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Iraq Index

Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq

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Updated July 11, 2005

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
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22 March-9 April, 2004: CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, Nationwide Poll of Iraq	
9-28 February, 2004: Oxford Research International Study of Iraqi Public Opinion	
State Department Study & Gallup Poll (2003)	

SECURITY INDICATORS


U.S. TROOP FATALITIES SINCE MARCH 19, 20031



Total from March 19, 2003 (start of major combat operations) through July 10, 2005:

Fatalities (all kinds): 1,755
Fatalities in hostile incidents: 1,351
Fatalities in non-hostile incidents: 404

MOST FREQUENT CAUSES OF U.S. MILITARY FATALITIES IN IRAQ SINCE MAY 1, 20032




Through July 6, 2005

NOTE ON U.S. TROOP FATALITIES SINCE MARCH 19, 2003 TABLE:

The daily Department of Defense casualty reports that we use for our monthly estimates on U.S troops killed doesn't make entirely clear when in a 24 hour period casualties were incurred. Since the reports are published 11AM daily, there is the possibility that our numbers for January 2005 and onwards are slightly off due to uncertainties about whether casualties occurred on the first and last day of each month. We have chosen to interpret the numbers in the casualty report as representing fatalities that occurred throughout the previous day. Total fatalities include four civilians working for the Department of Defense.

TOP FIVE LOCATIONS OF FREQUENT U.S. MILITARY FATALITIES SINCE MAY 1, 2003³



Through July 5, 2005: 1,143 (71 % of total)


AMERICAN MILITARY FATALITIES BY CATEGORY MARCH 19, 2003 – JUNE 25, 2005⁴

Category	Total fatalities as of June 25, 2005: 1,731			
Gender	Male: 1,692			
	Female: 39			
Age	Younger than 22: 516			
	22-24: 406			
	25-30: 426			
	31-35: 170			
	Older than 35: 213			
Component	Active: 1,352			
	Reserve: 149			
	National Guard: 230			
Military service	Army: 1,161			
	Marines: 517			
	Navy: 34			
	Air Force: 19			
Officers/Enlisted	Officer: 188			
	E5-E9: 533			
	E1-E4: 1,010			
Race/Ethnicity	American Indian or Alaska Native: 15			
	Asian: 32			
	Black or African American: 185			
	Hispanic or Latino: 195			
	Multiple races, pending or unknown: 22			
	Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander: 17			
1	White: 1,265			

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF AMERICAN MILITARY FATALTIES MARCH 19, 2003-MARCH 20, 2005⁵


Geographic distribution of Americans military killed
March 19, 2003- March 20, 2005
26.2% were from cities and large towns in the U.S.
40.5% were from suburbs in the U.S.
33.3% were from rural areas in the U.S.

U.S. TROOPS WOUNDED IN ACTION SINCE MARCH 2003⁶




<u>Total from March 19, 2003 through July 6, 2005</u>: 13,336 The daily Department of Defense casualty reports that we use for our monthly estimates on U.S troops killed does not make it entirely clear when in a 24 hour period casualties were incurred. Since the reports are published at 10AM daily, there is possibility that our numbers for January 2005 and onwards are slightly off due to uncertainties about whether casualties occurred on the first or the last of each month.

BRITISH MILITARY FATALITIES SINCE MARCH 19, 2003⁷




Total through July 10, 2005: 90

NON-U.S. & U.K. COALITION MILITARY FATALITIES SINCE MARCH 19, 2003⁸




Total through July 10, 2005: 97

NON-U.S. COALITION TROOP FATALITIES BY COUNTRY SINCE MARCH 19, 20039



Total through July 10, 2005: 189

IRAQI MILITARY & POLICE KILLED MONTHLY¹⁰



<u>Total June 2003 through July 10, 2005: 2,787</u> 1,300 <u>Iraqi military and police were killed between June 2003 and January 4, 2005</u> according to Iraqi Minister of Interior Falah Hasan Al-Naqib. "Iraqi Officers, Police Members Killed so Far Total 1,300," Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) January 4, 2005.

IRAQI INTERPRETERS WORKING FOR COALITION FORCES KILLED


Total number of Iraqi
interpreters killed
January, 2004 -
September 18, 2004
52

ESTIMATES OF IRAOI CIVILIANS KILLED SINCE THE START OF THE WAR

Source	Estimate	
Iraq Body Count	22,800 – 25,800 as of June 28, 2005 ¹¹	
Statement by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw	>10,000 as of February, 2004	
Shaik Omar Clinic, Baghdad	10,363 as of September 8, 2004	
	(in Baghdad and surrounding towns alone)	
Amnesty International (London)	>10,000 as of September 8, 2004	
The Human Rights Organization, Iraq	>30,000 as of September 8. 2004	
Iraq Index	Not including deaths from crime as of May 31, 2005:	
(assume 5,630-10,000 Iraqi civilians killed from	12,700-23,000	
March 19, 2003 - April 30, 2003	Including deaths from crime as of May 31, 2005:	
as reported in detail by Iraq Body Count)	29,700-60,800	

IRAQI CIVILIANS KILLED AS A RESULT OF ACTS OF WAR SINCE MAY 1, 2003


--- Estimate based on Iraq Body Count data --- Estimate based on Iraqi Interior Ministry data



Total May 2003 through June 28, 2005: 7,122-12,758


These numbers do not include Iraqi civilians killed during major combat operations March 19, 2003-April 30, 2003.

CAR BOMBS IN IRAQ (LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL)¹²




NOTE ON IRAQI CIVILIANS KILLED AS A RESULT OF ACTS OF WAR TABLE: Our lower bound for each month is based on detailed reports from Iraq Body Counts.org. Because the organization's reports of Iraqi civilian fatalities are not necessarily reported in the order they occur, the estimated number of civilians killed up until a certain date may change as more cases are reported. We recognize that these estimates are most probably lower than the actual number since many separate incidents go unreported or unnoticed. We are doing our utmost not to include suspected Iraqi insurgents killed deliberately by U.S. forces or Iraqi civilians killed as a result of crime. (Iraqi security forces are included in the lower bound.) Our higher bound for each month is simply 1.75 times the lower bound. This is a rough estimate, and reflects the fact that the estimates for civilian casualties from the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior were 75 percent higher than those of our Iraq Body Count based estimate over the December 2003 – May 2005 period. Ellen Knickmeyer, "Iraq Puts Civilian Toll at 12,000." Washington Post, June 3, 2005.

MULTIPLE CASUALTY BOMBINGS¹³



Total as of July 10, 2005: 312 (whereof 185 suicide bombings)

KILLED AND WOUNDED IN MULTIPLE CASUALTY BOMBINGS¹⁴




Total as of July 10, 2005:

Killed: 3,083 Wounded: 6,896

NOTE: Attacks that kill more than 2 people are considered multiple casualty bombings. Roadside bombs (improvised explosive devices) are not included in the tally of multiple casualty bombings.

