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THE PATH FORWARD FOR
DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA

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Who is Kim Jong Un?:

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Closing Remarks:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. JONES: Good morning. Welcome to Brookings. My name is Bruce Jones. I'm the vice president and the director of the Foreign Policy program here; and it's my pleasure to welcome all of you to today's very important workshop conference.

This is a conference jointly hosted by our Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the John L. Thornton China Center; and I think could not be more timely given the heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in advance of President Trump's visit to the region in the coming month in which the North Korea challenge will figure very prominently.

And the purpose of today's debate is to inform effective strategy for dealing with North Korea, which is surely one of the toughest policy problems on the world stage today. This specific day is designed to generate insights onto two key questions, which are often left aside in the discussion. One, who is Kim Jong Un, and what does he want? It's fine for us to debate the options to think about what we want, but any kind of serious strategy has to start with an understanding of who Kim is and what is he trying to accomplish; and second, what can be learned from past efforts to deal with this problem. This is not the first go-round of any set of strategies, and we want to make sure that we're learning as much as we can from what's been done in the past, both successes and failures of past efforts.

We have an extraordinary lineup to explore these questions today. We're extremely pleased to welcome Avril Haines, former deputy national security advisor, as our keynote, who will speak at lunch, who has been grappling not only with this challenge, but well aware of the complexities of American decision-making and how we try to think about this kind of problem; and we have a very deep bench of talent who have been thinking about this issue over a few decades, as well as in the near term.

I'm going to turn the floor over to Ryan Hass in a moment to introduce the rest of the panel, but before I do that, I want to introduce two people who have recently joined what is now a very deep bench on Korea and Korean Peninsula talent here at Brookings.

The first is Jung Pak, who is our new SK-Korea Foundation chair in Korea Studies. She served for eight years in the Intel community, both at the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and has an academic background, studying American history at Hunter College; and is really one of the world's sort of foremost experts on the real dynamics of the Korean Peninsula. I'm delighted to

have her here, adding bench strength and leadership to our efforts on both South and North Korea; and Ryan Hass -- who's over there -- is the David Rubenstein fellow in Foreign Policy. He just joined us. Prior to Brookings, he was a career foreign service officer, and served in the Obama White House, actually the National Security Council director for China, Taiwan and Mongolian Affairs -- so knows of what we speak when we think about the question of the Korean challenge and the Chinese angle to that; and these two will contribute enormously to our work.

You will have noticed we also have a new president, here at Brookings, John Allen, who among other things was the last military representative to the six-party talks the last time there were six-party talks with the Koreans -- so, just adding to our capability here at Brookings to try to offer insights, and thoughts, and constructive suggestions to those people inside the administration and outside, and to our allies who are grappling with this extraordinarily thorny problem.

And with that, let me turn it over to Ryan to introduce the panel.

MR. HASS: Good morning. Thank you, Bruce. As Bruce mentioned, the first panel will concentrate on the question, who is Kim Jong Un? What motivates him? What worries him? We have an all-star panel to unpack these questions.

Evan Osnos is a nonresident fellow in the Thornton China Center at Brookings, and a staff writer at The New Yorker magazine. He won the National Book Award for his book, "Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in New China." He also captivated audiences recently with his latest dispatch from Pyongyang, "The Risk of Nuclear War With North Korea."

The second panelist is Jean H. Lee who is a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a veteran correspondent. In 2011, Ms. Lee became the first American reporter granted extensive access in North Korea; and, in 2012, she opened AP's Pyongyang Bureau. She has since travelled often to North Korea, and in the process developed a deep expertise on what happens inside North Korea. We are pleased that she travelled from Seoul to be with us today.

The third panelist is Jung Pak, who Bruce has already introduced. I will just add that she's a good friend and a great colleague, and I'm delighted to be working with her.

Each panelist will make five minutes of opening remarks. Following the opening session, there will be Q&A with the audience; and I would now like to invite the panelist to the stage and we'll

begin with Evan.

MR. OSNOS: Thank you very much, Ryan; and thanks to Brookings as ever for putting together a terrific group today. We've got all our bases covered; and I'm going to be succinct because I'm much more interested in hearing what my fellow panelist have to say.

Just one logistic explanation -- I was in Pyongyang in August, in my capacity as a writer for The New Yorker magazine, and some people have said, how did you persuade the North Koreans to allow you to come and meet with government officials? And I said, well, actually, the more pertinent question is how did I persuade my wife that this was an idea that was worth tolerating; and she's a person of heroic forbearance, and so, I think, I should mention that at every occasion.

I'm going to make three observations about Kim Jong Un and the era of Kim Jong Un that I think might help us understand the world that he inhabits or at least the world that he is trying to project.

The first one is about the methodology of war. There is, after all, nothing new about the idea that the DPRK, or North Korea, presents a self-methodology about war and the significance of war in its narrative. This goes back for 70 years; but there is some important distinctions in the way that they talk about it now, really in the six years since Kim Jong Un has come into office that I think are, at least, worth noting. These are not differences of kind, so much as, perhaps, differences of emphasis.

The first one is that as a smaller and smaller share of the population has any personal experience or contact with the Korean War, he has to go that much further in order to remind everybody that it is an essential part of their self-image and, more importantly, his self-image; he after all being the offspring of Kim Il-Sung, and in their story -- let's remember, the United States invade;, was driven from North Korea in humiliation under the visionary leadership of his grandfather, Kim Il-Sung; and for that reason, he has inaugurated a larger, more lavish war museum in downtown Pyongyang -- you can see this when you go -- and even if it was initiated under his father, he has made sure that he makes frequent visits. It's a big part of the propaganda message; and when you walk in, the first thing that you see is a statute, three stories tall, that looks exactly like Kim Jong Un, but is, in fact, Kim Il-Sung; and if you make a point about that likeness they are thrilled because that's the point.

So, the other distinctive element of that methodology is that it's become inextricably intertwined with the notion of achieving the threshold -- the threshold that they perceive as having been

reached in July when they were able to fire an ICBM with the capability, at least in theory, of being able to hit the continental United States. That's their description; and they now mention it constantly -- and you'll hear this more as other visitors go, and I promise you there will be more visitors. This is now part of a new period where they're going to be doing that, and part of that -- talking about that threshold -- is that they now talk about the idea of a nuclear exchange in sort of casual ways -- the idea that it is a survivable part of warfare, and it's an evitable part of the continuum of the experience that they've had surviving Korean War and then also surviving famine, and so on.

A second observation that I made in Pyongyang is about the emphasis on economic development; and you saw this then repeated over the weekend in Kim Jong Un's comments to the Central Committee in which he referred repeatedly to economic development to the Pyongyang line; the idea of parallel simultaneous development of the nuclear program; and the economy. This is also, incidentally, carefully chosen to tie him in to his grandfather. His grandfather outlined the Pyongyang line in 1962 to the Central Committee. So, there is very much a connection between the way in which he talks about the economy and what he's trying to do which is to present himself as the inevitable and natural outgrowth of the heroic founder of the country.

If you go you see these show-piece real estate developments -- we've all read the same things that at the higher floors there may not be electricity; but, actually, the truth is, there is a fair amount of visible economic activity; and Jean will be able to speak to that more eloquently than I can -- she's got this longitudinal perspective. But outside the official economy, you see a lot of economic activity, as well. If you talk to defectors, as I have been doing recently, they will tell you about the new status symbols for the super-rich. There's always been, obviously, a class system in North Korea, but there is now this very pronounced divide between the super-rich and others; and the principle status symbol of the moment is a Yamaha piano. As I was told, it doesn't matter if you can play it; you have to have a piano.

So, that's also an indicator about the degree to which the permeability of the sanctions regime. You are able to get things into the country. There's a lot of this sort of visible status symbols that people are showing off as they go about their lives. One of them is electricity. If you get your neighbors together in your building; you essentially form a little bargaining unit; and you go to the electrical substation; and you say we are a special building; and you give them a bag of cash, and then you get

much more reliable electricity transmission than others.

A third observation about Kim Jong Un -- and then I'll leave it after this -- is his relationship to China, or at least the way that he talks about China, or doesn't talk about China. It is quite notable that after five days in Pyongyang, the only subject that I was asked not to write about of my interactions with North Korean government officials -- they said just don't quote us on what we said about China -- and I can be faithful to that agreement while also conveying the spirit of it; and the spirit of it was that they were very, very harsh; and they basically said that they regard China's approach to North Korea as essentially treating them like a pawn in this much larger dynamic with the United States. And, so, they are fundamentally distrustful of the idea that China has, at all, their best interest at heart. North Korean's have said to other American interlocutors that China treats them like the dirt between their toes. That's the expression that you've heard from others, which is a long way from lips and teeth, after all, which was the original formulation that Chairman Mao liked to describe the relationship between North Korea and China.

Just a couple of obvious points -- Xi Jinping has not seen Kim Jong Un; Kim Jong Un has not received the Chinese Ambassador in Pyongyang, and there have been efforts to -- you've seen that some of the North Korean weapon tests have been done on such a schedule that they embarrass the Chinese leadership -- most recently, the rocket launch last month that happen to coincide with Xi Jinping presiding over the opening of the Brecht Summit. Whether or not this was deliberately designed for that day or not, there was clearly no effort to prevent it from happening.

So, just in summary, I would say there're these three kinds of sort of political demonstration going on. One is about the methodology of war, incorporating the new capability that they have demonstrated; two, is about this commitment to economic pragmatism in some form or another, and at least permitting the elites to enjoy the benefits of economic development -- pacifying them to some degree; and then, the third would be the public and private effort to maintain independence from China, or at least to demonstrate assert that they are willing to reject Chinese influence and control; and I'll leave it there; thank you very much.

MS. LEE: I want to thank Jung and Ryan for including me in this panel today. Please bear with me because it's just about my bedtime in Seoul. So, I'll do my best to stay alert and coherent.

I'm not sure you planned, specifically, to have this panel on October 10th, but I just want to remind you that it is the Worker's Party anniversary -- the foundation of the Worker's Party. It's not a milestone year, so we're not expecting massive parades or anything like that; but I just want to point out that it is exactly seven years to the day that we first saw Kim Jong Un -- that he made his first public appearance. Not only to us in the outside world -- actually, I saw him the night before -- but to the North Korean people, as well. And I was there on Kim Il-Sung Square just standing on the plaza when he did step forward and present himself to his people. And I could not help -- and I'm sure you've all seen these pictures that the AP put -- the baby fat, the chubby cheeks -- and I just thought, God, I really hope this guy has a couple years of grooming because he's got a lot to take on. But it was really only 14 months later that his father passed away from a heart attack; and he was thrust into that role as leader; and I mention his youth and his relative inexperience; and also his relatively new appearance on the scene, because I do think those factors inform the strategy in North Korea.

What I want to do is -- because I have spent time in North Korea and I think we have several sessions of some very smart people who are going to be talking about some of the other issues -- the U.S., North Korea relations and the way forward -- what I'd like to do is just present a couple of points on the internal pressures inside North Korea, perhaps to try to help you understand the thinking on the part of Kim Jong Un -- since this is about who is Kim Jong.

So much of the country's ideology is pinned on this idea of a Kim in power. This is by design, but also puts a lot of pressure on Kim Jong Un to make sure that he follows through with that role for decades to come. Now, one thing I did when I was in Pyongyang in May -- my last trip was in May -- was ask at the bookstore for some books about Kim Jong Un. This is a guy we know so very little about. So, I did pick up two books. I will call them memoirs, but I will use air quotes because what I was looking for were some details to confirm the year that he was born. That has not ever been publicly disclosed; and I do believe the North Koreans will fudge that detail; and also a little bit about his childhood because we speculate quite a bit about the influence that shaped him when he was educated in Switzerland. You know, how much influence did the West have on his thinking? None of that is in here. This is essentially a printed format of Kim Jong Un looking at things; but it does have a very interesting -- when you open it up and you read the cover page -- and I'll just read the quote on the cover page. The revolutionary cause

of Juche, pioneered on Mount Paektu, will be carried forward reliably by Comrade Kim Jong Un as the lineage of Mount Paektu. I say this with confidence -- and this is a quote from Kim Jong Un -- just to show you the kind of importance that they've put on having a Kim member at the top of this power hierarchy; and for him to have to carry that forward for decades to come is expected as part of a calculation that goes into their strategy, both domestic and external.

So, I would just mention a few points. Now, in order to maintain that sense of loyalty among the people, they've clearly gone to no expense, at great cost to their people. We're talking about these bronze monuments that we're seeing, but it's not just that, it goes beyond that -- its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. So much money is being poured into that.

We need to remember that this is an impoverished country and people are going without food; without electricity; without the basic necessities of life because the regime has decided that they need to put the larger interest of the country's survival -- they need to make that a precedent and that takes priority. So, they're looking at the longer gain; and they're telling their people that without these things, without nuclear weapons, and without enforcing this sense of loyalty, we will not exist.

Another point that I would like to make -- just a couple of things that Kim Jong Un is under pressure to do. He needs to justify his status; his power; his position; and the rockets are all part of that. They're also portrayed -- I'd like to point out -- as gifts to the leader. Every time they send a rocket or even test a nuclear device, they call it gifts to the leader. That touches on the sense of filial piety that Koreans are very familiar with. So, part of the equation of understanding North Korea is understanding Korean culture, as well; and that has been bred through thousands of years of Confucian background. It's just important to look at North Korea through that filter, as well, and not just through this external filter that we're looking at from Washington.

Staying in power -- in order to stay in power, he's got to build loyalty among the people, among the elites, as Evan mentioned. This is a hard thing for a young man to do who had only been in the public eye for 14 months, and also had not had the time to build those loyalty networks that you need to stay in power in a regime and a structure like this. So, developing that core economy; making sure that you keep the elites happy; and also exacting punishment to those who do not follow your orders and exhibit any kind of opposition; so, really maintaining strict control over the behavior of the people who are

going to serve as your henchmen. So, there's quite a lot of effort spent on maintaining and building the sense of loyalty in these networks.

Part of that also, and Evan talked about this in his New Yorker piece, building the loyalty of the next generations to come. You need the loyalty of the next generation -- the youth and the children. One of the interesting things that you see in North Korea is, as we mentioned -- I think that you may have mentioned -- the rockets and the kind of violent imagery that we see in kindergartens, in schools. I was actually at dinner with a friend who has a two-year old child, and he was distracting us because he was playing with a space shuttle that he had gotten recently here in Washington at the Aeronautics Museum; and it really occurred to me. So, this child is two years old, he can barely speak a full sentence, but he could tell me about every single part of that space shuttle -- the boosters, and how it takes off; and how it lands. I made the connection thinking this is not that different. The North Koreans have picked up on a really smart strategy. Kids love space; they love space shuttles; they love rockets; they love devices. North Korea, Kim Jong Un, is also tapping into that -- children love this kind of technology; and he's building a sense of loyalty by giving them these kinds of tools; and also taking it to a higher level. Giving them computers; giving them the possibility of applying that technology and science to something that will carry them into the future; and bring them some sense of political clout, which is programs, and nuclear weapons, and bombs, and missiles that will bring some political clout to them within the Worker's Party.

