Iraq Index

Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq

www.brookings.edu/iraqindex

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</tr>
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## SECURITY INDICATORS

### U.S. TROOP FATALITIES SINCE MAY 1

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<thead>
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<th>Month</th>
<th>U.S. troop losses since May 1, 2003¹</th>
<th>Fatalities (all kinds)</th>
<th>Fatalities in hostile incidents</th>
<th>Fatalities in non-hostile incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total as of April 14</td>
<td></td>
<td>548</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### U.S. TROOPS WOUNDED IN ACTION SINCE MAY 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Wounded in action²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total as of April 14</td>
<td>2,728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** From the start of the war on March 19 until the end of major combat operations on April 30, 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom caused 138 American troop fatalities. Of those, 109 were the result of hostile action, and 29 the result of non-hostile action. 65 U.S. troops were killed in March 2003. There were a total of 73 American fatalities in April, 2003 22 of which were killed after April 9. Of those 22, 10 were the result of hostile action and 12 the result of non-hostile action.

**NOTE:** 541 American troops were wounded in action between March 19 and April 30, 2003.
BRITISH TROOP FATALITIES SINCE MAY 1 4/16/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>U.K. troop fatalities since May 1, 2003³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total as of April 16</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NON-U.S. & U.K. COALITION FATALITIES SINCE MAY 1 4/16/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total as of April 16</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CASUALTIES TO IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 3/15/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of Iraqi security forces killed since May as of March 13</th>
<th>Total number of Iraqi security forces wounded in action as of November 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>350³</td>
<td>182⁵</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Up until May 1, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom caused 33 British troop fatalities. Of those 33 fatalities, 6 occurred during the month of April. Of the 6 fatalities that occurred in April, 2 occurred after April 9.

NOTE: Excluding American and British troop fatalities, there were no coalition fatalities from the start of the war up until May 1. All such fatalities occurred after that date.

NOTE: The following is a detailed account of the non-U.S. & non-U.K. fatalities;
One Danish military fatality, August 19; one Spanish military fatality, August 20; Ukrainian military fatality, September 30.; Two Spanish military fatalities, October 9, and October 26( The former fatality was a Spanish military attaché. ); One Polish military fatality, November 6; 16 Italian military fatalities, November 12; 7 Spanish military fatalities, November 29 (Since the Spanish fatalities were intelligence officers, they are being counted as military rather than civilian fatalities); One Polish military fatality, December 22; 6 Bulgarian military fatalities, December 27; 2 Thai military fatalities, December 27; One Estonian military fatality, February 29; One Salvadorian soldier April 4; One Ukrainian soldier April 6.

NOTE: The estimate of casualties to Iraqi security forces is a very rough one. The total number of Iraqi security forces killed as of March 28 is assumed to be a minimum as it only reflects Iraqi police killed since the fall of Baghdad.
### IRAQI CIVILIAN CASUALTIES 4/7/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Iraqi civilians killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total as of March 26</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,180</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NON-IRAQI CIVILIAN CASUALTIES 4/16/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Non-Iraqi civilians killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>61*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total as of April 16</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** The estimate of Iraqi civilians killed is a very rough one. There may be some double counting of the people that are reported as dead due to violent incidents by the Iraqi morgue and reports of individual incidents, although measures to minimize any such double counting have been taken by focusing on separate incidents only.

**NOTE:** Of the 54 non-Iraqi civilians killed as of April 14, at least 16 were Americans, and 15 were contractors. The various nationalities of the United Nations employees killed on August 19 are not available at present.

**NOTE:** At least 30 Halliburton employees have been killed since the start of the war. Andrew Jacobs and Simon Romero,“Workers, Lured by Money and Idealism, Face Iraqi Reality,” *New York Times*, April 14, 2004.
# MASS CASUALTY BOMBINGS IN IRAQ SINCE MAY

4/16/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Mass casualty car bombings/Suicide bombings</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>$^3$</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>$^2$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>$^2$</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>$^4$</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>$^2$</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>$^7$</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>$^6$</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>$^7$</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total as of April 16</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>1,844</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** 55 of the 60 bombings as of April 12 were suicide bombings. Casualties do not include the suicide bombers. The tallies for the number of killed and wounded are approximate.
### COALITION TROOP STRENGTH IN IRAQ SINCE MAY

**4/16/2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>U.S. troops in Iraq</th>
<th>Other coalition troops in Iraq (excluding U.S &amp; Iraqi forces)</th>
<th>Total international troop strength in Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>~142,000(^{11})</td>
<td>~8,000(^{22})</td>
<td>150,000(^{23})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>~126,000(^{25})</td>
<td>~24,000(^{26})</td>
<td>150,000(^{27})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>~124,000(^{29})</td>
<td>~25,000(^{30})</td>
<td>149,000(^{31})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>~114,000(^{33})</td>
<td>~25,000(^{34})</td>
<td>139,000(^{35})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>~103,000(^{37})</td>
<td>~29,000(^{38})</td>
<td>132,000(^{39})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>~102,000(^{41})</td>
<td>~29,000(^{42})</td>
<td>131,000(^{43})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>123,000(^{45})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>~85,400(^{47})</td>
<td>~36,600(^{48})</td>
<td>122,000(^{49})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>122,000(^{51})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>115,000(^{53})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>130,000(^{55})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>137,000(^{57})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A= Not available

### U.S. TROOPS ENGAGED IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM STATIONED IN THE VICINITIES OF IRAQ AND AT SEA

**1/28/2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of U.S. troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>51,000(^{59})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** 26,000 U.S. and Coalition personnel providing logistical support to Operation Iraqi Freedom were deployed in Kuwait, as of March 4, 2004. Commander USCENTCOM, John Abizaid, “Prepared Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee”, March 4, 2004, p. 8.

