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TURKEY, EUROPE, AND THE U.S.: NEW CHALLENGES AND CHANGING DYNAMICS

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. JONES: Welcome to Brookings. My name is Bruce Jones, I'm the vice president and director for Foreign Policy, and it's a pleasure to welcome you to today's event co-organized by our Center for the United States and Europe together with our longstanding partner the Turkish industry and business association, TÜSİAD. TÜSİAD is a key institutional partner for us and their support and their collaboration over a number of years has been instrumental to making our Turkey work possible.

I'm delighted to be joined by several friends and colleagues from TÜSİAD today, most importantly their CEO, Bahadır Kaleağası. Thank you so much for being here today.

TÜSİAD is not only our partner but a very influential voice in Turkey's private sector and one of the most prominent civil society organizations in Turkey with a long track record of supporting participatory democracy and a competitive market economy, issues which are of course crucial to the debate about Turkey's future right now. Their mission I believe in many ways mirrors our own and our values, so it's a natural partnership. I'm also extraordinarily grateful to TÜSİAD for their constant respect for our independence and recognizing that the value of Brookings is in the independence of its scholars and their respect of that is much appreciated.

Today's discussion is going to examine the involved dynamics of Turkey, Europe, and the United States and the relations between them. For the United States Turkey has been a close ally and a strategic partner for seven decades, and for a long period of time widely considered to be a model of a rising modern democratic, Muslim-majority country and ally. Of course, now Turkey finds itself in a very difficult period and in a challenging neighborhood in dealing with instability on all flanks.

In recent years the success of Turkey's economic rise and the structural reforms in the early 2000s made huge progress but I think have been countered now by a number of

more significant negative developments including weakening of the rule of law and deteriorating democratic process. Today with the country's EU ascension process in profound question, I think, and its transatlantic commitments and liberal democratic credentials in question as well we appear to be in a place where Turkey looks to be altering its orientation away from the west.

It's not the only country doing that. One of the things that we're watching in the international system fueled by economic uncertainty, fueled by migration, fueled by fear of terrorism, fueled by questions about the balance of power, a number of countries are beginning to look at alternatives to the west in their models, both in terms of commitments to the rule of law and in terms of where they look for international support. We've seen that in elections across Europe to differing degrees in both central and Western Europe, and not Europe alone.

All of this at a time when there are tensions in the relationship between the United States and Turkey, most notably around issues in the Middle East, in particular differences over Syria, PKK, and related issues. Despite all of this, it seems to me that the United States and Europe still have huge strategic interests in continuing their effort to keep Turkey anchored in a Euro-Atlantic community of shared values and interests. This is a tricky and difficult time for that but of no less importance as a result.

It's a case, by the way, made very eloquently and very passionately in an important new book by Kemal Kirişçi, our TÜSİAD senior fellow here at Turkey and who will join us on stage shortly, who has just published this: "Turkey and the West: Faultlines and a Troubled Alliance," which strikes me as an awfully timely and well-crafted book. Kemal will speak to these issues on the panel today.

Before I turn things to the moderator I want to invite TÜSİAD CEO Bahadır Kaleağası to offer a few introductory remarks and to again express my appreciation and thanks to you and your team. So, with that, Bahadır. (Applause)

MR. KALEAĞASI: Thank you, Bruce. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your time today with us.

Ten years passed since the launch of the Brookings TÜSİAD program. Since 2013 we have enlarged the scope of the program to constitute the U.S.-Turkey program. The Brookings Turkey Project under the coordination of Professor Kemal Kirişçi is productive with panels, analysis, publications that stimulated debates on topics of relevance to U.S., Turkish, and Transatlantic relations. The independent and bipartisan thinking and debate at Brookings are crucial for the success of the program. I extend my thanks to all our colleagues in Brookings for their impressive intellectual and organizational contributions.

Today we will discuss common challenges encountered by Turkey, the EU, the U.S., with specific focus on the feature of international order and globalization. As the fourth industrial revolution begins to take hold around the planet the process of societal change and democracy are going through stages of fluctuation as was the case in every other industrial revolution. The first one triggered democracy of taxpayers, the second one democracy of people, the third one of the middle class, and now the question is interesting and open.

This 4.0 version of industry and technology and society has been quickly uploaded into our daily lives. But there is an algorithm problem with coding the dynamics of a new sustainable and inclusive development, thus of a better democracy. The direct evolution that we are in unfortunately has several adverse dimensions as well as beneficial ones. Innovations like quantum computing and artificial intelligence, internet of things, biotechnologies, renewable energies, they all have the potential to lead to smarter lives, smarter cities, smarter government, to more transparency, direct democracy, and public security. However, the globalization perceived by many people triggered a sense of economic insecurity and has by social polarization and post through political debate. Any items in the list of remedies from inclusive growth to better governance remain too conceptual for the taste of an increasing depopulistic public debate, and our topic of today is certainly affected by this.

As to Shiats we have been living the last ten years also in ups and downs. In the last year of Turkish history as a business community we have been coming to the foreground of

public debate asking for, as usual but change of course substance, better democracy in Turkey, better economy, and better relations with the west and particularly with the European Union. Better democracy for us is a really well-functioning constitutional order with separation of powers, zero prisoners of opinion, or politicians under the pressure of the judiciary system, and also and certainly a country of freedoms thanks to which we can be a country of democracy but also creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship, and social responsibility.

European process is very important in this respect. We know that future of Europe debate is very important also for Turkey's future within the western world and also in the European geography, a geography that is likely to be determined more and more by a variable geometry concerning circles of integration, multispeed Europe with different circles eventually, maybe, of course, with the core Europe federal European zone surrounded by a confidently larger circle where Turkey also can find its place provided that it fulfills the criteria of democracy of the European Union, but also alignment with more the single market rules.

Many problems are also valid on the relations with the United States of America. The U.S.-Turkish relationship has sunk to a new low point. Differences in priorities, and trade perceptions in Syria, disputes over multipole judicial cases in both countries, in addition to the deterioration of Turkey's image here in Washington and anti-Americanism in Turkey have weakened ties.