Now, he also has to show that he can defend the country. He's a young man, and in order to show that he can defend the country, he needs an outside threat. There is, frankly, nothing like an outside threat to bring a country together at a time when they are suffering from economic hardship. We see this in countries all over the world. Perhaps, we're seeing a little bit of that in this country, as well. North Korea and Kim Jong Un know the power of creating an outside threat. And, so, one of the things I see with this escalation of rhetoric between Washington and Pyongyang is that's just feeding the North Korean agenda. They actually need that rhetoric in order to justify and rationalize the continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. And, so, that is one issue that I hope we'll hear people discuss in later panels because that just serves to feed Kim Jong Un's agenda so he show his people that he can defend them. I do think that it's a counter-productive approach when it comes to North

Korea.

And the last point that Evan mentioned -- building the economy. If you look at the most recent book that came out on Kim Jong Un, that is the most important point that comes through in terms of their policy objectives -- is building the economy. And one thing I did notice when I was looking at the recent band of Korea economic figures -- you know, we have so little understanding of how their economy works. They have not published data in decades. However, we can make some estimates based on customs figures and other types of figures coming from other countries; but what we do know is that their economy has grown. Nuclear weapons, and the development of nuclear weapons -- they've been good for the North Korean economy; and so, this goes hand-in-hand when we talk about Pyongyang and his sort of parallel track. He's able to tell his people that by building nuclear weapons, we're also building the economy. It's about production; it's about manufacturing; so this is something to keep in mind, as well.

Now, I'm not going to go into any policy objectives because I'm hoping that we'll discuss that in later panels, but I would like for you to just keep in mind what the internal pressures are in North Korea. I think so much of our thinking is based on how North Korea is reacting to us in the outside world; but I do think Kim Jong Un have some internal pressures to deal with himself. He needs to stay in power; he needs to find a way to build the economy; he needs to build the loyalty of his people for decades to come -- and some of these calculations tie into this incredibly well-crafted and savvily-detailed strategy around nuclear weapons -- and nuclear weapons, they call them their treasured sword.

It started with Kim Il-Sung; it started with two pistols with Kim Il-Sung; and what he's trying to do -- and it's absolutely true that he is trying to model himself and ride on the coattails of his illustrious grandfather, but with a very modern bent. So, what he wants to say is I'm just like my grandfather, but while my grandfather had two pistols, I've got however many numbers of nuclear weapons. I'm following in his footsteps; I'm following in his path, but in a much more modern way. He is banking everything on these nuclear weapons and its satisfying both domestic and external needs as well; and that's something that's important to look at and consider. When we talk about a strategy going forward, we need to take into account the domestic pressures that he faces, and take into account whether he is going to be willing to give up the nuclear weapons, or what it is that we need to do in order to make sure that his sense of security -- and some of these other factors that he feels that he needs to

take care of first at home -- are secure and stable so that he can think about interacting and engaging with the outside world in a constructive way.

I wanted to just address a couple of points that Evan mentioned in terms of it's absolutely true that when they did build these high-rise apartments there were a lot of grumbles from -- even though these are very nice apartments, and really sort of allocated both for, not only the people who used to live in those areas, but people who are getting the apartments as a kind of perk -- but there were some concern among the people that living on those higher floors would be problematic because the power does go out. I'm not sure how it was for you but, generally speaking, when I was living there, it was out by 10 p.m., and you'd be in the middle of dinner and all of a sudden the lights would go out -- very standard for us. I always carried a flashlight. I didn't even interrupt my conversation, just turned it on -- very much a part of daily life in North Korea. That said -- I did hear some concerns about what will happen when the power goes out and you're living on the 25th floor.

An interesting point -- I am right now analyzing North Korean dramas. The dramas that are being released in the Kim Jong Un era, and I'll be presenting the findings from that next month at KEI. But it's interesting because in their daily dramas -- in their soap operas -- they've incorporated this concern. So, one of the dramas I'm looking at this concern about power outages and how are you going to get to your 21st floor apartment is part of the drama. So, it's always interesting to look, as well, at the North Korean's own state media, their own entertainment, to try to figure out how they address some of these concerns just on a ground level in terms of how do they tell the people, and how do they acknowledge it. So, it's fascinating stuff, and I hope you'll join me there if you're curious to see how some of this policy is being conveyed through North Korea's own soap operas.

And I think I wanted to mention also, you were talking about status symbols -- absolutely. And that goes back to the point I was making about the core economy -- keeping the elites happy. I wanted to make one more point. Koreans are a very conformist people generally. Their cultural tradition is very much a conformist one, and the [sic] South Koreans are very similar. So, they want to do what the group does, generally speaking; and so, anytime we try to suggest that there might be some sort of herb spraying in North Korea, that just doesn't fit into the North Korean thinking -- or the Korean thinking, for that matter. Even when, for example, in South Korea, people protest; they wage an opposition; it is very

much part of a group dynamic. There is a group sense of solidarity in anything they do; whether it's opposition or maintaining the status quo; and that is true in North Korea, as well.

So, just something to keep in mind, to remember that they have their own cultures and traditions and history, and that we may look at it from our perspective, but we also need to take their culture, their history into account, in trying to decipher their thinking. Okay. Thanks.

MS. PAK: Thank you, Jean; thank you, Evan. It's my pleasure to be up here with you. I'm a big fan of your writings. As Bruce mentioned, I was trained as an historian, as an U.S. historian. So, I'll start with this quote. Andrew Carnegie, the American industrialist and philanthropist once famously said it is but three generations from shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves. Or in other words, the first generation makes the money; the second generation keeps the money; and the third squanders the money.

Kim Jong Un seems determined to avoid that fate. Since his father, Kim Jong Il's, death in December 2011, Kim 3.0 has not only adopted the mantle of mythical, god-like leadership role that his father and grandfather held and continue to hold in their death, but seems determined to chart his own path. In short, this is not your grandfather's dictatorship. It's useful and important to know the history of negotiations with North Korea, and what we know of Kim Il-Sung, and Kim Jong Il, through observations of their actions in face-to-face interactions with the U.S., South Korea, Japan, Russia, and Chinese officials. But I think we would be remiss if we extrapolate Kim Jong Un's intentions in foreign policy preferences as if he and North Korea exist in an A-historical space that is unchanging and unevolved.

Let's consider the similarities first. The Kim family created and reinforced a cult of personality around each Kim. The regime is totalitarian; controlling the populous through fear and intimidation; ensuring loyalty through repression, rhetoric and rent. North Korea has been the shrimpiest of the shrimps among whales, hemmed in by larger neighbors, including a rising South Korea, and the memory of devastation wrought by the United States during the Korean War. The similarities end there.

Kim Il Sung was a revolutionary hero, fighting Japanese imperialism, the South Korean puppets, and the American jackals. Kim Jong Il had to navigate through world changing events, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of large-scale aide from Moscow -- the ever-suspicious Chinese who seems to be prioritizing their ties with Seoul in tense negotiations with the United States on its burgeoning nuclear program. And let's not forget the famine and drought in the 1990s and the

tightening noose of sanctions and international ostracism.

In contrast, Kim Jong Un grew up in a cocoon of indulgence and privilege. He continues to choose isolation; refusing to engage, doubling-down on the commitment to nuclear weapons; working toward improving conventional military capabilities; expanding the North's toolkit of provocations to include cyberattacks, and the use of chemical and biological weapons; and rebuffing every engagement effort by the U.S., China, and South Korea. He doesn't even bother to pay lip service to denuclearization as his father and grandfather often did.

During the arduous march -- the famine of the 1990s -- Kim was in Switzerland. His childhood was marked by luxury and leisure; vast estates with horses; swimming pools, bowling alleys; luxury vehicles, adapted so that he could drive when he was seven; summers at the family's private resort. He went skiing in the Swiss Alps and swimming in the French Riviera. His strong self-esteem and confidence was reinforced since he was young. His aunt said that on his eighth birthday party, Kim wore a general's uniform with stars, and the real generals with real stars, bowed to him and paid their respect to the boy -- I don't know about the real stars part. But Kim's charting of his own path can be seen in the way that he's shaped his public persona. He's determined to be a modern leader of a modern North Korea.

Unlike his father, Kim is more transparent. He's in public with his wife; he's hugging, holding hands; linking arms with men, women, and children -- young and old; and for the first time in April 2012, the regime also admitted publicly that its satellite launch had failed. He's out and about giving on the spot guidances like his father and grandfather did; but he's also pulling weeds; riding roller coasters; and horseback riding. He is comfortable with technology -- handling cellphones and lap tops; and talking earnestly with nuclear scientist and overseeing scores of missile tests. Less we have any doubt, Kim is young, vigorous, viral, and on the move.

Kim Jong Un's confidence can be seen as Pyongyang policy that North Korea can have both its nuclear weapons and economic development. North Korea's nuclear status was codified in the North's Constitution, even as Kim boldly claimed no more belt-tightening. Kim's very identity is tied to the nuclear program and North Korea's prosperity. Of note, Kim, like others in his generation, has never known a non-nuclear North Korea. For the past six years, Kim has poked and prodded; testing and

pushing the boundaries of international tolerance for his actions; calculating that he can handle whatever punishment is meted out; and to a larger extent, he has maintained the initiative on the Korean Peninsula to the frustration of the U.S. and his neighbors.

However, he has yet to face a real crisis in the ways his father and grandfather had to confront and manage. Kim's probable perception of success in international affairs, reliance on military demonstrations and provocative actions to get his way without any experience in negotiating, compromising, and diplomacy makes me wonder how much longer we can say with any level of comfort that Kim's nuclear weapons are only intended for deterrence and regime survival.

And given the steady drumbeat of internal purges; the sidelining of North Korea's diplomats since 2011; and Kim's apparent relishing of the recent war of words with President Trump, it would take a very brave North Korean official who would counsel dialogue in efforts to mollify Washington and Beijing.

In 2012, at the 100th anniversary of his grandfather's birth, during what was then North Korea's biggest display of weapons in a military parade, Kim gave his first public speech. He ended with the line let's go on for our final victory. At the time it sounded to me like the bluster of a new young leader. He may have been posturing then for all we know, but given recent developments, I hope that he hasn't shifted his position to a more aspirational and offensive one. Thank you.

MR. HASS: Thank you, Evan, Jean, Jung, thank for excellent presentations. The floor is now open to you. We have about 20 minutes for questions and answers; and while you formulate your questions, I will just make one quick observation about the three presentations we just heard. There was an emphasis on the internal threats and stresses Kim Jong Un faces, very little discussion of the external pressures that Kim Jong Un feels, which I felt noteworthy. Does anyone have any questions, comments, feedback? A microphone will be coming to you. We'll take two or three questions at a time, and then offer the panelists an opportunity to respond.

MR. SAETREN: Will Saetren. I'm with the Institute for China-America Study. So, my question is for Ms. Lee. You talked a little bit about elites; and we, obviously, know very little about the North Korean regime; the leadership; how it works; and I was wondering if you'd talk a little bit about those elites that we know so little bit about. Thank you.

MR. HASS: We'll take one or two more questions, and then we'll allow the panelist an opportunity to respond. Yes; Patrick.

MR. BEACTEN: Hi, I'm Patrick Beacten. with the Wilson Center. It's nice to see you all. My question is for Jung. How do you think Kim Jong Un sees the inner-Korean competition and unification issues? Is that something that's still alive and well and an important pressure within the regime?

MR. HASS: Sir.

MR. WINTERS: Steve Winters, Independent Consultant. The leading Russian expert on North Korea and others have suggested that one of the purposes of the nuclear weapons program of North Korea is also to guarantee Korean independence in regard to China; and that ultimately, it's a defense in that direction too. But I'm curious; was there any hint of that line of thinking among the people in North Korea.

MR. HASS: Why don't we take a pause here and allow our panelist a chance to respond?

MS. LEE: I'm not sure if you had a specific question about the elites, about who they are, or perhaps qualify --

MR. SAETREN: Yeah; the question was more, in general, who they are because with the countries like Russia and China, you know a little bit about who the leadership is beholding to; who they, basically, have to pander to. But I feel like North Korea is such a closed state that you don't really understand the dynamic of what Kim has to do to solidify his hold on power. I feel like that's an important dynamic.

MS. LEE: So, I'm just going to approach this from another angle. One of the things that I found -- spending so much time there -- is that their structure, their societal structure is so different from ours. So, for example, when we make decisions every day, it comes from our family. Your parents make some decisions about what you're going to do that day; how you're going to spend their money; in North Korea, it was completely different. With my staff, for example, the party was the determining factor. So much of their lives are built around the party structure -- political structure -- and that is the defining structure that tells them what they're going to do on a day-to-day basis. It tells them whether they're

going to eat at a certain restaurant; whether they're going to be able to go to the Arirang Mass Games; and this was new for me. But it was important to remember, within that structure then, in order to reach that level of elite, you had to have a certain amount of political clout. So, so much of the effort that I saw on the ground in North Korea was to build political clout; and I mentioned that a little bit earlier in my comments.

So, for example, I met a farmer when we were hearing these rumors about economic reform or changes to the economic structure, and they were saying finally if they make a little bit more extra rice -- she was a rice farmer -- they would be able to use that surplus for themselves rather than hand it over to the State, as was the case. So, when I asked her though what are you going to do with that extra rice? She said I'm going to offer it to the Party as a political offering. It was very insightful for me. That's so important. That's so much a part of their structure. When you have political clout, then you get a better apartment. So, I did visit homes in North Korea that were granted to people for their loyalty to the Party. So, just in terms of how we look at who becomes part of the elite -- of course, we're looking at things from our point of view as a capitalist country -- but for them, it's all about who has political clout, and there's certainly other factors. We do talk about, certainly, after the liberation and the Korean War, there were different structures that were put in place to kind of codify North Koreans and their background; but today most of it is about trying to build political clout and to rise out of your situation by showing your loyalty to the Party in that sense, and improving your sense of life. So, that's one part of the question you're asking.

I think the other part you were asking is how do they keep them happy? I mean, it's like Evan mentioned -- wanting a Yamaha piano. I can tell you that when I go into certain cafes in North Korea, I forget that I'm in North Korea; and it's terrible. We always have to remember that we're there; but they are just as sophisticated and international as South Korean with the latest -- most North Koreans when I was there, many of the North Koreans I was travelling with, each had two cellphones, just like I do. So, we were joking -- you know, I was just amazed by that. So, in some sense they are -- go ahead and weigh in.

