THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

FALK AUDITORIUM

# RETHINKING POLITICAL ISLAM

Washington, D.C.

Monday, September 25, 2017

PARTICIPANTS:

**Introductions:**

NATAN SACHS
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Middle East Policy
The Brookings Institution

**Panelists:**

MODERATOR: KRISTIN DIWAN
Senior Resident Scholar
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington

SHADI HAMID
Senior Fellow, Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World
The Brookings Institution

WILL McCANTS
Senior Fellow and Director, Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World
The Brookings Institution

GRAEME WOOD
National Correspondent
The Atlantic

* * * * *

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. SACHS: We're delighted to see you all. My name is Natan Sachs. I direct the Center for Middle East Policy here at Brookings, and on behalf of Bruce Jones, the director of the Foreign Policy program and Suzanne Maloney, our colleague, the deputy director, it's really a pleasure to welcome you all here.

It's a special pleasure because this is a celebration of a culmination of two years of very hard and outstanding work by two of my colleagues here, Shadi Hamid and Will McCants, as well as well over a dozen other scholars who have contributed to this work and staff as well.

The topic -- so first, I would be remiss if I didn't say our hashtag for today is "Rethinking Islamism." So if you're tweeting away, please use that. And the book we're celebrating is "Rethinking Political Islam" edited by Shadi Hamid and William McCants. They're right over here and we'll introduce them soon. And I really cannot recommend this highly enough. I saw the process as it was going on and I think very few works of scholarship have gone through such an iterative, comparative, rigorous work that is both in depth, scholarly at the highest level, but also contributes to the policy debate.

And the policy debate is a difficult one. The question of religion and state and religion and democracy plagues most countries in the world, including the one we're in at the moment. The founding narrative of the United States is, of course, intertwined with the idea of freedom of religion and freedom from religion in some cases. And the difficult balancing act that a lot of countries around the world, and certainly the democracies among them face, which is the striving for majority rule and the inherent limitations of power that are part of democracy. The idea of rejecting tyranny of all kinds, of a despite, a king, or of the majority and how to have both of these especially in cases where the majority of religion or majority of beliefs may restrain the freedoms of others.

These are very difficult cases and they are difficult especially for the Middle East where we work and other instances of Muslim majority countries. And this book, as you will see if you haven't purchased it yet, you will see when you do, looks at a whole wide variety of cases all the way from Indonesia, a country where I used to do research, through the Middle East, and all the way into North Africa.

This work also is one, as I mentioned, of an iterative process. You'll see that the more than dozen authors here drafted their work and that was then submitted for comments from others in a very interesting and innovative way. It was also submitted to the comments from the subjects themselves, the people that are being discussed, the Islamists, the ones who are changing the future of whom we're discussing. And in this sense it's fascinating, and I think one of the most interesting cases of scholarly work combining policy that I can think of. And one well worth looking at.

It's important in a few other ways that we cherish here at Brookings. We have a wide variety of diversity of opinions and you'll see it in the book itself, but we share one thing in common which is the notion, it's a bit heterodox these days, that facts, not opinions, should be the beginning of discussions. We do actually believe that, that we should first go look for facts, find out what is out in the world, and then have a conversation, disagreements included, based upon that.

And with that in mind, the authors and the editors went out to talk to people, some of whom they agreed with, some of whom they disagreed with vehemently, to find out what is out there with real phenomenon, very important phenomenon.

I imagine you're tired of hearing from me, so I will just say -- give my personal congrats and my thanks, first to all of you for coming out. Also to our moderator who we're very privileged today, Kristin Diwan, who is a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute here in Washington, and she had a wide variety of expertise, very relevant to our discussion, especially in the Gulf States on Islamism there, but also many other topics related to Islamism. She's taught at American University, at Georgetown, and at George Washington, and probably everywhere else in Washington as well. And she has a Ph.D. from University of Cambridge, which you may have heard of, and she's a resident of -- a native of Texas, which is very important in the bio.

I want to thank two others as well. Rasha Darr and Shamaya Majdub, who worked very hard on this work together with our scholars, and along with our other excellent staff at the Center for Middle East policy and especially the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic world, which is the center of this excellent work and really make everything else possible.

And finally, I want to thank the Luce Foundation, whose generous support helped this happen throughout this project. We are very grateful to them, both for their support and for the vision of

having independent, vigorous work done here at Brookings to further our understanding of this important topic.

And one last postscript of thanks, my congrats again to my friends Shadi and Will, and with that I'll turn it over to you.

MS. DIWAN: While they're mic'ing up everyone else, perhaps I'll go ahead and take advantage and get started.

I wanted to add, I'm Kristin Diwan from the Arab Gulf States Institutes, and I wanted to add my warm welcome to all of you and my gratitude for you joining us this evening for this book launch. I also wanted to add a warm welcome to all of our speakers here, of course, including the authors or the editors of this collective project.

Let me introduce each of them first and then I'll do a short introduction. We're going to have a bit of a discussion amongst the panelists, see if we can debate this wonderful contribution to the literature, and then we will have time at the end for all of your questions as well.

Shadi Hamid is, of course, the senior fellow right here to my immediate left and the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World in the Center for Middle East Policy and the author of the new book, "Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle over Islam is Reshaping the World."

Will McCants to his right, right, is a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy and director of its Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. He is also the author of the "ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State," which came out in 2015.

And we also have with us discussant Graeme Wood, who is a national correspondent for The Atlantic and a lecturer in political science at Yale University. He is the author of "The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State." And we're really privileged to have all of them here with us today.

As we start to think about this topic of rethinking political Islam, it's important to put it into context. The last several years and the years following the Arab uprisings of 2011 have been an exceptionally challenging period for Islamic political movements. As the book mentions, they've been faced with these twin shocks, one with the overthrow of the elected Muslim Brotherhood-led Morsi government in Egypt. And then, of course, the extraordinary and rapid rise of the Islamic State. Both of

these realities or actions really forced these Islamic movements to rethink a lot of their essential ideas, their organization, their practices. As you can imagine, the overthrow of the Morsi government, brought into question a lot of the commitment a lot of them had made to elections. Most of them have been moving in that direction. And then, of course, the rise of the Islamic State and its initial success coupled with this overthrow of an elected government started to raise questions and make some of the movements reconsider the efficacy and maybe even the necessity of violence in a region that was really, you know, going through a really rapid transformation. So it's really great to have the opportunity then to discuss and to debate the evolution of these movements, how they work through these challenges, and to think about what the future holds for these movements of political Islam.

I won't say a lot more about the book because I think Natan got into that, but I just wanted to add my own impressions that I found it a really amazing and wonderful contribution to the literature. I think some of its real strength is the inclusive approach that it takes. As you mentioned, there's over a dozen authors, I believe, that contribute to this who have done research and know very well and have done their field research in these 12 countries that are under consideration. I think the innovation of inviting in some of the practitioners from these Islamic movements themselves to comment is really a really added welcomed addition. And the fact that this took place in this iterative process over two years I'm sure really invited a lot of very interesting discussions and debates.

So to start off I thought I would just ask Shadi and Will to reflect a bit on this experience of this time to carry this project through and to think a bit about what you hope people will take from this book.

MR. HAMID: Yeah, great. Well, thank you, first of all, Kristin, and thanks to my fellow panelists, my colleagues Will and Graeme. Thanks to all of you for coming, and thank you, Natan, for that introduction.

