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PATH TO GREATER SECURITY

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. TALBOTT: Good morning everybody. I'm Strobe Talbott. It is my great honor to welcome you this morning. All of us here at Brookings are very proud to be hosting this event on the community of democracies prior to the ninth ministerial of the community at the State Department on Friday.

We're especially pleased to have my friend, my mentor and my boss, Secretary Albright, here with us this morning. She was instrumental --

(Applause)

-- in launching the community back at the turn of the century. We're also honored to have the new Secretary General Tom Garrett who brings more than two decades of democracy assistance and the values that come with democracy around the world during his extraordinary career.

In addition, we have a chance to thank his predecessor, Ambassador Maria Liza of Sweden and several other key figures in this enterprise as well. I'm thinking particularly about Mort Halperin, a long-time member of the Brookings family; Robert Herman; Doug Rutzen; and NDI's Ken Wollack. I'm particularly happy that we are also graced with the presence of Tunisia's former Prime Minister, Mehdi Jomaa. He is co-chair with Secretary Albright of the Democracy and Secretary Dialogue of the Community of Democracies. Secretary Albright will speak first, then Prime Minister Jomaa will speak, following their remarks, Brookings' Senior Fellow Ted Piccone and project director for the report that you'll be hearing about will moderate a conversation with his co-lead, Cheryl Frank and our two distinguished speakers. So Madam Secretary, once again, welcome to Brookings and the floor is yours.

(Applause)

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you very much, Strobe, and thank you for Brookings, yet again, playing host to an important discussion and thank you all for coming. And it's good to see so many friends up here on the stage and very much in the audience. I also want to thank the Community of Democracies and the leaders who are here with us today. And, Tom, I'm so glad you've been able to take over this really important position. It's terrific and Maria, you have been wonderful to work with, so thank you very, very much. And Ted, you have really been the operations behind all this and all the work that you've done has been terrific and Cheryl, I think everything that you guys have done in producing this

report and all the work that went into it. Because together, you guys guided the project to completion, authoring not only the report that is being released today, but dozens of case studies and briefing papers that I think will greatly enrich policymakers' understanding of these issues. And Mort, without you, this would not have happened. So you were there when we started all this.

I have to say I'm always very proud when people talk about the Community of Democracies and sometimes describe me as the mother of the Community of Democracies, Mort was the father. So -- but one of the things that happened at the beginning of the George W. Bush Administration, we had a meeting at the White House. They called the former people in to explain what was going on in Iraq and President Bush said, "It's really very important for you all to support democracy and Iraq and the Middle East generally," and I thought that was terrific. And then the meeting ended and President Bush said, "I want to take you all into the Oval Office to show you how I redecorated it." And as we were walking in, I said, "Mr. President, I'm so glad that you are so supportive of democracy, but you act as though you invented it, when actually, I did." And he did laugh, so -- but anyway, I am delighted to be a part of this and really very happy to have worked with the former Tunisian Prime Minister, Mehdi Jomaa. We have had a wonderful working relationship, and I have very much enjoyed going to Tunisia to see everything that's been going. Because I think he is a leader and has been a leader during the transition to democracy and his real experience has been totally invaluable.

Over the past year, with support from the U.S. State Department and the National Democratic Institute and others that have participated in this dialogue, we've explored the links between democracy and security. While members of this audience might find those connections to be self-evident, the truth is that many in Washington and elsewhere still don't believe that democracy should be a part of any foreign policy conversation. They see little connection between fostering democratic practices and the hardheaded pursuit of national interests. These attitudes have taken hold in some circles as the sense of euphoria that greeted the end of the Cold War, I'm sad to say has dissipated.

The financial crisis and the growing gaps between rich and poor have fueled anger and deepened doubts about the capacity of democracy to deliver on promises. Recent progress in a few countries and regions have been overshadowed by renewed authoritarianism in Russia; democratic backsliding in places such as Turkey; the rise of illiberal populism in Europe; democratic breakdown and

state failure in authoritarian Venezuela; and the collapse of order in parts of the Middle East and North Africa.

History's direction does not seem as obvious as it did a quarter of century ago when many felt that the expansion of democracy was inevitable. Yet, we know that international stability is still influenced greatly by whether freedom finds a foothold in nations where democratic forces are being repressed.

The research conducted through this dialogue provides ample proof backed by data that democracy is more than just another form of government. It is also a powerful generator of international security and peace. What we found makes clear that while democracy may not provide a guarantee against aggression, it is the best political insurance available. Governments that are publicly accountable rarely start wars, while regimes that run rough shot over their own citizens are often indifferent to the rights of their neighbors.

Moreover, in today's world, destabilizing conflicts erupt more frequently within societies than between them. And here again, democracies have a clear advantage because they embrace pluralism, encourage tolerance, and enable citizens to pursue change in a lawful and peaceful way. It's no coincidence that the hotspots most likely to harbor terrorists and generate waves and refugees are in areas of the world that are non-democratic. Meanwhile, democratic nations are more likely to support timely international action to fight violent crime, trafficking and disease. So over the long-term, democracy does provide stability, but the research offers a warning. Democratic transitions in the short-term often lead to increased disorder and instability. Political liberalization may open new avenues for grievances to be heard, but those still trying to control the levers of power are all too often unwilling or incapable of implementing meaningful change.

Corruption, which is the cancer of any democracy, can exacerbate the situation, locking in economic political and social advantages for a few at the expense of a broad social contract that benefits all. All this means that countries stuck in the messy middle of incomplete transition or illiberal democracy are especially vulnerable to conflict and violence. Advocates for democracy should not be deterred from these findings, but they can't be ignored either. What the findings made clear is that small deed democrats need to understand and respond to the legitimate desire of people everywhere for social

order and economic growth. Now, I've been in many arguments about which comes first, economic or political development. The truth is they go together because people want to vote and eat. We in the international community need to invest in making democracy delivery in transitioning countries, not only because it's consistent with our ideals, but because it is in our interests for democratic transitions everywhere to succeed. And this is where the Community of Democracies has a truly essential role to play for it brings together, democracies new and old to share best practices and help each other meet common challenges.