However, the historical perspective is important. It has been 150 years since Turkey dispatched its first ambassador to Washington. As Kemal Kirişci writes in his forthcoming book, it has been over 70 years since USS Missouri sailed into Istanbul signaling Turkey's entry into the emerging western alliance. Since then this relationship has entered dramatic ups and downs but has always recovered. That is because a strong partnership served the national interests of Turkey and United States and strengthens the larger transatlantic alliance.

The recent decision over the issues of non-immigrant visa demonstrates that any

one of the disputes in the relationship could quickly escalate into a real crisis. Therefore, resolution of these disagreements has become more urgent.

There is unfortunately mutual mistrust and even a degree of mutual content in Washington and Ankara that needs to be overcome. Strong political will, which appears to be absent in both capitals at present, is required to be reloaded as a genuine partnership. The situation is not sustainable and therefore the business and policy communities need to encourage leaders, policymakers, and legislators to continue engagement, to try to compartmentalize at least some of the disagreements for the time being and to see compromise on the others.

This must be done in recognition of the essential nature of the relationship and the fact that it is too big to fail. It is too important to fail, too important for the interests of the U.S. and Turkish citizens, too important for the western (inaudible) and interests in that geography where Turkey is a central role in this Euro-Asian access, too important to fail for the western values. Thank you very much. (Applause)

MR. KIRIŞCI: All right, we're all set. Let me start by welcoming you all to today's conference. I'm Kemal Kirişci, senior TÜSİAD fellow, and director of the Turkey Project.

Just allow me to say very briefly that since I joined the Project in 2013, January, it really has been a very enriching experience for me in all sense of the word, but including in being whipped by first Martin Indyk and then Bruce Jones to write that book. I am really very grateful that this opportunity was given to me.

Thanks to you for joining us today. You're joining us actually just as the Turkish prime minister, I believe, is starting his meeting with Vice President Mike Pence with an agenda that I hope will address that long list of grievances and problems and hopefully find a way out and build a constructive dialogue and set Turkey back on its western vocation.

I do realize that these days there are not many positive news coming out of Turkey, however, I still would like to see the quarter-full, not even half but quarter-full glass and

the reason for that is the U.S. decision to reintroduce some of the visa services, but also the decision on the part of the prime minister to come to this particular meeting on the grounds of Winston Churchill's famous saying that "jaw jaw is better than war war."

Just ahead of this visit there was a debate in Turkey that the visit should only take place if the visa issue was resolved. I understand through the media that it was those who believe that dialoguing is better than not dialoguing, and that's the quarter-full part of the picture out there.

Before I introduce to you the panel I still would like to make a few very quick substantive remarks. We Turks, and I hope most of us will in less than 24 hours commemorate the legacy of the founder of the Turkish Republic passing away in 1938, just about 80 years ago. I do want to commemorate and recall his legacy because he was a leader that carried a commitment that had already been in place in the latter days of the Ottoman Empire to give Turkey its western vocation. Atatürk was more ambitious than just that. He has that famous remark where he talked about not only catching up with contemporary civilization that then was defined as the west, but actually going beyond it.

Today the picture is one where my humble opinion is that it has never been as bad as seems to be the case. Anti-Americanism is rampant, skepticism towards the European Union has reached levels unheard of, but then don't misunderstand me, the relationship between Turkey and the west has always had these ups and downs as Bahadır also mentioned earlier on.

However, what is ironic is that it is the political party that is right now running Turkey that brought Turkey closest to being anchored in the international liberal order and equipped Turkey with the gains that were referred to by Bruce as well as Bahadır, and equipped Turkey also with that soft power that led it being touted as a model there. However, this was not sustained and we arrived where we are with growing authoritarianism, this regard for democratic values, and worse, the collapse of the rule of law.

The drift, interestingly, has come hand-in-hand with these developments in Turkey. However, I would like to underline that it is not only the fault, if you wish, of the Turkish side. We have also to recognize that the west's (inaudible), if you wish, in French has not been flying colors. I think many would agree with me that the cultural rejection that Turkey felt from the European Union in the last ten years has I think contributed to where we are in the relationship and where Turkey is. Also, the failure to respond to the coup attempt in July 2016 at least in part to the way in which Vladimir Putin did, that failure has also not helped the confidence between the two sides.

These two developments I think have played an important role in playing into the hands of the government and especially the ideological root from which it comes that has not been for a long time enthusiastic about Turkey's western vocation. We know the result, yet I'd like to complete the circle by saying that this visit is a very important one precisely because of the emphasis being put on dialoguing, but I think, it's again my sense, my humble opinion, that there is growing recognition even in the ranks of the government and the political party that supports it that to use a Turkish expression from along the Black Sea (speaking Turkish), the sea has run out of water, if you wish, and that Turkey is facing very serious geopolitical, economic-political challenges, and that those challenges are much more likely to be met with a constructive relationship with the west to serve Turkey's, if it's possible to say it, objective and national interests.

I'd like to conclude by a quote that retired Ambassador Jim Jeffrey made this past July on a commemoration of the coup attempt where he said -- you can look it up from the video at the Washington Institute -- where he said, "I'm going to say something really shocking, but we could have not won the Cold War without Turkey." And he went on to say Turkey would have not been able to protect, defend its national sovereignty without us. Today the problems that the United States and the west face, most of them are around Turkey and those are the challenges that also I think today increasingly is being recognized and can only be addressed



with the west.

Very quickly now let me introduce to you the panel. On my right is Victoria Nuland. I think many of you are very familiar with her; I need not go into the details of it. We are very honored that she is now with us at Brookings and formerly served as the assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia at the State Department. On my left, again, I have Amanda Sloat, who also was at the State Department serving as a deputy assistant secretary.

Victoria is going to say a few words about that larger picture to which already references have been made. That larger picture is not where it was in the 1990s and early 2000s that helped so much propel Turkey in the right direction, and reflect on how this is impacting on Turkish-western relations. Amanda's focus is going to be more on the current problems and how they are playing out.

And lastly, Hakan Yılmaz, my old friend and colleague from Boğaziçi University, whom we know is a leading scholar on Turkish politics but also Turkish public opinion. He has his finger on the pulse of the Turkish public opinion and he will reflect on how that public opinion is looking towards the west and its relationship with those universal shared values.