MR. OSNOS: Yeah; very briefly, just a couple of things. In some sense, North Korean elites in Pyongyang -- and we really need to be clear, we're talking about a pretty small, but not

insignificant percentage of the population. If Pyongyang represents 10 percent of the national population, these are the 10 percent that matter, in a sense, in terms of pressure on Kim Jong Un. There are people in Pyongyang who make a point of speaking with a South Korean accent as a way of indicating that they're cosmopolitan, they're sort of plugged in. They're watching, wink-wink TV and film, and so on. People get cosmetic surgery. So, I think, in a sense the risk for Kim Jong Un from his internal pressures is as much about the revolution and rising expectations; and you hear about this a lot. The fact that he's done this means that if he's going to maintain those -- avoid the fate that Jung so rightly described of shirt sleeve to shirt sleeve in three generations -- he now has to be able to deliver to the people around him.

MS. LEE: He's got to give them the creature comforts that they're experiencing when they travel overseas; and quite a number of them do. I think you said your plane was not very full, but most of the air carrier flights I took were packed with North Koreans who were travelling via China or to China; and so those people -- each plane load -- how many people are getting exposed to the outside world -- picking up cellphones. Like me, until 2013, they had to check them in at the airport; but developing a taste for some of those creature comforts; and so, he has to give them to some of the elites as well.

MS. PAK: Can I point out that elites -- it's historical and it's also monetized. The elites were a small group that live in Pyongyang, descended from the revolutionaries who went through the mountains; forded the rivers with Kim Il-Sung; but then there is that tension with the moneymakers that Evan and Jean are talking about, and I see Nat Krutchen in the back and he knows as much about this as anyone I know -- the moneymakers, the people who are becoming elite, rather than being born elite, these are some of the tensions that we could, as a policy measure, could take advantage of with the sanctions. The term elite is changing and, I think, that could be the beginnings of some of the fissures that we could exploit.

On the question on Kim and inter-Korean competition. What Jean and Evan are pointing out in terms of the coffee shops and the TV shows and the dramas, and the creature comforts of life in North Korea, I think those are directly from South Korea. South Korea is -- whether they like it or not -- are influencing the way they describe, or they define, what is middle class, or upper middle class. But on the other hand, they're holding on to the idea of being the purest, or the purer, Korean race. That

because they're not flunkies to the United States; that they still maintain this mythical Korean-ness that's a result of their isolation and something that they will defend with their nuclear weapons.

On the independence from China question -- I think the latest, the nuclear test and the rocket launches -- I think that is their declaration of independence. The nuclear weapons program was started not just against the U.S., but also to hedge against China. So, I think -- and I'm thinking about the fact that Kim Jong Un has not talked to senior Chinese officials at all; and I think it's his way of saying I'm my own man; I'm crafting my own path without you because I don't need you. So, I do think that there is a strong independence from China angle to this story.

MR. HASS: Excellent. Thank you. Why don't we open it up for another round of questions? Stanley.

MR. ROTH: Stanley Roth, retired. Given that this is a panel about who is Kim Jong Un, could you speculate -- all of you -- about who is Kim Jong Un if he succeeds with his weapon programs? If all the current policies fail and he has a reliable ICBM, nuclear tip capability against the United States, then which Kim do we see? Is this going to be a stable Kim, one who's accomplished his objective and can now focus on the economy; and this could be a deterrent situation after all. We keep hearing he's not suicidal. Or could this be a de-stabilizing situation; that he doesn't believe in extended deterrents and that Kim now feels he has de-linked the ROK in Japan from the United States because of his capabilities and might risk action confident that the U.S. won't intervene? I realize it's all speculative, but based on what you've told us about his character, which Kim do you think we would see in a success scenario?

MR. OSNOS: I'll take a first cut at it. I think we're going to have a lot of views on it; but one thought is -- a couple of things. You mentioned the fact that he's not suicidal. I think that's a big point, and it's one worth emphasizing. One of the things that Jean and Jung both describe is him growing up in this cloistered, prosperous, plush, easy environment. One of the few reliable face-to-face descriptions we ever get of Kim Jong Un comes from -- let's face it -- Dennis Rodman; and what has Rodman described? He describes a person who enjoys the fruits of his experience at the top. So, we live in a moment now where we are almost getting acculturated to the idea that there is the Jihadist impulse; the idea that you are going to die in service of some greater ideology. And I think it's important to remember what is Kim Jong Un's primary motivation in life -- seems to be the benefit of Kim Jong Un,

and his experience.

What that doesn't mean though, however, is that he's not capable of profound miscalculation; and the same level of seclusion and privilege that has also afforded him the non-suicidal impulse also means that he hasn't really been steeled in the kinds of mistakes and that he hasn't been tested in the ways that would prevent him from making a catastrophic error. And so, as you knew when you asked this question, we're not going to have a firm answer, but what we can do is lay out some of the probabilities; and I think the probabilities are that, fundamentally, he's going to try to do the thing that keeps Kim Jong Un alive.

MS. LEE: Just to build on that. We haven't really discussed it in this panel, and I think we'll probably discuss it in future panels, but completion of reaching the threshold and reaching the next step, which is re-entry and also miniaturization, and getting it on a missile that's capable of striking the United States -- this is just one part of the equation. The next step, obviously, there's a domestic benefit of having these weapons and showing your people you can defend them, but there's also that external purpose, which we haven't really discussed, which is to get the U.S. to the negotiating table -- I know, as strange as that sounds -- and to get the validation that he wants. Because another thing that he needs is validation from the United States. He wants the United States to acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear power, and to be able to go back to his people and say, look, they're treating me like we're a tiny country, we may be poor, we may be small, but the U.S. is treating us like a fellow super power. So, that's part of the equation. So, I think there are several steps involved here in terms of what he wants to do with this nuclear program; and then, from there, what does he extract? What kind of concessions; what does he negotiate with these nuclear weapons? So, I think this is just the start of it. I don't think it's meant to wreak destruction and completely annihilate the (inaudible) -- at least I hope not, because I live there. I think it's all meant as part of a larger strategy to win the things that his grandfather died, not succeeding to accomplish; and his father died not accomplishing; so these are part of the things he's inherited and the pressures that he still faces in trying to fulfill that legacy.

MR. HASS: Thank you. Jung, you want to come in on this?

MS. PAK: Just very briefly. I remember when I was briefing one of the senior DNI officials who had just entered office -- this was back in 2014 -- and he went around the room and he made

everybody say how long do you think this regime is going to last. One of the senior analysts said five years, max; and then I was next, and I said, well, he's got children. At the time, he had one child, but now he has multiple children. So I think in looking at the long haul it's not just about him, but he's probably also thinking about his people -- his kids; his family. And I would just add that I think if he succeeds I think he finally gets that respect. I think the reason he hasn't travelled anywhere is because he doesn't think he's going to get the red-carpet treatment, and it'll be really embarrassing for him. So, I think having the nuclear weapons status for him is about respect and it's about relevance, because otherwise you're just another poor country in Asia.

MR. HASS: Thank you. We have time for one more round of questions. In the back.

MS. YUNG: Yes; I'm (inaudible), Foundation for Empowerment. I'm already late, so I missed a lot of the presentation, but I'm sorry about that. But from what you have been saying and Kim Jong Un's policy; so I'd like to ask about Kim Jong Un's policy which enables people, particular elites in Pyongyang, to enjoy the sort of like the western style of the life (inaudible), and the other things they have; and then you are talking about the sophistication. Then, what kind of impact it would have on their own psychology, first for the elites. The one good path are very strong part of Kim Jong Un's policy, while Kim's family regime's policy is purity of the (inaudible); and their basic mission, if I understanding correctly, is to liberate South Korean's from the Yankees. Then, with this kind of thing, they don't mind saying it is corrupt, first. Second, the 90 percent outside of Pyongyang -- if they know about lifestyle of the Pyongyang elites, what do they think about their own situation and the way it is. They have dignified North Korea. So, many reporters have been talking about dignifying -- they already know Koreans feel that they have more dignity than anybody else -- that really keeps them up. So, what kind of a corrupt impact it would have on these common people's mind? People say that one of the most strongest policy would be to inject the information so that USB of the outside information or the most powerful tool to liberate North Korean mind.

So, basically, in summary, my question is Kim Jong Un's new policy. What kind of impact it has on elite's mind and the inequality between elites and the others, and can it hold up that kind of mission? Thank you very much.

MR. HASS: Why don't we take one or two more questions?

SPEAKER: Hi, Katherine (inaudible). I'd like to hear your thoughts on Kim Jong Un's recent promotion of his sister. What exactly will her new role entail, and is the timing of her promotion significant to you at all?

MR. HASS: Thank you. I have a question here?

MS. KIM: Hi, Patricia Kim with the Council on Foreign Relations. As all of you have mentioned, there is now this generation of super rich in North Korea and this has made people both loyal to the regime as well as creating vulnerabilities for the regime; but I think this is intention with the conventional wisdom today that economic sanctions aren't going to do much to persuade the North Korean regime to denuclearize. So, how do you address that tension? Is the regime vulnerable or not; and at what point does it become vulnerable? Thank you.

MR. OSNOS: Thank you. Anybody want to take one of these? I'll take a stab at a couple of these. The first question which was about the mindset of elites, I think -- we talked a little bit about what sort of the mindset is at the moment, but I want to take the question, if I can, in a slightly different direction, which is how is Kim Jong Un regarded by his people, which is also a relevant question. I mean to what degree are people in the countryside, for instance, aware of the lifestyle of the Donju, the super-rich living in the capital. Look, I think one of things you get from defectors is the sense that people are responsive to these somewhat lifestyle improvements. So, if you're in the city it's at the top end; if you're in the countryside, the ability to go to a market, or to work in a market, does have some effect on people's view of Kim Jong Un. So, he may not be as unpopular as we might assume.

On the other hand, people also look at him and see, as Jean described, a young man who did not rise up through the ranks of the guerillas. He didn't establish himself as a revolutionary hero; and so, in some sense, he has to prove himself. I think I'll probably leave time for the others; so I'm going to cut it off there.

MS. PAK: On the elite question. I think the question is what if the poorer people in the provinces were looking at the lifestyles of the rich and famous in Pyongyang. I'll go back to what I said about Andrew Carnegie. Back in the late 19th century during industrialization, the question for labor historians is not why there were so many protests; but why weren't there so many protests. Why weren't children who were at age 10 and 11 working in the coal mines? Why weren't their parents protesting out

in the street? And I think, to a certain extent, you can transfer that kind of analysis to aspiration, lifting yourself up by your bootstraps. The Horatio Alger story of the late 19th century and the early 20th century that was so popular is that somehow if you work hard; if you know the right people; if you lift yourself up; then you too can be there with the lifestyles of the rich and famous in Pyongyang. So, I think hope plays some part in the process of keeping the outside populations in the provinces mollified. Also, in looking at -- Jean was talking about her book of Kim Jong Un looking at things -- he's looking at things, but he's also hugging people. He's interested in what people are doing, which is exactly what Kim Il-Sung did in the 50s and 60s. He was out there; he was out there with the peasants. Kim Jong Il is pulling weeds; he's talking about turtle farming; so, while you have this vast wealth gap that Jean and Evan and others have described, you still have Kim Jong Un being out there with the people, cultivating hope in a lot of ways, and strengthening the resilience of the regime.

I think there is another thing about the sister promotion question? So, the way I saw that meeting, and the promotion of his sister, is that it's not that the analysis is yes, he's solidifying his rule -- the sister is a very critical part of his regime building and his legacy -- the way I saw it was that if you're having a party meeting and you're promoting the rocket guys and the deputy director of the light industries that works on textiles, that tells me that maybe somehow the North Koreans have moved on past this period of tension, that they're back to business. They're doing the promotions; they're in it for the long haul; and they're also talking about the economy. The speech that Kim gave was very much about the economy as much as it was about the weapons. So, I will stop there unless others have comments.

MS. LEE: Furthermore, just building on the sister's promotion, you know all of this does emphasize the importance of the Kim family as part of the ruling ideology; and it is one thing that I wrote in my *Esquire* piece that I wrote this summer, was that Kim Jong Un did revise the guiding principles on political life in North Korea to make sure that it includes a reference to a Kim member being in power. So, part of this -- you allude to that -- but I think on a more basic level, it is a tradition within the Kim family to have another Kim family member do all of your deifications. So, Kim Jong Il did that for Kim Il-Sung; Kim Jong Un is doing that right now for Kim Jong Il, which is what we saw this past weekend with fireworks and all this big celebration for his father's 20-year Anniversary to the Worker's Party secretary position; and we'll likely see Kim Jong Un's little sister doing that, as well, for her big brother. So, it's just part of

some of these roles that she's stepping into are roles that members of her family have played in that succession in that kind of history on how to deify the Kim family.

MR. JONES: Thank you. We started out this hour with the question who is Kim Jong Un; what animates him; what causes him fear. I would like to just end with a few observations that I took away, at least, from the presentations that we just heard.

First, it appears evident that Kim Jong Un is focused on preservation of power and continuity of the Kim family rule. He faces pressures internally to deliver on the needs and wants of the North Korean people, particularly the elite. Heightened rhetoric directed at North Korea helps and abets Kim Jong Un in feeding the mythology of confrontation that supports and justifies his rule; and internal stresses and pressures appear to be front of mind for Kim Jong Un on a daily basis.

So, with that let me just express my profound appreciation to these three great thinkers for advancing our understanding OF the question of who is Kim Jung Un.

Thank you.

MS. PAK: Thank you. I'm going to just briefly introduce the panel. This panel is on: historical lessons or case studies that can inform our views about how to solve the North Korea problem.

First up is Jonathan Pollack. He is the senior fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for East Asia Policy at the Brookings Institution, and one of my favorite colleagues at Brookings.

We have Michael Dobbs, author of the Cold War Trilogy, who is uniquely qualified to tell the story of the defining ideological contest of the 20th century.

Jake Sullivan is the Martin R. Flug visiting lecturer in law at Yale Law School, and he had served in the Obama administration as the national security advisor to Vice President Joe Biden, and director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State.

And finally, David Cohen, my former boss, who is a partner at Wilmer Hale, and was the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, where he helped to manage the Agency's domestic and worldwide operations, oversee its strategic modernization in the foreign intelligence collection all-source analysis, covert action, counterintelligence and foreign liaison relationships.

Each panelist will have five minutes to make remarks, and following all presentations the

panelists will answer questions from the audience, and I'll be moderating this panel. Over to you Jonathan?

MR. POLLACK: Thank you, Jung. Am I on? Okay. Thank you. I've been asked to make a few comments on the experiences that we have had, the United States in particular has had in periodic negotiations with North Korea, and what lessons derived from that experience would or would not instruct us, if under some hypothetical future we enter negotiations with them yet again.

This has been a very episodic process, to say the least. No American officials interacted with North Korean counterparts until the late Arnie Kanter met with a senior North Korean official in 1991. And of course, there's been since then, periodic efforts to negotiate with North Korea, come to understandings, most of them, of course, for reflecting the question of the status of the nuclear weapons program.

And a cynical observation might be that negotiations can work with North Korea until they no longer work. And the question would be is: what drives that process where there seems to be, at various moments in time, a degree of forward movement until the process comes to a halt? And there are multiple examples of this.