CRIME-RELATED DEATHS IN BAGDHAD SINCE MAY, 2003¹⁵




NOTE ON CRIME RELATED DEATHS IN BAGHDAD: Estimates for each month are typically based on the number of bodies brought to the Baghdad morgue with mortal gunshot wounds. We recognize that our estimates could be too high as a result of that some of the gunshot victims could be insurgents killed intentionally by U.S. military, but also that they could be too low since many murder victims are never taken to the morgue, but buried quickly and privately and therefore never recorded in official tallies. The homicide rate is calculated based on an estimated population of 5.6 million people in Baghdad.

NOTE ON CRIME RELATED DEATHS IN BAGHDAD: Interpol lists the following nationwide numbers per 100,000 citizens for countries in the region: Libya 2.08, Jordan 6.33, Lebanon 3.38, Saudi Arabia, 0.71. However, Interpol notes that these [nationwide] statistics cannot be used as a basis for comparison between different countries. This is partly because "police statistics reflect reported crimes, but this only represents a fraction of the real level. The volume of crimes not reported to the police may depend on the actions, policies and perceptions of the police. These can vary with time, as well as from country to country." Because of the inherent difficulty in interpreting and comparing international murder rates, all such statistics - including those stated in the table above - should be interpreted guardedly.

CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS WORKING ON U.S. CONTRACTS KILLED IN IRAQ

I	Civilians working on U.S. contracts in Iraq (both military and		
reconstruction) killed			
	As of December 31, 2004	232	

NON-IRAQI CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS KILLED IN IRAQ16




Total as of July 1, 2005: 244

NOTE ON NON-IRAQI CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS KILLED IN IRAQ: This list is incomplete and does not include an additional 44 contractors that were killed up until December 31, 2004. Since we do not know during which month these deaths occurred they are not represented in the graph above.


As of March, 2005, there were more than 20,000 foreign (non-Iraqi) private military contractors in Iraq. 6,000 of these are in armed tactical roles. Peter W. Singer, "Outsourcing War," *Foreign Affairs*, March 2005.

NON-IRAQI CIVILIANS (INCLUDING CONTRACTORS) KILLED SINCE MAY, 2003¹⁷



Total through July 10, 2005: 291

<u>COUNTRIES WITH MORE THAN 10 CIVILIANS KILLED</u> <u>IN IRAQ SINCE MAY 1, 2003 (EXCLUDING IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES)¹⁸</u>




Through July 10, 2005

FOREIGN NATIONALS KIDNAPPED IN IRAQ SINCE MAY 2003

Month	Number of foreigners	Status
	kidnapped	
Date of capture unknown	14	11 unknown, 3 killed
May 2003 - October 2003	0	
November	1	1 released
December 2003 -March 2004	0	
April	43	3 killed, 30 released, 2 still held, 1 escaped, 7 status
3.6		unknown
May	2	1 killed, 1 still held
June	3	2 killed, 1 escaped
July	26	3 killed, 13 released, 6 still held, 1 rescued, 1 escaped, 2
		unknown
August	30	15 killed, 15 released
September	31	4 killed, 4 released, 22 still held, 1 rescued
October	7	3 killed, 2 released, 2 still held
November	5	1 killed, 3 still held, 1 released
December	2	2 still held
January 2005	13	10 released, 3 still held
February	10	2 still held, 8 released
March	5	2 still held, 3 released
April	7	6 released, 1 still held
May	4	2 still held, 1 rescued, 1 killed
June	0	
July	1 ¹⁹	1 killed
Total		37 killed, 93 released, 48 still held, 3 escaped, 3 rescued, 20
through July 7, 2005	204	status unknown

NOTE ON FOREIGN NATIONALS KIDNAPPED IN IRAQ TABLE: The Iraqi Interior Ministry estimates that 5,000 Iraqis were kidnapped between December 2003 and late April 2005. Haifa Zangana, "Blair Made a Pledge to Iraqis Once," *The Guardian*, April 22, 2005.

TOTAL NUMBER OF INSURGENTS DETAINED OR KILLED²⁰



NOTE ON TOTAL NUMBER OF INSURGENTS DETAINED OR KILLED TABLE: The estimate of suspected insurgents killed or detained since May 2003 is a very rough one. The substantial increase in number of people detained or killed in November 2003 and onwards may not imply a huge increase in people detained or killed but rather that the data improved starting that month.

IRAOI PRISON POPULATION

INACTI RIBONT OF CLATTON	
Peak prison population in 2003	10,000
June 2004	5,435 ²¹
July 2004	5,700
	(of which 90 are foreign nationals)
September 2004	5,500
	(whereof 2 are women, 65-70 are juveniles
	and 130-140 are foreign nationals)
October 2004	4,300
November 2004	8,300
January 2005	7,837 ²²
June 2005	$10,783^{23}$

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF INSURGENCY NATIONWIDE

Month	Estimated strength of insurgency nationwide
November	5,000
December	5,000
January 2004	3, 000-5,000
February	N/A
March	N/A
April	5,000
May	15,000
June	15,000
July	20,000
August	20,000
September	20,000
October	20,000
November	20,000
December	"more than 20,000"
January	18,000
February	18,000
March	16,000
April	16,000
May	$16,000^{24}$
June	15,000-20,000 ²⁵

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN THE INSURGENCY

January 2004	300-500
July 2004	"Low hundreds"
September 2004	"Less than 1000"
November 2004	3,000
January 2005	"Fewer than 1,000"
February 2005	"Fewer than 1,000"
May 2005	1,000
June 2005	750-1,000 ²⁶

NOTE ON IRAQI PRISON POPULATION TABLE:

The detainee prison population as of January 21, 2005 only included 224 foreign fighters. The January, 2005 entry does not include 1,200 suspected insurgents being detained at smaller facilities at military brigade and division level. About 75% of those individuals are typically freed after a few days. **NOTE ON IRAQI PRISON POPULATION TABLE:** Military official claim that the duration of processing those arresting and releasing those who are innocent has been decreased to an average of 60 days from between 120 – 140 days. Only 25 individuals of those released have been recaptured for being suspected of conducting attacks against American forces. Dexter Filkins, "General Says Less Coercion of Captives Yields Better Data," *New York Times*, September 7, 2004.

NOTE ON ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF IRAQI INSURGENCY NATION-WIDE TABLE:

U.S. military believe foreign fighters are responsible for the majority of suicide bombings in Iraq. Independent researchers estimate that 44-70% of suicide bombers in Iraq are Saudi citizens. Susan B. Glasser, "'Martyrs in Iraq Mostly Saudis," *Washington Post*, May 15, 2005. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, said on December 16, 2004 that Saddam loyalist, and not foreign fighters remain the main threat in Iraq. "Baathists Main Threat," *Bahrain Times*, December 16, 2004.