But I'd also like to say that Hakan ought to be better known also for his hobby and his interest in folk music and the great poetry and songs he comes up with for which I really would like to express my warm feelings and congratulate him because if I was to start to sing I think all of you would run away from the conference. (Laughter)

With those words, I'd like to turn to Victoria and each of the panelists will respond seven, eight minutes and then we'll move on to our debate and discussion. Victoria, I'm honored to give you the floor as the moderator.

MS. NULAND: Well, thank you Kemal, and thank you TÜSİAD for this great partnership that we have with Brookings which keeps us focused on our ally, Turkey, and our strategic relationship as well as our shared responsibility for good governance not only in the Transatlantic space but in the world more broadly.

I'm going to start by agreeing with Jim Jeffrey. As I came up as a young diplomat all Americans in the business had an acute understanding of the essential role that Turkey played not only as a bull-work of security but as an increasingly prosperous open polity that helped us to win the global debate for liberalism, for open economies, for elected governance, for robust debate in our societies as a source of strength.

So, flash backwards with me to my first time serving at NATO 2000 to 2003, which was such a time of hope with new members of NATO, new members of the EU, a robust commitment across the Transatlantic space to increasing integration between Turkey and the EU with Turkey's voice so strong and loud and respected at NATO as the flank, if you will, both literally in terms of our conventional forces but also strategically in terms of its understanding of a part of the global challenge that some others didn't understand as well. And very, very strong American support at that time in our conversations with Europeans for keeping the doors open. Turkey had obviously joined NATO many decades before but keeping the doors open to greater EU integration and eventual membership for Turkey.

And then interestingly when the AKP Party comes into power much questioning in Europe, who are these guys, what do they want? But very quickly a strong outreach from the AKP side that what they wanted was to live in a more European way. What they wanted was to broaden the base of enfranchisement in Turkey economically, politically, bring more Turks who hadn't benefited from growth into the system and to bring that dynamism, that energy, to Europe and to be welcomed as they changed the Turkish system to look more European, if they could do that to be welcomed.

And it was really a time where we were spending a lot of our energy trying to convince Europeans that this young, dynamic, energetic, hungry Turkish population could, would, should be part of the engine of growth and liberalism not just in the Transatlantic space but globally, and that Turkey as that hinge to the larger Middle East also had a unique role to play in broadening the sphere of enfranchisement, human enfranchisement, government by the

governed to itself and to its east. We were very much in partnership in that regard.

Flash forward to 2008, '09, '10, disappointment, tensions, over the Iraq war, the economic crisis of 2008-2009, the rise of terrorism in our neighborhoods, the failure of the Arab Spring to bring more security, more democracy, or more openness as both the U.S. and Turkey had hoped, EU reluctance and perhaps Turkish slowness in finding a path together, and then of course the Syrian war which tears at the fabric of all of it and which I think both the U.S. and the EU failed to understand was an existential threat to Turkey being right on its border and our lack of ability to form a true strategic partnership on how we would manage this crisis in a way that would bring back to the Syrian people the opportunity to live better lives.

Then, of course, the coup attempt. And as Kemal and everybody else has said, the disappointment on the Turkish side with western understanding and American understanding of that. But then concern in Europe, in Washington, about how the aftermath of the coup has been dealt with.

But this is all part and parcel, as Kemal has made reference to and has Bruce and our TÜSİAD Chairman has made reference to, of a larger turn away from liberalism, not simply in Turkey but also in the United States. We now have leaders in the United States questioning freedom of the media. We have leaders in the United States questioning judicial independence. We have some calling for closing of markets. In Europe itself, in central Europe but in other parts of Europe, increasing questioning of whether judiciaries should be free, of whether the sovereignty that they had given to Brussels was actually paying results, an unwillingness to keep doors open to migrants and the victims of terrorism and bad governance as Turkey has done to such a spectacular and unappreciated, I think, degree as a global leader in welcoming more than 3 million refugees.

So, when you see increasing pressure on the press, on human rights, on rule of law in Turkey it is part of a larger trend which is not to excuse it; it began before the coup. But it's a part of a larger turning away from the basic tenants that brought us the prosperity, the

leadership, the security, that we've enjoyed for so many decades.

So, the question is, I think, for all of us, for the U.S., for the EU, for the NATO countries, for Turkey, is there really an illiberal option if we want to continue to grow and prosper? Does it make sense to close our markets rather than open them? Does it make sense to put pressure on entrepreneurs and free business folks and to restate the economy? Does it make sense to stifle the voices of change and of descent or is it better to have a vibrant conversation and vibrant checks and balances? Is there really an illiberal option for the United States or for Turkey or for Europe if we want to continue to benefit and grow, but most importantly to lead the direction that this planet goes and to be that beacon as we've always prided ourselves in being for government by the governed, for individual human rights, for collective prosperity as a result of openness. And as Turks have prided themselves as being in terms of a gateway to a Middle East that hasn't lived as well as they have and as an engine for a Europe that might have gotten complacent and not as innovative as it could be.

So, I want to vote for us coming back to our fundamental principles and us supporting each other not just in defending liberalism and openness but also in defending a model of prosperity and growth that depends on trade, depends on integration, depends on fighting back against far more illiberal forces in other parts of the world that we have defeated before and that are coming for us again, and are trying to change the rules of the road in a way that will not benefit Americans, will not benefit Turks, and will not benefit Europeans. And that also goes to our requirement to lead in strengthening and rebuilding a Middle East where citizens have a voice, where disputes are settled at the negotiating table, and where the next generation of folks across that region really believe that they will have a say in how they are governed and in their own futures rather than be dominated by increasingly going back to the future in the sense of autocracy.

So, I hope we make the right choices, I hope Turkey makes the right choices, but together those of us who understand that we go stronger together as we got more open need to

work hard to defend that.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you, Victoria. I can't help but feel that this was an inspiring set of remarks that I of course deeply share. But then now I have to turn to Amanda to sort of bring us back to cruel reality and how she assesses that reality with particular focus on Turkey and Turkey's relations and maybe just a few words on how we may be able to come out from this rut and take a few steps towards the picture that Victoria and many of us would like to see reemerging. Thanks.