The principle of democratic solidarity is powerful, and we are reminded of this fact every time the community gets together as it will later this week at the State Department. Around the world, governments ban together for reasons of geography, economy, history and religious faith, but there can be no better grounds for supporting one another than the shared commitment to freedom. And it is for that reason that the Community of Democracies deserves the enduring and high level commitment of our leaders. Not just at periodic meetings, but in our everyday policies and actions. We need to remember that building democracy is never easy, and it is never fully accomplished. And even in the world's oldest democracy, which would be us, we continue to evolve. It is something to be worked towards, step-by-step, country-by-country, day-by-day. It can be noisy, inefficient and at times exasperating, but it has also been tested over and over again. Nevertheless, its resilience should never be taken for granted.

At the first gathering of the Community of Democracies in Warsaw, Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek, emphasized both the value of freedom and its fragility. And I quote, "The emergence of democracy was the most important development of our century." But he also reminded us of another 20th century lesson, which is that the tides of freedom will always be opposed. Today, it is this warning that is on our mind and going forward, it must be on the minds of not only democracy and human rights activists, but the broader national security community here in the United States, because it's no coincidence that the principle threats to the safety and security of American citizens emanate from authoritarian regimes, such as Russia, North Korea and Syria, where the brutality of Bashar al-Assad enabled ISIS to take root.

The United States must consider this reality when we make our foreign policy decisions. It's sometimes necessary to make alliances of convenience with countries that don't share our values.

But even when we make such arrangements, we should never forget our long-term interests and our obligation to stand behind the homegrown champions for democracy and human rights. What our dialogue makes clear is that democracy and human rights must always be a pillar of our national security strategy and a part of our agenda, bilateral and multilateral. The word democracy cannot be left out of our foreign policy. Shedding our support for it would put in jeopardy our long-term economic political and security issues.

Without this commitment, U.S. foreign policy would lose its moral compass, it's most compelling claim for global respect and ultimately, the support and understanding of the American people. We must never forget that freedom is perhaps the clearest expression of purpose ever adopted and it is the Community of Democracies' purpose. Like other profound aspirations, it can never be fully achieved. It's not a possession, it's a pursuit and as today's even makes clear, it is the star by which the United States and our democratic allies must continue to navigate in the years to come. Thank you all very much and I look forward to our discussion today.

(Applause)

MR. JOMAA: Madam le secrétaire, Chair Madam, I would like to start by thank you for this shared collaboration. It was a good opportunity for me to take events from your large experience and it was really useful and great to have you in this meeting this initiative. Madam le secrétaire, Général, Monsieur (inaudible), Général, Monsieur Président, honorable members of the Community of Democracies, Brookings Institute, dear friends and guest, I would like thank you all for your leadership. Leadership is about enabling others to achieve shared purpose. Our purpose is to advance and empower liberal democratic systems that deliver results for citizens and enable agency for the population.

The uncertainty that is challenging this shared purpose is terror and the feeling the amount among the public opinion that democracies are not armored to face the security challenges of the 21st century. Both democracy and security are under daily threats from tyranny. It is as if we can no longer tell the difference between peace time and war time. And here, we are not talking about regular warfare, but asymmetry wars in which groups of individuals are able to wage war by themselves and as a result, our democratic system based on the rule of law inclusive of situations and free speech is being challenged. As we devise plans to counterattack terror, its causes and its consequences, parts of our

population are losing (inaudible).

When a system is being challenged, people become indeed impassioned and rely on authority to bring order back. We at the Community of Democracy have tackled the challenge of understanding better the causes and consequences of these threats. I would like to thank the Community of Democracies' team and all the stakeholders who were key in collecting and analyzing the data the findings of the final report are clear. We need more, not less of liberal democratic principles to tackle today's challenges because liberal democratic systems strengthen countries' resilience and this what the Tunisian experience demonstrates.

Shifting from vertical to horizontal management approach has strengthened both liberty and security in Tunisia, making our institutions more inclusive. Has created inspiring situation in Tunisia in which police, army and the citizens where united in areas where public services was weak and fought terror together. More liberal democratic systems create more urgency. More urgency leads to more inclusion, inclusion leads to resistance. Democratic system cannot start from scratch. A specific level of states; a specific level of institutional capabilities is required. With a state monopoly of violence over violence, but also, with accountability and accountability here is the force of the law and not the law of the force. Creating more mediocratic, efficient and inclusive institution is how we will progress and this what the Community of Democracies next step can be about. Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. PICCONE: (Inaudible) up here. Here we go. We're going to continue the conversation, and then I hope to have an opportunity for some Q&A. Thank you. Thank you very much to our co-chairs for the efforts they put into this project, which involved the whole series of workshops and dialogues around the world including in places like India and Mexico, South Africa and Brazil, and here in Washington at the U.S. Institute of Peace and State Department.

The results of all that work are available in this report that are in the lobby and we have other materials on our website that will really show you the kind of the breadth and the depth of research that we did and we collected that shows very clearly the direct relationship between security and democracy. Whether you look at it from the security point of view or from the point of view of democratic governance and human rights. I mean, then there are some questions about causality and the causality I

would say -- argue -- runs in both directions, but the correlation is very high.

I was looking this week at the regular report that the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights makes to the U.N. Human Rights Council which he runs through a series of Human Rights crises around the world, and you see just how prevalent their connection is between situations of high-end security and situations of democratic failure and human rights violations. And I can give some very -- many examples, and I think you're all familiar with them. They're in the headlines every day. We see the current crisis in Myanmar which typifies the kind of hybrid mixed regime that Secretary Albright referred to and the research shows is us a very fragile, more vulnerable situation for states to be in.

This is one of the key takeaways, or a place like Cambodia where the government, I would say, is sowing the seeds for conflict by its repression of opposition leaders, journalists and NGOs. You have the more outright authoritarian regimes. Certainly, no one can doubt that the nuclear saber rattling in North Korea is just the latest demonstration about how far the Kim regime will go to protect its illegitimate system, which comprehensively denies its citizens the most basic freedoms. If you look at the Middle East, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Bahrain, Iran, these are places where insecurity is very high and they all feature weak illiberal governance sectarianism, heavy-handed, counterproductive security measures repression of fundamental rights, especially for women.