Two or three things bear on this, one is that it may be that at the end of the day the North Korean elites are those responsible for the formulation of North Korean strategy really know what their red lines are, may be better than others. In other words, things that you cannot overcome, places you cannot go, things you cannot do, much of this, of course, historically has focused on issues of verification, related both to nuclear weapons, and other capabilities. And that's been a persistent problem going back to the time that Hans Blix first entered North Korea for the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the early 1990s.

So, if we look at that as a relevant guide, we can ask: what is it that denies the possibility for going beyond? Is it simply a question of what you are trying to hide? Is it a question of a profound distrust that exists? Let's remember that North Korea, under Kim Il-sung, Kim Il-sung in 1957, he made a request of Mao Zedong, and he asked for all remaining Chinese personnel, military personnel and government, you know, and other kinds of economic personnel alike, to be withdrawn from North Korea.

And they were. Mao honored that agreement; that was in October of 1958, and it is my

argument that there has been no sustained, meaningful foreign presence of any country in North Korea now for 60 years. I daresay that's part of the secret of what I will advisedly call North Korea's success, if the question here is simply the capacity to deny external influence into the system with all the unpredictable consequences that could ensue.

Now, we can say that from the point of view of the United States, negotiations do indeed at times buy time, although we could ask: time for what? This is something that I know some of the people in the audience here have grappled with in their own their own experiences, but what we see at present, I think, is that there's a new context. The contexts here are the heightened risks of military conflict that are all too evident, at least in public chatter, whether that reflects the realities behind the scenes we don't know.

It also bears consideration that all these negotiations have been with a remarkably small number of individuals in the North. So, in some sense when we have negotiated successfully or not with North Korea, there's the question of how representative are these individuals? They come mainly, of course, from the Foreign Ministry, but the access into the, dare I call it the North Korean deep state, is much more problematic. And that is what a stymie does at regular intervals in dealing with the North.

So, I don't want to -- There's no time to go through all the historical episodes, but it's striking to me, nonetheless, that at different critical junctures when the door has opened to possibilities and I -- for example if we think back to the very end of the George W. Bush administration, the Bush administration was prepared to make concessions of an extraordinary sort to North Korea. I mean, we understand this to some extent from the historical record some have written about it, but at that very moment North Korea balked.

Curiously enough, this coincides with the period where Kim Jong-Il was in extraordinarily problematic health, he had had a stroke in 2008, and essentially these conditions, except for that time early in the Obama administration when the president certainly tried to see where there was negotiation possible with North Korea, it's been pretty much shut down ever since.

And we can ask questions why, it does coincide, then we the ascendance of Kim Jong-un. We have to ask and reflect about this as we now approach this new period of time where there are certainly many voices claiming we should be negotiating with the North, or at least talking to the North, we

ought to be asking ourselves: what is it that we expect to be an outcome from there? Do we even know exactly what it is we would want from this process? And what kinds of guarantees would there be?

So, I look at this, given this problematic record, and it's one of the things that makes me as rather cautionary about what the possibilities would be here, even as we confront the new realities of a now much more nuclear-armed state. Does North Korea really seek a negotiation here, and toward what end? Those are questions I think we ought to be asking ourselves, we ought to look before we leap, and that may be certainly preferable to something that induces a major crisis, but we have to examine these historical cases very, very carefully lest we over invest in that process when the results have proven so, shall we say, spotty. I think I'll end there, and welcome your questions. Thank you.

MS. PAK: Thank you, Jonathan. Michael?

MR. DOBBS: Thank you very much. Just to introduce myself. I was a former Washington Post reporter, I spent a lot of my career covering the collapse of communism, as I was in Russia when the system collapsed. And when I came back I wanted to write about Cold War, the course of the Cold War. I wrote a book called "One Minute to Midnight," which was about the peak of the Cold War, the most dangerous moments in the Cold War. And I would like to share some of my conclusions in researching and writing that book which may resonate with you as we think about the risks that we are running with North Korea.

My number one conclusion is that the real danger of war you know in October 1962 came, not from the conscious decisions and actions of the three key players, Khrushchev, Kennedy and Castro, but from miscommunications, misunderstandings and mistakes at all levels. Not only of the leaders, but also lower down the chains of command. The most famous book about the Cuban missile crisis is probably "Essence of Decision" by Graham Allison, in which he talks about the rational actor model, as he described it.

When I did my research what really struck me, was not the rational actor but the irrational actor. And by irrational actor I don't mean only the irrational leaders, but irrational actors at much lower level, and this is exemplified -- the kind of risk we ran is exemplified for me by a story of something, an incident on October 27, 1962, which was probably the most dangerous day of the missile crisis, it was called Black Saturday. When there was -- a U-2 was shot down over Cuba.

The Strategic Air Command got to DEFCON 2, and at that precise moment, in a completely unrelated incident, a U-2 stationed in Alaska flies to the North Pole to conduct an air sampling mission, atomic air sampling mission, and by mistake takes a wrong turn over the North Pole, and instead of coming back to Alaska ends up over the Chukotka Peninsula on the most dangerous day of the Cold War.

The Soviets sent up MiG Fighters to try to get it down, the plane runs out of fuel over the Chukotka Peninsula, miraculously makes it back to Alaska. And JFK says, "There's always some son-of-a-bitch that doesn't get the word;" and that to me, some son-of-a-bitch, we can imagine that kind of incident happening in the case of North Korea.

Second lesson: the key role that is played by a president that nobody else can play. We hear a lot today about all these wise people surrounding the president, but if you study the ExComm meetings in October 1962, in many cases or in several key moments, it was one man against the rest of the ExComm, and decisions were taken by a minority of one.

It was only one person in that room, in the cabinet room of the White House, who had the broader view. He was not just interested in his department; or how we would defend NATO, he was answerable not only to Americans but also to future generations, and that was JFK.

He also happened to understand the risks that I talked about, the risk of an accidental nuclear war. He had had experience in World War II, himself, his brother had been killed in World War II, and in this he shared something with the Leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, who had also gone through World War II.

Third lesson: it helps when this president has a sense of history. JFK had, just shortly before the missile crisis; he had read a book called "The Guns of August" by Barbara Tuchman, which deals with the origins of the First World War. And that book was very much on his mind in the way he approached the missile crisis. He kept on asking himself in 1914 the world stumbled into war without anybody really knowing the reason why.

But if we were going to get into a war in October 1962, Kennedy wanted to know the reason why, and he kept on asking that question. And although history never repeats itself exactly, there are lessons to be drawn from history. And Kennedy, both because he had experienced history himself as

a soldier in World War -- in the war, but also because he had made a study of history, he was well placed to answer that kind of questions.

Lesson number four: what we conventionally think about of military superiority has very little meaning in the nuclear age. In 1962 the United States had overwhelming nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union by numerical figures, you know, four or five times as many U.S. missiles could hit the Soviet territory as vice versa. And the qualitative difference was even greater.

But this meant very little to JFK. During the crisis he asked two most, very important questions. First of all he said, when they were considering airstrikes over Cuba to take out the missile sites, he said to the Commander of -- the Tactical Air Command: can we get all the missile sites that we've identified, all the missiles, all the missiles that exist in Cuba? And the answer was: we think so Mr. president, but we can't absolutely be sure. That was a very sobering answer for JFK.

And the other question that JFK asked was: what happens if even one of those missiles hits the United States? And the answer was, well, perhaps 500- 600,000 Americans might be killed. And Kennedy said, well, that's more than the number of Americans who died in the entire Civil War. That was unacceptable to him, and he later said that, you know, despite the military superiority that we enjoyed over the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev had sufficient deterrent to prevent Kennedy from thinking about a first nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.

The fifth lesson: we've heard a lot about the madman card, the madman card is really a weapon of the weak against the strong, and in the missile crisis the madman card was played by Fidel Castro.

The slogan of the Cuban Revolution is Patria O Muerte, Fatherland or Death, and the ability to use the madman card effectively depends on whether you can convey that you really are suicidal, and it's difficult for the president of the richest country, the most powerful country in the world to do that, because powerful countries have more to lose than poor, relatively powerless countries. So, be careful how you use the madman card.

Lesson number six: the danger of red lines. Kennedy had drawn a red line about Soviet sending offensive weapons to Cuba, and he later came to regret that, because he discovered that it boxed him in.

The final lesson: the lack of knowledge about the other side. When I researched the crisis and I -- now it's possible to gain access, pretty much, to all U.S. intelligence material -- of the intelligence-gathering off the crisis, the war intelligence gathering. And there are many things that we did know, including the location of the sites, but there were many things that the CIA was unable to tell Kennedy.

They didn't know about the number of Soviet troops in Cuba, they told him that there were 7- or 8,000 Soviet Troops, there were 42,000 Soviet Troops. They didn't know -- He kept on asking about the location of the warheads, we knew where the where the missile sites were, but we didn't know where the nuclear warheads were. We only found out about that many years later.

They didn't know about the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Cuba, they didn't know about the Soviet plans to destroy Guantanamo in the event of a U.S. invasion of Cuba. And probably the biggest unknown was the intentions of the other side. They didn't know why -- that they misunderstood the reasons why Khrushchev had sent missiles to Cuba in the first place. They saw thought it was about -- something about the balance of power, when it was actually more to do with defending the Cuban Revolution.

So, there was a lot they didn't know. Now, the real question in the Cuban missile crisis was whether rational actors can impose their will on the irrational ones. And by the rational actors, in the case of the crisis, I mean Kennedy and Khrushchev. They ended up actually pretty much on the same side, against the irrational actor, the man who was playing the madman card, Fidel Castro. They decided that the risk of escalation was too great, and the crisis had to be brought to an end somehow, which is why Kennedy sent his brother, Robert, to the Soviet Embassy in Washington on the night of October 27th, and they jointly brought an end to the crisis.

Now, in the North Korea Crisis you have three sides as well, the United States, North Korea and China; but the configuration is very different. We don't know who the rational actors are, and who are the irrational ones? So, those are my lessons. Thank you.

MS. PAK: Jake?

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you. I had the privilege of working with -- Oh, hello? It was cutting me off before I said, I had the privilege of working with him, he was always fiddling with my

microphones -- with David Cohen and others here, including Avril who we'll hear from later, on a range of different issues. Among them, of course, the North Korea issue, but also what I've come here today to talk about, which is lessons from the Iran Nuclear Diplomacy that could potentially be relevant for what is a significantly different context, but obviously there are some clear parallels.

And I guess I would start by saying, that if you work hard, this is to the future negotiator of the North Korean Nuclear Deal, that if you work hard and you produce the deal you, too, can wait with bated breath about whether a future president will ultimately walk away from it, as we are doing this week with the Iran Nuclear Deal. That was meant as a joke, kind of, (laughter) although it's not really a laughing matter.

You know, the first thing that strikes me about the nuclear diplomacy with Iran, and I was involved in the initial establishment of the Discreet Channel in Oman that led to the Interim Deal and ultimately paved the way for the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action, is that while we spent hours, days, weeks, years in the room with the Iranians, and with our negotiating partners most of the negotiations were shaped by activities that took place outside of the negotiating room.

And the nature of U.S. strategy towards Iran and the Obama administration was a -- I think a remarkably singular whole-of-government approach that was multi-dimensional, that was the president's top priority, that was driven by the National Security Advisor, bought into by all of the principals, and executed up and down the government. So, whether you are talking about sanctions, which David will get into, intelligence-led activities, Force posture, alliance coordination, diplomatic options.

Tom Donilyn and Susan Rice put enormous attention and effort into running a whole-of-government operation to shape the overall environment, and ultimately to shape Iran's choices. And, as I look at the way that North Korea policy has been conducted thus far, over the course the last few months, of course from the outside you can't see everything, but I think this administration could learn lessons from the optempo, the intensity and the interdisciplinary nature of the strategy that the Obama administration pulled together that ultimately created the conditions under which you could have successful diplomacy.

It's interesting that at this point it always seemed clear that the Iranians would be

prepared to put on the table their nuclear program and, you know, reach a deal that involves -- have pretty severe restraints. But in the early years of the Obama administration, in dealing with the Ahmadinejad Government, even in the P5+1 Process, their notion of what a nuclear deal would look like wasn't even in the same sport, let alone the same ballpark as what was ultimately required and ultimately produced.

They were not thinking, by any means, of reducing the number of centrifuges, or dealing with their plutonium reactor, or dramatically expanding inspections. So, there had to be steps taken; and economic pressure was a central part of it, to change their calculus as to what they were going to have to put on the table and ultimately deal with.

And that leads me to the second lesson which is about leverage. You know, obviously we sought to build up leverage that we could then convert into diplomatic results at the negotiating table, and a core part of that leverage was this global sanctions regime that we built and then carefully tended. And I'm not going to go into detail on this, because David can speak about it with much greater authority and specificity.

But I would say that we did rely on two factors of the Iranian economy in building this leverage. The first is that it was relatively exposed to the international community, and part of what we accomplished was reducing their oil exports from 2.5 million barrels a day to 1 million barrels a day, which had a dramatic impact on their economy.

And, of course, freezing their assets which were being held overseas, both in connection with the oil exports and other exports of the Iranian economy; so, this was an exposed economy, and not just exposed in one place, but in Europe, in China, in Japan and Korea, in South Africa and India, and other places.

The situation with North Korea is somewhat different as, David will get into. They are exposed but they are basically exposed to one country, China, where they do 85 to 90 percent of their trade. So, it creates a different set of calculations but fundamentally figuring out where that exposure is and how to attack it, is a critical part of building the economic leverage.

The second is that we recognized that in Iran's case they had to be at least somewhat responsive to their population, to a sense of economic dislocation and disempowerment among the

Iranian population that mattered from the point of view of regime stability over time. They cared about discontent in the street. They worried about how to create outlets for pressure. And ultimately Rohani's election in 2013 was about a response to the economic hardship that had been imposed over the course of several years of growing sanctions against Iran.

The question is: is North Korea similarly responsive? I think we heard from the earlier panel, and we can assess, certainly not the same way that Iran has, and so the power to withstand economic pressure, even if you can crank it up via the route of China, may be different in the North Korea case than in the Iran case.

One of the things that doesn't get talked about as much in the overall strategy towards Iran, was the credible threat of military force. And it came into play I think in two important respects. The first is that the credible threat of military force, whether by the Israelis or by the Americans, had an impact on the rest of the world agreeing to forego some of their own economic benefits from trading with Iran and signing up to the global sanctions.

When Secretary Clinton and others were going around the world, basically building this coalition, when David would show up in capitals around the world, one of the things that they could credibly say was, if we don't figure out a diplomatic solution that we will arrive at through the application of economic pressure, we may end up in a circumstance where either the Israelis take a strike, or the United States has no choice but to take a strike. That had a meaningful impact on people signing up to this global campaign of economic pressure.

Similarly, the possibility that Iran would face a military action I think had a meaningful impact on their own capability clock, on the speed with which they were prepared to advance their program. And they were careful not to move too far too fast because they didn't want to take some kind of precipitous step forward that might trigger a military response.