MS. SLOAT: Thank you very much. It's hard enough to speak after Victoria generally but especially with that setup it's even harder. But I very much agree with everything Victoria said, who was very much a coconspirator with me on wrestling with a lot of these issues on the U.S.-Turkey relationship during our time at the State Department.

And thank you to everybody who is here. The fact that we have a standing room only event I think is testament to the amount of interest as well as concern in Washington, both looking at the importance of the U.S.-Turkey relationship and also having a lot of concern about where the relationship stands now.

Certainly, as I used to say all the time in government which I think is equally true now, Turkey is an important but a challenging partner. As all of the speakers who have come before me have said it's very clear why Turkey remains an important player within Europe, within the Middle East, and of great interest to the United States. In fact, it's very difficult to think of many problems in that region in which Turkey is not an active player and an active part of the solution to those problems.

As Victoria mentioned, we have a situation in Syria where the U.S. continues to engage with Turkey on how to not only defeat ISIS but also to work on the governance strategy, the future of Assad, what does Syria look like after ISIS has gone. Turkey obviously has a vested interest in what's happening in Iraq following the referendum in the KRG. Turkey is an important counterterrorism partner for the U.S. and especially for Europe in terms of managing

the flow of foreign fighters from these battlefields into Europe.

Cyprus. Turkey is an important partner to resolving that, and if we could finally get that conflict resolved it would be wonderful for the region, especially for the prospects of NATO and EU cooperation.

Turkey is also housing over 3.5 million refugees right now, and it's extraordinary if you stop and think about that number especially when you think about some of the debates within the U.S. about refugees. 3.5 million. I think really it has done a remarkable job in terms of integrating that number of people into their society.

Turkey, I think, is also facing a lot of legitimate security concerns and I think rightly has some frustrations with the west. Victoria alluded to the coup attempt last summer and a lot of the aftermath that they are continuing to deal with there. Many Turks will describe it as their 9/11 and I think are taking a lot of security precautions to ensure that similar events don't happen again.

They also have very real security risks coming from their neighborhood, a decades'-long conflict with the PKK, certainly very clear on happiness with U.S. support for the YPG in Syria given its affiliations with the PKK, and also broader challenges within the region from terrorist groups.

Yet at the same time there is growing concern, and we're seeing very similar debates within the U.S. and within the European Union about some of the domestic trends in Turkey that are more illiberal, that are drifting in an authoritarian direction. I think while there is understanding and sympathy of the crackdown following the coup there is concern about the breadth and depth of some of these purges from government institutions especially when the Turkish government is seen to be pursuing NGOs, human rights activists, civil society, and media representation.

We're now also in the U.S. and in numerous western European countries seeing our citizens getting caught up in this ever-expanding net with I think a very flexible definition of

what constitutes terrorism. That rightly I think is causing a lot of concerns in our societies.

So, the challenge for both of us, on both sides of the Atlantic, is how to respond. How do you recognize that Turkey is a very important and legitimate strategic partner, and yet at the same time how do we respond to what we're seeing as troubling developments in a NATO ally and an EU-aspirant country?

In recent months you've started to see some of these countries taking some specific steps. Germany, for example, has updated their travel advisory to warn people from Germany travelling to Turkey that there is a possibility of arbitrary arrest and potentially limited options that the German government can use to help these citizens who are caught up in this in Turkey. The German government is also looking to limit some of the state guarantees for foreign investment in Turkey. So, given the tourism and the economic ties between Germany and Turkey that's an approach that the German government is taking.

Within the EU as a whole, efforts to update the customs union between the EU and Turkey have been put on hold. It's something that Turkey is quite keen to have, it's something I think that would be beneficial for both sides, but that's being placed on hold right now. Also, the decision on pre-accession funding to Turkey is being decreased somewhat by the EU, but importantly it's still being used and targeted towards civil society in Turkey which I think all of us need to support.

Finally, the U.S. has long struggled with how to respond to this as well, and I think the recent disagreement over visas certainly reflects some growing frustration here and also some consequences for some of these actions. I think the Turkish side characterizes this more as a visa spat. I think the way the State Department has characterized it is a much more legitimate response to concerns about the security of personnel at these consulate and embassy missions and a desire for some of those disagreements to get resolved.

Finally, let me say a few words about the broader questions that all of this raises, which is how in a sense do we think about our relationship with Turkey? I want to put forward

three sort of broad-brush approaches. One of the most extreme approaches is this desire that we should simply give up on Turkey. We should cut off EU accession talks. There are some very extreme arguments that maybe we should kick Turkey out of NATO, leaving aside NATO not actually having provisions to do that, but it's very much the abandon Turkey method. This I think would be the biggest mistake in terms of our approach.

If you look at the debates that are happening within the EU I think it's quite striking that two of the EU countries that actually have the most difficult relationship with Turkey right now are actually the biggest proponents of continuing the accession process and that's Germany and Greece. We had Greek Prime Minister Tsipras here a couple of weeks ago and he made a passionate defense about the need for the EU to continue engaging with Turkey as a means of keeping them within this transatlantic framework. There is a risk if we end up pushing Turkey away that they're going to look for strategic partners elsewhere, and those partners as we've seen in conversations about defense sales and about means of resolving the situation in Syria are Russia and Iran. So, if nothing else I think we need to keep pointing Turkey in this transatlantic orientation.

A second broad approach that people have started to advocate with increasing frequency on both sides of the Atlantic is to take a much more transactional approach to Turkey. Some in the EU have argued that perhaps we stop accession talks but we simply focus with Turkey on areas where we have shared interests, economics, counterterrorism. And there are similar arguments coming out of the U.S.

Personally, I'm skeptical of this approach. I'm particularly skeptical of the ability of western countries to be able to play this game cleanly and effectively. My argument would be that rule of law needs to be a fundamental component of our dialogue. An important part of the EU accession process is this rule of law and human rights framework and a set of benchmarks that Turkey needs to meet if it is going to join the EU.

If you look at disagreements between the U.S. and Turkey, especially on some of



these visa and court cases, they also get to broader questions of rule of law. And so taking rule of law completely off the agenda is not a way for either of our countries to solve these problems.