I'll just highlight some of the few themes that I think really stuck out with me in terms of thinking about what we wanted this book to accomplish and some of the main takeaways we got from reading various drafts and iterations of the contributions.

The first thing is sort of this idea of the twin shocks that Kristin talked about, the first one, of course, being the coup in Egypt that overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood-led government and then the

rise of ISIS. We'll talk more about the latter.

When it comes to the Egyptian coup, oftentimes we talk about the importance of learning lessons, but I think what's striking is that different movements or groups can look at the same moment or the same event and come out of it with two very different interpretations. So if you take how, for example, the main Tunisian Islamists Party and Ennahda reacted to the Egyptian coup, they became much -- even more cautious and compromising than they already were. And part of what they were thinking was, hey, what happened in Egypt, we've got to do everything that we can possibly do to avoid that fate. And if that means making more compromises and deemphasizing our Islamist or Islamic identity, so be it. Where if you take the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and if you take some of the younger members of the movement, and even some of the older ones, they come out of it saying that, hey, maybe the mistake we made is that we should have been more revolutionary. We should have been more confrontational. We shouldn't have left Tahrir Square in the early months of the uprising or the revolution. We shouldn't have been too accommodating towards the military. We should have almost in a sense played a little bit harder, in some ways at least. And I think from at least an American policy perspective, Americans wouldn't necessarily see becoming more confrontational or more revolutionary as being a positive lesson to learn. So I think it really depends in that respect. And Will will talk about some of the other cases where violence becomes more of a consideration. For example, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. So that's one thing.

And I'll just give one example of something an older and quite prominent member of the Brotherhood told me two years ago and that has sort of stayed with me a little bit. His name is Om Durag, and actually, he's one of the contributors. And he essentially responded to some of the contributions in the book and wrote what I thought was an interesting chapter that did do actual rethinking. Because of the prerequisites for anything being included in here is that there had to be rethinking; otherwise, it wouldn't really fit because the title of the book is "Rethinking Political Islam."

So I asked him, I was asking him, what are some of the major lessons learned? Where are you doing the most rethinking? Stuff like that. And he said, "If I look at the list of mistakes the Brotherhood made, this is the biggest one, trying to fix the system from inside gradually." Where, again, Ennahda took quite a different approach or response and said we want to be more gradualist in light of

what's happened. So that's one thing.

The second theme that I think really emerges and that I find absolutely fascinating is this question of how do we measure success? When we're trying to understand how successful a given Islamist movement is, how do we judge that? And quite importantly, how do they judge it from their own perspective? And I think that for those of us who have spent, you know, I'm American, I think a lot about elections. That's how our own system works. So we think about who wins elections as being the major consideration. And I think that a lot of us Western scholars or Western analysts, we're very focused on electoral results, and understandably, that's quite important. But what happens when Islamist parties do quite well in elections or even win them but they can't actually change society even though they're in power? In "power" or actually in power.

So one very interesting contrast is say between the Moroccan Islamist Party, the PGD, and Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, and those are two of the country cases that we feature in the book. And what was fascinating to me coming out of this whole project was in some ways Jamaat-e-Islami, despite doing really badly in elections, they only get a handful of seats in Parliament so they have no real electoral presence. But you could argue, and perhaps I would argue, that Jamaat-e-Islami has ended up being more influential in ways that are maybe harder to measure. So in terms of reshaping the educational curricula in the country, influencing judicial appointments, Islamizing society at large. So you can Islamize society without necessarily having many seats in Parliament, where if you take the PJD, and it's an important case because it's one of the few cases where Islamists have been in power since close to the start of the Arab Spring and they continue to be a part of the government. There has been an Islamist prime minister for several years, but despite holding power in some sense, the question then becomes what have they actually changed in Morocco? And many Moroccans would criticize the PJD and say, hey, we might have Islamists who are technically in power but because the monarchy is very influential and has veto power over major decisions, that limits the ultimate effectiveness of an Islamist party even if the Islamist party keeps on winning. So that's a very I think important contrast. And I think those of us who study Islamist movements from the West or the Western academy or Western think tanks, for a long time I think we were encouraging Islamist movements and dialogue and meetings and we were telling them you guys have to become more moderate. You have to. And one way to do that is

to focus more on elections, to focus on forming political parties. And all of that is obviously part of normal politics. But there's an interesting debate now, and you see a number of the different country cases of, hey, did we become obsessed with elections where we lost sight of the other things that make us an Islamist movement? And some of those things are religious preaching, influencing the educational system, social service provision. These are sort of the core animating aspects of many Islamist movements but with the rise of democratic politics at least for a moment and with elections becoming more important, you see Islamist movements shifting their focus from their traditional core areas of competence to elections and winning and so forth. And that is an open question, especially in countries where there aren't elections any more. If that's become your focus for such a long time and there is no real electoral politics because countries have become more authoritarian, then you're sort of in a sense stuck.

And this sort of also fits, I think, into this bigger issue that these aren't political parties in the traditional sense. They are more than political parties. We can't compare them to say the Democratic Party or the Republican Party or the Labour Party in Britain. These are parties that actually have -- that actually started out as religious movements first and went into politics later. And the question then becomes what should the relationship be between the movement and the party? Does one subsume the other? Do they co-exist together? Does one dominate the other and vice-versa? So that's something that comes out in a lot of the cases.

Well, the last thing I'll say is this controversial -- potentially controversial -- you guys can tell me if you think it's controversial in the Q&A session, is the fact that we really -- we sort of saw this as not your standard edited volume. We wanted this book to sort of be a running dialogue. And I think that if you read it you'll start to see how it's a different kind of approach to writing something. And as Kristin said, one thing we really try to do here, every contributor read if not all of the other contributions, many of them, and that informed their own writing. And in some cases they went back and forth and responded to each other. And we thought this seems kind of obvious to me but maybe it's not obvious to other people, is that if you're writing a book about political Islam, you have to actually include the voices of the people you're presumably studying. Even if we don't like them, even if we disagree profoundly with many of these movements, to understand these movements we have to hear what they are saying about are they

rethinking some of their core premises? And if so, what does that actually entail? And one thing that we required from the Islamist respondents and contributors was that they had to actually do rethinking. They couldn't just give the party line and leave it at that. And we actually rejected several submissions from people we reached out to because we thought there is actually no real rethinking going on here.

MR. MCCANTS: So my job is to talk about the violent stuff, unfortunately. We, as Kristin said, we're looking at two different shocks to the system, to the Islamist system. And as I presume all of you know in the audience, Islamists are folks who are very keen to have Islamic law and norms, be it the center of political and cultural life. And so there are a number of conservative political actors in Muslim majority countries that are pushing to do this and the broad rubric we use is Islamists. And there's violent and nonviolent varieties.

And what's interesting for this volume is we asked the various authors to assess what the impact had been of the violent guys on the nonviolent guys, and particularly ISIS. What had the rise of ISIS done to these movements? Had it impacted their thinking? Had it impacted the political context in which they operated? In some cases, yes; some cases, no. Probably the most obvious impact was the ways that the political opponents of Islamists, nonviolent Islamists, tried to paint all of them with the same brush, particularly the black brush of ISIS and to say that, you know, they are of a type. All of these Islamists share the same basic premises they would argue. And ISIS is just kind of the violent tip of this larger iceberg.