**NOTE:** Of the 51,000 troops involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom stationed outside of Iraq in September, approximately 10,070 were Navy personnel (most at sea in the Persian Gulf). The majority of the remaining 40,090 troops are assumed to have been stationed in Kuwait. Since approximately 2,500 Marines were stationed in Kuwait, we assume that roughly 37,590 Army troops were stationed in Kuwait or in the vicinities. This table will be updated as soon as more recent data becomes available.

**NOTE:** All numbers are end of month estimates, or latest data available for the current month.
### Top Ten Non-U.S. Coalition Contributors of Military Personnel in Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition Country</th>
<th>Military Personnel in Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>8,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining 23 coalition countries</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Coalition Forces Activity

#### 4/7/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Average Number of Patrols/day</th>
<th>Average Number of Raids/day</th>
<th>Average Number of Anti-Coalition Suspects Captured/day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
- The functions of each coalition country's military personnel vary, and range from security forces to medics and engineers.
- The majority of the 33 country coalition forces are organized into two multi-national divisions (MND). The MND South East is under British command and includes forces from the United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark, Czech Republic, Portugal, South Korea, Netherlands, Romania, Norway, New Zealand, and Lithuania. The MND Central South is under Polish command and includes forces from Poland, Spain, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Romania, Latvia, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Honduras, Mongolia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Thailand and the Philippines. In addition, Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, El Salvador, Estonia, Japan, Macedonia, Moldova and Singapore contribute military personnel in some capacity.
### Daily Insurgent Attacks on U.S. Troops & Reward Offered by Insurgents for Attacking U.S. Troops Since May 4/2/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Typical number of daily attacks on U.S. troops nationwide</th>
<th>Reward for carrying out attacks on U.S. troops ($) (attack/successful attack)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>100/500 (^{60})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>6 (^{66})</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>15 (^{67})</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>50 (^{68})</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>30-35 (^{69})</td>
<td>1,000-2,000/3,000-5,000 (^{70})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>22 (^{71})</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>15 (^{72})</td>
<td>500/3,000 (^{73})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>18 (^{74})</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>20 (^{75})</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>25 (^{76})</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A= Not available


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Typical number of daily attack on Iraqi security forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>2 (^{77})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>4 (^{78})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>4 (^{79})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>4 (^{80})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Daily Insurgent Attacks on Iraqi Civilians 4/2/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Typical number of daily attack on Iraqi civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>2 (^{81})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1 (^{82})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>3 (^{83})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>4 (^{84})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### U.S. Forces Ability to Discover Hidden Explosive Devices Before Detonation 12/9/2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Explosive devices that are discovered by U.S. troops before detonation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late spring/early summer</td>
<td>10-15 (^{85})%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>75(^{86})%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Accuracy of Intelligence Leads Provided to U.S. Forces 12/9/2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Accuracy of intelligence leads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late spring/early summer</td>
<td>50(^{87})%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>90(^{88})%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**AMERICAN MILITARY HELICOPTERS DOWNED BY ENEMY FIRE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of helicopters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total as of April 16</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ATTACKS ON IRAQI PIPELINES, OIL INSTALLATIONS & OIL PERSONNEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BAATHIST LEADERS STILL AT LARGE SINCE APRIL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Iraqi 55 most wanted: Individuals still at large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>13&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>12&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>9&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** The helicopters referred to above are believed to have crashed as a result of hostile fire, although three of the helicopter crashes included in the table (December 10, January 13 and January 23) are still under investigation.

**NOTE:** An attempt to assassinate an Iraqi distribution manager for the Oil Distribution Company on November 10 left the manager wounded and his son killed. An Iraqi police colonel in charge of oil installation security was shot and killed November 20. Both incidents took place in the city of Mosul.
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF IRAQI RESISTANCE NATIONWIDE SINCE NOVEMBER 4/14/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Estimated strength of Iraqi resistance nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>5,000²⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>5,000²⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>3,000-5,000²⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>5,000²⁷</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUSPECTED INSURGENTS DETAINED OR KILLED SINCE MAY 4/16/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Estimated numbers of suspected insurgents detained and killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1,000²⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1,000²¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1,000²¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>1,000²¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>750²⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>750²⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>3,000²⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1,000²⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2,500²⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1,950²⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1,750²⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1,960²¹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: “Over 90 percent” of the enemy combatants are Bath Party loyalists, according to John E. McLaughlin, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Dana Priest, “The CIA's 'Anonymous' No. 2; Low-Profile Deputy Director Leads Agency's Analytical Side,” Washington Post, January 9, 2004. Brig. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, commander of the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division, estimates that as of March 18, there was “only about 100 "foreign terrorists" in Baghdad, organized into about six cells.” “Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr. of the 82nd Airborne Division said he believed there were a total of 50 to 80 foreign fighters in eight to 10 cells” in Anbar province as of March 18. “Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Iraq Attacks Blamed On Islamic Extremists; U.S. Says Hussein Loyalists No Longer Dominate,” Washington Post, March 19, 2004.