I can go on, but I think you get the point. The most insecure places in the world, whether we're talking about civil war or terrorism or hunger and poverty or violent crime, all feature illiberal or semi-democratic autocratic leadership who choose to undermine rather than strengthen social contract. So I think the diagnosis is very evident and so is the prescription. We need -- if we want more security in the world, we need greater respect for liberal democracy and human rights and yet, as we heard before, this has not become a confirmed and guaranteed element of our national security strategies around the world.

I want to highlight a couple of the key takeaways based on the evidence we gathered. First, we need to be very strategic and focus our limited resources on the symptom -- I'm sorry, less on the symptoms and more on the root causes of the disease. So we need more work on strengthening institutions, addressing rule of law and corruption problems, patronage and factionalism. It's also a long-term effort, political change is difficult. We also need to be strategic about where the international

community can have the most impact with its limited resources, and I think that's where there are semblance of democratic governance and the political will to do three things: strengthen institutions that deliver public services fairly and equitably; reduce factionalism, ethnic divides and patronage; and fairly administer the law. We lay out several recommendations in the report and the big headlines, I would offer to you today. Why didn't (inaudible) put up a participation? Seems so basic. We have that battle in our own country about right to vote and voter registration and protecting the right to vote, especially for women and youth. You need straight -- state capacity that's strong, that's meritocratic that is bureaucratic in the best sense of the word and controls for corruption.

We heard from our consultations, a high priority on reforming the security sector. There does need to be more work to have a civilian led ministries of military and police and intelligence and to make them more accountable to the rule of law. We also heard from our team about criminal justice issues and the importance of aligning criminal justice. We need a strong criminal justice system, but it needs to be aligned with basic principles of human rights. Social services -- it needs to have some level of community and public participation in order to have legitimacy.

One key factor that we worked on with a special brief is the role of women and the role of women in politics and insecurity and mainstreaming the role of women across the board. Finally, we have a section on protecting our electoral processes from cyber-attacks, defending human rights online as much as offline and the need to develop greater international norms for an open and secure internet. Finally, I just want to say on this general subject that it's the importance of civil society in watchdogging and assisting states with these tasks. No society can flourish without the active participation of its citizens and I want, in particular, to recognize the group that's here in this room today who are here for the Community of Democracies Ministerial from the civil society organizations from around the world. We recognize the many sacrifices that you are all making to shine a light on injustice and holding governments accountable to their obligations.

I want to turn to Cheryl Frank who is our co-lead on this project and has focused in particular on strategies to address violent extremism. She is a researcher with the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, and I want you to say a little bit more about the work that you've done in this field. I would point out a recent report by the UN Development Program that looks specifically at violent

extremism in Africa interviewing hundreds of recruits who had been radicalized, and the evidence from those interviews is very strong that issues of grievances against the state around politics; around corruption; and in particular state security actions against family members or friends, it's become the tipping point for them to join extremist groups and I know your work very much confirms that. And if you can share a little bit of your findings for this.

CHERYL FRANK: Thank you very much, Ted. It's -- I have to say it's a great privilege to be here and to be part -- and to have been invited to be a part of this broad one-year project and our job at the Institute for Security Studies is while we're an African institute, there's really been to delve into the dynamics and focusing in on violence extremism for want of a better word and terrorism and looking into the causes and the drivers and looking to where we can find some solutions. And I think that -- I suppose the starting point is really that with straighter balancing streams and terrorism has evolved so quickly over a period -- the period of the last 15 years, we've seen so many changes. And we've been seeing state responses to those dynamics, and what we see now is a cycle of violence that states and some non-state actors intricately woven into together to the point that states cannot point only to non-state actors and say, "This is the problem." We have become -- states have become part of the problem and part of the cycles of violence that we see. And this is democratic states and non-democratic states, like, so what we see and what has been demonstrated and a number of you in reports -- a number of reports that we've seen over the last 15 years, there's a lot of evidence of state abuses and everything from violent actions; the targeting of ethnic and religious minorities; a wide range of abuses from states themselves. So states have become part of the complex of the problem and this is not necessarily only in the theaters of conflict of Iraq and Syria, but across the board and certainly in Africa and the work we do ourselves, democratic states are, themselves, the perpetrators of abuses and so the question is -- and Ted points to it in the report, is yes, we may call ourselves democracies, but how many of those principles and values and practices are embedded in the way we are responding to the problems that we see.

So states have tended to externalize these problems from themselves and so -- and it has been, I think, a failure of international institutions and the many different structures that we have globally dealing with the problem of terrorism or violent extremes in that we have not been able to hold states to account for their actions as part of this dynamic that we see. We're also questioning

significantly, the exceptionalism that we give to violent extremism and terrorism as a problem of violence in the world. Because Ted talked about a wide range of violence that we experience regularly across the world and this exceptionalism given to terrorism and -- is worth examining for the differences that we see. I mean, what are the causes and Ted pointed to some of them. Where are the roots? And many of them are similar to other problems of violence we find across the world. Criminal that we find in communities; in cities; similar themes emerge from those young people; from those communities as the reason driving that violence.

So it is worth really considering and we do that in the papers you will see outside. We also pointed a little -- looked a little into this -- the new focus on the prevention of violent extremism. You'll heard terms like PBE and CVE countering violent extremism. We warn from the evidence we've seen so far about -- in these papers about us seeing this as benign activity. As necessarily activity that is there to support communities and to help communities deal with the causes at the local level. We would rarely see warnings from special repertoires, for example, of some of the harm that can be done purely because the words violent extremism are not very well defined.

So it is easy to criminalize behavior that we all accept in democracies that we are allowed to think certain thoughts; we are allowed to think in certain ways; we are allowed to express our views and we are -- and about a wide range of actions have been criminalized against -- in the context of violent extremism, that we need to watch out for. We also -- PVE and CVE also tend to focus a lot on young people; tend to focus on profiling ethnic and religious groups and a lot of this needs to be watched. It's simply not benign activity and we need to watch it for the abuse of rights as well.