And so they would use this as an argument then to discredit these more mainstream Islamists that had a much more popular following. We saw this after the coup in Egypt where Sisi sought to present his political opponents, particularly members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood; as ISIS. We saw this as the secular opponents of Ennahda in Tunisia. Some of them were trying to paint Ennahda, which is another Islamist movement with this same kind of brush, particularly after Jihadists in that country assassinated some prominent politicians, secular politicians. And so that was one of the obvious impacts was the political opponents of Islamists trying to use the rise of ISIS to discredit these other movements they were in competition with to take power in these countries that were experiencing a revolution.

Something else that came out of a lot of dialogue, particularly with the younger members

of these different Muslim Brotherhood organizations was, I'll put it the right way, kind of a grudging admiration for what ISIS had been able to do. We didn't hear anybody express respect for the religious teachings of ISIS. Certainly not for their methods, the brutality. But we did encounter a number of folks who were impressed with what they had achieved in Syria and Iraq, and in a way, feeling as if perhaps they had been too quick themselves to give up violence. If you're dealing with a situation where the regime is cracking down violently, does it make sense, they would argue, to just surrender your weapons or not to have any at all? And so while there was a sincere distancing from the ideas of ISIS and their methods, the more brutal methods, there was kind of for some younger members a grudging admiration for what they had done and they would sometimes point to ISIS as, you know, an example of what might have to happen if there is no other alternative. And I think one of the more interesting contributions and the volume that maybe Shadi can circle back to is from Stephen Brook talking about the Egyptian Brotherhood and how the regime, the Sisi regime systematically winnowed away and did away with nonviolent modes of activism until they were left with much more violent modes of pressing their political agenda.

We also looked at a number of the civil wars, particularly Libya, Syria, and Yemen, to see how the Muslim Brotherhood groups had reacted to those wars. How had they actually dealt with context of violence? So these are not countries where like Egypt or Tunisia there was a less violent transition, more stable. These are countries in outright civil wars. So how did the Muslim Brotherhood conduct itself under those circumstances? And there were, of course, plenty of differences, but that will be mind-numbing to go through, so just a few of the similarities.

One thing to notice is that in Syria, Libya, they didn't really have much of a presence on the ground because the prior regimes in those countries had been so successful in hollowing them out and exiling their leaders, putting them in jail, so they didn't really have much of a presence on the ground and they really had to try and rebuild it after these wars break out. They tried, both of them in Syria and Libya, they tried to get involved on the violent side of the game because they realized quickly that you weren't really going to have a seat at the table unless you have some sort of militia, but they weren't really good at doing that. The Brotherhood in Syria tried to set up its own units and just were either not good at managing them or the other violent actors were just much more effective at setting up these kind

of paramilitary, so they didn't make it. In Libya, the same kind of story, although they had a little bit more success because they partnered with other militias rather than trying to set up their own. And then in Yemen, I don't think they ever really made a go of it at all.

The Brotherhood, with exceptions, like say Hamas, in general, what the Brotherhood is good at is parliamentary politics. The normal rules of the political game you're more familiar with and there are other countries, some of which Kristin studies, where they've been very successful at parliamentary politics. And even in these violent contexts, these are places where the Brotherhood skills really shine. The Libyan Brotherhood doesn't do well in the parliamentary elections, but because they're more cohesive as a group, they do better in parliamentary politics for their few members that are in there. The Syrian Brotherhood, there's no parliament on the ground really for them to participate in but they're very good at the politics of exile. They're one of the more prominent groups among the Syrian exiles that are jockeying for attention abroad, particularly in Turkey. And then the party, the political party in Yemen that is associated, part of it is associated with the Brotherhood, the Isla Party, has also been historically very good at parliamentary maneuvers. It has been both a strength for the Brotherhood faction of that party, because they have allied with a lot of different competitors, but it has also been a weakness because they have been subject to the agendas of those other competitors as well.

The problem for the Brotherhood though in these contexts, of course, is that you don't really have functioning parliaments. So when the game is violence, they don't do very well. But when the game is the normal game of parliamentary politics, they can shine.

I'll leave it there.

MS. DIWAN: Let me ask the two of you one more question and then I'll bring Graeme into this, because I wanted to really highlight and bring out some of the richness of the book which really is in these in depth case studies, which allowed you or the writers to look at both political context and then to think about how that political context is affecting both ideology and the organization, like how they are adapting to this political context. And I was really struck by one of your writers, Jacob Olador, who was thinking about this and thinking about the book as a whole, and made the argument that -- a really strong argument that the movements are really just a product of their political circumstances. I mean, you just mentioned, you know, these kind of strong cases where you have the Muslim Brotherhood participating in

areas where there's a civil war. And I think Jacob goes on to kind of argue that the book maybe underestimates how severe kind of the challenge was to these different movements. So I wanted to know what you thought about that. And if you have an example or a thought about a movement that was able to adapt, so in a way to really think what they were doing. And if you believe then that there is still that room for adaptation in these kind of extraordinary political circumstances which as you both mention are both freezing them out in some cases of the political participation but then also pushing them into these arenas of conflict that they're not very good at.

MR. HAMAD: So there are certainly commonalities across quite diverse cases. So when we talk about Muslim Brotherhood or Brotherhood-inspired movements, they all share a similar school of thought. And you can kind of see the similarities across quite diverse cases. But the striking thing is -- so you would have thought that maybe the Egyptian coup would force some of these groups on a transnational level to form stronger bonds with each other because they all sort of share a similar narrative of oppression, of being pushed to the side, of being marginalized, but what we actually still see, even after the coup in Egypt, is the movements are very different from each other so it's hard for them to really coordinate or cooperate in any serious way besides meeting up at conferences in Istanbul and talking to each other and calling each other up on the phone. I mean, there's not a whole lot more you can necessarily do.

And there were some interesting instances that we've had in some of our dialogue meetings where if you have, for lack of a better way to put it, a bunch of Islamists in a room from different countries, they sometimes are quite surprised to hear what members of other movements are doing. And we know more, Will and I, about what members of their sort of brother movements are doing in other countries than they do.

And so to give one example, a Yemini Muslim Brotherhood member will generally not know a whole lot about the Syrian Brotherhood, or a member of the Syrian Brotherhood will know very little about the Brotherhood analog in Indonesia, perhaps almost nothing. They might even be slightly surprised that there is sort of a Brotherhood analog in Indonesia. So at some level, and it might be a bit of a cliché to say it, but local context really does matter. And I almost feel a little bit sheepish having to sort of emphasize that because we should be beyond that of knowing that, hey, context and nuance

matters and all politics is local and so on. But obviously not all politics is local because there still is that transnational bond. It does mean something to be a Muslim Brotherhood-inspired movement, at least at the level of sort of vague philosophy. So when there are parliaments, they all seem very keen to participate in parliament. That does seem to be one commonality, for example.

The other thing that I would say is when we talk about rethinking, I think we also have to keep our expectations -- I don't want to say low but we shouldn't -- we shouldn't expect a profound ideological rethinking. At the end of the day, most of these movements are still Islamists. So if we, as sort of Westerners, come to these groups and say, well, to prove that you're really doing substantive rethinking, you essentially have to, in effect, stop being Islamists. That's obviously not going to happen because these movements are Islamist for a reason. If they stop being Islamist and became something else then it might defeat the purpose. Right? So I think that's sometimes the kind of rhetoric that you'll sometimes hear from people in the West, Americans, Europeans saying, essentially, if Islamists want a seat at the table in their countries, then they have to basically accept everything that we as Westerns believe, and part of that would be presumably constitutional liberalism, gender equality, Western style protection of minority rights, at least as we understand it here in this country. But that's obviously not going to happen because these movements are Islamist. So I think that's an important thing. So none of our cases, with maybe the partial exception of Tunisia, and we can talk about that more, but we don't see a profound ideological reshaping. The kind of rethinking that we see is important but not at the level of an entire overhaul of the philosophy.

