base that is export-oriented needs the West.

China can't substitute for that, at least not yet, China is trying to reach the same consumer market with its exports, and therefore I think we have some leverage in trying to induce

Pakistan towards a relationship where we can then expedite our trade relationship and our development and economic relationships with them further, and not just Americas, but the West's writ large. So, that's one point I would make.

A somewhat related point, and it gets to your observation, Madiha, that we need to think about Pakistan through multiple prisms, and not just the security prism or the counterterrorism prism, but I think of it as one of four giant developing countries in the world, short of the true giants of China and India.

There are four countries that are sort of right around that 200 million-person population, and it's Brazil -- well Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan and Nigeria, and they're all pretty close to 200 million. These are sort of in a league of their own in terms of size and capacity, and I'm not suggesting that Pakistan can be turned into the South Asian equivalent of Brazil, for analytical purposes altogether, but I do think that to the extent we, you know, can reinforce our economics and trade vision for Pakistan by thinking of it as one of these giant developing countries, that may be a useful paradigm as well.

MR. RIEDEL: And it's the only one of the four that has nuclear weapons.

MR. O'HANLON: There is that little detail, yeah. So, let's go here to my friend in the fifth row, and then we'll work our way back -- No, I'm sorry, no, fifth row, the woman in the red here, yeah.

MS. BROWN: Amanda Brown of Brownstein Hyatt. You made a compelling case that security aid is not that critical to Pakistan, so given that, what would you anticipate Pakistan's response to cutting off the aid would be, even if it's just a token effort at putting pressure on the Haqqani network or others? And grant this administration is rather opaque, but given your observations of administrations what do you think it would take for the U.S. to reinstitute aid?

MR. O'HANLON: Okay. And then there was -- two rows back on the aisle, please?

QUESTIONER: Thank you. My name is Haddine. I just have a question, you know, with regards to your opinion regarding the incidents, like OBL incident, and then Mullah Mansoor incident, and you have suggested that those kinds of incidents actually, put kind of embarrassment for Pakistan, and they also prove to the Pakistanis, the common Pakistanis that whatever the government is taking

(inaudible) is not exactly true.

But while we are suggesting that, why can't we think of, like, instead of going towards this approach we can think of having the intelligence-sharing between the two countries, because that's how the Pakistan and U.S. were related in the past as well, and they brought a good kind of results in the past as well, so why not that approach?

MR. O'HANLON: And let's take one more in the back, next to last row, the gentleman with the yellow shirt, and then we'll go back to the panel.

QUESTIONER: Yes, Kevin Hawker, TV Producer. With regard to (inaudible) in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, two of the most important decisions we made was one to start arming the Mujahideen six months prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And the second was the raid in Abbottabad in 2011. Where any of those decisions made in collaboration with the Pakistanis?

MR. O'HANLON: Madiha, would you like to start again, please?

MS. AFZAL: Sure. Yes. Absolutely! So, I'll start with the second question, and then back to the first. So on Intelligence sharing, the U.S. is not sharing intelligence -- did not share intelligence with Pakistan in the OBL incident, and perhaps the Mullah Mansoor incident because it doesn't believe that Pakistan will use the intelligence in a constructive way, right. So, it believes that those -- that if it had shared intelligence OBL would have gotten away, and perhaps similarly for Mullah Mansoor.

So, I'm not, I mean in some sense, suggesting unilateral strikes as a policy prescription that, beyond taking out militants, actually ends up convincing the Pakistani civilian population of safe havens, is a cynical approach. The other approach could be that the U.S., you know, so sort of declassify some intelligence, and actually puts it out in the open but that, again, runs the risk of those people being taken -- the safe havens being dismantled and moved to another location, right.

So the real problem is that of trust, and I think the elements in the intelligence agencies have cooperated at point, and the Pakistan intelligence agencies have cooperated at point certainly, but they have also not cooperated at other points, and that's the fear that the U.S. has in sharing intelligence.