We believe that a third piece of this debate around (audio gap) prevention is really that -- Ted pointed to a lot of the structural issues that a lot of our evidence is showing. Access to economic activity; access to political participation; corruption -- a whole range of those factors are part of the dynamic that we see relating to violent extremism. However, a lot of our investment around prevention is not in dealing with those factors. We're not focusing on dealing with corruption. We're focusing at community level again, and we're focusing on non-state actors and citizens as being the problem. And not having a -- state distribution that are far broader than again, focusing on young people, for example, and demonizing young people as the issues in those context.

So I wanted to focus particularly on this question of religious identity and ethnic identity. You know, we tend to -- we've come to believe that Islamic radicalized youth are the problem, but we tend to be blinded to the bigger structural problems when you focus in on ethnic and religious identity only. So we believe that certainly the research is telling us that we need to be looking again at how these things may be symptoms that are more obvious to us, but the structural realities are the more fundamental things that we need to focus on.

So Ted, I know I have two more minutes or something like that.

MR. PICCONE: Or we can come back in discussion.

MS. FRANK: Okay. So just to make a last point before closing is that we actually argue very strongly in a lot of the reports that the focus on securitized and militarized responses as a first option by states in the context of terrorism, is something that radically needs shifting and we suggest that democracy gives us these exceptional tools called a criminal justice systems in terms of our responses and where we can carve those out. And we believe there's great value in putting suspected terrorists on trial, doing public trials, demonstrating that justice does exist to communities and then providing appropriate punishments for the crimes committed. So the demonstration of justice is something that we're all familiar with, but we're simply just not using enough. And I'll stop there.

MR. PICCONE: Great and we'll come back to some of these points. I want to pivot a little bit. We look broadly at issues of insecurity, including issues of conflict and civil war and we have a lot of experience over the years in addressing situations of conflict and the post-conflict situation where elections become so important as a way to rebuild the social contract and widen political participation. And I want to ask you, Secretary Albright, to put on your NDI Chairman's hat and say a few words about how you all look at the role of elections in that process of state building after conflict.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, thank you and these were great reports. And I think we always think of elections as being the central aspect of creating a democracy. Elections are necessary, but not sufficient. I think that is what one has to look at and I do think that the electoral process and the preparations for the elections are a very important part. NDI does spend a lot of time before we actually - the election itself takes place in terms of training monitors and thinking about how the electoral commission should look and what kind of information people have and spend a lot of time on the ground

before and then obviously, the elections themselves.

I would like to bring in something which really, I think, we haven't considered enough and that is the role of information as far as elections are concerned. And that -- and just generally, because you already talked about technology and cyber and all that, but the bottom line is, I do think we have not spent enough time on the way people get information now. And that -- and I often talk about how does one get from Tahrir Square to governance? Well, Tahrir Square was brought together by social media of a lot of people going to Tahrir Square, having gotten their information from their own source of information and to some extent, an echo chamber and this goes directly to elections. I happen to think the elections in Egypt were called too soon.

MR. PICCONE: Mm-hmm.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Because the people in Tahrir Square, their views have been disaggregated. They had not formed into any kind of group and the Muslim brotherhood was organized and so when the elections were called, they were ready to go and the initial demonstrators on everything were the ones that had not organized themselves. And I think that one of the things we're finding with NDI is an undercutting of political parties. Mainly, because of this disaggregation due to different sources of information. So I think that's important.

The other part and we see this all the time, or more and more, is that one of the first things that NDI did was in the Philippines many years ago and creating the electoral commission was one of the truly essential parts of it and yet, one of the question in the most recent elections in Kenya was the electoral commission properly selected. How did it act, et cetera, so those we have to look at. And then I think we also have to look at what happens -- in Kenya again, it's a very good example, who's now going to run the next election? What is going to be the role of the preparation for it? Who are the monitors, et cetera? So there are many, many questions that arise even though we -- a lot of people think NDI just does elections. That is part of it. We are more and more looking at, not just the role of civil society, but the rule of law, which is something -- Cheryl, I think your point on criminal justice, but just the existence of rule of law system and respect for it. So it's all part of one story.

MR. PICCONE: Right. I wanted to now talk a little bit specifically about the case of Tunisia which has gone through some very important transitions. It continues to grapple with that. As a

former heard of government of that country trying to address both political change and the demands for socio-economic improvement of people's lives, can you say a little bit of now does a new government actually try to deliver better standards of living, but within a broader social contract environment?

MR. JOMAA: I think to focus on what you're saying on the election are associated (inaudible), that's the case of Tunisia. I think we succeeded to organize fair elections and to ensure this full transition, but the fears after what is happening now, the democracy is in the (inaudible), why? Because people are expecting. They have a hope; they have explanation; they have expectation and they are expecting this new system to deliver better than the previous one. And when you see the situation since we are in this transition, since we are learning -- in the learning phase today, we don't have the same performance. We don't have the same efficiency that we got before, so we need more time to setup this efficient system today. So we were focusing on election and we succeeded on that. We were focusing on taxes, I mean, the consideration and we succeeded on that, but now, what we have to do is to deliver proof to people that democracy is bringing better other ways. We have people thinking that what is the meaning of democracy?

That's the second point, which is important, you know, this transition period is how we behave because there's a big difference better the taxes and aims and the constitution and all what we (inaudible) into tax and the behavior of the people. It's democracy. It's more than a change of taxes, democracy is a change of the taxes, a change of the rules, but is how to transform that; how to implement all of that and it's the major, I think, challenge that we have. Besides that, you have the social aspect. It's not only political. It's not only a question of rights, which is very important, this frame, but how to ensure and to consolidate this experience with prosperity, with economic development and today, really, if there is a challenge, it's there. It's social and economic -- it's more than how to organize and how to succeed election. It's more which article we have to put in the constitution.