COALITION TROOP STRENGTH IN IRAO SINCE MAY

Month		U.S. troops in Iraq		Other coalition troops in Iraq	Total international troop
	Active	Reserve (includes National Guard)	Total	(excluding U.S. & Iraqi forces)	strength in Iraq
May 2003	~142,000	~8,000	150,000	23,000	173,000
June	~126,000	~24,000	150,000	21,000	171,000
July	~124,000	~25,000	149,000	21,000	170,000
August	~114,000	~25,000	139,00	22,000	161,000
September	~103,000	~29,000	132,000	24,000	156,000
October	~102,000	~29,000	131,000	25,000	156,000
November	N/A	N/A	123,000	23,900	146,900
December	~85,400	~36,600	122,000	24,500	146,500
January 2004	N/A	N/A	122,000	25,600	147,600
February	N/A	N/A	115,000	24,000	139,000
March	N/A	N/A	130,000	24,000	154,000
April	N/A	N/A	137,000	25,000	162,000
May	N/A	N/A	138,000	24,000	162,000
June	89,700	48,300	138,000	23,000	161,000
July	N/A	N/A	140,000	22,000	162,000
August	84,000	56,000	140,000	23,700	163,700
September	82,800	55,200	138,000	24,600	162,600
October	82,800	55,200	138,000	24,000	162,000
November	82,800	55,200	138,000	24,000	162,000
December	82,800	55,200	148,000	25,000	173,000
January 2005	90,000	60,000	150,000	25,300	175,300
February	N/A	N/A	155,000	25,000	180,000
March	N/A	N/A	150,000	22,000	172,000
April	N/A	N/A	142,000	22,000	164,000
May	N/A	N/A	138,000	23,000	161,000
June	N/A	N/A	135,000 ²⁷	23,000 ²⁸	158,000
July	N/A	N/A	135,000	23,000 ²⁹	158,000

N/A= Not available

NOTE ON COALITION TROOP STRENGTH IN IRAQ SINCE MAY TABLE: In late 2003 the Department of Defense announced that it planned to draw down the number of American troops in Iraq to 105,000 by May 2004. "GAO-04-902R Rebuilding Iraq," June 2004, General Accounting Office. NOTE ON COALITION TROOP STRENGTH IN IRAQ SINCE MAY TABLE: All numbers are end of month estimates or latest data available for the current month.

TOP TEN NON-U.S. COALITION CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN IRAQ

Coalition country	Military personnel in Iraq ³⁰			
United Kingdom	8,000			
South Korea	3,600			
Italy	3,000			
Poland	1,700			
Ukraine	1,650			
Georgia	850			
Romania	800			
Japan	550			
Denmark	530			
Bulgaria	400			
Remaining 17 coalition countries	1,920			

As of May 6 - June 15, 2005


"HIGH-VALUE" INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

Increase in number of "high-value"	September 2004 compared to January 2004			
intelligence reports drawn from interrogations	50%			

INSURGENT ATTACKS WITH REMOTELY DETONATED BOMBS

Time	Average number of bomb attacks	Bomb attacks injuring or killing U.S. troops
April 2004	25/day	90%
End of February 2005	30/day	25%


ATTACKS ON IRAQI OIL AND GAS PIPELINES, INSTALLATIONS & PERSONNEL31



Total through July 10, 2005: 245


NOTE ON TOP TEN NON-U.S. COALITION CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN IRAQ TABLE: In addition to the United States, 27 countries have troops in Iraq as of June 8, 2005: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. "Iraq Weekly Status Report," *Department of State*, June 15, 2005.

VIOLENT INCIDENTS AGAINST THE COALITION AND ITS PARTNERS AS REPORTED BY THE G.A.O.




NOTE: Exact numbers for each month are not available.

$\underline{\textbf{NUMBER OF DAILY ATTACKS BY INSURGENTS}}^{32}$



NOTE: Numbers for June 2003 are incomplete.

AMERICAN MILITARY HELICOPTERS DOWNED IN IRAQ33



Total through June 27, 2005: 37

COALITION FORCES ABILITY TO FIND AND DISARM IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDs)

Time	Percentage of IEDs found
	and disarmed ³⁴
December 2003	40%
December 2004	50%
April 2005	40% ³⁵

NOTE ON AMERICAN MILITARY HELICOPTERS DOWNED IN IRAQ TABLE: Of the 37 helicopters downed in Iraq since May 2003, at least 20 were downed by enemy fire.

PERCENTAGE OF THE 3RD INFANTRY DIVISION (3RD ID) ON THEIR SECOND TOUR IN IRAQ

Percentage of the 3rd ID on their second				
tour in Iraq since March 2003				
50%				
as of February 26, 2005				

MILITARY PERSONNEL DEPLOYEDTO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN SEPTEMBER 2001-JANUARY 2005

Service	Personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan September 2001-January 2005	Percentage of total deployed more than once September 2001-January 2005
Army	Active Duty: 307,019	Active Duty: 37%
-	National Guard: 120,054	National Guard: 30%
	Reserve: 74,104	Reserve: 34%
Air Force	Active Duty: 160,508	Active Duty: 33%
	National Guard: 42,807	National Guard: 47%
	Reserve: 24,038	Reserve: 49%
Marines	Active Duty: 104,244	Active Duty: 28%
	Reserve: 15,938	Reserve: 12%
Navy	Active Duty: 185,538	Active Duty: 26%
·	Reserve: 12,837	Reserve: 21%
Coast	Active Duty: 1,602	Active Duty: 12%
Guard	Reserve: 195	Reserve: 1%

NOTE ON PERCENTAGE OF THE 3RD ID ON THEIR SECOND TOUR IN IRAQ SINCE MARCH, 2003: 10,000 of the roughly 20,000 soldiers in the 3rd ID took part in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the immediate occupation thereafter. Rowan Scarborough, "Army's 3rd Division Returns to Iraq, Washington Times, February 26, 2005.

NOTE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN TABLE: The average number of American troops deployed to Afghanistan was 6,000 in 2002, 9,800 in 2003, 18,500 in 2004, and 17,300 up until February 2005.

BAATHIST & OTHER RESISTANCE LEADERS STILL AT LARGE

Month	Iraqi 55 most wanted plus an additional
	25 ex- Baath party leaders still at large
April	65
May	53
June	48
July	43
August	41
September	40
October	40
November	40
December	38
January 2004	37
February	35
March	34
April –	34
December 2004	
January 2005	32
February	31
March- May	31
June	30^{36}