So, finally, my third approach and my preferred approach is to continue having dialogue with Turkey, and specifically to try and expand the dialogue to include a broader set of issues. I think today's meeting between Vice President Pence and Prime Minister Yıldırım is very important. I think we need to remember that our relationship is between countries, it's not between leaders. So, to the extent that we can broaden the engagement between our two countries, move beyond just our presidents to this engagement between vice presidents and prime ministers, engagement between Secretary Mattis and his counterpart, between Secretary Tillerson and his counterpart, and all the way down is extremely important.

Relatedly, we need to remember the 50 percent of Turkish society that does not support the direction that the country is going in, and that's why I think the EU's decision to continue targeting accession funds to civil society is important and that's why I think the United States needs to continue engaging with Turkish civil society.

Finally, I think there's a role for strengthening our economic relations. That's why I'm delighted that TÜSİAD is hosting this event, is an important partner of Brookings, and is continuing to put that message forward in both the United States and the European Union. There is tremendous capacity for stronger economic ties between our countries and I think it's an important way to continue broadening this dialogue to make the case that some of the measures that have been introduced within Turkey are not the most hospitable to business and foreign investment and to find ways to broaden and deepen our relations.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks, Amanda. I've had a career for more than 30 years in academia and as I listened to Amanda I kept saying, oh, I wish I could be saying what she's saying in such a structured, clear, and lucid manner. (Laughter). Amanda, I agree with your observations and especially those three options and your preference for the one that prefers engagement, dialogue, and supporting and sustaining rule of law.

All I'd like to add is to look back. And for Hakan and for me who've been observing Turkey for decades, Turkey reached its peak in the numbers of people pouring into Turkey as tourists, students, business people, et cetera, when its democracy and rule of law was in a much better state.

Turkey won a seat at the UN Security Council for the first time since the early 1960s in 2008 with a huge margin and then lost its second effort in 2014 in an embarrassing manner. So, its peak of soft power was also in those days and that sense was strongest I think in the neighborhood.

I don't want to abuse your time and also Hakan's time. Hakan, how do you look at this debate so far and how do the Turkish public look at this? Where do they stand themselves? And try not to be too depressing about what the picture is. (Laughter)

MR. YILMAZ: Thank you, Kemal. Thank you. It's also much harder to talk after these three excellent speakers.

Perhaps I just want to start with one remark which sort of came to my mind when I was listening to these speeches, which is to see Turkey as a problem. (Inaudible) used to say that Spain is the problem, Europe is the answer. Turkey is not a problem. Obviously it's a country which we live in, I'm going to go back to Turkey, teach in its university, socialize with its people. It's a tremendously creative country. It's not a problem, it's an asset for the west. It's a country with excellent companies, corporations, universities, very highly creative artists, very hospitable people.

So, the problem is not to see Turkey as a problem but to see ways of reintegrating Turkey into the liberal international order or into a liberal west which is a challenge not just for Turkey but also for the west. As Kemal used to underline the problem in our first speaker Victoria used too, the fact the west itself was distancing from the liberal principles and it's a challenge for both entities and not just for Turkey. So, Turkey is not a geostrategy problem, it's a geostrategy cultural, artistic, economic, military asset for the west. So, it's good

to keep that in mind before talking about Turkey. We're not some remote country, you know, in one of the lost parcels of the universe. That's one thing.

Second thing is Turkish public's decision for the European Union -- and that is my topic -- is a yes, and it has been a yes for at least 15 years since we started to measure public opinion in a serious way. But it's a highly qualified and complicated yes. Those who are saying yes changed. The reasons for which they have been saying yes have also changed. Interests and emotions at which they were saying yes have also started to change.

So, I'm going to talk about all these three in a minute but it is also a yes against the backdrop of historical memory of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire with the west plus certain constants of the public in Turkey with respect to Turkey's foreign relations and international context.

Historically speaking, Turkey joining the west is a yes against what we call Sèvres Syndrome which in Turkey is a court of operation, it's a modus operandi, which means since the time of the Crusaders in the 12<sup>th</sup> Century onwards have always been trying to western countries, whether European countries, Americans included into that, have been trying to keep the Turks away from Anatolia and the Holy Lands and give those sacred lands back to their rightful owners, whether these are the Greeks or the Armenians or the Kurds or whoever they are.

So, that is a syndrome in the sense that it has been very nicely codified, put into the school books, and transmitted from one generation to the other, so every Turkish school child, girl or boy, who studies in Turkish elementary schools learns this by heart. And then they finish the high school all her or history knowledge is this Sèvres Syndrome and the related knowledge about it. So, it's a very serious modus operandi, court of operation for Turkish population at large.

When we measure the public opinion in terms of various questions that aim to sort of find as indicators of Sèvres Syndrome what we found out is that close to 60 percent of

the population have been almost automatically answering our questions following the lines of this Sèvres Syndrome. It's a very serious emotional impediment that determines Turkey's -- at the emotional level that is what operates and that is what shapes Turkish-EU relations.

At the current level what we have found was that there is another court of operation which we have discovered lately with our research that was conducted almost exactly a year ago, we wanted to measure where the Turkish left and the Turkish right were diverging from one another, what were the norms, values, attitudes at which these two are separating from one another. What we found was the following.

The single most important issue in which the Turkish nationalists' rights was most intensely felt was Turkey's foreign relations, the international relations of the country. Not so much domestic politics of Turkey but as it comes to Turkey's relations with foreign countries, the international context of Turkey, that is the area in which 70 percent, 80 percent of the population were holding to the most intensely nationalistic propositions. So, that was declining when, for example, you talk about the economy or domestic political issues; you don't see that much nationalism. But when it comes to the foreign relations, the state logic so to speak, the *raison d'état*, has been very much influential in determining people's attitudes and that includes obviously Turkey's relations with the west.

For example, 70 to 80 percent believes that their nation is superior to the other nations, that they would (inaudible) their nations in conflicts with other nations no matter whether it is right or wrong. And if national interests are justifying it, it is good to interfere militarily in other nations even if that violates international law and international agreements. So, there is this great majority who are supporting these and other statements in terms of Turkey's international relations and foreign relations.