NOTE: As of January 5, 14 cells, each consisting of 20-100 enemy combatants are believed to be actively operating in Baghdad. Patrick J. McDonnell, “Information Is Flowing After Hussein's Arrest,” Los Angeles Times, January 5, 2004. Data on success in the counterinsurgency campaign is somewhat encouraging, but no one can tell how quickly cells that are being depleted or destroyed are either regenerating or being replaced by the formation of new cells.

NOTE: The estimate of suspected insurgents killed or detained since May is a very rough one. The substantial increase in number of people detained or killed in November and onwards may not imply a huge increase in people detained or killed but rather that the data improved starting that month. The numbers for suspected insurgents killed or detained from November to March is not a monthly total, but the projected total given the daily pace of detained anti-coalition suspects. Since the monthly totals do not include anti-coalition suspects killed, except for in April, the real number of anti-coalition suspects detained and killed is likely to be higher.

NOTE: As many as 70-80% of those detained may be innocent and military judges have recommended they be released. Jeffrey Gettleman, "U.S. Detains Iraqis, and Families Please for News," New York Times, March 7, 2004. About 9,000 people are in coalition custody as of 6 January, 506 of which are said to be released within the next couple of weeks. Edward Wong, “U.S. Officials Plan to Release Iraqis Who Pose Just 'Some Risk’,” New York Times, January 6, 2004. Since 8,500 suspected anti-coalition fighters are detained as of March 27, it appears as if the majority of suspects detained are released after a couple of weeks, or months.

## SIZE OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES SINCE MAY

### 3/26/2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Civil Defense Corps</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Border patrol</th>
<th>Facilities protection services</th>
<th>Total Iraqi security forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>7,000-9,000&lt;sup&gt;112&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>30,000&lt;sup&gt;113&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>11,000&lt;sup&gt;114&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>34,000&lt;sup&gt;115&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>670&lt;sup&gt;116&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,500&lt;sup&gt;117&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>37,000&lt;sup&gt;118&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2,500&lt;sup&gt;119&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,700&lt;sup&gt;120&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>&gt;12,000&lt;sup&gt;121&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>56,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>55,000&lt;sup&gt;122&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4,700&lt;sup&gt;123&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>700&lt;sup&gt;124&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6,400&lt;sup&gt;125&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18,700&lt;sup&gt;126&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>85,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>68,800&lt;sup&gt;127&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>12,700&lt;sup&gt;128&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>900&lt;sup&gt;129&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>12,400&lt;sup&gt;130&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>52,700&lt;sup&gt;131&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>147,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>71,600&lt;sup&gt;132&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>15,200&lt;sup&gt;133&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>400&lt;sup&gt;134&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>12,900&lt;sup&gt;135&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>65,200&lt;sup&gt;136&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>165,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>66,900&lt;sup&gt;137&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>19,800&lt;sup&gt;138&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1,100&lt;sup&gt;139&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>21,000&lt;sup&gt;140&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>97,800&lt;sup&gt;141&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>206,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>77,100&lt;sup&gt;142&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>27,900&lt;sup&gt;143&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2,000&lt;sup&gt;144&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18,000&lt;sup&gt;145&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>73,900&lt;sup&gt;146&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>198,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>75,000&lt;sup&gt;147&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>35,493&lt;sup&gt;148&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5,174&lt;sup&gt;149&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>23,426&lt;sup&gt;150&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>73,992&lt;sup&gt;151&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>213,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stated goal</td>
<td>75,000&lt;sup&gt;152&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>40,000&lt;sup&gt;153&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>40,000&lt;sup&gt;154&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>25,727&lt;sup&gt;155&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>55,000&lt;sup&gt;156&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>235,727</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A= Not available

### NOTE:
- All numbers are end of month estimates, or latest data available for the current month.
- There are 10,000 police on duty in Baghdad as of March 18. The goal set by the CPA is to have 19,000 police on duty. Major General Martin Dempsey, Commander, 1st Armored Division, *Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing*, (www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040318-0549.html [March 19, 2004]).
CRIME-RELATED DEATHS IN BADGHAD SINCE MAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Estimated annualized murder rate per 100,000 citizens(^{157}) (For comparison Washington DC rate: 43(^{158}))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>70-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>95-130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>95-160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>110-190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>80-140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>70-120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>55-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>70-120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>70-120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>70-120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>70-120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Lower estimates for each month are typically based on the number of bodies brought to the Baghdad morgue with mortal gunshot wounds. Higher estimates reflect the fact that many victims are buried quickly and privately and never recorded in official tallies. To estimate these, when possible we use the total number of bodies of victims brought into the morgue in a given month as a very rough proxy for total murder victims in Baghdad (recognizing that many bodies at the morgue are not those of murder victims, but at the same time that many murder victims never are taken to the morgue.) The upper bounds also include victims of suicide and car bombings. The homicide rate is calculated based on an estimated population of 5.6 million people in Baghdad.