Once all of that done, we have to focus on how to deliver to the people; how to make them feeling that's it's improving their lives; and one of the most important things is to have institution and strong institution and to show the capabilities of the institution and it takes a longer time. But anyhow, with all these problems and this challenge, when you see how we perform it, even with a couple of fears, if I take the main issue that we got in the last three or four years, it would show us (inaudible) and

security. I think that democracy brought to us a lot. When you see how we face it -- that.

I don't know how if you remember what happens in the south of Tunisia where there was an attack from a group of terrorists that come in from Libya to setup an Islamic capital in the south. We facing them with citizens; with our police; with our armies because all of these people since they are in a democracy and inclusive system, all of them were considering them self as responsible of the country and it's not a regime who is there to protect them. Not --it's our country, it's our system, our freedom and with the citizens, we were able to face that and to defeat this big challenges to defeat this big threat. I mean, so democracy is not easy and mainly, as you said in (inaudible) nation democracy, but -- and people are expecting more. There are many challenges, but already we see the democracy, it's not versus security, democracy; it's not against security. Now, security could be consolidated by the democracy and we need democracy to have the security and all this opinion are doing that. We have to find a compromise between them. Now, we have to strengthen the democracy by the security, and the security by the democracy.

MR. PICCONE: Well, it's so great to have you in this conversation because Tunisia is one of the most fascinating experiences that we can speak of right now. They're unfortunately, many other examples that aren't going so well, so it's hopeful to hear from you how that's unfolding.

One of the other important findings of this research was on the role of women in politics and specifically in national security and in addressing violent extremism. There's very interesting research that shows that the more women are actually in positions of policymaking; in parliaments and in cabinet, the more you get policies that are oriented towards peace and development and away from a more direct use of military force. And I wanted you, in particular, Cheryl, to say a couple of points about how your research has shed a light on the role of women in addressing violent extremism.

MS. FRANK: It's a complicated and fascinating area of research simply because there is a belief -- so sort of a centralization of women as the fixers of the problem and as playing a benign role and/or beneficial roles in society in terms of fixing problems and supporting families and holding things together.

The evidence that we've seen is really fascinating in terms of -- Ted speaks about the -- firstly, women have a range of choices that are available to them. And those choices depend on the

nature of the society they live in and the social norms. And whether they feel that those norms are norms that they want to break out of and we've seen a lot of that in the context of the conflict where women have taken leadership roles and have run military units and taken up fighting roles that are really outside of the roles that they would usually take.

The other side of this is that women tend to be very much focused on -- we have seen some examples of -- for example, in South Africa, families that have left as three generations of family, a unit of family going to fight in Syria and that has included several women and children. Now, in those cases, a lot of the evidence from those cases and some other cases in Kenya, for example, of women traveling across the border into Somalia, back again. Back to their families have all been associated with women's roles in their families and women's definitions of their functions of holding families together, which means that if there is a decision that is beyond their control of them leaving and having to serve in searching roles, they tend to do that and it's limited by the range of opportunities available to them.

And so we really struggle with these interesting dynamics of how (audio gap) people interested in preventing violent extremism are going into communities in Kenya, for example, and some of the most affected communities and saying, "Let's bring women's equality to this space and let's show women that they have economic power and they have a range of political power and so on." And creating a whole new dynamic for those women that are often alienating those women from their communities and alienating them from the choices that they would narrowly make. And so a bunch of outsiders going in and offering women's equality is not necessarily going to be -- bring resolution. It brings further complexity to the situation women find themselves in.

So the matter of gender and taking a gendered view though of violent extremism and terrorism is something that we argue very strongly for in the paper that we have presented here. Both in terms of women's -- trying to figure out why women make choices to become fighters or enablers or supporters. And then in other cases, the ameliorative effect, what they do the support, but in other cases where they are purely victims -- victims of poverty firstly and they're victims of a whole range of social dynamics that are operating on top of that and security dynamics that are operating in addition to that. Such as violent extreme missed organizations recruiting in their regions and then security agencies that are also operating in those regions and are becoming an additional factor on women and pressure on

women to have to deal with.

So not an easy set of dynamics to work through, but certainly, there are women who are rising above these circumstances who are becoming part of trying to understand them better. And I think that, that's where the answers will come from. Women in local communities who help you understand how to move forward.

MR. PICCONE: So very complex at the micro level --

MS. FRANK: Absolutely.

MR. PICCONE: -- but on the macro level, the report also points out that in democracies you have much greater -- much lower physical attacks against women and higher gender equality. So there again, the structural issues point toward a much more positive role for women and for policy to bring equality into force. I want to turn to the group for Q&A, but please --

MR. JOMAA: I would like to just make a remark. I'm always asked what is -- what makes Tunisia different and the situation evolving in a more positive way than other spring -- than other countries. So there is many regions, I think, the level of education; our tradition with constitution and those in society, but I think the main reason is the position of the women in the society in Tunisia. Really, a good job was done after the independence. We were aware that we cannot have a society -- a progression the society with only the health of the society, so the woman and the rights of women were empowered.

In this period of national democracy, each time there was a threat of the model of the society, the women were there to protect and to defend. And we do believe that in Tunisia, for the future, to build a strong democracy and to build a big -- a strong economy, and to protect the society from all this negative phenomena, the corruption, we need the leadership of the woman. So really, if we don't succeed to give the right place to the woman, we don't give us the chance to succeed the society.

MR. PICCONE: Do you want to come in on this?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, let me just say, I obviously talk about this often and when I was Secretary, it was the first time that we really established a part of the State Department that focused on women's issues and not just because I'm a feminist, but because we know when women are politically and economically empowered, societies are more likely to develop peacefully and -- but also,

it's a resource issue and most every country, women are more than half the population and it's crazy not to get women involved in a way that the productive members of society. I think the issue though that is important and when I was -- well, first of all, at the U.N., it was one of the times I didn't have to cook lunch myself, so I asked my assistant to invite the women, permanent representatives and at that stage, there were 183 countries in the U.N. and I get to my apartment and there's six other women there out of that many and it was Philippines, Kazakhstan, Canada, Trinidad, Tobago, Jamaica and Liechtenstein and me. So being an American, I created a caucus and we called ourselves the G-7. And -- but the thing we did which I think the first thing, was to lobby to have women judges on the War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia because most of the crimes had been against women and we did manage to get two women on it. And so, then I think I did the same thing with the foreign ministers. There were only 14 of us at the time, but the bottom line, I think, is if there are more women in cabinet level posts, and they can -- if there's a woman defense minister and a woman foreign minister, their cooperation. But I think, also, using more women at lower levels, getting women elected to a variety of offices in civil society and I do think this is true, not all women love each other, but the bottom line is in Burundi, for instance, we were trying to avoid the kinds of things that had happened in Rwanda to get women to begin to talk to each other. But I think Cheryl, the point you make about women do have a protective instinct about their families and if it's to go out and fight, you will do that. So -- and it's hard to categorize also.