SIZE OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES ON DUTY

	OI HEIQI BECCHIII	Y FURCES ON DUTY			
Month	General police capabilities	National Guard	Iraqi armed Forces	Border patrol	Total Iraqi security forces
May	7,000-9,000	N/A	0	N/A	7,000-9,000
June	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A
July	30,000	N/A	0	N/A	30,000
August	34,000	670	0	2,500	37,170
September	37,000	2,500	0	4,700	44,200
October	55,000	4,700	700	6,400	66,800
November	68,800	12,700	900	12,400	94,800
December	71,600	15,200	400	12,900	99,600
January	66,900	19,800	1,100	21,000	108,800
February	77,100	27,900	2,000	18,000	125,000
March	75,000 22% partially or fully trained	33,560 100% partially or fully trained	3,005 100% partially or fully trained	23,426 39% partially or fully trained	134,991 65% partially or fully trained
April	80,016 22% partially or fully trained	23,123 partially or fully trained	2,367 partially or fully trained	18,747 49% partially or fully trained	124,253 68% partially or fully trained
May	90,803 28% partially or fully trained	24,873 partially or fully trained	3,939 partially or fully trained	16,097 57% partially or fully trained	135,712 71% partially or fully trained
June	83,789 32% partially or fully trained	36,229 partially or fully trained	7,116 partially or fully trained	18,183 partially or fully trained	145,317 83% partially or fully trained
July	31,300 partially or fully trained	36,229 partially or fully trained	7,700 partially or fully trained	19,859 partially or fully trained	95,088
August	32,942 partially or fully trained	37,925 partially or fully trained	6,288 partially or fully trained	14,313 partially or fully trained	91,468
September	40,152 partially or fully trained	36,496 partially or fully trained	7,747 partially or fully trained	14,313 partially or fully trained	98,708
October	44,728 partially or fully trained	41,261 partially or fully trained	6,861 partially or fully trained	18,148 partially or fully trained	110,998
November	49,455 partially or fully trained	43,445 partially or fully trained	6,013 partially or fully trained	14,593 partially or fully trained	113,506
December	53,571 partially or fully trained	40,115 partially or fully trained	14,500 partially or fully trained	14,267 partially or fully trained	118,009
January 2005	58,964 partially or fully trained	36,827 partially or fully trained	14,796 partially or fully trained	14,786 partially or fully trained	125,373
February	82,072 "trained & equipped" Unauthorized absences personnel <u>are</u> included	59,1 "opera Unauthorized absences po	tional"	N/A	141,761 Trained and effective: General Myers: 40,000
March	84,327 "trained & equipped" Unauthorized absences personnel <u>are</u> included	67,; "operal Unauthorized absences pe	tional"	N/A	Senator Biden: 4,000 -18,000 151,618 ³⁷ Trained and effective: Lt. Gen Petraeus: 50,000 "off-the-cuff"

April	86,982	72,511		N/A	159,493
	"trained & equipped"	"operational"			
	Unauthorized absences	Unauthorized absences person	inel are <u>no</u> t included		
	personnel <u>are</u> included				
May	91, 256	76,971		N/A	168,227
	"trained & equipped"	"operation	al"		·
	Unauthorized absences	Unauthorized absences person	inel are <u>no</u> t included		
	personnel <u>are</u> included	_			
June	92,883 ³⁸	75,791 ³⁹		N/A	168,674
	"trained & equipped"	"operational"			
	Unauthorized absences	Unauthorized absences personnel are not included			
	personnel <u>are</u> included	· —			
July	94,25640	77,65741		N/A	171,913 ⁴²
	"trained & equipped"	Unauthorized absences person	inel are <u>no</u> t included		
	Unauthorized absences	_			
	personnel <u>are</u> included				
Stated	142, 190	61,904	36,635	29,360	272,566
goal	(revised up from 89,369	(Revised up from 41,088 in	(Revised up from		
	in June 2004)	June 2004)	35,000 in June 2004)		

N/A= Not available

IRREGULAR IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

February, 2005	"As many as 15,000 soldiers"
June, 2005	100,000 (peshmerga only) ⁴³

IRAQI POLICE EQUIPMENT

<u>IRAQI POLICE E</u>	JUIPMEN	<u> </u>							
Iraqi police component	Status of equipment available as of September 13, 2004								
	Weapons		Vehicles		Communications		Body armor		
component	On hand	Required	On hand	Required	On hand	Required	On hand	Required	
Iraqi police service	93,093	213,185	5,923	22,395	13,245	67,565	42,941	135,000	
Civil Intervention Force	0	11,490	0	1,002	0	10,240	0	4,800	
Emergency Response Unit	500	1,020	0	58	300	352	270	270	
Total as percentage of requirement	41%		25%		17%		31%		

BORDER PATROL EQUIPMENT

DONDERTATIO	E EQUIT	11111						
	Status of equipment available as of September 13, 2004							
Department of Border Enforcement	Weapons		Vehicles		Communications		Body armor	
	On hand	Required	On hand	Required	On hand	Required	On hand	Required
	16,442	42,601	1,798	8,271	1,627	8,271	4,000	28,626
Total as percentage of requirement	39	0%	22%		20%		14%	

NOTE: The discrepancy between equipment needed and equipment on hand might not be as severe as these numbers suggest, considering that equipment requirements are based on numbers of security personnel needed, and not the number of security personnel currently serving.

ECONOMIC & QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS

FUEL

				Fuel supplies available			
	Millions of barr		Millions of liters/day			Tons/day	Overall fuel
Time	Crude oil production	Crude oil export	Diesel (Prod. & Imp.)	Kerosene (Prod. & Imp.)	Gasoline/Benzene (Prod. & Imp)	Liquid Petroleum Gas (Prod. & Imp.)	supplies as percentage of goal during that month
Estimated prewar	2.5 (prewar peak)	1.7- 2.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	(the goals have shifted)
level							10.01
May 2003	0.3	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	10 %
June	0.675	0.2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	23%
July	0.925	0.322	6.5	4.75	13.5	1,880	44%
August	1.445	0.646	10.25	6.2	14.0	2,530	57%
September	1.7225	0.983	14.25	6.9	17.3	3,030	70%
October	2.055	1.149	14.75	9.6	16.35	3,700	78%
November	2.1	1.524	13.14	13.3	11.792	3,610	76%
December	2.30	1.541	12.29	9.4	12.9	3,460	72%
January 2004	2.440	1.537	13.91	11.3	13.32	3,445	78%
February	2.276	1.382	15.21	13.05	16.65	4,670	88%
March	2.435	1.825	15.03	17.28	17.19	5,010	92%
April	2.384	1.804	22.75	4.46	19.3	3,607	79%
May	1.887	1.380	22.92	4.005	18.07	3,264	73%
June	2.295	1.148	16.47	4.9	22	3,086	75%
July	2.2	1.406	17.95	5.75	22.3	3,820	80%
August	2.112	1.114	16	4.2	15.1	3,417	84%
September	2.514	1.703	16.35	6.35	14.6	2,707	72%
October	2.46	1.542	16.15	7.95	18.6	3,044	80%
November	1.95	1.320	16.5	7.7	17.9	3,324	77%
December	2.16	1.520	18.3	10.5	17.6	4,222	88%
January 2005	2.10	1.367	12.7	6.7	20.65	5,017	75%
February	2.10	1.431	15.9	8.55	21.2	5,003	84%
March	2.09	1.394 57	19.7	8.05	20.3	4,894	93%
April	2.14	1.398 58	18.3	7.6	23.7	5,219	97%
May	2.1	1.308	22.2	4.4	22.5	5,030	93%
June	2.17^{60}	1.377	18.962	6.25 ⁶³	18.3 ⁶⁴	5,137 ⁶⁵	97%
July	2.06^{66}	1.484 67	19.6 ⁶⁸	6.369	20.2 ⁷⁰	3,683 ⁷¹	94%
Stated Goal:	2.5 revised down in February 2005 from 2.8- 3.0	N/A	18 revised up in March 2005 from 17.5 in February	5.4 revised down in May 2005 from 6.8 in April	18 revised down from 19.1 in September 2004	4,300 revised up from 4,000 in September	We assume that the maximum supplies as percentage of goal for each category can only reach 100%