NOTE: Despite a generally poor security situation in Baghdad, there are indicators suggesting that the situation is improving somewhat. According to a report made by Brig. Gen. Mark Hurtling, assistant commander, 1\(^{st}\) Armored Davison, Baghdad, “we continue to see a decrease in crime (especially as we put more Iraqi Police and ICDC [Iraqi Civil Defense Corps] on the streets.)\(^{159}\) Nevertheless, according to one senior Iraqi police chief on January 22, although “murders [in Baghdad] are decreasing,” the level of other crimes such as robberies and carjackings has not. “The police are weak”, he continues. “We don’t have enough supplies. The public is still afraid to cooperate with us. They fear tribalism and retribution.”\(^{160}\) The Pentagon has yet to make any statistics on Iraqi crime or murder rates available as of March 12. This table will be updated as soon as more information becomes available.

NOTE: Because Baghdad comprises roughly 1/5 of the entire Iraqi population, Iraq’s national murder would according to our statistics be roughly 10-30 per 100,000 citizens per year—even if there were no murders outside of the capital at all…Interpol lists the following nationwide numbers per 100,000 citizens for countries in the region; Libya 2.08, Jordan 6.33, Lebanon 3.38, Saudi Arabia, 0.71. However, Interpol notes that these [nationwide] statistics cannot be used as a basis for comparison between different countries. This is partly because “police statistics reflect reported crimes, but this only represents a fraction of the real level. The volume of crimes not reported to the police may depend on the actions, policies and perceptions of the police. These can vary with time, as well as from country to country.” Because of the inherent difficulty in interpreting and comparing international murder rates, all such statistics - including those stated in the table above - should be interpreted guardedly.
IRAQI NATIONAL DEBT: CREDITORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creditor country/ creditor by country of origin and interest</th>
<th>Outstanding amounts due by Iraq (millions of dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>499.3(^{101})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>813.1(^{102})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>184.5(^{103})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>192.9(^{104})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>564.2(^{105})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>30.8(^{106})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>152.2(^{107})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,993.7(^{108})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,403.9(^{109})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,726(^{110})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4,108.6(^{111})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>96.7(^{112})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>54.7(^{113})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>3,450(^{114})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>321.2(^{115})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>185.8(^{116})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>117.5(^{117})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>930.8(^{118})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2,192(^{119})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt and others</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>500(^{120})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>17,000(^{121})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1,000(^{122})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>16.5(^{123})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf States</td>
<td>30(^{124})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>31.8(^{125})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>295(^{126})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>800(^{127})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest (as of 2002)</td>
<td>47,000(^{128})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>~117,660</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A= Not available.

NOTE: Debt towards Paris Club countries, Russia and the Republic of Korea (cursive) excludes interest rates and is defined as; “from the debtor side, the amounts due by the public sector. From the creditors’ point of view, the figures include credits and loans granted, or guaranteed by, the Governments or their appropriate institutions. Basically, private claims (debt owed to private creditors) as well as private debt (owed by private Iraqi Institutions without public guarantee) is excluded from this recollection….Russian claims: this figure represents the amounts due to Russia after a simulation of the adjustment on Soviet era claims consistent with Paris Club methodology.”

NOTE: “Estimates of Iraq’s foreign debt vary widely, from $62-130 billion. The disparities in estimates are due in part to a disagreement between Iraq and its neighboring states over the nature of approximately $30 billion in assistance given to Iraq by several Gulf States during the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq considers these payments to have been grants; the creditor states consider them to have been loans. Figures also vary depending on whether they include interests which some estimates put at $47 billion and rising. The World Bank/Bank for International Settlements’ 2001 estimate for Iraqi debt totaled $127.7 billion, including $47 billion in accrued interest. The U.S Department of Energy’s 2001 estimate was 62.2 billion.”

NOTE: “There are known to be creditors in Egypt, although the exact amount of this debt is not known. There are also assumed to be other unknown or undisclosed creditors in these and other countries.”
PLEDGES MADE TO THE COALITION & RECONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT FUND FACILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or Institution</th>
<th>Amount pledged in grants and/or loans (millions of $)</th>
<th>Form of pledge (millions of $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>244.1</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
<td>2,500-4,250</td>
<td>Loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,500 grants &amp; 3,500 loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>.560</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>18,600</td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>3,000-5,000</td>
<td>Loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>~32,740 - 36,490</td>
<td>~23,240 in grants &amp; 9,500-13,250 in loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amount needed for the next 5 years according to the World Bank and the United Nations</strong></td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** The table includes countries that made a pledge to Iraqi reconstruction in the form of a grant or a loan. In addition, Iran offered cross-border electricity material, access to their terminals, and $300 million in credit, Sri Lanka offered to contribute 100 tons of tea, Vietnam offered $500,000 worth of rice, and Saudi Arabia $500 million in export credits.