And one thing that I do think counts as important that does deserve attention but it might seem a little bit in the weeds is this question of if there is a political opening in say Egypt in 10 or 15 years, will the Brotherhood learn from its mistakes and will it -- so what will the relationship be between any new party it forms and the original Muslim Brotherhood Movement? They could just have one party, the Freedom and Justice Party like they had in 2011-2012, but one thing that you are hearing is, hey, and you've got very vocal people in the movement saying that if there is a political opening, there shouldn't be one Islamist party tied to the Brotherhood; there could be three, four, or five, and every Muslim Brotherhood member would have the freedom to join which ever Islamist party they wanted to join.

Now, is that actually doable in practice? We'll have to wait and see. And one of the

challenges is if you have different Islamist parties and you have let's say a single district, you could have different Muslim Brotherhood members competing for the same seat in parliament, for example, and that would undermine internal cohesion. So in practice it sounds nice but how would that actually look? But the fact of the matter is that those things are being discussed openly.

MR. MCCANTS: Yeah. So in many senses it's the governments that set the rules of the political game. But, you know, we also found that the Islamists, you know, they don't have to participate in the game. It is an option. Like in Morocco, the Brotherhood-inspired party, the PJD, chose to participate in the game and got some limited returns. They did well in the elections. They were able to form a government. But it's the king that's really in charge.

The other major Islamist group opted out and decided not to participate and was very much in protest against the government. So it's not so deterministic in the sense that the governments set these rules and then you must abide by then. You can opt out. And even within the rules, I mean, the Tunisian experience is the fascinating one because as Shadi knows better than I do, you have these interesting tensions within the organization itself and you have a capable leader at the top who has been willing to make some tough decisions for the sake of preserving Tunisia's political transition that may cut against the interests, the immediate interests of his own movement. But the movement itself is very fractious. You have some parts of the movement that want to be a lot more religious and you have other parts of the movement that want to move away or at least greatly soften the religious aspect and be much more of a political party. And what bubbles up from all of that argument is the final outcome. But if you just focus on the outcome, you miss this turmoil, this inner turmoil that produces it. And it's not a set thing. You know, Ennahda could have made different decisions at various points. It wasn't a given that they would turn over power but they made those decisions and it will have lasting consequences for the organization as the transition, you know, returns to normal politics. And they're going to have to live with what they did.

MS. DIWAN: I'm going to bring Graeme into the conversation now. You've spent a lot of time reflecting on and writing about the Islamic State. I wanted to get your impressions of the book, and especially your sense of the interrelationship then between these politics Islamic movements and the Islamic State and the jihadi movements that you've spent more time studying.

MR. WOOD: All right. First, let me congratulate the coeditors here on a really useful book. I mean, this is a book that you can read and among other things, it will give you an overview of these issues in many different places. Many different places that are very different from each other. And that really does bring what the new ideas are to the fore. So congratulations on that.

Now, to your question, I'll try to give perhaps my impressions but also I'll try to filter through my impressions, what I think the impressions might be of someone who might be sympathetic to the Islamic State. And this will build on the comments that Shadi and Will just gave.

The impression is one of fractiousness, is of complexity. It is an impression of many different things going on with what is nominally the same end, which is a greater reflection of Islam and the politics of various places. So what I think you'd find is a frustration with this, a sense that the fact that these political movements are so different from place to place and yet there is only one Islam would, I think for many people, result in exactly the kind of frustration that would lead them to think that maybe there is something that transcends all of these movements. Maybe there's something that unifies them all, brings them to a kind of baseline or a common denominator.

So I wonder if that might be one of the aspects of this that we should be thinking about. There will, of course, be some population of people who have, shall we say, a low threshold for frustration, and who might find, might observe that if the politics of the Brotherhood in Tunisia is different from the politics of the Brotherhood in Egypt or even further afield, then this might be evidence that there has to be a reworking from the ground up, a real rethinking of political Islam. So that, I think, speaks perhaps to what Will was referring to as the inspirational quality of the Islamic State to people who themselves were not drawn to its theology, to its legal interpretation, but who at least saw it as doing something that cut through the complexity of what is, for lack of a simpler term, politics. That is, they see the Islamic State as having accomplished something that politics will make impossible to achieve in any single lifetime, in any of the cases that are featured in this volume.

So I would be curious of your thoughts of whether the rise of the Islamic State might have something to do with the complexity that we're seeing so well portrayed in the chapters of this book.

MR. HAMAD: Just to piggyback on that, I think there are few successes. So if you are a member of a mainstream Islamist movement, like the Brotherhood in these different countries, it's hard to

point 80 years later and say here is a major success that we can sort of take as our own. I mean, the one case which is interesting and is quite complex on its own is Turkey, and I think that the level of success there is coming under more questions, obviously. But you know, you can point to Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt as places where Islamists were in power but it didn't or hasn't worked out that well. It's a very mixed record. And I think from the -- if you look at Egypt in particular, you have people who are still senior figures in the Brotherhood who were around in the 1960s, were in prison under Nasir in the '60s. They've been around for a very long time and you can imagine how surprised and amazed they were when the Arab Spring happened and they won five consecutive elections and they finally think to themselves after all these decades they're going to have a chance to do what they always wanted to do. But then look what happened. So that's bound -- that's a difficult legacy to take on. If you're a young person who hasn't been sort of inculcated in the ethos of nonviolence and you're angry and you look at the Brotherhood and what they have to offer, is it very compelling? What is the main takeaway from the Brotherhood's experience?

Now, you might look at ISIS and you might say, hey, this is a pretty brutal, disgusting version of Islam but they did the one thing that the Brotherhood was never able to do, which is to actually govern for a significant period of time. And it also raises a question, if you're a gradualist organization, that means that you're essentially indulging in the messiness of politics. And I think it's hard to get what you want, especially when you have strong regimes, strong deep states. It's hard to actually realize your vision, your Islamic vision, whatever that might be in practice. So politics is complicated, and I think part of ISIS's appeal to a tiny minority but still significant enough to change the course of the Middle East is that forget about the messiness of politics. Let's just -- brutality and force is the way to get things done.

MR. MCCANTS: And if I can add one thing, it's that we also encountered the opposite reaction as well. Not quite as common, but we did have instances of people, particularly younger people in the Brotherhood who had watched the rise of ISIS. Maybe it had family members interested in it. And had begun to really think about what kind of Islam were they as Muslim Brothers pushing for in a way that they had not really stopped and thought about before. You know, there's sort of kind of big Islamist issues that they will push for, like banning alcohol, more conservative dress, but ISIS, because of the way it tries to justify its violence, really foregrounds the Islamic arguments for what they're doing, caused some

of these members to really stop and reflect about, okay, what kind of Islam are we really pushing for? If we are to get the levers of power, what do we want to put in place? And that is certainly not it, so what is it? We can't just keep pushing for pushing's sake.