I think there's a question here about Pakistan's response to the cutting off of security assistance. As has been pointed out, you know, Pakistan anticipated this, it sort of built this into its actions and, really, just the cutting off of security assistance is not going to have any impact in the short term, and it could well stay cut off. I think, you know, there was a there was a piece on *PBS News Hour* that Bruce shared yesterday about how the Pakistani Generals are threatening -- are going to sort of cut off intelligence cooperation, but we don't really know what the messaging is.

Whether that messaging is coming from the entire military, or whether it's just certain elements in the military who are, sort of, acting defiant, because right now there's a political game being played in Pakistan as well. Their election is coming up this year, and Pakistan does not want to appear to be submitting to the United States. So, there's going to be pushback and defiance from that end for sure.

I would argue that another decision that the Trump administration -- or that the State Department made also on the 4th of January, which was to put Pakistan on a watch list for violations of religious freedom. That is a decision that perhaps could have more impact in the longer term, because Pakistan really cares about how it's perceived in the world, and there are violations of religious freedom there, no doubt, but the Obama administration had been hesitant to put Pakistan on even this watch list, which is kind of a halfway point, between going to a country that actually does violate, being classified as a country that does violate religious freedoms sort of heavily.

So, it's on this -- that's a list called: the countries of particular concern, and there are multiple tiers of that. But even on this, being on this halfway point signals that there are other sorts of actions that the administration may be willing to take, and that kind of action may get the Pakistanis to get their act together, because they care about the perception of the country in the West.

And, arguably, the civilians care much more about the perception of the country in the West, at least outwardly, because that, that actually also benefits them politically if Pakistan is, you know, internationally, sort of, it has a higher repute, it benefits them politically as well.

MR. O'HANLON: Bruce?

MR. RIEDEL: I'll just make a comment on the intelligence cooperation. Even in the best

of times, like the 1980s, cooperation between the CIA and the ISI was very, very troubled. There's a lack of trust on both sides, for good reason. You know, the purpose of a liaison relationship in the intelligence world is to infiltrate the other service and steal their secrets. It makes it hard to have real trust between you when everybody knows that's what the game really is all about.

Certainly, in the last decade it's been very, very bumpy. Two CIA Chiefs of Station have been outed in the Pakistani press by the ISI, which made it impossible for them to do their job. One of them returned to the United States and had a strange physical ailment that almost led to his death, which led many to believe that he may have been poisoned.

Imagine going into a meeting with your counterparts, in which the last thing you want to do is have a tea, because you think: they may be trying to kill me in this meeting. It really makes for a rocky, rocky relationship.

I do want to come back to one point you mentioned, which was the importance of bringing others into this dialogue, and I want to mention, particularly, the importance of bringing in the Gulf into this dialogue. Whatever else President Trump has done in foreign policy, he has tried very hard, and with a certain degree of success, to establish a strong relationship with both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Having done that, it seems to me here's a real opportunity for us, not that Pakistanis love Saudi Arabia, I think it's safe to say they don't, and that they don't -- resent, often, the way Saudi Arabia has treated them over the years, but the Saudis and the UAE have significant influence, they've provided significant amounts of money.

Abu Dhabi and Dubai have more or less become the capital in exile of both Pakistan and Afghanistan, Theoretically the nature of this relationship, the nature of this alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia, if we remember the rather bizarre photograph of everybody standing around a circle, a globe, was to fight terrorism.

Okay. Well, let's use it to fight terrorism, let's tell the Saudis that the place we want to fight terrorism is Pakistan's support for the Haqqani network, for Lashkar-e-Taiba, use your influence, do

something about it, at a minimum, stop these groups from raising funds in your own country.

And here's where I'll conclude. Mullah Mansoor's death was not only embarrassing for the Government of Pakistan; it was very embarrassing when his passport was found. This man dies in a drone strike but somehow his passport was found after the fact. I've always said -- it's always been a question mark in my mind. I guess Pakistani passports are extremely fire-resistant. (Laughter)

But when they examined his passport, no one denies it was his passport, he was a frequent traveler to where, Dubai. He went there 13 times in the two years preceding, and Manama, Bahrain. He wasn't going to these places because he wanted to go ice skating in Dubai, he was going there to raise money. So, if we want to use the new relationships which the President has developed, here's a here's a possibility, but we have to engage and we have to have a strategy, including a diplomatic engagement strategy which is, again, as I will say, I don't see it having been developed so far.