**NOTE:** The Bush Administration’s supplementary spending bill received congressional approval on Nov 4, 2003. Although the amount devoted to Iraqi reconstruction that the House and Senate approved was $1.4 billion less than requested, the entire amount will be given as a grant instead of as earlier discussed, a loan.

**NOTE:** Since not all pledges referred to are immediately available as funds, it is hard to assess how much money is presently available for Iraqi reconstruction purposes. Another reason for the delay in making money available is that loans to a non-sovereign government are not legal according to international law.
### Fuel Supplies Available

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Crude Oil Production (Millions of barrels/day)</th>
<th>Crude Export (Millions of barrels/day)</th>
<th>Diesel (Prod. &amp; Imp.) (Millions of liters/day)</th>
<th>Kerosene (Prod. &amp; Imp.) (Millions of liters/day)</th>
<th>Gasoline/Benzene (Prod. &amp; Imp.) (Millions of liters/day)</th>
<th>Total LPG (Prod. &amp; Imp.) (Tons/day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Pre-War Level</td>
<td>2.8-3.0&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.7-2.5&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>0.3&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>0.675&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.2&lt;sup&gt;31&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>0.925&lt;sup&gt;32&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.322&lt;sup&gt;33&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.5&lt;sup&gt;34&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.75&lt;sup&gt;35&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>13.5&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1,880&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>1.445&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.646&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10.25&lt;sup&gt;40&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.2&lt;sup&gt;41&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>14.0&lt;sup&gt;42&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2,530&lt;sup&gt;43&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>1.722&lt;sup&gt;44&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.983&lt;sup&gt;45&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>14.25&lt;sup&gt;46&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.9&lt;sup&gt;47&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>17.32&lt;sup&gt;48&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3,030&lt;sup&gt;49&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>2.055&lt;sup&gt;50&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.149&lt;sup&gt;51&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>14.75&lt;sup&gt;52&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9.6&lt;sup&gt;53&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>16.35&lt;sup&gt;54&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3,700&lt;sup&gt;55&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>2.156&lt;sup&gt;56&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.524&lt;sup&gt;57&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>13.14&lt;sup&gt;58&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>13.3&lt;sup&gt;59&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>11.79&lt;sup&gt;60&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3,610&lt;sup&gt;61&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>2.300&lt;sup&gt;62&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.541&lt;sup&gt;63&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>12.29&lt;sup&gt;64&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9.4&lt;sup&gt;65&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>12.9&lt;sup&gt;66&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3,460&lt;sup&gt;67&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2.440&lt;sup&gt;68&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.537&lt;sup&gt;69&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>13.91&lt;sup&gt;70&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>11.3&lt;sup&gt;71&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>13.32&lt;sup&gt;72&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3,445&lt;sup&gt;73&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>2.276&lt;sup&gt;74&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.382&lt;sup&gt;75&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>15.21&lt;sup&gt;76&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>13.05&lt;sup&gt;77&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>16.65&lt;sup&gt;78&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4,670&lt;sup&gt;79&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2.435&lt;sup&gt;80&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.561&lt;sup&gt;81&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>15.02&lt;sup&gt;82&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>17.28&lt;sup&gt;83&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>17.19&lt;sup&gt;84&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5,010&lt;sup&gt;85&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>2.393&lt;sup&gt;86&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.4&lt;sup&gt;87&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>19.44&lt;sup&gt;88&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>14.58&lt;sup&gt;89&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18.36&lt;sup&gt;90&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3,660&lt;sup&gt;91&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stated Goal:</td>
<td>2.8-3.0 by December 2004&lt;sup&gt;92&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>18&lt;sup&gt;93&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18&lt;sup&gt;94&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18&lt;sup&gt;95&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6,000&lt;sup&gt;96&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A = Not available

**NOTE:** Estimated domestic consumption of crude oil is 450,000 barrels per day.

**NOTE:** Kerosene imports began 5 October, 2003. All previous months cover only production

**NOTE:** LPG = Liquified Petroleum Gas

**NOTE:** The administration’s post war estimate was that Iraq would accrue $2-3 billion in oil revenues between June and December 2003. As of March 19 total crude oil export revenues since June exceeds $5 billion. “Iraq Progress Report,” *Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs*, March 19, 2004.
### ELECTRICITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Nation-wide (Mega Watts)</th>
<th>Baghdad (Mega Watts)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>4,400&lt;sup&gt;307&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2,500&lt;sup&gt;308&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>3,948&lt;sup&gt;308&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3,172&lt;sup&gt;309&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>300&lt;sup&gt;309&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>3,236&lt;sup&gt;302&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>707&lt;sup&gt;310&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>3,263&lt;sup&gt;304&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1,082&lt;sup&gt;303&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>3,543&lt;sup&gt;306&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1,229&lt;sup&gt;307&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>3,948&lt;sup&gt;308&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>3,582&lt;sup&gt;309&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>3,408&lt;sup&gt;310&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>3,725&lt;sup&gt;311&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>4,125&lt;sup&gt;312&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>4,026&lt;sup&gt;313&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>3,896&lt;sup&gt;314&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>6,000&lt;sup&gt;315&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2,500&lt;sup&gt;316&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stated Goal:</td>
<td>by June 2004</td>
<td>by October 2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Stated Goal:**
- 6,000 by June 2004
- 2,500 by October 2003