N/A= Not available

NOTE: Kerosene imports began 5 October, 2003. All previous months cover only production **NOTE:** LPG= Liquified Petroleum Gas

OIL REVENUE FROM EXPORTS

Time	Oil revenue (\$ billions)
June 2003	0.2
July	0.36
August	0.44
September	0.73
October	0.89
November	1.21
December	1.26
January 2004	1.26
February	1.10
March	1.61
April	1.50
May	1.36
June	1.28
July	1.40
August	1.24
September	1.75
October	1.99
November	1.25
December	1.44
January 2005	1.49
February	1.34
March	1.55
April	1.89
May	1.58
June	1.93
July	0.22
Total as of	32.24
July 6, 2005	

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ACCORDING TO THE WORLD BANK 72

Time	Gross domestic product (\$ billions)		
2002	18.4		
2003	12.1		
(estimate)			
2004	21.1		
(projection)			

	Average amount of electricity generated (Megawatts)		Average hours of electricity/day	Average of mega watt hours	
Time	Nation-wide	Baghdad	nationwide	(MWH)	
Estimated prewar level	3,958	2,500	N/A	95,000	
May 2003	500	300	N/A	N/A	
June	3,193	707	N/A	N/A	
July	3,236	1,082	N/A	N/A	
Aug.	3,263	1,283	N/A	72,435	
Sept.	3,543	1,229	N/A	75,000	
Oct.	3,948	N/A	N/A	79,000	
November	3,582	N/A	N/A	70,000	
December	3,427	N/A	N/A	72,000	
January 2004	3,758	N/A	N/A	79,000	
February	4,125	1,307	13	90,000	
March	4,040	1,192	16	86,000	
April	3,823	1,021	15	78,000	
May	3,902	1,053	11	80,000	
June	4,293	1,198	10	93,500	
July	4,584	N/A	10	100,300	
August	4,707	1,440	13	109,900	
September	4,467	1,485	13	107,200	
October	4,074	1,280	13	99,306	
November	3,199	845	13	76,550	
December	3,380	N/A	N/A	81,114	
January 2005	3,289	985	9	78,925	
February	3,611	1,180	8.5	86,675	
March	3,627	994	11.8	87,051	
April	3,390	854	9	81,350	
May	3,712	N/A	8.4	89,088	
June	4,153 ⁷³	N/A	9.4 ⁷⁴	102,525 ⁷⁵	
July	4,583 ⁷⁶	N/A	12 ⁷⁷	$110,\!000^{78}$	
Stated Goal:	6,000 to have been reached by July 1, 2004	2,500 to have been reached by October 2003	N/A	120,000	

N/A = Not available

NATIONWIDE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE SINCE MAY, 2003

	UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
Month	Unemployment rate
	nation-wide
May 2003	N/A
June	50 - 60%
July	N/A
August	50-60%
September	N/A
October	40 - 50%
November	N/A
December	45-55%
January 2004	30 - 45%
February	30 - 45%
March	30- 45%
April	30 - 45%
May	30-45%
June	30-40%
July	30-40%
August	30-40%
September	30-40%
October	30-40%
November	30-40%
December	28-40%
January 2005	27-40% ⁷⁹
February	27-40%
March	27-40%
April	27-40%
May	27-40%
	•

N/A= Not available

INFLATION

Time	Inflation
July 2004	0.6%
August	3.6%
September	5.4%
October	8.5%
November	5.4%
December	3.3%
January 2005	13.9%
February	11.4%

TRAINED JUDGES80

Time	Number of trained judges
May 2003	0
June 2004	175
May 2005	351

NOTE ON NATIONWIDE UNEMPLOYMENT TABLE: Estimates of Iraq's unemployment rate varies, but we estimate it to be between 28-40%. The CPA has referred to a 25% unemployment rate, the Iraqi Ministry of Planning mentioned a 30% unemployment rate, whereas the Iraqi Ministry of Social Affairs claims it to be 48%. "Reconstructing Iraq," *International Crisis Group*, Report, September 2, 2004, p. 16, footnote 157. There is an inherent difficulty in measuring the Iraqi rate of unemployment over time. Because recent estimates are likely to be more accurate than older ones, but also higher, this means that despite an improvement in the economic situation nationwide, the numbers give the impression that it is getting worse. Considering the increase in entrepreneurial activity after the end of the war, we have for the purposes of this database assumed that there has been an improvement in unemployment levels, and hence weighted information supporting such a conclusion heavier than contradictory data reports.

TELEPHONE SUBSCRIBERS

Time	Telephone subscribers
Estimated prewar level	833,000
(landlines only, no cellular network)	355,000
September	850,000
December	600,000
January 2004	600,000
February	900,000
March	984,225
April	1,095,000
May	1,220,000
June	1,200,000
July	N/A
August	1,463,148
September	1,579,457
October	1,753,000
November	2,135,000
December	2,152,000
January 2005	2,449,139
February	2,569,110
March	2,982,115
April	3,172,771
May	3,172,771
June	3,801,822 ⁸¹
Previous goal (Jan. 2004)	1,100,000

INTERNET SUBSCRIBERS

INTERNET SUBSCRIDERS	
Time	Internet subscribers
	(does not include unregulated users of Internet cafes)
Estimated prewar level	4,500
September 2003	4,900
January-April 2004	N/A
May	54,000
June	59,000
July	73,000
August	87,000
September	95,000
October	102,978
November	110,000
January 2005	124,293
March 2005	147,076

MEDIA⁸²

Time	Commercial TV stations	Commercial radio stations	Independent newspapers and magazines
Prewar	0	0	0
May 2003	0	0	8
June 2004	13	74	150
January 2005	10	51	100
March 2005	N/A	N/A	200
April 2005	24	80	170
May 2005	23	80	170

WHEAT PRODUCTION

Time	Tons
	(in millions)
Prewar	1.9
2003	2.6
2004	N/A

N/A=Not available

27


WORLD BANK ESTIMATE OF IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION NEEDS

Category	N	Millions of dollars		
	2004	2005-2007	Total	
Government Institutions, Civil Society, Rule of Law & Media	99	288	387	
Health, Education, Employment Creation	1,880	5,310	7,190	
Infrastructure	5,836	18,368	24,204	
Agriculture and Water Resources	1,230	1,797	3,027	
Private Sector Development	176	601	777	
Mine Action	80	154	234	
Total	9,301	26,518	35,819	

C.P.A.-ESTIMATED NEEDS IN SECTORS NOT COVERED BY THE UN/WORLD BANK ASSESSMENT

Category	N	Millions of dollars		
	2004	2005-2007	Total	
Security and Police	5,000	-	5,000	
Oil	2,000	6,000	8,000	
Culture	140	800	940	
Environment	500	3,000	3,500	
Human rights	200	600	800	
Foreign Affairs	100	100	200	
Religious Affairs	100	200	300	
Science and Technology	100	300	400	
Youth and Sport	100	200	300	
Total of CPA estimates	8,240	11,200	19,440	


AMERICAN AID APPROPRIATED, OBLIGATED AND DISBURSED TOWARDS THE IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND (IRRF I & II) 83



NOTE: An 'appropriation' is defined as a plan, approved by the Office of Management and Budget, to spend resources provided by law. *Quarterly Update to Congress: 2207 Report*, October 2004. An 'obligation' can be defined as "a definite commitment which creates a legal liability of the Government for the payment of appropriated funds for goods and services ordered or received." GAO/OGC-91-5: *Principles of Federal Appropriations Law*, Office of the General Council, July 1991. A 'disbursement' is an actual payment (check goes out the door) for goods/services received. *GAO-04-902 R: Rebuilding Iraq*, General Accounting Office, June 2004.