MR. PICCONE: There's another interesting finding related to this which is the role of divorce and absent fathers in radicalization toward extremism, is another common feature we're finding.

Well, we have about 25 minutes for discussion. So I would like to turn to the audience. I see some hands popping up. And we have microphones floating around. So maybe we'll start right here on the end and then work our way back.

SPEAKER: Yes, my name is (inaudible) from Egypt, working for Front Line Defenders. Well, I congratulate you for this -- on this report which is -- will be very helpful to civil society and focusing. I have two questions. First, as Communities of Democracies, what action can be taken to translate the finding of this report onto policy level, because we see today in the Middle East, that the (inaudible) allies to Western government are associated British regimes that their policies produce more radicals? I came from Egypt country where it's clear that Egyptian prisons under President Sisi produced more recruit to

ISIS and to radical group in Egypt, but unfortunately on the policy level, many Western governments do not make this this connection between security and democracy. Is there a document? It exists in European Union document, the State Department, we see this connection in the document, but in the policy level, there is this gap.

The second question on Tunisia, one of the achievements in 2011 is the civil society gain very wide space, which is very important for the (inaudible) of the democratic policies. Today, we hear some news -- worrying news on the -- some restrictions that may be imposed in civil society. The counter tourism legislation and how it also raised some challenges to (inaudible) media and bloggers. We have seen also some bloggers and activists too detained in south of Tunisia during the latest protest. I hear -- I'd like to hear your views on this and what expect for some prospective civil society and the (inaudible) of humanized defenders in Tunisia. Thank you.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you. Let's take one or two more questions and then we'll come back to the group. Here on the -- over there.

SPEAKER: Hello, my name is Seaton and I work with the School for Ethics and Global Leadership just down the street. Thank you so much for your commitment to liberal democracy, your work on this report and, of course, your time today. I really appreciate it.

I'm wondering, obviously, there's an important role for the international community to play in supporting emerging democracies, but I'm wondering about the role that the international community can play with sowing the seeds for democracy or whether that's something that should really come from within the country and if that affects the success of the democracy; if this is an external force rather than it being an internal force. Thank you.

MR. PICCONE: Okay. Thank you and I would like one more in the -- yes, Vincent. Yes, thank you.

SPEAKER: Hi, my name is Vincent. I'm currently a graduate student at the School of Foreign Service in Georgetown and I also had the opportunity to participate in the Communities of Democracies Youth Forum held in Taipei earlier this year. One of the discussions that we had was youth participation in politics. In genuine participation, how do you feel that once youth are brought into the system, into the institution and into governance that they're really able to have a genuine impact that

they're not dismissed by those who have a lot more experience in room and have a lot more say?

MR. PICCONE: Right, thank you. Would you like to start?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Let me start with the last one. I'm a professor at Georgetown School of Foreign Service. You are not one of my students, but let me just say this. I think one of the things that I've been saying and I believe this more and more every day, that we are living in an entirely new era and for us to be -- have no nostalgia about the rules and institutions of the 20th century, we need to think about what needs to be done in the 21st. Some of it to do with technology and globalization and identity, but it also, as far as I'm concerned, means the youth are the ones that have to be involved because I do think that ultimately, there needs to be more -- different new ideas and I think that -- therefore, the youth is very important.

It goes also to the question that you asked. I am very -- I love teaching and I do think that the foreign students that we have that then do go back to their countries are a combination of understanding how this country works and that are able to kind of be inside, outside, outside, inside and that we need to spend more time with some of the foreign students in this country that then can go back to their countries.

I do think also that at least in just looking at what has happened in terms of democracy support in the last 20 years, it's a lot harder than we thought and, therefore, I have come to the feeling and I hope that we can look at this a little bit, is that the hardest part is the kind of fragile democracies that don't have all their institutions in place yet and to what extent can the international system help those countries in terms of what are practices that work; what are the ones that don't? Kind of a guidance system of some kind because I think that you do have to build on what's going on in the country internally, but also that it needs some kind of outside support and there are certain things that are aspects of democracy, but I do think we need -- and I hope we -- as we keep spending time on this and how to implement it, what I have found the most difficult is that it takes longer to put a democracy into place than we think. That there was the euphoria in the post-Cold War. I can believe that Viktor Orbond was our darling and now is somebody that is undermining democracy.

So what is it that happens? What can we do in terms of the report to figure out so that, that doesn't happen and to go back? There does need to be help from the outside to kind of water the

seeds that are planted internally.

MR. JOMAA: Okay, I understand what you say. That's what I explained. You know, it's not because we changed the taxes and we decided to go through a new constitution that took everything that we built. We switched from zero to 100 percent. We are in a transition and you have a mixture of this mindset, this mentality because people were using with some behavior and the new obligations -- what is -- for me, what is granted in Tunisia that now, each time we have this kind of excess, we have the information and we can protest it. We can really do enough to develop this immunity which is now growing, but it's not 100 percent, so the main -- I mean, the main threat is not that because I cannot imagine that today we can touch to the freedom without any protestation. Yeah, there is some people that are using with the old methods and they have the temptation to do that, but we developed enough immunity that we will resist and that we will find and progress.