So, I think it had some deterring effect on the Iranians as well, and that is important because as David knows better than anyone, sanctions are not a fast-moving tool, and so slowing the capability clock was important to give time and space for the sanctions to be able to work effectively in the Iran context. And, you know, we knew that we could in fact pursue a credible threat of military force because first, we had a good sense of where the major Iranian nuclear facilities were, query whether

that's the case with respect to the broader nuclear complex in North Korea.

And second, we did not have to worry about the level of catastrophe that would be present in terms of a North Korean response against solar or otherwise. Obviously Iran would have some capability to respond to an attack, but a much more limited capability given their place in the neighborhood, what they possessed, and what we and our partners could respond with. And so, that threat had a level of credibility that query whether the same is present in the North Korea context.

We've heard, I think, over the course of today, and many people in this room know from, you know, their own independent analysis that Kim Jong-un doesn't look like he's in much of a mood right now to get involved in a meaningful negotiation. And so lessons about the precise parameters of a negotiation, and so forth, may not be all that relevant.

But what I will say is that having a dedicated bilateral channel that is discrete, that is hidden from view, was a central feature of our being able to reach a successful outcome with Iran. If this had simply been done through the P5+1 Process, or through a Six-Party Talk process, as the analog in North Korea, I don't think we would ever have reached the outcome we reached.

We needed a dedicated space to have the conversation, to make the trade-offs, to table the proposals, and I think the same thing would hold true in the context with North Korea. And I know that over the course of years we've tried to think about ways to maintain some contact with the North Koreans, privately, discreetly, quietly building those channels, those contacts up into something that looks more like a negotiation over time, is something that, you know, we've got to try to stick with even if the odds seem incredibly long at the moment; because any successful negotiation will emanate from that kind of channel to a greater extent than some public formal set of negotiations.

The final thing that I would say is that, all of the major powers of the world, in the case of Iran, were united on one side of the negotiating table with Iran on the other side of the negotiating table, and what was interesting about that was it took a certain number of chairs to actually seat all of the P5+1 representatives because you had the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, plus Germany, plus the EU, that's a bunch of people.

The Iranians insisted on an identical number of seats on their side of the table, and had to go find bodies, their drivers and so forth to fill them, but this was a negotiation set up with the world on

one side, and Iran on the other side. One of the interesting dynamics in the North Korea negotiation, and Michael referred to this, is a three-sided negotiation; that the Chinese -- It's not the U.S. and China and the rest of the world on one side of the table, and North Korea on the other side of the table; that is part of the challenge.

Now, now there's a reason for that related to China and North Korea's unique historical relationship, but I think part of the long-term diplomatic strategy, cannot just be about going after the Chinese on more pressure to set up a U.S.-North Korea negotiation. It should be to shift the Chinese orientation so that they feel some responsibility as a regional power, as a player with global responsibilities to actually fulfill the North Korean paranoia we heard about on the panel before.

That now North Korea, in a sense, has to shift from being their client, or someone -- where they are the broker between the U.S. on one hand, and North Korea on the other hand, to being a problem they need to help solve.

I don't think that that kind of adjustment is going to happen in the near term, but I think there are seeds that have been planted to that effect within the psychology of some of the leaders in China, and that this has to be a shift that we have to push for over time. Because as long as we remain in this three-sided negotiation, I think our capacity to be able to effectively shape the environment and shape the North Korean's calculus will be inhibited and, we will not be able to make the same kind of progress we were able to make with Iran.

So, those are some thoughts from the Iran experience that may prove useful, if ever we do get back to the table with North Korea.

MS. PAK: David?

MR. COHEN: So, thank you. Thanks for inviting me -- and it's great to work with Jake, here it was great to work with Jake, in this Iran Deal with (inaudible), and with whole team. So, as Jung mentioned, I was most recently the Deputy Director of the CIA. Before that I was the Under Secretary of Treasury for Terrorism Financial Intelligence, which is a mouthful of a title, but basically I got to oversee all of our sanctions efforts, including the sanctions that Jake was referencing that built up over time, creating the leverage for the Iran negotiations, but also the North Korea sanctions, the Russia sanctions, and what have you.

So, my comments this morning are going to be focused on the role of sanctions historically, and how they can be a part of the effort going forward with North Korea. So, first I think it's important to recognize that sanctions can serve three purposes, and possibly a fourth. The three which I think are familiar with the most, is that the number one, sanctions are essential to reinforce international law, essentially.

You know, in a series of Security Council Resolutions, whether you're talking about Iran or North Korea, the Security Council has made clear that the testing, you know, the development of a nuclear program is unlawful. The Security Council has demanded North Korea returns to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And so following through on sanctions is a way of putting some reinforcement in that international law obligation on North Korea.

Secondly, sanctions can impede progress, particularly targeted sanctions that are aimed at those entities, both inside a country and outside the country, that are essential for helping to develop the nuclear program, the Ballistic Missile Program. And so, in the Iran context we spent a lot of time over many years identifying the brokers, identifying the businesses, identifying those actors outside of Iran who were providing essential ingredients to the Iranian nuclear program and its ballistic missile program.

That is still going on, I should note, with respect to the ballistic missile program, frankly it's a part of also the deal to keep an eye on the nuclear program. In North Korea the same thing; we are you know, have been and are continuing to focus on those external actors that support the North Korean program, both by going after the financial institutions, and the businesses that are supplying material, as well as trying to take out of international commerce by designations, the North Korean entities.

That's not going to stop the program. It didn't stop Iran's program, it won't stop North Korea's program, but it does impede progress, it does create time and space for other efforts to proceed.

The third objective of sanctions is to create leverage, as Jake noted. The effort in Iran to ramp up the sanctions over time, and to move from these targeted sanctions that impede the program, to much more broad-based sanctions that really took a toll on the Iranian economy, that created important leverage and frankly trade currency for the deal.

And, you know, Jake can speak to this as he was, you know, involved in the discrete channel in these negotiations, but the Iranians were, you know, as Jake noted, not that interested in

negotiations for a long time. And we were talking, I don't know if we were talking or negotiating, or somewhere in between, for some period of time.

But it wasn't until the fall of 2013 when the Iranian rial basically fell off a cliff, because of the oil sanctions had been put in place, because of the additional sanctions that we've put in place to essentially deprive Iran of access to the revenue that it was earning from the reduced oil sales that it was able to make. That's when the Iranians really became serious about the negotiations. That sort of leverage, you know, can be created by sanctions.

The fourth way in which sanctions can be useful, and I say "can be" because I think this is a debatable point, but it's important to think about, is to foment unrest internally in a country. You know, as Jake noted, the Iranians were concerned about the street, were concerned about losing control of their population. That created some leverage for negotiations, but there is also a theory that had we continued with the sanctions, and even ramp them up further, that it could have created the conditions for some internal efforts to oust the regime.

And I think in North Korea, the last panel was talking about the role of the elites and how Kim Jong-un is able to keep the elites on-side. I think there is a question that's worth talking about, about whether a significantly torqued-up sanctions program that deprives North Korea, and deprives Kim Jong-un of the ability to buy off the elites; it makes the elites feel that, you know, their little hold on a decent life in North Korea, as they look around the rest of the country and realized that everyone else is living in great deprivation, that that is at risk if the nuclear program, ballistic missile program continues. And sanctions, particularly really intensive sanctions, I think can, at least theoretically, play into that. At a minimum, it creates additional leverage.

I would say, the second point; that I think that the Trump administration has taken some important steps to create the leverage that might be necessary to get a good negotiation going. You know, I would, frequently, at events like this would say, you know, going back six, nine months ago, that the idea that North Korea was sanctioned out, or that sanctions won't work on the North Korea, was wrong.

You know it was in fact the case that we had a much less intensive sanctions program focused on North Korea than we had had on Iran, or for that matter, on many other of our sanctions

targets for many years. Even as we were ramping up our sanctions on North Korea it still hadn't reached anywhere close to the level that we had with Iran. I think that is no longer the case.

And I would just cite a couple of things here. The Security Council Resolution from over the summer that took aim at North Korea's ability to export coal, that will take off about a billion dollars of Korean -- of North Korean revenue. And mind you, the North Korean economy is about the size of Dayton, Ohio's economy, just by a sort of, you know, analogy. It's about a 4- or \$5-billion economy. You take off a billion dollars of their revenue, that's a significant impact.

The second really important step was the Executive Order that was issued last month, in the middle of September, that that wasn't the first foray into secondary sanctions, but was a really significant step up of the secondary sanctions aimed at North Korea. And essentially what this Executive Order did was, through the threat of cutting off financial institutions that trade with North Korea, in any goods. It doesn't have to be an illicit goods, it doesn't have to be in something for the nuclear program, the ballistic missile program, but any trade with North Korea that any financial institution facilitates, that financial institution can be cut off from the U.S.

That is an extraordinarily powerful secondary sanctions tool. It is essentially imposing a worldwide trade embargo on North Korea, because any bank that wants to be able to operate internationally needs to have access to the U.S. financial system, if that bank, any bank helps facilitate either import or export, significant import/export into North Korea they can be cut off from the U.S. That is a powerful, powerful tool, and I think over time we will see having a real impact on North Korea.

The other part of this that the Trump administration has taken on is, to try to change the Chinese calculus. So, over the summer there was an action taken against a bank called the Bank of Dandong in China, which had been facilitating a fair amount of economic activity with North Korea and, you know, that was, I think, a shot across the bow to China saying, we are prepared to put at risk your financial institutions if you don't, you know, sort of come onside on this three-part, you know three-dimensional negotiation, to come over to our side a little bit in the effort with North Korea.

And then again, this Executive Order, by targeting financial institutions anywhere that facilitate trade, given that about 90 percent of all of North Korea's trade goes through China, it is effectively another sort of warning shot at China that their financial institutions are at risk.

And you can see the Chinese recognize that, because at the same time that we announce this Executive Order, the Chinese Central Bank sent out notice to their financial institutions telling them to draw down their accounts with North Korea, and not to take on any new North Korean accounts. They are trying to protect their financial institutions from the threat that they will be targeted by the U.S.

The final two points I will make very quickly are: number one, sanctions take time to work, we have impatience here, I think you can see this in some of the president's tweets that this problem needs to get solved immediately. Sanctions won't solve this problem immediately, they take time to have an effect, and the steps that have been taken over the last six months or so, to increase the pressure that will manifest over, you know, a couple of years.

And that was our experience in Iran, you know, it took some time for the efforts going after their oil, going after their access to their revenue, for the Iranians to really become serious about negotiations, and frankly for the effect on the economy in Iran to take hold. The same is true with North Korea.

And the final point is that sanctions are not a policy, sanctions are a tool of a broader policy effort, as Jake was saying, a whole-of-government effort was necessary in Iran, the same is true in North Korea. You see some disconnect, currently, in the administration on this point. You see Secretary of Mnuchin, Secretary Mattis, Secretary Tillerson, talking about the importance of negotiations, the importance of imposing pressure on North Korea to try to induce the negotiation.

You have a president who is tweeting that all these efforts are futile. Like that policy disconnect is a real problem, because sanctions to work need to be embedded in a broader policy construct, and without that, without there being that broader policy construct it's just, you know, punitive action without any, I think, real prospects of success.

MS. PAK: We are going to open up to questions. I was thinking about; but let me start off by saying, thank you for those comments from all of you. Michael Dobbs, I was thinking about something from your book, where you say: communism was not defeated militarily, it was defeated economically, culturally and ideologically. And I thought of that quote when Jake was also talking about creating the space, and David was also talking about creating the space and creating the leverage.

So, I wonder if you think that the idea of maximum pressure and engagement should be flipped around, creating the space? Or do you have any thoughts about the sequencing of, you know, the types of activities that need to be undertaken, or the conditions that need to be created for negotiations on anything to happen?

MR. DOBBS: Well, from the point of view of someone who did see the Communist system collapse in the country of its origin, I do think that, I mean a larger analysis, but I think the basic reason for the collapse of Communism were the internal weaknesses and contradictions in the system itself, rather than the pressure that was applied from outside.

In fact, I think that the Cuban missile crisis was probably the last moment in the Cold War when anybody really thought seriously of the possibility of a military victory over Soviet Union. And that was in a way liberating because it excluded the military solution from the equation, we had to find other ways to undermine Communism in the Soviet Union, including engagement which proved, over time, of course it took a long time, it's like sanctions, but it took even a longer time, but that proved very effective.

But, you know, it took a generation and, you know, this was Kannon's strategy back in 1948 with containment, that identifying and gradually exploiting, over many, many years, the weaknesses in the system. And that was the strategy that was finally adopted towards the Soviet Union, and I think is the only strategy that has a chance of working with North Korea, if you take the military solution off the table.

MS. PAK: We'll take three at a time as we did last time; so, back there, in the middle, and then Patricia.

MR. ROTH: Stanley Roth, still retired. Two questions one for the panelists. I think all of you mentioned possibilities with some skepticism about three-party negotiations, and who is on what side, but I don't think, and I could be wrong, any of you mentioned South Korea. Can one really have negotiations on the fate of South Korea without South Korea at the table?

The second question, a little unusual, is for the moderator, going back to the last panel. Who is Kim Jong-un? You know, we didn't talk about some of the lesser sanctions; that strikes me as quite interesting. Meaning the international isolation, the closing of embassies, sending home of workers, shutting down small trade in a lot of different countries. I'm not sure if any of the North Korean

restaurants have been shut yet.

But, in other words, it seems the Trump administration is having increasing success in global isolation, detached from the U.S., China, and some of the sanctions that David talked about. How, if at all, does that affect Kim? The fact that there is a more global isolation closer to a pariah regime, does it, maybe, push him towards negotiations, or the opposite? Push them to dig in more?

MS. KIM: Thank you. Hi. Patricia Kim, Council on Foreign Relations. As Jake mentioned in the panel, the Trump administration's handling of the Iran deal has real implications for dealing with North Korea, so I'd like to ask: how can the U.S. government persuade North Korea and China that any deal we strike, assuming we can get to the table at some point, will be honored by successive U.S. administrations? Are there measures that our government can take to restore our credibility as a good negotiating partner?

SPEAKER: My name is (Inaudible), and I'm a visiting fellow at the (Inaudible). My question goes to David. You mentioned lastly that sanction took time, I'd like to ask you, how long will it take? Do you think it would work in time before North Korea has the capability to be able to attack here. Thank you.

MS. PAK: We have four questions on global isolations, the role of South Korea, how to first say -- that the U.S. is credible if we enter negotiations? And the last one; how long will it take?

MR. POLLACK: Let me proceed in violent agreement with Stanley Roth, that this is, after all, the Korean Peninsula, and in addition we have the immediate proximity of Japan as a second core American ally. Too much of this discussion goes on almost oblivious to this larger context, and very frankly you are not going to get a credible outcome, recognizing the odds and the credible outcome are very, very problematic, if you, in some sense, have South Korea absented from this process, or Japan.