NON-AMERICAN AID PLEDGED AND DISBURSED TOWARDS IRAQI RECONSTRUCTION⁸⁴





PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT

Year	Children enrolled in primary school	
2000	3.6 million	
2003/2004	4.3 million	

COMMERCIAL AIRPORT DEPARTURES NATIONWIDE

Time	Commercial aircraft departures nationwide (per day)	
Prewar	2-3	
January 2004	40	
April	20	
May	20	
June	45	
July	45	
August	45	
September	45	
October 2004	45	
Stated goal for July 2004	200-300	

HEPATITIS OUTBREAKS

Rate of incidents (all types of hepatitis)		
2002=100		
2003=170		
2004=200		

RELATIVE AMOUNT OF CAR TRAFFIC

Relative amount of car traffic (Prewar level 1.0)		
July 2003	1.0	
January 2004	2.0	
July 2004	3.0	
January 2005	5.0	

TYPICAL LENGTH OF GASOLINE LINES


Typical Length of Gasoline Line		
(miles)		
July 2003 0.1		
January 2004	0.5	
July 2004	1.0	
January 2005	1.0	

NOTE ON HEPATITIS OUTBREAK TABLE: The hepatitis level in 2002 is defined as 100.


POLLING/POLITICS

MAY 27, 2004 - APRIL 20, 2005: INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE


QUESTION TO IRAQIS: IS IRAQ MOVING IN THE RIGHT OR WRONG DIRECTION?



QUESTION TO IRAQIS: HOW DO YOU THINK YOUR LIFE WILL BE A YEAR FROM NOW?



PERCENTAGE OF IRAQI POPULATION IN SUNNI AREAS WHO THINK IRAQ IS MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION



2-11 FEBRUARY 2005: AMERICAN MILITARY85 (90% of sample from Baghdad, 10% from Mahmoudiya, Istiqlal, and Taji)

SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE TOWARDS POLITICAL ENDS, AGAINST IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, AND

IRAOI INFRASTRUCTURE

	71 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		
Time	Do you support		
	the use of violence towards	the use of violence towards attacks against Iraqi security	
	political ends?	forces?	infrastructure?
August 2004	Yes: 9%	Yes: 6%	Yes: 6%
(Urban only)	No: 89%	No: 91%	No: 91%
	Don't know: 1%	Don't know: 3%	Don't know: 3%
February 2005	Yes: 4%	Yes: 2%	Yes: 4%
(Urban only)	No: 93%	No: 96%	No: 93%
	Don't know: 3%	Don't know: 2%	Don't know: 3%

WHO CAN IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN IRAQ: IRAOI SECURITY FORCES, U.S. MILITARY FORCES OR THE ARMED NATIONAL OPPOSITION?

IRACI SECURITI FORCES, C.S. WILLITARY FORCES OR THE ARMED WATTOWAR OF OSTITON.			
Time	How would you rate your confidence in		
	the Iraqi National Guard	U.S. military forces improving	the armed national opposition
	improving the situation in Iraq?	situation in Iraq?	improving the situation in Iraq?
August 2004	A great deal/Quite a lot: 74%	A great deal/Quite a lot: 8%	A great deal/Quite a lot: 32%
(Urban only)	Not very much/None at all: 15%	Not very much/None at all: 86%	Not very much/None at all: 55%
	Don't know: 11%	Don't know: 6%	Don't know: 13%
February 2005	A great deal/Quite a lot: 76%	A great deal/Quite a lot: 15%	A great deal/Quite a lot: 20%
(Urban only)	Not very much/None at all: 17%	Not very much/None at all: 76%	Not very much/None at all: 51%
	Don't know: 7%	Don't know: 9%	Don't know: 29%

SUPPORT FOR/OPPOSITION TO THE COALITION

Time	How much do you support or oppose the	
	presence of Coalition Forces in Iraq?	
August 2004	Support: 17%	
	Oppose: 77%	
	Don't know: 6%	
February 2005	Support: 23%	
(Urban only)	Oppose: 71%	
	Don't know: 6%	

SATISFACTION WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ACCESS TO UTILITIES

CHILDING TO THE CONTROL OF THE WILLIAM TO THE CONTROL OF THE CONTR			
Time	How satisfied are you	How satisfied are you with	Do you have water service
	with the local	the availability of electricity	in your home?
	government?	in your neighborhood?	
August 2004	Satisfied: 34%	Satisfied: 7%	Yes: 70%
(Urban only)	Dissatisfied: 63%	Dissatisfied: 92%	No: 29%
February 2005	Satisfied: 28%	Satisfied: 4%	Yes: 79%
(Urban only)	Dissatisfied: 70%	Dissatisfied: 96%	No: 20%

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT

		Ethno-religious group (gender)	Ethno-religious group (gender)
		Interim government (Allawi)	Transitional government (Jafari)
Presidency	President	Sunni (M)	Kurd (M)
-	Deputy President	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Deputy President	Kurd (M)	Sunni (M)
Prime Minister	Prime Minister	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Deputy Prime Minister	Kurd (M)	Kurd (M)
	Deputy Prime Minister	Position did not exist	Shiite (M)
	Deputy Prime Minister	Position did not exist	Sunni (M/F)
	Deputy Prime Minister	Position did not exist	Turkman (M/F)
Key Ministers	Defense	Shiite (M)	Sunni (M)
<u>, </u>	Electricity	Sunni (M)	Shiite (M)
	Finance	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Foreign Affairs	Kurd (M)	Kurd (M)
	Interior	Sunni (M)	Shiite (M)
	Justice	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Oil	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
Ministers of State	National Assembly	Position did not exist	Shiite (M)
	National Security	Position did not exist	Shiite (M)
	Provinces	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Women	Kurd (F)	Sunni (F)
Other Ministers	Agriculture	Shiite (F)	Shiite (M)
	Civil Society	Position did not exist	Shiite (M)
	Communications	Shiite (M)	Kurd (F)
	Culture	Shiite (M)	Sunni (M)
	Displacement and Migration	Christian (F)	Shiite (F)
	Education	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Environment	Shiite (F)	Kurd (F)
	Health	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Higher Education	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Housing and Reconstruction	Sunni (M)	Shiite (M)
	Human Rights	Kurd (M)	Sunni (M)
	Industry and Minerals	Sunni (M)	Sunni (M)
	Labor and Social Affairs	Shiite (F)	Kurd (M)
	Planning	Shiite (F)	Kurd (M)
	Public Works	Kurd (F)	Kurd (F)
	Science and Technology	Turkmen (M)	Christian (F)
	Tourism and Antiquities	Position did not exist	Sunni (M)
	Trade	Sunni (M)	Kurd (M)
	Transportation	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)
	Water Resources	Kurd (M)	Kurd (M)
	Youth and Sport	Shiite (M)	Shiite (M)