### VALUE OF THE IRAQI DINAR (ID)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>$1 =ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>2,000&lt;sup&gt;317&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1,948&lt;sup&gt;318&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1,675&lt;sup&gt;319&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1,360&lt;sup&gt;320&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1,425&lt;sup&gt;321&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1,415&lt;sup&gt;322&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1,425&lt;sup&gt;322&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PORT CARGO CAPACITY AND COMMERCIAL AIRPORT DEPARTURES NATIONWIDE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Port cargo capacity (raw tonnage in millions)&lt;sup&gt;323&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Commercial aircraft departures nationwide (per day)&lt;sup&gt;324&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-war</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of January 20</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stated goal for July 2004</td>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>200-300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** A nationwide currency exchange program was initiated on October 15, 2003 during which new Iraqi dinars were put in circulation and old currency was destroyed. The program was completed on January 20, 2004. The table above tracks the appreciation of the new currency since it was introduced.
**WATER SUPPLY AND SEWAGE CAPACITY SINCE MAY** 12/01/2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Potable water availability (millions of liters)</th>
<th>Sewage capacity (millions of liters)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated pre–war level</td>
<td>12.9&lt;sup&gt;226&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.2&lt;sup&gt;226&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4.0&lt;sup&gt;227&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>13.4&lt;sup&gt;228&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.3&lt;sup&gt;229&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>21.3&lt;sup&gt;330&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A= Not available

**IRRIGATION** 12/01/2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Irrigation canals in need of clearing (km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>20,000&lt;sup&gt;331&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>5,000&lt;sup&gt;332&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>3,500&lt;sup&gt;333&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TELECOMMUNICATIONS** 4/5/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Number of phones</th>
<th>Number of Internet connections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated pre-war level</td>
<td>1,100,000&lt;sup&gt;334&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4,500&lt;sup&gt;335&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>850,000&lt;sup&gt;336&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4,900&lt;sup&gt;337&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>984,225&lt;sup&gt;338&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1,045,000&lt;sup&gt;339&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal for Jan 2004</td>
<td>1,100,000&lt;sup&gt;340&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>50,000&lt;sup&gt;341&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LOCAL GOVERNANCE COUNCILS** 2/18/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of local governance councils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>255&lt;sup&gt;342&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>318&lt;sup&gt;343&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HOSPITALS RESTORED TO PRE-WAR LEVEL OF OPERATIONS** 3/7/2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Hospitals restored to pre-war level of operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>90%&lt;sup&gt;344&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** “Probably 75% of the sewage in [Iraq] is going to the rivers,” according to John Kluesener, manager for water, wastewater and irrigations systems for Iraq reconstruction. Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Iraqi Experts Tossed With The Water,” Washington Post, February 27, 2004.

**NOTE:** As of December 30 it is estimated that 60% of the Iraqi population has access to limited supplies of potable water. CPA/DoD aims to provide 75% of Iraqis with potable water by April 2005, and 11% of Iraqis with sewage services by March 2005.

**NOTE:** The irrigation canal program was concluded with more than 16,500 km cleared.

**NOTE:** Number of local governance councils includes city, district, sub-district and neighborhood councils.
### NATIONWIDE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE SINCE MAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Unemployment rate nationwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>60%&lt;sup&gt;est&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>&gt;50%&lt;sup&gt;est&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>50%&lt;sup&gt;est&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>45%&lt;sup&gt;est&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>45%&lt;sup&gt;est&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A = Not available

### NOTE:
The Iraqi Ministry of Planning announced the unemployment rate to be 28% on March 15 but other estimates are much higher.

The numbers referred to in the table is a very rough approximation of the employment situation in Iraq. As noted by Director of Employment, Fatin Al-Saeda, Iraqi Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs on October 22, 2003 “There are no employment statistics for Iraq.” Department of Defense, “Assistant Secretary for Policy at the Department of Labor, Chris Spear briefs on Iraqi Minister Of Labor And Social Affairs,” (http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20031022-0809.html {October 22, 2003}). Transcript. Estimates made by economists, however, generally range between 50-70%. There is an inherent difficulty in measuring the Iraqi rate of unemployment over time. Because recent estimates are likely to be more accurate than older ones, but also higher, this means that despite an improvement in the economic situation nationwide, the numbers give the impression that it is getting worse. Considering the increase in entrepreneurial activity after the end of the war, we have for the purposes of this database assumed that there has been an improvement in unemployment levels, and hence weighted information supporting such a conclusion heavier than contradictory data reports. Another factor contributing to a somewhat improved employment situation in Iraq is that some 395,000 jobs have been directly created by the Coalition Provisional Authority as of April 5, 2004. The target is to create 850,000 jobs. “Draft Working Papers: Iraq Status”, Department of Defense, April 5, 2004.
## POLLING