And that's, I think, the case with all the nations in democracy. It's not granted the first day. We have to build; we have to support; to work hard and we will maybe within one generation to setup something which is more durable and more efficient. The real threat today is coming from the social and economic situation and we have to pay attention to that because if you don't deliver; if you don't give to the normal people in their daily life, the dividend of this democracy, it's a real threat. It's not this attention to freedom or some attention to freedom because we have enough people vigilant to withstand that and to resist to that and to correct that.

MR. PICCONE: I think some of these questions including the one on Egypt and on external versus internal is very relevant to the meeting of the Community of Democracies, which the U.S. government is hosting for the first time and you wouldn't know it because they've decided to bring it down to a pretty low profile. But I would -- one of the key points you make in the report is number one on this point, practice what you preach. If you want to be a leader and an assister or supporter, it starts with actually being a good example at home. And obviously, that is a concern to many small deed democrats in the United States and I think you're seeing some of these effects in Egypt when the United States shifts ground on that front. The other point that I'd like to make. We don't maybe make it so clearly in the report is that we can clearly make the argument for values. This is who we are. We believe in democracy. It's what we live and it shows up in the documents and it says the right things. But at the end of the day

when you pit values against national security interests, the interests are going to win most of the time. And that's why it was so important to make the instrumental argument for why democracy actually, empirically is the better path toward security and safety for all citizens. So there is that piece of the arguments as well. Do you want to come in on any of these points or we go back to Q&A?

MS. FRANK: Just a quick point about the youth issues. You know, we've been so used to for the last hundred years focusing on young people as the problem and, you know, when it comes to criminal violence and so on. The research shows us that young people play -- they are regularly (inaudible) placed many, many roles in their communities. They're parents, they're caregivers, they are employees, they are employers. They do a whole wide range of things in their communities and in the context of violent extremism, a lot of the young people in this U.N. report shows them as -- and a series of research shows that a lot of young people are making decisions based on very rational -- they're making very rational decisions. And particularly around -- in cases where employment is a struggle, access to political (inaudible) struggle, for them the decision is to be -- take part (inaudible) activities so to join a group that espouses violence, sometimes is perfectly rational in their context. So that's what we need to engage with a little bit more strongly in terms of how we understand, how we can support that young person.

Last point to make about this and to bring these issues together is the -- is that if we invest in young people and they are multiple positive outcomes. There is no question that we should be investing in young people in a whole range of ways, particularly in employment and engagement in political participation. However, what's happening now in the context of violent extremism, we're focusing on those youth in those communities where we think they're going to become violent. Whereas, we should be focusing on young people generally. I'm trying to reach these many goals in the context of SDGs and not just focusing on the ones that we expect to become troublesome.

And the last point is that we should also be taking children seriously in the context of all of these debates. You know, there's this overlapping definitions and who's youth and who are children and so on. But we've observed in many contexts that children are being arrested as terrorist aspects with their parents and there's a lot of attention that we -- attention is being drawn away from the possibilities of risks around children as well and we need to take that a little bit more seriously.

MR. PICCONE: Let's come back for a couple more questions. Strobe, did you have a question?

MR. TALBOTT: Yes, Ted, and it picks upon something that you said just a few minutes ago. I'm going to move back so I can see my friend, Madeline. It's -- and I put the question in the context of non-partisanship and I would also think that both Ken and Tom, in their capacities are thinking about this too. And that is, we are going through an unusual phase in American democracy right now and to what degree and in what way is that radiating around the world and how do you put your view about the American democracy as a model for the rest of the world?

MR. PICCONE: Great, and I saw a hand right here, yes. Right there, yes.

SPEAKER: Thank you. My name is Felicia from Kenya. And my question is around the issue of violent extremism. We've had a lot of cases where organizations working on these issues have been attacked. You know, some being deregistered and others having their accounts frozen. From the study what are some of the findings in terms of where such governments are coming from and what do you think are some of the policy solutions that would promote collaboration between state and then state actors, as opposed to the kind of suspicion that we have? We know that you find organizations are being, you know, threatened and lose a (inaudible) being revised to create an environment that is not enabling. And just to thank Secretary for the work that NDA is doing in terms of promoting women participation and threatening political practice in Kenya.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you.

MR. PICCONE: And I think I saw a hand right here, yes.

SPEAKER: Thank you. My name is Seal and I'm from Toca. Just to tell you the truth, when you were talking about terrorism and I'm not worried about that, rather I'm worried about anti-terrorism. In the meantime, we were talking about this violent protests. It's not a threat for me, rather the threat is the Secretary officials. I mean -- so why I would say that, this terrorism is (inaudible) and then some developing nations might pay a (inaudible) for democracy. But in contrast in Toca, where I'm living, the anti-terrorism and then for the (inaudible), looks like anti-terrorism in the state government (inaudible) to fight terrorism is direct threat to democracy. For instance, (inaudible) I have been detained for something like three months. I've been tortured and I faced so many difficulties for doing what? Merely

for just writing on social media and then the laws that have been used to try and accuse me is a terrorism law. And those -- that's why I'm just terrified when I'm talking about -- when you are -- when you or you are talking about the terrorism, but I'm very more terrified and terrorized by anti-terrorism itself. Thank you.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you and I'd like to take one more. Vovani here from Viet Nam. Oh, right here in the front.

SPEAKER: My name is Vovani from Action for (inaudible) in Viet Nam. I would like to ask to Madam Secrétaire, not a question, but an advisory for people who certain fall democracy in the communist country like Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos. In a situation like today, that the western country link more on (inaudible) relationship ideal than democratic (inaudible) ideal. By the say, I would like to say that I appreciate very much your vision, your critique to U.S. policy in South Viet Nam before 75 in your book. Thank you.

MR. PICCONE: Well, why don't we continue with this pattern and start with you.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Let me just say kind of to pull some of this together, I think that on the issue of fighting terrorism -- let me go back to the Egypt story in some way because what was interesting was that there's a question, initial democracy and the Tahrir Square kinds of things as being disorganized and creating chaos and I tried to picture some middle age man living outside of Cairo saying, "I can't come in to open my stall in the soup and so I've had it with all this Tahrir Square. I want order." And so that brings on Sisi and order and then, there is the question of who is disrupting the order? Do you arrest the journalist or various people because they are disrupting the order? And sometimes wanting -- and this is part of the thing I think we need to address is how what happens in fragile democracies and that they don't automatically become functional places and there are issues. Because then it leads -- or Turkey, same thing in terms of all of a sudden wanting order, arresting people that don't in fact fit the model and creating more order and then there's the question of how the United States behaves with that country. So it leads to larger issues.