MR. O'HANLON: Okay. I think we've got time for one or two more rounds. So, let's see how we can do it. I'll start in the back this time, there's still a hand back there, and I'll work my way forward on this round.

MR. ALI: Hi. My name is Muhammad Ali. I teach at GW and at Hopkins currently, and I write in the Express Tribune in Pakistan. So, my question is, you know, given -- and there's been admission of this -- the de-hyphenation of India-Pak, and the re-hyphenation of Af-Pak, which was in Pakistani minds a much more myopic, you know, way of dealing with the country.

And now the post-tweet, there has been a signaling from the Pakistani Foreign Office, you know, that there are regional insecurities for Pakistan. I mean the U.S. saying that India needs to have a role in Afghanistan for its development and, you know, and be more insidious implications at least, you know, from the Pakistani perspective. And, you know, besides all these other issues mentioned vis-à-vis the Gulf States, what can be done to address those particular types of regional insecurities if it comes to, you know, more proactive engagement? So not only what's done within Pakistan, but what's done, you know, vis-à-vis that entire region?

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. And let's see. I know we've got a couple of hands here in

the front, and maybe that will be it, and I think that will be our last round, and we'll wrap up. So, we'll take these two together, please, and then to our panel for one last round.

MR. WINTERS: Steve Winters, Independent Consultant. I don't want to get too far ahead of the news cycle, but along with this report about stopping the sharing of intelligence, there was a suggestion that the Pakistani Government might expel all the Afghan refugees who are in Pakistan, which somebody said is a-million-and-a-half. What would you see is the result if something like that were to happen, I mean, the reaction of the U.S., and such?

MR. O'HANLON: And then finally, across the way.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. My name is Hakia Balsey. I'm from the Emerging Democracies Institute. I've lived in Afghanistan for a few years, and I've been to Pakistan several times. My question is, is there a way to look beyond the framing of the Islamist State, of a Muslim State, or the Muslim problem in Pakistan?

And looking also beyond the idea of (a) education is going to solve the problem, because when we saw Tunis, Tunisia, it's not like people who were uneducated that we are joining extremist groups, it was people, and continues to be the case of people stripped out of a sense of life.

Or if being and living under the multi-generational trauma, PTSD, that are basically across the world, proving that young people tend to be more inclined of joining extremist groups because they have ended up calculating their life as being pointless. So, compare that type of attitude with an attitude of 20, 30 percent of people in this country that have contributed to an administration that basically rejects, or ultimately created a new way of dealing with the world that none of the institutions, including those who have been doing polling and analysis could predict that we are in this moment. Right?

So, so there the reaction is to fight because there is lots of guns that are sold from the West to these parts of the world, while here the reaction is reject, and no cooperation with the rest of the world. So, can we maybe go a little bit beyond of the existing frames of analysis here? Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: So, why don't we start, this time with Bruce, and then give Madiha the chance to finish up the event, as is appropriate, since we are celebrating the launch of her book. And

also the first question was naturally, sort of, a security regional question, you can touched on whatever you like, and then we'll go to Madiha to finish up, and fittingly, on this last question.

MR. RIEDEL: Well, we've been talking about Pakistan and its neighbors; the history of Pakistani-Indian relations suggests that we are overdue for a crisis between India and Pakistan.

The last real big crisis we had was the Mumbai Crisis in 2008, which, by curious coincidence was about to be memorialized I think today, when Prime Minister Netanyahu and Prime Minister Modi go to the site of the murder of six American citizens by the LeT in Mumbai, to remember that event, and brought the sole survivor of that family who is now, I think, 10 years old.

We are overdue for one of these crises. The good news is that successive American administrations, going back to Bush 41, have been able to play a very useful role in trying to moderate the results of these crises and avoid escalation, escalation that could go all the way to nuclear war.

It's a little hard for me to imagine this team playing that role. I don't want to be overly negative, but our Secretary of State hasn't demonstrated a whole lot of capacity at diplomacy. He doesn't seem to be terribly interested in diplomats let alone diplomacy. Tweet storms are not the way to react to terrorist incidents, or to try to walk people back from the brink.