That is two operational causes, Sèvres Syndrome plus this foreign relations concentrated nationalism, are the emotional background against which Turkish people are making their decisions for the European Union. That decision is a yes. It's a yes in the sense

that it was around 70 percent of the people who would say yes to join the European Union in the early 2000s, the first time we took the poll it was 2002. Today, in time, this declines, steadily declines, to around 50 percent. The last time we measured this was exactly this month last year and I don't think it has changed since then. It should have increased a little bit actually to around close to 60 percent today, that's my hunch of the public opinion, but it stays around 50 plus percent.

The reasons -- the composition of the people who say yes have also changed, interestingly, in the past than the current problem was galvanizing, mobilizing its own constituency for the cause of the European Union and for this they did a great job. They mobilized the outskirts of the big cities, the small towns and villages of Anatolia for the cause of Turkey joining the European Union. At that time the majority of the supporters used to be more right-wing, more rural, and more religious segments of the Turkish population.

In time, particularly in the last five to six years, this composition has changed and today the majority of this 50 plus percent who will support Turkey's entry into the European Union are composed of the more metropolitan, more well-educated, left-leaning, or liberal left-leaning, younger, more women, segments of the Turkish population. So, the composition has also changed.

With the composition changing the reasons for which, or the expected benefits from the European Union membership have also changed. In the past economic benefits came at the top of the list and today political benefits are topping the list, particularly expectations of a society that is under rule of law, democracy, those types of political -- and free movement in the European Union, that also has risen in the last five years to be almost the third reason for which people are expecting to join the European Union.

If my time is up I can stop here.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes, thanks, Hakan. (Laughter)

MR. YILMAZ: Or I can go on talking.

MR. KIRIŞCI: It's the first time a panelist is offering to stop.

MR. YILMAZ: I was trying to squeeze myself into this eight minutes but --

MR. KIRIŞCI: I think you really did a truly grand job, especially towards the end when you compared the way in which the composition of the supporters have changed. I think this is very significant.

Time has lapsed very quickly. Rather than me asking a second round of questions to the panelists I'd like to turn to you, to the floor, because I'm sure you have many questions and we do have a great panel here. So, I look forward to receiving your questions.

There is one already in the far end.

QUESTIONER: Hello, Harry (inaudible) with Georgetown University. I want to ask a question about Fethullah Gulen. Obviously it's an issue of great importance for President Erdoğan. He's given evidence to the Justice Department saying that he needs to be extradited but I think that the indication is that that evidence was not enough for the U.S. government considering that Gulen is still in the United States.

So, given the importance that the Turkish government places on extraditing Fethullah Gulen and the importance that the United States government places on the rule of law and ensuring that we follow the treaties that we've set with Turkey, what's a concrete path forward on resolving this issue given no evidence on one side and the need for evidence on our side? Thank you very much.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you. Yes, please? And let me take three questions a round.

QUESTIONER: My name is (inaudible). I would like to ask the question estimating Turkey foreign policy since last three years kind of little bit underestimated related based on the President Erdoğan view, I would like to ask especially for two previous U.S. diplomats, is there any way that U.S. can change the world's view trying to figure out a better deal between Turkey as a democratic-elected country person instead of using this (inaudible)

views and creating more difficult situation to connection between Turkish public and government?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you. Yes, please? And then I'll have another round.

QUESTIONER: Rosie Berman, attempting to build a career in the foreign policy space. My question is for former Ambassador Nuland. You mentioned that the Syrian civil war is an existential threat to Turkey. Would you mind elaborating on that? Thank you.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you. I'll take you in the next round. Let me turn to the U.S. diplomats -- former diplomats, we must underline it. Let's see if you're able to respond to the question of Gulen's extradition and how to find a balance between that issue and the rule of law, as well as the question about whether a different narrative could be adopted on Turkey. There is also the Syrian war one for you, I believe.

Let's start with you, Victoria.

MS. NULAND: Excellent, all right.

MR. KIRIŞCI: You're the more experienced one, so.

MS. NULAND: Amanda is, as you know, a terrific Europeanist and great friend of Turkey so I was proud to work with her in the State Department.

On the Gulen issue, the issue here is that the evidence needs to persuade not the U.S. Executive Branch but the U.S. Judicial Branch that there is a case here. The Turkish government appears to be even more sure in its conviction based on its continuing to unwind intelligence information, et cetera, that there are roots back to Pennsylvania. It is a good thing that that evidence is continuing to be provided to the Justice Department. But the worst thing that could happen would be for us to try to make a case but fail in the U.S. court system due to lack of evidence. So, when I left government we were trying to work together on the kinds of evidence that would be persuasive in a U.S. court. I hope that is continuing.

On a better dialogue with Turkey on foreign policy, to me it's part and parcel of the Syria question. I think it begins and ends with Syria. My personal view is that we missed an

opportunity in 2012, '13, '14, to come up with a common strategic approach with Turkey, with our European allies and with some in the Gulf on how to approach Syria as the war began to spiral.

Turkish government came to us in 2013, 2014, wanted to do much more together in northern Syria. It was unclear whether we would have been able to make that deal but I wish we had taken it more seriously because obviously we ended up in that place with the work we're now doing to the west of the Euphrates together, less aligned to the east of the Euphrates. But by that time the situation had spiraled greatly and we had players like Russia and Iran working for different aims that complicated the situation.

So, I would still hope that we could work with Turkey on a combined military and political pathway. I'd like to see a lot more emphasis on end-state diplomacy particularly now that Raqqa has been liberated. Who is going to run Raqqa? Are they going to be in the image of the future Syria that we'd like to see? Are they going to try to demonstrate to Syrians including those who aspire to, you know, ideas from other parts of the world as to what a peaceful democratic Syria could look like?

When I talk about an existential problem for Turkey it's not just the flow of refugees, it's the fact that there was abuse of Turkish territory by those who were trying to exploit the problems in Syria, that our views of who is a terrorist and who wasn't were not always aligned either. And straight geography. If you're closest you're going to feel it most.

So, I would like to see us start with that and do it better than we've done it either in the Obama administration or to date in the Trump administration.

MR. KIRIŞCI: I suspect that that issue is probably being addressed right now.

MS. NULAND: Let's hope so.