And I must say, Stanley, and here, speaking to some of the issues, were raised by the other panelists, one of the successes, if you will, of the Trump administration has been, whether it's because others are wary of exactly what the United States might do, or God knows what, but you have all of the -- including China increasingly, singing more from a common sheet of music.

There doesn't seem to be, you know, in my view at least, you know, I mean or there is a belief to use various kinds of tools such as sanctions in a much more active way against North Korea, and

that frankly I can't -- I'm not going to get into the realm of predictions, but I think in a lot of respects the economic bite on this will, with time, be very, very significant.

It's just simply the question of the timeline of this relative to the other kinds of things that the United States and others worry about with respect to the operationalization of a nuclear weapons' capability of a long-range. And those are the two things, but it does highlight the vulnerabilities that I think are there, but also the protecting of the core equities of American allies first and foremost, the Republic of Korea.

MR. SULLIVAN: Just on that point, you know, when I referred to the unique role of China, I wasn't suggesting there be three-party talks between the U.S., China and North Korea; only that China join the same side of the table, in a sense, as the Japanese the Koreans and the Americans are on. So of course Japan and Korea should be central to this.

I would note, as an interesting lesson from the Iran talks is, when we were running the secret channel in Oman we were not consulting with either Israel or Gulf partners, or for that matter in a direct way, with our other P5+1 one partners, that caused friction over time, it was a challenge for us, and it was a trade-off between being able to ensure discretion and secrecy on the one hand, while on the other hand, recognizing that our important allies and partners had equities that we had to take into account.

And of course we didn't produce a final deal without that consultation, but it was something we were very mindful of. So, the point I was trying to make on China has more to do with the unique role they play in this context that was not present in the Iran context. I think if you constituted the P5+1 today and started an Iran nuclear negotiation, the Russians would actually look more like China does in the North Korea context. They wouldn't just be one of the team. They would think of themselves having to balance equities vis-à-vis Iran and the United States in a different way.

And focusing on that dimension for me is quite intriguing. And I was interested in what Jonathan just said, that the Chinese approach to this may be shifting more quickly than maybe I have perceived so far.

On the issue of the interaction or interplay between Iran and the Iran nuclear deal, and potential diplomacy with North Korea, I think the premise of the question is very sound; which is, if the

United States makes a deal with a nuclear aspirant and says, we are prepared to do certain things if you accept certain restraints and then walks away from it, it definitely, directly undermines our credibility both with respect to other nuclear aspirants, or countries seeking to advance their nuclear capabilities.

And with our negotiating partners who were asking both to join us at the table and to join us in continuing economic pressure that comes at some cost to them. So, there's no doubt in my mind, and it doesn't take leaps of logic to see the ways in which the harm would accrue from walking away from, or calling into question the Iranian nuclear deal on any future effort to bring about a stable negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear question.

I would just underscore, that there's an even more fundamental issue at play here which is, we have a nuclear crisis that we are spending this morning talking about, the North Korean nuclear crisis, why would we want to add a second nuclear crisis other than to employ a similar group of Think Tank people to have a conference, maybe tomorrow, on how we have terrible options with Iran because we don't have the possibility of a negotiated solution, so what the heck are we going to do?

And so I think, particularly, as we try to grapple with crisis, raising questions about our staying power with respect to the Iran Deal is not -- it doesn't justify strategic logic, it defies simple common sense.

MR. COHEN: So let me try and tie together three different questions into one answer, which is that the North Korean economy is vulnerable, so I mean Jake made the point that one of the advantages we had in the Iran context was Iran was out in the world, and so there were a lot of places where we could squeeze the Iranians in various ways, and we took advantage of that. It took a lot of work, a lot of travel around the world, but we got, you know, the Indians, and the South Koreans, and in the Europeans on board, what have you.

North Korea is quite different, it is obviously highly concentrated in China, but there are also these other places around the world, and this gets to the question of this pressure campaign that the -- that frankly the Trump administration has continued what we were doing in the Obama administration, and I think isn't really important. Is to go out, and to cut off these little fountains of funds that go back to North Korea.

They are important because the North Korean economy is so small, and Kim Jong-un's

need for foreign currency is so intense. He needs foreign currency to buy what they need to import, and to buy off the elites. He can't use the Korean won, the North Korean won to buy anything, he needs foreign currency. And so if you go after their ability to earn foreign currency overseas including, you know, through what they do in their embassies to essentially run little mini, you know, trading posts out of their embassies.

It makes a difference back in North Korea. So there is vulnerability in the North Korean economy that we can target both with these broad-based sanctions, but also on these more targeted sanctions, and going after their financial networks around the world.

Related to that though, is the point that Jake was just making, we need our allies to work with us on this effort, we need China in particular, but we need others around the world, the same as we needed them in the Iran context. For them to do that they need to bear cost, it is painful in some respect, particularly for China, to change its approach to North Korea, and to put pressure on the North Koreans. If they wanted to do that -- if it was painless they would have done it a long time ago.

To get the Chinese onboard with this, in the same way we got the international community onboard with Iran, we need to be able to tell them that there is a better outcome, that there is -- that we are actually serious about a negotiated resolution here. If they don't believe that, if the Chinese, in particular, don't believe that we are interested in negotiation in North Korea it's going to be that much harder to get them to bear the cost of putting pressure on the North Koreans,

And that is one of the real dangers of backing out of the Iran Deal, is that we will be unable to credibly tell the Chinese, and others around the world, that they should bear this cost because we are actually interested in a non-military solution to the North Korean nuclear problem.

MR. EINHORN: I'm Bob Einhorn from Brookings. As Jake and David have pointed out, the Obama administration succeeded in imposing devastating economic sanctions against Iran, that provided great leverage for the Iran Nuclear Deal, but apparently not sufficient leverage to achieve U.S. maximum negotiating goals, including in particular a complete ban on uranium enrichment in Iran. And JCPOA, the Iran Nuclear Deal, has a wide range of compromises; I think they were necessary compromises to make, but compromises.

Now, David has pointed out how the Trump administration has succeeded in ramping up

pressures against North Korea, and I agree they are very, very impressive and potentially important tools, and this will provide more leverage: but how much leverage; to achieve what objectives in the negotiation? The current objective is to put irresistible pressure on North Korea to the point where Kim Jong-un agrees to abandon his nuclear and missile programs completely and in the near future.

Is that achievable? I don't think that's achievable, and if it's not achievable, with all the leverage we are able to amass, you know, should we fall back to, you know, interim limits, a phased approach to denuclearization? Or is that too politically risky, and we should simply fall back to a long-term strategy of deterrence, pressure and containment?

SPEAKER: Thank you. It's very interesting. Could it be said that --

SPEAKER: Introduce yourself?

SPEAKER: I'm a student. Could it be said that Israel pre-'67, where it was very economically weak, could be comparable to North Korea for, it got its nuclear weapons, and was able to hold itself back even through conventional means, but still had the backbone of those nuclear weapons, and it succeeded, so the North Koreans could also make that bet.

MR. AUGUSTINE: Alex Augustine. I have a question regarding -- we talked about with the sanctions program, a not insignificant aspect of the program is the hope that the effect on the populace will be to ferment unrest with the government. We talked about that in the context of Iran, and also, hopefully, that may or may not work in North Korea, given the recent EO, concerning a much broader-based sanctions program.

But with Korea, I'm curious, because North Korea emphasizes this enmity with the United States, and that's something that's built into the culture of North Korea, and the North Korean populace that, you know, the United States is the enemy, North Korea is a victim of United States' aggression, and because the regime controls so much of the information that the population has access to, how do you think that affects the effectiveness of a potential sanctions program in North Korea in that regard?

MR. POLLACK: North Korea likes to gather enemies, they have many enemies, the United States is only one of them. In fact, at the present time the only major power with whom North Korea interacts on any kind of semi-regular basis, is Russia. They are not dealing with China, they certainly aren't dealing with the United States on any kind of a credible basis, and Japan's relations,

although at different times has flirted with the idea of trying to resume the return of the other abductees, that's pretty much shut down right now because of all of North Korea's missile and nuclear activity, and direct threats to Japan.

And of course, then there's South Korea that frankly the North Koreans have stiffed despite their incentives to do otherwise. So, you know, it's an odd juxtaposition, but granted, naming the United States as a primary adversary, I get that, that's been a sustaining element in North Korea from their very origins. It's a threat-based system.

But, you know, I think that the pressures here come from multiple channels, I mean, because there is the question of: are they really, in essence, shutting themselves off from a whole variety of prospective relationships, or because of their own wariness? I mean, very frankly, the North Koreans have openly now, in very authoritative ways, begun to talk about China as an enemy, and let's not lose sight of that.

North Korean nationalism is extraordinarily intense, and it's certainly well-practiced over the decades, and so that's kind of where we are at. If I could turn just to Bob's questions very, very quickly; Bob, it is my reluctant conclusion that, you know, where we will be, frankly, in a way not unlike what George Kennan talked about a long time ago, is in a long-term containment and deterrence policy versus -- vis-à-vis North Korea.

I'm not trying to compare North Korea, per se, as a system, it is remarkable in its own right, just given how -- what a modest society or regime we are talking about here, but I think that that's what we have to keep our eye on that ball. It doesn't mean that in some context we wouldn't talk to North Korea, but I think that the first and foremost goal has to be a strategy of inhibition, by all means practicable, but short of the onset of war.

Now, how you juggle that, and how people estimate that may vary a great deal, but I think that those are realistic and achievable goals. It's not a solution, or it's certainly not a near-term solution, but it's a very, very necessary way in which I think the United States has to protect, not only its own interests, but the interests of its core allies in the region.

MR. SULLIVAN: Bob, your question really hits, you know, it's where the rubber meets the road, and going back to the Iran context which, of course, Bob knows well because he was a critical

part of the early phases of those negotiations. We had the benefit, when you think about the clocks the capability clock of Iran versus the sanctions clock of the United States, to have advanced the sanctions clock to the point where there was enormous pressure on Iran before their capability clock had reached a truly critical juncture, I think part of that is because they slow-walk their program for the reasons that I said, whereas North Korea has been racing forward pell-mell.

And that meant that we could, in fact, do something which, in the North Korea context, is often maligned and that is to get a freeze. I mean, effectively what we did for a-year-and-a-half, from essentially November of 2013 until July of 2015, was an interim agreement that would essentially stop things in time, and then you can get to those compromises that you ultimately talk about.

That only worked because we could freeze the Iranian program, because we brought enough pressure to bear at a point that we felt we could manage. The problem in the North Korea context is, everything that David has talked about is going to take considerably more time and these -- in the race between these two clocks, it seems very difficult to see how you amass enough pressure to produce the freeze, to produce whatever the compromises are over time.

That that basic equation doesn't line up as nicely in the North Korea context as it worked in the Iran context. But nonetheless, I think, as an object of our strategy we still have to work towards that for as long as we can, because I neither think that we should decide now is the time to go take some preventive military option, nor do I believe that we should say, wherever we end up at the end of the day, today our policy is now just to shift to, you know, essentially a form of acquiescence in this capability, and then managing it over time.

So, even though I acknowledge this is not easy to do, I think that basic logic still has to obtain, we still have to build the pressure as fast as we can in an effort to try to change the way in which these two clocks are running.

MR. COHEN: Let me just offer one quick addendum to Jake's clocks here, and that is that the -- and this goes back to the question I didn't ask before, about how long it's going to take. The clock on pressure in North Korea can actually accelerate very quickly, both in reality and in perception. The reality, it will take a little bit longer because it's just the way economies operate, but if the Chinese were to, say, clearly definitively, that they were going to, say, cut off fuel oil, petroleum to North Korea,

and they did it.

You know, they got a big pipe, and they've got a handle on it, they turn it, they cut it off, they've done it before, they can do it again. If they were to do that the sort of *intro lorem* effect of that in North Korea, I think would be significant. Even before you see the economic impact roll out there is such a sort of exquisite vulnerability in North Korea, to what China can do, that you can accelerate this clock if you get the Chinese on board.

That's obviously a big if. You know, we've been --as a country we've been working on that for quite a while, but you know, I think there are some, you know, green shoots of possibility here that China may be prepared to do that. Again, if they think that we are serious about a negotiated resolution. They think that what we are going to do is bomb North Korea and spark a war there, you can forget about China being of any assistance I think.

MR. POLLACK: Just a quick point to follow on David's observation. One of the vulnerabilities here is that the economy of Northeastern China is let's just not say, a stirring success. In an ironic way, there is a dependence on trade with North Korea, of various kinds of commodities, and again the Chinese here, I'm not trying to put them on a pedestal, but the decisions that they have at least announced, and things they have agreed to through the Security Council Resolutions, and through statements of their own, suggest to me that they are more prepared than in the past to bear these costs.

I think that the other thing that bears some consideration is the Chinese of course are on the cusp of the 19th Party Congress, and I don't have to remind my good colleague, Chung Lee, out in the audience. Let's see also what outcomes come out of that process as well. It's not to think fancifully about this, but it's just in a very ironic kind of way, China has a vulnerability here that we tend not to weigh just simply because China seems to have this disproportionate role in the North Korean economy.

One final thing, if I could, let us pay attention to Russia, it represents the possibility of a get-out-of-jail-free card, and there has been movement here by the Russians, they are trying to reactivate a whole variety of relationships that could lead to some clever strategies that we'll still find North Korean resources getting out, finding their way maybe even to China, and other places still.

So, I'm not putting, you know, kind of unconditional faith in the honoring of the agreements that are there, but Russia, whether diplomatically or otherwise, is a potential wild card in this

situation right now.

MR. DOBBS: Yeah. Very briefly to expand on my earlier answers; of course we are preoccupied with the short-term crisis and short-term solutions, but we need not to lose sight of two things. One is the risk of uncontrollable escalation, we have to think about that, and think how we are going to deal with that, that's the most worrying concern to me. I think we are in a -- perhaps not quite as dangerous as the Cuban missile crisis, but we are fast approaching that kind of risk.

And secondly, I think we need to think longer term, we need to think about devising the kind of policies that ultimately enable the West to defeat Soviet totalitarianism, and this is not something that's going to happen overnight, it's going to take decades, generations, but we should be investing some thought, as much thought into that to dealing with the short-term crisis.

MS. PAK: Speaking of the clock and the time, it's time for lunch. Please join me in thanking my esteemed colleagues, and panelists, so really, thank you. Wonderful! (Applause)

Just some public service announcements: lunch will be served in the hallways with two lines, and panelists will follow Brookings Staff into the Johnson Room. Thank you.

MR. HASS: Hello, everyone. Welcome back for our keynote (technical interruption) -- my pleasure to introduce our keynote speaker today, a friend and mentor, Avril Haines. Avril is currently a senior research scholar at Columbia University where she is working to harness academic breakthroughs to address societal challenges. Prior to that she was deputy national security advisor for President Obama where she was an active participant in all discussions relating to North Korea. She has also served as deputy director at the Central Intelligence Agency, legal advisor to the National Security Council, and performed rules in the Department of State, U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations, the Hague Conference on Private International Law, and as a law clerk in the 6th Circuit.