**FEBRUARY: OXFORD RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL/BBC/ABC NEWS STUDY**

### IRAQI PERCEPTION OF OVERALL SITUATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>How are things compared with a year ago?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Better: 56.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worse: 18.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### JANUARY: STATE DEPARTMENT STUDY OF IRAQ

#### GREATEST THREAT TO IRAQI CITIZENS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of threat</th>
<th>Baghdad</th>
<th>Basrah</th>
<th>Mosul</th>
<th>Fallujah</th>
<th>Samarra</th>
<th>Karbala</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Street crime</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street bombs</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large bombs such as those against Iraqi police stations and international organizations</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed encounters between Iraqis and Coalition Forces and others</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed encounters with religious or tribal militia</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenge killings/Baath killings</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial extortion</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectarian war</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic war</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### GREATEST THREAT TO IRAQ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of threat</th>
<th>Baghdad</th>
<th>Basrah</th>
<th>Mosul</th>
<th>Fallujah</th>
<th>Samarra</th>
<th>Karbala</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Street crime</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street bombs</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large bombs such as those against Iraqi police stations and international organizations</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed encounters between Iraqis and Coalition Forces and others</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed encounters with religious or tribal militia</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenge killings/Baath killings</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial extortion</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectarian war</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic war</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside threats</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IRAQS ON COALITION FORCES LEAVING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>More safe</th>
<th>Less safe</th>
<th>No difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>November: 12%</td>
<td>November: 71%</td>
<td>November: 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January: 19%</td>
<td>January: 65%</td>
<td>January: 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>November: 6%</td>
<td>November: 85%</td>
<td>November: 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January: 17%</td>
<td>January: 67%</td>
<td>January: 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>January: 28%</td>
<td>January: 59%</td>
<td>January: 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallujah</td>
<td>January: 56%</td>
<td>January: 29%</td>
<td>January: 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarra</td>
<td>January: 54%</td>
<td>January: 41%</td>
<td>January: 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>January: 24%</td>
<td>January: 50%</td>
<td>January: 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>November: 15%</td>
<td>November: 62%</td>
<td>November: 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilla</td>
<td>November: 7%</td>
<td>November: 83%</td>
<td>November: 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diwaniya</td>
<td>November:13%</td>
<td>November: 83%</td>
<td>November: 1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING IRAQIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Iraqi Armed Forces</th>
<th>Coalition forces</th>
<th>Joint Iraq-Coalition efforts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallujah</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarra</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Iraqi Armed Forces</th>
<th>Coalition forces</th>
<th>Joint Iraq-Coalition efforts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallujah</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarra</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONDITIONS FOR PEACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Improved</th>
<th>Worsened</th>
<th>No difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>August: 22%</td>
<td>August: 53%</td>
<td>August: 24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January: 51%</td>
<td>January: 25%</td>
<td>January: 24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>August: 24%</td>
<td>August: 58%</td>
<td>August: 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January: 59%</td>
<td>January: 17%</td>
<td>January: 24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>January: 38%</td>
<td>January: 39%</td>
<td>January: 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallujah</td>
<td>August: 25%</td>
<td>August: 63%</td>
<td>August: 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January: 33%</td>
<td>January: 44%</td>
<td>January: 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarra</td>
<td>January: 34%</td>
<td>January: 43%</td>
<td>January: 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>January: 27%</td>
<td>January: 61%</td>
<td>January: 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramadi</td>
<td>August:16%</td>
<td>August: 66%</td>
<td>August: 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>August: 15%</td>
<td>August: 71%</td>
<td>August: 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleymania</td>
<td>August: 56%</td>
<td>August: 18%</td>
<td>August: 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>August: 58%</td>
<td>August: 9%</td>
<td>August: 23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SAFETY IN IRAQI NEIGHBORHOODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>January</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallujah</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarra</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilla</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diwaniya</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramadi</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleyman</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IRAQI CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Baghdad</th>
<th>Basrah</th>
<th>Mosul</th>
<th>Fallujah</th>
<th>Samarra</th>
<th>Kirkuk</th>
<th>Hilla</th>
<th>Diwaniya</th>
<th>Najaf</th>
<th>Ramadi</th>
<th>Suleyman</th>
<th>Erbil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq police</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Iraqi Army</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi ministries</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing Council</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Forces</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EFFICIENCY OF COALITION FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Baghdad</th>
<th>Basrah</th>
<th>Mosul</th>
<th>Fallujah</th>
<th>Samarra</th>
<th>Karbala</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keeping law and order in the streets</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracking down criminals</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting Iraqis from major threats</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working cooperatively with Iraqi security forces</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting their forces and compounds</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LATER POLLING:
STATE DEPARTMENT STUDY AND GALLUP POLLS