MR. KIRIŞCI: And let's hope that some progress can be achieved. Amanda, how would you respond? I suspect you're going to reflect along similar lines to Victoria on the Gulen extradition issue. That was a very good point, judiciary/ executive difference there. But



the question about that narrative, narrative towards Turkish democracy, coming from the United States, how would you respond to that?

MS. SLOAT: Victoria and I are likeminded on many of these issues and I agree with her response. The only thing I would add on Gulen is I think the way you framed the question is right, and I think there's a risk that it's going to remain a bilateral irritant for that reason.

The one thing I would add is I think there is a perception in Turkey that the U.S. is not taking this seriously and I would disagree with that. Certainly, my sense of the way the U.S. administration both under Obama and now under Trump is approaching this is that there is very active and ongoing consideration within the Department of Justice of the evidence that the Turkish government has handed over, and there have been visits by teams of State Department and Justice Department lawyers to Ankara to discuss these things. So, I think it should continue to be discussed but there is a risk, as you said, that we're going to remain at this impasse.

On the question of perceptions, I think that's particularly unfortunate, and I think there tends to be a lot of anti-Americanism in the Turkish media which is also unfortunate perpetuating some of these misunderstandings. I think there is also a lot of frustration in Washington about things that are happening within Turkey. You certainly see this in Congressional debates, you know, you can hear it at think tank events around town.

So, I think as was said by one of the earlier speakers today, there is a very high degree of mistrust between the two countries and I think there is not always a very sufficient or in-depth understanding by both countries of what's happening. That's why I think I would make a continued plea for dialogue and also for the U.S. to continue to try and find ways to speak to the Turkish people directly.

Ambassador John Bass, in one of his last acts when he was in Ankara, for example, recorded a video on YouTube to try and get his message out directly to the Turkish public about why the U.S. had taken the actions that it did on suspending the visas. I think that

was an attempt for the U.S. government to try and get its narrative or its explanation out of why it was taking these actions to make the case that it was not directed against the Turkish people but was being done for specific security reasons.

So, I think it is a challenge. I think it's an unfortunately byproduct of a lot of the mistrust that we have between these two countries, but there needs to be continued dialogue both at the very senior levels of U.S. government and also within civil society as well.

MR. KIRIŞCI: I can't help but want to add a point to what Amanda just said which I agree with. Part of that dialogue I feel also requires a freer media in Turkey so that the narratives emerging from that dialogue trickles down to the public and impacts on its public opinion.

I seriously doubt that there are many in the Turkish public who are aware of how seriously U.S. authorities are taking the extradition request. I seriously doubt that they are aware of the visits that, Amanda, you have just referred to. This I think once more underlines your point towards the end of your first intervention where you said why transactional relations would not really work but that you need to focus on the shared values. Open society, more dialogue, and more recognition, awareness, of what the real picture is rather than the picture that is constructed on behalf of the public there.

Hakan, would you like to respond too briefly or shall I go for the second round?

MR. YILMAZ: I think there were enough responses.

MR. KIRIŞCI: We had a gentleman right in the middle who was seeking the floor. And then, yes, of course, you and then -- yes, right there. Thank you. Try to be brief so we can take one more round.

QUESTIONER: Okay. My name is Isat Singer, World Bank retiree. Yes, there are problems in Turkey you read in the papers, you also talk about those problems. But I'm curious about one thing. Turkish economy this year will grow at 5 percent. In the next two to three years 3 percent, 4 percent, maybe higher. Those numbers, growth rates, are higher than

in the United States and in the whole of Europe. In Europe it runs around 2 percent.

My question is how can we explain this? Economy is performing better compared to some countries but there are so many social, economic problems, political problems.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you. Yes, sir? To your right.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Edward Nessim, unemployed. (Laughter) I have a comment and a question.

The first comment is we've mentioned how the relationship over the last decade has been getting worse, partly for policy reasons from the United States, the confusion in Syria, the Arab Spring, but also to do with large changes in Turkey.

My question is the following: what will make the present Turkish government happy? Thank you.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Ooh. (Laughter) Yes, please?

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Hi, Katie Lundy, master's candidate at American University. Over the summer I had the opportunity to work with the Turkish-American Lines in Pennsylvania and Harrisburg and there were a few differing opinions on the coup and the legitimacy of the coup. So, I was wondering for the perceptions between the Turkish people and the American people if there was indeed a distinct difference between how the coup was received between our two countries? Thank you.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you. Really great questions. Hakan has a background as an economist. I believe he graduated from the Department of Economics with a flying GPA. (Laughter). Well, I'm sure something is left behind. Would you be able to take the question on the economy there? I have my own opinion too that I'd like to share but I'd prefer to hide behind you.

MR. YILMAZ: Economically speaking, one of the most important developments over the last 15 years or so was two major developments. One was the inclusion of new

classes into the mainstream economy; new entrepreneurs, new consumers, new producers that hadn't been previously in the economic sphere. Now they've made an entry into the economic sphere and they have become rich, much richer compared to their past level of living. And they are the major constituency of the current government. So, that's one perhaps major development.

The other side of the picture is that the current government has established a light network of social security that touches upon providing hospital services, health services, to poorer segments of society which are I believe even better than some European societies and particularly the United States, maybe. Plus smaller-, medium-sized payments to, for example, women who take care of disabled children at home, to people who were fighting in the anti-terror movement.

So, there are a number of payments from the government budget to the different lower segments of society and that also somehow included them into the mainstream economy and as supporters of the current government. So, the current government, economically speaking, virtually created its economic new classes and included them into the economic mainstream.

So, the problem today is obviously these people are scared of being excluded from the economic mainstream if the power constellation changes. So, therefore, in any power constellation, any reasonable opposition would simply reiterate its commitment to keep them included. If you create an atmosphere that if I come to power you are going to go back to your dusty Anatolian towns, to the outskirts of the big cities, you are going to be impoverished and I'm going to give my money back to the old classes, the old money people, then that type of position is bound to lose every single election to the foreseeable future.

So, those people have been in, they are in, and they is no way they are going to go anywhere else. And they have also made an emotional investment, as Ernesto Laclau has said, in the current government and (inaudible). So it's hard to sort of back up that relationship.