MS. DIWAN: I'm going to push a little bit forward on that same point but trying to think now about the future of these movements, so drawing from the experiences that you drew in this book but now thinking about what's going to happen moving forward. And then while we're still on the theme of the Islamic State, I mean, we now have the situation where they've been defeated in Mosul, soon to be defeated in Raqqa. How then do they still exist as a model, getting around the fact that it's hard to believe that they were in some ways successful -- I mean, seen as a successful model given kind of the brutality and not really a very -- now they're not even a very successful version of what they were trying to accomplish? So what lesson is going to be drawn from that then? I mean, you may say that the politics is messy, that we didn't get anywhere electoral politics, but clearly this use of violence and stuff has also been pushed back and, you know, the creation of an Islamic State has now, you know, is now failing. So what lesson is going to be drawn from that? And will this create the defeat of Islamic State? Maybe premature assuming that, but in some key areas, will that create new space for political Islam or how do you see this playing out?

MR. HAMAD: Well, I think this is why the vast majority of members of mainstream Islamist movements have not joined ISIS. So even if there is a bit of grudging respect from some of the younger, more revolutionary members of these movements, it's ultimately not a viable model. And, you know, I've talked to young Brotherhood members in exile who would sort of do -- they would sort of play with the theory of what low level violence might look like, targeting security personnel, Molotov cocktails, economic sabotage. So not al-Qaeda or ISIS-style violence but a more kind of anarchic violence. And I heard quite a bit of theorizing about it but when push came to shove, very few people actually decided to do something about it. And this goes to Will's initial point that Brotherhood organizations or individuals, even when they try, they're just not good at violence. That's not their comparative advantage. They don't do violence well.

So if you're asking yourself, well, which Islamist organization do I want to join? No one who is really into violence is going to be like, oh, let me join the groups that are more gradualist and

participate in parliament and actually kind of suck at violence even when they try. No one is going to do that. They're going to choose the more explicitly violent movement or groups. So I think that's why we haven't seen a turn towards mass violence on the part of members of these movements. But I think when it comes down to it they're stuck. So ultimately, if ISIS isn't in the long run a viable model, the sort of steady as she goes, slow, play the long game approach doesn't work so well either except in the cases where you could say, like Pakistan or even to some extent Indonesia and Malaysia where Islamists don't focus on elections but they focus on the broader context, and you've actually seen more Islamization and more Sharia implementation, at least in some regions, in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. That, to me, would be the other model. But it's not a model that is very well known in the Arab world. And this goes back to when we would talk to Brotherhood members or Ennahda members or whatever, they were not very -- they didn't understand this idea of let's not focus on elections and instead focus on societal outreach. And even if we get like two seats in parliament, it's not a big deal.

MR. MCCANTS: Yeah, I'm keen to hear Graeme's answer on the ISIS point, but if I could just briefly piggyback on what Shadi just said, it was probably one of the most striking things I came away with when these interactions would occur among Islamists from all over the world. I mean, it was -- if you got the guys from the Arab world talking to the folk from South or Southeast Asia, it was like dogs and cats talking to each other, just mutually incomprehensible because the way the Islamists talked about politics and influence in South or Southeast Asia was really different from the way they talked about it say in the Arab world where there was much more of a focus on we've got to win big at the polls. And the guys to the further east saying it doesn't matter so much. We never win much at the polls but we end up getting a lot more of our agenda pushed forward as a consequence.

MR. WOOD: I would say the question of the viability of an Islamic State model has sort of been answered, it's true, on the battlefield. It doesn't really exist as it wished to say a few months ago. But I'm not sure that the takeaway lesson that Islamist groups more broadly would have from this is that it's simply not viable. It would be something more like it's more viable than we thought it was going to be. That is, it was able to accomplish something that we hadn't seen before with any of the means that we have attempted, and we'll just take that data point and perhaps add it to the mix. And it might be that it can't exist in isolation, that data point. It's not something that fits with the larger skillset, ideology that we

have as parties, as movements, but it's still remembered by individuals, certainly they're not as vocal about it as they once were, but as a kind of beautiful dream that failed but that got way closer than expected and that required the combined efforts of dozens of countries to extinguish.

Now, what will they take away from that? I'm still not quite sure. I think that though it does have a kind of model of power seizure and of governance that was not nearly the going concern that it was before the Islamic State arose. It would have been perhaps best exemplified with maybe the Iranian Revolution, something that I don't think was a model say 10 years ago but this kind of Sunni version of it plus incredible brutality added on top now I think is something that people will remember as something that achieved a result that was greater than anyone thought it was going to be able to be.

MS. DIWAN: When you say "achieved a result," you're just talking about seizing territory?

MR. WOOD: I'm talking about seizing territory, summoning thousands, tens of thousands of people from many different cultures, many different backgrounds, languages, and being an inspiration for many people. So I think that model, the idea that there might be something beyond the national boundaries that divide Muslims. Again, I'm parroting ISIS propaganda here, but this is what they're going to claim is the discovery of the Islamic State is that these movements can happen. We didn't believe they were possible at all before.

MR. HAMAD: The governing part I think is really important because there isn't a great Islamist governing record in general. And I think that people don't always pay attention to this aspect of ISIS's legacy. They were obviously very brutal and savage, but they also were -- there was more intellectual production on how to govern. Obviously, it was a very extreme form of governance, but they took it seriously, which hadn't been the case to the same extent with say al-Qaeda or previous extremist groups, and generally, we don't consider terrorist groups to be particularly concerned with building elaborate bureaucratic structures, but if you actually look at the ISIS governance structure, it was actually somewhat elaborate in certain ways. I mean, and there was a lot of -- you might recall there was a lot of coverage early on when ISIS was capturing territory about them, setting up consumer protection bureaus or being very concerned with very minute details on the local governance level. So I think that is the part of it that I think will stay quite intriguing to many, to some, perhaps not may. Does that -- I'm curious,

Graeme, what you would say about that.

MR. WOOD: Yeah, very much so. I mean, when you were remarking on the complexity, I would say also the simplicity of it. There is a sense among Islamic State followers that, look, the law that will be implemented is God's law and much of the administrative baggage that we see causing other movements to fail, other governments to fail, Islamist or not, Muslim or not, didn't exist there because of that simplicity. So when you see ISIS food inspectors going around and looking at packets of Halal hot dogs to make sure that they're not expired, this is a sense that we've winnowed down what we need to do to successfully govern in a competent and non-corrupt way. Again, the showroom model of this is, I think, one of the bigger legacies ISIS. That we did this once; it could be done again. Now, there might be as I say other ways in which it'll be made impossible. The lesson might be that we tried it once, we got close but we'll never get that close again, but still, the inspiration that it will provide as something that did get that much further will be acutely felt among people who have suffered for a long time as many people in the Middle East have from extreme misgovernment.

MS. DIWAN: Let me ask one last question to push forward this whole question of the future of Islamism, and it's a kind of counterargument to some of the assumptions that you make in the book than that are presented here. And then I'll turn it over to the audience, so get your questions ready.