APRIL 11-APRIL 20, 2005: INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE

IRAQI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQI PEOPLE

	Very representative: 35.5%
Do you feel that the new Iraqi Transitional	Generally representative: 37.3%
Government is representative of the Iraqi	Not all are represented: 14.7%
people as a whole?	Not at all representative: 4%
	Don't know: 7.5%

FEBRUARY 27- MARCH 5, 2005: INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE

(Interviews conducted across the country except for Anbar (Ramadi), Ninewah (Mosul), and Dohuk for security reasons)

IRAQI VIEWS ON SITUATION IN IRAQ: FEBRUARY 27 – MARCH 5, 2005

Thinking about your life today, to what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?		
I am hopeful for the future	Strongly agree: 65.7% Agree: 25% Disagree: 4.3% Strongly disagree: 2.1%	
I fear for the safety of myself and family	Strongly agree: 53.2% Agree: 23.5% Disagree: 7.4% Strongly disagree: 13.9%	
Things will get better slowly	Strongly agree: 56.2% Agree: 33.5% Disagree: 5.5% Strongly disagree: 2.2%	
My life was better before the war	Strongly agree: 21.9% Agree: 15.4% Disagree: 20.6% Strongly disagree: 40.1%	

ISSUES IRAQIS MOST WANT THE GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH

- 1. Inadequate electricity
- 2. Unemployment
- 3. Healthcare
- 4. Crime
- 5. National Security
- 6. High prices
- 7. Presence of coalition forces
- 8. Terrorists
- 9. Drafting of a constitution
- 10. Lack of adequate housing

IRAQIS ON POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

Do you feel that the Transitional National	Yes: 70%
Assembly will represent the Iraqi people	No: 18.6%
as a whole?	Don't know: 8.3%
	No answer: 3.2%
Is there a political party or figure that	Yes: 20.8%
you currently support of feel shares your	No: 72.9%
values or ideas?	Don't know: 4.2%
	No answer: 2%

IRAQI JANUARY 2005 VOTER TURNOUT & ELECTION RESULTS

Voter turnout	Election results
8.46 million	United Iraqi Alliance (Shiite): 48%
(58% of the eligible	Kurdish Alliance: 26%
population)	Allawi's Iragi List: 14%

JANUARY 19 - JANUARY 23, 2005: ABU DHABI TV/ZOGBY INTERNATIONAL POLL

Do you favor U.S. forces withdrawing either immediately	Sunni Arabs: 82%
or after an elected government is in place?	Shiite Arabs: 69%
Do you believe that the U.S. will "hurt" Iraq over the	Sunni Arabs: 64%
next five years?	Shiite Arabs: 49%
Do you believe that the ongoing insurgent attacks are a	Sunni Arab: 53%
legitimate form of resistance?	
Do you prefer an Islamic government or a political	Own religion: 59%
system where citizens are allowed to practice their own	Islamic government: 34%
religion?	

SEPTEMBER 24-OCTOBER 4, 2004: INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE

IRAQI PERCEPTION OF OVERALL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY: SEPTEMBER 24-OCTOBER 4, 2004

Question	Findings
In the past year and a half, has your	Yes: 22%
household been directly affected by violence	No: 77.5%
in terms of death, handicap, or significant	
monetary loss?	
Thinking about the difficult situation in Iraq	Multinational forces: 33.4%
currently, whether in terms of security, the	Foreign terrorists: 32.1%
economy or living conditions, who – in your	Armed supporters of the former regime: 8.1%
view – is most to blame?	Ourselves: 5.3%
	United States: 1.5%
	Combinations of all listed factors: 12.2%

MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES TO IRAQIS: SEPTEMBER 24-OCTOBER 4, 2004

Five most important issues to Iraqis
Unemployment: 17.6%

Crime: 14%

Infrastructure: 9.5% National security: 9% Multinational forces: 6.8%

Other: 56.9%

PROSPECT OF CIVIL WAR: SEPTEMBER 24-OCTOBER 4, 2004

Question	Findings
Do you believe that the prospect of civil war, widespread	Unlikely to happen in Iraq: 68.8%
ethnic, sectarian or other armed struggle - is now:	Always possible, but unlikely: 14.8%
	Likely to occur in the near-term: 7.8%
	Don't know: 8.3%

AUGUST 10-20, 2004:

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE & INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE FOR ADMINSTRATIVE AND CIVIL SOCIETY STUDIES POLL

	Better: 46.5%
Since the Fall of the Baath regime in April 2003, do you feel that your life has	Worse: 31.3%
gotten better, worse or stayed the same?	Same: 20.8%
	Don't know: 1.1%
Do you feel that there are enough opportunities for you or people like you to	Yes: 40%
play a role in improving the quality of life in your community?	No: 42%
	Don't know/No answer: 10%
	Very likely: 20.2%
To what degree do you feel that democracy in Iraq is likely or unlikely to	Somewhat likely: 37.8%
succeed?	Somewhat unlikely: 13.9%
	Very unlikely: 18.3%
	Don't know: 9.3%

JULY 24 - AUGUST 2, 2004:

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE & INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE FOR ADMINSTRATIVE & CIVIL SOCIETY STUDIES POLL

IRAQI PERCEPTION OF CURRENT SITUATION: JULY 24 - AUGUST 2, 2004:

	Economy	<u>Security</u>
Thinking about the last two months, do you feel that the economy and security have	Better: 47.36%	Better: 56.77%
gotten better, worse, or stayed the same?	Worse: 13.99%	Worse: 19.96%
	Same: 36.08%	Same:21.63%

END OF JUNE, 2004: IRAQ CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND STRATEGIC STUDIES POLL

END OF JUNE, 2001: HUIG CENTER FOR RESEMBLISHED STRIPEON		
Yes: 67%		
Yes: 80%		
More safe: 41%		
Less safe: 34%		
No difference: 17%		
Stay as long as is necessary for stability: 13%		
Leave immediately: 30%		
End of June: 50%		
End of April: 25%		
Yes: 50%		
End of June: ~60%		
End of April: 36%		
Yes: 49%		
Yes: 54%		
No: 37%		

9-19 JUNE, 2004: COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA) POLL

CONFIDENCE IN IRAQI SECURITY FORCES:9-19 JUNE, 2004

Do you support the new Iraqi Army?	Yes: 70%
Do you support the new Iraqi police?	Yes: 72%

14-23 MAY, 2004: COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA) POLL

CONFIDENCE IN SELECTED INSTITUTIONS: 14-23 MAY, 2004

Month	Iraqi Police	Iraqi Army	Coalition
			forces
November 2003	84%	71%	N/A
January 2004	80%	63%	28%
March	79%	61%	13%
April	67%	62%	7%
May	76%	62%	10%