So, I'm worried. I'm very worried. There must be elements in Lashkar-e-Taiba who are also saying it's been more than eight years since we carried out a significant operation.

And certainly the Modi Government with its pluses and its minuses for many Pakistanis is the quintessential example of a threat to the Islamic identity of Muslims, not only in Pakistan, but Muslims in India as well.

So, I'm worried about that. This is one we should keep a close eye on, and this is one in which it would be useful to begin the process of engagement with Pakistani civilian leaders now so that we know their phone number the day that we want to call them up and say: please, I know you have a button too. Don't push your button.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Bruce. Madiha, over to you to wrap things up, please.

MS. AFZAL: Sure. I think I will tie on some of the -- on all three questions and sort of

have give one answer that ties on, or answers some aspects of those questions. So, I think to the question at the back, Pakistan will really want to be treated on its own terms, it doesn't want to be treated as a hyphen, not Af-Pak, not Pak-India.

And I think as much as any sort of engagement with Pakistan, sort of, does not even mention the two, and is really on its own terms, as much as that is possible, that would benefit the engagement with Pakistan. So, it doesn't mention India, it doesn't mention Afghanistan, even though, obviously, they play a huge role.

Very quickly on Afghan refugees; Pakistan has been -- I think that question was somewhere here -- Pakistan has been really, has kind of said that its Afghan refugees are a problem for the country in terms of tying them to extremism that is occurring in the country. So, it's a harmful narrative that has been sort of playing up for a couple of years now. And it recently extended -- it's been extending the stay, so it recently extended the stay by a month or so.

I don't really see that playing into sort of this current news cycle, but there are a lot of decisions, and this is sort of where I want to sort of end with Pakistan. Pakistan, over the last couple of years, has been sort of a maddening place to follow, because with every step forward there has been a step back.

And in terms of sort of going back to your question about, can we move beyond some of the paradigms? I think Pakistan itself is struggling, and unsuccessfully, to move beyond some of its paradigms. So, I'll give you a couple of examples. You know, the ex-Prime Minister now, Nawaz Sharif, talked about -- had been invoking when he was in power, the idea of Jinnah's Pakistan. Kind of, the idea of Pakistan going back to its progressive, and kind of positive roots, and had made some concessions to minority groups.

So, you know, you could see Christmas being celebrated all over Pakistan, there were concessions made to the very small Hindu minority that remains in Pakistan by passing a law that benefited them in terms of Hindu marriage.

He actually even made concessions to the Ahmadi minority in Pakistan, by naming a

university department after Pakistan's most-famous Ahmadi, who is a Nobel Laureate. So, there are these steps forward, where Pakistan seems to be breaking out of its paradigm, moving to a more positive sort of identity.

And then there is, with those steps forward there's also a step back. So, most recently we've seen Islamabad basically being under siege by an Islamist, a new group of fundamentalist Islamists who really showed that both the civilian government, and the military government were kind of hapless in response to these, sort of, men-wielding sticks.

And in the end Pakistan gave in -- the government signed a memo that gave into, sort of, all the demands that they'd asked for, including no change in the Blasphemy law, and more things that sort of go against the progressive direction that Pakistan is taking.

I think, you know, the real key is whether a political leadership can come forward that's not in place right now, Pakistan's current civilian government is badly battered, and new elections, elections are going to be held in 2018 and we -- any government that's going to come into power, any democratic government that's going to come into power, is going to be pretty bruised.

But if it can get its act together enough to have a real reckoning of what it takes to shed sort of the negative things -- the negative aspects of its identity and its ideology that have saddled it and pulled it back, by really reaching to kind of a more positive vision based on the economic development that is occurring there, the industrialization that can, you know, really sort of propel it forward,

I think that's the way forward. But only Pakistan can do this. I mean we can't really push them to do this on this end, the only thing we can do on this end is, you know, have the civilians on speed-dial, and basically have them be our primary partner.

But they are the ones who need to undertake those changes.

MR. O'HANLON: Fantastic! Thank you all for being here. Thanks to you Bruce.

Thank you, and congratulations, Madiha. (Applause)

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