I think really on how you deal with countries like Viet Nam or former communist countries, it's something that's true not just in Asia, but everywhere in terms of again, in trying to figure out how you respect the people that were able to fight at a very difficult time, honor them and then at the same time,

begin to create another system. But also, then to sort out one of the hard parts in former communist system is lustration to see how people behaved and then questions as to whether they really behaved as well as they thought they had. So there are many more issues. But on foreign policy, it's the same issue always to what -- and this has to do and I'll get to what Strobe asked, the values. Because I always have trouble with this, you know, there's always discussion about, "Is American foreign policy idealistic or realistic?" And I never -- I thought it was a false dichotomy because I never knew whether I was an idealistic realist or a realistic idealist. And you need both and I think that sometimes you make arrangements that may seem to undercut the value system, but you always have to remember the values. I think that is the part that is absolutely essential, which leads me to your question, Strobe.

I think that one of the hard -- I'm a very -- I'm a grateful American. I'm an immigrant and I always was very proud of our system and I understand it's difficult. There's no question. One of the questions that has come up, when NDI has gone abroad, we just were in Ukraine, for instance, and meeting with a number of the faction leaders that are there trying to figure out how they were going to be able to operate within their legislative branch. And I said, "Well, you have to compromise." And that is not a four letter word. And they said, "You mean, like your kind of people in your country?" So we are not a very good example of the kinds of things that we have been talking about. And that does bother me an awful lot.

I am deeply bothered and I have said so by what just happened when President Trump went to Poland. He stood next to the President of -- the Prime Minister of Poland who is not exactly democratic and talked about what one should or shouldn't do about the press and the judicial system. The word democracy was not in the speech. I was appalled that a president of the United States could go abroad and pretend that the word democracy was some kind of a really bad word. So that really bothers me is that we're not standing up for our values.

But the positive part that I'd like to say is that basically, we are showing that even a democracy of more than 220 years is evolving, that there are constantly kind of changes and that the strength of democracy is that it can correct its mistakes and there is a certain amount of resiliency going on in this country with the judicial system; with Congress. The first article of our constitution is about the power of Congress and it's interesting to watch their doing and the press, by the way. So I think that we

can be overly kind of feeling that we know how to do everything, but I do think we need to put out that we are -- that there is a resiliency here that I think is very, very important and I hope that, that's a positive message that even an old democracy has to sort out what to do and -- but I would prefer if our government spoke more strongly about democracy and I'm hoping very much as a result of this Community of Democracies meeting that it's a strong statement. I really do think actually the world democracy means to appear. It can't all be about fighting terrorism and corruption. Democracy is what we're about and when we started the Community of Democracies, it was about trying to get best practices together and some admission that we need help too.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you. Would you like to comment on some of these points; on any of the questions?

MR. JOMAA: On United States, I think the (inaudible) is the best one to make comments.

MR. PICCONE: Fair enough. I mean, do you see it playing out in certain ways in Tunisia or in the region. We have coming from Ethiopia, as well as from Egypt, I mean, are you concerned about -- because Tunisia has been an important partner for the United States on security issues, but also as a recipient of U.S. assistance. Are you concerned in the current environment?

MR. JOMAA: yeah, we are concerned and you know that they tried to cut in the assistance, but fortunately, I think that we succeeded to keep the same level, so we are less concerned than others. And that today, the level of collaboration between the United States and Tunisia and Europe is very good really and one of the path that we took to face all of the threats of terrorism, violence and may be coming from the neighborhood -- I mean, from (inaudible) which is in trouble. One of the parties was this collaboration -- efficient collaboration with the United States and European and the neighbors, as well as Nigeria and (inaudible). So we don't have to comply without its -- I think it's working so --

MR. PICCONE: Yeah, yeah --

MR. JOMAA: -- it's the same situation and then for other countries today, but we are expecting to improve all of that and not to reduce. So we have a good relationship here with many influent people and we try to at least keep that level of collaboration and support.

MR. PICCONE: Yeah. Well, that does show the checks and balances and the role of

Congress helping to keep things balanced. Cheryl, do you want to make any final comments before we wrap up, in particular, on counter-terrorism tactics?

MS. FRANK: Yes, two comments. On the question of Kenya, it is a difficult situation and we know those cycles of activity to sort of quieting down so society engagement over periods of elections and so on. There are mechanisms though that are in some ways opening things up for those organizations working on violent extremism through the National Counter-Terrorism Center and so on. So that those possibilities are there, but I think Kenya is one of those places with the vibrant civil society, strong legal community and it is one of those places that the courts can be used relatively easily -- relatively, I say, to challenge some of the developments there.

I also wanted to note that the point about, you know, it was the first point I made around counter-terrorism activities being now so much -- as much part of the problem as violent extremism itself. Because of the violence associated with it; because of the injustices; because of the abuse. So we have a much more complex set of circumstances to deal with and we try to deal with better in the paper we've written.

And my last comment is about Egypt is that next week, we think that Egypt will be named as one of the co-chairs of the global counter-terrorism for the working group on East Africa. Now, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum espouses many of the values that we've been talking about here, has many good practice documents and so on. So it's one of the way to talk to Egypt in much more concrete terms about meeting some of those objectives and promoting some of those objectives.

MR. PICCONE: Well, I think you can tell from the discussion that we've covered a broad set of topics, but they all relate to one another and that's the point. That we have to think more holistically about how to address insecurity through our democratic tools and our human rights values and we hope that the meetings this week will be valuable. Very grateful to see some society partners around the world here and I want to thank, in particular, Maria Leissner, for her leadership, as well as Mort Halperin along the years the years on these projects. And thank you all for coming. Thank you, our co-chair.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you.

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