IRAQI PUBLIC OPINION NATIONWIDE AND BAGHDAD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Nationwide Findings</th>
<th>Baghdad Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you agree that in general, the local Iraqi police force is trusted by most members of the community? 260</td>
<td>Agree/somewhat agree: 77%</td>
<td>Agree/somewhat agree: 80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you feel that the attacks emphasize the need for continued presence of Coalition Forces in Iraq 261</td>
<td>Agree: 66%</td>
<td>Agree: 61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If coalition forces left immediately, would you feel more safe, less safe, or no difference 262</td>
<td>More safe: 11% Less safe: 71% No difference: 10%</td>
<td>More safe: 12% Less safe: 75% No difference: 13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BAGHDAD PUBLIC OPINION: EARLY FALL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will Iraq be in a better condition five years from now than it was before the U.S.-led invasion? 363</td>
<td>Better off: 67% Worse off: 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is Iraq better off now than it was before the invasion? 364</td>
<td>Better off: 33% Worse off: 47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was ousting Saddam worth the hardships endured since the invasion? 365</td>
<td>Yes: 62% No: N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you like to see U.S. troops stay longer than a few more months? 366</td>
<td>Stay longer: 71% Not stay longer: 26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there circumstances in which attacks against U.S. troops can be justified? 367</td>
<td>No: 64% Sometimes justified: 36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you been afraid at times to go outside your home during the day within the past four weeks? 368</td>
<td>Yes: 86% No: N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is Baghdad a more dangerous place now than before the invasion? 369</td>
<td>Yes: 94% No: N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A = Not available
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Do you approve or disapprove of the way the George W. Bush is handling the situation with Iraq?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| April 14-16 | Approve: 76%  
|            | Disapprove: 21%  
|            | No opinion: 3%   |
| June 12-15 | Approve: 63%  
|            | Disapprove: 34%  
|            | No opinion: 3%   |
| July 7-9   | Approve: 58%  
|            | Disapprove: 39%  
|            | No opinion: 3%   |
| July 18-20 | Approve: 57%  
|            | Disapprove: 39%  
|            | No opinion: 3%   |
| July 25-27 | Approve: 60%  
|            | Disapprove: 38%  
|            | No opinion: 2%   |
| August 25-26 | Approve: 57%  
|              | Disapprove: 41%  
|              | No opinion: 2%   |
| September 8-10 | Approve: 51%  
|                | Disapprove: 47%  
|                | No opinion: 2%   |
| October 6-8 | Approve: 47%  
|            | Disapprove: 50%  
|            | No opinion: 3%   |
| November 3-5 | Approve: 45%  
|             | Disapprove: 54%  
|             | No opinion: 1%   |
| December 5-7 | Approve: 50%  
|             | Disapprove: 47%  
|             | No opinion: 3%   |
| January 2-5 | Approve: 61%  
|            | Disapprove: 36%  
|            | No opinion: 3%   |


5 “Security Forces in Iraq,” DoD Briefing Slides: 6 November 2003, Ratio of reserves to active forces derived from graph.

6 The monthly breakdown of casualties to Iraqi civilians is partly based on estimates made by Iraqbodycount, (www.iraqbodycount.org), and partly on assessment made by the author.


According to Deputy Director of Operations Brig. General Mark Kimmit. Average of numerous data points.

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Coalition Provisional Authority. (www.cpa-iraq.org).


Ibid.


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Ibid.


The MacFarquhar article is the source for the May range, as well as the higher bounds for June, July, and August. The Marlowe article is the source for the numbers used in the September range and the lower June and July bounds. The lowerbound for June and July is derived from reports that “almost all” of the 2,173 deaths by firearms in Baghdad in 2003 occurred between May and the end of September. Assuming that
2,100 deaths occurred between May and September, we derived the average lower bound for June and July by subtracting the respective numbers cited for May, August and September. The lower bound in November and December is based on statistics provided in the Fleishman article. Based on our notion that the August range was of the highest quality data, we used those numbers to derive a lower to upper bound ratio, which we then applied to estimate a higher bound for November and December. Having no data for October, we constructed an estimate for this month range by taking the average of the lower and upper bounds for September and November respectively. Having no recent data in January, February, and March, we assume that the murder rate is the same as in December. We intend to update these entries as soon as more information becomes available.

162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
Ibid. Based on three weekly data points.


281 Ibid. Based on three weekly data points.


283 Ibid.


285 Ibid.


287 Ibid.


289 Ibid.


293 Ibid.


295 Ibid. Based on a two-week estimate.


297 Ibid. Based on a two-week estimate.


299 Ibid. Based on a two-week estimate.


307 Ibid. Based on a two-week estimate.


309 Ibid.


312 Ibid.


314 Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. Stated as 85% of prewar capacity (6.2 million liters).

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“Progress Competes with Chaos in Iraq,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 19, 2003

Author’s estimate.


“Opinion Analysis, Office of Research, Department of State, Washington DC, January 29, 2004. The margin of error for the entire sample is approximately +/- 4 percent, but varies among cities.”

Ibid.

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Will Lester, “Poll Finds Baghdad Residents Glad to Be Rid of Saddam,” *Associated Press*, September 24, 2003. The Gallup poll cited was carried out between August 8 and September 4. It has a margin of error of +/-3%.

Ibid.

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