There is a kind of assumption, and you just stated it right here, Shadi, a minute ago that despite the kind of really difficult and trying circumstances that these movements have been through in the past few years that they will endure. They're going to make a comeback and a reemergence, that there's always going to be this kind of Islamic politics in the region. And also, kind of hear that same thing and the idea that this will still remain a model, even though it looks to some from the outside as a great failure, this will still remain a model. But I want to make the argument or just put it out there as a possibility, maybe that won't be the case at this time. Maybe we're looking at a period where the pushback against these movements is more sustained within a number of states. We should bring in some of the regional context here of what's happening right now in the Gulf States with the embargo that they're putting on Qatar, which is clearly meant to constrain again the movement and the kind of discussion that can go on this space for debate amongst Islamic groups. And we should look at what's happening as well now in Saudi Arabia where we see a real change of mind it appears now at this point,

and the approach of the states and the role of Islam within the governance of the states where we now have a state where they've gone beyond declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization to now really pushing back. We've just seen a wave (inaudible) of some key figures from the Islamic Muslim Brotherhood networks within the kingdom. Of course, a rash of others, too, who aren't even Islamists. But this is really constraining both on kind of a global level and domestically in a key state that has really served as an exemplar for a lot of Islamic movements seeing this kind of pivotal change.

Is it possible, given these constraints and given the failures on both the political side and the military side if you're going to say Islamic State, that more and more population will just turn away from Islamism and lead to other models? Nationalism is becoming a much more stronger force right now.

MR. MCCANTS: Yeah, I'll give it a crack. I think you're right Kristin in the sense when you talk about the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization. I think that is what's under a lot of duress. But if you're not specifically talking about the Brotherhood, you know, I don't know if it plays out that way. I mean, the group you study in Kuwait I don't think is formally connected to the Brotherhood anymore. And, you know, they've been a regular member of Parliament for years and it's, you know, they have an antagonistic relationship with the royals but they're loyal opposition in the same way the Brotherhood in Jordan is. The PJD as well is not a Brotherhood organization it's inspired by and it's a normal political actor. The same for Ennahda in Tunisia. So I'm intrigued by your point but I wonder if it doesn't more specifically apply to affiliated Brotherhood organizations, which certainly in Egypt but elsewhere are under a lot more duress because they have been labeled by a number of powerful countries in the Persian Gulf as terrorist organizations. And the Trump Administration is also entertaining the idea of designating them terror organizations, which will greatly constrain their ability to operate. I don't think Arabs will give up Islamist party politics but they may give up the Brotherhood as a vehicle for that politics.

MR. HAMAD: I'd also say that, you know, Islam is -- and here I'm talking about Brotherhood-inspired organizations -- are in a sense historical determinists. They believe that history moves with them. So if there are temporary setbacks, it can be 50 years from now, 80, at some point in the progression of history they will -- they will win in just a matter of time. And that's why for a long time through the 50's, 60's, 70's, and 80's in say Egypt, they were -- they bided their time and they said when there is a real political opening, then we are the ones who are going to fill that vacuum. And it's just a

matter of time and we're willing to wait and we're willing to be patient. And this word patience in Arabic is something you hear sub from Islamists a lot. And perhaps this is how they justify the fact that things are really bad in Egypt and they're probably not going to have an opening for a very long time, so it makes sense to counsel patience if you have nothing else to counsel. But I do believe that they really think that however long it is from now, that once there is a political opening in say Egypt, to use a case of extreme repression, that they will come back. And that was the case in also Tunisia and Libya. And these are two countries where the main Islamist groups were not just extremely repressed but decimated. They almost disappeared from these countries altogether. The same would go for Syria. But once there's a political opening, each of these three countries, the Brotherhood-type groups come in and become quite prominent, or in the case of Tunisia, they win the first elections. So I think that is why I'm not someone who ever really thinks that there's going to be a true defeat of these groups where they don't have any popular support and they fall by to the dust bin of history. I don't think we have a lot of historical support for Islamists being destroyed in the long run ideologically.

And I'll also say there's also this issue of what does death mean? In cases where a lot of members of these groups have died, let's say with the Rabaa Massacre in Egypt but also in the civil wars, there's a very interesting question that's sort of tied to theodicy, what does God permit evil? And if 1,000 people died in the Rabaa Massacre, then the question is how will you sort of do justice to their death, and how will you sort of in a way be true to their memory? And I think that is something which will be a very big issue in Egypt if there's ever an effort to reconcile or to have some kind of truth and justice commission or something like that, the question is what do you do with the memory of the dead? And how do you -- I don't have an answer to that one but I think that makes some of these cases a little bit more challenging.

MS. DIWAN: Why don't we open it up then for your questions? I need you just to raise your hands and I guess we have people walking around with microphones. Is that right? Okay. So find one of these people. And just please give your name and your affiliation and we'll be happy to hear your questions.

Right here.

MS. STACEY: Hello, I'm Nevzer Stacey. I'm the founder and president of Hasna, Inc.

It's a small NGO in Washington, D.C.

My question is, if we're really interested in bringing forward thinking about Islam's role in politics, why doesn't the book, this wonderful book that I just bought, address issues in Iran?

MR. MCCANTS: Do you want to take a couple or do you want to go one by one?

MS. DIWAN: We can take a couple, I think.

Let's go right to the front.

DANIEL: Hi, my name is Daniel. I'm a public school teacher here in D.C.

Does Islamism look different for organizations that are Shia versus Sunni and does that speak more to their political or cultural objectives?

MS. DIWAN: Great. So perfect consonance between the two questions. So do you want to go ahead and address those?

MR. HAMAD: Yeah, so, I mean, it's a very easy answer. So we had to focus. We couldn't cover everything, so we decided to focus on Sunni Islamist movements. And the way we sort of define the scope of cases is that we say Muslim Brotherhood or Brotherhood-inspired movements are the focus of the book, because otherwise, if you bring Iran into it, it's going to seem very different and also hard to compare. And part of what we wanted to do was to take 12 Brotherhood or Brotherhood-inspired movements across geographical areas and see what the commonalities and differences were. There are Shia Islamists, of course. There is a Shia Islamist government in power, obviously, in Iran, but there are also Shia Islamist parties that participate in democratic politics. And we have a Shia Islamist party in power in Iraq right now and that's a fascinating case but one that we didn't feel well-equipped to really bring into this volume. But it's still obviously important.

MR. MCCANTS: And I would say in answer to your question that another big difference that would make comparison very difficult is just the way, the different ways that Sunnis and Shia do religious authority. As you probably know, the Sunnis tend to be much flatter in terms of religious hierarchy, and the Shia tend to be much more vertical. And as a consequence, a lot of party politics, violent politics of the Shia variety is very much tied to the clerical establishment and thus state authority in Iran whereas you don't find the same kind of analogy in the Sunni world.

MS. DIWAN: Excuse me. I'll take some more questions. This gentleman over here.

SPEAKER: So Professor (inaudible) was giving a lecture and I wanted to know what your opinion was on this concerning the Arab Spring -- so leading up to the Arab Spring and the crisis that happened there which led to the creation of an institutional and ideological vacuum, which then led to the rise of political groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic State, whose political view was to build a functional, autonomous administrative body, let's say, for example, in Iraq and Syria with Islam as an ideology. And so my question was do you think they used -- so of course, Islam was a tool but was it a means for unification? Was it their main goal? Or was a political stability or creating an autonomous institution their main objective?

MR. HAMAD: This is a softball you're lobbing right at Graeme.

MR. WOOD: You're asking about the goal of ISIS?

SPEAKER: To what extent were they using religion? In a utilitarian way?