Avril will deliver a keynote address, after which she has kindly agreed to take questions.

Thanks.

MS. HAINES: So now that you've had some lunch and you're ready to go to sleep I'm going to try to set the stage. All right. First of all I really want to thank Brookings, and not just for organizing and hosting the discussion today, but for all the remarkable work, frankly, that they've been doing on this issue and so many others to ensure that the policy community remains thoughtful, informed,

agile in approaching the toughest national security and foreign policy challenges that we face today in an ever increasingly complex world. And the discussion, I'd say, this morning pulled together by Bruce and Ryan and Jung, with some of the most thoughtful people that I know on this subject, was particularly fascinating and worthwhile, which is frankly saying something when it comes to North Korea, given that, as many people in this room know, we've been talking about this for a long time and it's not a small challenge to say something that's new or different or even just interesting given the amount of ink and digital space that's been spilled over the years in an effort to identify a sort of successful path forward.

So, with that introduction, I should warn you that I too have nothing new to say on this subject, but I favor a particular combination of really old ideas, which I hope to convince you is the right approach. In short, I think three lines of effort need to be engaged in at the same time. First, I think we should continue to increase diplomatic and economic pressure on the DPRK to bring Kim Jong Un to the table and secure a freeze as the first step in a phased approach that might ultimately lead to denuclearization. Secondly, I think we should continually coordinate our efforts with our allies and engage in contingency planning with China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan in the event of a collapse of the regime. And, third, we should engage in activities intended to support the people of North Korea when doing so that does not significantly detract from the pressure campaign, highlight the human rights abuses of the regime, and get information to the people of North Korea regarding the outside world.

So this isn't really a change from where we were at the end of the Obama Administration, but I would argue that there is a greater chance for this combination to succeed now than ever before because of key shifts in the landscape over the last several years. But, first, I'm going to start explaining why I think this is the right approach. As I see it, administrations on a bipartisan basis have tended to agree on many if not all of the key policy objectives that we're after. One, freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons program with the ultimate goal of rolling back the program to achieve a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Two, preventing the additional proliferation of nuclear weapons information and material from North Korea to other actors. Three, reassuring our allies such that, among other things, they don't pursue nuclear weapons themselves. And, four, ensuring that our efforts with respect to North Korea do not weaken other key U.S. policy objectives, including our more general efforts to counter proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world.

So thus far, in an effort to achieve these objectives, both democratic and republican administrations have implemented an approach in which we've aggressively pursued economic and diplomatic pressure on the DPRK with the stated goal of bringing them to the negotiating table, all the while recognizing that we cannot create enough pressure to do this through unilateral sanctions and that the key player is China, given that approximately 90 percent of North Korea's international trade is with China. So, consequently, the principle mechanism for pursuing effective sanctions has really been through the United Nations. Since 2006, at the instigation of the United States, the Security Council has adopted eight resolutions over the years that impose increasingly onerous sanctions on North Korea, including severe limits on weapons trade, banking, other financial transactions, some of which we've talked about today. And I argue that we need to continue to pursue such pressure, both by enacting new sanctions and by doing everything we can to encourage full enforcement of existing sanctions. And I support the Trump Administration's efforts in this regard.

Nevertheless, such pressure has to be combined with other policy initiatives if it's to have plausible success. But before I get to those other policy initiatives, I want to take just a moment to talk about the reasons for supporting diplomatic and economic pressure versus, for example, military action, which has been discussed. I realize that given the current pitch of concern, driven in part by the ratcheting up the rhetoric, 15 missile tests since President Trump took office, including an ICBM, and the 6 nuclear tests, people are questioning whether we can and should continue to exercise the patience necessary for applying pressure. Some suggest that rather than continue with a perceived to be failing policy we should take some limited preemptive strike against the regime to demonstrate that we are in fact willing to take military action, perhaps against known nuclear facilities.

I won't get into the question of whether I think such a strike could effectively destroy the DPRK ballistic missile threat capacity or its nuclear weapons facilities or weapons, but instead I would just point to Chairman Dunford's statement this summer with which I agree, that while a military option is not unimaginable it would surely be horrific and would lead to "a loss of life unlike any we have experience in our lifetimes". Furthermore, it would be hard to imagine how such a strike would achieve the policy objectives identified. Surely, given everything we know about Kim Jong Un, no one doubts that he would be inclined to respond with force in order to deter us from further action and to prove that he cannot be

pushed around. A non-response would be perceived as weak, might lead to his overthrow, and in the face of such action he would have even less incentive, if that is possible, to give up his nuclear weapons. Additionally, China would be under substantial pressure to support the North in such a situation, given their mutual defense pact with the North. And what message, for example, would it send to China's partners and prospective allies if China did not respond to an attack on their ally that was not in response to an armed attack, even if Pyongyang had engaged in threatening language and rhetoric? In other words, we should be clear, as the Chairman was, that there are no costless military options here that would address the threat we are facing. And while military action may seem appealing because the alternative seems less than satisfying as we watch the DPRK continue to pursue an increasingly improved nuclear weapon capability while we apply pressure, we should be careful not to get caught up on the need to look and feel strong and instead act with strength. As Sun Tzu said, the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.

To be clear, I'm not suggesting that military action should be off the table. No U.S. president has ever taken it off the table and I wouldn't recommend that we do so now. But I do not believe we have come nearly close enough to exhausting other options and, in fact, a number of trends may assist our efforts in applying pressure, such that we will see better results over the next several years than we have seen in the past. And, moreover, although the North Koreans have reached yet another milestone in their development of deliverable nuclear weapons with the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, little else has materially changed. With approximately 30,000 U.S. soldiers on the Peninsula with their families we were before, and are now still in a situation in which Pyongyang could attach the United States and its allies causing a terrible loss of life. And in my view Kim Jong Un has little incentive to do so, though it is possible that he can be goaded into doing so.

Another common criticism to this approach comes from those who argue that pressure makes no sense because no amount of pressure will convince Kim Jong Un to give up his nuclear weapons, which he recognizes as being key to his remaining in power. And, in fact, I think that is likely true, but as I see it that is not the only reason to engage in a pressure campaign. Among other things, even if you assume that Kim Jong Un will never come to the table, no matter how dire the circumstances, to negotiate in good faith a full rollback of the DPRK's nuclear weapons program, he may be willing to

come to the negotiating table to negotiate a freeze and perhaps over time additional measures, such as inspections, that would allow for a slowdown of the North's nuclear program, which would be worth it in the short-term as we pursue other aspects of a broader policy attended to achieve denuclearization.

In fact, the DPRK's Foreign Minister indicated in 2016 that they would be willing to suspend nuclear tests if the United States stopped conducting its annual military exercises with South Korea. And both China and Russia have stated their support for such an approach. And while I would not agree to a freeze-for-freeze along these lines, I do agree with the idea that attempting a phased approach to denuclearization that starts with an interim freeze on the DPRK's ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities in exchange perhaps for certain modifications to the military exercises that do not reduce our readiness when it comes to defending our ally, the Republic of Korea, is worth considering.

We should be clear eyed, however, about how difficult this approach will be. During any such negotiation the North will argue that we should not continue to apply pressure against them and that sanctions should be suspended during the course of negotiations. Yet, of course, if we pull back too far there will be little incentive for the DPRK to agree to anything and instead they will try to find ways to extend the negotiations. In my view, efforts should be made to agree in advance with China on continuing to engage in robust implementation of sanctions during the course of negotiations, if not the addition of new sanctions depending on certain conditions. And doing so will also help convince our allies that such an engagement is not foolhardy.

Another challenge to this approach will be that engaging in such a negotiation risks appearing to accept the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state, which would undercut our nonproliferation efforts more generally and potentially incentivize bad behavior. But to mitigate against this concern we should do what we can to make clear that any initial freeze is part of a phased approach intended, at least from our perspective, to lead to a full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

And, finally, any adjustments we make or incentives that we offer during the course of the negotiations are likely to be concerning to our allies. And so we would need to convince them of the value of this approach and closely coordinate on our discussions to bring them along with the reassurance they will know what we are doing at every step of the way.

But as I stated earlier, a pressure campaign must be combined with two other lines of

effort, one of which is to continually coordinate with our allies, and in particular, engage in contingency planning with China, Korea, and Japan in event of a collapse of the regime. I don't think we can rely exclusively on a phased approach to achieve our principle objective, which is to roll back North Korea's nuclear program. And while not impossible, it is highly unlikely that the phased approach will lead to the DPRK willingly giving up its nuclear weapons in the near-term. What seems far more likely is that over the next several years the regime collapses, Kim Jong Un is overthrown or an ally successfully pursues regime change, and under such circumstances it is not clear whether anyone that attempts to replace Kim Jong Un will be more likely to engage in good faith negotiations to achieve denuclearization. But particularly in the face of a significant uprising or collapse, we face a number of extraordinary risks for what will need to be prepared. And as the pressure mounts and more information gets into North Korea from the outside, as a consequence of technological developments, the more likely we are to see such upheaval. In the event there were to be a collapse China would likely deploy a military force into North Korea to create at the very least a buffer zone in an effort to prevent millions of North Koreans from pouring into China and to avoid having a South Korean military presence on its border. The Republic of Korea would likely ask for our assistance in a move north of the 38th parallel for similar reasons and in an effort to accomplish reunification. The Russians would go on high alert and perhaps take advantage of certain aspects of the situation vis-a-vis the Chinese. And in between we would have perhaps the worst loose nukes challenge one could imagine, which potentially uncontrolled factions of the DPRK military taking possession of conventional and unconventional weapons to defend themselves against outsiders.

And, consequently, a key policy initiative that must accompany the pressure campaign intended to lead to a phased approach is intensive contingency planning that ensures we are as prepared as we can be in the event of a regime collapse. Such contingency planning must be done not only with the Republic of Korea but also with China and of course Japan. For everyone should have a clear expectation in the event of the situation deteriorating of what each country's military will do in order to avoid miscalculations and unintended escalation. And strategically this planning, unlike the effort at the end of World War II that created two Koreas, should be done with the specific intent of reaching an agreement among the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan and China, regarding an ideal end state that would include a denuclearized Peninsula, a unified Korea, and perhaps the removal of -- or at

least a substantial in U.S. troops from the Peninsula. And besides being the responsible thing to do, an effective contingency plan may have a subtle but important impact on China's calculus regarding pressure.

Finally, I come to the third line of effort that I believe should be advanced in parallel to the pressure campaign and contingency planning. This line of effort has three subparts and is focused on the North Korean people. First it would involve in engaging in activities intended to help the people of North Korea when doing so does not significantly detract from the pressure campaign. So such as providing certain assistance in the event of a natural disaster. Second, it would involve highlighting the human rights abuses of the regime, and, third, it would involve getting information to the people of North Korea regarding the outside world. All three are intended to counter to some extent the near constant anti-U.S. propaganda that is fed to the North Korean population, which will remain a serious problem for our national security and foreign policy, even after Kim Jong Un is gone. If we have done nothing to counter the perception, and as we've seen in other foreign policy scenarios, we cannot overestimate the importance of how the population regards the United States if we are to hope to influence events and avoid long-term threats that can develop into unexpected threats in the future.

Secondly, the way the first two activities are mutually reinforcing of the pressure campaign and would help us to maintain a multilateral coalition focused on pressure against the regime as one of the key concerns expressed by certain partners when we ask them to assist us in applying increased pressure on the regime, is that the additional sanctions under discussion may hurt the people of North Korea because the elites in the regime will only transfer the loss of revenue rather than suffer themselves.

And, of course, as I noted at the beginning, these ideas are not new and in fact generally represent an extension of the Obama Administration's policy, which appears to have been largely adopted by the Trump Administration with some adjustments. In fact, this may be the policy that the Trump Administration is pursuing. But if so I would make a few suggestions on the margins that I believe would increase their chances of success. First I would avoid engaging in rhetorical barbs with Kim Jong Un, particularly if they are not coordinated with our allies and even China. Without a carefully coordinated approach the allies are likely to be on edge and will feel unsure of U.S. intentions, which may cause them

to take uncoordinated action and ultimately not be as useful a partner as we would hope for in solving this extremely difficult challenge. Moreover, historically, the North would like nothing better than to drive a wedge between the United States and the Republic of Korea and we should not make their job any easier. Furthermore, such barbs, if not coordinated can provide an excuse for them to avoid cooperation with us on the enforcement of existing sanctions and development of new ones. Additionally I don't see the value of such rhetoric in pushing Kim Jong Un toward negotiation. The rhetorical barbs seem far more likely to lead to an unintended escalation of the conflict that ultimately puts our troops on the Peninsula in danger.

Second, I would coordinate, coordinate, and coordinate with our allies, first and foremost, and then China to the extent feasible. At the end of the day we cannot resolve the North Korea challenge without the help of the allies and China. And, furthermore, if we're to move forward on the policy initiative outlined above, there are going to be points at which our allies will feel exposed and concerned. And given the threat that they're facing it's hard to blame them. President Moon has indicated greater willingness than many of his predecessors to engage and thus is more likely to support the approach I've outlined. But he will be even more supportive if he can trust us to consistently coordinate and tell them what we are doing at every step. With such coordination and trust the Republic of Korea and Japan are less likely to move toward self-help solutions, such as their own nuclear weapons programs, and more likely to give us room to do things unilaterally that they might otherwise be uncomfortable with and that might help up to achieve our policy objectives, such as modify our annual military exercises in the context of a freeze.

Third, I wouldn't walk away from the Iran deal as it will send the message that we cannot be trusted to live up to our commitments and will almost certainly make it harder to enter into negotiations with the DPRK over their nuclear program. Now, I'm obviously biased here. I believe the Iran deal was good policy and that it is in the best interest of the United States to support the deal, but I don't intend to turn this into a discussion of the deal. I would just say that if we refuse to hold up our bargain, particularly a commitment made to an adversary regarding their nuclear program, despite the fact that they are complying, I cannot imagine that it would not have an impact on the DPRK's calculus as they consider whether to enter into negotiations with the United States regarding their own program. And at the very

least it would give them greater leverage in the discussions to say that they can't rely on us to follow through on our commitments and consequently presumably they will demand that we frontload our commitments before they're willing to do anything. And certainly Russia and China, who are part of the deal with Iran, will support the North in such comments given that we will have breached our commitment not only Iran but to the P-5 countries, which of course includes Russia and China.

So, finally, I just want to explain something I said at the beginning about why I think this approach is particularly likely to achieve success within the next few years for those who question why pressure, which has yet to bear results, will do so now. I think it's more likely not only because with each successive UN Security Council resolution on sanctions, and every other step made since 2006 to increase the pressure on the DPRK we've slowly ratcheted the intensity of economic pressure on the DPRK significantly. But also because there are a number of shifts in the landscape, including ones that will help to accelerate and intensify the pressure we bring to bear. First, Kim Jong Un has leaned into fear and intimidation tactics to maintain his authority in ways that far exceed those of his father or grandfather. This is likely the case because he didn't have the years that either of them had to build a network of loyal supports through the government, and consequently his approach to solidify power was to exercise extraordinary brutality against any perceived threats and thereby deter future threats. This approach, while effective in the short-term, carries with it a cost and one that he is consistently trying to mitigate and one that consequently may drive him toward a phased approach that carries with the promise of small economic or legitimacy gains without costing him the program as a whole. Additionally, it is worth noting that his approach to power may ultimately make him more vulnerable to an overthrow, and consequently is yet another reason to lean into contingency planning.