Every opposition project in Turkey has to take this hard political-economic fact into consideration when designing its own project for political power and economic development.

MR. KIRIŞCI: But you didn't stress the difference between 3 and 5 percent. I'm not an economist, and I see some economist in the audience, at the risk of being thrown tomatoes at I'm going to argue on the heels of what Hakan has just said, bearing in mind what he's just said, that the difference between 3 and 5 percent is that the government is pumping credit into the economy to continue to maintain the people who were successfully integrated, included in the economy --

MR. YILMAZ: I was going to just say this, that by including certain segments you also exclude certain other segments and that is the political problem we have. Your previous economic success also becomes a hindrance for economic growth. For example, if you grew too much on construction today that sort of becomes an impediment for further economic growth. So, you have to reinvest your resources in new economies, in new people. That means political inclusion. That is, I think, the problem we have found ourselves in.

The problem is two-fold. Not to exclude the previously excluded, to reinclude the previously excluded. That is the political problem we have to solve and that is a very highly complicated problem, nor does a solution exist to the problem. When I look at the political programs and projects of the position parties they are nowhere close to solving this major complicated, complex issue. So, that is also a political problem. There is a political problem for which there is no political solution.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yes. And to be able to sustain that growth rate Turkey needs technology and Turkey needs foreign direct investment. That is not going to be achieved and sustained if you have the government of Germany feeling obliged to issue warnings to its citizens that also include business people, investors, engineers, that are then unable to travel to Turkey and engage the Turkish economy in the direction that Hakan suggested it should be going in terms of keeping up with the massive changes, technological changes that are taking

place, and Bahadır made references to the fourth revolution there.

We got a bit digressed and we do have two more questions there. One is what would make the government happy in Turkey.

MS. NULAND: I'm not going to speak for the Turkish government. (Laughter)  
They have representatives here who can do that.

MR. KIRIŞCI: And then the good question from Harrisburg, the differences of --

MS. NULAND: Maybe you should comment on what would make the Turkish government happy.

MR. YILMAZ: Yes, yes, you should do it. (Laughter)

MS. NULAND: He's not going to invite me back.

MR. KIRIŞCI: I need to have had some career in diplomacy to be able to wiggle myself out of this tough question. But I will suggest that some of the answers might be in the book. (Laughter)

MS. NULAND: A shameless plug. An excellent book.

MR. KIRIŞCI: All right, I'll take a risk. If I was in the shoes of the American government, which I'm not, or in the shoes of the European Union I think I would try to start by engaging in a dialogue to encourage all sides to look in the mirror and to begin to address what were the mistakes that were made along the line and try to suggest extracting lessons for all sides, the Turkish side but also the American and the European sides, with the objective of moving forward together in a constructive way.

I would like to think and believe, go back to that quarter-full glass, that hopefully today's meeting may open the way towards such an exercise. It's not an easy one; I appreciate the challenges and the difficulties. But I also do think that the transatlantic community side, the U.S. and the European Union, have a strong card and that strong card is the fact that Turkey was doing impressively well when it was engaged in and with the west in a constructive way. I hope this helps.

But, Hakan, would you be able to very quickly respond to the differences on the coup coming from Harrisburg? How come, if I understood the question correctly, the perception of what happened in the U.S. is somewhat different than what happened in Turkey?

MR. YILMAZ: I think the U.S. perceptions of domestic politics of Turkey have also tainted the U.S. perceptions of the coup attempt last year and that was a tragedy because that was a real threat and the Turkish government felt life and death question for a while. This wasn't seen as such a big threat at least for a while by the U.S. and European governments. On the contrary some theories that the Turkish government soft-staged the coup against itself. That was not well received obviously by the Turkish government in Turkey.

So, if I were in the shoes of the U.S. or European Union policymakers I think I would perhaps readdress my policies in the sense of including Turkey in the European Union, for example, by opening certain chapters that call for Turkey to reestablish rule of law, democracy, and those issues about which they are now very highly critical of Turkish domestic politics. These are going to form very productive sort of institutions, institutional mechanisms, through which there is going to be, as you said, dialogue between the two sides. And through this dialogue they might voice their grievances, mutual grievances, agree on what they are conflicting from one another, and perhaps come to certain agreements.

The only way to have this conversation is to restart the EU accession process for which the European Union is so much scared that any move towards Turkey would be perceived by the European populations as a concession to Turkey and then the far-right is going to rise and they're going to lose elections. I think this scare on the part of the European Union is preventing the European Union from using its strongest tool, its strongest instrument, for contributing to the problems for which they are criticizing Turkey. So, that's a major problem on the part of the European Union.

In the case of Turkey I think the EU is the major player and the United States traditionally has supported the EU for engaging itself with Turkey. I think that if the two powers

make this type of engagement using the EU accession mechanisms for contributing to Turkish rule of law and democracy that would be in the short-term a very highly stabilizing force for the Turkish government and I think also for the Turkish public opinion.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks, Hakan. I need not say that I am in agreement with Hakan and that dialogue need not be only at the level of government and leaders and ministries but also civil society. I that is very pertinent to the question that was raised from Harrisburg.

We've run out of time. I was really hoping to take another round. But I do want to give Victoria and Amanda a quick opportunity to make closing remarks in the light of especially the discussion we just had on dialoguing, the Turkish economy, et cetera. Thanks.

MS. NULAND: Just very briefly and very simply to say that I agree with everything that's been said about the importance particularly in a U.S.-Turkey context but also the three-legged stool of Turkey, EU, and the U.S. to continue to try to work through the challenges that we have, to continue to try to keep our societies open and vibrant, and to take advantage of opportunities like prime minister-vice president happening at the same time as TÜSİAD-Brookings to knit that fabric. And more exchanges of young Americans to Turkey and young Turks to the United States in the business sector and the nonprofit sector and on the government side.

We can't lose each other; it's too important. Neither one of us can afford to turn our back on our responsibilities as open, free societies both in terms of the transatlantic space and globally.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you, Victoria. Amanda?

MS. SLOAT: I'm the final thing standing between you and your lunches. Victoria took the words out of my mouth. I have nothing further to add. (Laughter)

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks. Thank you to you all. (Applause)



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