MR. WOOD: I think the suggestion that it's one or the other is one that we have to resist. There are definitely stages along the way where we can see tactical decisions, choices made by ISIS that were clearly utilitarian, and there are other stages where the utilitarian consideration would have suggested something quite different from what they've done, such as declaring war on Planet Earth.

So I think we have to mark our points in time when we're looking at these choices. And I think we can see a clear trend as well where in the beginning there were many tactical choices made, and as time went by, fewer and fewer of them. So again, I suggest that we resist that kind of bifurcation of motivation. And then notice that as time has gone on it's tended toward one rather than the other.

MR. HAMAD: I would also challenge this idea that there is something called religion as a category and something called politics. Obviously, that's our post-enlightenment construction and it makes sense maybe from our perspective. But I think one thing that comes out in the country case studies, and if you read through the 12 countries, I think you'd sort of -- and I asked you, okay, person who read this book, how much of this is about religion versus how much of this is about politics? It's very hard to answer that because the two are really inextricably intertwined. And even in the minds of the very actors themselves, if you ask someone in the Syrian Brotherhood or the Jordanian Brotherhood, why are you doing what you are doing at this very instant? Is it because of one or the other? They won't be able to really answer that.

MS. DIWAN: We'll take some more questions. And I just want to remind you to please give your name and affiliation. We have the gentleman here with the glasses in the middle who has had his hand up. Well, we'll do both of you. Go ahead.

MR. TORIANO: My name is Daniel Toriano. I would like to know, what are the reasons why the U.S. does not fully support the brave struggle of the Kurds?

MS. DIWAN: Okay. Unrelated question. We'll take a question here as well.

MR. SHAM: Thanks. My name is Paul Sham. I'm a professor of the Israel Studies at the University of Maryland, but my question has nothing to do with Israel or Palestine. It's deceptively simple. Do you think the term "Islamism" is inherently pejorative? And I've found a lot of Muslims dislike it but they don't have a better alternative. I think personally that it can be neutral. It means the same as political Islam but I was wondering what your experience in using the term, and is it so vague that it's hard to be an analytical category?

MS. DIWAN: Okay. So we have a definitional question, and then if you want to try to link the Kurds to issues of Islamism, you're welcome to do that.

Do you want to take those or do you want to take some more questions?

MR. MCCANTS: I'll leave the Kurdish one to Shadi because I know he's dying to do it. But the definitional one, I sort of think like you do that it can be a neutral term, that it's academically quite respectable. And what I think Shadi and all of us on this panel have found, when you're say talking to non-Western Muslims, when you're talking to folks in the Arab world and elsewhere, Islamists, they don't object to the term. Not that I've ever found. And we've used it in common discourse. They would describe themselves in that way.

Now, the question about whether it's analytically useful or not, I'd be interested in other thoughts. I mean, in one sense it can be very misleading, right, because we are applying it to a lot of different phenomena that share a very basic idea of moving Islam more to the center of public life. But gosh, that includes everything from Ennahda all the way to ISIS, which is just, there's a galaxy between the two of them. But we have the same problem with other terms we use, like socialism as well, that describe a lot of different movements and really political configurations. But nevertheless, was the only language we had to talk about it. So I think until a better alternative comes along we're stuck with it.

MR. HAMAD: So there's one group that is now really going out of its way to not be called Islamist, and I guess they're worth mentioning in this context. Just because -- so I was in a dialogue meeting where there were Islamists and non-Islamists talking to each other from different countries last week and something really funny happened where a Tunisian secularist got pretty worked up and was starting to really criticize Ennahda member of Parliament who was in the room and essentially, even though he was a secular liberal person, he was like, wait, what's wrong with you guys? There was a vote to raise taxes on alcohol, alcohol consumption and you guys, despite being an Islamist party, voted against raising taxes on alcoholic products. Are you not real Islamists? What is wrong with you guys? Find your core. And then the Islamists responded and said, well, this is -- she felt that the word Islamist is used to put them in a box, that they're expected to do certain things because they fall under the rubric of Islamist. So that to me was sort of an interesting illustration. But it's really -- but to be fair though, I mean, I met with the leader of the Russian Anushi as recently as early 2015 and I was using Islamist in Arabic for the whole interview and never once did he take issue with the word. That said, they are now making an effort to move away from that and now they want to be called Muslim Democrats. We can debate whether this is evidence of a real profound shift or it's more about branding.

MR. WOOD: So I don't know if we have a lot to say on that. None of us are really experts on the Kurdish question so we wouldn't want to pretend that we have something really smart or original to say about it.

MS. DIWAN: Let's go into the very back on the left.

SPEAKER: Thank you. (Inaudible).

I want to ask about the case of Erdogan. You wrote an article for The Atlantic. Now, Erdogan is a winner in political terms but he's no longer a democrat and his former friends, former Prime Minister (inaudible) in some cases they (inaudible) party for departing (inaudible). So there's a gap between (inaudible) they've got power but their founding principles and the democratic principles, they just don't care anymore. Can you give more comments on Erdogan's legacy for the other (inaudible) in the region. How do people -- how do new generations think of this dilemma? Thank you.

MS. DIWAN: Take one more question, maybe here. With the scarf. The red scarf here.

MS. SALOME: Kristina Salome from Kristin's institute, actually, Gulf States.

My question is looking at these various Islamic movements, what would you say their leaders most misunderstand about their movements themselves and the context in which they thrive?

MR. HAMAD: So just to -- so the question referred to a profile of Erdogan that I had written in The Atlantic. So I'm very much -- I want to go out of my way to take religion seriously as a motivator if it's warranted. And spending time with senior AK Party figures and people even in Erdogan's circle, I mean, I think it is very clear that religion -- it's not everything. Religion is never everything as Graeme said earlier. It's always a mix of different factors. But I'm kind of uncomfortable with this constant desire amongst some in the West, perhaps because we ourselves are products of secular environments, that our default is to always minimize. We want to find ways, let's put it that way, we want to find ways to minimize the role of religion if we can. But I mean, so does Erdogan have a very clear vision about what the end Islamic society looks like? No, he's not an intellectual. He's a streetfighter. He likes to play tough and he takes pride in playing very rough. But does he have a very instinctual Islamism? If I could call it perhaps a visceral Islamism, there's no doubt in my mind, and I think that's the part of it that I really -- that in my own work when I write about Turkey that I do my best to convey.

MR. MCCANTS: The second question was about what do the leaders misunderstand about their movements? I mean, I guess just because by virtue of who we talked to, you know, a lot of the leaders seemed to -- I don't know if they misunderstood I but they really -- I don't think they full grasp just how impatient their youth are in these movements. There is a lot of frustration, particularly in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the youth are very tired by the old guard which has been there for decades. But, you know, in other parts of the Arab world as well, and the frustration of the youth comes from the fact that, one, they haven't been in the struggle a long time. They haven't played the long game like these old guys. And two, they're dealing with a very tumultuous politics. Change is possible. They've seen that it's possible. And I think to go back to Graeme's point, it's why some of them are looking over their shoulder at what ISIS has been able to accomplish with some grudging respect because they are frustrated, very frustrated with the slow pace of change and the cautious, cautious approaches of their leadership. And the leadership is cautious because they've had decades of trying to survive under very tough regimes. But it is going to lead, at least in the case of the Egyptian Brotherhood, to some major fracturing in the future.

MS. DIWAN: We have time for one more round of questions. The gentleman with the glasses here in the aisle.