Second, China has been willing to partner with us more and more in applying pressure to the regime. And while I would attribute this to in part a recognition of the fact that the DPRK's pursuit of nuclear weapons continues to have significant downsides, such as destabilizing impact on the Peninsula and driving us to increase our security presence in the region in ways that make them uncomfortable, such as the case with our decision to deploy THAAD missile to the Peninsula.

I also believe that some of it comes from a very personal irritation among the Chinese elite with the way in which Kim Jong Un has disrespected President Xi and China during the course of his

reign. And this disrespect has furthermore highlighted the fact that they are not fully in control of his actions, which may at some point turn against them.

Third, advances in technology have made it increasingly difficult for the DPRK to keep its citizens from being exposed to the world outside of the DPRK, which ultimately increases pressure on Kim Jong Un to find ways to strengthen the economy, increase international trade, and gives us greater leverage in pursuing a phased approach while at the same time making it more likely that eventually the government is overturned. And with this changing landscape our diplomacy should have a greater chance for success. And although I share the impatience felt by so many to find a solution to the threat we face from a nuclear armed North Korea, I also have seen how over time U.S. diplomacy can have an utterly transformative impact on our foreign policy, addressing national security challenges without the loss of life that generally accompanies military action and which also tends to result in unpredictable and frequently negative long-term consequences.

So given the series of bad choices we face I do think we need to continue to give this approach further time and space to see if we're able to avoid the horror that the Chairman spoke of in the context of a military option.

Thank you.

MR. HASS: Thank you, Avril, for a tremendous presentation. I'd like to turn the floor to you for any questions.

QUESTIONER: It was very interesting and it seemed really coherent, your strategy. And how would the cyber realm play into your strategy?

MS. HAINES: How would cyber realm play in? So let me start by just saying that one of my particular hobby horses has been that we think about cyber sometimes in a stovepipe and not in the context of our broader national security. And I think it's critical to think of cyber just like every other battlefield that we have essentially in space within which we have to operate. So within cyber I think one of the aspects of obviously part of what the North Koreans have done in the context of the Sony attack or other things like that, is to create irritants and to engage in damaging effects in many respects. And we have to push back against those and create a sort of multilateral coalition to respond to them, so there's those kinds of cyber pieces. But then, of course, more generally it's just -- we have to have, as Jake

indicated was true in the context of the Iran deal, a really whole of government approach in pursuing our policy. And cyber would certainly be a part of any whole of government approach that we would be engaging in to pursue our policy.

MR. HASS: Yes, let's take several questions.

MR. WINTERS: Thank you. Steve Winters, independent consultant. Just a very brief question. You've emphasized the need to coordinate with Japan and South Korea, also perhaps China, for the eventuality of a collapse in the North. But does that suggest that after all these years we don't have a coordination yet, that we're not prepared for a collapse in the North? And, if not, why not?

MR. HASS: Okay. Any others? Yes, in the back.

MR. BURTON: John Burton with the Korea Times. How much do you think that the North Korean leadership and the North Korean people fear absorption by South Korea? And does that contribute to the stability of the Pyongyang regime?

MR. HASS: Avril?

MS. HAINES: Okay. So do we have a contingency plan? Right, exactly. Not the one that I spoke of, which is to say that what I'm talking about and suggesting that needs to be done is really developing contingency planning not just between us and the allies but also with China in that context. And that's very difficult to do, not the least of which is because it's very hard for China to engage in that kind of contingency planning given that their ally is North Korea. But it's critical in my view to actually addressing a situation that I think is at least plausible to occur at some point. And certainly the extraordinary national security implications of a collapse are worth making a strong effort to address it.

And then to the question of how much do I think a fear among the North Korean population of South Korean absorption leads to Pyongyang's power. I mean I don't know that I'm the best person to answer the question of what is in the mind of North Koreans per se, but my sense is that there are a lot of factors. I wouldn't have named that as being the most important factor. I think there is a sense among, you know, North Koreans, and certainly the leader has indicated such, that the Korean Peninsula should be unified at some point. I think there's an obvious disagreement as to unified under whom. And the North Koreans would say under Kim Jong Un and obviously the South Koreans would say under President Moon. So I think on both sides there is concern, it's just asymmetric I suppose in

terms of what the implications of that are. I do think it's more in the sense that there's a fear of invasion of outsiders that it is a part of the mentality. And I think it was well expressed by the panel that talked about sort of the bunker mentality that essentially exists within North Korea and the way in which there's a sense that they feel as they are at war and, in fact, as a legal matter they are. And that that is a part of what allows the control to be kept as well.

MR. HASS: Patrick?

MR. McEACHERN: Patrick McEachern with the Wilson Center. Thank you. Thank you for this forward looking speech. I'd like to ask you to look back for just a moment on the Obama Administration and, to the extent to which you can, share with us a little bit about some of the U.S.-DPRK contacts, as brief as they may have been, with respect to North Korean demands for a peace regime or, as you referenced, the freeze-for-freeze proposal.

MS. HAINES: Yeah, very hard to really provide any kind of detailed sort of description of that. What I would say is that I think from my personal perspective we were not yet at the point where the pressure that was created even though it continued to get ramped up through successive UN Security Council resolutions and so on, and I think has been successfully ramped up obviously further in the Trump Administration. At the point that we left even it was insufficient to really provide the leverage that would be necessary for a phased approach. And I think it's more that you could see the trend lines moving in a certain direction, both with the increase in pressure, and some of the things that I highlighted at the end of what I had to say for why it is that I think that those things are just going to continue to actually help us to accelerate pressure in some respects.

So I don't think we were there yet. I don't know that we are there at this moment, frankly, either. I think it may take a little bit more time. I just recognize that it's harder and harder to deal with it.

Finally, on contacts, I'd say that my own view is that it's extremely useful to have as many channels as you possibly can and I do support what I understand to be at least Tillerson's understanding that there are several channels. I hope that's the case.

QUESTIONER: Thank you for your recommendations. And I just want to ask, since you recently served in the U.S. administration regarding this issue I guess you wouldn't be able to talk in detail, but you emphasized importance of coordination with allies. And one of them would be South

Korea obviously, but given the current circumstances what do you think the Korean government would need to do to ensure greater coordination with the U.S. Trump Administration?

QUESTIONER: This Jo, I'm a policy consultation. That's for the speech. I'm very interested that you mentioned nowadays probably it's easier for the people in North Korea to access the information from outside as well as the possibility to even have the Kim Jong Un authoritarian overthrown in the future. So I want to know a little more details about that. Is there a plan to gather people in North Korea to access more information from the outside and how would that be handled?

Thanks.

MR. HASS: Does anyone else want to weigh in? Joan?

QUESTIONER: Thank you so much, Avril. Is there a particular sequence to your three points or three ways forward?

MR. HASS: Stapleton?

MR. ROY: Stapleton Roy at the Wilson Center. Could you expand on the concept of a freeze? We have a long history of failed negotiations. We now have a nuclear North Korea. Our negotiating strategy seems to say we need to negotiate something that's urgently necessary but we take off the table that might be necessary to get there. I don't see why we should play around with exercises. If it takes us to halt exercises, a freeze on exercises, why isn't that a good bargain to get a halt to their missile and nuclear testing program? It seems to me we're sort of repeating the same old errors again. We want to accomplish something but we aren't prepared to give what might be necessary to get there. I'm just interested in comments.

MR. HASS: Maybe we'll take one or two final questions. Evan?

QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. Avril, a version of a question that was asked earlier of a previous panel. I am curious, given that we may be about see the Iran deal decertified, what impact do you think that might have on the North Korea issue?

Thank you.

MR. HASS: And then for a final question maybe the lady in the back?

QUESTIONER: Thank you. In regards to a contingency plan do you see any room for United States-Russia cooperation?

MR. HASS: Thank you.

MS. HAINES: Am I going to get tested on this? (Laughter) You may have to help me if I miss something.

Okay. One question was asked about greater cooperation with South Korea and what advice would I give I guess to the South Koreans on this point. I think, in my experience at least, the Republic of Korea is terrific at frankly their outreach to the U.S. government and I had a very close relationship with my counterpart. I know really everybody around me had close relationships with their counterparts. I think it's important for both sides obviously to do everything they can to coordinate. And so I'm hoping that the Trump Administration is doing more coordinating than it sometimes appears, but in any event I do think it's an absolutely critical aspect of any North Korean policy, frankly, that we have. South Korea is our extraordinary and long-standing ally in the region and we're not going to be able to solve this without them. So I'm not sure that that's fully satisfying, but it's the best I think I can do.

In terms of information coming into the DPRK and the fact that I think that that may over time be another pressure point for a possible, you know, revolution of sorts. So I think it's clear that there is more information getting in and I think, frankly, the panel that you heard earlier from people who have been there are seeing that that's happening. And I'm sure that that's for a variety of reasons, but not the least of which is that technology makes it so much easier now to actually get information into places that otherwise might have been essentially kept isolated by a government.

I do think that that creates a couple of different pressures, one of which is I think the one that was outlined that I also mentioned in my speech I think, which is essentially that as people see how other people are living, right, in other countries there is a desire -- you know, there's sort of a recognition of the current situation is really bad and just how bad in a sense -- and a desire to get more materials and other things from outside. And that puts pressure I think on Kim Jong Un to deliver in some respects to the elites, but also more generally. And I think that gives us a potential opening for the phased approach point that I was trying to make earlier. I do think also just in the kind of conversation that was had earlier also about how things worked with the Soviet Union and watching that develop, I think the information coming in from the outside was a part of what led to the internal pressures that essentially caused its combustion. So I think that those are what I'm thinking when I'm talking about those issues.

Then in terms, Jung, of your question about the sequence. You know, I see all these of three lines of efforts that you're doing at the same time. So I think, you know, I put the first line of effort as pressure leading to a phased approach and I think we still have some space to go before we really can get to probably the conditions under which, but I'm not in a position obviously right now to tell. And that's for the administration to kind of work through. At the same time I think we need to be engaging with our allies on everything, but then also on contingency planning. And I believe that as we've seen the shift in China occur just a little bit and, you know, I think it's -- the question of how much is a good one and whether or not there's a point at which it won't shift any further, I think you really want to lean into contingency planning to see if they're willing to do it. And then frankly, as I said, I believe that in some respects if you were to get to a point where you actually had a contingency plan that China was part of a discussion on, it may shift their view on the degree of pressure they're willing to put on North Korea because so much of their concern is an existential crisis of what happens if they destabilize North Korea so, so much that they end up with millions of refugees on their borders and destabilizing of the Peninsula, et cetera. So that's at least a piece of it. And then, finally, I really think what I believe is sometimes overlooked but a critical piece of the policy is focusing on the North Korean people and thinking about how are they perceiving us, what does that look like over the years. I think that's maybe less of a short-term and more of a long-term strategy, but one that I think is critical and we're going to be facing it at some point. So, anyway, those three.

Then why not stop the exercises? Yes, okay. So this is a very good question.

MR. ROY: No, no, no, just --

MS. HAINES: What?

MR. ROY: Don't stop the exercises.

MS. HAINES: No, no, no, but why not trade it for a negotiation. Right.

MR. ROY: Why take it off the table?

MS. HAINES: Right.

MR. ROY: Before you (inaudible) the negotiation?

MS. HAINES: Why not take -- say that again? Why not take them off --

MR. ROY: (Inaudible) said we want to negotiation (inaudible) but no exercises. They

can be part of it.

MS. HAINES: Right. That's entirely fair. I am not suggesting that we shouldn't be willing to have a conversation about the exercises. My concern about a freeze-for-a-freeze, in the way that it's been termed, and the offer essentially that I indicated is on the table is that I think it's insufficient. So I think one North Korea is engaging in illegal activity in testing nuclear weapons, doing ballistic missile tests that are against UN Security Council resolutions. What we're doing in our exercises is making sure that we're ready to protect our ally, i.e., the Republic of Korea, in the event of an attack. So I don't see these two as equivalent in that sense. What I do think is that it is possible to consider modifications, maybe even substantial modifications to the exercises that alleviate some of the frustration and concerns that the North Koreans raised in that context while at the same time conserving our capability to be ready to protect our ally. And I think that's a perfect example of a place where you really need to coordinate with the public of Korea because part of what you're doing is not just dealing with the freeze piece, but also making sure that the Republic of Korea feels sufficiently reassured in this situation that they're also not engaging in escalatory behavior that creates a problem in that situation as well. So that would be my thought on that.

Evan, you asked about the Iran deal. I mentioned it in my talk. I absolutely think that even aside from an argument over the merits of the deal, which I obviously support, but putting that aside, as was earlier indicated, I just think we are shooting ourselves in the foot if we pull out of a deal where we negotiate over a nuclear program with an adversary, they are complying with it, and we've decided to walk away from it. It's the wrong message to be sending to the North Koreans as you're saying you're exercising pressure to drive them to the table to have a negotiation over a nuclear deal. So that would be an issue.

Russia? Is that right? What was the question?

SPEAKER: Cooperating with Russia.

MS. HAINES: Thank you, yes. Oh, in the contingency plan, could I imagine them in contingency plan cooperating? Yeah, I could imagine the discussion. And I debated myself whether or not to include them in the group of countries that I think it's important to negotiate a contingency plan with, but I honestly think it's more important to be focused on the Republic of Korea, Japan, and China. It's not

that it's irrelevant, but I think that those are the key countries that you really need to work through contingency planning. And I think to bring Russia into that in early stages -- and I think frankly this is the kind of thing that would have to be done behind closed doors, not something you're doing publicly -- but I think to bring them into that discussion early on is probably a mistake. It's a disruptor, it's not necessarily useful. I do agree with I think the point that was made earlier by Jonathan, I do see Russia as being a wildcard in many respect as to how things develop and that will be very interesting. It's hard to predict for a number of reasons, but it's something to watch obviously in this landscape.

Is that it?

MR. HASS: Tremendous. You answered every question. Thank you. (Laughter)

Please join me in thanking Avril for a tremendous presentation. (Applause)

MR. PAK: Thank you, Avril, thank you Ryan, thank you to everyone who spoke today, and especially for a tremendous staff, Hunter, Maeve, Paul, Aileen, Ryan, and everybody who helped out with this event. We're very grateful for your support and for your participation. And we just wanted to let you know that this problem is ongoing and Brookings will be hard at work in our Korean Peninsula Working Group on answering some of these questions that were posed by our panelists and by you, the audience. So thank you very much and please join me in thanking the panelists. (Applause)

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