HOW LONG SHOULD COALITION FORCES STAY IN IRAQ: 14-23 MAY, 2004

Question	Findings
How long should Coalition Forces stay in Iraq?	Leave after a permanent government is elected: 45%
	Leave immediately: 41%
	As long as Coalition Forces think it is necessary for stability: 6%
	Two years: 4%
	Don't know/No answer: 4%

PRISONERS ABUSE AT ABU GHRAIB: 14-23 MAY, 2004

Question	Findings
Were you surprised when you saw the abuse of prisoner's	Yes: 71%
at Abu Ghraib?	No: 22%
	Don't know/No answer: 7%
Do you believe that the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib	All Americans are like this: 54%
represents fewer than 100 people or that all Americans	Fewer than 100 people: 38%
behave this way?	Don't know/No answer: 8%
Do you believe anyone will be punished for what happened	No: 61%
at Abu Ghraib?	Yes: 29%
	Don't know/No answer: 10%

ABILITY OF IRAQI POLICE AND ARMY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN IRAQ: 14-23 MAY, 200

Question	Findings
Do you think it is likely that the Iraqi police and Army will	Very likely: 62%
maintain security without the presence of Coalition Forces?	Somewhat likely: 25%
	Not very likely: 6%
	Don't know/No answer: 4%
	Not at all likely: 3%

IRAQI PERCEPTION OF INSURGENTS: 14-23 MAY, 2004

Please indicate if and how the following statements apply to tho	se who attack the Coalition Forces and those who
work with then	1
They believe that the Coalition is trying to steal Iraq's wealth	Totally true: 66% Partially true: 12%
	Not true: 7%
They believe all foreign forces must leave at once	Totally true: 59%
	Partially true: 15%
	Not true: 11%
They believe national dignity requires the attacks	Totally true: 53%
	Partially true: 15%
	Not true: 13%
They want democracy, but do not believe the Coaltion will	Totally true: 41%
help democracy	Partially true: 22%
	Not true: 15%
They want to establish an Islamic state with no outside	Totally true: 31%
influence	Partially true:28%
	Not true: 21%
They are trying go undermine the transfer of responsibility to	Totally true: 27%
Iraqi forces	Partially true: 18%
	Not true: 36%
They are trying to help us create a better future	Totally true: 23%
	Partially true: 23%
	Not true: 32%
They do not want democracy in Iraq	Totally true: 17%
	Partially true: 21%
	Not true: 45%
They are angry because they lost the privileges they had	Totally true: 15%
under Saddam	Partially true: 17%
	Not true: 48%
They want to return to Saddam and the Baath party	Totally true: 9%
	Partially true: 11%
	Not true: 61%

NOTE ON IRAQI OPINION OF COALITION FORCES: Although not represented by the original polling information, we assume that the 131 of the 1068 people whose opinions were not accounted for in the "leave" or "stay" categories either did not know or choose not to answer the question.

MARCH 22-APRIL 9, 2004: CNN/USA TODAY/ GALLUP POLL

Question	Findings	
Has the coalition invasion in Iraq	More harm than good: 46%	
done more harm than good or	More good than harm: 33%	
more good than harm?	The same: 16%	
	Don't know:	4%
Is Iraq much better off,	Much better off: 11%	
somewhat better off, somewhat	Somewhat better off:	31%
worse off, or much worse off	About the same:	17%
than before the U.S. and British	Somewhat worse off:	24%
invasion?	Much worse off:	15%
	Don't know:	2%
Would you prefer for the U.S.	Leave immediately (in the next	
and British forces to leave	few months): 57%	
immediately (in the next few	Stay in Iraq for a longer period	
months), or do you think they	of time: 36°	
should stay in Iraq for a longer	Don't know: 7%	
period of time?		
Do you think of the Coalition	Mostly as occupiers:	71%
forces mostly as occupiers, or	Mostly as liberators: 19%	
mostly as liberators?	Both equally: 8%	
	Don't know:	2%
At the time of the invasion last	Mostly as occupiers:	43%
spring, did you think of the	Mostly as liberators:	43%
Coalition forces mostly as	Both equally:	9%
occupiers, or mostly as	Don't know: 4%	
liberators?		
Over the past three months, have	Improved:	25%
conditions for creating peace and	Worsened:	54%
stability in Iraq improved or	Stayed the same:	19%
worsened?	Don't know:	2%
If the Coalition left Iraq today,	More safe: 28%	
would you feel more safe or less	Less safe: 53%	
safe?	No difference:	12%
	Don't know:	8%

9 – 28 FEBRUARY, 2004: OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL/BBC/ABC NEWS STUDY

IRAQI PERCEPTION OF OVERALL SITUATION

Month	How are things compared with	
	a year ago? ⁸⁶	
February	Better: 56.5%	
_	Worse: 18.6%	

STATE DEPARTMENT STUDY AND GALLUP POLLS

IRAQI PUBLIC OPINION NATIONWIDE AND BAGDHAD: NOVEMBER 19-28, 2003

	Nationwide	Baghdad
Do you agree that in general, the local Iraqi police force is trusted by most members of the community?87	Agree/somewhat agree: 77%	Agree/somewhat agree: 80%
Do you feel that the attacks emphasize the need for continued presence of Coalition Forces in Iraq? ⁸⁸	Agree: 66%	Agree: 61%
If coalition forces left immediately, would you feel more safe, less safe, or no difference? ⁸⁹	More safe: 11% Less safe: 71% No difference: 10%	More safe: 12% Less safe: 75% No difference: 13%

BAGDHAD PUBLIC OPINION: AUGUST 8 - SEPTEMBER 4, 2003

Question	Findings
Will Iraq be in a better condition five years from now than it was	Better off: 67%
before the U.Sled invasion? 90	Worse off: 8%
Is Iraq better off now than it was before the invasion? ⁹¹	Better off: 33%
	Worse off: 47%
Was ousting Saddam worth the	Yes: 62%
hardships endured since the	
invasion? ⁹²	No: N/A
Would you like to see U.S. troops	Stay longer: 71%
stay longer than a few more	
months? ⁹³	Not stay longer: 26%
Are there circumstances in	No: 64%
which attacks against U.S. troops	
can be justified? ⁹⁴	Sometimes justified: 36%
Have you been afraid at times to	Yes: 86%
go outside your home during the	
day within the past four weeks?	No: N/A
Is Baghdad a more dangerous	Yes: 94%
place now than before the	
invasion? 96	No: N/A

N/A= Not available

¹ Fatality numbers from January 1, 2005 and onwards are reported as documented daily from "Operation Iraqi Freedom U.S. Casualty Status," *Department of Defense*. (www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf).

² Calculations based on data made available at (icasualties.org/oif/).

³ Calculations based on data made available at (icasualties.org/oif/.

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⁵ Lawrence J. Korb and Nigel Holmes, "Two Years and Counting," New York Times, March 20, 2005.

⁶ Casualties update daily from "Operation Iraqi Freedom U.S. Casualty Status," Department of Defense, (www.defenselink.mil/news/).

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⁹ Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, (icasualties.org/oif/).

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