MR. JORDAN: Ju Jordan. I work for the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy.

My question would be what is unique about Islam or the Muslim world that the secularization of political society seems extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future?

MR. MCCANTS: That's yours, Shadi, for sure.

MS. DIWAN: Let's go to the other gentleman with glasses in the aisle. No, sorry.

MR. BURDEN: Hi, my name is John Burden.

I have a question as it relates to what you said about the youth being frustrated. With that, and with the secular -- pardon me, sectarian governments in places like Iraq, Syria, Iranian influence in the region, how do you prevent those guys going to ISIS and the rise of ISIS not happening again, this time worse than before because we had AKY previously, then you have ISIS. So it's like what's the next stage?

MS. DIWAN: Let's let him ask his question just in front, right there.

MR. SHOWALTER: My question -- Brandon Showalter, Christian Post.

I was curious to know from Mr. McCants, you touched on the fact that you spoke with, I believe, Islamists, individuals who expressed a degree of admiration for what they accomplished. Could you maybe elaborate further on that and, you know, in light of the grotesque atrocities that we're watching here in the West with heads being chopped off, explain sort of maybe the psyche of those individuals who are expressing positive thoughts about what they accomplished given the atrocities that we all watched with horror.

MS. DIWAN: We have three questions. I'll let each of you take whichever one you like. Graeme, maybe --

MR. WOOD: Okay. I'll take the question about how do we prevent the next ISIS. And I think one observation I will make is that ISIS's ideas, we've discussed them as if they are discredited as ideas. I think they're not discredited as ideas. They're discredited as a movement that wants to continue to have power. For the people who are attracted by the ideas, they remain a perfectly viable possibility for a future movement. So I think the first thing that we have to note about the rise of ISIS, given that

these ideas preexisted ISIS and yet did not produce an ISIS until it actually arose, is that with ISIS it had a place where these ideas could be instantiated. There was a playground, a kind of Jurassic Park where the version of Islam that they imagined from the earliest history of the religion could come back to life and they could actually watch this happen. So we should not allow a future Jurassic Park to arise and we should acknowledge that the ideas behind it are still out there.

MR. MCCANTS: And on your question about them being happy, if that's what came across from my remarks, I'll be more careful. What I mean is that they were -- there was a grudging respect and they were impressed. And you can see this probably most clearly with the younger Egyptian Brothers, but there's a feeling that, look, there was -- our guy who got elected through following the rules of the game, he was overthrown and then they killed 1,000 of us and we couldn't do anything about it. So there's a lot of fury and the desire to fight back and they look at what ISIS did and they said, that's horrible in terms of their methods but they had guns. If we had guns, they wouldn't be able to do this to us. So we may not use the guns in the same way but we had better get guns. And at the very least, we can defend ourselves, and at most, we can realize this dream that we've been fighting for. So I don't mean to communicate that they applaud the grotesquery but what I do want to say is that there is a disenchantment, a growing disenchantment among the younger members, particularly in these more violent transitions with the slow gradualist pace and the kind of talking out of the two sides of the mouth where we can have some defensive violence but we're still nonviolent. A lot of these younger guys are tired of it and are growing very impatient.

MR. HAMAD: So just for some background, the reason that Will was chuckling at one of the questions, and it's not because it's a bad question. It's a totally -- it's a great question. It's so great in fact that I wrote an entire book on it, but that's my previous book. So maybe that's what you were sort of alluding to. But I don't want to -- so you might have an idea about what I would say to that question, this question of whether there's something unique about Islam's role in public life and is it resistant to secularization. So I can't speak for others but, I mean, not to promote that book but it is called Islamic Exceptionalism. So I do think that there is something exceptional about Islam's role in public life. But we don't really get into that so much in this book. We really tried to focus not on Islam as a religion per se but how Islam manifests itself politically in different cases and being very specific and contextual. But I

think there are lessons that you could learn from reading this book about how does -- what does it mean for Islam to play a role in politics? And I think different people will come up with different interpretations. It's also, I think, really interesting to see how the Islamist contributors, how they describe in their own words what it means for them for Islam to play a prominent role in public life.

And I would also just say just to piggyback on what Will said is on the question of violence, and I'll just recount a very interesting encounter. Will was also in the room, and it was one of the dialogue meetings that fed into this book. And there was a member of the Brotherhood who was quite young and he was angry but in terms of expressing this grudging admiration for ISIS, just to paraphrase what he said, and we did sort of talk about this more in some of other writing, is he pretty much said that after one of the massacres, after the coup in Egypt, he was so angry at the loss of his fellow brothers at the hands of the Egyptian security forces, so for a moment -- and I was surprised that he actually admitted this to us, and there were a bunch of, you know, there were a bunch of Americans in the room, he pretty much said for a moment I wanted to totally let go of myself and be violent. But then he sort of like -- he admitted that he sort of had to resist that urge or that temptation and sort of guard against that but he felt something and that was a powerful urge. But then he came back. What he said in this context was he came back to the teachings and the ethos of the Brotherhood which for decades has really emphasized nonviolence. And this is where I think how long you've been in the movement really matters. If you're someone who just jointed the Brotherhood a year ago, you're not going to be as inculcated in this idea of playing the long game, of being gradualist, of being patient in the face of violence. That said, if you grew up under the Nasser regime and you've been, you know, you're used to this level of repression and patience has always been your approach, then that will come to you as second nature. So I think it's not just about youth and the passions of youth. And again, I would just emphasize that in the case of the Brotherhood, we're talking about the Egyptian Brotherhood, we're talking about a minority that have really resorted to violence. Where more -- where violence is more of an issue on a daily basis is in the cases that Will talked about -- Yemen, Syria, and Libya. So I think that's just worth emphasizing that it's sort of an urge that people don't feel proud of when it comes to this temptation, but in many cases they're able to sort of say, well, hey, well, we're not actually going to do it.

MS. DIWAN: Well, we've run out of time so I want to -- well, I want to give each of the

participants though one moment to give a closing thought if there's something that you wanted to kind of sum up or that didn't get addressed that you wanted to bring up. So let me start with Graeme. If you have anything you wanted to add before we close.

MR. WOOD: Sure. I will echo something Will said. The answer to the question, what did the leaders of these movements not understand? I think what we can observe from just about anywhere we look is that they likely do not understand how little control they, as the leaders of the movements, have over the future of the movement. The rise of ISIS, as well as the fractiousness of the movements in individual countries shows that they're moving faster than anyone, certainly someone who is an elder statesman who has watched a kind of slow incubation period, a kind of frozen in time moment during periods of great repression than anyone can really control. So I think that's the overall expectation that we might be able to get out of what we see from the cases in this book.

MR. MCCANTS: No final words of wisdom, just gratitude, Graeme, for you coming all this way, and Kristin, for you leading the discussion. We're very grateful. And to Shadi for being a great coeditor.

MR. HAMAD: Well, yeah, it was great working with you, too. So, yeah. And thanks to both of you. I don't have any more profound -- a profound thought to offer but thanks. Thanks again for being a part of this.

MS. DIWAN: Okay. Well, I want to thank all of you for coming. And I want to welcome you now to a reception which is going to take place just outside the doors here. Will and Shadi will be willing to discuss with you and to sign books. You can purchase the book. And again, thank you all for coming and all of our panelists for their contributions.

(Applause)

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2020